External Monitoring Service E.C. Development Cooperation - Latin America -

Compendium Of Lessons Learnt

Brussels, December 2007

This document comprises a collection of lessons learnt identified by monitors in the course of their work in Latin America over the last couple of years and includes both positive and negative experiences. One of the main lessons learnt arising from the ROM exercise is that on the one hand, the same mistakes are frequently made and on the other, successes are not capitalized and built on. There is clearly a need to pay more heed to what works, what doesn´t and why. The information provided on the selected projects is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to draw attention to some of the more commonly occurring weaknesses and strengths of EC financed cooperation projects in the region.

Our sincere thanks to the following monitors for their contributions:

Ausín Francisco Bello Nayra Cabarrús Carolina Canessa Roberto Canossa Massimo Colson François Dierna Rosa Dionizio Vitor Dixon Charles Etesse Grégoire Hernández Lidia Madsen Britta Martín Cesar McHugh Karen Mencarelli Fabrizio Rivas Carlos Santomé Juan Manuel

A special thank you to Cecile Delhez for putting the document together.

The LA monitoring team Brussels – December 2007

______2 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 I. CHOOSE YOUR PARTNER WELL AND IDENTIFY ROLES CLEARLY ...... 5 1 - Development of Guayaquil’s Marginal Urban Areas - ZUMAR ...... 6 2 - Development of the Shawi and Awajún people of the Cahuapanas river basin...... 7 3 - Support for Civil Society and Democratisation in Brazil: the INESC programme to increase social participation in decision-making on key policies...... 8 II. KNOW YOUR INTERVENTION AREA - THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE ...... 9 4 - Fight against poverty based on food security in the municipalities of Antequera and Pazña in the department of Oruro, Bolivia...... 10 5 - Elementary Education, Vocational Training and Primary Health Care Centre...... 11 6 - Quality and equity in intercultural education in Puno ...... 12 III. THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE / INTEGRATED APPROACH – COVER ALL BASES ...... 13 7 - Technical support services for micro and small food processing businesses in Lima and Junín ...... 14 8 - Rural tourism and an alternative approach to traditional coffee making in the Venezuelan Andes ...... 15 9 - URB-AL: “Women transforming their cities; Municipal services to support women” ...... 16 10 - Implementation of a pilot project of first level primary health care in three districts...... 17 IV. CHANGING INGRAINED ATTITUDES REQUIRES A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH - EMPOWERING LOCAL COMMUNITIES...... 18 11 - Incorporation of torture prevention practices into the behaviour and attitudes of public authorities, military and police officials and community leaders ...... 19 12 - Integrated programme for the eradication of urban poverty - ACTUA ...... 20 13 - PROPOLI – The fight against urban poverty in Lima y Callao ...... 21 14 - Rural development programme in the Tierradentro region ...... 22 V. DEFINE YOUR EXIT STRATEGY FROM THE OUTSET ...... 23 15 - Strengthening of civil society – creation of indigenous defence attorneys...... 24 16- National municipal training system...... 25 VI. COORDINATION IS KEY - THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING ALLIANCES ...... 26 17 - United in the fight against HIV-AIDS in Ecuador - UNIVIDA...... 27 18 - Strengthening of women’s human rights for a life free of violence ...... 28 19 - Improvement in the living conditions of ancestral communities in the mangrove swamps in the Province of Esmeraldas ...... 29 VII. A QUESTION OF TRUST...... 30 20 - PRODELSA: Local Development and Food Security Programme ...... 31 21 - Strengthening peasant agriculture and good local governance for sustainable development in Mozonte and Telpaneca ...... 32 VIII. THE CASE FOR CONSOLIDATING / BUILDING ON PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES ...... 33 22 - Economic and social development in the North-central area of Nicaragua ...... 34 23 - Introduction of Fair Trade Labelled Products on the Mexican Market...... 35 24 - Support for land planning aimed at ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources and the implementation of priority projects in the Honduran Moskitia region...... 36 25 - Strengthening local governability for the conservation of forests in the Colombian Amazon and the development of cross-border programmes with Brazil and Venezuela ...... 37 IX. NEW SOLUTIONS FOR OLD PROBLEMS - THE MERITS OF INNOVATION ...... 38 26 - Institutional Support ...... 39 27- Farmers, especially women, become stronger as active economic agents in the supply of food from rural to urban areas in the central region of Colombia – “Farmers’ markets” ...... 40 28 - Support for Reform of the State Apparatus ...... 41 X. THE NEED FOR CONCRETE RESULTS ...... 42 29 - Rio HURTADO — civil agenda against poverty and desertification, empowerment of the people for environmental protection ...... 43

______3 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 XI. SHAKY FOUNDATIONS ...... 44 30 - EU-MERCOSUR customs co-operation ...... 45 XII. GIVE WOMEN A CHANCE ...... 46 31 - An alternative to poverty and the economic migration of indigenous people in Cuchumatanes; support for diversification, conversion to agro industrialisation and marketing of organic coffee made by micro producers...... 47 XIII. MORE (money) IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER (aid) ...... 48 32 - Integrated support to minors in high risk situations (AMAR) ...... 49 33 - Strengthening of local skills for the sustainable and profitable management of forests in the Loreto region. FOCUS ON FORESTS ...... 50 34 - Rural development programme for the Tierradentro region (PT)...... 51 XIV. RULES MUST MATCH REALITY ...... 52 35 - Support to secondary education in Honduras (PRAEMHO) ...... 53 36 - Decentralisation and municipal strengthening...... 54 XV. LEARNING FROM OTHERS INSTEAD OF REINVENTING THE WHEEL...... 55 37 - Municipal strengthening and decentralization ...... 56

______4 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

I. CHOOSE YOUR PARTNER WELL

IDENTIFY ROLES CLEARLY

______5 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 jfk

Project Title: 1 - Development of Guayaquil’s Marginal Urban Areas - ZUMAR Project Number: 2003/003-235 Country: Ecuador EC contrib. € 6,000,000 The programme started when an EC and Andean Community Mission visited the Municipality of Guayaquil to collect information on environmental sanitation projects. The selected municipality was in the vanguard of local development, serving as a model for other municipalities. From the very beginning, the Municipality had emphasised their desire to improve health conditions and social services in the marginal urban district of Bastión Popular in a participatory way, taking into account the diverse ethnic and social context. The “Dirección de Acción Social y Educación” fully assumed responsibility for the project (i.e. complete “ownership”) and throughout project implementation, received constant support from the Mayor and Municipal Directors as well as from Councillors for Social Action Project and the Cooperation Unit. In July 2007, the achievements and installed capacity of ZUMAR Background and were transferred to the Municipality, via the autonomous "ZUMAR" Corporation, created by Objectives the programme for that purpose. General Objective: Contribute to improving health and social conditions as well as the sustained development of local management capacity in Bastión Popular by means of a participatory and comprehensive methodology. Specific objective: Opportunities have been created and the foundations laid for a sustainable and equitable accumulation of skills among the individuals and communities of Bastión Popular in order to boost local development processes centred on construction, equipment, rehabilitation and the provision of basic services, the improvement of urban conditions, increased self-esteem and the strengthening of the social fabric, by means of an active, participation-based methodology involving the community and inter-institutional coordination. ZUMAR is an integrated local development project that built on the strong commitment of the city government combined with an active and well organized population. Two particular aspects of the project’s design can be identified as having converted it into a success story: a strategy based on the principle of participatory management and, the selection of an efficient municipality with a solid social policy as the local partner. The project adopted the role of “facilitator”, supporting local organizations in the management of specific projects within their districts (thus ensuring a local/community vision) and helped them to build up a Local Development Plan (global vision). The methodology included: a comprehensive approach, transparency and accountability (Coordination Committee), complementarity of resources (multiple alliances and agreements), inter-sector and inter-institutional articulation (Polyfunctional Centre), community and institutional strengthening (areas for permanent training) and educational communication as a crosscutting issue (focussed on community education and exploitation of the mass media and publications). Lessons Learnt ZUMAR was chosen as a pilot project and presented as a success story at the 1st Congress

on Sustainable Development, held in Mexico in 2005. The sense of teamwork created between project staff and the Municipality led civil servants to value the usefulness of external cooperation and coordination with NGOs. The creation of a private entity linked to the Municipality (the ZUMAR Corporation), responsible for ensuring the sustainability of project results and services and enjoying administrative autonomy has also proven to be a highly successful strategy. Cultural diversity was skilfully handled through the “Ritmos y Sabores” (Rhythms and Flavours) Intercultural Festivals, institutionalized and taken on by the community as a social responsibility company. Women participated actively in the project, getting involved in the planning, organization, implementation and evaluation processes and now more than 50% of the district organizations are run by women and a female leader manages the Office for district improvement at the Polyfunctional Centre. Concerted planning, documentation and qualitative systematisation contributed to the smooth running of ZUMAR, allowing experiences to be recorded and distortions corrected.

______6 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 2 - Development of the Shawi and Awajún people of the Cahuapanas river basin Project Number: 2005/095-551 Country: Peru EC contrib. € 598,100 Since 1979, Terra Nuova has been working, through support activities and strategic alliances, with organisations representing the native people of the Peruvian Amazon and, since 1994, of the Alto Amazonas province. The local counterpart is CORPI (Regional Coordination of the Indigenous People of Alto Amazonas – San Lorenzo), which has been defending the collective and land rights of indigenous people since 1996. Its main intention is to strengthen the social capital of CORPI and its community bases thereby contributing to the decentralisation process in the country. Project General Objective: To improve the quality of life of the indigenous communities of Shawi Background and (Chayahuita) and Awajún (Aguaruna) people in the district of Cahuapanas, by ensuring the Objectives sustainable use of resources available on their lands and strengthening their organisation,

replicating the successful experiences of other indigenous people in Alto Amazonas and promoting their involvement in government and the development of citizenship as provided for by the national decentralisation framework. Specific objective: To implement a specific and replicable programme for the “sustainable development with identity” of the Shawi and Awajún people by establishing aquaculture ponds, providing access to clean water and strengthening organisation and participation in local government. The design and intervention logic are very relevant to the rural development and cultural identity issues of the Shawi and Awajún people of the Cahuapanas river. The project was devised at their request and with their involvement with a clear intercultural perspective. An important aspect of this work was the strategic decision to appoint an indigenous coordinator (directors of CORPI) who organises all the work with the communities and works with the local project coordinator. The indigenous coordinator acts as a bridge and an interpreter between the project and the communities, given that none of the members of the local technical team speak the native languages, which is one of the weaknesses of the action. One of the key factors in ensuring the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the experience was the choice of CORPI as the local counterpart. CORPI is one of the decentralised organisations of AIDESEP (Inter-Ethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Forest – a widespread and complex national organisation that includes over a thousand communities). In this context, there is enormous potential for replicability when activities are deemed successful and useful, because they can be transmitted to other communities thereby multiplying access to their benefits for other people and groups. It is Lessons Learnt the indigenous leaders who accelerate the process, mobilising the population and this effort is complemented by the Municipalities of Datem and Cahuapanas, which have allowed public funds to be channelled into the project. Female leadership is being strongly promoted, participating in the work of the Mesa de la Mujer Indígena Amazónica (committee of indigenous Amazonian women) and supporting events such as the Encuentro Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas de la Amazonia Peruana (national gathering of indigenous women from the Peruvian Amazon). A significant increase in the involvement of women in the project’s activities has been achieved. These are positive cultural developments that would be more sustainable if a specific gender strategy existed. Like most projects in the Amazon, action is frustrated by continuing accessibility and communication problems, such as the high cost and length of travel and the scarcity of adequate transport, the lack of banks in the area and the extra cost and relative insecurity of couriers for sending documents and money. This means that plans and budgets have to include specific strategies and funding that take account of these situations, which are a daily local reality.

______7 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 3 - Support for Civil Society and Democratisation in Brazil: the INESC Project Title: programme to increase social participation in decision-making on key policies Project Number: 2000/011-625 Country: Brazil EC contrib. € 1,505,184 Implemented by INESC, an NGO created in 1974 for the purpose of strengthening the democratic process in Brazil, this project constitutes the third stage of co-financing by the EC (1992-94; 1996-98; 2001-04) and aims to achieve the institutional strengthening and consolidation of the INESC mission by means of the following strategy: General Objective: To strengthen and consolidate the democratic process in Brazil by increasing social participation in decision-making processes regarding key policies, in particular with regard to the National Congress. The project was divided into 4 main components: 1: Defending and guaranteeing human rights, 2: Defending pluralism (ethnic, Project political, sexual, religious, etc.), 3: Contributing to changing the gender discriminating Background and relationships that are prevalent in Brazil and 4: Ensuring that existing legal guarantees Objectives protect the most vulnerable sections of society.

