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Welcome to the latest edition of Hedge Fund Spotlight, the monthly Hedge Fund Spotlight newsletter from Preqin providing insights into the hedge fund industry, May 2015 including information on investors, funds, performance and more. Hedge Fund Spotlight uses information from our online product Hedge Fund The $1bn Club Online, which includes Hedge Fund Investor Profi les and Hedge Fund Analyst. Largest Hedge Fund Managers In this month’s feature article, we take a look at the ‘$1bn Club’, a group of the world’s largest May 2015 hedge fund managers, and identify the traits and characteristics that are unique to this Volume 7 - Issue 4 distinguished group which controls a vast proportion of industry capital. Page 2 FEATURED PUBLICATION: Largest Investors in Hedge Funds The 2015 Preqin Sovereign Following on from our feature article, we take an in-depth look at the ‘$1bn Club’ of institutional Wealth Fund Review investors allocating at least $1bn to hedge funds, including the signifi cance of this group, investment preferences and new entrants to the Club. Page 5 The 2015 Preqin Industry News Preqin Sovereign Wealth Fund Review Following the UK general election in May, we take a look at the hedge fund industry in the UK. Page 8 In association with: alternative assets. intelligent data More from Preqin: Hedge Fund Research See what’s new from Preqin this month in the hedge fund universe. Page 9 To find out more, download sample pages or to purchase your copy, please visit: Preqin Investor Network www.preqin.com/swf We examine the activity of the investors on Preqin Investor Network to see which fund types, strategies and regions are of current interest to investors, as well as which institutional investor types have been proactively looking at funds in April. Page 11 New York: One Grand Central Place 60 E 42nd Street The Facts Suite 630 New York, NY 10165 Performance Benchmarks - The latest hedge fund performance benchmarks. Page 12 +1 212 350 0100 In Focus: Macro Strategies Hedge Funds - The latest statistics. Page 14 London: In Focus: Chicago-Based Investors - Investment preferences and investor types. Page 15 3rd Floor, Vintners’ Place 68 Upper Thames Street Fund Searches and Mandates - We examine hedge fund investors’ latest plans. Page 16 London EC4V 3BJ Conferences - Upcoming hedge fund conferences around the world. Page 17 +44 (0)203 207 0200 Singapore: One Finlayson Green You can download all the data in this month’s Spotlight in Excel. Wherever you see this symbol, the data is available for free download on #11-02 Excel. Just click on the symbol and your download will begin automatically. Singapore 049246 You are welcome to use the data in any presentations you are preparing; +65 6305 2200 please cite Preqin as the source. San Francisco: 1700 Montgomery Street Suite 134 Sign up to receive your free edition of Hedge Fund Spotlight every month! San Francisco CA 94111 www.preqin.com/spotlight +1 415 835 9455 w: www.preqin.com e: [email protected] Twitter: www.preqin.com/twitter alternative assets. intelligent data. LinkedIn: www.preqin.com/linkedin BEST INFORMATION AND DATA VENDOR The $1bn Club Largest Hedge Fund Managers Download Data The $1bn Club: Largest Hedge Fund Managers In this month’s feature article, Joseph McGee takes a look at the ‘$1bn Club’, a group of the world’s largest hedge fund managers, and identifies the traits and characteristics that are unique to this distinguished group which controls a vast proportion of industry capital. Fig. 1: Top 10 Hedge Fund Managers by Assets under Management Firm Firm Location Total AUM ($bn) AUM Date Bridgewater Associates US 169.5 31 March 2015 AQR Capital Management US 64.9 31 December 2014 Man Investments UK 50.0 31 March 2015 Och-Ziff Capital Management US 47.2 1 May 2015 Standard Life Investments UK 35.3 31 December 2014 BlackRock Alternative Investors US 31.8 31 December 2014 Winton Capital Management UK 31.1 31 March 2015 Viking Global Investors US 30.3 31 December 2014 Millennium Management US 29.2 1 May 2015 Lone Pine Capital US 29.0 31 December 2014 Source: Preqin Hedge Fund Analyst Over the past year, hedge fund industry assets have increased, as BlueCrest Capital which fell out of the $20bn+ bracket, partly due surpassing the $3tn mark as of December 2014. One notable to spinning out its BlueTrend funds as Systematica Investments in group active in this space is managers with at least $1bn in assets January 2015. under management (AUM) – the ‘$1bn Club’ – comprised of some of the largest hedge fund managers in the world. Being in the Club In order to get a more complete picture of the $1bn Club, it