AN FOR AN EMERGING CONTINENT: REFORMS TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS

Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Senior Fellow, Growth Initiative

THE PRIORITY with the responsibility of coordinating conti- nent-wide development efforts and serving as Late in 2014, as the Ebola crisis escalated, a pop- the voice of Africans in matters of global gover- ular African newspaper carried an opinion piece nance. Tackling the most pressing issues on the entitled, “Where is Africa?” (Ndemo 2014). continent—including accelerating “the political This question was in reference to the fact that and socio-economic integration of the conti- the African Union (AU)—which was expected nent;” helping “promote and defend African by many Africans to lead the effort against the common positions on issues of interest to the epidemic—was missing in action. The author continent and its peoples;” promoting “dem- suggested that the AU should have immediately ocratic principles and institutions, popular par- called for an “Ebola Summit” to discuss the crisis ticipation and governance;” and promoting and find ways to deal fully and effectively with “peace, security, and stability on the conti- it. Instead, the AU was absent and left the job nent”—calls for the participation of a suprana- to governments and organizations from outside tional organization such as the African Union the continent. (For more on the Ebola epidemic (African Union 2000). Increasingly, however, see “Fighting Ebola: A Strategy for Action.”) observers both in and outside the continent are In the case of other African crises during the last noting that the AU is either not willing or not several years, the AU has behaved similarly—it capable of carrying out its objectives effectively. has failed to lead In the case of other or even function A well-functioning and effective AU is crucial African crises during the as a relevant par- to the social, political and economic advance- last several years, the ty in their reso- ment of Africa. For a continent comprised of 54 countries that vary widely in terms of land AU has failed to lead lution. At other times, the AU has size, population, ethnic and religious diversity, or even function as a been willing to and levels of development, the organization relevant party in their act, but has been that is expected to serve as the primary central- resolution. At other too slow in taking ized coordinating institution in uniting Africans action. in advancing their joint welfare and enhancing times, the AU has been their peaceful co-existence must be one that willing to act, but has Besides address- (1) fully understands and appreciates the mul- been too slow in taking ing crises, the AU tifarious problems that currently confront the continent; and (2) has the capacity to carry out action. is also charged

the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 29 the required policies and also has the legal au- Africa’s race-based apartheid system. The 1991 thority to do so. Treaty, which aimed to create an African Economic Community through a gradual pro- Of course, the AU cannot function effectively cess with full political and economic integration, if it is pervaded by incompetence, limited re- significantly expanded the mandate of the OAU. sources, corruption and other bureaucratic in- efficiencies. Thus, the key to making the AU Unfortunately, the OAU failed to undertake a successful instrument and powerful voice is or accomplish many of these important tasks, reconstructing and reconstituting both the in- especially promoting and institutionalizing de- stitution and its organs so as to create a polit- mocracy. In fact, from the late 1950s to the ical and bureaucratic institution that functions early 1990s, the continent was pervaded by according to the rule of and serves as a true military dictatorships, single-party regimes, and representative of the wishes and aspirations of generally governments that were unaccount- the broad cross-section of African people. It is able to the people, highly corrupt, and acted only such an efficiently run organization that with impunity. Thus, the OAU, which came to can deal effectively with the multifarious prob- be considered by many observers as a “club of lems that currently plague the continent. dictators,” lacked the moral standing to serve as an effective voice for Africa. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? In addition, the OAU was unable to perform The Organization of African Unity: its function as the continent’s peacemaker—its The Need for One African Voice charter’s stipulation of non-interference with the internal affairs of other countries limited The desire to unite Africans under a central- the ability of national governments to intervene ized institution has been an important goal of when it was determined that state- or non- Africans, dating back to the years during which state actors in member states were committing they fought the European colonialists for inde- atrocities, for example, against innocent civil- pendence. The most important development in ians. The consequences of this inactivity on the the effort to unite the continent came with the part of the OAU were serious violations of hu- formation of the Organization of African Unity man rights, exploitation of vulnerable groups, (OAU) on January 25, 1963. The OAU was ex- and many cases of ethnic cleansing. Examples pected to serve as an instrument or mechanism include the failure of the OAU to intervene and for forging unity and solidarity among African stop the violent activities of dictators such as Idi states. It was also expected to advance coop- Amin (), Mobutu Sese Seko (Zaire/DRC), eration among countries in order to enhance (), Hosni Mubarak and promote economic development, improve (), and Sargent Samuel Kanyon Doe (Libe- the quality of life of all Africans, encourage and ria). Perhaps, most glaring is the failure of the make possible the peaceful settlement of dis- OAU to effectively and timely prevent the mas- putes, expand inter-country trade, and advance sacre of Tutsis and their supporters in democracy. An important core mandate of the in 1994. Due to its many challenges, the OAU OAU was that it fight to eliminate any vestiges was dissolved in 2002 and replaced by the of colonialism on the continent, including South African Union,1 which was founded on a revised

