British soldier takes part in civil affairs patrol in Helmand Province U.S. Marine Corps (James Purschwitz)
Leaving the Civilians Behind The “Soldier-diplomat” in Afghanistan and Iraq
By Edward Burke
he militarization of aid in conflict zones is now a reality and is likely to increase exponen- tially in the future. Stability operations are critical to the success of any viable counterin- T surgency strategy.1 Yet in much of Afghanistan and Iraq, civilian officials working alone have proven incapable of successfully distributing and monitoring stabilization funds or imple- menting associated operations; thus, they have required close cooperation with the military. Many
Edward Burke is a Political Analyst at the Foundation for International Relations (FRIDE) in Madrid, Spain.
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 27 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) highly political nature of humanitarian and countries have not adequately addressed defi- development assistance during a counterin- ciencies in models of civil-military cooperation, surgency campaign: “If war . . . is an extension with severe repercussions for the International of politics by other means, so too is relief and Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in reconstruction an extension of political, eco- Afghanistan. Meanwhile, nongovernmental nomic and military strategy.”3 organizations (NGOs) and some government In highly insecure areas, the protection of development agencies complain that the deliv- civilian officials is overly burdensome and inef- ery of aid by the military can exacerbate the ficient. Due to restrictions on their movements, targeting of civilian aid workers.2 Highlighting civilian officials cannot adequately monitor the failure of civilian agencies to cooperate local dynamics and ensure that the delivery of effectively with the military may provide tem- aid is not counterproductive to long-term politi- porary vindication to skeptics within the NGO cal objectives. The military is therefore better community, but such criticism does not solve equipped to provide reconstruction and humani- the critical dilemma of how to deliver recon- tarian assistance, being able to assume a number struction and humanitarian assistance to the of different roles as required. The U.S. Army most violent parts of Afghanistan and Iraq or has observed that “even though stability opera- other nonpermissive environments. tions emphasize non-lethal actions, the ability Where the targeting of civilian officials and to engage potential enemies with decisive lethal aid workers is a key insurgent tactic, there is force remains a sound deterrent and is often a key to success.”4 In the United Kingdom (UK), today, we risk overlooking one the cross-departmental Stabilisation Unit has of the most important tenets of conceded that the military’s “greater mobility enables them greater access to manage projects counterinsurgency strategy: maintaining implemented by local partners in highly inse- a firm civilian lead cure areas.”5 During Operation Panchai Palang in Afghanistan last summer, the U.S. military often no alternative to delivering aid through reiterated old complaints about the “near total the military. Consequently, the military has absence” of civilian experts, but then assembled found itself forced to blur conventional dis- the largest ever Civil Affairs (CA) or civil-mili- tinctions by taking the place of civilian aid tary cooperation (CIMIC) contingent attached agencies. This is to the detriment of humani- to a combat brigade—mostly Reservists with tarian concepts of neutrality, but vital to the backgrounds in local government, business man- successful prosecution of a counterinsurgency agement, and policing.6 Soldiers occasionally strategy. It presents an uncomfortable choice grumble about either the absence or ineffective- between permitting the military to intrude ness of diplomats and humanitarian assistance/ upon “humanitarian space,” or upholding the development officials. They have essentially concept of neutrality and risking total failure. moved on, now willing to take on tasks conven- Stuart Bowen, the outspoken Special Inspector tionally seen as the remit of civilian agencies. General for Iraq Reconstruction, in a nod to The influential French counterinsurgency Carl von Clausewitz, has aptly summarized the expert David Galula astutely observed that
28 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 during a counterinsurgency campaign, “tasks stability operations as a “core U.S. military and responsibilities cannot be neatly divided mission that the Department of Defense shall between the civilian and the soldier, for their be prepared to conduct and support. They operations overlap too much with each other.”7 shall be given priority comparable to combat The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq operations.”9 More recently, Secretary Robert require such a “comprehensive approach,” Gates has set about reorienting the defense utilizing the full range of civilian and military budget toward counterinsurgency and stability capabilities to stabilize both countries. Today, operations.10 DOD spending of U.S. Official however, we risk overlooking one of the most Development Assistance (ODA) has rapidly important tenets of counterinsurgency strat- proliferated, rising from 3.5 percent before 2003 egy: maintaining a firm civilian lead. This was to almost 26 percent in 2008.11 emphasized by Galula, who warned that “giv- In response to its experiences in ing the soldier authority over the civilian would Afghanistan and Iraq, in 2008 the U.S. Army thus contradict one of the major characteristics produced Field Manual (FM) 3–07, Stability of this type of war.”8 Operations, which effectively offers a coherent The need for a civilian lead on setting set of guidelines on how the military can assume policy for stability operations does not mean responsibility for defense, diplomacy, and devel- that the military cannot undertake political/ opment. The introduction to FM 3–07 observes humanitarian tasks where civilian officials are that “expeditionary civilians exist neither in unable to do so. However, civilian supervision the numbers, nor with the skill sets, required is required to monitor such activities to ensure for today’s operations,” and even if these were that policy is not set by the military. Crucially, to exist, “there will still be many instances in civilian leadership helps to dispel the percep- which it is too dangerous for these civilians tion of the host population being under military to deploy.”12 The manual goes on to describe occupation. It is important, however, that civil- potential U.S. military involvement in not only ian officials should not be a rigid, bureaucratic the emergency provision of essential services obstacle to a more flexible military approach. but also in how to assume a full range of politi- They must adapt according to the evolving situ- cal responsibilities—essentially the functions of ation on the ground, listening and responding government—until these can be transitioned to military advice, while ensuring that govern- to a civil authority. It offers a careful set of ment policies are not compromised by the mili- guidelines on various governance tasks that the tary for the sake of expediency. To undertake military may be expected to assume, including this complex task requires a civilian doctrine and the preparation and supervision of elections. It an unconventional diplomat. seeks to learn the lessons of Iraq by foreseeing “military forces quickly seizing the initiative to The Political Military improve the civil situation while preventing the The U.S. military has undergone a radical situation from deteriorating further.”13 shift in how it prepares for war. This shift can FM 3–07 is a natural extension of counter- be traced back to 2005 when the Department insurgency doctrine within the U.S. military. of Defense (DOD) implemented a landmark The manual does not offer guidance, however, new directive that unambiguously referred to on the division of political labor between the