For this purpose there are 5 strategic lines of intervention: 1. Drawing up proposals aimed at strengthening legislative power in relation to executive power in the country; 2. Drawing up new draft laws aimed at improving living conditions for the population, especially for the most marginal and excluded sections of society, 3. Monitoring and follow up of draft laws and other legislation, 4. Providing information to civil society on developments in the budgeting cycle in order to ensure social participation in the National Congress budgetary control sessions and 5. Interacting with other civil society organisations, networks and forums, in an attempt to increase their participation in Congress. INESC acts as a bridge between national political institutions and civil society. One of its institutional aims is to ensure that Congress becomes a genuine forum representing the diverse interests of the nation. In addition it aims to guarantee that civil society can participate actively in the political life of the country, particularly in legislative processes, so as to play a part in designing public policies and exercise effective social control over the Government’s performance, particularly as regards the budget. Various monitoring missions judged the project as excellent in terms of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness, as well as impact and sustainability. As regards the impact achieved, it is worth highlighting that: i) Because of its innovative and pioneering nature, INESC has become one of the principal agents responsible for spreading a culture of social control and monitoring of the national public budget ii) The intensive parliamentary interaction work carried out by INESC is contributing to the democratisation of parliamentary activity; iii) The work of monitoring and influencing the drafting and approval Lessons Learnt of laws is contributing to expanding the rights of disadvantaged and vulnerable sections of society (indigenous people, women, children and young people); iv) building on the success achieved in Brazil, INESC is pioneering work aimed at building awareness among civil society networks in other countries as regards the relevance of including national parliaments in their political agendas. This intervention provides some interesting lessons: i) Decisive and continued support for innovative initiatives led by recognised institutions with a clear trajectory has allowed a proven and valid model to be created for the involvement of the most vulnerable members of civil society in public policy-making; ii) The provision by the EC of a relatively moderate amount of money has achieved a nation-wide impact thanks to the multiplier effect of adopting an intervention method based on intensive networking; iii) The EC - NGO link is a perfectly valid way of promoting democratisation by strengthening relations between society and the State, by complementing the more traditional support to the provision of services by NGOs with support for political advocacy and social control.

______8 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

II. KNOW YOUR INTERVENTION AREA -

THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE

______9 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 jfk 4 - Fight against poverty based on food security in the municipalities of Project Title: Antequera and Pazña in the department of Oruro, Bolivia Project Number: 2000/047-193 Country: Bolivia - 2002-2005 EC contrib. € 478,696 The department of Oruro where 95% of the rural population live below the poverty line is one of the poorest in Bolivia. The municipalities of Antequera and Pazña, where the project was implemented, are categorised as class 3 in terms of vulnerability and food insecurity. The rural population of both municipalities mainly make their living from farming and increasingly from cattle breeding which, constituting the main form of saving, has expanded considerably beyond the capacity of available grassland. The deterioration of the Project soil and the lack of irrigation and suitable inputs (seeds, fertilisers etc.) are having a Background and negative impact on farming activities (beans, potato, quinoa and vegetables). High levels of Objective chronic malnutrition among children (50% in Antequera, 40 % in Pazña) resulting from their unsuitable diet which has a poor protein content is evidence of high levels of food insecurity. The project strategy aimed to tackle the three aspects of food insecurity: lack of availability and access to food and inappropriate use. The overall objective of the project was to “contribute to improving the nutrition of families in the municipalities of Pazña and Antequera". The project purpose was to "improve protein consumption among families in the Peñas, Challguamayu and Tutuni cantons of the municipalities of Pazña and Antequera". The project was very well designed thanks to the socio-economic study carried out beforehand and to a thorough understanding of the dynamics of local production systems. Thanks to the existence of the base line study combined with the setting up of the Nutritional Food Situation Information System, the project was able to assess its main indicators with a high degree of accuracy. The productive infrastructure goals were achieved 100% and milk production increased by 127%. In addition, 8 veterinary centres were opened. 27 promoters were trained and all the planned training was carried out resulting in an increase in the adequacy of consumption levels from 73% to 82% in the case of calories and 75% to 89% as regards proteins. In terms of institutional development, the project supported the creation of a farmers economic organisation, 10 women’s groups as well as strengthening the management capacity of municipalities, that now dedicate 35% and 69% of their investment earmarked for local development to productive areas. This project constitutes a source of good practices both in terms of design as well as implementation, monitoring and assessment. In particular, it Lessons Learnt demonstrates that local economic development based on farming is feasible on the Altiplano as long as it incorporates a focus on potential markets. The principle lesson learnt is the importance of a sound socio-economic diagnosis that clearly identifies the livelihood strategies of the beneficiaries and the potential for reinforcing them and for resolving bottlenecks rather than simply focusing on the provision of services based on a general characterization of problems. It was possible to establish a clear and concrete Logical Frame with verifiable indicators/goals. The project applied some basic principals such as building on local practice and strategies, introducing innovative ways of dealing with the most easily resolved bottlenecks regarding market potential, counterparts that dealt in a transparent way with beneficiaries, periodic participative assessment processes, etc. It included a monitoring and assessment system established from the base line study: the Nutritional Food Situation Information System was established from the outset which facilitated the monitoring and assessment of the indicators of results and objectives as compared with the base line and all of this was achieved with limited costs. In and of itself, the Nutritional Food Situation Information System should be analysed with a view to assessing its usefulness for other food security projects and programmes.

______10 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 5 - Elementary Education, Vocational Training and Primary Health Care Centre Project Number: 2001/011-782 Country: Guatemala EC contrib. € 1,600,000 The Project is a result of the relationship established between the Kato-Ki Co-operative and the Italian Piccini Foundation. The Co-operative was set up in Chimaltenango in 1972 by farmers seeking funding for their agricultural activities. Impoverished by natural disasters and political violence in the 1980s, many of them emigrated from Guatemala. Faced with this situation, local leaders proposed an educational alternative that would multiply opportunities for poor children and young people of both sexes in Chimaltenango, as well as help to overcome the consequences of the damage suffered. This led to the establishment of the Project, which created an educational centre in the village of Monte Project Cristo and 44 surrounding communities, promoting education and vocational/employment Background and training to generate income, as a means of achieving overall development and an improved Objectives quality of life. General Objective: To offer new financial, social, cultural and development opportunities for the inhabitants of the rural communities involved by offering educational and training opportunities as well as health education. Specific objective: 1. To promote the elementary and vocational education of young people in the selected communities. 2. To raise educational standards in schools in the neighbouring villages by updating teachers’ skills. 3. To strengthen the community structure in terms of collaboration and co-operation, and to develop political, social and cultural awareness. 4. To raise the level of health education among the population concerned. The proposal put forward by the Kato-Ki Co-operative is innovative insofar as it builds on the more formal model for elementary education extending it to include education in values (gender, culture, environment, citizen participation, human rights), as well as providing vocational/employment training to generate income. The strength of the ideological and educational focus, as well as the organisational and executive skills of the local Project team, together with the long-standing relationship of trust between the Co-operative and the Italian NGO, contributed significantly to the success of the project. There have also been a number of unforeseen positive effects not specifically considered in the original design such as the development of values, attitudes and behaviour that promote gender equality and the interaction between cultures that takes place among students in the education centre and at home. Lessons Learnt The insertion of the Project into local organisational structures and its high degree of relevance in terms of the local Maya Kakchiquel culture were key factors contributing to project success in particular as regards the sustainability of the various processes generated by the M. Cristo Centre. Unfortunately, the Project lacks a well-defined and structured monitoring system – including both quantitative and qualitative indicators of processes and impacts – in order to measure and evaluate the effects of actions taken, both periodically and on completion, and allowing for a more accurate measurement and assessment of its impact on people and communities. A systematisation of its successful processes could be extremely useful in allowing the model to be replicated in other establishments and/or regions of the country. This could be done by promoting coordinated work with the Ministry of Education at local and central level, in order to influence national educational policies.

______11 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 6 - Quality and equity in intercultural education in Puno Project Number: 2005/095-874 Country: Peru EC contrib. € 736,270 CARE has been working in Puno for almost twenty years. Since 1996, it has been supporting intercultural bilingual educational activities based on agreements with the regional office of the ministry of education. In the context of this strategic alliance, it has developed a sequence of three projects: Elementary Education for the Development of Aymara Communities (1996-1999), Musuq Yachay (New Learning – Intercultural Bilingual Education, 2000-2002) and EDUBIMA (New Bilingual and Multicultural Education in the Andes, 2003-2006). On the basis of these experiences, it is supporting a mesocurricular Project proposal for decentralised, participatory intercultural bilingual education in the Puno Background and Region. This is consistent with the Education for All Declaration (Jomtien, 1990) and the Objectives Millennium Declaration (2000) and, at national level, with State Policy on education as

contained in the National Agreement, the General Education Law (2005) and the Law on the Bases for Decentralisation (2002). General Objective: The standard of education among the population of Puno has been improved and the educational system enables indigenous communities to participate more fully in Peruvian society. Specific Objective: The quality of Intercultural Bilingual Education in the Puno Region is improved and fulfils the needs of boys and girls more adequately. This project builds on the long-term experience gained by CARE in the region and in the education sector, as well as on the aforementioned pilot projects in intercultural and bilingual education. This has allowed the organisation to achieve recognition by local and regional operators, and to build relevant strategic alliances with them. The NGO has also succeeded in taking advantage of its close relationship with the regional government to extend and institutionalise its work on the implementation of public policies, considerably expanding the scope of its targeted work as a non-governmental organisation. The project strategy has three components: a) Participation and co-operation by State actors and civil society, strengthening regional and local education councils; b) Strengthening local operators, in order to improve the quality of education, the management and leadership skills of officials, teachers and specialists in the education sector, and of the leaders of community organisations, both male and female; c) influencing educational and public policy by disseminating knowledge, engaging in dialogue and providing advice on the new proposals regarding intercultural policies and the curriculum, in order to promote the use and respect of the Quechua and Aymara language and culture. It is important to stress that the project is consistent with the efforts being made by the Lessons Learnt State to improve the quality of education in terms of reading, writing and mathematics, the performance indicators for which are very low among school children in the rural areas of Puno. The method developed by CARE applies the new focus based on constructivism to the teaching of Quechua as a mother tongue and Spanish as a second language. The technical team, which includes specialised male and female teachers from the area, carries out important training work with local teachers. Another important aspect that has had an impact on the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the project is the participatory approach to analysis and planning, in addition to awareness-building and training activities on intercultural bilingual education with mothers and fathers as well as community leaders and authorities. Proposals like these require crosscutting intercultural and gender strategies applied from the planning stage and throughout implementation, so as to increase the chance of overcoming cultural and gender stereotypes that currently create inequality in classrooms and educational communities. Furthermore, projects in the field of health and food security can play a very important role in complementing educational activities and making them more viable, considering that many pupils suffer from poor health and under nourishment, which makes learning very difficult for them.

______12 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMPREHENSIVE / INTEGRATED APPROACH

COVER ALL BASES

______13jfk Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 7 - Technical support services for micro and small food processing businesses Project Title: in Lima and Junín Project Number: 2000/011-424 Country: Peru EC contrib. € 490,011 Micro and small businesses make up 98% of economic units in Peru and employ about 73% of the labour force. Whereas in Lima the food processing sector is the largest micro-business activity, in Huancayo, very much a farming region, it has immense potential for growth. In this context, and drawing on the experience gained by Practical Solutions-ITDG in the use of technologies for the modernisation of micro and small businesses combined with the new approach adopted by the National Industrial Project Employment Training Service of Peru (SENATI) in support of small businesses, this pilot Background and project based on Technical Support Centres (CAT) for micro and small food processing Objectives businesses in Lima and Junín was created. Overall Objective: improve the earning capacity of food processors and their families. Project Purpose: strengthen the capacity of micro and small scale food processing businesses in Lima and Huancayo in order to increase their quality, diversity and productivity so as to guarantee and increase their income, create employment and promote economic development among other low income groups.

In conceptual terms, the intervention adopted an integrated approach that included both financial and non financial business development services linking training activities, technical support and credit. The correct identification of the following contributed to the correct focus of the project: i) the counterpart institution: a solid national institution with key synergies and complementarities with the project’s Management Unit; (technological orientation, organisational and management culture) ii) the typology and correct identification of beneficiaries with productive potential that proved realistic; iii) the choice of sector, with clear economic potential; and iv) objectives adapted to the project timeframe. As regards the implementation strategy, this was also characterised by an integrated approach: while training and technical support produced technological-productive and management capacities in the beneficiary micro and small businesses, the marketing component (either directly via the counterpart entity or indirectly through strategic alliances) was emphasized from the outset. A clear market approach is essential when it comes to projects supporting the productive sector. Similarly, the inclusion of a loan fund requires either a study of potential sources of financial services or the proven experience of the executing/implementing institution in order to ensure the provision of an integrated package of services. Lessons Learnt Even in the case of a project targeted directly at the micro level, that is to say, strengthening the business and productive capacities of micro and small businesses, one key lesson is the importance of intervening: a) at the intermediate level, strengthening business links and networks with public and/or private support institutions; and b) at the macro level, by influencing the formulation of public policies which, in this case, benefit the development of micro and small-sized businesses in Peru. With reference to the scope of the objectives, the project reveals the importance of taking into account a culture of unwillingness to pay for business development services, especially in markets distorted by a surplus of supply. In order to promote processes of cultural change, it was shown how schemes that initially subsidise these services can become self supporting. The project is an example of i) the need to prioritise the consolidation of processes prior to extending coverage; and ii) how including the participation of women as entrepreneurs has a positive effect on project impact. An exit strategy was implemented from the beginning of the project thereby giving rise to learning processes which are now institutionally consolidated. In management terms, the use of monitoring, assessment and systematisation tools such as: i) intermediate and final assessments; ii) the internal monitoring system; and iii) the exit strategy not only had a positive impact on efficiency but also on the achievement of objectives and the sustainability of project results.

