The Limits of Sovereignty and Post-War Okinawan Migrants in Bolivia 主権の限界と戦後ボリビアへの沖縄移民

Pedro Iacobelli

series of questions regarding both Japanese sovereignty of its former prefecture and the legal status of the Okinawan people abroad.1 The U.S. military administratively severed the ABSTRACT: This paper examines the legal islands from mainland Japan during the U.S. implications for Okinawan migrants of Article 3 led post-war occupation of Japan (1945-1952) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (hereafter while garrisoning the islands. As former enemy SFPT), signed between Japan and most of the territory and the main military hub for U.S. Allied Powers in 1951. Particularly, it analyses forces in the Western Pacific, the U.S. military the case of post-war Okinawan migrants in government closely watched the Ryukyu Bolivia, showing how the legal conditions in the Islands territory and discouraged border Ryukyu Islands were extended to the Andean crossing. country. The Japanese defeat in the Asia-Pacific War (August 1945) was followed by the The flow of migration to South America, once occupation of the country by the United States. buoyant, became an option that only a few The peace treaty, signed six years later, people could afford. In the penurious time of originated during the early years of the Cold post-war Okinawa, international migration was War and was fraught with geopoliticalonly possible for those who had been “called” implications. The SFPT allowed the U.S. by relatives to join them in South America 2 military to retain control of Okinawa prefecture (yobiyose) and could pay the fees involved. The without formally severing it from Japan. In San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951) did not other words, the treaty-makers allocatedde substantially change the daily circumstances of jure sovereignty over Okinawa to Japan while people living in Okinawa. Unlike the rest of the U.S. enjoyed de facto sovereignty. This Japan, the islands remained under direct U.S. distinction gave rise to a legal conundrum control. However, the prospects for migration concerning the future of the islands and the did change; from 1954 Okinawans without legal situation of the Okinawan people onshore family members abroad could migrate via one and abroad. Building on Japanese and English of the state-led migration programs to South primary sources I examine the reaction of America, one of the few regions in the world American and Japanese jurists to Article 3 and open to accept Japanese migrants after the the approach of both governments toward war. First Bolivia, next Brazil, and finally offshore Okinawan migrants. Argentina became host nations for post-war Okinawan migrants. Between 1954 and 1967 over fourteen thousand Okinawans migrated to *** the Americas, including three thousand people who went to Bolivia.3

The post-war United States occupation and Scholars working on Okinawan post-war history administration of the Ryukyu Islands posed a have focused on the vicissitudes of the Islands

1 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF and its people within the U.S-Japan bilateral Japanese consular protection. However, due to framework.4 Ōta Masahide, Gavan McCormack, pressure from the U.S., the Japanese Yoshida Kensei, Arasaki Moriteru and Tanji government did not honor its obligations Miyume, among other researchers, have toward Okinawan migrants. This is clear in the studied U.S. cold war policies implemented on case of the post-war Okinawan community in the Ryukyu Islands, emphasizing the U.S. Santa Cruz, Bolivia where a Ryukyuan colony military base-building process, the impact of was established in 1954 and became a site of U.S. policies on the local population, and the great symbolic production of the political emergence of resistance to U.S. military pressures at play in the region.9 Since the domination.5 Known as the “Okinawa problem”, Japanese government encouraged emigration scholars have studied the unbalanced power- to Bolivia, it had the responsibility to look after relations between the U.S. and Japan.6 Other both emigré communities: those that originated scholarship, for instance the work of Oguma in mainland Japanese and those from the Eiji and Taira Koji, has emphasized the colonial Ryukyu Islands. But due to U.S. pressures, it elements in the historical relation between the failed to assist the latter. In other words, the Japanese government and the Okinawan case of the Okinawan emigration to Bolivia, the people.7 The problematic and ideological first U.S.-endorsed emigration program in the confrontations taking place on the Ryukyu Ryukyu Islands, highlights the asymmetries of Islands have been amply studied in Japanese power between Japan and the U.S. in a non- and in English. However the question of the Asian regional context.10 legal position of overseas Ryukyuan communities after the San Francisco Peace It is important to observe the process whereby Treaty has not received much attention.8 The the U.S. designed its long-term dominant purpose of this study is to examine the coming position in the Ryukyu Islands. In particular I into being of the SFPT and the discussion am interested in how the “sovereignty around the legal status of post-war Okinawan problem” was understood by U.S. and by migrants in Bolivia. By doing so, it allows us to Japanese jurists in the wake of the Treaty of highlight some of the ambivalence thatSan Francisco. The analysis of the legal underscored the relations between Okinawans, discussion on the limits of Japanese sovereignty Japanese, and Americans in the Okinawa in Okinawa can shed light on two points: (1) homeland as well as in Okinawan overseas Japanese awareness of Japan’s rights and communities. obligations concerning the Okinawan people and (2) the desired Japanese stance regarding In this article, I show that the legal situation of international law in this matter by some overseas Okinawan individuals was leftJapanese jurists. unresolved by the creators of the peace treaty, led by John Foster Dulles. As a result, the I begin this article by contextualizing U.S. post- international status of Ryukyuans in South war control of Okinawa Prefecture. I will then America was subject to regional power plays present the position of Japanese scholars who involving Japan and the U.S., rather than the eloquently expressed concerns about the legal rules of international law. In particular, I position of Okinawa under international law. evaluate the role of the Japanese state in Next, I will analyze the presentations on the overseeing Ryukyuan migrants in the 1950s. I “Okinawan problem” at the Annual Conference argue that the Japanese government had of Japanese International Law Scholars in 1954. sufficient legal grounds to claim that the The presentations were published in the 1955 Okinawan people were Japanese nationals and special edition of the “Journal of International were thus entitled to the Japanese passport and Law and Diplomacy” (Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) a

2 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF leading Japanese journal in the field.11 Finally, I avoid violating the U.S. declared principle of will examine the consequences of the SFPT for “no territorial aggrandizement” (Atlantic Okinawan communities living outside of Japan. Charter, 1941).17 In the end, the future of the In order to do this I will use the case of the U.S. position in the Ryukyus (and that of the “protection problem” (Hogo Mondai) and the Okinawan people) would be determined by the Ryukyuans in the Department of Santa Cruz in terms of a peace treaty between Japan and the east Bolivia. Allies.18

From enemy territory to “our territory” Okinawa was one of many insular Pacific territories occupied by the U.S. in the wake of Japan lost control of Okinawan prefecture when World War II, and an important part of the U.S. United States forces captured the islands in defense line in the Pacific. It was from the 12 June 1945. The Battle of Okinawa, the beginning placed under U.S. military bloodiest battle fought in the Pacific, marked government.19 While mainland Japan, with its the end of Japan’s direct control over the pacifist constitution, was (in theory at least) Ryukyu Islands and initiated long-term U.S. made a zone of “peace”, Okinawa was explicitly 13 administration of Okinawa. But what was the transformed into a zone of “war”.20 This American rationale behind retaining theasymmetry was evident from the moment the Ryukyu Islands? What benefits were sought by first signs of the emergence of the Cold War the U.S. Departments of Defense and State? In became visible. As result, the U.S. State this section I would like to succinctly answer Department concurred with the Defense these questions as a means of gauging the Department in the necessity to secure long- status of the Okinawan people in the post-war term control of the islands.21 The future of period. Okinawa and its people was thus defined by its strategic location. The U.S. National Security Like mainland Japan, the Ryukyu Islands Council (NSC), the highest defense entity in the remained ‘occupied enemy territory’ from the U.S., framed U.S. national policy with regard to end of hostilities until the peace treaty came the possession of Okinawa in memorandum 14 into operation in April 1952. This meant that NSC 13/3 of 1949.22 In these documents the Okinawa was under U.S military control and its NSC emphasized that any peace treaty with destiny would be determined by the wartime Japan had to include certain security agreements. The Cairo Communiqué (1943) requirements. Among them, NSC 13/3 stated had stated that Japan would be “expelled from that the U.S. had to “retain on a long-term all other territory which she has taken by basis the facilities at Okinawa and such other violence or greed”. This cast a cloud of facilities as are deemed by the Joint Chiefs of uncertainty over the future of the Ryukyus. Staff to be necessary in the Ryukyu Islands […] However, U.S. officials subsequently held that the military bases at or near Okinawa should be the Communique did not pertain to the Ryukyu developed accordingly.” From the American 15 Islands. Similarly, the Potsdam Declaration perspective, Okinawa had to remain under U.S. (1945) failed to state whether Okinawa was to control after a peace treaty with Japan was be included in the territory that Japan would signed.23 NSC 49 and the September 1950 NSC 16 keep. Indeed, the wartime agreements60/1 complemented the objectives of NSC 13/3 inconclusively referred to the status of the by expressing the view that any future treaty Ryukyu Islands. Moreover, the option of with Japan must guarantee the U.S “exclusive annexing Okinawa as a former enemy territory strategic control of the Ryukyus”.24 was rejected. The American government, particularly the State Department, wished to It should be noted that at all times U.S. defense