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 29 military in theater and the diplomats whose task better at making policy in Afghanistan than it is to lead on bilateral relations. It also assumes their civilian counterparts. a capacity within the U.S. military that does Although the UK military has been quick not exist. CA officers (predominantly Reservists to blame the Labour government for not deploy- from administrative or construction professional ing enough personnel or materiel in either backgrounds) lack training in political and lin- Afghanistan or Iraq, the passing of blame has guistic skills, as well as an advanced knowledge obscured what one former officer at the British army’s Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) has described as an “insular, UK officers have spoken enviously of conformist culture” that has sapped a “capacity the U.S. Foreign Area Officer concept for international reflection and rapid change.”17 and training Despite such criticism, it is obvious that some senior UK officers do wish to learn from the mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq. UK officers of their local environment upon deploying to have spoken enviously of the U.S. Foreign Area Afghanistan and Iraq.14 The U.S. military is Officer (FAO) concept and training, which quickly adapting, however, and has substan- allow U.S. officers to acquire a wide range of tially increased funding for language and cul- skills, whether in international development tural training since 2007.15 or languages. The U.S. military has developed a ten- The evolution of the UK military has been dency to design and make policy in Iraq without much less ambitious than that of the United sufficient civilian oversight. The local agree- States since the beginning of the campaigns ment reached in 2006 and 2007 by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Labour govern- military to “turn” significant parts of the Sunni ment has not undertaken a Strategic Defence insurgency was initially the brainchild of a U.S. Review in more than a decade. Despite a Army officer, Colonel Sean MacFarland, who reduction in defense spending from 4.1 percent transformed former insurgent militia into U.S. of gross domestic product in 1990 to under 3 allies without the consent of the Iraqi govern- percent today, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) ment. This decision “took the United States proposes to spend a large part of this limited into the dangerous and complex new territory budget on a new nuclear deterrent and two of supporting an armed group that was opposed new aircraft carriers that many UK defense to the government in Baghdad that the United experts believe to be surplus to requirements. States also supported.”16 The “surge” strategy Given the shortage of specialist skills and bypassed the Department of State and military vital equipment for British troops deployed chain of command. The fact that this policy in Afghanistan, one serving officer bluntly has been vindicated in part does not lessen the observed, “The choice we face is ‘Fortress worrisome implications that such actions have Britain’ versus ‘intervention’. . . . What we for civil-military relations. More recently, the really need is to develop armies that can get appointment of General Karl Eikenberry as out into the world, helping to stabilise conflict Ambassador to Kabul in early 2009 gives the situations, conducting ‘war among the people.’ impression that senior U.S. military officers are We’re not preparing for that at all.”18
30 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 The UK military in Helmand Province has Afghanistan and Iraq by the UK government. learned from the experience of Iraq by moving This is far from the case. The UK military to improve civil-military relations. Military primarily sees its role in Afghanistan as one personnel are both willing and well placed to of “buying space” for the civilians to provide gather knowledge on local contractors and political solutions, but it is deeply frustrated at monitor projects. They have also worked to the lack of a coherent narrative and realistic ensure that training and monitoring teams, strategy for success.19 This has led to a worry- while maintaining “the necessary force pro- ing trend of the military launching political tection capabilities,” operate in a deliberately broadsides at their civilian masters. Prior to his less overt manner. The British army has estab- retirement from the British army in November lished a unit of CIMIC officers, the Military 2009, General Sir Richard Dannatt joined the Stabilisation Support Group, with a range of opposition Conservative Party as an advisor stabilization skills and has also acknowledged and robustly criticized the Labour government’s a need to improve training in linguistic and strategy in Afghanistan. This followed a num- cultural skills, including knowledge of local ber of public speeches criticizing UK policies political structures. In September 2009, the prior to the end of his term as chief of staff of MoD moved to address this knowledge defi- the army.20 Such political activity by a serving cit by creating a Defence Cultural Specialist British officer is without precedent in recent Unit to advise commanders on operations in times and reflects a strain on civil-military rela- Afghanistan and elsewhere. tions at both the highest levels in London and Although the UK military has faced the in Afghanistan. same dilemmas as its U.S. counterpart, it has The evolution of the U.S. and UK forces reacted differently, in part due to a lack of funds toward an increasing role in stability operations with which to undertake stability operations contrasts with the relative inertia of many of unilaterally. Senior UK officers have been reluc- their NATO Allies, who continue to deploy tant to change the political game in the areas insufficient CIMIC capacity to Afghanistan. under their command in Afghanistan and Iraq. The role of Spain in Badghis Province in Such an enduring preference to “leave politics northwest Afghanistan is a case in point. to the civilians” has allowed civilian agencies to Despite the Spanish government’s insistence improve performance in Afghanistan and reas- on terming the mission of Spanish troops in sert political primacy at every level of opera- Afghanistan as “reconstruction, stabilization tions. It has also enabled the emergence of a and democratization,” the Ministry of Defence unique model of civil-military cooperation in has repeatedly chosen to deploy elite troops Helmand Province. The DCDC at Shrivenham to Afghanistan, including members of the drew upon these experiences to produce a long- Parachute Regiment.21 These soldiers have the awaited stability operations doctrine at the end combat skills to undertake an offensive counter- of 2009. insurgency capacity, which their government is Unlike the U.S. military, the hesitancy of unwilling to utilize, but they are neither trained the UK military to adopt a unilaterally politi- nor equipped to undertake CIMIC tasks, for cal approach should not be taken as indicat- which Spain only allocated 10 to 15 military ing a general satisfaction with the policy set for personnel in 2009. Consequently, insurgents