______14 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 8 - Rural tourism and an alternative approach to traditional coffee making in the Project Title: Venezuelan Andes Project Number: 2005/111-808 Country: Venezuela EC contrib. € 749,761.82 The project strategy is based on the principle that Community-based rural tourism can Project stimulate the promotion of local development and lead to the improvement of the socio- Background and economic situation and living conditions of the local population. The project aims to Objectives establish a network of tourism services and businesses in this traditional coffee making area and to increase the commercial value of regional products. To that end, the project includes technical assistance, training, marketing support and microfinance. There is a romantic vision according to which all villages are “pretty” and can therefore be converted into tourist destinations, which unfortunately is rarely the case... After some 20 years of work in the Venezuelan Andes -among other regions of the country and of the continent- and drawing lessons from the successful European experience in rural/agro tourism, the Foundation “Programa Andes Tropicales” (www.andestropicales.org) developed a strategy based on the following five steps: 1) Market research and identification of potential clients Mapping, planning and development of “destinos” (destinations). A “destino” is modelled on a holistic interpretation of existing local features such as culture, history, geography, production patterns, language, food etc. Detailed geographic knowledge and mapping are key to this exercise. Tools such as satellite imagery, GPS and computers enabled thematic maps that are useful for tourism and development as a whole to be drawn up. Design of routes and/or products that are consistent with the “destino” principle. *Tourism cannot be improvised; specific attractions must be identified, qualified and geo- referenced. Lessons Learnt Community training on how to manage the supply of quality services. *Here is the opportunity to create and/or develop small family and/or community businesses to provide the services required by tourists while at the same time preserving and promoting the identity and authenticity of the local population. These diverse initiatives need to be coordinated and articulated in order to ensure quality and a sound community base as well as to facilitate the management of investments and incomes. In the case of the Venezuelan Andes, the Association of Tourist Guides and Hoteliers was created with offices in every parish or community offering tourist products and/or routes. 5) Promotion of “destinos” and marketing. *Promotion and Marketing take place once tangible results are achieved from the first four stages. These lessons learned could easily serve as "best practices" in the field of community based development combined with the preservation of biodiversity. From this particular experience we can conclude that the expertise required to ensure technical and strategic clarity is more valuable than the amount of funding provided.

______15 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 9 - URB-AL: “Women transforming their cities; Municipal services to support Project Title: women”

Project Number: 2005/113-116 (R12-B2-05) Country: Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Uruguay, France and Spain, EC contrib. € 747,202.12 This project is intended to build on the work carried out by the “type A” project implemented during the first phase of URB-AL, which was called “Building inclusive cities: promoting Gender Equality in Local Government”, and involves the same local counterparts. The municipal authority of the Metropolitan District of Quito, Ecuador, is the party that signed the grant contract with the EC and is responsible for general coordination of the project. The first phase of the project allowed gender equality requirements to be identified and the actions that promote gender equality to be determined and recorded. It also Project contributed to ensuring the informed and participative involvement of the municipal Background and authority. On this basis, the parties involved established the need to continue working on Objectives the consolidation of processes implemented by the municipalities and to ensure their sustainability by promoting the involvement of citizens and institutionalisation. The intervention strategy for this second phase comprises three components: the “institutional” component which targets the strengthening of structures, operations and staff dealing with gender issues, the “services” component, which strives to strengthen key municipal services aimed at women; and the “participation” component, which is aimed at strengthening the channels through which women can influence public policy decisions. The main crosscutting and supra-local activities are: training, exchange and dissemination of information. This project is considered to be highly relevant because it deals with the development of gender equality in cities in terms of strengthening female citizenship and institutional capabilities at the municipal level as dynamic factors for sustainable development. The all- encompassing approach described in the previous section is extremely suited to the realities in which the project intends to intervene, considering that it includes six different countries (two European cities and four Latin American ones). The management structure and implementation of the project are also worth noting. There is high profile political and strategic coordination, a high quality and professional intermediate technical level and a level consisting of women as members of civil society. This has created a structure that allows for continuous dialogue, in which all managers are Lessons Learnt aware of the project and all levels contribute to its efficient implementation. One of the winning strategies of the project is the significant amount of work done to influence the institutionalisation of gender policies by municipal authorities based on incorporating people with political decision-making powers into the programme’s policy team. Also worthy of note is the training provided to middle-ranking technical personnel in the municipal authorities which contributes to the sustainability of the actions implemented by the project. Finally, full advantage has been taken of the networks created between the cities involved in the programme, as a result of which there is real feedback regarding the experience gained and the strategies implemented by each city.

______16 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

10 - Implementation of a pilot project of first level primary health care in three Project Title: districts. Project Number: 2004/062-816 Country: Guatemala EC contrib. € 1,500,000 The project came about in response to a number of identified needs: (i) on the one hand the clear shortcomings of the Integral Health System in terms of poor community participation, inefficiency and the lack of a systematic and measurable evaluation of health services and their impact; (ii) on the other hand, the need to develop a model for the various forms of co-operation in the health sector, both nationally and internationally. In order to overcome these problems, the Instancia Nacional de Salud [national health authority] drew up a proposal for an alternative model that includes primary health care Project and that is being implemented by this pilot project, with the support of Medicus Mundi and Background and CORDAID. Its ultimate objective is for the model to be taken up by the Ministry of Public Objectives Health in Guatemala. General Objective: To persuade the Ministry of Health to approve the “Primary level inclusive health care” proposal, once its objectives have been met, in districts 9 and 10 of Nahualá and Santa Catarina Ixtahuacán, Sololá, and in the district of San Juan de Oztuncalco, Quetzaltenango. Specific objective: An improvement, within 45 months, in the health of the population of the aforementioned districts, as a result of the Proposal being implemented in accordance with the managerial, programming and operational plans, attributes and perspectives which are considered as optimum for the Guatemalan health system. This is a very relevant project, which is gradually meeting the health needs of the rural indigenous, poor and extremely poor population in the targeted municipalities. Its uniqueness is the cultural relevance of its design, the integrated health care model proposed and the processes generated in order to apply it. The coherence and solidity of the intervention strategy is due to the fact that the alternative and inclusive health model proposed has scientific support resulting from research carried out within the framework of the Instancia Nacional de Salud. It also has socio-political support as it is a vehicle that can be used by civil society, through the aforementioned Instancia Nacional de Salud, to promote equality in national health policies. These measures constitute an innovative pilot project involving structural changes that seek to achieve greater equality, quality and efficiency in the Guatemalan healthcare system, which is exclusive and unequal, through a number of essential components: comprehensive Lessons Learnt care, team management, in-service training and permanent evaluation of human resources, an information system and epidemiological monitoring, community participation and interaction with social partners. Its inclusive character is worth highlighting as it seeks to achieve all the objectives relating to personal and community health care rights, in addition to gender equality and intercultural objectives. An experiment such as this, which seeks to influence national policy, needs a number of years to become institutionalised in the Ministry of Health at local and national level and to be fully adopted by local authorities and other local players, thus ensuring the sustainability of the model in the medium and long term. Even though the project strategy permanently promotes fairness in applying the proposed care model, in order to ensure the proper development of local institutional skills and empowerment of the interested parties, it will be necessary to gradually transfer responsibility for participative health planning to local authorities and organisations that for the time being are merely executors.

______17 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

IV. CHANGING INGRAINED ATTITUDES REQUIRES A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH

EMPOWERING LOCAL COMMUNITIES

______18jfk Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 11 - Incorporation of torture prevention practices into the behaviour and Project Title: attitudes of public authorities, military and police officials and community leaders Project Number: 2002/034-529 Country: Peru

EC contrib. € 819,734 (EC contribution 100 %) The project is financed by the budget line for torture prevention and rehabilitation of torture victims within the context of the “European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights” (EIDHR). The project started implementation before the conclusions and recommendations of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (CTR), which had investigated crimes of political violence between 1980 and 2000 in Peru, were published. The Commission recommended a series of structural reforms with the aim of contributing Project to the search for truth, justice and compensation for the victims of political violence during Background this period. The project gains special importance in the follow-up process related to the and Objective implementation of the CTR’s recommendations. Even after the official end of the internal armed conflict and the dismantling of the illegal armed group “Shining Path” (Sendero

Luminoso), torture continues to be one of the major causes of human rights violations in Peru today, not only with regard to the abuse of the civilian population by state security forces, but also within the security forces (Army and Police). The project’s objective was to contribute to the elimination of torture by raising awareness in the population and the public authorities and competent security bodies. Activities focused on four pilot areas particularly affected by torture: Huanuco, Ayacucho, Lambayeque and Loreto. The project is highly pertinent in Peru, but its intervention logic could be equally relevant in other national contexts given that torture by state security forces continues to be a human rights problem in several Latin American countries (although to very differing degrees). Countries with a history of counter-insurgency movements and a high number of torture victims – mainly civilian -, such as the armed conflicts in Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua) and Colombia could also benefit from this project’s experience in various aspects: the intervention logic is built on the transfer of skills and knowledge to the local level, as the Peruvian partner, NGO IPEDEHP (Instituto Peruano de Educación en Derecho Humanos y la Paz) works in coordination with five smaller local NGOs. All of them have established a fluid working relationship with the local security forces and through the efficient administration of the project’s funds they have managed to attend more requests for training in torture prevention than originally foreseen. The response of the participating local security forces was positive with regard to training materials and teaching methodology, which included a dialogue between the security forces and local communities about their experiences during the worst period of political violence. This dialogue has Lessons Learnt created mutual trust in some intervention zones and has been an important first step on the way to reconciliation, as the population perceives that some local commanders are committed to torture prevention and that a slow but steady generational change is taking place in the security forces. The training methodology includes components related to gender based violence and violence in the family, which constitute problems many police or military offcials can relate to, out of their personal experience and because they encounter these problems frequently in the course of their work. Another experience worth highlighting is the efficient follow-up of training activities and the continuous impact assessment at the local level, which the project uses in order to adjust strategies in its working relationship with the security forces. The prospects for the political sustainability of the project are positive regarding the offcial agreement between IPEDEHP and the Peruvian Ministry of the Interior on training for the police. With regard to the Army, cooperation with the project and the “good practices” of local army officials will in all likelihood gain the approval of the Army’s High Command and result in changes in the curricular of the security forces.

______19 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 12 - Integrated programme for the eradication of urban poverty - ACTUA Project Number: 1995/000-989 Country: Chile – 1999-2003 EC contrib. € 9,660,000 Chile has achieved significant economic development over the last ten years. Its macroeconomic figures in terms of growth and inflation, and its integration into the world economy, have placed the country in a position of privileged stability compared with other countries in the region. However, the fruits of this economic boom have not been equally distributed throughout all strata of Chilean society; Chile still has significant pockets of poverty and hardship. The impact of poverty is particularly significant in urban areas in certain suburbs of large cities. Deeply rooted inequalities and economic, social and cultural problems were common to all the communes selected by the project; a precarious quality of life characterized by Project significant marginalisation, domestic and social violence, poor availability of basic social Background and services (health, education, housing, benefits), redundancy, crime, alcoholism, drug use Objectives and trafficking, insufficient and unreliable urban and community facilities and infrastructure,

and an increasingly deteriorated environment. Overall Objective To contribute to the eradication of chronic poverty or "engrained urban poverty" in the target sectors of three communes selected in the Metropolitan Region and three in the Bío- Bío region. Project Purpose To establish a model for municipal intervention that uses the Urban Poverty Programme's (PPU) methodological approach with a view to improving the living conditions of families living in extreme poverty in the target sectors. The programme set out to generate an integrated development plan to promote the integration of families living in poverty into social protection networks and at the same time improve their economic situation and access to the labour market. The integrated approach to the fight against poverty from the perspective of the family was an innovative approach implemented by the programme that produced excellent results and that has sewn the seeds for government initiatives such as the Puente Programme or Chile Solidario which are still running today. All concerned municipalities played a very active part in the implementation of the project and, through their technicians became the real executors of the project. In all cases, a model of intervention was established for the management, planning and performance of actions as part of the policies to reduce poverty and Lessons Learnt marginalisation with a new more integrated approach. In view of the programme’s performance, it is safe to say that any innovation in sector policies requires actions targeted at public management structures on the local level, that clearly take account of the time and resources needed for such a process. Programmes linked to the eradication of poverty cannot be exclusively resolved centrally; they must be formulated at local level, maximising integrated action in the areas concerned to ensure interventions are more relevant and that they target and organize action in a way that ensures improved distribution and use of resources. Progress must be made with the decentralization of social policies and the bolstering of municipalities as agents for development, encouraging the participation of citizens in matters and decisions that concern their development in order to produce successful social policies.