3 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF requirements prioritized territorial control. The administration.30 There were, however, two language was framed to make legal permanent main limitations to putting a territory under the U.S. occupation of the Ryukyus in the service of Trusteeship System: no member of the U.N. building America’s keystone in the Pacific. was eligible to become a trust territory, and an independent non-member state could not be Trust the Trusteeship System made a trust territory because it had already attained self-governance, the ultimate purpose The retention of Okinawa became one of the of the Trusteeship System being transition to main issues during the peace treaty independence.31 Moreover, the U.S. had the negotiations. John F. Dulles (1888 – 1959), possibility of locating the Ryukyu Islands as a Consultant to the Secretary of State, had the ‘strategic area’ within the Trusteeship difficult task of putting together numerous System.32 This option actually meant reduced interests, including the NSC plan for de facto military appropriation of the Ryukyu Islands, interference from the U.N. since ‘strategic into the peace treaty. In Japan, Prime Minister areas’ were not scrutinized by the General Yoshida Shigeru’s calculated efforts to work a Assembly but by the Security Council. deal with the U.S. to reduce as much as Nevertheless, the trusteeship system did not possible the duration and scope of the U.S. prevent Security Council members from presence in the Ryukyus were systematically inquiring and, potentially, criticising the U.S. crushed by American officials.25 In addition, role in Okinawa. Japanese authorities, including the Showa John Foster Dulles decided to obtain in the emperor, expressed in private their willingness 26 peace treaty with Japan an option to seek to exchange Okinawa for U.S. protection. trusteeship if desired by the U.S., but in the Some of the Allied Powers such as New meantime the U.S. would retain full control of Zealand and Canada supported the idea of full U.S. dominion in the Ryukyu Islands. However, Okinawa. This meant that the U.S. military annexation would violate the U.S. declaration could remain in the island and avoid that it would not seek aggrandizement and international scrutiny. As Senator Howard risked provoking the opposition of the other Alexander Smith noted in a meeting with Dulles Allied Powers and United Nations members in the Far East Sub-Committee of the Senate generally.27 Thus, Dulles sought a system that Foreign Relations Committee, the draft would would facilitate U.S. control without“permit the United States to retain control of annexation. the Ryukyus indefinitely if a trusteeship were not secured” and inquired whether this “would The idea of placing the Ryukyu Islands under not lay us open to charges of imperialism”.33 the Trusteeship System was thoroughlyDulles reportedly suggested that “the provision discussed among U.S. scholars and diplomats.28 be allowed to stand until the attitude of other The Trusteeship System was a revised version countries could be ascertained”.34 of the pre-war Mandate System, and it increased international accountability for the In order to retain Okinawa, as required in the administration of a trust territory byNSC documents, the U.S. opted for a formula implementing United Nations supervision.29 that separated the sovereign from the This system allowed three categories ofadministrator. Article 3 of the Treaty of San territories subject to the trusteeship: a. former Francisco stipulated that “Japan will accept any mandated territories; b. ex-enemy territory; proposal to put the Ryukyu Islands under the and c. territories voluntarily placed under the U.N. trusteeship system”.35 Futhermore it system by states responsible for thestated the following:

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Pending the making of such a Japanese legal experts. proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will Making sense of Article 3: How the SFPT have the right to exercise all and was interpreted? any power of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the Olcott H. Deming, U.S. Consul General to territory and inhabitants of these Okinawa (1957-1959), said that then-Secretary islands, including their territorial of State Dulles once asked him “what waters.36 problems” he was having there. Deming responded that “the biggest one was continually trying to explain [to the locals] what Okinawa remained under Japanese sovereignty residual sovereignty means”.40 Article 3 and the since it was not severed by the SFPT but the concept of ‘residual sovereignty’ triggered a United States controlled all rights of its series of debates on different aspects of U.S. - 37 administration. Before and during the 1951 Ryukyu and Japan-Ryukyu legal relations. The Peace Conference John Foster Dulles clarified legal conundrum around the sovereignty of the meaning of the legal wording. He explained Okinawa increased as it became clear that the that although the U.S. had the rights of U.S. had no intention of making any proposal to administration, Japan exercised “residual put the Ryukyus under the Trusteeship sovereignty” (zanryūshuken) over the System. territory.38 The Office of Legal Adviser of the Department of State explained that: U.S. political advisors noted the issues not addressed in the Article 3. For example, Niles W. Bond concluded in 1952 that, “as a beginning, it is believed that the legal status of The phrase [residual sovereignty] expresses the the islands should be clarified, if feasible by idea that, far from being a cession of formal recognition of the sovereignty of Japan sovereignty, Article 3 of the Peace Treaty and the Japanese nationality of the contains provision only for the broad exercise inhabitants”.41 However, these problems were of the rights and powers of sovereignty by the left unresolved by U.S. government authorities. United States. Thus the United States has not On the contrary, courts and judges settled annexed the islands or claimed sovereignty disputes related to the legal position of over them; sovereignty remains in Japan –even though in a latent or residual form. But the Okinawa. For instance, a tort involving a car right to exercise the rights and powers usually accident in Okinawa in 1951 raised the associated with sovereignty has been given to question of whether Okinawa was a foreign 42 the United States.39 territory or not. An American, employed by a contractor engaged in military construction in The wording and explanation given for Article 3 Okinawa, sought compensation from the served U.S. strategic interests in the region, federal government in a Court District in but did little to make it comprehensible. The California. The appellant alleged that the American control was Janus-faced; on the one accident resulted from the negligence of an hand it sought to control population, territory unknown employee of the U.S. in leaving an and military bases; on the other, it sought to unlighted crane parked on the road after dark. avoid specifying the precise nature of U.S. The judge in this case, before admitting to have power in the Ryukyus in the peace covenant. no concluding answer, stated: “it cannot be Indeed, it obscured the legal position of the said that the loss of sovereignty over the island Ryukyu Islands, puzzling both American and by Japan vests the ‘de jure sovereignty’ in the