is captures the attention of many institutional investors, but is no necessary to look closer at its overall composition, both in terms easy feat; many have steadily grown their assets over many years, of membership and strategies. Fig. 2 shows how assets are withstanding both turbulent and stagnant periods and delivering distributed between the larger and smaller members of the $1bn returns to investors. New entrants to the Club have demonstrated Club. The vast majority of members manage between $1bn and superior performance to accumulate their assets or have shown $4.9bn, while on the larger end of the scale, 22 fi rms manage credentials from previous fi rms to attract large amounts of capital. over $20bn in hedge fund assets. Aggregate capital is heavily distributed at each end of the scale: fi rms in the $1-4.9bn category Preqin’s Hedge Fund Analyst shows that there are currently over have $892bn in aggregate assets under management (28% of the 570 managers worldwide with at least $1bn in hedge fund AUM, an industry) and fi rms managing over $20bn have $790bn (25%). The increase of 63 managers from last year, representing a signifi cant proportion (92%) of total industry capital. Here, we take a look at the Fig. 2: Assets under Management Distribution Within the $1bn Club $1bn Club of hedge fund managers and identify the characteristics and attributes of what it takes to reach, and remain at, the top of 1,000 28% 30% the hedge fund industry. 900 25% $892bn 25% 800 The Composition of the $1bn Club $790bn 700 20% 19% 20% The recent growth in industry assets has been particularly 600 $631bn $593bn noticeable among the largest hedge fund managers. Fig. 1 shows 500 15% the 10 largest fi rms by AUM. Within this group, several members 400 418 have experienced signifi cant changes in AUM over the past 12 10% 300 months. Bridgewater Associates is currently the largest hedge fund 200 manager globally and increased its assets from over $154bn in 5% March 2014 to almost $170bn in March 2015. Among other leading 100 89 42 22 managers, the biggest mover was Man Investments, where a 0 0% number of major acquisitions such as Numeric Investors (in June $1-4.9bn $5-9.9bn $10-19.9bn $20bn or More 2014) and NewSmith (February 2015) boosted the fi rm’s hedge Assets under Management fund assets from just over $28bn in March 2014 to $50bn in March No. of Firms Aggregate AUM of Firms Proportion of Industry Assets 2015. Not all managers have seen assets increase however, such Source: Preqin Hedge Fund Analyst 2 Hedge Fund Spotlight / May 2015 © 2015 Preqin Ltd. / www.preqin.com The $1bn Club Largest Hedge Fund Managers Download Data Fig. 3: Breakdown of Strategies Used by Hedge Funds Fig. 4: Breakdown of Number of Core Strategies Offered by Managed by $1bn Club Managers $1bn Club Managers 100% 1% 3% 1% 1% 100% 3%1% 2% 8% 11% Niche Strategies 7% 9% 9% 90% 10% 90% 17% 8% 24% 11% 13% 14% 80% 14% Multi-Strategy 80% 14% 10 or More 11% 24% 70% 70% 18% 12% 19% 14% Relative Value 6-9 16% 25% 19% 60% Strategies 60% 7% 5% 4-5 15% 50% Credit Strategies 50% 14% 21% 9% 19% 22% 3 40% 40% 27% 14% 18% Event Driven 7% 2 30% Strategies 30% 19% 51% Macro Strategies 1 20% 41% 20% Proportion of Hedge Funds 34% 32% 30% 27% 27% 10% Equity Strategies 10% 21% Proportion of Hedge Fund Managers 0% 0% $1-4.9bn $5-9.9bn $10-19.9bn $20bn or $1-4.9bn $5-9.9bn $10-19.9bn $20bn or More More Assets under Management Assets under Management Source: Preqin Hedge Fund Analyst Source: Preqin Hedge Fund Analyst median assets under management for a $1bn Club fi rm is $2.4bn, Previous Experience and Age Help to Break into $1bn Club refl ecting the heavy concentration of fi rms in the $1-4.9bn segment. A number of new fi rms launched over the past year have reached Strategy Preferences of the $1bn Club $1bn or more in assets. 2014 saw the likes of Darsana Capital Partners, Finepoint Capital, Hitchwood Capital Management, There are also signifi cant differences within the $1bn Club between Shellback Capital, Three Bays Capital, Thunderbird Partners and the larger and smaller fund managers in terms of the range and Two Creeks Capital Management all launch debut funds that have number of strategies they employ. Smaller managers in the Club grown to over $1bn in AUM. A number of fi rms are reported to be are more likely to offer equity strategies (as shown in Fig. 3) than targeting a similar result in 2015, including former Brevan Howard all other AUM segments. This may refl ect the diffi culties in scaling partner Chris Rokos’s Rokos Capital Management and former Eton core equity strategies funds without affecting performance.
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