The Securitization of Asylum in Australia: Delineating Endogenous and Exogenous Causes

Kane Jamen Matthews

B. A. (Hons), University of Western Australia, 2012

This thesis is presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Political Science and

International Relations

The University of Western Australia

School of Social Sciences

2018

Thesis Declaration

I, Kane Jamen Matthews, certify that: This thesis has been substantially accomplished during enrolment in the degree. This thesis does not contain material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary institution. No part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of The University of Western Australia and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this degree. This thesis does not contain any material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. The work(s) are not in any way a violation or infringement of any copyright, trademark, patent, or other rights whatsoever of any person.

Acknowledgements

To all of my friends and family who have been there through these years you have my eternal gratitude. Particular thanks to my family Dee, Steve, Raoul and Tex for seeing me through with love and support to meet the challenges! I would also like to express appreciation to the

University and the support provided by receiving a Postgraduate Award scholarship that made undertaking possible. I would like to express gratitude to all staff who assisted me along the way, especially to those supervisors who guided me through this project. Most of all, I would like to say a special thankyou to, Professor Samina Yasmeen, whom I am most indebted and without whose wisdom and patience this thesis could never have been written.

This research was supported by an Australian Government Research Training

Program (RTP) Scholarship.

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Abstract This thesis investigates the securitization of humanitarian migration to Australia. Utilizing securitization theory, it looks to elite discourse: the construction of threat in the speech of political elites in Australia, to answer key questions. What has driven the securitization of

(humanitarian) migration in Australia and elsewhere? Is Australia’s response to unauthorised boat arrivals the result of entrenched historical fears over undesirable immigration? Or are non-traditional security threats best considered a response to emerging global relations?

Data to answer these questions has been sourced by exhaustively coding and analysing the rhetorical frames utilized by parliamentarians in two distinct periods, the Vietnamese refugee

Crisis 1975-81 and the contemporary era of securitization following the Tampa Affair and continuing until the implementation of Operation Sovereign Borders 2001-2013. This thesis will comprehensively map how political elites conceived of refugees in those two periods.

Shifts in discourse, and the relative dominance of different ideas being voiced, can then be used to determine how these conceptions have changed over time and which phenomena are interpreted as threatening. Analysing certain hypothesis against the empirical data collected, this thesis offers alternative explanations to conventional perspectives that understand the backlash against refugees as a resurgence in exclusionary (racial) xenophobia, by locating new relations in the globalized economy and security environment as key driving forces.

Given the emergence of refugee issues as a top level international problem that strains relationships and threatens peace and security, insight into the complex relationship between these forces is necessary to understand what has caused the securitization phenomenon and, ultimately, the future trajectory of this pressing issue. In doing so, this thesis offers original contribution to securitization literature by providing a methodological avenue to overcome the problem of theory-heavy assumptions by extensively drawing upon test data.

Table of Contents

List Figures and Tables ...... vi

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

PROJECT AND METHODOLOGY ...... 10

CHAPTER I Theoretical Foundations ...... 18

1.1 The Emergence of Migration as a Security Threat ...... 18

1.2 A Constructivist Approach to Security Studies ...... 21

1.3 Securitization Theory ...... 26

1.4 Framing, Discourse and Security ...... 39

CHAPTER II Case Study One 1975-1981...... 48

2.1 Australia and the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis ...... 48

2.2 Refugees in Speech: Utterances in Hansard 1975-1981 ...... 66

2.3 Conclusions on Conceptions of Refugees During the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis ....92

CHAPTER III Case Study Two 2001-2013...... 96

3.1 Tampa and Beyond ...... 96

3.2 Global Immigration Trends into the New Millennium ...... 97

3.3 Australian Developments ...... 100

3.4 The Third Wave: Politics and Policy ...... 109

3.5 Changing Perceptions of Asylum Seekers ...... 119

3.5 Desecuritizing Unauthorised Arrival ...... 125

3.6 Refugees in Speech: Utterances in Hansard 2001-2013 ...... 137

3.7 Conclusions on Conceptions of Asylum Seekers in the New Millennium ...... 156

CHAPTER IV The Historical Hypothesis ...... 159

4.1 Australia’s Colonial Legacy ...... 159

4.2 Representations of History, Identity and Nation in Speech ...... 177

4.3 Conclusions on Representations of Historical Identity in Refugee Discussion ...... 192

CHAPTER V The Economic Hypothesis ...... 196

5.1 Globalization and Structural Economic Change ...... 196

5.2 The Politics of Reaction ...... 200

5.3 Welfare Chauvinism ...... 208

5.4 Economic Perceptions in the Speech of Political Elites ...... 214

5.5 Conclusions on Impact of Economics on Refugee Issues ...... 233

CHAPTER VI The International Security Hypothesis ...... 237

6.1 The Refugee Regime Within Macrosecuritized Systems ...... 237

6.2 The Cold War as a Macrosecuritized System ...... 244

6.3 The Global War on Terror as a Macrosecuritized System ...... 249

6.4 Representations of International Security in the Speech of Political Elites ...... 257

6.5 Conclusions on Representations of International Politics on Refugee Debates ...... 275

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION ...... 284

Bibliography ...... 297

List of Figures

1.1 Mayring, P. (2000). Qualitative content analysis 15

1.2 Australian Parliamentary Library: Boat Arrivals 1989-2002 106

1.3 Australian Parliamentary Library: Excised Islands 112

1.4 Boat Arrivals By Calendar year 1976 to 2014

and Financial Year 1989-90 to 2014-15 126

1.5 ‘Stop Illegals Now’ Coalition Advertising Still 181

1.6 Australia: Number of Overstayers, 1990-2003 229

List of Tables

2.1 Australian Parliamentary Library: Boat Arrivals 1976-88 52

2.2 UNHCR: Boat Arrivals in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong 59

2.3 Most Dominant Framing Devices in Refugee Discussion 1975-81 68-9

2.4 Requests for Protection Visas (excluding Offshore Program) 2009-2014 128

2.5 25 Most Dominant Framing Devices in Refugee Discussion 2001-2013 138-9

2.6 Major Framing Devices Relating to History and Identity 180

2.7 Major Framing Devices Relating to National Wealth 216

2.8 Major Framing Devices Relating to Illegal Migration 221

2.9 Major Framing Devices Relating to International Security 258

2.10 Major Framing Devices Relating to International Relations 270

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Introduction

It has been 16 years since the issue of refugees skyrocketed to dominate the 2001 Australian federal election after the Tampa, a vessel carrying asylum seekers, arrived unauthorised in

Australian waters. Treating the event as a violation of Australia’s territorial integrity, the

Howard Government transformed Australia’s relationship with refugees by implementing a radical program of naval interdiction, intercepting refugee boats at sea before they could reach the Australian mainland, and forcibly relocating asylum seekers to third nations for processing.

Putting aside several attempts by successive governments to abolish this formula over the period 2007-2013, the implementation of Operation Sovereign Borders in September 2013 essentially revived the central practices of the Pacific Solution which remain in place to this day.

Scholars seeking to understand these events have not had difficulty placing the phenomenon within its historical context. Australia’s history has been dominated by nationalism expressed as racism and the xenophobic anxiety of a young nation geopolitically isolated from the powerful allies and the imagined core of its culture. Consequently, an executive that favoured defensive, strict immigration restriction has had a formative impact on nascent Australian nationhood and has guided the development of the nation’s culture and government. The securitization of asylum can be presented as a continuation of this historical process, in a sense, just more of same. While there is truth to this view, it does not go far enough as a comprehensive explanation. It overlooks important shifts at the international level of analysis, which are driving changing norms relating to refugees and their reception around the world.

The research undertaken in this thesis seeks to delineate those factors and ultimately provide answers to which phenomena are consequential in driving the securitization of humanitarian migration in the contemporary era.

Is the securitization of asylum a protection of Australia’s historical stance regarding immigration? Or can this development be primarily explained by emergent features in the global economy and international security environment?

Ultimately, delineating which factors have had the most consequential impact on the changing norms of asylum will best help scholars understand the future of this issue that increasingly impacts the ‘high-politics’ of international stability, peace and security. The securitization of humanitarian migration in the form of naval interdiction and regional detention is a new manifestation of immigration restriction that has radical implications, not only for Australia, but for the future of the 20th Century asylum regime internationally. Irregular maritime migration is an expression of the global refugee problem drawing increased attention as an especially complex problem from policy makers.1 The exodus of refugees into the

Mediterranean, flowing on from millions of asylees fleeing the Syrian Civil War, provides a pressing example of the impossibility of regional insulation from mass irregular migration in the modern era and has drawn comparison to the problem to Australia’s North.