5 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF traditional sense, in the native Okinawa” but after the SFPT. since “the will of the United States is in fact the supreme will on Okinawa, the United States For the Japanese jurists, it was important to has therefore acquired what may be termed a confirm that Japan was entitled to claim full ‘de facto sovereignty’.43 Similarly, the question sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands in the of whether or not native Okinawans were future. This concern was triggered by the nationals of the U.S. was brought to court in obscure wording of the war covenants (e.g. 1954. An Okinawan resident in Hawaii claimed Cairo Communiqué; Potsdam Declaration) as that since Okinawa was a possession of the U.S. seen above. It was also influenced by the he was not an alien but a national of the U.S.44 ongoing process of emancipation and nation- The court had to define where the sovereignty state building in several regions of the world of Okinawa resided. It finally concluded that (e.g. India, Indonesia, Philippines). The Ryukyu “Japan, and not the United States, having the Kingdom had controlled most of the area of ‘de jure sovereignty’ over Okinawa (…) the Okinawan prefecture prior to its incorporation 46 defendant [the Okinawan man] is not a national within the modern Japanese state in 1879. For of the United States”.45 the Japanese jurists there was a possibility that the territory under U.S. military control could These examples illustrate how Article 3 of the be permanently severed from Japan. SFPT temporarily blurred the limits ofConsequently, some Japanese scholars Japanese/American sovereignty and confused considered it necessary to stress the legality of the understanding of citizenship in the Ryukyu Japanese control over Okinawa from a Islands. Furthermore, it allowed legal organs of historical point of view. For instance, Akiho the U.S. to have a privileged position to Ichirō (1900-1988) emphasized that the Ryukyu interpret matters of jurisdiction as they saw fit kingdom’s almost three hundred years old since the administration of the islandsrelationship with the Satsuma daimyo (vassals remained under U.S. military administration. of the bakufu in Edo) was fundamental to justifying Japanese ownership of Okinawa. “The The Japanese juridical understanding of status of the Ryukyus is one of the most the Status of Okinawa important matters. This problem could be clarified in the analysis of the Ryukyu In Japan, jurists and academics from the Kingdom’s status in relation to the Satsuma country’s most prestigious universities met in daimyo”.47 Similarly, Hanabusa Naoshi Kyoto at the autumn 1954 conference of the (1902-1994) vindicated the Japanese position in Society of International Law. Professor Yamada Okinawa vis-à-vis the Chinese tributary state Saburō (1869-1965) pointed out the aim of the status of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Hanabusa noted Kyoto conference was to clarify thethat in ultimate terms the government in Tokyo international position of Okinawa. Theyhad legally incorporated the Ryukyu Kingdom analyzed the “Okinawan problem” from three into the Okinawan prefecture in its 1879 perspectives: history, international law, and annexation.48 For academics like Hanabusa, the international economy. The conference’sJapanese claims to Okinawa were based on the proceedings were published in a special edition historical relations between the two territories. of the Journal of International Law and Diplomacy. Their views on the Okinawan Also, it was important for many Japanese problem allow us to highlight how the situation scholars to confirm American academics’ was perceived in mainland Japan and to thinking on the Japanese claim of sovereignty identify the legal, if not necessarily political, in order to clarify the international position and limits of Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa future of the Ryukyu Islands. Ueda Toshio

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(1904-1975), in his review of twenty-three and any power of administration, legislation American publications on the Okinawanand jurisdiction in the Ryukyu Islands. The question, concluded that scholars in the United Japanese government endorsed this at the States shared the view that Japan had historical peace conference and reaffirmed its position in rights over the Ryukyu Islands.49 In his study, several bilateral treaties (e.g. The Aerial he mostly relied on Hyman Kublin’s article on Navigation Service between Japan and the the 1870s’ controversy between Japan and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern China concerning sovereignty over the Ryukyu Ireland of 1952). However, the scope and Islands.50 For Kublin (and Ueda) both China and duration of Japan’s “residual sovereignty” was Japan had a long history of relations with the not defined in the SFPT. The treaty did not Ryukyu Islands, but China had lost its rights make clear to what rights Japan was entitled as over the Ryukyus because the Qing government holder of “residual sovereignty”; or how Japan persistently used an old system of traditions to was to fulfill its obligations towards the local 54 sustain its claim rather than Western legal Ryukyuans. For Irie, the U.S. was entitled to rationalism.51 The Japanese on the contrary, as the administration but not the disposal of the Kublin stated, “deemed the issue an affair of territory. the first magnitude and, unshackled by tradition, quickly revealed how well Occidental 52 In relation to the southern diplomatic procedure had been mastered”. In territory, since Japan keeps conclusion, Ueda´s position was that Japan’s residual sovereignty, America legal rights over Okinawa had strong historical merely received the rights of and legal foundations recognized by the administration for an unspecified Western Powers. time; without Japan’s consent, it cannot change the territorial A more pressing issue was how to interpret the status. Even though Japan Japanese position on Okinawa after the San promised to agree to any American Francisco Peace Treaty. If put under the proposal to the U.N. in relation to Trusteeship System, the Japanese jurists were putting the southern territory confident that the Ryukyus would be initially under the Trusteeship system, to severed (bunri) from Japan as a former enemy which America is the sole territory but eventually would return to Japan. administrating authority, it is not There were a few precedents in international the case that the U.S. has received law for comparable cases. For example, Irie carte blanche to propose a change Keishirō (1903-1978) mentioned the case of in Japan’s vesedg territorial Bessarabia, a region of Moldavia. Bessarabia rights.55 was severed from Russia after the Crimean War; but returned in the Berlin treaty of 1878.53 My impression is that, in general, the Japanese Indeed, the transfer of authority did not mean scholars did not worry much about the future of dividing the country. It only meant transfer of the former Okinawan prefecture as a trust one section of the territory to the territory. They were more concerned with administration of another state.56 Irie asserted defining where Japan stood if the Ryukyu that the Ryukyu Islands belonged to Japan, and Islands were not put into the Trusteeship not to the U.S. Thus, Japan had the right to System. expand various legal prerogatives into the territory and to keep its own public institutions As previously stated, the San Francisco Peace in Okinawa. Moreover, he concluded that any Treaty gave the U.S. the right to exercise all institution established by the U.S.

7 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF administrative authority, including theOkinawa. As I have demonstrated, American Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), could politicians, academics, and the U.S. armed not engage in foreign affairs as its authority forces candidly confirmed the military purpose came from the U.S. not from Japan.57 Like Irie, of retaining the Ryukyu Islands. The cold war Shinjō Toshihiko, asserted that Okinawascenario in the region made it “desirable” for belonged to Japan. Indeed, he was more the U.S. to retain the territory and the bases on categorical when it came to defining what kind it. However, the transfer of administrative of sovereignty remained with Japan. For him, rights also affected the position of Ryukyuan Okinawa’s legal position was best explained as migrants. a quasi-leased territory: The American and Japanese authorities did not discuss the legal status of overseas Ryukyu For the above points, today’s migrants during the negotiations of the peace Okinawa is in a situation just like a treaty.60 This is despite the ongoing flow of self- leased territory. But because it has funded Okinawan migrants to South America, not been furnished with the mostly to Argentina, from 1948 onwards.61 By necessary formal conditions of a 1952 over one thousand Okinawans had leased territory, the international migrated to South America. There is no legal position of Okinawa is in a reference of their legal status in the peace ‘state of preparation to lease;’ in covenant. other words I think is reasonable to understand it as a ‘quasi-leased territory’.58

Similarly, Kuwada Saburo considered that the transfer of administration did not cause a change in the nationality of the local population since “the administrator may not confer on the inhabitants the nationality of the state; the power of the administrator is limited to granting the inhabitants permission for permanent domicile”.59

Finally, Irie stressed that if the U.S. did not pursue the option of the Trust territory, Japan could claim its “right of re-vindication (shicchi kaifukuken)”. Moreover, because the treaty did not limit the scope of Japanese participation in Okinawa’s daily life, Irie called for a more active role by the Japanese government in Okinawa issues.

Overseas Okinawans: Consular responsibility The first Japanese immigrants to South Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty America disembark in Brazil in 1908. Half extended America’s control of post-warwere Okinawans.