1  is the only African country is not a member of the African Union—in 1984, Morocco officially withdrew from the OAU to protest the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). The SADR claims sovereignty over all of the Western , which Morocco believes and argues is part of its territory. Although South was admitted as the 54th member of the African Union shortly after it gained its independence in 2011, it has yet to sign and ratify the Constitutive Act.

30 foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 charter addressing the weaknesses of the OAU, community level remain unresolved. While sev- but carrying on its major goals. Unfortunately, eral units do exist in the the AU seems to have inherited the OAU’s ap- continent today (e.g., proach to the performance of its functions as (ECA), Economic Community of West African evidenced by the failure of the organization to States (ECOWAS), among others), many have effectively and timely spearhead the peaceful not provided the necessary enabling environ- resolution of destructive conflicts in South Su- ments for greater cooperation and trade. As dan, the and . a result, trade among members has not in- creased significantly. Perhaps more important is Economic Development the fact that some of the protocols establishing regional economic communities have not yet On the development side, although the AU has been implemented, which is in part failure of produced and disseminated relatively elaborate the AU as it is tasked with coordinating and and well-defined policy initiatives (e.g., New working with regional economic communities Partnership for Africa’s Development, NEPAD), in expediting the implementation of various in- for the alleviation of and the empower- tegration plans. By and large, many of the key ment of women, among others, the implemen- development proposals remain statements of tation of these plans has been quite poor. The intent and lack actual implementation. It is for AU has recently formulated a long-term devel- this reason that some observers have referred opment plan dubbed “Africa 2063: Unity, Pros- to the AU as a “talk shop” (Essa 2013). perity and Peace,” which outlines a strategy to guide the continent’s development for the next The Post-2015 Agenda 50 years. Unfortunately, even after a decade of the AU’s existence, poverty remains widespread Some of the key development issues that the throughout the continent, women continue to AU is expected to spearhead in 2015 include be oppressed and exploited, and Africa remains presenting a coherent African position on the at the periphery of both the global economy post-2015 Millennium Development Goals. and the international governance system. These Here, the AU needs to push for goals that re- failures are directly related to a number of fac- flect the actual needs of Africans. Although the tors, including low financing, weak leadership African Union has already released its Common organs and limited genuine representation of Africa Position on the Post-2015 Development the general public. Agenda that includes its own vision for 29 Sus- tainable Development Goals, AU negotiators Regional Integration must participate fully and effectively in the talks at the U.N. so that the African platform is given The AU is expected to spearhead the conti- a proper hearing. (For more on the Post-2015 nent’s regional integration effort and help pro- Development Agenda, see “Africa Looks vide viable regional integration units, which Forward to the Post-2015 Development could serve as mechanisms for cooperation in Agenda.”) To successfully enhance the African investment, provision of infrastructure, man- agenda, the AU needs strong leadership and agement of the environment, and growth and well-qualified technical staff—two things that development. Unfortunately, in reality, it is un- critics have argued the body lacks. In addition, likely that the proposed Continental Free Trade to amplify the African voice, many people in- Area (CFTA)—a carryover from the Abuja Trea- side the continent have called on the AU to ty—will come to fruition by 2016 because a narrow down the scope of the AU’s goals to large number of issues at the regional economic focus on those that affect the largest number