______20 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 13 - PROPOLI – The fight against urban poverty in Lima y Callao Project Number: 1995/000-995 Country: Peru EC contrib. € 12,000,000 The Project began on 15th January 2003 and was designed to contribute to solving the following problems, which were deemed to be a priority for the poorest settlements on the outskirts of Lima: (i) lack of resources and skills in local government for planning development and undertaking programmes to combat poverty, (ii) poor education and work training among the poor, (iii) under-employment, casual labour and poor quality of work, (iv) short life of micro-companies and low profitability of the activities they undertake, (v) poor access to basic services for the poorest, especially drinking water, housing and sanitation. The group which is directly benefiting from the project amounts to 16,000 people and 150 organisations, in addition to the 10 municipalities corresponding to the following districts of Metropolitan Lima: Villa María del Triunfo, San Juan de Mira flores, Project Villa el Salvador, Pachacámac, Lurín, Comas, Ventanilla, Puente Piedra, Ate and San Juan Background and de Lurigancho. Objectives The general objective is to contribute to reducing poverty levels in the marginal urban

areas of Metropolitan Lima. The specific objective is to succeed by involving the poor in the areas of intervention in the development process within their districts. The results are: R (1) Improved management capability of the municipalities in the context of decentralisation, R (2) Newly strengthened municipalities, social organisations and economic organisations take on a leading role in the fight against poverty through the development of their districts, R (3) Improved income and jobs in micro-companies served by the Project, R (4) Young people in extreme poverty gain access to the labour market through technical training, R (5) Vulnerable sectors of the population are integrated with a view to reducing inequality, R (6) Greater access of the population to basic sanitation services with a beneficial impact on the environment. This project, which has gained excellent reviews from the monitoring missions so far carried out, has highlighted various aspects and taught a series of lessons for future interventions: - PROPOLI is defined as a facilitating project, which focuses on working with district municipalities and civil society organisations and attaching a lot of importance to supporting the processes already established. - The activities aimed at strengthening institutions and implementing processes that promote collective initiatives and strengthen social organisation (support for municipal authorities, job information and placement centres, bonuses, scholarships, integration centres) have a multiplying effect which ensures that a relatively wide section of society can benefit from the socio-economic integration of vulnerable people. - PROPOLI is an innovative programme which is introducing new ways of overcoming Lessons Learnt poverty. The intervention demonstrates the effect that EC support can have in supporting decentralisation processes, using municipalities as the driving force of development and social inclusion. - Its major contribution to job creation is based on the adoption of a strategy of agreement among the main local players, which leads to the establishment of strategic alliances for local development. - The intervention strategy is based on a deep understanding of the fact that generating employment and income is a shared responsibility of the civil society, local authorities and central government. - The involvement, level of ownership and sense of belonging of the project beneficiaries create the right framework for social dialogue and local agreements for local employment and development.

______21 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 14 - Rural development programme in the Tierradentro region

Project Number: 1996/003-076 Country: Colombia EC contrib. € 8,000,000 The project was implemented between 2000 and 2005, in the middle of the armed conflict, Project with little interest on the part of the Government in the problems of indigenous people and Background and farmers. Objectives Its objective was to improve the socio-economic conditions of the people of Tierradentro through organisational consolidation and implementation of a sustainable Life Plan. The following is the “Lessons learnt” paragraph from the final implementation report drawn up by the Programme Co-Management body (23 December 2005). “The lessons learnt by the communities and the region are a subject that should be investigated directly with each of the communities, it is not up to the project management unit to identify them. As members of the team that participated in this project, we would make the following comments: -True and comprehensive participation in all stages of the project management cycle is vital to its implementation and therefore to ensuring that both successes and failures are considered by local operators as real opportunities for development and learning. -It is a mistake to continue believing that communities have no abilities; they must be encouraged to act as protagonists, supporting their right to be the subjects of development rather than the passive beneficiaries of any given intervention. -Development, combined with effective social participation, can open up different scenarios for resolving the armed conflict in Colombia. When communities have the support they need to manage their development with independence, sovereignty and responsibility, they remain within their territories and develop a creative resistance to conflict. -The effective provision of financial and technical support by the project counterparts becomes a major stimulus that allows credibility and legitimacy to be restored, not only by external co-operation actors but also by the Colombian State. Lessons Learnt -Every time the Community has been allowed to be actively involved, there have been greater probabilities of success, particularly where difficulties have been dealt with jointly. Where “successes” were achieved without participation, they were not perceived as appropriate. Where activities failed, these failures were seen as being remote to the communities. -The misalignment of timetables imposed by external co-operation and the State with those of the communities is a source of tension and distorts participatory processes, which leads to waste and the transformation of insignificant conflicts into major disputes, distracting attention from what is fundamental for the region. The regulatory framework should allow for alternatives to be implemented that do not result in unnecessary pressure being exerted on communities. -The security of an International Co-operation Project depends on the adoption of the necessary preventive measures, particularly authorised forms of social participation, and on the adequate insertion of the Project itself in the region. -For a Project to grant high levels of autonomy and independent operational responsibilities to management teams in the field is positive. This was shown to be the case in the Tierradentro Programme. -Institutions and public policy-makers need to be more sensitive/aware in order to develop their know-how based on local experiences.”

______22 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

V. DEFINE YOUR EXIT STRATEGY FROM THE OUTSET

jf ______23 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

Project Title: 15 - Strengthening of civil society – creation of indigenous defence attorneys

Project Number: 2001/005-559 Country: Guatemala EC contrib. 2,090,000 Within the context of the “Peace Agreements”, and more specifically, the contents of the Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the need to create the necessary political and legal conditions so as to facilitate better access to justice by indigenous peoples was identified as a priority. The Guatemalan Ministerio Público (Ministry for Home Affairs) therefore considered it crucial to create specific Indigenous Public Prosecutors in order to develop a general framework for indigenous rights within the Project Ministry, and to train those responsible for the administration of justice on the subject Background and matter as well as encouraging a better understanding by indigenous peoples of their rights Objectives and how to have them enforced.

General Objective: Contribute to the consolidation of democratic participation in Guatemala in line with the Peace Agreements and the reform and decentralization of the State. Project Purpose: Strengthen equal participation by civil society in the definition, application and control of public policies, especially by means of the creation of specific indigenous public prosecutors as well as by familiarizing and training the population in general as well as those responsible for administering justice on the rights of indigenous peoples. This is a Project which, for the first time in Guatemala, addresses the problem of ethnic discrimination and the whole question of indigenous rights from the perspective of a public institution such as the Ministry for Home Affairs. The strategies designed to effectively incorporate this subject into the workings of the Home Office are worthy of special attention as they are aimed at sustainable structural changes within the institution. Of particular note are the following: the creation of a special section dedicated to Indigenous Human Rights that provides advisory services to all of the principal Secretariats of the Ministry; the creation of public prosecutors specialised in Ethnic Discrimination, responsible for the criminal prosecution of detected crimes; and the creation of a Handbook on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to be used by all prosecutors. Lessons Learnt The training of Home Office civil servants has also been a key element of this strategy leading to increased impact and sustainability. The rights of indigenous peoples and more specifically ethnic discrimination have now been included as compulsory subjects in the curriculum of the Ministry’s Training Unit. The Project Management Unit has ensured close coordination with indigenous organizations which can also be identified as a “best practice” given that it is not customary for the State, and in particular for the Ministry for Home Affairs to create a permanent forum for dialogue and coordination with civil society organizations. Also of note is the collaboration provided by indigenous lawyers in the elaboration of both the theoretical and practical tools used by the Project. Given the innovative nature of these tools the participation and support of indigenous lawyers has lent greater legitimacy and relevance to the project.

______24 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 16- National municipal training system Project Number: 1995/002-988 Country: Colombia – 2000-2004 EC contrib. € 6,036,000 As stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Colombia 1991, the National Training System was set up in 1998 to increase the capacity for learning and action among state organisations and employees in order to produce efficient and effective administration in a coordinated way and according to a single set of criteria. The European Commission decided to support the Colombian Federation of Municipalities´ (FCM) initiative to reinforce the administrative capacity of municipalities enabling them to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to them as part of the on-going decentralisation process. The Project was approved by the European Commission on 4 February 1995 but was not actually put into effect until three years later, subsequent to compliance with a series of prerequisites by the Colombian government which prevented action being taken at that time. The project was finally implemented between February 2000 and March 2004. Overall Objective: To strengthen municipalities' capacity for self-management with a view Project to reactivating communities both socially and economically. Background and Project Purpose: Objectives 1. To prepare municipal employees for the assumption of new responsibilities assigned by

the Constitution of 1991. 2. To establish a Local Public Policy Observatory (OPPL) capable of providing concepts, instruments and tools to facilitate the definition, performance and assessment of policies by those responsible for public, private and community decisions related to the implementation of development plans and land-use planning. 3. To train competent and competitive human resources for teaching and research, and provide them with the necessary theoretical bases to tackle problems and find solutions related to land management from a sound knowledge base and combined with capacity for action and analysis, interpretation and understanding of territorial issues. 4. To contribute to the process of strengthening the Colombian Federation of Municipalities through implementation of the Municipal Documentation, Research and Information Analysis Unit. The key lesson learnt from this project is the importance of clearly identifying the roles of the different actors involved and ensuring that projects respect and support their specific mandates. The experience developed and the strategies identified with project support for the Advanced School of Public Administration and the Colombian Federation of Municipalities have been and continue to be used in order to comply with the institutional mandates of the two entities. In the case of the Advanced School of Public Administration, the experience of "government schools" has been extended to other areas (through the creation of dynamic “spaces” led by departmental authorities in coordination with the various training units of public institutions that support municipal mayors in the various tasks entrusted to them), and the informal "Viernes del Concejal” ("Counsellor’s Friday") training strategy is also still in operation as a training instrument for counsellors in sessions that take place every last Friday of the month in a different Municipality (see website for further details). http://www.esap.edu.co/viernes%20del%20concejal) The network of 12 Lessons Learnt Municipal Documentation and Information Centres (CDIM, http://www.esap.edu.co/sncm),

which includes the OPPLs, has been strengthened and is expected to be expanded to include 4 additional centres. This network now serves 539 municipalities throughout the country and enables interested parties to access relevant information for the management of local public administrations via internet thereby creating virtuous circles of “learning by doing”. The network currently comprises approximately 2,500 documents (1,860 documents on local management in addition to land-use plans; government programmes and development plans, etc.), with an average number of consultations of 32,110 per year. Also key was the investment made in participative educational methods and communication systems through the setting up of a network of collaborators and strategic alliances (on a national scale and with other international cooperation entities) that have produced a high degree of effectiveness, impact and sustainability in a short period of time (four years of project implementation) in spite of the difficult social and economic conditions prevailing in the country.

______25 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

VI. COORDINATION IS KEY

THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING ALLIANCES

jf ______26 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

jfk Project Title: 17 - United in the fight against HIV-AIDS in Ecuador - UNIVIDA Project Number: 2006/104-297 Country: Ecuador EC contrib. € 2,727,527 In 2005, CARE Ecuador completed the “VIDA” (LIFE) project aimed at strengthening sexual and reproductive health services that included a component dealing specifically with HIV- AIDS services (prevention, pre and post test counselling, referral and cross-referral, biosecurity) in health centres run by local partners. Furthermore, it worked in secondary schools on the PRONESA (National Programme for Education on Sex and Love), run by the Project Ministry of Education and Culture and aimed at providing sex and relationship education for Background and students. Since 2005, CARE Ecuador has focused its efforts on the province of Guayas, the Objectives area most affected by HIV-AIDS. The experience gained with its local partners served as a basis for the project under review which operates in an additional eight provinces. General Objective: To halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV and AIDS by the year 2015. Specific objective: To reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS in the provinces most seriously affected by the illness in Ecuador. The design is very relevant to the problem of HIV-AIDS in the 9 selected provinces, which constitute the most affected regions in the country. It has solid support in terms of international agreements and commitment from the government of Ecuador within the context of the national Programme to Assist Illnesses Associated with Poverty (HIV and AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis) and Target 7 of the sixth Millennium Development Goal. CARE is also one of the principal partners/beneficiaries of the World HIV/AIDS Fund Programme. The project comprises a number of different strategies, but the one with the greatest political reach is probably the one concerned with the promotion of coalitions of key players including central government, the UN, bilateral and multilateral donors and national and international NGOs. Furthermore, in order to manage and implement activities on the local level, CARE allied itself with two highly recognised institutions in the field of sexual, Lessons Learnt reproductive and community health (CEMOPLAF and REDIMA respectively), which is a contributing factor to the potential high level of sustainability of UNIVIDA. Thanks to the creation of networks between the various actors involved, overlaps in activities are being overcome and the technical quality of the local partners is being strengthened as they take part in the National Programme for the Prevention and Care of HIV/AIDS (Ministry of Health) and engage with the National Programme of Education on Sex and Love – PRONESA. Also of note is the inclusion of new “players” in these coalitions, such as medium and large companies with social responsibility. This development will entail access to considerable economic resources which will contribute to the sustainability of the project as well as increasing the supply of specialised private services within the national health system and opening up opportunities for generating income for HIV-AIDS patients and their families through credit for small and medium sized companies.