These developments illuminate the modern logic of governmentality and the changing nature of state authority in the globalized era: in the Post-Cold War security environment, anarchic human movements are increasingly framed as crises of security that necessitate intervention by

1Newland, K. ‘Maritime Migration a Wicked Problem’, in Newland et. al. ‘All at Sea: Policy Challenges of Rescue, Interception, and Long-Term Response to Marine Migration’ Migration Policy Institute, 2016 pp.33-37

2 state authorities. As with any emergent security threat, the materialization of new external relations that determine the behaviour of agents is just one aspect that must be addressed. The variability of this kind of threat across time and space leaves the securitization phenomenon inherently impenetrable by purely material analysis. Instead, it must be approached from the ideational realm.

Specifically, asylum seeker boats have been presented as a national security threat by government in the contemporary era when at other times they were not. Understanding the dominant symbolic associations attached to these developments, what refugees mean to policy makers in the contemporary era (as opposed to the past), is central to completing the picture: the worldview implicit in designations of national-security. This thesis addresses the diverse variables involved, requiring comparative analysis with other similar international phenomena.

Reviewing primary source data and in-depth discussion, however, will be reserved for the

Australian case. This will then act as an example to highlight the complicated new relations of the global paradigm on refugees. Based on the research undertaken, this thesis will analyse discourse relating to refugees in Australia from two distinct periods, the New Millennium Post-

Tampa 2001-2013 and the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis 1975-1981. This allows for what has been identified as the contemporary period of securitization2 to be compared with the largest historical case of unauthorised arrivals to Australia gauge the transformation of discourse.

By anchoring the present within the context of the past, this thesis will map the ideological changes that have informed the evolution of the issue within Australia and, by understanding

2McDonald, M., ‘Constructing insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post-2001’, International Relations, 19(3), 2005, pp. 297-298

3 this momentum, those trajectories which promise to have the most widespread and long-term impacts. Approaching the subject with a macroscopic view it becomes clear that the myriad of push factors driving refugee flows will not change in the foreseeable future, especially as developing countries continue to undergo processes of nation-building which are, unfortunately, characterized by refugee creation. Most people fleeing conflict remain either internally displaced within their state of origin or within the proximate region of their homelands but hundreds of thousands regularly continue towards developed refugee-receiving nations which afford them legal protections and can best address their needs. Despite the developing world exhibiting strong trends of economic growth over recent decades, the persistence of great disparities of wealth between developed and underdeveloped regions of the globe will continue the push-pull dichotomy that characterizes extensive humanitarian migration routes from source nations to other regions.

This broadly suggests Australia will continue to occupy a similar role as a refugee-receiving nation into the future. Given that attitudes towards refugees are cooling in traditional refugee- receiving nations, the global refugee issue will only become more acute with time as commitment to stress-alleviating regular resettlement programs threaten to slow. Structural changes in the world economy and the forces of globalization have resulted in a backlash from nativist political movements with anti-immigration platforms, a societal shift which ultimately favours the international restriction of illegal human movement (refugees included) in the interest of addressing the needs of the in-group. At this stage, however, any attempt to pursue retrenchment from the international refugee regime will necessarily involve the implementation of punitive deterrent measures and, considering the undeterrable nature of asylum seekers in the grips of mortal fear, military intervention by state authorities.

Moreover, these developments have all taken place prior to accounting for scientific forecasting on the dramatic impacts of climate change, which has introduced further materially-determined pressures that are now unavoidable. Areas which will become too arid or inundated by the rising water level for habitation, will necessarily experience mass emigration, regardless of whatever aid programs and deterrent policies are implemented by states. Furthermore, it is likely these shocks will encourage intergroup conflict as resource strains grow. That refugee issues will persist globally for the foreseeable future and continue to provide a serious challenge for government is a fact that need not be laboured. Fully understanding the complexity of the global refugee problem by assessing current macroscopic trends is, therefore, of paramount importance for the future of international peace and security.

In 2017, the global refugee issue is not only a problem that is logistically insurmountable within any reasonable timeframe; it has entered the realm of high politics. The issue of refugees can change governments and strain otherwise stable international relationships. The pressures of humanitarian migration and debates over burden-sharing threaten the unity and viability of the

European Union itself – the preeminent symbol of liberal-progressive multilateral engagement.

The treatment of the issue early in Trump’s Presidency represents the completion of a long process: Trump clearly articulates the conflation between refugees and illegal immigrants in top level dialogue.3 This symbolizes that the reactionary criminalization of asylum and the recategorization of humanitarian migrants as illegal immigrants is now the rhetorical frame in

3Anderson, S. Belot, H. “Trump Slams Dumb Refugee Deal With Australia After Worst Phone Call” ABC News 3 February 2017 Accessed Online: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-02/trump-slams- dumb-refugee-deal/8235820

5 operation in the highest office of the United States, a nation instrumental in the creation and maintenance of the international refugee regime.

The adoption of these narratives into the political mainstream risks accelerating the dissolution of norms which, ultimately, threatens the long-term functioning and robustness of humanitarian migration regime. On this subject, as with so many features of the new paradigm on refugees,

Australia has cemented its significance as a symptomatic case by proving perversely ahead of its time. Concerns over the future of the politics of asylum should not be limited to those who view the regime as an intrinsic moral good or necessary component of liberal governance: the persistence of unresolved displacement of peoples can have radical destabilizing effects on regional politics. The turn to restriction obscures the reality that an enormous portion of migrants fleeing along these routes are genuine refugees fleeing violence and oppression.

Because the revival of anti-immigration rhetoric and associated political platforms fundamentally relate to the identity of states and intergroup relations, it is necessary to study the ideological content of political speech and determine how attitudes are being formed.

Similarly, as anti-immigration politics are being driven by perceptions more akin to social prejudices as much as they can be considered deterministic responses to material forces, I will explore Constructivist thought and Securitization Theory in the opening chapter of this thesis to lay down firm epistemological foundations. Given the propensity for public attitudes to be informed by symbolic and psychosocial factors over the types of dispassionate analysis favoured by professionals, investigating the political rhetoric and ideological relations advanced by politicians over a sufficient period of time ought to more accurately reflect which variables are being understood as consequential by political elites and the public, regardless of

6 the intricacies governing the arrow of causation. This forgives the need to make assumptions about the behaviour of individuals resulting from comprehensive ‘real world’ economic and geopolitical analysis here. This thesis, therefore, will not rely on gaining insights from original research into economic or security issues per se (as they might be understood by scholars of economics or security) but gauge the ideational impact of these variables by looking to their reproduction in discourse.

Whereas understanding the nuances of party politics is a central part of scientific investigation into any democratic society, this thesis will resist overinvesting in the narratives of partisan contest. The policy failures, backflips and vacillations that accompany controversial issues may essentially obfuscate those shifts which constitute deeper trends in language and ideology common to both major parties in Australia and, by extension, the political life of the nation.

The securitization of humanitarian migration in Australia is a process which has been evolving for decades and a multitude of parties and sectors share responsibility. The continued and widespread persistence of counternarratives to the securitization process proves the subject is a rich case for analysing information frames and ideological narrative. By looking to the content of this speech as such, preoccupations of blame or justification can be circumvented to take a broader view that locates shifts at the societal or national level and uncovers paradigmatic changes that more accurately gauge the momentum and inertia of the contemporary era. It is these brute associations which will bind the evolution of the issue into the future, especially now that political elites are, after decades of alarmist debate, pragmatically beholden to a public that demands hard solutions at the expense of flexibility.

This thesis does not seek to be overly predictive or polemical, neither will it expound policy failures and offer elegant solutions to the problems Australia faces with unauthorised arrivals, self-selected refugees or controversy over its indefinite regional detention infrastructure. Much has been written about Tampa and the cultivation of a national moral panic over asylum seekers, the illegality of some of Australia’s practices under international law and the traumatic damage inflicted by indefinite offshore detention. Expounding these facts here is not necessary as I will not contest them. Given the secrecy that has surrounded the issue for many years I will not undertake research that seeks to uncover new empirical information on the issue as it unfolds or contest established or official information. Rather, I will provide original depth to the subject by accessing data on the public record (official Hansard) to establish empirical shifts with confidence. From this data, those narrative strands which have persisted across time, grown in invocation and evolved in new environments can be identified to provide answers to the research question.

Chapter I will introduce the relevant literature and lay out a comprehensive theoretical approach that has guided the methodology and places later investigation on firm epistemological foundations. Chapter II will serve as the first empirical case study, introducing the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis 1975-81 and refugees as the subject of speech in Parliament.