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Indeed, overseas Okinawans were invisible to responsible to assist the migrants.66 Initially the Japanese and American negotiators.Foreign Operation Administration (FAO) was Consequently, when migration became a state the American agency in charge of the effort in 1954, questions such as how Okinawan migrants.67 people could obtain legal benefits from their nationality, or what government was The Okinawan migrants had to apply for a responsible for them abroad, emerged.travel permit and an identity document (mibun Following the Universal Declaration of Human shōsho) at the USCAR offices.68 The latter Rights, the Okinawan people had the right to a document, in lieu of a passport, identified them nationality (article 15[1]) and no one could as “Ryukyuan” and indicated neither Japanese arbitrarily deprive them of it (article 15 [2]).62 nor American citizenship. In fact, it proved to However, cold war politics cast a shadow of be more a cause of confusion than assurance ambiguity over these fundamental human for the travelers. For example, it made it rights in Okinawa. Both, the U.S. and the difficult for the Ryukyuans to obtain visas in the Japanese governments claimed responsibility consulates and embassies in mainland Japan. It for the migrants in the 1950s. So the question also provoked constant misunderstandings at that arises from this situation is this: to what the port of entry in the country of destination.69 extent were the Japanese and the U.S.At the end of the day, the American position governments responsible for the Ryukyuan was that Okinawan migrants were the migrants? inhabitants of a U.S. occupied territory. Consequently, they could travel and enter into From the American point of view, since the foreign countries as Ryukyuans, not as inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands were under Japanese citizens, and thus, subject to the U.S. U.S. authority the U.S. was the sole party consular services. On the other hand, the responsible for their wellbeing. This was also Japanese position called for the recognition of considered to be the case when outside the migrants as Japanese nationals nihon( Okinawa. The establishment of the United kokumin toshite). If the SFPT prevented the States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Okinawan people from enjoying the benefits of Islands (hereafter USCAR) in 1950 and the Japanese nationality in the Ryukyus, there was Government of the Ryukyu Islands (hereafter no legal impediment to recognize their GRI) in 1952 aimed to promote thenationality beyond the islands. Irie Keishirō, a development of Okinawa and the betterment of leading advocate for a greater involvement of living conditions in the islands.63 Since the the Japanese government in Okinawan affairs, migration program, a policy to reduceanalyzed the legal position of Okinawan population in a demographically constrained migrants in the Kyoto conference of 1954. region, was one of the joint-policies pursued by Taking the case of Cyprus in the nineteenth these two organizations, the U.S. authorities in century as a precedent, he concluded that in a Okinawa considered that the success of the case of transfer of authority the inhabitants emigration plan was connected with the keep their nationality.70 Since the Japanese development of the Ryukyu Islands.64 As constitution guarantees freedom to move and Norman D. King, Chief of the Public Affairs change residence (chapter 2, article 22) the Division, demanded: “The State Department Okinawan people could maintain their Japanese must assume the responsibility of providing nationality even if they migrated overseas. protection for the émigrés. Failure to do this Furthermore, for Irie the U.S. rights over the will undoubtedly result in assumption of Ryukyus were geographically framed and thus responsibility by a Japanese mission”.65 Outside held no authority over the Okinawan people the islands, the U.S Foreign Services was made outside the Ryukyu Islands.71 Indeed, from a

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Japanese point of view, the nationality of the The Hogo Mondai and the limits of inhabitants of the southern territory had to be Japanese nationality in Bolivia properly specified in their travel documents: “The citizens of the Ryukyus, together with The international status of Ryukyuan migrants being ‘Ryukyuan’ are Japanese nationals. For in South America became a minor problem in this reason, the Certificate of Identity has to be Japan-U.S. international relations. The question applicable to the Japanese and Ryukyuan of the status of the migrants and their laws”.72 Therefore, Irie concluded that the nationality originated a debate which was Ryukyuans had no legal impediment to seek called “the protection problem” orHogo and receive assistance from the Japanese 76 consulates or embassies. Mondai. The Japanese government, at a request from the GRI, sought to include the soon-to-arrive Ryukyuan migrants in Bolivia “Following the SFPT plan, even under the umbrella of its diplomatic service in though all and any of the southern 77 the region in mid-1954. Japan’s Ministry of territories would become part of a Foreign Affairs considered providing protection trust territory, as mentioned above, the status of Japanese to the migrants in Bolivia but first “desired to nationals doesn’t change; and in know what will be the role played by the U.S. contrast with other trust officials in Bolivia” and inquired into the plans territories’ inhabitants, in this case proposed by the U.S. to protect the Ryukyuans they keep Japanese nationality. in Bolivia.78 The United States rejected the idea Moreover, unless special and claimed the sole right to protect the regulations are set forth in the migrants. As explained in the Tokyo based trust agreement the protective monthly-publication “Kaigai Ijū” (External authority of Japanese diplomacy Migration): continues to exist”.73

The beginning of the discussion on Japan was rightfully entitled to claim and take responsibility for the overseas Okinawans. In the Protection Problem was the end Okinawa, as Prime Minister Yoshida initiated when the GRI requested had stated in the last stage of the peace treaty to the Japanese government that negotiation, has “always been Japanese the Okinawans overseas be treated territory, inseparably tied to Japan proper; and as Japanese citizens. The Japanese its inhabitants are Japanese”.74 Thus we could Foreign Ministry accepted the have expected a stronger commitment from the request and in the case of Bolivia Japanese government towards its overseas discussed sending a delegate from nationals. However, due to the American the embassy in Peru. However, the pressure to keep the Okinawans under their American [government](with the control (and the prosaic Japanese defense of authority over Okinawa) felt their rights), the Ryukyuan migrants were kept in an ambiguous position. As seen below, in uncomfortable that the GRI was some cases, post-war Okinawan migrants asking the Japanese government to depended more on U.S. consulates than on the protect the migrants so assistance nearby Japanese diplomatic offices in South for sending migrants overseas is America.75 still at a standstill.79

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urgently wrote to GRI’s Chief Executive requesting help.83 The GRI looked to the Americans for help.84 First, Higa Shuhei, Chief Executive of the GRI, and Inamine Ichiro, chair of the Ryukyu Emigration Association, wrote several letters to U.S. authorities and to their American acquaintances to hasten aid.85 In reply, coordinated by Point 4, the U.S. dispatched a group of physicians from Foreign Operations Administration (hereafter FOA) to the region.86 Together with Bolivian specialists, they treated the patients and investigated the disease.87 Higa, in February 1955 thanked them Okinawan migrants in Bolivia for the assistance: “It is thanks to the great efforts made by both the U.S. Government and Bolivian Government to protect against the U.S. apprehension concerning the Ryukyuan disease that the patients seem [sic] to have migrants was not based entirely on itsrecovered”.88 For the United States, the interpretation of Article 3 of the SFPT. There question of the success or failure of the were also economic and political reasons for Ryukyuan colony posed a grave problem from strengthening control over the islands. The the standpoint of public relations because it U.S. government had allocated nearly one could serve as “an example of the U.S. million dollars to support the Ryukyu migration treatment and concern for the welfare of program and wanted to protect itsRyukyuans”.89 Conversely, the Japanese 80 investment. Moreover, in the case of the government did not show similar interest or Santa Cruz colony, it had compromised with readiness to get involved in the Uruma disease the Bolivian government to ensure thecrisis. The Japanese upon hearing of the sustainability of the colony through thedisease outbreak in Bolivia, while preparing for assistance of the “Point 4” delegation in the incoming Japanese mainland settlers, 81 Bolivia. The U.S. thus had a stake in the secured a report from their Legation in Peru success of the migrants in paving the way for a and, two months later, appointed a member of well-established community which could host the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a resident thousands of Okinawans as well as contribute official in Bolivia.90 However, the Japanese to the prosperity of the host society. move did little to counterbalance U.S. control of and responsibility for the Ryukyuan The debate on the Hogo Mondai took a twist community in Bolivia.91 Finally, at a different when natural disaster struck the newlylevel, Nagayama Tetsu, chief of the Uruma established Okinawan community “Uruma” in Colony, reported that the Japanese Association Santa Cruz. As told by Gushiken Kotei, a leader at La Paz “was kind enough to present us Bs. within the local community, an unknown high 1,074,000.00 in token of sympathy”.92 fever disease ran wild throughout the colony. “It was a disease which, within three days of The Uruma disease crisis confirmed the getting the fever, determined whether the dependent relationship between the Ryukyuan patient dies or lives”.82 The unknown disease, at community and the U.S. government. For the the time called “Uruma”, took the lives of American authorities it was important to show fifteen migrants in six months. Shuzo Nishihira, “interest” in the emigration project to preclude leader of the Okinawan group in Bolivia, Japanese criticism of the U.S. position. The