______27 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 18 - Strengthening of women’s human rights for a life free of violence Project Number: 2004/065-090 Country: Ecuador – 2004-2007 EC contrib. € 544,366 The project is aimed at the eradication of gender based violence, now recognised as a global objective given that its social, psychological and cultural consequences constitute an insurmountable barrier for its female victims. The desire to lead a dignified and in particular, a healthy life, goes beyond the individual level and puts the onus on public authorities and society in general, to participate actively in the fight against this form of violence. This project constitutes a good model of social, legal and psychological attention to female victims of violence in the urban areas of 5 big cities in Ecuador Project where marginalization has become a key factor in the increasing use of violence against Background and women. Accompanied by a highly experienced local NGO, the Project also aims to Objectives increase the coverage and quality of the public services available to female victims in

such a way that protection of a woman’s right to lead a life free from violence becomes institutionalised. General Objective: Improve the quality of life of the urban population of Ecuador by strengthening human rights and eradicating domestic violence. Project Purpose: Women from the marginalized suburbs of the five cities covered by the Project, who have been victims of violence, are familiar with and exercise their human rights, especially their right to a life free of violence. The Project, which started in the second half of 2004 and which ends in July 2007, has accumulated a series of positive results and impacts. It comprises a well designed intervention strategy based on two main pillars: an integrated vision of the phenomenon of violence and solid linkages and coordination between all relevant actors, both public and private: those responsible for the administration of justice, the police, The National Directorate for Gender, local governments private foundations, associations and organizations specialised in working with female victims of violence. On the other hand, the Project incorporates a series of novel experiences that are Lessons Learnt achieving a huge impact, as witnessed by the high level of satisfaction expressed by the beneficiaries. Of particular note are the Commissioners for Women, appointed by the National Directorate for Women, the traveling theatre outfits that aim to increase awareness and the domestic/sexual violence Sections created in Public Prosecutors´ offices. Despite the complexity of the subject matter, the Project has succeeded in attaining the political commitment of local government through the promotion of mechanisms that contribute to minimizing the incidence of violence and to taking action through the courts in order to safeguard women’s rights. The Center for Equality and Justice in the municipality of Quito is a particularly innovative model of integrated attention for female victims of violence.

______28 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 19 - Improvement in the living conditions of ancestral communities in the Project Title: mangrove swamps in the Province of Esmeraldas Project Number: 2006/119-423 Country: Ecuador EC contrib. € 1,317,627 The proposal originates from and forms part of a wider project providing support to the farming and Afro-Ecuadorian communities that inhabit and subsist in the mangrove ecosystem, so that they may fully exercise their rights, participating in land management, accessing basic services, influencing the corresponding policies and improving their financial conditions. These rights are key elements of the Government’s social, environmental and poverty reduction policies. In this context, local and European organisations have been carrying out important work over a period of more than ten years with a view to influencing policy and implementing social and economic development programmes in the region. In Project the northern area of the province, the Ecuadorian Populorum Progressio Fund (FEPP) and Background and the Ecuadorian Centre for Alternative Development and Studies (CEDEAL) have promoted Objectives various initiatives in the economic and social sectors. In Muisne, the Ecological Defence Foundation (FUNDECOL) promotes the protection of mangrove swamps in the Forest Life Refuge of the Muisne River Estuary. General Objective: To promote a participative process for the full exercise of rights, leading to an improvement in the economic and social well-being of ancestral communities in the mangrove swamp ecosystem in the province of Esmeraldas. Specific Objective: To allow beneficiary communities and their organisations to improve their economic and social situation by participating in the management and conservation of mangroves, generating and applying national policies, exercising their rights and improving production. The project is centred on developing a positive link between conserving the mangrove swamp ecosystem and improving the quality of life of the resident population with a clear focus on rights and the development of real abilities, in order to allow the population to exercise the rights granted to them within the framework of current legislation: natural rights (conservation and management of protected areas), the rights of communities to live and subsist in the territories as well as to access services and lead a decent and sustainable life by controlling the resources of the territory. The strategy aims to mobilise economic and social interests, involving people in the management and protection of the territory. Investments in production and social investments have been designed with a clear bias in favour of women. The rights of communities in the mangrove swamp ecosystem are recognised in principle by environmental legislation which allows the resident population to become involved in the management of protected mangrove areas. Social policies relating to health and education also recognise and support plans for adult literacy, sexual and reproduction rights and gender equality. As part of the decentralisation process, responsibility for the said policies Lessons Learnt has been partly taken over by local government authorities. Finally, the action is part of a series of long-term processes launched over ten years ago by local partners of HIVOS: FEPP, CEDEAL and FUNDECOL. These processes are promoted by actions at various levels: a) development of political processes for the recognition of people's rights b) taking advantage of opportunities and openings created by public policies (creation of capabilities and institutional links) c) strengthening of basic organisation experiences d) direct implementation of innovative measures to improve economic gains (intensifying production, tourism, etc.), e) establishing a basis for learning. The most significant examples of good practice are: a) a clear and joint vision of the process, which is interpreted by highly committed local operators through different forms of implementation and with high levels of participation, b) linking of land rights with the duty to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of resources, c) promoting sustainability by establishing strong co-operation with public institutions and creating the necessary skills in order to ensure that rights are not only recognised but also effectively applied and interpreted at local level.

______29 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

VII. A QUESTION OF TRUST

jf ______30 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 jfk Project Title: 20 - PRODELSA: Local Development and Food Security Programme Project Number: 2003/005-981 Country: Nicaragua EC contrib. € 13,000,000 Project To contribute to the implementation of the national strategy for poverty reduction and the Background and national policy for the agricultural and forestry sector with a view to contributing to the Objectives economic and social development of the population in a state of food insecurity and of the rural economy as a whole. The support of public policies is linked to the level of confidence that is placed in the State, and in particular in its ability to pursue development and poverty reduction policies and programmes. For more than one year, the PRODELSA project had both its hands and feet tied. This situation resulted from an error in the design whereby the approved operating regulation further tightened the already rigid State contracting standards. According to the regulation, municipalities were requested to subcontract the services of private implementing entities. Although the bidding process was fully respected, these implementing entities had -in turn- to comply with the state procurement rules for the budgeted activities, resulting in a duplication of rules and total inflexibility. Either there is confidence and local governments are allowed to be the project executors or there is no trust in the State and a programme is designed in order to be implemented by private bodies. The forced mixing of the two options automatically generates inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Only recently in June 2007, was an addendum signed, which made requirements more flexible and unlocked the situation. It is rather easy to understand that, when it comes to a food security programme aimed at vulnerable and extensive populations, distrust results from two risks that are repeatedly observed in Latin American public governance: the risk of politicization in terms of Lessons Learnt clientelism and the risk of corruption. However, it seems that trying to overcome these risks by increasing the levels of administrative control is not the best solution. In Nicaragua, other options have proven useful: Clearly institutionalizing confidence in state bodies at the local level (municipalities, ministries of health and education), holding them liable for implementation. Moreover, they are the only ones who currently handle State regulations with a certain level of efficiency. Since the 90s (EC projects financed under the refugee budget line), we know that there is a very limited supply of service providers at the local level that meet the requirements for supplying the State. Therefore, it makes sense to create a design which goes beyond that weakness, recognizing the social fabric and adapting the rules to the reality rather than expecting small organizations with low management capabilities to comply with the requirements of “Law 323”. Ensuring that the local government decentralizes the decision-making process to the level of counties and communities. The FISE experience (projects led by the community) shows that public regulation and local dynamics can be made compatible. Application of the principles of subsidiarity, gradualism and promotion of local public-private partnerships, according to existing local capacities. Promoting civic control and making decision-making and its modalities public.

______31 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

21 - Strengthening peasant agriculture and good local governance for Project Title: sustainable development in Mozonte and Telpaneca Project Number: 2005/095-213 Country: Nicaragua EC contrib. € 747,589 Project The project, carried out by AVSF and UNAG, implemented a strategy aimed at facilitating Background and processes in order to contribute to the strengthening of peasant agriculture and local Objectives governance in the neighbouring municipalities of Mozonte and Telpaneca, north of Nicaragua. During this external monitoring visit, the monitor was struck by the fact that the families who had won the contest for the “best farm” were grateful for being "beneficiaries" of the project, whereas this was actually a reward for having implemented soil conservation, reforestation and crop diversification techniques before entering the said project. This reaction reflects the paternalism of many of the post-Mitch "briefcase projects”. The farmers in question insisted on showing receipts for the various items they had bought with the prize money which amounted to 1000 cordobas (about 40 euros). It is interesting to note that in line with their paternalistic approach, the project had originally proposed that the winners be rewarded in kind (rather than cash) so as to prevent them from “misspending” the prize money. Lessons Learnt Contrary to expectations however, the majority of the winning families had decided to buy barbed wire in order to expand and encircle a larger amount of land for the expansion of what they call the “patio”, where, once it is protected against animals, agriculture can be intensified. Unfortunately, no microfinance organization provides credit for this type of purchase and no development project provides the families with barbed wire rolls despite the fact that it is a worthwhile investment since it induces a leveraging ing of investment, production and productivity. Once again, it was shown that beneficiaries can and should be relied on to work towards their own development once they are provided with the appropriate opportunities.

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VIII. THE CASE FOR CONSOLIDATING

BUILDING ON PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES

______33jf Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 jfk Project Title: 22 - Economic and social development in the North-central area of Nicaragua Project Number: 1997/005-863 Country: Nicaragua EC contrib. € 10,000,000 PRONORCEN was part of the EC’s policy to support peace-making, reconciliation and economic re-integration in Nicaragua and subsequently to support the economic and social development of the country in a context of good governance and consolidation of democracy. Its intention was to contribute to improving the living conditions of the rural population in various municipalities of the North by restoring and improving the production system, promoting organisational and institutional development and improving rural roads, as well as ensuring the social and economic integration of women. Particularly worthy of Project note is the transfer of farming technologies through 9 multi-service co-operatives, which Background and took over responsibility for services on completion of the project and continued to provide Objectives them to members. These co-operatives underwent an intense training process aimed at improving their entrepreneurial skills, which produced steady growth in terms of members and the size of their credit portfolios. There has also been an intense process of institutional strengthening and organisational development of the 8 municipalities involved, including both technical strengthening and reinforcement of the entities created to promote greater involvement by citizens, with a specific component dealing with gender equality. Lastly, the infrastructure work enabled 140 km of new roads to be restored/built. The clear effects of PRONORCEN can be seen when visiting the municipalities that benefited from the project 2.5 years after its completion (ex-post monitoring). Continued assistance (through various subsequent EC financed projects), both technical and financial, to the multi-service co-operative system in the north of the country enabled the effective consolidation of these organisations to be achieved, which left them in a strong position when external assistance came to an end and above all left them with a financial instrument that helped them to expand their activities. The assets transferred are used correctly and diligently maintained. The most tangible effect of this project is the degree of consolidation and growth achieved by the multi-service co-operatives that now form part of a second level structure (Ucosemun). The co-operatives have grown in terms of members and credit portfolio by 110% and 200% respectively since 2004, when PRONORCEN ended. They currently consist of around 12,000 members and have a credit portfolio of approximately $12 million US. In general terms, the impact and sustainability of the support provided by the Project has been very positive. The following aspects are of particular note insofar as they could serve as useful lessons learnt for future projects: (i) PRONORCEN provided a coherent response to the problem which it intended to help resolve (reviving the Lessons Learnt economy and consolidating democracy) by means of an appropriate methodology (delegation of responsibility rather than direct implementation); (ii) a sufficiently long period of support thanks to the successive implementation of several projects (Refugee budget line + CFT), allowed a sufficiently long period of assistance to be provided to the beneficiary population and its organisations, thus achieving a consolidation of results (in many other projects, support has ended prematurely); (iii) the synergy between various co- operation tools allowed PRONORCEN beneficiaries (some of them co-operatives) to receive (technical and financial) assistance from other Projects financed by the EC (UESA, Oxfam- Intermon); (iv) a high level of cost-benefit efficiency, insofar as PRONORCEN had an approximate ratio of 60% between capital investments (infrastructure, human capital, credit funds) and management costs, which is relatively favourable as compared with other similar initiatives in Latin America; (v) the operational post-project mechanisms, such as the fund placed in the hands of a private financial organisation to administer, with clear and operational rules, which has borne fruit in terms of its effects on beneficiaries and on maintaining the value of the fund. The principle lesson learnt is how support that is consistent, synergetic and sufficiently extended over time, efficient in its management and with adequate post-project mechanisms can produce surprising, sustainable and high impact results.