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 31 have extended their control over large parts, way off. This delay has serious repercussions if not most, of the province. There is an obvi- for the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, where ous contradiction in structuring ISAF policy there is a chaotic divergence of approaches around a “reconstruction mission” in Badghis to stability operations. Nominally, the ISAF if Spanish and Afghan troops do not hold ter- Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) is ritory on which to reconstruct. Meanwhile, responsible for building a civil-military strat- the Spanish government development agency egy for Afghanistan; in practice, however, he (Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional struggles to be effective due to his ill-defined para el Desarrollo), although unable to moni- role and powers.23 Tellingly, it is the ISAF com- tor projects in most of the province due to the mander and not the SCR who, together with escalating insurgency, has refused to allow the the Afghan Minister for the Interior, co-chairs military to do so on its behalf, claiming that this the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) would blur lines between Spain’s civilian and Executive Steering Committee. military commitments to Afghanistan.22 These It is difficult to refer to the PRT as a struc- contradictions lie at the heart of the problem tured model; these can vary enormously in size, with many of the European contingents in preponderance of military or civilian person- Afghanistan; soldiers are equipped to fight but nel, and command structures.24 There is a grave cannot do so robustly due to domestic politi- need for NATO member states to coordinate cal considerations. They ultimately run the risk doctrine and best practice: scant guidance exists of being (grudgingly) replaced by the United on when and how a PRT should transition from States on both counts. being more or less military or when it should cease to exist. Where humanitarian workers are able to operate, it is important that they be per- in 2006, member states agreed in mitted to do so without unnecessary intrusion principle to the concept of a NATO or duplication of effort by the military and that comprehensive approach but took 2 years civil-military models such as PRTs transition to to negotiate an Action Plan to put this more civilian entities, such as Field Advance into effect Civilian Teams. Attempts to improve coordination among ISAF contributors have seen mixed results At the NATO level, the Alliance does not at best. In 2006, ISAF introduced train- have a clearly defined set of guiding principles ing initiatives and developed a Handbook of to inform a more coherent civil-military rela- Best Practices for incoming PRT staff. The tionship in Afghanistan. In 2006, member states mechanisms of the PRT Executive Steering agreed in principle to the concept of a NATO Committee and PRT Working Group have comprehensive approach but subsequently also been updated to reflect lessons learned. took 2 years to negotiate an Action Plan to put However, the impact of new guidelines in this into effect. A highly variable approach to the field appears negligible, as underresourced CIMIC and civil-military cooperation among soldiers and civilians deal with competing NATO member states means that the imple- demands, not least from their respective home mentation of a unified framework is still some capitals. Rather than carrying out a clearly
32 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 delineated, centralized plan for Afghanistan, overstated the role of the military and under- operations are generally left to the discretion of stated what civilians could do even in a hos- the individual PRT’s lead nation, an approach tile environment.”28 This contrasts with other that has been labeled as the “Balkanization” of ISAF PRT-lead countries that continue to take the aid effort due to the lack of any coherent a more cautious approach. centralized planning to manage PRT collective In some provinces of Iraq, senior United activities.25 This in turn impacts local conflict Nations (UN) officials, who have spent the dynamics and the consolidation of the Afghan bulk of the European Union’s (EU) almost state, whose officials are overwhelmed by the €1 billion in aid, have never actually seen the divergence of perspectives and practices among projects they commissioned. Agencies such such a large coalition. as the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) have even resorted to “Where Are the Civilians?” monitoring projects through aerial photog- Although Multi-National Force–Iraq raphy.29 In Afghanistan, a 2009 report by the (MNF–I) and ISAF officers frequently com- plain about the shortage of civilian experts the “politics of aid” is at its most in areas worst affected by insurgency, it is apparent during an insurgency where debatable whether a significant increase of the incumbent regime and the shadow civilians would deliver the results expected of them unless highly restrictive limitations insurgent state compete to secure the on movement are reassessed.26 Diplomat and support of the local population civilian expert movements are greatly hin- dered by regulations imposed by their respec- Humanitarian Policy Group observed that an tive ministries—what former British diplomat escalation of attacks by insurgents on aid work- Hilary Synott has called “the dead hand of ers has resulted in a “general retrenchment [of senior managers.” Excessive “duty of care” aid workers] to provincial capitals and a shrink- restrictions prevent diplomats and civilian ing of the overall field presence.”30 Despite experts from delivering accurate analysis of increased restrictions on civilian movements, the political situation, developing contacts many ISAF contributors are reluctant to allow among the local population, and implement- the military to monitor contracts.31 This is ing and overseeing reconstruction projects.27 understandable but overlooks the clear warn- However, the response to this challenge is ing from the Taliban-Quetta shura leadership not uniform within ISAF. For example, the that any organization providing aid without United Kingdom has increasingly come to see their direct permission will be targeted.32 The the greater mobility of its civilian personnel in Humanitarian Policy Group has concluded that, Helmand as necessary, despite obvious secu- regardless of whether projects are implemented rity concerns. Consequently, civilian personnel by international or local staff, “aid organisations attached to the PRT Lashkar Gah and stabi- are being attacked not just because they are per- lization advisors have a much wider presence ceived to be cooperating with Western political in the province than in 2007 and early 2008. actors, but because they are perceived as wholly A senior UK official has concluded that “we part of the Western agenda.”33