Chapter III will introduce a second case study, the securitization of asylum in Australia 2001-

13. These chapters will explain the context and significance of the periods in question before presenting the primary data collected. The dominant discourse from the periods will be detailed and explained. Chapters IV-VI follow a different structure, assessing thematically driven hypotheses informed by extensive review of the relevant literature to ultimately delineate those forces driving the politics of asylum in Australia. Chapter IV will directly consider the extent to which Australia’s historical legacy informs discourse relating to refugees in Australia.

Chapter V will focus on the intersection between changing economic conditions and humanitarian migration. Finally, Chapter VI will investigate the impact of dramatic shifts in the international security environment on the securitization of asylum. It is these avenues of investigation that will provide the most meaningful information to progress knowledge in the discipline and ensure the data highlights definitive answers to the research questions. The data will then be used to determine whether Australia’s historical culture and political environment endogenously drives the issue of asylum seekers or if the transformation of the politics of asylum in Australia is exogenously informed by structural pressures in the era of globalization.

This thesis builds upon literature that has identified the securitization of humanitarian migration in Australia (and elsewhere) by demonstrating a unique avenue to accurately map the discursive transformation that has occurred parallel to this securitization process – the sociological construction of threat that exists logically prior to successfully securitized practices. It will investigate the security talk itself, rather than theoretically assuming it exist to constitute a causative bridge. If the securitization process relies on the advancement of persuasive securitizing claims and the construction of threat, this security talk must be present and identifiable within parliamentary discussion. If it is not, then fundamental assumptions about the securitization process must be revised. In the same vein, this thesis addresses the theory-heavy nature of securitization theory by establishing an investigation on a more empirical basis and offers an original avenue to explore the felicity conditions of securitization as a speech act and the sociological conditions that have facilitated securitizing claims: both identified as areas requiring expansion within the body of literature. By adopting a simple data driven perspective, the driving issues and features of the debate, or the forms that have become most persuasive and dominant, can be isolated. Similarly, the research undertaken for this thesis will provide significant insights into certain theoretical stances held within securitization

9 literature, particularly regarding the intrinsic nature of ‘normal’ democratic politics as opposed to the executive-led politics of exception. This will strengthen the utility of securitization theory, a lens which best promises to provide insight to the pressing issues surrounding global migration that threaten the global order.

Project and Methodology

Following on from literature exploring Australia’s experience with asylum seekers and the boat people phenomenon, the Tampa incident (2001) will be taken as a defining moment in the identification of unauthorised arrivals as a fully-fledged security issue. From Tampa until the successful introduction of Operation Sovereign Borders in 2013 (a moment indicating readoption of offshore detention and the full manifestation of unauthorised boat arrivals as an issue under military control) will function as the period under study in which asylum in

Australia has been broadly securitized. This definition of this period as a case study is supported by Securitization literature on the subject (such as McDonald and Watson) who recognise that from at least 2001 onwards the politics of asylum in Australia have been framed within the realm of security.4 To gauge the extent or nature of this change, however, it is first necessary to develop an understanding of how the issue was conceived before this securitized period.

4See McDonald, M. (2005). ‘Constructing Insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post- 2001’, International Relations, 19(3): 297-320 ; Watson, S. D., The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking Boats, Routledge, 2009

It is for this reason that the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis has been chosen as a case to control and contrast contemporary developments. The selection of this period is an obvious choice: the

Vietnamese Refugee Crisis was Australia’s first experience as a country of first asylum when refugees from Indochina began to arrive unauthorised by boat in 1976. Consequently, it prompted discussion in parliament and ultimately led to the establishment of Australia’s formal refugee intake steam. This case period will conclude in 1981, marked by a natural lull in boat arrivals after that year. This provides a necessary level of material similarity between the periods under comparison. Furthermore, while those Vietnamese refugees were never presented by the government as a threat to national security, their arrival stimulated sufficient discussion among policy makers to assess the discursive environment. Similarly, to say that

Vietnamese boat arrivals were not interpreted as a security threat does not mean that the

Australian public were not concerned or in some way ‘threatened’ by their arrival which certainly provoked anxiety from sections of society. Owing to the open-ended nature of inquiry into discursive frames, it is crucial that the events being selected as cases are highly similar, lest differences in perception be attributed to actual real-world difference that is independent of discourse. The effectiveness of frames can only meaningly be compared regarding the same issue. Fortunately, the arrival of unauthorised asylum seekers is a materially similar phenomenon across the decades in question, limiting differences to those very contextual factors (socio-political judgements regarding the asylum seekers themselves) that are the variables of interest to this thesis.

While keeping the phenomenon of unauthorised boat arrivals as the focus of this thesis, information relating to Australia’s national experiences and discourse regarding immigration or granting political asylum in general will not be excluded. On the contrary, contrasting

Australian perceptions of immigrants and asylum seekers with those individuals arriving

11 unauthorised will yield clues necessary to ascertain what has caused this group to bear the brunt of securitization by the government (as opposed to visa over-stayers and other illegal immigrants). This will require some appreciation of Australia’s history regarding immigration generally, including that which took place prior to the cases in question.

The data used for content analysis will be drawn from a large volume of sources. The language of political elites discussing asylum seekers and unauthorised arrivals will be drawn from

Hansard: parliamentary speeches, debate and statements from the two case study periods, 1975-

81 and 2001-13 respectively. Drawing insights from securitization literature, investigation will be essentially limited to those political elites, who monopolize the authority to “speak security” by articulating the national interest. To ensure theoretical clarity and place concise boundaries to the field of data, the symbolic associations analysed are those attached to the word

“refugee(s)” as presented within Australia’s Lower House of Parliament. This is the only place in which the ‘security talk’ component of Australia’s experience with securitization is necessarily present. The methodology will then progress to categorize references into identifiably discrete or semi-discrete information frames which then represent the state of the symbolic order. Narrowing the dataset to this philosophically complete range of sources allows for analysis to be exhaustive, that is to say, involving every single utterance of the symbol so that information acquired is theoretically holistic. Furthermore, no accuracy will be lost through extrapolation.

This approach provides the added benefit of side-stepping some of the most significant methodological issues associated with qualitative analysis, like the isolated and selective inclusion of fragments that may provide rich textual analysis but remain non-representative of

12 the text in its entirety or simply appeal to biases introduced by the researcher.5 All uncodeable instances of the word ‘refugee’ utterly lacking in discursive content can, therefore, be excluded without adversely impacting the accuracy of efforts to establish the relative dominance of discursive frames in operation. Specifically, data will be gathered from those two case study periods and then compared so that ideational shifts can be identified in a systematic manner.

This is achieved through crudely constructing the symbolic order itself: ordering frames from most to least frequent and widespread, calculating their proportions and reviewing their content.

Information will be provided by coding references into categories which frame asylum seekers in terms of different discursive narrative structures by utilizing NVivo qualitative analysis software. The sorting of this information will ultimately suggest which factors have been central in the construction of asylum seekers as a threat and which have not. It is worth taking time to flesh out some methodological questions. Here I am using ‘narrative’ in the broader sense as part of qualitative analysis as outlined by Polkinghorne to mean the entire prosaic text being utilised as data,6 much of the complexity associated with drawing information from personal stories can be avoided. When dealing with historical and political sources, often the purpose of qualitative content analysis is to explore “paradigmatic”7 cognition. That is to say, general concepts that include other concepts or categories as subordinate. Bruner elaborates

“People do not deal with the world event by event or with text sentence by sentence. They frame events and sentences into larger structures”8 It is easy to see here how discursive framing

5Antaki, C., et al., Discourse Analysis Means Doing Analysis: A Critique of Six Analytic Shortcomings, 2003 6Polkinghorne, D. E., ‘Narrative Configuration in Qualitative Analysis’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 8(1), 1995, p.7 7Ibid. p.9 8Bruner, J. S., Acts of Meaning, Harvard University Press, p.64

13 follows implicitly from paradigmatic cognition. A fragment of text refers to a passage that has some overarching continuity in meaning.9 Every fragment of text involving the utterance

‘refugee(s)’ has been analysed and every identifiable reference coded. For the purposes of this thesis, all data collected is from sentences relating to refugees, or from fragments

(uninterrupted passages of speech by political elites in parliament) that contain these references. Despite the fundamental importance of framing on cognition (and subsequently upon political judgements) there is no a priori way to identify discursive frames or even help narrow their definition.10 As opposed to quantitative methods, because the purpose of qualitative content analysis is to identify the thematic commonalities, a priori knowledge of these categories and relations would render the research problem solved in advance. The creation (or better yet ‘discovery’) of these categories or frames remains “an art” that must be done inductively.11

Typically, the best way to avoid the epistemological and methodological risks associated with the construction of categories that may bias data sorting towards supporting hypotheses is to follow on from the relevant insights identified by others in the literature, even if those discursive frames were not intended directly for the question at hand.12 This is because the level of relative arbitrariness introduced ensures that the research question/ hypotheses are not leading.13 It is important to note, however, this does not preclude any posteriori revision to such categorisation. On the contrary Polkinghorne has described testing the ordering power of different categories to find the “best fitting” model as the advantage of qualitative research, as

9Malterud, K., ‘Systematic Text Condensation: a Strategy for Qualitative Analysis’, Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 40(8), 2012, p.797 10Bruner, J. S., Acts of Meaning, Harvard University Press, 1990 p.106 11Ibid. 12King, G., et al., Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton university press, 1994, p.157 13Ibid.