______34 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

Project Title: 23 - Introduction of Fair Trade Labelled Products on the Mexican Market Project Number: 2001/011-831 Country: Mexico EC contrib. € 626,267 The project was aimed at tackling the huge disadvantages a large majority of small Mexicans producers are faced with both on the domestic and the international market, which arise in various ways: Low market prices advantaging big and medium-sized producers; market volatility ; concentration of marketing networks with low margins for producers; constriction of domestic markets by massive imports and deregulation; lack of financial and commercial management capacity of the producers and their organizations; low levels of organization and coordination for marketing; poverty and marginality. Project General Objective: Massive participation of small producers’ products in the Mexican Background and domestic market, in terms of Fair Trade, through the introduction and promotion of a Fair Objectives Trade label and the development of various marketing channels for coffee, honey, maize

and handicrafts Project purposes: PP1: Mass consumption of small producers’ products through the promotion of the Fair Trade label; PP2: Creation and implementation of a reliable system for Fair Trade certification; PP3: Promotion of the participation of small producers’ brands on the market in terms of Fair Trade; PP4: Promotion of the participation of private companies and brands in Fair Trade; PP5: Development and Promotion of small producers’ collective structures and brands. 1. The project is noteworthy as it facilitates, strengthens and consolidates ongoing processes by creating strategic synergies/alliances between existing (still emerging) second floor entities, which have direct links with Small Producers Organizations as partners /allies. In this way, it aimed at optimizing resources and making the most of each institution’s specific technical skill (production, marketing, certification and promotion companies as well as political lobbying). 2. The project’s role of facilitator requires close monitoring in order to ensure the compliance of all activities: at operational level, greater emphasis on planning systems and inter-institutional monitoring. Lessons Learnt 3. One of the key elements as regards sustainability was that the project did not introduce any new technology or concept, thus reaching a high level of ownership by the target group. 4. It is worth noting that the strengthening of the institutional framework has enabled continuation in services once the action had been finalized, despite some financial sustainability problems in the short and medium term. 5. Also of note is the importance of having adopted and initiated in the short term the second EC funded project called "Springboard for Products of Small Mexican Producers" in order to consolidate the established social and institutional foundations and ensure the sustainability of investments.

______35 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 24 - Support for land planning aimed at ensuring the sustainable management Project Title: of natural resources and the implementation of priority projects in the Honduran Moskitia region Project Number: 1999/054–206 Country: Honduras EC contrib. € 1,023,482 GVC, an NGO with significant experience in the Nicaraguan Moskitia, working with the municipal authorities of Puerto Lempira and Awas, began identifying the project in 1997. The initiative is based on implementing a model already tried and tested on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, the main elements of which are local and environmental Project development by means of participative planning, learning and action. The beneficiaries Background and are the Miskito and Ladino people living in the two municipalities (approximately 18,000 Objectives inhabitants across 30 villages and 104 hamlets).

General objective: To draw up a municipal land development plan by implementing a negotiated strategy allowing local people to participate actively in the decision-making process and in establishing priorities for short, medium and long term sustainable development. The project was carried out in an area with a high concentration of natural resources in extremely fragile ecosystems populated almost exclusively by Miskito people, living in poverty and suffering the consequences of the heavy pressures being exerted on natural resources by external actors (fishing, livestock farmers, etc.). The project’s intervention strategy is focused on supporting processes aimed at establishing municipal environmental development plans and bringing together communities in the agro- ecological areas by organising and formulating sectorial natural resource management plans (fishing and forestry). Based on the results of the planning processes, the project finances production initiatives. The project has a systematic approach to managing development processes, based on the following principles: 1) participative design and implementation, 2) planning and partial implementation (priority projects), 3) strengthening local institutions, 4) local and sector basis, 5) use of multiple diagnosis and participative planning tools and 6) establishing the foundations for learning processes. Within this support framework, the project has been able to take advantage of budgetary flexibility as a result of the policy of not defining the nature of production investments in advance. Lessons Learnt As regards project impact, the involvement of communities in the planning processes and in local development structures is considered a key factor as it breaks with the traditional marginalisation of the Miskito people, allowing them to demonstrate their capacity to participate in economic and political life, as well as to propose wide-ranging solutions by means of sector plans. The project is an important experience that confirms the validity of the sector approach to promoting the management of natural and forest resources set out in the EC’s new Country Strategy Paper 2007-13, which specifically deals with the links between the environment/ forest resources/indigenous rights/overcoming poverty. Within this framework, the project has developed important methodologies and lessons learnt about the local situation and its ability to respond. Furthermore, the project has confirmed 1) the validity of concentrating funding on actions in clearly defined geographical areas and in accordance with a strategy devised in agreement with local public and private entities, 2) the relevance of continuing to improve the design of actions by introducing a process-oriented focus (better definition of the methodology and monitoring of results and less focus on inputs and rigid designs, budget flexibility with regard to investments and realistic implementation timeframes).

______36 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 25 - Strengthening local governability for the conservation of forests in the Project Title: Colombian Amazon and the development of cross-border programmes with Brazil and Venezuela Project 2006/114-452 Number: Country: Colombia EC contrib. € 3,494,100 The project is part of the COAMA (Amazon Consolidation) Programme, a network of NGOs dedicated to developing the rights of Indigenous People and conserving the Amazon forests. -COAMA I (1989-1992): Working at local level: Community projects (Micro-projects) -COAMA II (1992-1996): Working at “zone” level: Creation of AATIs, drawing-up of Life Plans -COAMA III (1996-2002): Working at departmental level: Coordination between indigenous and departmental authorities for the joint establishment of state authority in the Amazon department. -COAMA IV (2002-2005): Working at regional level: Start of CANOA (Co-operation and Alliance in the North and East Amazon) and creation of the mambe•shop (fair trade in Amazon craft Project products) Background -COAMA V (2006-2011): Working at regional level: Extension of experiences to other and Objectives departments, strengthening of CANOA and consolidation of mambe•shop.

The different stages of COAMA have been financed mainly by: European Commission (1989 – 2011); Austrian Government (1993 – 2007); DANIDA (1993 – 2001); Embassy of the Netherlands (1997 – 2003); The Sigrid Rausing Trust (2002 – 2008); Asdi (2003 – 2009); Novib – Oxfam (2000 – 2007). General Objective: Good government for the conservation and management of the Amazon rain forest Specific Objective: To contribute to the sustainable management of the forest in the North East Amazon region by ensuring the governability of indigenous lands, developing local family businesses and cross-border programmes. The COAMA programme is clearly an initiative worth supporting. Furthermore, given that it is a process which requires long-term support (it has been running for 15 years and all the indications are that it will need continued support in the long term), the strategy adopted whereby each project is a “continuation” of the previous one is justified. Over the years, results have shown that the programme has contributed to enabling the indigenous people of the Amazon to exercise their rights (managing their land, resources and environment) leading to a much more sustainable management of their resources. However, given that this is such a long-term programme, it is important for each project to measure the “steps” being taken in this direction: achievement of results throughout the life of the project, strategies for gradual withdrawal/reduction of the project services. This monitoring of results has to be rigorous, otherwise there is a risk of: Lessons Learnt Difficulties in demonstrating the results achieved (and resulting donor fatigue) Support being provided for too long with regard to some services (which could create a certain amount of dependence among the population). The slowness of the process is justified if the progress made is solid and sustainable but this requires rigorous management both at the design and project stage (in order to determine the progress achieved over a given period of time, “the small steps taken towards achieving the goals of the programme” that justify the project being implemented over a certain period of time with the amount of resources allocated to it) and in terms of monitoring implementation and establishing an exit strategy (based on results). Projects of this kind (remote populations, lack of infrastructure, lack of support from public institutions) justify the high cost, which is mainly connected with high human resource costs and transport (aircraft, river…).

______37 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

IX. NEW SOLUTIONS FOR OLD PROBLEMS

THE MERITS OF INNOVATION

______38jf Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 26 - Institutional Support Project Number: 1998/003-011 Country: Brazil EC contrib. € 6,516,000 In 2002, through the National Public Security Plan, the government announced its intention to cut crime by mobilising society and transforming police structures to turn them into efficient institutions that respect human rights. The reforms announced included the Project definition of preventive and offensive policing, rigorous control of the use of lethal force, Background and external monitoring by the Public Prosecutor and by Police Ombudsmen. Furthermore, the Objectives government launched the National Human Rights Programme I and II (1996 and 2002), aimed at combating the spread of violence, including in police forces. Specific objective: i) To strengthen the “Police Ombudsman” institution, which carried out external monitoring of police activities; ii) To support community policing activities and modernise police procedures in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The project is particularly relevant to support for the implementation of the federal government’s public security and human rights policies. It is, however, a particularly complex project in terms of implementation. In fact, in institutional terms, implementation of the project depends on its approval by state governments, which have autonomy regarding public security. In addition, the views of the federal government are not always shared by State governments. Furthermore, combining human rights with public security is an approach that is new to police forces, where a culture of intervention prevails in which repression and the denial of civic rights is still predominant. The project is particularly innovative because it helps to create a series of instruments that will make it easier to establish a stronger link between defending the rights of citizens and public security. The project specifically contributes to improving intervention procedures (by reviewing the respective manuals of procedure), to developing the concept of community policing and to ensuring better management of information by creating and integrating Lessons Learnt police databases. Police training is one of the cornerstones of the project because this is the way in which alternative approaches to intervention will be conveyed. Additionally, the development of Police Ombudsmen, which has been strongly boosted by the project, will allow citizens to report situations in which police action has involved a violation of their rights. The Ombudsmen are also fighting to achieve effective recognition by a number of States and greater awareness of their existence among citizens. In spite of the activities carried out as part of the project to promote the Ombudsmen, cultural factors remain that restrict their action. Naturally, the project cannot on its own aspire to bring about a complete change in the behaviour of police forces given the complexity of the problem and the size of police organisations. The hope is, however, that it will work as a demonstration for the security system as a whole, based on the specific activities carried out in the city of Rio de Janeiro and in the Police Ombudsman offices in the 14 States in which they have already been set up.

______39 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 27- Farmers, especially women, become stronger as active economic agents in Project Title: the supply of food from rural to urban areas in the central region of Colombia – “Farmers’ markets” Project 2006/132-186 Number: Country: Colombia EC contrib. € 749,746 The “farmers’ markets” project is the outcome of the Mandato Agrario, a proposal for public policy aimed at promoting the development of the farming economy and food security, and the creation of the Committee for Rural Municipal Dialogue (CICC) in 2004, which consists of 10 farmers’ organisations and aims to influence the Master Plan for Food Supply and Security (PMASAB) of the municipal authority of Bogotá. With support from Oxfam in the UK, the Latin American Institute for Alternative Legal Services (ILSA) and the CICC intend to strengthen the role played by small producers in Project the central area of Colombia (Boyacá, Cundinamarca and Tolima) who supply food to the Background and capital. This is taking place in a context characterised both by the exclusion of farmers Objectives from economic development flows and by the food insecurity that affects large swathes

of the population of Bogotá. General objective: To contribute to building a development strategy based on strengthening fairer links between the rural and urban sectors, reducing rural poverty and improving food security in Colombia. Specific objective: To strengthen the role of farmers, especially women, and their organisations in the supply of food between rural and urban areas in the central region of Colombia in order to improve rural income and food security. The Project is particularly relevant, not only because of its objective, which is to improve the position of farmers in the food supply chain and to generate models of local development that establish links between rural and urban communities but also because of tits timing as i) there is a tendency towards increased organisation among farmers, and ii) implementation of the PMASAB is undergoing an adjustment. The Project is highly efficient and is based on a transparent administrative and financial management model. It is extremely effective and has very strong technical and management skills with a strategic political vision and, therefore, the skills to ensure influence. The action, which is based on the piloting of marketing strategies for small producers, strengthening their abilities at the local level through Marketing Committees (informal and flexible structures) and opening up new markets in the capital, is accompanied by political lobbying, led by local partners, and aimed at achieving structural changes in food supply policies in Bogotá. This has resulted in co-operation with the municipal authority of Bogotá, which has taken the form of an agreement, currently being renewed, that deals with the co-funding of actions and their expansion. This not only contributes to the Lessons Learnt achievement of objectives but also has an impact on sustainability, going much further than improving income for 2000 producers and ensuring food security for the city at the same time. Another valid aspect worth highlighting is the contribution that the “farmers’ markets” brand is making to forming public opinion and to building awareness among consumers, making the rural economy an important part of urban life in Bogotá. The way in which public opinion is being influenced as a way of achieving political change is viewed very positively. The inclusion of learning and monitoring system is also contributing to systematising this experience, which could serve as a model for similar actions. The importance given to gender equality as a cross cutting issue is ensuring the dynamism of actions which include initiatives aimed at rural women and in particular their attitudes. In the institutional context, the CICC and the Law on Rural Women reflect the strategic importance of linking work done at the micro level (farmers; consumers) with work at the meso (institutions and organisations) and macro (public policies) levels. The latter is essential for determining whether an investment like this one, however innovative its investment strategy may be, will actually result in real change. For the time being, it is advancing positively.