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 33 The “politics of aid” is at its most apparent military must move to fill the vacuum until the during an insurgency where two rival systems, insurgency can be contained. the incumbent regime and the shadow insurgent Prior to the Iraq War, the conventional state, compete to secure the support of the local thinking in the U.S. Government was “to get population. The ISAF commander, General diplomats out of war zones on the understand- Stanley McChrystal, has consistently stressed the ing that diplomats had to be protected and importance of a profound political knowledge to preserved for when the fighting was over.”35 inform the delivery of aid even at the most basic In the aftermath of the political chaos that levels: “If you build a well in the wrong place in gripped Iraq in late 2003–2004, the U.S. State a village, you may have shifted the basis of power Department conceded that it had insufficient in that village. . . . Therefore, with a completely resources to “plan, implement or manage sta- altruistic aim of building a well, you can create bilization and reconstruction operations.”36 divisiveness or give the impression that you, from Exacerbating the weakness of interagency coor- the outside, do not understand what is going dination in Afghanistan and Iraq is the lack of on or that you have sided with one element or specialist skills and local knowledge of U.S. dip- another, yet all you tried to do is provide water.”34 lomats deployed there. Few have experience or Logically, sustainable reconstruction and sufficient training in working with the military provision of essential services mean that such in hostile environments. The reality that diplo- efforts must be integrated within a locally macy in conflict situations requires highly spe- owned plan so that in the mid to long term, cialized skills that cannot be simply learned on such activities can be undertaken by the gov- the job by a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) more ernment. However, this directly leads to the accustomed to conventional diplomacy is an extension of the government’s writ, namely important lesson that the State Department has its capacity to provide for its citizens, thereby yet to show definitive signs of learning. The cul- challenging the rival structures of the shadow ture of the State Department is partly to blame: state established by the insurgency. Because U.S. diplomats are generally discouraged from most intergovernmental aid organizations and cross-agency assignments, as these postings are international NGOs are unable and unwilling often perceived as detrimental to career pros- to work with the Taliban, the “humanitarian pects.37 This is the opposite experience to that space” becomes loaded in the government’s of the U.S. military, where an ambitious officer favor. The targeting of NGOs and their “recipi- is now expected to work in multiple disciplines. ent partners,” including hospitals and schools, As of January 2009, the Political-Military that do not operate with the insurgency’s con- Bureau at the State Department had 26 foreign sent is therefore a tactic born out of cold and policy or political advisor (POLAD) positions brutal reasoning, aimed at increasing the depen- attached to the military. Another 17 FSOs dence of the local population on the insurgents’ were assigned to military education and train- rival political, economic, and social infrastruc- ing institutes. In the past, however, FSOs have ture, and not simply an innate zeal or cruelty. considered such positions career dead-ends, and Consequently, in areas worst affected by the the military has frequently complained that the insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is Department of State “doesn’t exactly send its no humanitarian space to speak of. Instead, the A Team.”38 POLADs also do not receive the
34 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 extensive training necessary to adapt to an convoluted landscape of agencies engaged in sta- advisory role in a military environment, and the bility operations.42 More pragmatically, USAID State Department has no mechanism in place has occasionally requested that the military take to track officers who previously held political- over monitoring duties of contracts where the military positions at home so that a pool of perceived threat level to U.S. civilian officials experienced officers could be maintained for has significantly escalated.43 future deployments and consultations.39 In the campaign to “win hearts and minds” In Iraq, U.S. diplomats rarely venture out in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military has come of large military bases unless accompanied by a heavy security escort, often provided by private the culture of the military predisposes it security companies deeply resented by the local to expect that, where civilian agencies populace. In particularly dangerous areas, civil- ian officials will frequently not leave military “have the lead,” they have the resources compounds for weeks or even months. During and know-how to deploy self-sufficiently this time, their only contact with Iraqis will be with local employees who work within the mili- to expect too much from its civilian counter- tary zone. Many diplomats are therefore almost parts. The culture of the military predisposes it completely ignorant of their surroundings and to expect that, where civilian agencies “have the rely heavily on the military or the intelligence lead,” they have the resources and know-how to agencies for information on local events. deploy self-sufficiently. However, it is obvious The lack of training provided to U.S. dip- that, in addition to bureaucratic shortcomings, lomats and restrictions on movement have the State Department and USAID do not have had severe consequences with regard to politi- sufficient funding with which to recruit and cal dynamics in Afghanistan and Iraq. Vastly train personnel. It is estimated that only 1 cent inflated contracts stir up resentment by making of every dollar that the U.S. Government spends a few individuals extremely wealthy. In the case on national security and foreign affairs is allo- of Iraq, the monopoly on U.S. reconstruction cated to diplomacy and aid.44 There is clearly a contracts was compounded by the reality that chronic shortage of U.S. FSOs—key diplomatic many “bids” were in fact all subcontracted to posts in the Middle East remain unfilled—with just a few local construction companies, which severe consequences for U.S. diplomacy abroad in turn imported significant quantities of mate- and civilian control of foreign policy.45 In 1990, rials from individuals with close contacts with USAID’s direct hire personnel numbered 3,500, the Iranian government.40 In Afghanistan, local down from 15,000 during the Vietnam War. This businessmen contracted by the United States and figure has declined by another third since the first other ISAF contributors to undertake reconstruc- Gulf War even as USAID’s annual budget has tion projects often pay bribes to the Taliban to increased from $5 billion to $13.2 billion today.46 secure the safe passage of building supplies.41 The The United States has finally grasped that U.S. Agency for International Development the State Department and USAID need to (USAID) has also recently begun subcontracting prepare for conflict and not just postconflict monitoring to international civilian contractors, engagement. It is envisaged that in 2010, 150 adding another layer of bureaucracy to an already additional POLAD diplomats will be embedded
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 35 U.S. and British civilian members of Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand Province talk with school headmaster U.S. Marine Corps (Jeremy Harris)