the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 31 of Africans, are Africa-specific (and hence, are ter into negotiations to resolve disputes—as it unlikely to be lobbied for by other countries), threatened to do in the recent events in Burkina and are least likely to be vetoed (Carin 2014). Faso. The AU has also been involved in matters of management of natural resource wealth and Peace and Security especially in pushing for member countries to sign international protocols that deal with cor- Africa still suffers from violent mobilization by rupt practices. The AU took another step toward various ethnic and religious groups. However, addressing these issues at its June 2014 sum- the AU—despite the fact that, unlike the OAU, mit when leaders amended the protocol of the it has the mandate to intervene in these cri- African Court on Justice and , al- ses—has been unable to deal directly with this lowing the group authority over “…corruption, violence, as seen in intractable civil conflicts in money-laundering, human and drug trafficking, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South and piracy…” (Allison 2014). However, the AU’s Sudan, as well as the increasing threat of terror- progress on these matters has generally been in- ism by groups such as Boko Haram, al-Shabab, credibly slow—and in a few cases nonexistent the Lord’s Resistance Army, and al-Qaida in the and even regressive. In several countries, execu- Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although there have tives have manipulated national constitutions in been some notable successes such as in the order to extend their stay in power, and, in do- case of , the failures stand out. In many ing so, have caused political regression. In addi- respects, the AU has either been extremely tion, although elections have become the norm, slow to intervene in various conflicts in the con- many of them are marred by chaos, vote theft tinent or has done so ineffectively. In fact, the and rigging, intimidation of opposition leaders, African Union effort in Central African Republic and violence. The AU does not appear to have (MISCA—Mission internationale de soutien à la a clear strategy to Centrafrique sous conduite africaine) was con- deal with erosion The AU does not sidered a total failure. These short-term mis- of democracy and appear to have a clear sions have not been the only disappointments: has not been fully strategy to deal with The launch of the has al- prepared to play ready been delayed several times, even though the crucial role of erosion of democracy it was expected to have been established and helping prepare and has not been fully made operational by 2010—largely due to lim- the electorate prepared to play the ited resources from the member countries. An in each country crucial role of helping additional obstacle to the AU’s efforts to bol- to deal with any ster peace lies at the Heads of States level as post-election vio- prepare the electorate they are expected to provide guidance on such lence. in each country to deal matters. with any post-election Corruption also re- violence. Good Governance and Corruption mains widespread and theft of resources and illicit capital flows The AU has played and continues to play an im- continue unabated—and the AU does not portant role in bringing about improvements in seem to have a clear strategy to deal with them. domestic good governance, accountability and The problem of illicit capital flows is particularly transparency. It is empowered to impose sanc- worrisome because some of the key actors in- tions in cases of non-democratic transitions of volved are the country leaders who make deci- power or where parties to conflicts refuse to en- sions at the AU Assembly forums.

32 foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 Crisis Response and Mediation and that requires attention. (Murithi 2013; Ki- menyi 2014). The Ebola crisis in has revealed ma- jor weaknesses in the AU, spurring calls for re- This marginalization is also true when the in- form in the institution’s operations. The main ternational community is dealing with other is- weakness here is the absence of emergency re- sues such as the challenges of climate change, sponse action plans and also the failure by the international financial flows, the flow of goods AU to prioritize key issues that matter to the and services, global security, transnational ter- African people. This arises primarily from the rorism, and corruption in international business fact that the AU is not represented at the grass- transactions—problems vital and often dispro- roots and as a consequence, the African peo- portionately detrimental to the continent. The ple’s priorities are not reflected in the institu- AU must pursue reforms to global institutions— tion’s responses. In fact, the AU seems to avoid such as in the U.N. Security Council—with de- many continent-wide and regional issues. One termination and zeal and must not relent (Daily particularly important matter in which it has Nation 2014). The AU should push for the in- failed to provide leadership is the conflict over clusion of at least two permanent membership management of the allocation and utilization seats for Africans. of water in the River Basin, a contentious issue with the potential to degenerate into a WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN 2015 major conflict. Avoiding difficult issues makes the AU largely irrelevant and is a situation that Despite these challenges, the African Union has, needs to change. by all accounts, performed much better than the OAU. For example, although there are still Providing a Global Voice many countries under autocratic rule, democ- racy is more widespread in the continent today. Finally, one thing that Africans expect is that In addition, the AU has become more active in uniting 54 nations greatly enhances the con- peace operations—a good example is AMISOM tinent’s standing in the arena of global gov- (the African Union Mission in Somalia). ernance. As noted previously, the AU, as au- thorized by these countries, is the legitimate In the previous discussion, we have highlighted representative of the continent on matters of the various critical roles expected of the African global governance. Despite its size and large Union and its apparent failures. In light of these population, however, Africa’s impact on glob- priorities and disappointments, it is critical that al governance is marginal. In some situations, this necessary organization undergoes key re- the African voice is ignored or even treated forms and is restructured so that it can become with disdain. Similarly, Africa does not really a more efficient instrument for the economic have much effective input into matters of in- and political transformation of Africa. These re- ternational justice, as evidenced by the utterly forms include: undemocratic role played by the U.N. Security Council in various international governance is- 1. Financing: As noted above, a serious sues. The International Criminal Court’s focus problem that the AU faces in meeting on Africa in prosecuting individuals suspected its task has to do with inadequate fund- of war crimes, crimes against humanity and ing. This has been particularly apparent other atrocities is another example of a situa- in dealing with emergencies such as con- tion for which the AU has expressed concern flicts between various groups within a