14 it is how paradigmatic concepts can be identified.14 Furthermore this allows for, but does not necessarily require, the development of more computational (quantitative) analysis.15 This process is illustrated by Mayring in the diagram below.

Fig. 1.1 Source: Mayring, P. (2000). Qualitative content analysis. Forum: Qualitative social research

In this case, initial pre-identified categories taken from pervious literature will be the frames and metaphors thought to be influential on Australian attitudes regarding asylum seekers, which will be used to guide investigation. For example, the framing of Indochinese refugees though the lens of Cold-War politics (as allies, people fleeing communist tyranny, victims of a

14Polkinghorne, D. E., ‘Narrative Configuration in Qualitative Analysis’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 8(1), 1995, p.10 15Mayring, P., ‘Qualitative Content Analysis’, Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 2000

15 senseless war along with Australians, etc.)16 provides discrete discursive frames. Another narrative is the asylum seeker as an economic migrant (or illegal immigrant), a frame which conflates unauthorised arrival of asylum seekers with criminality through association with people smugglers.17 This type of analysis provides an opportunity to ‘test’ concepts present in the literature. If threat is designated by ‘security talk’ then there must be security words. If it is true, for instance, that the historically well-rehearsed motif of seaborne invasion from the north is central in Australia’s securitization of asylum seekers, then references that invoke that metaphor (northern boarders, hordes, open floodgates, etc.) ought to be present in the speech of those who talk security. If they are not, what are the frames that have grown to dominate the symbolic order and which have driven securitization? Similarly, if Australians are primarily experiencing threat from asylum seekers based upon instrumental resource concerns and the perception of unfair economic advantage, then illegal immigration frames (queue-jumping, people smuggling, illegal arrival) ought to feature prominently in the data.

While the formation of coded categories into themes relies heavily on researcher discretion, this thesis will adhere to Patton’s dual requirement for coding reliability whereby coded material must exhibit internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity to validate qualitative insight.18 The strength of this approach is that it bridges qualitative and quantitative analysis, allowing for qualitative codes to be translated into quantitative value for the purposes of testing and review. Whereas the data presented in this thesis will include some figures and percentages, the project remains in essence qualitative analysis with its origin as discursive

16Brennan, F., Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of Queensland, 2003, p.32 17Baldwin-Edwards, B. and M. A. Schain, ‘The Politics of Immigration: An Introduction’, in Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Martin A. Schain (eds) The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe, Frank Cass, 1994 p.29 18Patton, M. Q., Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990

16 code. The dataset in its entirety, too unwieldly to be included in the text, will be sorted so that the framing devices presented are those that were dominant within the symbolic order (unless stated otherwise). In chapters IV-VI dedicated to thematic analysis, these codes can then be contrasted between periods to determine paradigmatic shifts and provide deeper insights into the research questions. By selecting those narrative strands substantiated by frequency, the most problematic aspects of qualitative analysis can be ironed out and the data considered with confidence. Additional selected categories that meaningfully build off these frames will also be introduced – less dominant frames that illustrate relevant relations.

To avoid unnecessary repetition, I will only provide illustrative content from those discursive frames that have not been previously provided in the body of text. This allows for clearer comparison to be made between periods so that paradigmatic change can be identified. When a discursive frame is in operation in both periods this process is straightforward. However, in some cases, analysis necessarily involves identifying frames that act as an analogue between periods to highlight discursive evolution. Following on from the inherent limitations imposed on qualitatively coding semi-distinct and occasionally ambiguous rhetorical frames, this process must be consigned to the best possible choice. Having detailed the methodology employed, I will now move on to present the theoretical foundations for approaching the complicated intersection between immigration, threat and identity in political science and introduce the relevant literature that has informed and guided the approach outlined above and the analysis to come.

Chapter I

Theoretical Foundations

The Emergence of Migration as a Security Threat

Chapter I will primarily deal with the theory and conceptual foundations that explain the significance of the nexus between immigration and national security in the contemporary era.

The literature review explains the chosen methodology and the structure of the remainder of this thesis. To understand how asylum seekers have come to be considered a national security threat in Australia, it is necessary to have a solid conception of what security ‘means,’ and how that meaning is changing with respects to nation-states and International Relations (IR). To do this, I will firstly ground theory in traditional understandings, before moving on to

Constructivist accounts of security studies. Secondly, I will explain the importance of narrative and discourse in the social construction of threat to explain how content analysis of language can provide illuminating information relating to those constructions.

Security studies attempts to answer the question of what security means, or at least to provide scope and clarity to questions regarding when it is appropriate to consider something a security issue. Debate over what constitutes this proper scope of security studies notwithstanding, scholars agree that the essential quality of security politics must remain conceptually tied with survival and existential threat (things that threaten this ‘existence’ or survival).19 It is easy to see how this concept operates in IR: as nothing prevents warfare and violence in anarchic international system, one state might have the capacity to conquer and destroy another with

19Buzan, B., ‘Rethinking Security After the Cold War’, Cooperation and Conflict, 32(1), 1997, p.13; Ayoob, M., ‘The Security Problematic of the Third World’, World Politics, 43(02), 1991, p.259

18 near impunity. States, therefore, identify these threats to their existence and take steps to ensure their own security from these threats. Exactly how they identify threats is a question that becomes centrally important within debates regarding the study of security. When designations of threat are generated from a traditional source, such as a powerful foreign state with extensive resources and a large military capacity, this question is straightforward. It appears obvious from an appreciation of (human) nature that, in a system without authority, egoistic states will inevitably come into conflict.

The fact that this mindset draws upon such a naturalistic philosophy is significant. It commits theory to a timeless and unchanging perspective. This feature becomes a theoretical weakness when having to explain deep structural change, as is apparent in the field of security studies.

Expounding naturalist arguments, however, certain states become a security threat to others simply as a logical consequence of geopolitical reality. Waltz provides one of the best-known encapsulations of this logic setting forth the structural basis for IR.20 Consider the experience of the Cold War. While the United States and the USSR were not ‘close’ in geological proximity, they rationally identified each other as their biggest threat. Waltz explains, threat in this environment is “In a bipolar world there are no peripheries. With only two powers capable of acting on a world scale, anything that happens anywhere is potentially of concern to both of them.”21 Therefore, it was the capacity for global action of both of these great powers that logically made them identify each other as their main threat and rival. The structural (material) relationship between these powers determined their security relationship.

20Waltz, K. N., Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, 2010 21Waltz, K. N., Theory of International Relations, Reading Mass. Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979 p.171

Scholarship developed within this paradigm followed a somewhat simple form, bipolarity offered a structured framework in which strategic choices were aimed at balancing against the rival camp. The rationality of these choices was thought to be informed exogenously from the system.22 In other words it did not matter who, or which state, was making a choice, only which systemic pressures were operating on them at any time. A concise analogy might be a game of chess, it is the actual arrangement of pieces on the board at any given turn which logically dictates the next best move: the identity of the player themselves will have no bearing upon this fact. Concepts such as geopolitical balancing, large alliance systems and military deterrence dominated academic literature into the nature of security during the Cold War period.23 This was not only limited to geographical calculations, anything that influenced the

‘distribution of capacity,’ such as the development and manufacture of new arsenals, was also considered of primary importance. To be secure was, therefore, to balance and deter those others who had the material capacity to threaten the state militarily.