11 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF case revealed that the Japanese government, Department of USCAR, all GRI-sponsored far from Bolivia, did not challenge American settlers sought to obtain Japanese passports for primacy in Ryukyuan affairs in Bolivia. Indeed, their children, but: in taking no action in a time of crisis, the Japanese government failed to establish a claim to sovereignty over Okinawa. [U]nlike other Japanese diplomatic service offices in South America, The Hogo Mondai entered a new stage when the legation [in Bolivia] does not the Japanese government began its own register Ryukyuan settlers as migration program in Bolivia. Less than a year Japanese nationals. Therefore, it after the first GRI-sponsored community was does not issue Japanese passports established, a mainland Japanese community to them. The Japanese legation [in was created in Bolivia. There was thus both an Bolivia] is afraid the U.S. Okinawan colony and a Japanese colony in the government will object to issuing region of Santa Cruz. For the benefit of mainly passports to them for reason that the latter, the Japanese government emigration of the Ryukyuans to strengthened its diplomatic links in the region Bolivia and their settlement have by adding to the embassy in Lima, Peru a been co-sponsored by the U.S. 96 mission in La Paz, Bolivia. In addition, the Government. Overseas Cooperation Office Kaigai( kyōkai rengokai) (aka. Kaikyōren) opened an office in Although the Japanese and GRI requested that Santa Cruz to assist the mainland Japan the Ryukyuan migrants be placed under the migrants in Bolivia. Technically bothprotection of the Japanese office in Bolivia, the communities were Japanese and all migrants U.S. rejected this petition, insisting rather that 93 were Japanese nationals. But far from Point 4’s office would carry on with that providing assistance to Okinawans migrants in responsibility.97 The American authorities held Bolivia, Japan confined its support to Japanese that a Japanese passport was not necessary for 94 migrants. For instance, according to the Ryukyuan migrants. Not having one did not Japanese Nationality Act of 1950, art. 9 and the prevent settlers from pursuing “legitimate Family Register Act of 1947, art. 104, if activities” or from receiving “lawful protection Japanese nationals wished to obtain Japanese from the Bolivian government”.98 Besides, as nationality for a new born child in Bolivia or stated by Lt. Col. C. I. Guida, from the elsewhere abroad, they were required to report Executive Office, “all U.S. embassies and the birth of the child to the nearest Japanese consulates are prepared to assist people from diplomatic office within 14 days of the birth. the Ryukyu Islands”.99 Asato concluded that The Act also states that if the will to obtain “the crux of the whole matter lies in the desire Japanese nationality was not made known to maintain a link between the place they left within that period, the child would lose the and the land they chose […] however the 95 privileges of obtaining Japanese nationality. Japanese legation in Bolivia does not handle Ryukyuans in other parts of South America such matters of the settlers for the reason outside Bolivia could register the newborn in a stated [above]”.100 Japanese embassy or consulate. The diplomatic service processed the documents and sent In other words, the Hogo Mondai was a conflict them to the justice bureau in Fukuoka where a between Japan’s obligation to protect its special Family Registration Office exclusively nationals, and the U.S. insistence on for Okinawans operated. In Bolivia, as reported maintaining its guardianship over the migrant by Ken Asato from the Economic Development community in Bolivia. It was not the case that

12 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF the Ryukyuans desired to end their connection transfers of funds and also those for which the with the American government in Bolivia in U.S. entered into a formal agreement with the favor of a closer relation with Japan. Ota Sochi, local government. Consequently, the Okinawan Director of Social Affairs GRI, suggested that in community in Bolivia, the first migration order to provide complete protection for the project since the U.S. took control of the migrants, “(…) the emigrants carry theRyukyus, was among all such communities in passport issued by the GOJ’s resident office as South America the most influenced by well as the certificate of identification issued by American hegemony in terms of their the High Commissioner so that they can Nationality. receive protection from both the U.S. government and that of Japan”.101 However, this Although Article 3 separated the administration idea was also rejected by the Americanof the Japanese territory it did not legally affect authorities. The American position in Bolivia the Okinawan people’s Japanese nationality. As shown by some of the Japanese jurists quoted created a Gordian Knot that the Japanese did in this study, the treaty neither hindered Japan not dare to cut. The result was that Okinawans from participating in Okinawan daily life, nor were deprived of their right to have a prohibited it from taking responsibility for nationality and kept in an ambiguous status overseas Okinawans. The Japanese (neither Japanese nor American).102 In short, government, however, failed to provide basic the ambivalence of their status overseas consular services such as provision of reflected the ambivalence of their status at identifying documents for Ryukyuans abroad, home. notably in Bolivia, as a result of American pressure to maintain control. If we understand Conclusions a client state as a state that conducts its In this article we have analyzed some of the foreign policy according to the dictates of a consequences of Article 3 of the San Francisco more powerful state, Japan behaved as a client 103 Peace Treaty on Okinawan migrants,state in Bolivia in the 1950s. Where we could particularly to Bolivia. We observed that the have expected a stronger Japanese U.S. defense requirements were essentially commitment from the Japanese government territorial and that John Foster Dullestowards its overseas nationals, we found a attempted to satisfy the Department of Defense pragmatic nation reluctant to act against the requirements by assuring that U.S. maintained U.S. will. control of the island and the inhabitants. Article Acknowledgements 3 sprang from an Asian cold war context and it was meant to be an instrument to be used in I would like to thank Prof Mark Selden, Prof Asia, not in South America. However, Japan’s Gavan McCormack, Prof Tessa Morris- Suzuki, post-war territorial division was projected onto Prof Matt Allen and Prof Miyume Tanji for the overseas communities as we havehelpful comments on earlier drafts of this demonstrated for Bolivia and South America. paper. I would also like to thank Prof Sensui Hidekazu for the enthusiastic support I Article 3 gave the U.S. the right to control received while visiting Okinawa. entry and exit from the Ryukyu Islands. In addition, the American hegemonic reach About the author enabled the U.S. to maintain responsibility for the islanders throughout South America. For Pedro Iacobelli is a PhD candidate at the the U.S. the most important RyukyuanAustralian National University and Adjunct communities were those which involved higher Professor at the Pontificia Universidad Católica

13 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF de Chile. His doctoral dissertation deals with 5 Ōta Masahide,Okinawa No Tennō: the postwar Japanese and Okinawan emigration Kōtōbenmukan (the Okinawan Emperor: The programs to Bolivia. High Commissioner) (Tokyo: Asahi bunnkō, 1996), Yoshida Kensei, Democracy Betrayed: Recommended citation: Pedro Iacobelli, "The Okinawa under U.S. Occupation, ed. Edward H. Limits of Sovereigny and Post-War Okinawan Kaplan, vol. 23,Studies on East Asia Migrants in Bolivia," The Asia-Pacific Journal, (Bellingham: Western Washington University, Volume 11, Issue 34, No. 2, August 26, 2013. 2001). Arasaki Moriteru, Okinawa Gendaishi (Contemporary History of Okinawa) (Tokyo: Notes Iwanami Shinsho, 2005). Tanji Miyume, Myth,