______40 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

Project Title: 28 - Support for Reform of the State Apparatus Project Number: 1999/003-013 Country: Brazil EC contrib. € 2,853,190 The project is carried out under the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning, Budgeting and Management (MP) and its purpose is to support the Brazilian government in implementing its public administration reform policy. Project The project is implemented within a very complex political-administrative context due to the Background and political-administrative structure of Brazil which is based on interaction between federal, Objectives state and municipal levels. Specific objective: (i) to support management flexibility in public administration; (ii) to strengthen the capacity of central institutions to implement administrative reform; (iii) to improve the management capability of high ranking civil servants; (iv) to improve relations between public administration and citizens; and (v) to forge permanent links with Europe. Given the size and complexity of the reform of the State administrative apparatus, the project focuses above all on areas in which it can be innovative and to which it can bring a significant degree of added value (strategic planning and planning by results, land planning, public-private partnerships, people management) to the reform process. The nature of this project means that it is heavily dependent on changes in the political cycle. Furthermore some of its specific objectives refer to areas which are highly sensitive in public management (pay, professional careers) whereas others involve complex institutional relationships (land and strategic planning, public-private partnerships). Consequently, the management of the project has a small margin of manoeuvre when it comes to taking action on external conditions which affect the range of its objectives. However, the project is well embedded into the strucure of the administration, which gives some guarantees of it being able to adapt to changes in these external factors. Lessons Learnt The implementation strategy of the project is based on an intelligent mechanism which organises activities according to a logical sequence for each of the areas covered by the project. This logical sequence includes seminars, expert missions, studies, workshops and culminates in technical missions to Europe. This method makes it possible to progressively explore the areas covered by the study and at the same time ensures an efficient selection process of the participants taking part in the final study visits. Another innovative feature is the creation of themed networks introduced to manage the project. A themed network is set up in relation to a particular subject (for example ‘public- private partnerships’) and, informally, it brings together people from different organisations who have a common interest in the theme. This form of organisation provides for a much more flexible and speedy exchange of information than is able to take place in the generally bureaucratised structures of public administration.

______41 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007

X. THE NEED FOR CONCRETE RESULTS

______42jfk Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 29 - Rio HURTADO — civil agenda against poverty and desertification, Project Title: empowerment of the people for environmental protection Project Number: 2003/062-355 Country: Chile EC contrib. € 845,071 The project, drawn up by the Chilean NGO El Canelo is the result of an initiative taken by a community organisation in the Rio Hurtado valley (northern Chile) to strengthen civil society organisations with a view to improving “management of the natural economy” and to combat environmental decline. The initial, very ambitious plan provides for radical Project changes in the environment and farmers’ and breeders’ living conditions. Background and General objectives: To contribute to: i) the incorporation of participative procedures for the Objectives planning and implementation of national sustainable development projects and programmes to combat desertification, ii) the development of a sustainable regional economy and economic management which can halt, and in the medium term reverse, desertification and soil impoverishment. Specific objective: To strengthen the capabilities of civil society organisations in the Río Hurtado community in their fight against poverty and desertification. The main strength of the project lies in its focus on empowering civil society within a rural community. Its implementation demonstrates that positive changes can be achieved in terms of the commitment and self-esteem of individuals. The creation of a Community Forum and of a community radio service represent key factors in this respect. Local organisations, young people, farmers and breeders take part in meetings and committees on specific issues chosen by the target group (education, waste management…), which are greatly appreciated. However, with 70% of the time available for project implementation having passed, concrete results on the ground are disappointing, raising questions about the initial design. The main lesson to be drawn from this initiative is that the design of projects based on activities aimed at strengthening the capabilities of civil society must place sufficient emphasis on promoting economic activities in order to effectively contribute to tangible benefits for the target group. A good example of this can be found in the reforestation Lessons Learnt activities, which have barely begun and which from the outset should have received input from the Agricultural Communities with regard to the design and implementation of concrete activities. A good balance between technical and organisational aspects is a key factor in the success of this type of project. The first positive results, which can be considered as the basis for future actions, result from i) co-operation among the valley’s producers in the promotion of agricultural activities (exchange of experiences, seeking out markets…) ii) the good relationship established with local institutions and existing sources of finance and iii) the significant involvement of schools, teachers and pupils. The potential sustainability of the benefits achieved by the project is considered high due to the strong focus placed on ensuring that the beneficiaries are “owners” of the project. However, co-participation by farmers in productive investments (financial contribution…) should be strengthened in order to overcome the somewhat paternalistic approach that still prevails in Chile and which risks undermining potential sustainability.

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XI. SHAKY FOUNDATIONS

______44jfk Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 30 - EU-MERCOSUR customs co-operation Project 1999/001-052 Number: Country: URUGUAY EC contrib. € 5,300,000 € (primary commitment); 2,780,850 € (secondary commitment). The 1995 Framework Agreement between MERCOSUR and the European Union (EU), signalled a commitment by the EU to support the MERCOSUR integration process, and defined the area of customs as a key axis of co-operation. During the second phase, when legislative and regulatory harmonisation requirements were identified as a priority in the context of consolidating the Customs Union, financial support was approved in 2002 for “EU-MERCOSUR customs co-operation” with the aim of contributing to the creation of a single market for the four Member States. The start of this programme was however delayed until 2004 as it Project coincided with adjustments being made to the EC’s technical and financial regulations. Background General objective: To consolidate customs integration within MERCOSUR and the creation of a and Objectives Single Market. Specific objective: 1. To converge towards the establishment of common customs legislation within MERCOSUR; 2. To simplify and computerise procedures, coordinating and unifying checks in Integrated Control Areas; 3. To strengthen the exchange of information within the framework of legislation currently applicable in MERCOSUR; 4. To make Customs Authorities aware of the need to renew structures and ensure the efficient management and training of human resources, and 5. To make co-operation activities viable by implementing a communication policy. The original Project was conceived with a high degree of ambition, pursuing a wide range of objectives which assumed that institutional and political advances would be made within MERCOSUR that were not consistent with the political/institutional context at the time. Internal weaknesses within the organisation related to the different degrees of political will to progress towards a customs union were reflected in very slow progress with regard to project implementation, a situation that was made worse by: i) frequent changes in management staff; ii) a complex implementation mechanism, whereby technical, political and strategic management activities lacked a regional focus; and iii) a lack of clear and effective communication and coordination rules between the network of operators involved. Furthermore, design flaws were identified that related to i) the fact that the management body, located within the Uruguayan national customs authority, had little leadership ability and, above all, little decision-making power due to the fact that it had no legal basis and ii) the fact that a large amount of the budget was allocated to hiring European technical support in a region with plentiful skilled human resources. A series of factors contributed to reducing implementation to a minimum and, therefore, to a failure to achieve any concrete results. The design was not in keeping with the Lessons Learnt political/institutional context and the situation within MERCOSUR. The organisation did not even have a Technical Secretariat with the necessary decision-making powers to support the work of project management. The lack of political will was reflected both in the inefficient implementation mechanism, which was slow and lacked a set of systematic decision-making and communication procedures, and in the delayed approval of the VAT exemption within the framework of the Project, which effectively prevented the use of EC funds. Additionally, the change that took place during the period of implementation in the EC´s administrative and financial regulations, as well as the lack of clarity with regard to the application of these rules by the DCE and the lack of flexibility and inadequacy of these rules for an intergovernmental structure like MERCOSUR, contributed to the failure of the project to achieve any of its objectives. Subsequently, a number of political incidents between the Member States of MERCOSUR (e.g. the paper-making companies’ conflict between Uruguay and Argentina), as well as developments in the political environment with regard to trade integration, have put the brakes on any increase in the political commitment to the process which will undoubtedly limit the project’s potential impact.

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XII. GIVE WOMEN A CHANCE

______jf 46 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 31 - An alternative to poverty and the economic migration of indigenous people Project Title: in Cuchumatanes; support for diversification, conversion to agro industrialisation and marketing of organic coffee made by micro producers Project Number: 2003/063-299 Country: Guatemala EC contrib. € 625,000,00 The project is in line with the needs of the beneficiaries, it contributes to the advancement of the Peace Agreements as well as to overcoming poverty and to greater participation by women and indigenous peoples. It concentrates its efforts on helping farmers to improve coffee production and to diversify, with the potential for marketing their products, maintaining a coffee price which reflects production costs and is sustainable. Environmental issues are considered as cross-cutting and special attention is given to women.

The project is managed by a consortium of European NGOs, MAIS and IDW and is led by Project the latter. Background and General Objective: Contribute to consolidating the processes initiated by the Peace Objectives Agreements and improve the socio-economic capability of the region, strengthening

organisation levels, creating sources of work, maintaining food security and generating added value in production by promoting productive activities which will generate income and which are geared towards diversification, harvesting, storing, transforming and marketing organic coffee. Specific objective: Small producers, men and women, improve their socio-economic, gender equality and environmental conditions through diversification, an increase in the added value of coffee and other crops from Huehuetenango and the strengthening of their organisations. The project is implemented by two second level organisations from Huehuetenango, ASCODIHUE and ASDECOHUE, which are made up of associations and co-operatives of small coffee producers, as part of the development projects which both entities are carrying out in the region. Of note is the effort made by the partners to analyse and update various practices and strategies which had proven to be successful in other projects. As a result, significant progress was made in the certification of organic, socially responsible and environmentally friendly coffee. Crop diversification also contributed to improved agricultural practices which protect and preserve the environment as well as presenting an opportunity for increasing Lessons Learnt family incomes. The project clearly highlights the work carried out by women and is promoting the development of “café femenino” as a privileged trademark, from which they will receive a higher economic return. In addition, once they have constituted themselves as an association exclusively for women, they will have a greater say in matters which affect them directly. Efforts to highlight the productive capacity of women, the collaboration of husbands in handing over plots of land to their wives and, above all, the great initiative and dedication shown by the women themselves, has opened up more opportunities for women and to a certain degree is helping to break down the traditional patterns of coffee production.

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XIII. MORE (money)

IS NOT ALWAYS BETTER (aid)

______48 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 32 - Integrated support to minors in high risk situations (AMAR) Project Number: 1996/004-666 Country: Paraguay EC contrib. € 10,030,000 1995 saw the creation of the Secretaría de Acción Social (Social Action Secretariat) for the purpose of forming social policies and obtaining social investment funds for the most vulnerable groups in Paraguay including, as a first priority, children and young people considered at high risk. Consequently, in 1997, the EC decided to support the initiative and an agreement was signed with the Secretariat. The project aimed to reduce risk factors which compromise the well being of children and young people. It was carried out within the time allowed but 50% of EC funds were withheld. Due to this “withholding” of funds by Project the EC as well as a negative medium term review of the project, the national counterpart Background and did not contribute its share. During the implementation period there was a failure to Objectives achieve the expected results due to the fact that only between 22% and 44% of the foreseen budgets were actually invested. General Objective: To change the ways in which children and teenagers living in extreme poverty in Paraguay participate in families, communities and institutions by reducing shortcomings and risks which limit their personal development and social integration. Specific objective: To counteract the social risk factors to which children and teenagers in high risk communities in Asunción and Ciudad del Este are exposed, by improving their educational, family, community and institutional conditions, in order to enable them to develop personally and integrate socially. Although the project was highly relevant to solving the existing problem in terms of subject and structure, the intervention strategy was misguided because it sought to intervene directly and therefore ended up competing with the Secretaría de Acción Social (SAS). The project design covered the three dimensions of the problem: 1) the individual, 2) the family and the community and 3) institutions and organisations. Notwithstanding the lack of financial resources, the perception of the project is relatively positive. The project began with a direct approach which required a great deal of resources, although it did propose innovative solutions that motivated beneficiaries, social organisations and government institutions. When the flow of resources terminated, it was these same people who generated the dynamics that allowed the processes which had been initiated with the project to continue. One of the greatest successes was that it reached several different groups of beneficiaries in different ways: unregistered children, children in prison, children in refuges, school children, street children etc. The most noteworthy effects of the project have been: 1) to publicise the situation Lessons Learnt regarding birth certificates (around 70% of children below the age of 1 were not registered) and to define methods of mass registration which have been taken on by different organisations 2) to show that rehabilitation of young offenders is possible, as witnessed by the fall in the re-offending rate from 77% to 23% in the Itaguá Educational Centre 3) to show that street children can re-establish their family ties if, together with their parents, they receive appropriate and timely guidance, a methodology which the SAS is applying in a new social programme 4) a reappraisal of the subject of childhood in society and a methodological approach focused on bringing about a solution (with significant contributions from the academic sector). Given these successes it is therefore considered unfortunate that the following serious weaknesses were never corrected in order to allow for even greater benefits: 1) the lack of an effective system for sector and donor coordination 2) the creation of “imposed” community structures which ultimately failed and 3) the poor foresight in directing 12 million euros to a recently created secretariat with an annual budget of 700,000 euros in addition to the requirement for a counterpart contribution of 2 million (3 times the annual budget).