within military commands, although it remains The funding of a large share of humani- unclear how POLADs fit into the command tarian and reconstruction projects from the structure of U.S. operations.47 In 2005, USAID U.S. defense budget is exactly the opposite established an Office of Military Affairs (OMA) experience of other NATO countries where to facilitate coordination with the military, the budget has been controlled by a ministry and is now comparatively far ahead of other of foreign affairs or a respective development NATO government development agencies in agency. The Commander’s Emergency Response acknowledging that they have a significant Program stabilization fund for 2008 amounted role in contributing to U.S. national secu- to approximately half a billion dollars, more rity.48 This follows the creation of the Office than the combined education and health bud- of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and gets of the Afghan government for that year.51 Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004 as part of the U.S. diplomats and aid officials are increasingly U.S. Government’s Civilian Stabilization reliant on the goodwill of DOD to fund their Initiative. Remarkably, however, the U.S. projects in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress refused to pass a State Department In 2005, the newly constituted S/CRS authorization bill to fund S/CRS.49 Admiral developed a draft Planning Framework for Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict of Staff, intervened to plead the S/CRS case, Transformation, which it disseminated for inter- which eventually was awarded $200 million agency comments. Disputes over the wording from the DOD budget for 2006 and 2007.50 continued until 2008 when the S/CRS was
36 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 forced to abandon the document and published and 2003 when the Secretary for International a less detailed version, laying out a framework Development, Clare Short, refused to take that was finally approved in May 2008.52 S/CRS any measures to prepare DFID adequately for does not have the authority or personnel to lead the contingency of war in Iraq.56 Senior DFID a comprehensive approach; rather, it facilitates officials pointed to the wording of the 2002 agreement among the various parties and man- International Development Act as precluding ages a reserve of civilian experts. Its influence in the use of aid to further the United Kingdom’s Afghanistan and Iraq has been extremely lim- immediate political and security interests, ited.53 The complexity of the S/CRS task has objecting to any inclusion of DFID in UK been exacerbated by a highly confused and bur- Afghanistan counterinsurgency strategy, which densome congressional committee system, with they claimed was a military concept that DFID over eight committees assuming responsibility could not support.57 Since 2006, however, there for stabilization and reconstruction activities. has been a significant shift in such thinking, as In August 2009, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal agreed to implement an Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan the incoherent selection and training for Afghanistan. This initiative is an innova- of diplomats sent to Iraq were to be a tive attempt by the U.S. civilian and military consistent feature of UK deployment leadership in Kabul to develop a model for through to 2009 civil-military relations during counterinsur- gency and stability operations, and to some extent illustrates the dearth of appropri- DFID came under pressure to contribute to UK ate structures and guidance emanating from national security interests. In 2008, the DFID Washington. From late 2009, civilian represen- contribution was an integral part of the UK tatives were appointed to each U.S. regional projected Afghanistan Strategy—essentially a command and at the provincial/district level blueprint for the civil-military effort to counter “to execute U.S. policy and guidance, serve as the Taliban-led insurgency. DFID has also made the civilian counterpart to the military com- moves to prioritize spending in other develop- mander, and integrate and coordinate [civil- ing countries in which the United Kingdom has military] efforts.”54 Crucially, the new structure an important national security interest, includ- provides for a joint decisionmaking mechanism ing Pakistan and Yemen. at every level of operations on issues affect- The UK civilian response to filling the gov- ing stability operations and, if properly imple- ernance vacuum that emerged in Iraq’s south- mented, will go a long way toward improving east region was chaotic, reflecting a lack of civilian oversight of the military and U.S. knowledge, resources, and a grave incoherence, unity of effort in Afghanistan.55 if not outright hostility, between key govern- In the United Kingdom, DFID officials ment departments. The Foreign Office initially have previously demonstrated a profound dislike proposed appointing the Governor of Bermuda, of working toward UK security interests, espe- Sir John Vereker, as the Civilian Coordinator cially if it involved close cooperation with the for the Coalition Provisional Authority in MoD. Such an attitude was evident during 2002 the south of Iraq, despite the fact that he had
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 37 never worked in a country in or emerging from the scope and performance of the PRT’s activi- conflict.58 The person eventually selected for ties increased considerably, with one UK official the post, Hilary Synnott, was given a mission observing that “the key objective was to salvage statement just under half a page in length and our reputation.”62 was told “to play it by ear.”59 The incoherent The lack of capacity to deliver in conflict selection and training of diplomats sent to Iraq countries also contributed to a growing crisis in were to be a consistent feature of UK deploy- morale within the FCO.63 A shortage of per- ment through to 2009. The slow and inadequate sonnel and cultural/language training means deployment of Foreign and Commonwealth that the FCO and DFID continue to rely heav- Office (FCO) and DFID personnel, delays in ily on local staff in key strategic countries. the release of funds, and the unwillingness of Only five FCO personnel have a basic level of the army to fill the civilian gap meant that the Pashtu, particularly surprising given the UK United Kingdom ultimately lost the crucial commitment to Afghanistan since 2001 and postinvasion “window” in which to decisively the large number of UK citizens of Pakistani engage in the south of Iraq. and Afghan descent.64 DFID has also suffered As the insurgency increased in intensity, from a shortage in political and cultural exper- during 2006 and 2007 the UK-led PRT failed to tise, attributed to insufficient training and short transition from a primarily civilian entity into deployments: postings to Afghanistan and Iraq one that took a more military approach to sta- often only last 12 months. The UK National bility operations. During this period, the Basra Audit Office (NAO) has noted that there has palace was being hit daily by up to 40 rocket and been little guidance and no “lessons learned” mortar attacks, often bringing the PRT’s work to approach to DFID’s work in insecure environ- ments, observing that there is “limited research and experience on delivering effective aid in the establishment of a Stabilisation insecure environments, so the information Unit led to various UK departments on which DFID is able to base its decisions is agreeing on a roadmap that has weak.” Worryingly, in a survey undertaken by brought about significant the NAO, 40 percent of DFID personnel found improvements in Helmand Province the induction period prior to deployment poor or very poor. In addition to a lack of institu- tional memory, training, and a high personnel a virtual standstill. Reconstruction efforts were turnover, DFID frequently dispatches personnel also hampered by internal conflicts between with no previous overseas development experi- senior personnel within the PRT, arising prin- ence: over 50 percent of DFID representatives cipally from “a lack of clear guidelines” as to its in Afghanistan during 2008 had never been role and objectives.60 The fact that British and posted abroad before.65 Danish civil-military structures in Basra “ran The inability to monitor projects due to a along parallel tracks and were not integrated” shortage of personnel and a highly adverse secu- only added to the confusion.61 Following a rity situation had grave consequences for UK major MNF–I/Iraqi operation against insur- stability operations in Afghanistan during 2006 gents in Basra during March and April 2008, and 2007. A suicide attack on civilian personnel