Despite this Realist approach being considered orthodox, early work in the realm of security studies had already suggested that this framework alone was insufficient. There was something more to questions of security, something that involved ideas and values. This is evident in

Wolfers seminal definition of security as “absence of threat to acquired values.”24 Years later

Booth would echo this sentiment, security should not just be taken as prospects for survival, but “survival plus” a certain type of freedom. In other words, it is not enough to consider a state

22Wendt, A., ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American political science review, 88(02), 1994, p.384 23Williams, P. D., Security Studies: An Introduction, Routledge, 2012, p.3 24Wolfers, A. ‘“National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol’, Political Science Quarterly 67, 1952, p.485

20 secure if this existence is concurrent with a genuine loss of sovereign self-determination or subservience to foreign domination or influence.25 Even when loosely incorporating these ideational aspects, however, the focus overwhelming remained on interstate conflict and the ability of nations to retain and defend their ‘core values,’ or for their ideological independence to ‘survive’ as a polity. It is difficult to see how a group of people, relatively small in number and without organisation or resources, such as asylum seekers arriving unauthorised by boat, could have the capacity to endanger the survivability of a nation state or its core values directly.

It is for this reason that migration is considered a non-traditional or ‘emerging’ security threat.

Because of this, it is impossible to approach the issue using the concepts and approaches associated with traditional security studies, which tend to rely on the analysis of material factors and offer material mechanisms as explanative factors. One way to analyse the emergence of migration as a security issue has been through a Constructivist approach.

A Constructivist Approach to Security Studies

Constructivists, as their name suggests, view politics, threat and security, as socially constructed.26 This is not to make the mistake of thinking that Constructivists are interested in ideology rather than the physical or ‘real’ world. In fact, the charge that Constructivism is inherently tied to utopian idealism that overlooks the importance of the real-world facts is a common, if misguided, criticism of the school of thought that amounts to a caricature of the discipline.27 Constructivists agree that the material world of ‘brute facts’ exists and is of great

25Booth, K., Theory of World Security, Cambridge University Press., 2007, p.39 26See Hurd, I, ‘Constructivism’ in Reus-Smit, C. and D. Snidal, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford Handbooks Online, 2008 2008, 27McDonald, M. ‘Constructivism’ in P. D. Williams, Security Studies: An Introduction, Routledge, 2012, p.60

21 importance in understanding IR. However, they acknowledge that ‘social facts’ (things that do not exist ‘naturally’, or prior to human construction) can have an enormous impact on questions of threat and security. Take for instance Wendt’s now famous observation used by Hurd to introduce the conceptual value of Constructivist thought in the Oxford Handbook of

International Relations.28 Wendt reflected that five North Korean nuclear missiles were more threatening to the US than the 500-strong nuclear capability of the United Kingdom. The elegance of such an insight is in its simplicity, indeed the answer he gives is a simple one – the

United Kingdom is a friendly state whereas North Korea is not.29

Despite the obvious conclusion, the implications are far reaching. This reality would simply not eventuate if threat is purely generated rationally and deterministically through an appraisal of material circumstances. If threat is generated in some essential way from objects (and associated capabilities) then it must be the case that 500 missiles are more threatening than 5.

The fact that the social reality of stable friendship can result in circumstances in which foreign states generate almost no threat despite their military capacity proves that materialistic analysis can be rendered extraneous under certain conditions. At the very least, it illustrates that the ideational and contextual elements of threat can come to completely dominate judgement on security matters. Wendt draws upon these insights to develop a view of IR in which relations between states can be meaningfully categorised according to broad social definitions: dividing relations between friendship, enmity and reserving a space for neutral indifference. Because an

“anarchy of friends” is different to an anarchy of enemies, the latent potential for the evolution of cooperation always exists.30

28Hurd, I, ‘Constructivism’ in Reus-Smit, C. and D. Snidal, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford Handbooks Online, 2008 p.298 29Ibid. 30Wendt, A., ‘Constructing International Politics’, International Security, 20(1), 1995, p.78

Utilising the Constructivist approach to security studies has been identified as particularly valuable in the Post-Cold War period, for two major reasons. Firstly, the collapse of the

Communist bloc and the inability of mainstream (Realist) analysis to predict or convincingly explain how such a radical structural change to the international (security) system could have occurred, somewhat “embarrassed” traditional approaches.31 Secondly, the number of conflicts that seem to be centred on identity (ethnic-nationalist conflicts) in the Post-Cold War period have soared, along with the number of issues that are considered non-traditional security threats. This, in turn, has been reflected in a broadening of the scope of security studies and academic literature on security.

Securitization scholars such as Bigo have attributed the dominance of Realist approaches in security as a by-product and legacy of the bipolar superpower rivalry of the Cold War.32

Conversely, the broadening agenda of issues considered security-related by governments is partly a consequence of well-resourced intelligence agencies rapidly losing their raison d’etre with the end of the Cold War and attempting to reinvent their purpose and relevance.33 This shift encapsulates how Constructivism conceives of structure and system in political relations

– not as reflecting permanent naturalistic laws, but as reified constructs of human relations.34

The danger of Realism, therefore, is that analysts will accept empirical observations as ostensibly inevitable natural laws, rather that correctly identifying these relations as social constructs that are taken-for-granted.

31Kratochwil, F., ‘The Embarassment of Changes’, Review of International Studies, 19(1), 1993, pp.63-65 32Bigo, D., ‘International Political Sociology’ Chapter 9 in P.D. Williams, Security Studies: An Introduction, Hoboken, Taylor and Francis, 2008, p.119 33Bigo, D., ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), 2002, p.64 34Hurd, I, ‘Constructivism’ in Reus-Smit, C. and D. Snidal, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford Handbooks Online, 2008 p.300

Whatever causes have been most consequential, only Constructivism can account for these systemic changes and sufficiently appreciate ideational factors. It is for this reason that a

Constructivist epistemological foundation will be adopted for this thesis. Despite being associated with Post-structuralist and Post-Positivist approaches, Constructivism should not be considered hamstrung by the same epistemological vagaries that may exist in more ‘Critical’ theories. This thesis will adopt the view of Hopf that Constructivism can view non-material factors as independent variables in a causality process.35 Nothing logically precludes ideational features being empirically observed and incorporated into explanative theories in a positivist sense, even if social facts may often be harder to measure than material ones.

Constructivism has been used by scholars in this way to empirically reassess assumptions about

IR. Katzenstein has been said to have ‘married’ Constructivism with security studies. In The

Culture of National Security Katzenstein focused the role of domestic politics as constructing the interests of policy makers and, therefore, the behaviour of states.36 To continue the chess analogy, whereas the constraints of the game exogenously inform the decisions of agents, the identity of the player making those decisions will ultimately impact on what choices are made.

This insight extends to norms involving hard power, like the regulation of the use of powerful weaponry such as the international “taboo” involving chemical weapons, involving both domestic and international pressures. This nexus has been accommodated by scholars such as

Ruggie and Kratchowil by synthesising both the domestic and international dimensions into

35Hopf, T., ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International Security, 23(1), 1998, p.185 36See Katzenstein, P. J., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, 1996

24 what is called ‘holistic constructivism.’37 Kratchowil undertakes a language based analytic approach to demonstrate how the construction of norms precede both domestic decision making and foreign affairs.38 This mindset conceives as these two Constructivist approaches, both the system level (international) and unit level (domestic) aspects of the theory, as essentially compatible. Under this approach, domestic and international manifestations of politics are considered extensions of the same political milieu. The conceptual element drawn upon to explain how this synthesis casually occurs is termed ‘internalisation.’39 The concept of internalisation refers to the fact that political elites, policy makers and the government itself do not exist separately outside of the constructed cultural reality of the polity that they inhabit and represent. In this schema, there is a complicated feedback between system level and domestic considerations, resulting in a situation where the state (as operated by people from within that particular culture) cannot help but reflect ideational facts that have been internalised by policy makers. There is, therefore, a psychological mechanism whereby the identity of the policy maker exists a priori to threat construction and the politics of security.40

This explains how the same, or at least very similar, physical events might be interpreted as having different significance at different times by different people, going far to explain how security issues ‘emerge and dissolve’. Adopting these insights is necessary in ascertaining how types of migration have emerged as a national security threat in recent decades and is, therefore, central to this thesis. One school of thought with its basis in Constructivist thought,41

37Price, R. and C. Reus-Smit, ‘Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism’, European Journal of International Relations, 4(3), 1998 p.269 38Kratochwil, F. V., Rules, Norms, and Decisions: on the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge University Press, 1991 39Ibid. p.149 40Ibid. 41See McDonald, M. ‘Constructivism’ Chapter 5 in P. D. Williams, Security Studies: An Introduction, Hoboken, Taylor and Francis, 2008

Securitization theory, has gone further than any other in explaining the process by which security issues are constructed and will be developed below.