the brookings institution | africa growth initiative 33 country and the Ebola crisis. The delay in Internationally, this leadership has under- the creation of an African standing army mined the reputation and credibility of is also mostly due to lack of resources. the AU. Thus, African countries need to There are two interrelated problems when revisit the qualifications of the chair. it comes to financing in the AU: low levels of funding through member country con- 3. Strengthening the AU Commission: tributions and a high dependency on do- The is the in- nors. The low funding by members is the stitution’s implementing organ. Unfortu- outcome of an inadequate process of set- nately, this is a weak organ and its imple- ting levels of member contributions and menting capacity is quite inadequate. The also enforcing compliance. Reliance on authority of the chair of the commission donors essentially constrains the choices is limited, which has a significant impact and priorities of the AU and forces the on his or her ability to make the decisions institution to focus more on the interests necessary to advance the organization’s of donors. The AU should adopt reforms mission. A key and necessary reform in- that increase contributions from member volves increasing the decision making countries and ensure timely payment. authority of the chair of the commission These could include instituting specific so that he or she can more effectively im- earmarked taxes and increasing the share plement decisions without delay. As the of contributions by members accompa- African Union Commission Chairperson’s nied with clear compliance enforcement. current term will expire in 2016, 2015 is an important year to consider these re- 2. Leadership: The issue of leadership is at forms. the heart of the effectiveness of the AU and is particularly timely given that the 4. Grassroots Representation: The AU’s Assembly of Heads of State will select a ineffectiveness is, in many respects, due new chairperson in 2015. Like the OAU, to the fact that it is quite often unable to the heads of state chair the organization fully appreciate the issues and problems on a rotational basis—there are no mini- facing Africans at the grassroots. This is mum standards of the quality and charac- due partly to the fact that the AU does ter of those elected to that position. The not operate as a fully representative orga- result has been that some of the chairs nization. One way to remedy this problem of the AU are individuals whose perfor- is to establish an AU parliament where mance as heads of state, especially in members are elected directly by the vot- the areas of democracy, accountability, ers in their respective countries. Such a transparency and human rights, is total- representative assembly should enhance ly at odds with the ideals of the union. the ability of Africans to participate more Under the leadership of such heads of fully in continental governance and make state, pushing for progressive reforms has certain that the policies advanced by the been quite difficult and often ignored. AU reflect their interests and values.

34 foresight africa: top priorities for the continent in 2015 References Murithi, T. 2013. “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled African Union. 2000. The Constitutive Act of the Relationship?” Institute for Justice and African Union. : AU. http://www. Reconciliation, Policy Brief 8, March. http:// au.int/en/about/constitutive_act. www.ijr.org.za/publications/pdfs/IJR%20 Policy%20Brief%20No%208%20Tim%20 Allison, S. 2014. “Think Again: In Defense of the Miruthi.pdf. African Union.” Institute for Security Studies, September 9. http://www.issafrica.org/iss- Ndemo, B. 2014. “Where is Africa?” Daily Nation, today/think-again-in-defence-of-the-african- October 20. http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/ union. blogs/dot9/ndemo/-/2274486/2492622/- /2d49l7z/-/index.html. Carin, B. 2014. “The African Union and the Post-2015 Development Agenda.” Centre for Nolan, R. 2013. “A Look Back at 50 Years of the International Governance Innovation Policy African Union.” U.S. News & World Report, Brief No. 45, July. http://www.cigionline.org/ 30. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/ sites/default/files/cigi_pb_45_0.pdf. blogs/world-report/2013/05/30/the-african- union-celebrates-50-years. Daily Nation. 2014. “UN Security Council undemocratic, must include Africa’s voice: Vines, A. 2013. “A Decade of African Peace and Uhuru Kenyatta.” November 17. http://www. Security Architecture.” Chatham House. nation.co.ke/news/Uhuru-Kenyatta-criticises- http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/ UN-Security-Council/-/1056/2525042/- chathamhouse/public/International%20 /12el5jcz/-/index.html. Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Vines.pdf.

Kimenyi, M. 2014. “The International Criminal Court in Africa: A Failed Experiment?” Open Democracy, November 11. https://www. opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/mwangi- s-kimenyi/international-criminal-court-in-africa- failed-experiment.

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