38 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 in Helmand Province in November 2007 led for over a year, until it was eventually concluded to a review of DFID operations, with the effect that only £1 million could be accounted for.71 that by early 2008, “practical reconstruction and The United Kingdom, like the United development efforts had stalled, as had efforts to States, has recognized the shortcomings of its improve governance.”66 The Danish civilian con- civilian engagement in Afghanistan and Iraq tribution in Helmand was also struggling: “Due and has moved to correct an obvious lack of to a lack of priority and personnel,” 75 percent interagency coordination of efforts. The estab- of the planned activities of the stabilization lishment of a Stabilisation Unit led to various advisor in Lashkar Gah were cancelled during 1 UK departments agreeing on a roadmap that month in 2008.67 However, unlike postinvasion has brought about significant improvements in Iraq, this breakdown in the civilian effort led to Helmand Province. The original plan for the a review of operations and a redoubling of the province, produced when the United Kingdom civil-military effort with a coherent structure put took the lead there in 2006, did not effectively in place to improve cooperation. deal with the integration of the civilian and mili- Despite improved civil-military coherence, tary efforts.72 The roadmap shifted the activities UK civilian officials in Afghanistan are severely of the PRT in Lashkar Gah away from a post- hampered by a lack of air transport, being com- conflict approach toward that of dealing with pletely dependent upon the goodwill of the a mounting insurgency. In June 2008, London military as their request for a suitable aircraft in announced the creation of the Civil-Military Helmand “had to be cancelled, and the deposit Mission Helmand (CMMH), which has signifi- forgone, because [Her Majesty’s] Treasury had cantly improved the integration of military and not approved the funds.”68 Due to restrictions civilian efforts into one coherent strategy. on mobility, DFID was subsequently able to dis- CMMH has emerged as an important burse only half of its allocated funding for the model for civilian supervision of stability opera- province. DFID has also been forced to spend tions that, because of extremely adverse security large amounts of its budget on private security conditions, are monitored by the military. It is company contracts: one contract with Control administered by the lead personnel from the Risks in Afghanistan in 2003–2004 cost £6.8 military, FCO, and DFID and integrates equiv- million, including the provision of 68 secu- alent representatives from the U.S., Danish, rity guards, and in 2009, the same company and Estonian contingents. Tasks such as intel- received the majority of the £2.9 million fund- ligence, political analysis, planning, district ing allocated to a local governance project in level stabilization, media, and communications, Basra Province.69 The NAO has calculated that which previously were carried out in parallel, placing a UK civilian for a year in Afghanistan are now conducted jointly. The civil-military has cost up to $250,000. Subcontracting to collaborative effort at headquarters in Lashkar NGOs has also proven unfeasible in much of Gah is replicated in other districts of Helmand, Afghanistan and Iraq due to security concerns.70 each with a joint civil-military stabilization In the case of the Southern Iraq Employment team of approximately 10 staff located within Programme, lack of oversight of the local the relevant battlegroup. Importantly, CMMH authorities who received a grant of £4 million clearly places a UK civilian official at the center meant that fraudulent reporting went unnoticed of all decisionmaking in Helmand.73
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 39 The pragmatic approach offered by teams. The posting of a military liaison officer CMMH, where stabilization officers at the in DFID has also improved coherence in both district level provide direction to military Afghanistan and Iraq. The Stabilisation Unit personnel, means that civilian expertise and has played an important role in facilitating military capabilities are pooled toward realiz- the harmonization of different agencies’ views ing the common objectives of the UK strategy into a more coherent UK government strategy, in Afghanistan. The civilian component— and has accelerated the deployment of civilian approximately 50 experts drawn from various personnel to conflict areas, recently placing government agencies—leads reporting on over- civilian personnel on the ground in Helmand all progress in the province, and a regular joint district centers “cleared” by the military within civil-military report is dispatched to Whitehall 24 to 48 hours. The unit is responsible for by the ambassador in Kabul, who is responsible updating the Stabilisation Task Matrix, which for oversight of the UK’s Afghanistan strategy.74 describes a range of tasks germane to stability UK military officers have reported posi- operations and models of civil-military coop- tively on the effectiveness of stabilization advi- eration. The matrix is currently being updated sors in coordinating a comprehensive approach to recognize that “civilians can do more,” a at the operational/tactical level. In addition, testament to the improved performance of the the deployment of FCO and Stabilisation Unit UK civilian engagement in Helmand. The personnel throughout the province rather than Stabilisation Unit currently operates a num- just in Lashkar Gah contrasts favorably with the ber of cross-departmental training courses and experience in Basra Province, where a hand- is participating, together with the FCO and ful of UK civilian officials were eventually MoD, in a DFID-led audit of “conflict skills” restricted to operating from one location, the in order to gauge the future predeployment Contingency Operating Base at Basra interna- needs of UK personnel.77 In 2007, the UK gov- tional airport.75 CMMH also offers a means of ernment announced the creation of a separate structuring civilian and military political con- Stabilisation Aid Fund as an extension of the tacts with a close liaison established between preexisting Global Conflict Prevention Pool. the civilians and the “planning” units of the The fund has a budget of £243 million for 2008– military’s Task Force Helmand. Building on this 2010 that is overseen jointly by the MoD, FCO, experience, the UK government has the oppor- and DFID according to a “triple key” system.78 tunity to put in place a more coherent doctrine The Stabilisation Unit is an important step on civil-military relations during counterinsur- toward harmonizing UK government activities gency operations.76 in working toward national objectives when The UK government has introduced a at war. However, for all its innovative steps in number of important measures to improve civil- moving closer to the holy grail of the compre- ian oversight and training of the military. The hensive approach, the unit lacks a champion in Stabilisation Unit has recently taken practical the Cabinet. It is frequently seen as too closely steps to improve the level of guidance given to aligned with DFID, yet it answers to three gov- the military, and has amended a DFID guide- ernment ministries (DFID, FCO, and MoD). book aimed at improving best practices for This is not only a consequence of the unit’s Quick Impact Projects implemented by CIMIC offices operating out of DFID, but also because