Securitization Theory

Securitization theory, developed by Buzan and Wæver (together, along with adherents referred to as the Copenhagen School), provides an elegant solution. Securitization theory circumvents many of those problems identified in security studies discussed above by reconceptualising security as activity: something people do. In this way, the difficulty of locating the causes and objects of threat and security externally, as well as explaining how certain issues pass in and out of the realm of security threats at different times, can largely be avoided. All that is necessary is to identify where security is ‘being done.’ Specifically, securitization theory conceives of this activity as a speech act. A securitizing speech act has the following structure or grammar. An actor identifies a particular phenomenon as a threat to the existence of a particular entity (referent object). They frame the issue as approaching a point of no return and offer a suggested course of action that will alleviate that threat. This action is termed a

Securitizing claim.42 There are two ways of philosophically grounding how security operates as a speech act. The first draws on linguistic theory, in particular the work of Austin.43 Under this linguistic (and more formally philosophical) approach, security speech acts are self- referential and performative.44

42Hayes, J., ‘Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security: Nixon, India, and the Ties that Bind’, International Organization, 66(01), 2012, p.66 43Austin, J. L., ‘How to do Things with Words’, Oxford university press, 1975 44Balzacq, T. Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Routledge, 2010 p.1

Security utterances, therefore, do not necessarily attempt to accurately describe the world (as much language does) but perform a certain action. A common analogy imparted to explain a performative speech act is the naming of a ship.45 When somebody proclaims that they have named a ship you cannot judge the truth or falsehood of that claim through a scientific examination of the world (you cannot check the ship in question to see if the statement is accurate) in the same way that one may be able to do when assessing the factual accuracy of language that attempts to describe physical reality. This statement is an action – it seeks to influence the behaviour of others. The intended outcome of the sentence is that people will now adopt the speakers’ claim and refer to the ship in question appropriately. Linguistically, therefore, the meaning of such a sentence is located in the grammar or ‘felicity circumstances,”46 the structure of the statement itself and its purpose.

Other examples of this kind of speech include promises and bets which invoke social and relational ideas, they are not meant to be ‘neutral’ descriptions of external reality. Similarly, securitizing claims can be identified in the same manner, locating the grammar of security, signified by those aforementioned features. Within this paradigm, the invocation of security operates in a near ontological manner: if something is called a security threat then it is one.

Obviously, this level of abstraction raises epistemological problems of its own. A major criticism of securitization theory is that is betrays the rigor of political science by contributing such an all-inclusive view of security that the field of security studies loses all meaning.47

45Balzacq, T. Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Routledge, 2010 p.3 46Ibid. p.1 47Ibid.

Balzacq’s contribution offers a second understanding of how the speech act ought to be regarded within securitization theory that avoids falling into philosophical extremes. Balzacq utilises a more sociological understanding which he terms “pragmatic.”48 This approach does not consider a securitizing speech act as a ‘self-referential particle’ but rather focuses on securitization as an intersubjective process. In other words, to understand the practice of securitization, one must look at how specific political actors have made such securitizing claims within an existing complex political, cultural and historical environment. In fact, it is these factors that dominate the success or otherwise of securitizing claims. For clarity, I will explain this intersubjective process by returning to the earlier analogy of naming a ship.

Adopting a common-sense view of reality, it is obvious that it is not whether a speech act meets the necessary and sufficient grammatical conditions that is the primary determining factor as to whether the claim is successful. The major factor in this example is whether or not it influences other people to accept the claim in question. For a ship naming to be successful, others must accept this claim and behave as if it is true, also referring to the ship by that name.

It is easy to imagine how a formally (grammatically) correct claim could be unsuccessful- that someone’s suggested name for a ship may never become accepted by enough people to be considered “the” true name of the ship. In the same way, securitizing claims may be identifiable based on felicity circumstances, but the success or otherwise of these claims must be gauged by looking to their impact and the implicit process of acquiescence that these consequences imply.

48Ibid.

To succeed, a securitizing claim needs to convince and it is for this reason that such claims are audience focused and strategic.49 They often utilise emotive language and relevant societal metaphors.50 Bourdieu explains the poignancy of this seemingly simple point- the only thing limiting the power of language to completely construct alternate realities in the minds of listeners that dominate their worldview, is the level of scepticism the listener utilises.51 It would be easier to convince an audience to accept emergency measures to defend against an enemy state, for instance, than to take measures against possible Martian invasion. If the public genuinely believed Martians were a threat, however, (as some people did during the initial radio broadcasts of H.G. Wells War of the Worlds), then the issue could be securitized. It is in this way that securitizing claims are ultimately embedded in an existing intersubjective socio- historical realm. An audience must accept that the phenomenon identified is a threat to the survival of their own community.

Securitizing claims, therefore, cannot (as some critics accuse) be about anything at all: the object or phenomenon must be believed to be an existential threat. While this may still strike some sceptics as a less than concrete epistemological basis it should be remembered that all languages and symbolic orders draw meaning in a totally conventional manner. There is no way to tell what a word means without being told. Entire languages are, therefore, intersubjective constructs. Even in the realm of security actors can only respond to the

“meaning that the objects have for them.”52 Even if there are theoretically value-neutral material threats completely unconstructed by discourse they become “known to human beings

49Balzacq, T., ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context’, European Journal of International Relations, 11(2), 2005 p.172 50Ibid. p.174 Balzacq, T., Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, Routledge, 2010. p.9 52Balzacq, T., ‘Security, Identity, and Symbolic Interactionism’, International Review of Sociology, 12(3), 2002, p.483

29 only in the form in which [they are] perceived by human beings.”53 Therefore, knowledge of such threats must be spread and expounded within the symbolic realm of human communication, meaning that the threat constructed (rather than any external reality) is the primary object of people’s thought. This helps to explain how discursive activity can be so central to questions of security and, subsequently, opens the door to utilizing linguistic content as data.

Appreciating this sociological reality places power and authority at the centre of securitizing claims, in part for the simple reason that people are more easily convinced by those in authority who operate as professional stewards of security. It is for this reason that securitization theory exists firmly within the realm of ‘power politics.’54 The social capital of the actor making the claim, therefore, is of critical importance. This is why successful securitizing claims so often come from political elites. Not only do political elites have access to instrumental tools for the process, such as the mass media, the public trust the government (to a greater or lesser extent) as professional caretakers of national security who are more likely to be credible identifiers of threats than the average person.55 Nevertheless, “there is always a political decision to accept securitization.”56 Securitizing claims, even from those with high levels of authority are intended to influence an audience (that is, after all, the purpose of the claim as an act). While the audience is a necessary component of how securitization theoretically operates it is often

53Ibid. 54Buzan, B., et al., Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. pp.32- 33 55Bigo, D., ‘Security and Immigration: toward a critique of the governmentality of unease,’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), 2002, pp.63-66 56Buzan, B., et al., Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. p.29

30 seen to be the most under-developed aspect of the theory and has been considered problematic.57

Fortunately, the relationship between the audience and the executive exhibits greater transparency in Western liberal democracies, for several reasons. Firstly, in established democracies the careers of political elites are ultimately linked to public support which provides a mechanism for feedback – authority does not just speak to the public, public sentiment is also picked up on by political elites. Secondly, as Western-liberal democracies typically have more stable, entrenched institutions, any extraordinary change away from

“normal” politics is more likely to be met with resistance than in more authoritarian systems without separation of power.58 This more robust space for public debate is then reflected in the persistence of counter-narratives. It is for this reason that securitizing claims are coupled with so much justification- should the audience reject bids for exceptional power those actors making securitizing claims may experience costs in the form of damage to their credibility or popularity.

It is important to note here the distinction between extraordinary and normal politics as conceived by Securitization Theory as the terms take on a semi-technical meaning and are conceptually important. ‘Normal’ politics is taken to mean the institutional norms (legal or conventional) that are in place whereas extraordinary measures (the politics of ‘exception’) relate to those that do not fit within that framework.59 Although this may seem vague at first,

57See Léonard S and C. Kaunert, ‘Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory’, In: Balzacq T (ed.) Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, London, Routledge, 2011 pp. 57–76 58Buzan, B., et al., Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.28 59Ibid.

31 it intimately relates to securitization- securitizing claims are to justify extraordinary political measures precisely because a phenomenon has been identified that normal political practices ostensibly cannot solve. The Copenhagen School believe that the elevation of an issue ‘above’ political deliberation and debate is a central hallmark of successful securitization.60 While this suggestion does not fully apply to the subject at hand (in Australia the securitization of unauthorised arrivals has remained controversial and contested throughout the decades of the

New Millennium) this process is significant as it signifies that a willingness to engage in activities that would have otherwise violated the legal or social rules of the actors in question.