1 Protest and Struggle in Okinawa (London: I will use the terms Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands Routledge, 2006). Gavan McCormack and (or Ryukyus), and Nansei Shoto Satoko Oka Norimatsu,Resistant interchangeably. The Nansei Islands are the Islands:Okinawa Confronts Japan and the entire island chain to which the Ryukyus belong. In the San Francisco peace treaty the United States (Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield term Nansei Shoto (plus its bearings) was used. Publishers, , 2012). Okinawa is the name of the largest island of the 6 For instance the work of Watanabe Akio, The Ryukyu group, and “Okinawa” is often used to Okinawa Problem, a Chapter in Japan - U.S. designate all of the islands and the Japanese Relations (Melbourne: Melbourne University prefecture as well. Press, 1970). 2 Ordinance 93, 1953: “Control of Entry and 7 For example Ōta Masahide, Kenshō : Showa Exit of individuals into and from the Ryukyu No Okinawa (Inspection: Okinawa During the Islands” in United States Civil Administration 1950 - 1972, Laws and Regulations During the Showa Period) (Naha: Naha shuppansha, U.S. Administration of Okinawa: 1945-1972, ed. 1990), Taira Koji, "Troubled National Identity: Gekkan Okinawa Sha, vol. Book 2 (n/d). Section The Ryukyuans/Okinawans," inJapan's VII. Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity, ed. Michael Weiner (London: Routledge, 1997). 3 Endoh Toake, Exporting Japan: Politics of Oguma Eiji, 'Nihonjin' No Kyōkai - Okinawa, Emigration toward Latin America (Urbana and Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen, Shokuminchi Shihai Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009), Kara Fukki Undō Made (the Boundaries of the p.164. 'Japanese': Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan and Korea. From Colonial Domination to the Return 4 On the bilateral problem see Robert D. Movement) (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1998). Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands: The 8 Reversion Movement and U.S. - Japan Relations There have been a few approaches to the (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004), Robert D. topic from Kozy Amemiya and Taku Suzuki. See Eldridge, "The Revision of the U.S.-Japan Kozy Amemiya, "The Bolivian Connection: U.S. Security Treaty and Okinawa," inJapanese Bases and Okinawa Emigration," inJPRI Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Working Paper (JPRI: Japan Policy Research Integration, ed. Iokibe Makoto, et al. (London: Institute at the USF Center for the Pacific Rim, Routledge, 2008). Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, 1996). Suzuki Taku, "Becoming 'Japanese' in Keystone: The American Occupation ofBolivia: Okinawa-Bolivia Trans(National) Okinawa and U.S. - Japanese Relations (College Formation in Colonia Okinawa," Identities 13, Station, Texas: Texas A&M University, 2000). no. 3 (2006).

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9 For a discussion on “corporal inscription” in Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem : the Ryūkyū islands see Suzuki Taku,Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, Embodying Belonging: Racializing Okinawa 1945-1952 (New York: Garland Pub, 2001). It Diaspora in Bolivia and Japan (Honolulu: should be noted that in December 1953, the University of Hawai'i Press, 2010). pp.8-9. Amami islands to the north reverted to Japan.

10 The literature on this case has focused, 15 Although in the Cairo meeting Roosevelt mostly from an ethnographic perspective, on intended to transfer the islands to China, the local dynamics in the colonies in Bolivia and Department of State personnel were not aware their relationship with the local Bolivian of his intention. So when the Division of community. Political Studies, under Dr. Isaiah Bowman, interpreted the Cairo Declaration, it concluded 11 The JILD is the journal of the Japanese that the Ryukyus “did not appear to be of the Society of International Law (est. 1897), based type which fell within the meaning of the in the Faculty of Law of the University of phrase in question (…)” quoted in Eldridge, The Tokyo. It has been published since 1902. Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 12 Ōta Masahide, "Re-Examining the History of 1945-1952 p.57. the Battle of Okinawa," in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff: Japan 16 For the Cairo Communiqué see here; for the Policy Research Institute, 1999). pp.13-14. Potsdam declaration here. All sites visited on Most textbooks date the Battle of Okinawa April 7, 2010. The Yalta Agreement, the other between April 1st and June 23rd of 1945. main wartime agreement, did not address the future of Japan’s territory. For a complete 13 For testimonies of the battle of Okinawa see study on the wartime agreements and the Yahara Hiromichi, The Battle for Okinawa, position of China towards Okinawa see Hara trans. Roger Pineau and Masatoshi Uehara Kimie, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia- (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995). Pacific:Divided Territories in the San Francisco p.105. and George Feifer, Tennozan: The Battle System (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.158-65. of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992). p.446. Also see 17 As early as 1942 discussion was held on the chapter 2 of McCormack and Norimatsu, status of Okinawa. In 1943 the State Resistant Islands:Okinawa Confronts Japan and Department recommended that the islands be the United States. The Itoman Prefectural returned to Japan following U.S. victory. See Peace Memorial Museum vividly illustrates the Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa terrifying situation experienced before, during Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan and after the battle. Relations, 1945-1952 p.53.

14 The main study on the first seven years of 18 Fisch, Military Government in the Ryukyu U.S. administration in Okinawa from a military Islands. 1945 -1950. p. 55. For a cultural perspective is Arnold G. Fisch,Military approach to the U.S. position in Okinawa see Government in the Ryukyu Islands. 1945 -1950, Pedro Iacobelli, "Orientalism, Mass Culture and 2005 ed. (Honolulu: University Press of the the Us Administration in Okinawa,"ANU Pacific, 1988). p.4. For an OkinawanJapanese Studies On-Line 1, no. 4 (2011). perspective, see the first chapter of Arasaki, Okinawa Gendaishi (Contemporary History of 19 Okinawa had a different administrative Okinawa). pp.1-30. On the genealogy of the structure than mainland Japan. The Ryukyu bilateral problem see Robert D Eldridge,The Islands were under the jurisdiction of the

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General Headquarters of the Far EastOkinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.- Command GHQ/FECOM from 1947. For a Japan Relations, 1945-1952 pp.301-314. complete analysis of the chain of command in occupied Japan and Okinawa see Takemae Eiji, 26 For the official Japanese position on Okinawa, Inside G.H.Q.:The Allied Occupation of Japan see Department of State, Foreign Relations of and Its Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and the United States, 1951, vol. VI, Asia and the Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, Pacific (in two parts) Part 1. (Washington, D.C.: 2002). pp.121-123. Government Printing Office, 1977). pp. 811; 833; 960-961;1163. For comment on the so- 20 Gavan McCormack, Client State: Japan in the called ‘Tenno message” see ŌtaKenshō : American Embrace (London: Verso, 2007). Showa No Okinawa (Inspection: Okinawa p.122. For an analysis of the “separation” of During the Showa Period). pp. 314-329. Okinawa from Japan and its contemporary Matsuoka Hiroshi, Hirose Yoshikazu, and consequences see particularly chapters six and Takenaka Yorohiko, Reisenshi: Sono Kigen, seven. Tenkai, Shūen to Nihon (the Cold War History) (Tokyo: Dobunkan, 2003). pp. 84-85. 21 Okinawa Policy within the State Department, illustrated by the 1943 Masland Paper, 1944 27 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the Borton Paper, 1945/1946 Emerson paper, and United States, 1951. pp.1057-1062. The U.S. 1946/1948 Feary Paper, all envisaged return of position in Okinawa was repeatedly criticized the Ryukyus to Japan. By 1949 that option was by the Soviet bloc following the peace treaty unthinkable. Eldridge, The Origins of the meeting in San Francisco. See Nippon Times, Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in "Excerpts from Gromyko Speech," Sept. 7 Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952 p.54. 1951.