40 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 almost all of its operational costs have until now distinction between the civilian and military been channelled from the DFID budget, rather efforts, it is far less desirable for governments to than being split three ways.79 continue to invest heavily in a country such as The Stabilisation Unit’s role is limited to Afghanistan only to find that due to the level mediating among the three departments and of insecurity, civilians cannot engage, and, operating according to their consent. The task due to lack of guidance, the military cannot of imposing a solution upon interdepartmental deliver, or worse, that tensions may be exacer- disputes falls to the Cabinet Office responsible bated by a haphazard delivery of aid. Misspent for the day-to-day coordination of all UK gov- aid entrenches corruption and is a useful pro- ernment business, which is perceived as lacking paganda tool as well as an occasional source of sufficient personnel and expertise.80 One means of addressing this authority deficit could be for the Stabilisation Unit to be placed solely under while many critics are horrified at the remit of a properly resourced Cabinet Office. the idea of the military undertaking The Conservative Party has proposed creating humanitarian and reconstruction tasks a new National Security Council where the normally carried out by civilians, it is Stabilisation Unit will have a “strong voice.” difficult to consider an alternative in However, it is not clear how such a body will certain circumstances operate vis-à-vis the Cabinet Office and how it will differ substantially from existing com- mittee structures. The Conservatives have also funding for the insurgency. This is particularly vaguely proposed that Stabilisation Advisors important given the U.S. “civilian surge” in would “report to the military chain of com- Afghanistan during 2009 and 2010. Unless the mand,” although again what exactly this means Obama administration chooses to ease security in practice remains to be seen. Alarmingly, it restrictions on U.S. civilian officials in Iraq, the seems to imply military seniority over UK civil- costs of the deployment will be exorbitantly ian officials in Helmand.81 high and results are likely to be unsatisfactory. In Helmand Province, the United Kingdom Need for Civilian Doctrine is currently testing a thoughtful and pragmatic While many critics are horrified at the idea merging of the civilian and military efforts of the military undertaking humanitarian and that is worthy of further study. In agreeing on reconstruction tasks normally carried out by mechanisms to integrate military and civilian civilians, it is difficult to consider an alterna- efforts, Ambassador Eikenberry and General tive in certain circumstances. By refusing to McChrystal have offered a coherent U.S. acknowledge that civilians are frequently inca- vision for improving security in Afghanistan. pable of performing the wide range of stability Both countries are substantially ahead of the tasks expected of them, and simultaneously are curve in trying to make unity of effort a work- not training the military to fill that void where ing reality, and such initiatives give grounds required, we are destined to fail repeatedly. for optimism that the civilian performance can Although the prospect of close cooperation improve. However, these initiatives can only with the military has the effect of blurring the succeed if both governments continue to reform
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 41 their civilian bureaucracies toward empower- Afghanistan, whose office was created in 2008, ing decisionmaking by officials on the ground so is encountering the same problems as in Iraq that they can respond more quickly to the needs due to “very little oversight” of the $32 bil- of a rapidly evolving counterinsurgency strategy. lion that has been appropriated.84 There is an In advocating greater political awareness obvious need for a comprehensive approach to among the officer corps, military strategist reconstruction contracting procedures, includ- Michael Howard observed that “military com- ing the possible creation of a single civil-mili- manders will need exceptional political wisdom tary agency with a pooled budget to take a clear as well as military skill; but they should refrain lead on humanitarian aid and reconstruction in from attempting to shape the political world to the areas worst affected by insurgency. their image.”82 This is still true today. Although The political leaders of NATO still can- General David Petraeus has observed that not agree on what the comprehensive approach the U.S. Department of State “is never going really means: some member states view it as a to put an Ambassador under a general, and method of collaboration in security sector [DOD] is never going to put a general under an reform, while others argue that it should con- Ambassador,” on political matters, soldiers must stitute a closely integrated counterinsurgency yield to civilian guidance at all levels.83 This strategy.85 This is exacerbated by continued con- means granting civilians unequivocal authority fusion as to the structure of PRTs, and where at every stage of the design and implementation and how they should operate. Such political of stability operations, even if such activities are weakness severely undermines the coherence carried out by the military. It does not matter of ISAF operations in Afghanistan, where the whether the military makes the “right” political lack of a clear strategy and guidance on civil- decisions; these decisions are simply not for the military division of labor is exacerbated by the military to make. proliferation of actors cluttering the same space. Whereas the military now plans for opera- Ultimately, it will take a greatly strength- tions according to “ink-spots” or “clear, hold, ened political will and commitment by NATO and build” through a means of combat and sta- governments to unite different agencies to oper- bility operations, civilian officials are frequently ate under a single strategy with a less ambiguous unsure how they should deploy alongside the command structure. Such reform needs to begin military and lack guidance on their role within at home before it can be implemented abroad an overall counterinsurgency strategy. There or consolidated on a NATO-wide basis. The are exceptions, such as the performance of UK United States and United Kingdom have come Stabilisation Advisors in Afghanistan, who a long way from the thinking that restricted the are able to deploy at a local level alongside the military contribution to stability operations dur- UK military, often within hours of a military ing the initial period following the invasions offensive to clear an area. Comparative to the of Afghanistan and Iraq. Such innovation and United States, the United Kingdom appears to fresh thinking should not be thwarted, but rather be easing its restrictions on civilian movement. matched by the emergence of a new type of dip- Continued deficiencies in models for civil- lomat with the requisite authority and skills to military cooperation remain extremely costly. direct civil-military resources toward realistic Stuart Bowen has noted that his counterpart in objectives. If respective heads of government are