It should be noted that such extraordinary practices do not have to be particularly ‘radical’ or explicitly violent- they just need to be sufficiently outside existing or usual procedures that they required this special type of justification. Nevertheless, the preoccupation of securitization theory with authority and attempts by political elites to justify the use of security forces has led scholars such as Eriksson to be concerned with some of the implicit ethical and theoretical dimensions of the field.61

To understand the relevance of this criticism it must be understood how the concept of executive control is interwoven with the logic of security. It should be remembered that references to security have the purpose of justifying action. Taken to its extreme (but logical) conclusion security utterances are to seek social support for, and prepare security forces for violent measures. Put simply, security is an argument to justify violence. Furthermore, it is one that is readily accepted, self-defence being perhaps the strongest legitimating claim to violent

60Wilkinson, C., ‘The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?’, Security Dialogue, 38(1), 2007, p.9 61See Eriksson, J., ‘Observers or Advocates? On the Political Role of Security Analysts’, Cooperation and Conflict, 34(3), 1999, pp. 311-330

32 action at any level of analysis.62 Any targeted people that has been accepted as a security threat

(remembering that threat is intimately linked with the concept of survival) will not be subject to the same ethical considerations as other people. Aradau follows this logic to discuss why treating security as a universal is impossible – someone must be being secured from someone else.63 It is in this manner that considerations of perspective begin to emerge, which provides a critical range of implications.

The fact that security serves a particular community, at the expense of another, means that considerations of identity, community and in-group out-group relations between peoples are inherent within the paradigm. In the political realm security essentially refers to collective identities.64 Identity not only delineates the in-group (the “we” group) from the out-group (the

Other) it also informs the relationship between the in-group and other groups. Wendt, during one of his more radical assertions simplified his three categories of group relationship

(friendship, enmity and indifference) to a continuum with two extremes- the Other can be congruous with the self (ingroup) or an anathema to that group (antagonistic).65 When speaking of security and securitization it is this conception that is most relevant as securitizing claims operate to force this very judgement to be made- either the people in question are indeed a

62Bowett, D. W., Self-Defence in International Law, Manchester University Press, 1958 p.10 63Aradau, C., ‘Security as Universality? The Roma contesting security in Europe’, Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics. Routledge: Abingdon, p.4 ; Bigo, D., ‘International Political Sociology’ Chapter 9 in P.D. Williams, Security Studies: An Introduction, Hoboken, Taylor and Francis, 2008, p.123 64Stivachtis, Y. A., ‘International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security’, Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(1), 2008 p.3 65Jepperson, R. L. and A. Wendt, ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, in P.J Katzenstein (ed) Culture and National Security, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, p.52

33 threat to the collective community or they are not. This is what Williams means by stating that securitization, in its purest form, creates an “absolute divide between friend and enemy.”66

Concern over utilising such divisive conceptual schemes is often tied to the accusation that the theory rests upon controversial Schmittian notions of collectives and antagonism, concepts that were, as was Schmitt himself, connected with Nazism and fascism in the 20th century.67

However, these misgivings are misplaced as the ethics of human political behaviour should not be confused with the ethical ramifications and commitments of theory (despite the fact that the ethical dimension of theory does provoke significant questions). To deny the utility of a framework such as Securitization Theory simply on account of a Schmittian framework would be as naïve as to refrain from the study of any subject that considered the workings of unethical or illiberal practises, no matter how widespread those practises may be in the real world. The

Copenhagen School, for instance, in no way endorse the construction of socio-political antagonisms. Williams describes this position as viewing “securitization as a social possibility intrinsic to political life.”68 It is, therefore, a human behaviour that must be understood in order to critically appraise demagogic communitarian posturing. The Copenhagen School do loosely maintain an ethical commitment to “normal” politics and desecuritization.69 This is because normal politics tends to be more deliberated, democratized and universal, and therefore, more congruous with emancipation and liberal society. Conversely, the hasty, executive-led and potentially violent politics of security are far more liable to authoritarian abuse. Crucially, however, this is not to say that scholars of securitization hold securitizing claims and the

66Williams, M. C., ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), 2003, p.516 67Ibid. p.515 68Ibid. p.522 69Roe, P., ‘Is Securitization a ‘Negative’ Concept? Revisiting the Normative Debate Over Normal Versus Extraordinary Politics’, Security Dialogue 43(3), 2012, p.249

34 politics of security to be unethical per se. Floyd succinctly declares “not all securitizations are morally equal.”70 It is generally accepted that the ethics of securitization are circumstantial, that is to say, dependent on whether the actor has genuinely identified a threat to the community and has offered a reasonable plan to neutralise this threat. Depending on the real-world context and who or what benefits from a given securitization, therefore, it can be morally justified.

In addition to addressing ethical concerns, it is also briefly worth acknowledging criticism directed at securitization theory stemming from geographical and cultural limitations. Despite being an attempt at providing an expansive and inclusive theory of security, the overall focus of Securitization Theory upon the relationship between the speech acts of political elites and their audiences has been criticized as remaining within the “Westphalian straightjacket” of political science.71 Wilkinson has questioned the relevance of the utilising the theory outside of Western liberal democracies, or at the very least outside of ‘European’ style Westphalian states.72 For the purposes of this thesis I will accept that securitization theory may have such limitations, but that Australia easily qualifies as an appropriate entity. Furthermore, these concerns have been recently challenged by Vuori’s extensive research into the politics of securitization and associated speech acts in the People’s Republic of China – a nation undoubtedly culturally and historically outside of the “liberal democracies and Euro-

America.”73

70Floyd, R., ‘Security and the Environment: Securitisation theory and US environmental security policy’, Cambridge University Press, 2010 p.56 71Wilkinson, C., ‘The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable outside Europe?’, Security Dialogue, 38(1), 2007, p.5 72Ibid. 73Vuori, J. A., How to do Security with Words. A Grammar of Securitisation in the People’s Republic of China, University of Turku, 2011 p.31

Hayes notes that the structure of securitization as a phenomenon transcends cultures despite the fact that securitizing actors in autocracies have a very different relationship to their audience and will utilise a different securitizing vocabulary.74 Vuori’s work not only supports the claim that securitization follows a ‘universal grammar’ that transcends conventional languages,75 it is this very universality that demonstrates why the application of Securitization Theory has been so varied and flexible, covering a range of issues that can be thought of as non-traditional security threats. This has included research into environmental hazards, human movement and epidemics.76 For example, Sjöstedt highlights how the Clinton administration was able to securitize AIDS as a security threat to implement policies in order to curb its spread.77 Floyd also identifies at the Clinton era as the first signs of politicians attempting to construct environmental damage as a bona fide security threat.78 Interestingly, when political elites have attempted to securitize climate change, this mobilization has been less successful. This probably stems from the fact that our planetary ecosystem is not a traditional referent object, whereas the natural tendency for tribal groupism among humans (and the subsequent need to protect the in-group from outside aggression) can be appreciated on a more emotionally intuitive level.

Literature that explicitly deals with the connection between migration and security is a recent development. For much of the 20th Century academic literature regarding migration had its grounding in economics. After the Second World War (when enormous global migration

74Hayes, J., ‘Securitization, Social Identity, and Democratic Security: Nixon, India, and the Ties that Bind’, International Organization, 66(01), 2012, p.70 75Vuori, J. A., How to do Security with Words. A Grammar of Securitisation in the People’s Republic of China, University of Turku, 2011 p.15 76Sjöstedt, R., ‘Ideas, identities and internalization: Explaining securitizing moves’, Cooperation and Conflict 48(1), 2013, p.145 77Ibid. 78Floyd, R., Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2010 p.87

36 occurred from non-industrialised nations to those industrialised ones) most Western governments conceived of immigration schemes as necessary components in rebuilding their war-torn economies. In fact, highly politicised debate over the threat of mass migration only really emerged in Western-liberal democracies after the 1970’s economic downturn, which coincided with the establishment of migrant communities that were now large enough and

‘visible’ enough to constitute a permanent change.79

To native populations, the perception that these migrant communities were guest-workers could no longer be maintained and, considering the deterioration of economic conditions, the role migrants were to play in the national life of their adopted home (and indeed their very loyalty) to those states came under scrutiny. As such, migrants have been increasingly linked to insecurity. This relationship is a complex one and hard to clearly define. Choucri describes why, the subject is “particularly challenging…migration, security and the linkage between the two are inherently subjective concepts.”80 Once notions of identity are introduced, this matrix becomes even more complicated. Traditional security studies theorising is unequipped to handle issues with such prominent ideational components. Buzan and Wæver themselves note that the work of the Copenhagen School is well equipped to investigate how immigration and security are connected.81 Securitization theory, then, has proven a powerful tool in exploring this connection. Looking at migration has become a principle use of the theory. Bourbeau utilized Securitization theory to investigate the tightening of immigration processes amongst

79Baldwin-Edwards, B. and M. A. Schain, ‘The Politics of Immigration: An Introduction’, in Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Martin A. Schain (eds) The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe, Frank Cass, 1994 p.9 80Choucri, N., ‘Migration and Security: Some Key Linkages’, Journal of International Affairs, 56, 2002, p.98 81Buzan, B., et al. (1998). Security: a new framework for analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Western states, identifying a growing fear of the potential ‘anarchy’ of mass migration.82

Despite being a relatively new area of literature, this growing body of work establishes that migration channels have been undergoing a process of securitization across many states and regions.