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33 - Strengthening of local skills for the sustainable and profitable management of

forests in the Loreto region. FOCUS ON FORESTS Project 2001/059-133 Number: Country: Peru EC contrib. € 1,382,117 The project objectives are: Project That people in the Loreto region have improved their income from sustainable forest Background management. and Improved skills among local people in the development and implementation of profitable forest Objectives management plans in the Loreto region based on social, economic and ecologically sustainable

criteria. This anecdote is considered symptomatic of the approach to money by both technical experts and the “river population” and was recounted by the manager of Amazon Ivory – a man who has lived in the Amazon for over 20 years – who had set up a contract with communities along the Yanayacu river in the Pacaya-Samiria reserve, Nauta province in the Loreto region. The contract consisted of the supply of tagua, the fruit of the yarina palm (Phytolephas macrocarpa), and had been negotiated on a participative basis with the community assemblies. It was estimated that each member would earn 60 soles per day for harvesting and delivering tagua. The communities were responsible for harvesting, delivery to the company in Iquitos, collecting the money and then paying each family that had contributed. The contract specified the name and DNI (identity card No.) of the 4 people in each community who were authorised to collect the money. In 2006, delivery took place during the first few months, although in much lower volumes than had been agreed, then it stopped altogether. Each time he tried to find out what was happening, the businessman heard negative rumours which suggested that he had tricked the community. Finally, in order to dispel all doubts he requested a meeting with the community. Present at the meeting was the man who had been responsible for the last collection who, after much insistence, confessed that when he got back to the community, he was 10 soles short so he accused the businessman of not having paid him in full. The businessman showed by means of receipts, that he had indeed paid the full amount – around 2000 soles. Then the businessman tried to find out why the community was not delivering the amount that had been contractually agreed and set up by them in accordance with their working capacity. He then discovered that people were working only as much as was needed to make the minimum daily wage set at 15 soles per day (instead of the potential amount of 60). Although this anecdote was not confirmed with the community in question the following few observations can be put forward: Lessons Mistrust is rife! People would prefer to lose 2,000 soles a week because they think they have Learnt been robbed of 10 soles. The rationale of the river worker is to work not with a view to accumulating but to meeting certain basic consumer needs for which a few hours work a day is adequate. In Amazonia the concept of “habilitación” (credit in kind), inherited from colonial times or from the rubber era continues to prevail. Under this system, the employer loans tools, weapons, ammunition and essential products to the “habilitado”, the person receiving the loan, who then goes down river for weeks or months at a time with the agreement that they will return with rubber, wood or some other forest product. It is a system which usually leads to forms of quasi- slavery with nobody taking responsibility and consequently no respect being shown for natural resources nor the rights of others. Likewise it is symptomatic of social customs and the poor management of money. These contradictions become ever more acute when natural resources become scarce. In effect, the communities expected Amazon Ivory to behave as an “habilitador” rather than a business partner. Projects automatically assume that beneficiaries wish to increase their income: but it is important to understand the role that money plays in economies in which it is scarce? There is a need to better understand what motivates people. Another observation arises from the fact that administration of the community appears to be the responsibility of the men; we can only assume that things would be different if women were also allowed to take decisions. In the case of the Autonomous Committee of Román Sánchez, (Jenaro Herrera, province of Requena) a less disruptive outcome was negotiated which is also more appropriate, given management capabilities. In effect, the Committee charges the buyer a tax of 2 soles per crate (the crate is sold directly by the harvester at 20-25 soles) on sales of camucamu and this income goes towards paying for work done by the community to maintain natural resources.

______50 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 34 - Rural development programme for the Tierradentro region (PT) Project Number: 1996/003-076 Country: Colombia EC contrib. € 8,000,000 The project was implemented between 2000 and 2005, in the middle of the armed conflict, Project with little interest on the part of the Government in the problems of indigenous people and Background and farmers. Objectives Its objective was to improve the socio-economic conditions of the people of Tierradentro by means of organisational consolidation and the implementation of a sustainable Life Plan. The following is a list of 5 productive projects undertaken by the Tierradentro Programme (TP): Since 2003, the TP invested a great deal in the establishment of fruit demonstration plots, in an attempt to specialise and intensify cultivation, as well as dedicating resources to processing and marketing. Two years since the end of the TP, nothing remains. The coffee roasting plant located in Segovia is packaging 200 kg of coffee, which means that it is working at 20% of installed capacity, notwithstanding an upward trend since its construction. The plant was clearly oversized from the outset. The organic coffee programme had as many as 15 technicians paid by the TP agreement. At the time of closure, a transition was planned and in the end only 2 paid technicians and a network of 12 voluntary promoters were left. Since 2006, the programme has taken part in international shows and events, it has obtained an export licence and is exporting. In 2005, the TP financed a plant for extracting starch from the achira plant (Vitoncó). The plant managers now require funding to increase the surface area used for drying, Lessons Learnt which will allow them to produce more for the new markets they have identified. In 2005, the TP provided around € 6,000 to farmers in Inzá for the production of sugarcane, much less than what was provided as funding for the organic sugarloaf programme in 7 sugar mills in Paez. However, with the support of the municipality, these farmers were able to install a 2nd plant in Viborá and are currently producing with strong demand from the local and non-local markets, consistently increasing their sugar cane production. The TP methodology always requires a local organisation to be given responsibility. Initially, there were big budgets for investments but later on the contribution just about covered the investment required. It is very interesting to note that these later and more modest projects had a greater impact and were also more sustainable. In these projects, producers had to find a way to finance themselves or find additional funding to keep themselves going step by step, growing and gradually setting more and more ambitious targets for their companies. An abundance of resources and technicians does not always guarantee the success of projects, scarcity and gradual progress does!

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XIV. RULES MUST MATCH REALITY

______jfk52 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 35 - Support to secondary education in Honduras (PRAEMHO) Project Number: 2003/005-747 Country: Honduras EC contrib. € 28,000,000 At the request of the Ministry of Education, and in view of the limited proportion of the population acceding to secondary education in Honduras (24% in 2005), this programme is aimed at supporting the transformation of education currently being undertaken in the country. Conceived as a support to medium level education as a whole, it focuses in particular on Vocational Training by working with 19 “reference centres” (at least one per department.) General Objective: To contribute to the strengthening of education in Honduras, with Project special emphasis on Vocational Training. Background and Specific objectives: OE1. To establish a legal framework for secondary education that Objectives differentiates between academic education and vocational training and that provides a clearly defined Basic National Curriculum as well as an accreditation system for education centres and a certification system for diplomas in vocational training in order to ensure the quality of skills within a competitive world. OE2. To improve the quality of Vocational Training Centres in terms of management and teaching, by establishing a network of reference centres in Vocational Training that are properly equipped and managed by qualified staff. OE3. To give priority to students from the most vulnerable groups access to Vocational Training through a system of economic aid, including the transition towards insertion in the labour market. The programme is considered to be highly relevant given that vocational training in Honduras is in a critical situation at almost all levels (content of courses, infrastructure and equipment, teaching levels) and can be considered as having a comprehensive and innovative design. The original design included a logical sequence of actions: 1. Establishment of the new legal framework (revised curriculum, accreditation system for centres, and certification of graduates); 2. Rehabilitation of infrastructure; 3. Provision of appropriate equipment; and 4. Training of teachers. The project has however suffered serious delays due to various factors: administrative problems such as the preparation of tenders (due to a lack of knowledge among Ministry officials regarding EC rules), late arrival of the International Technical Assistance (who could have helped overcome this weakness) deficient bids (lack of capacity of national suppliers), a lengthy State budgetary process, a change of Government and significant changes with Lessons Learnt regard to the Project Management Unit itself (rotation of a large part of the team, including the Director). As a result of these delays and under pressure to comply with the EC´s so called N +3 Rule, the programme is elaborating and launching all tenders at the same time with no regard for the logic described above. Whilst understandable, this strategy has undermined the sense of the project and resulted in a number of perverse situations e.g. the training of teachers has been initiated before agreement on the new curriculum has been achieved and without their having access to the necessary equipment (essential in the case of vocational training); the equipment will be received before the infrastructure has been rehabilitated and this is not expected to be completed on time (before end project) in any event. In addition, this time pressure means that sufficient attention is not being given to quality aspects which could have a highly detrimental effect on project results and impact. This project is a clear example of how the rigidity of the N +3 rule, coupled with a lack of foresight and/or lack of adequate risk analysis, allows adverse external (and internal) situations to negatively affect a generally well designed project, leading to the hasty implementation of activities, thereby sacrificing the logic of intervention and quality and putting at risk the ultimate achievement of results.

______53 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 36 - Decentralisation and municipal strengthening Project Number: 2003/003-061 Country: Guatemala EC contrib. € 20,000,000 Despite the successes achieved in recent years, Guatemalan municipalities continue to be excessively dependent on central government, both politically and financially, because of their weak and unstable administrative organisation. The “Democratic Municipalities” Project project aims to strengthen public institutions involved in the decentralisation process, Background and whether they be local organisations and institutions (municipalities, communities or Objectives municipal associations) or central organisations (ministries, parliamentary committees or other public bodies). The services it provides essentially involve training and technical support. Despite the significant progress achieved in ensuring that the beneficiary organisations of the recipient countries take ownership of the initiative, there are aspects of the project implementation process that hinder the achievement of this objective. These include the decision to outsource all of the services financed by EU funds, which would not appear to be conducive to ensuring the quality and ownership of results by the final beneficiaries. Theoretically there are pros and cons to outsourcing the services aimed at beneficiaries rather than allowing them to be managed directly by the organisation responsible for project implementation. The aim of outsourcing is to ensure greater transparency and efficiency, but this does not seem to be the case in practice. The rigid structure of the contracts is not suited, for example, to the gradual nature of the decentralisation process, which is the case with this project. The splitting of activities into service contracts has not allowed for a “results oriented approach” to be respected. This makes it difficult to formulate a “layered” Logical Framework which would clearly show how each activity performed by the contractors will contribute to achieving the various results. The main Lessons learnt disadvantages detected are the following: (i) the tendency for the main beneficiaries to abdicate responsibility when faced with the difficulty of understanding and making appropriate use of the services they are being offered (ii) fragmentation of the services offered to beneficiaries and frequent duplication in the provision of technical support and training. The outsourcing of services also fails to produce the savings that were hoped for; the overheads incurred by contractors, added to the general management costs of the project, mean that the actual value of the services received by the beneficiaries is less than a third of the total funding, two thirds of the funds being used to cover the costs of delivering the services. The provision of such expensive services by means of international contracts can only be justified if they bring a significant added value in terms of quality, efficiency and transparency, compared to those that might be achieved using less expensive mechanisms (direct implementation or small local contracts). In practice this is not always the case. Furthermore, the fact that the contributions made to municipalities and associations of municipalities are limited to “software”, without the possibility of applying this software to an actual programme of investments and service improvements (hardware), considerably reduces the impact of the project.

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XV. LEARNING FROM OTHERS

INSTEAD OF REINVENTING THE WHEEL

______55 Compendium of lessons learnt – December 2007 Project Title: 37 - Municipal strengthening and decentralization Project Number: 1999/005-617 Country: Costa Rica EC contrib. € 9.600.000 The project is in line with the National Development Plan of the Costa Rican government, and aims to modernize Public Administration and support the process of decentralization. Costa Rica is a highly centralized country with an intermediate administrative level which is still weak and incipient (the legal basis allowing local governments to generate their Project own income is only 10 years old). Background and General Objective: To contribute to the processes initiated by the Costa Rican State Objectives aimed at deepening democratic practices and improving governance. Specific Objective: To contribute to the strengthening of local governments’ management capacity and to promote the elaboration and development of a model of decentralized territorial organization and management as well as improved articulation between the various State actors, incorporating gender and sustainable development as cross cutting issues. The project is considered to be highly relevant, with a good design and a coherent and comprehensive strategy. Since the early 90s, the growing demand for basic services, demographic developments and massive immigration coupled with problems of corruption have generated difficulties for the State in the fulfilment of its responsibilities and resulted in the marginalisation of citizens with regard to their institutions and decision makers. This situation has led one of the most centralized and unitary Latin American countries to initiate a process of decentralization. Notwithstanding this promising start, project efficiency, effectiveness and impact are assessed as weak and in need of improvement. In a country with such limited experience in the area of administrative decentralization, it is of utmost importance to have access to the experiences of other countries in this area i.e. lessons learned (so as to apply best practices and avoid the errors made by others) and to incorporate a high level of expertise into all aspects of the programme (i.e. elaboration of studies, strategies etc.). Coordination and collaboration with other actors is always key to project success but even more so in cases where national experience is so limited. The lack of coordination Lessons Learnt with and indeed unawareness of other projects or programmes from which this "experience" could be drawn is therefore all the more worrying in a project such as this. Taking for example the case of URB-AL, this EC financed initiative which deals with many of the project’s themes of interest could serve as an important source of information and expertise for the programme in its attempts to put in place an effective decentralization process. In particular, the URB-AL documentation center or observatory, both of which record the experiences of the various initiatives financed by URB-AL would be good starting points. Another indication of this lack of coordination is the fact that several of the actions proposed by the programme have already been undertaken by other actors working in the field of decentralization e.g. elaboration of criteria for identifying good practices developed with the support of Dutch cooperation. In short, this project clearly illustrates the consequences of not taking account of and collaborating closely with similar initiatives that have tried to tackle the same subject. It represents a clear case of reinventing the wheel.

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