42 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 serious about a whole-of-government approach to conflict management, it is incumbent upon them to assume personal responsibility for its implementation, working directly with interagency organiza- tions such as S/CRS and the Stabilisation Unit and not subsuming them beneath other government departments. Consensus is a luxury rarely achieved in war; therefore, leadership and attention to detail at the highest level of government are required to prosecute it effectively. PRISM Notes 1 The U.S. military defines stability operations or stabilization as “missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” See U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3–0, Operations, available at
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 43 20 General Sir Richard Dannatt, “A Perspective on the Nature of Future Conflict,” transcript of meeting at Chatham House, London, May 15, 2009, 2. 21 Miguel Gonazález, “Zapatero iniste en que la misión en Afganistán es de reconstrucción,” El País, October 10, 2009, and EFE, “270 paracaidistas españoles vuelan a Afganistan para relevar a los legionarios,” El País, July 4, 2008. 22 Proceedings and interviews at Spanish Ministry of Defence Conference, “La Estrategia de Afganización,” Barcelona, June 16, 2009; and Colonel Rafael Roel Fernández, “La contribución del Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) español de Qala e Naw a la reconstrucción de Afganistán” (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, February 5, 2008). 23 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations,” Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008, 21. 24 Finn Stepputat, “Synthesis Report: Civil-military Relations in International Operations—a Danish Perspective,” Danish Institute for International Studies, April 2009, 8. 25 Barbara Stapleton, “A Means to What End? Why PRTs Are Peripheral to the Bigger Political Challenges in Afghanistan,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10, no. 1 (Autumn 2007), 40. 26 Stepputat, 28. 27 Hilary Synnott, Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq (London: Tauris, 2008), 261. 28 Interview with UK official, September 2009. 29 National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, “Department for International Development: Operating in Insecure Environments,” October 16, 2008, 25. 30 Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: 2009 Update” (New York: HPG, 2009), 6. 31 Interview with Spanish official, Barcelona, June 16, 2009. 32 A Book of Rules (Quetta: The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, September 10, 2009). 33 HPG, 6. 34 General Stanley McChrystal, transcript of meeting at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, October 1, 2009, 1. 35 J. Anthony Holmes, “Where Are the Civilians?” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January-February 2009). 36 Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps” (Washington, DC: GAO, November 2007), 1. 37 Gordon Adams, testimony to Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, July 31, 2008. 38 Rusty Barber and Sam Parker, “Evaluating Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams while Drawdown Looms,” United States Institute of Peace trip report, December 2008, 1. 39 John Finney and Alphonse La Porta, “Integrating National Security at the Operational Level: The Role of State Department Political Advisers,” in Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security, ed. Gabriel Marcella (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 304–305. 40 Interviews with MNF–I officials, Iraq, March and April 2009. 41 Patrick Cockburn, “Return to Afghanistan,” London Review of Books, June 11, 2009.
44 | Features PRISM 1, no. 2 42 National Audit Office, 25. 43 Stuart Bowen, Jr., statement to U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Washington, DC, March 11, 2008, 9. 44 Holmes. 45 Hillary Clinton, testimony before U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, May 20, 2009. 46 Ibid. 47 John Finney and Alphonse La Porta, “FS Know-How: Maximizing the Value of the Political Adviser Function,” Foreign Service Journal (October 2008). 48 RAND National Defense Research Institute, “Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), xxi. 49 Robert Perito, statement to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Defining the Military’s Role toward Foreign Policy,” Washington, DC, July 31, 2008. 50 Eric Edelman, testimony before U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 51 Matt Waldman, Caught in the Conflict: Civilians and the International Security Strategy in Afghanistan (London: Oxfam International, 2009), 14. 52 RAND National Defense Research Institute, 40. 53 Stewart Patrick, “The U.S. Response to Precarious States: Tentative Progress and Remaining Obstacles to Coherence,” in Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy Coherence, ed. Stefani Weiss, Han-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann, 2009), 66. 54 McChrystal, C–I. 55 “United States Government Integrated Civilian Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan,” Embassy of the United States, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 2009, 28–35. 56 Interview with a former advisor to former UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Madrid, May 2009. 57 House of Commons International Development Committee, Reconstructing Afghanistan (London: House of Commons, Fourth Report of Session 2007–2008, February 5, 2008). 58 Synnott, 4. 59 Ibid. 60 Kasper Hoffmann, “Civil-Military Relations in Iraq 2003–7,” Danish Institute for International Studies, September 2009, 58. 61 Hoffmann, 56. 62 Interview with UK official, Basra, March 2009. 63 Eddie Barnes, “Foreign Office has ‘Culture of Clones,’” Scotland on Sunday, March 22, 2009. 64 Alex Barker, “Afghan Mission Lacks Language Skills,” The Financial Times, August 20, 2009. 65 National Audit Office, 29. 66 Lieutenant Colonel Phil Sherwood, “Reconstruction and Development in Afghanistan: A Royal Engineer Regiment’s Experiences,” RUSI Defence Systems (October 2007). 67 Stepputat, 41. 68 House of Commons International Development Committee. 69 Interview with UK official, September 14, 2009, and National Audit Office, 32. 70 House of Commons International Development Committee.
PRISM 1, no. 2 Features | 45 71 National Audit Office, 22. 72 Peter Dahl Thruelsen, “Counterinsurgency and a Comprehensive Approach: Helmand Province, Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal (2008). 73 Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development (London: House of Commons Defence Committee, May 15, 2009). 74 Teuten, NMCG Conference, 2009. 75 Interdepartmental acrimony over Iraq was never fully diffused from 2003 until the UK military with- drawal in 2009, although the Stabilisation Unit did play an important role in improving the performance of PRT Basra during 2008 and 2009. One UK official observed that “the unit came into existence too late in Basra to play the role that it is now playing in Helmand.” Interviews with UK officials in Iraq, March 2009, and London, September 2009. See also Sherwood. 76 Interim Joint Warfare Publication 3–90, Civil-Military Cooperation (London: Ministry of Defence, November 2003). 77 Richard Teuten, “Stabilisation and Post-conflict Reconstruction” (London: Stabilisation Unit, 2008). 78 In 2009, the Stabilisation Aid Fund was joined to the United Kingdom’s peacekeeping budget, requiring another name change. 79 According to a UK government official, this is due to be remedied in 2010 when the FCO, DFID, and the MoD will assume responsibility for an equal share of the operational costs of the Stabilisation Unit. Interview, London, September 14, 2009. 80 Interviews with UK officials, London, September 2009. 81 See “One World Conservatism: A Conservative Agenda for International Development,” Policy Green Paper No. 11, available at
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