22 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 28 Edwin O Reischauer, one of the most United States, 1949, vol. VII, The Far East and influential academics in Japanese affairs, and Australasia (in two parts) Part 2. (Washington, later U.S. ambassador to Japan, supported D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976). limiting the U.S. trusteeship on Okinawa as pp.730-736. Also see Hara Kimie description in much as possible and returning the rest of the Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia- territory to Japan. W.W. Butterworth, Director Pacific:Divided Territories in the San Francisco of the Office of Far Easter Affairs, William System. Chapter seven. Sebald and Douglas L. Oliver were cautious 23 Initially the U.S. Department of Defense and about extending the occupation. And J.F. Dulles Department of State aimed to retain “facilities” and John Allison supported the trusteeship and develop the U.S. position in Okinawa. See option. See respectively: Edwin O. Reischauer, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the The United States and Japan (Cambridge: United States, 1949. p.655. In 1950, this came Harvard University Press, 1950). pp.237-239; to mean control of the whole territory. Dean Department of State, Foreign Relations of the Acheson, "Crisis in Asia -an Examination of the United States, 1949. p.815; and Yoshida, U.S. Policy," The Department of State Bulletin Democracy Betrayed: Okinawa under U.S. XXII, no. 551 (1950). pp.111-118 Occupation. p.45.

29 24 Quoted in Yoshida,Democracy Betrayed: Under the Mandates System, the Permanent Okinawa under U.S. Occupation. p.45. Mandate Commission of the League of Nations was responsible for supervising the mandates 25 Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral territories but in the practice it did not have

16 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF real power. See George Thullen, Problems of Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa the Trusteeship System : A Study of Political (Vancouver University of British Columbia, Behavior in the United Nations (Geneve: 1963). pp. 10-12. Rosa Caroli suggests that the Librairie Droz, 1964). p.12. ibid. p.11. The Ryukyu Islands became a “Land without Trusteeship system has been inactive since status”. Rosa Caroli, Il Mito Dell´Omogeneita 1994. Giapponese : Storia Di Okinawa (Rome: Franco Angelini, 1999). pp.191-203. 30 In the history of the Trusteeship System the only case of making an ex enemy territory a 39 Marjorie M. Whiteman,Digest of trust territory was when Somalia was trusted to International Law, vol. 1 (Department of State Italy, its former colonial master. There are no Publication 7403, 1963).,p.270. cases in which states voluntarily placed a 40 territory under the system. Chairmian Edwards Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of the Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in Postwar U.S.- United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons, Japan Relations, 1945-1952 p.359. 1956). p.40. 41 “The United States Political Adviser to SCAP 31 Ibid. pp.39-42. (Sebald) to the Department of State” in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 32 Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, United States, 1952-1954, vol. 14,(in two parts) Charter of the United Nations: Commentary Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing and Documents (Boston: World Peace Office, 1985). p.1092. Foundation, 1946), pp.359-60. 42 Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604, N° 33 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 12746, (9th Cir, 1951) in here accessed April 10, United States, 1951. p.933. 2010.

34 Ibid. p.933. For another document stating 43 Ibid. Dulles’ position see ibid. p.841. 44 The case’s description can be found in 35 “Treaty of Peace with Japan” in UCLA East Whiteman, Digest of International Law. pp 268 Asia Studies Documents at here accessed April – 271. 7, 2010. 45 Ibid. p.269. 36 Ibid. 46 The Ryukyu kingdom was a tributary state to 37 The Peace treaty was signed by forty eight China and since the seventeenth century to the nations, including Bolivia. The USSR opposed Satsuma daimyo. See George H. Kerr, Okinawa, the “illegality” of transferring the Ryukyus to the History of an Island People, 1969 ed. U.S. custody. Similarly the Gov. of India (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., rejected Article 3 and thus did not attend the 1958). SFP Conference. Nippon Times, "Excerpts from Gromyko Speech." For the Indian position see 47 Akiho Ichirō, "(Okinawa Kizoku Ni Kansuru Department of State, Foreign Relations of the Ichishōsatsu)," The Journal of International Law United States, 1951. pp. 1062;and Diplomacy (Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) LIV, 1269-70;1288-1291. no. no. 1-3 (1955). p.57.

38 The term was Dulles’ creation. Mikio Higa, 48 Hanabusa N., "Transitions About the

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Reversion of Okinawa (Okinawa Kizoku No 60 Following the documents on the San Enkaku)," The Journal of International Law and Francisco Peace Treaty published in the FRUS Diplomacy (kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) LIV, no. no. collection. 1-3 (1955). p.38. 61 Source: JICA, Okinawaken to kaigai ijuu 49 Ueda T., "Okinawa Question in the Eyes of (Tokyo: Jica 1982) pp, 98 – 99. Cited in Endoh, American Scholars (Amerika Gakusha No Mita Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration toward Okinawa Mondai)," The Journal of International Latin America. p.164. Law and Diplomacy (Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) 61 LIV, no. no. 1-3 (1955). The declaration of Human Rights was ratified in 1948. Japan joined the United Nations in 50 Ibid. pp.40-46. 1956.

62 51 Ibid. p.46. Hyman Kublin, "The Attitude of The directives for USCAR were established in China During the Liu-Ch'iu Controversy, a memorandum approved by the Joint Chiefs of 1871-1881," Pacific Historical Review Vol. 18, Staff (JCS) in October 4, 1950. Department of no. No. 2 (1949). State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. VI, East Asia and the Pacific 52 Kublin, "The Attitude of China During the Liu- (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Ch'iu Controversy, 1871-1881." p.116. 1976). pp.1313-1319. For the GRI see Art. II, C.A. Proclamation No. 13, 29 February 1952; in 53 Irie Keishirou, "Legal Status of Okinawa United States Civil Administration:1950 - 1972, (Okinawa Shotō No Hōtekichii)," The Journal of Laws and Regulations During the U.S. International Law and Diplomacy (Kokusaihō Administration of Okinawa: 1945-1972, ed. Gaikō zasshi) LIV, no. 1-3 (1955). p.64. Gekkan Okinawa sha, vol. Book 1 (n/d). p.112.

54 Ashida Hitoshi, former Prime Minister and 63 The U.S. supported the emigration program leader of the Democratic Party questioned as a policy to reduce the levels of social tension Yoshida on the contents of the treaty. The focus in an overpopulated area. See Kozy Amemiya, was the practical benefits of having “residual "The Bolivian Conection: U.S. Bases and sovereignty” of the territory. Okinawa Emigration," in Okinawa: Cold War Island, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Cardiff: Japan 55 Irie, "Legal Status of Okinawa (Okinawa Policy Research Institute, 1999). Shotō No Hōtekichii)." p.74. 64 “FOA Report on Emigration Possibilities in 56 Ibid. p.77. Bolivia”, 3 September 1954, U.S. National Archives, RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30. 57 Ibid. pp.78-80. 65 In the preamble of the 1961 agreement 58 Shinjo T., "Okinawa No Kokusaihōjyō No Chii between the Bolivian Government and the (Status of Okinawa in International Law)," The United States concerning the immigration of Journal of International Law and Diplomacy Ryukyuans, it is made clear that because the (Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi) LIV, no. 1-3 (1955). U.S. exercises “all and any powers of p.107. administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants” , it can act as 59 Kuwada Saburo, "Status of Okinawans under responsible authority for the migrants in the Japanese Nationality Law," The Japanese Bolivia. See “Agreement Between the Annual of International Law, no. 3 (1959). p.88. Government of Bolivia and the Government of

18 11 | 34 | 2 APJ | JF the United States of America Concerning the 73 Quoted in Eldridge,The Origins of the Immigration of the Ryukyuans” Draft 8/23/61. Bilateral Okinawa Problem : Okinawa in The United States Administration Materials – Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952it The Ryukyu Islands: S 312 UN 19 (20), at the should be noted that Yoshida’s “always” could Sengo Shiryō shitsu, Ryukyu University. not mean anything earlier than 1609.

66 The FAO was part of the U.S. aid plan for 74 In conversation with Ota Masahide, I learned friendly countries. In 1953 the role of FAO was about the case of Japanese and Okinawan to assist the colonization plan by givingfishermen who were shipwrecked on the guidance. See “Memorandum for the Record” Indonesia coast in the 1950s. The Japanese 10 Nov. 1953. At the U.S. National Archives, consular office in Indonesia promptly took care RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30. Still in late of the Japanese fishermen whereas the 1954 FOA’s role in the migration program was Okinawans were left without assistance. not all clear. Oscar Powell, Director of the FOA office in Bolivia, was at loss about his duties 75 The term Hogo, together with “protection”, toward the migrants, so he requested an can be translated also as “conservation”, Airgram defining in general terms what they “guardianship” or “patronage”. were expected to do. See “Letter to Marry W. Yee (Director W.C. Division FOA)” December 76 Kaigai Ijū, 20 July 1954, p.6. 22, 1954. U.S. National Archives, RG. 319, SA 270 R18 Ex60 Box 30. 77 “Summary of meeting held between Mr. Ishida and LO” 10 May 1954. In The United 67 Since there was no Japanese office in the States Administration Materials – The Ryukyu Ryukyu Islands that could emit passports, they Islands: S 312 UN 11 (19), at the Sengo Shiryō had to apply for one of the Ryukyu-proof of shitsua, Ryukyu University. citizenship. 78 In Japan International Cooperation Agency’s 68 For a complete description of the Visa Record Office (JICA), Kaigai Ijū, edited by application procedures see Tamashiro Migorō, Nihon kaigai kyōkai rengōkai, 20 July 1954, "Okinawa Kaigai Ishū Kankei Kiroku (Records p.6. Related to Okinawan Overseas Migration)," Ijūkenkyu, no. 16 (1979). 79 The U.S government, through USCAR, invested US$160,000 for the first Bolivian 69 Turkey agreed to assign the island of Cyprus group. The U.S. Congress appropriated over to be occupied and administered by England in US$800,000 to support migration. See Kaigai the Berlin treaty (1878). England could control Ijū, 20 June 1954, p.39. However, the latter Cyprus though titular sovereignty would sum was not used in fiscal year 1955. Also the remain in Turkey. See Thomas Ehrlich, counterpart funds (from the Bolivian "Cyprus, the "Warlike Isle": Origins and government), used to build housing, provide Elements of the Current Crisis," Stanford Law food supply for the first year and for road Review 18, no. 6 (1966). pp.1024-1025. construction, was derived from the nine million 70 Irie, "Legal Status of Okinawa (Okinawa dollars in aid received from the U.S. Shotō No Hōtekichii)." p.86. government. Therefore, most of the money came from U.S. appropriations. See 71 Ibid. p.86. “Memorandum for the Record” 10 Nov. 1953. U.S. National Archives, RG. 319, SA 270 R18 72 Ibid. p.88. Ex60 Box 30.

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80 The U.S. Technical Assistance Program was “Letter to Harry W. Yoe (FOA) by O.Powell”, called “Point Four”. Harry Truman’s inaugural February 1, 1955, U.S. National Archives R.G. address in 1949 proclaimed the Point Four 319 S.A. 270, R.18 Ex.60 Box 30. Program, with the objective of “making the 86 benefits of our scientific advances and Initially it was thought to be Malaria but the industrial progress available for thetest failed to confirm it. JICA, Kaigai Ijū, 20 improvement and growth of underdeveloped March 1955, p.8. According to Kozy Amemiya, areas”. See Ravi Kanbur, "The Economics of it could have being an outburst of Hanta virus. International Aid," inWorking Paper Amemiya, "The Bolivian Connection: U.S. Bases Department of Applied Economics andand Okinawa Emigration." Mangement (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2003). 87 “Remittance as medical expenses for the 81 Gushiken arrived in Bolivia a year after the patients among emigrants”, OPA, Cod. R diseased was controlled. He quotes his brother, 00053789 B a member of the first group, to explain the tragedy. Kotei Gushiken, Okinawa Ijyūchi : 88 “Current Status of Ryukyuan Colonization in Boribia No Daichi Totomoni (Okinawa´SBolivia” 10 February 1955. U.S. National Migration Land : Together in Bolivia's Ground) Archives R.G. 319 S.A. 270, R.18 Ex.60 Box 30. (Naha: Okinawa Taimusu, 1998). p.52. 89 “GRI Mission to Bolivia” 23 March 1955. U.S. 82 “Letter from Shuzo Nishihira (Chairman National Archives R.G. 319 S.A. 270, R.18 Urgent Countermeasure) to Higa (6 January Ex.60 Box 30. 1955)”. In U.S. National Archives, Registration Number 319, Stack Area 270 Room 18, ex.60 90 This doesn’t mean that the Japanese box 30. newspaper did not cover the event, but in their report there is no direct mention to any form of 83 Higa Shugei, Chief Executive, wrote to J. official aid. Tigner requesting immediate dispatch of government officials. He also called for an 91 “Report of the group condition”, OPA Cod. official investigation and necessary action. R00053789B. The official exchange rate was Similarly, Inamine wrote to U.S. Senator W. one dollar for 100 bolivianos, but the free rate Judd. Letters and related documents inwas one dollar for 1200 bolivianos. Okinawan Prefectural Archive (hereafter OPA), Cod. R 0053789B. 92 Ryukyuans were Japanese nationals even though Okinawa was under U.S. military 84 Many of Inamine’s letters were directed to control. Representative Walter Judd, who had advocated and sponsored migration to Bolivia. 93 This situation changed in the 1960s when the See Walter Judd papers, Box 145, folder 2, The U.S. modified its position towards Okinawan Hoover Institution Archives (HIA), California. emigrants and allowed the Japanese agencies to gain control over all Okinawan and Japanese 85 JICA, Kaigai Ijū, 20 March 1955, p.8. colonies. American specialists were interested in the disease itself and ran a series of experiments. 94 Acts quoted in “Excerpts of Provisions of The treatment was mainly to immunize the Japanese Laws” OPA Cod. 0000011835. population against yellow fever with the first injection of diphtheria-tetanus-whooping cough 95 “Status of Ryukyuan Emigrants in Bolivia” vaccine administered to all children. See OPA, Cod. 0000011835, p.2. Italics mine.

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96 Nihon Kaigai Kyokai Renairais, “Boribia no HICOM” 21 April 1961. in The United States seikatsuto roudou”, 1956, p.84. Administration Materials – The Ryukyu Islands: S 312 UN 19 (7), in the Sengo Shiryō shitsu 97 “Status of Ryukyuan Emigrants in Bolivia” (Postwar Archives Room), Ryukyu University. OPA, Cod. 0000011835, p.2. 101 This situation affected the socioeconomic 98 MOFA, 16 Kai, J’0079, folder 2. Lt. Col. conditions of the community in the 1950s and Crescenzo I. Guida from the Executive Office early 1960s. Years later the mainland Japanese replied to the request to change the U.S.-issued community of San Juan in Bolivia remembered Ryukyuan travel document for Japanese this situation. JICA, Shinsaku Nanbo, in passports. Nihonjin Borivia Ijyūshi (History of the 99 “Status of Ryukyuan Emigrants in Bolivia” Japanese Migration in Bolivia) (Tokyo: Nihonjin OPA, Cod. 0000011835, p.3. Borivia Ijyūshi Hensai iinkai, 1970). p.147.

100 “Letter to Byron E. Blankinship, office of 102 See note 95.