This process has been particularly evident in Europe, where migrants and mass immigration in general has gradually become symbolically associated with notions of instability and societal risk to be managed by executive government. Subsequent efforts to restrict human movement into the continent in the interest of risk mitigation- termed ‘Fortress Europe,’ has been explored within the literature.83 Bigo takes a different approach, focusing on the role of security professionals and their management of “societal unease.”84 This paradigm acknowledges that security professionals (including government ministries) are not necessarily responding to

‘new’ threats per se, but constructing immigrants as a threat through conflation: problemizing the issue in the likeness of other portfolios, such as organised crime and terrorism. As the performance of the executive has become increasingly measured by this type of governmentality, politicians must retain “symbolic control over their boarders” to maintain their own legitimacy85 – a phenomenon I argue is reflected in Australia. In this way, immigrants have become scapegoated and the control of migration a key indicator of government performance. Bigo is not the only scholar to link the securitization of migration with the technical population management and the politics of sovereignty. Humphrey conceives of the securitization process in many Western liberal democracies, including Australia, as a

82Bourbeau, P., The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order, Taylor & Francis, 2011 p.2 83Stivachtis, Y. A., ‘International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security’, Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(1), 2008, p.3 84Bigo, D., ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), 2002, p.85 85Ibid. p.65

38 significant shift of focus on the part of governments from maintaining national order to control international disorder.86 This process is termed ‘hypergovernance’ and typically exists at national borders, involving intercepting and deterring unwanted entrants, including asylum seekers.87

Framing, Discourse and Security

Despite having post-structuralist links and being typically focused on the analysis of language,

Securitization Theory does not have to be post-structuralist in essence and can be utilized as more than just a ‘critical’ theory. A cogent epistemology can be constructed right to the meta- theoretical level. This process can be traced through constructivism generally, as well as a sociological/psychological grounding through symbolic interactionism and discursive framing.

This is important as it provides a solid theoretical foundation which legitimates more positivist empirical investigation at later stages. To completely explain how this thesis will integrate the insights present in these approaches, it is necessary to explain how framing operates in theory and how these phenomena can be studied in practice. Framing refers to the way information is communicated. Entman famously defined framing as to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context.”88 It is scientifically established that human beings think associatively and primarily through language.89 Framing, as a phenomenon, is linked to this associative and symbolic ability of the human mind and it is

86Humphrey, M., ‘Migration, Security and Insecurity’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(2), 2013, p.180 87Ibid. 88Entman, R. M., ‘Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm’, Journal of Communication, 43(4), 1993, p.52 89Johnson-Laird, P. N., Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 1983

39 this deep neurological foundation that makes framing such a powerful force. People cannot help but be influenced by the associative power of their own mind: you cannot choose what associations and memories particular objects or symbols may cognitively arouse.

Because language necessarily works through a structure of associations, different labels for the exact same object can activate associations that other labels may not have. For this reason the way things are framed has a drastic impact upon how others process information. This is not only limited to short, ‘uncontrolled’ associations. Zaller comes to the conclusion that while people may hold “true attitudes,” these attitudes are “highly changeable” depending on context, including non-substantive changes in wording.90 In Framing Theory Chong and Druckman emphasise how pronounced this effect can be, using an example taken from a survey into political opinions. The question asked the respondents to gauge the permissibility of a particular group being able to hold a ‘hate rally.’ When preceded by the line, “Given the importance of free speech” 85% of respondents agreed with permitting the rally. However, when others were asked the same question preceded by the line “Given the threat of violence” only 45% thought the rally ought to be permitted.91 This amounts to an enormous statistical difference, especially considering many people conceive of their political opinions as convictions that are not liable to superficial change.

This example demonstrates how people are influenced by the way information is presented.

When primed to think about the concept freedom of speech, a political value with a strong

90Zaller, J. and S., ‘A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences’, American Journal of Political Science, 1992 p.579 91Chong, D. and J. N. Druckman, ‘Framing Theory’, Annual Review of Political Science, 10, 2007, p.104

40 positive association for many, people were far more likely to acquiesce to a potentially harmful activity than when they reminded that it may lead to violence. It was not variability among the attitudes of respondents (supporting free speech and condemning violence) that produced these differing results but the presentation of different information frames that encouraged respondents to access meaning in a certain way. In the same way, the interpretation of events of political significance can differ significantly depending on how they are framed: a theme at the heart of this thesis.

Initially, the concept of framing was explored from a communications background. Most work that sought to explore the impact of frames on political judgements looked to the presentation of issues in the media. This includes research into issues as varied as abortion, terrorism and immigration. Others, such as Courtemanche et al. have used framing to explore the nexus between security and immigration, adding scientific depth to the question by designing surveys to measure the impact of security frames upon attitudes towards immigration in the United

States.92 The research found that security frames were more impactful than any other type, such as immigration being presented as an economic or cultural threat, for example. Furthermore, the data proves that framing immigration as a security issue impacts upon attitudes and importantly, translates to policy preferences on the part of respondents. This effect goes as far as changing the attitudes of self-described ‘liberals’ toward supporting the curtailment of civil liberties should they accept security is at stake.93

92See Lahav, G. and M. Courtemanche, ‘The Ideological Effects of Framing Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties’, Political Behavior, 34(3), 2012, pp. 477-505. 93Ibid. p.492

Scholars of Securitization Theory have drawn upon the significance of framing, linking it with the securitization process, though often without much detail. Watson notes that Balzacq,

Stritzel, Huysmans and Bigo all fall within that category.94 McDonald and Merefield use the concept of framing in greater depth to understand how the issue of Iraq was securitized by

Prime Minister Howard to justify Australia’s involvement in war.95 Vuori recognises that the construction of identity frames is central to the logic of securitization on his work on the grammar of security in China.96 Only by framing social movements as unpatriotic or a danger to the goals of the Chinese Communist Party has the Chinese government been able to securitize ‘seditious’ movements and legitimate violent repression. Conversely, only by framing their identity as patriotic, populist and committed to the ultimate goals of socialism have social movements in the nation achieved longevity.

Watson also addresses the impact of security frames upon humanitarian migration in Australia and Canada by looking at representations of the issue in the media.97 He goes further, arguing that the concepts involved in securitization and security framing are so similar that securitization should be considered a subset of framing98 – security operates as a special master frame by which to order information. It is this understanding that I will adopt for the remainder of this thesis. Utilising this connection provides greater depth to Securitization Theory by incorporating literature that already holds answers to gaps present in the theoretical framework,

94Watson, S. D., ‘’Framing’ the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on Threat Construction’, Millennium 40(2), 2012, p.280 95McDonald, M., ‘Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia, asylum-seekers and the normative limits of the Copenhagen School,’ Australian Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 2011, pp. 281-295. 96Vuori, J. A., How to do Security with Words. A Grammar of Securitisation in the People’s Republic of China, University of Turku, 2011 97Watson, S. D., The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking Boats, Routledge, 2009 98Watson, S. D., ‘‘Framing’ the Copenhagen School: Integrating the Literature on Threat Construction’, Millennium 40(2), 2012, p.291

42 such as a deeper understanding of the role of the audience, ‘resistance’ and non-linguistic communicative forms.99

The non-universal nature of concepts such as identity means that the analysis of any threat must be considered from a unique standpoint: “identity politics must be situated historically.”100 It is for this reason that primarily focusing on one nation over time with historical depth is preferable to drawing international comparisons to assess the securitization process. The immigration of one group of people into a country may be considered a threat to that nation’s security whereas migrants from another country at the same time are not.101 While this may seem obvious, it highlights how complex judgements are being made in migrant receiving states about the nature (identity) of certain migrants and whether they will be a danger to the state they are entering. Such a judgement involves both categorisation of the immigrant and also self-definition of the host society.102 This does not simply refer to ascertaining whether certain individuals may seek to violently harm the state they are entering (through acts of terrorism, for instance), although concerns that migrants may be explicit security threats do exist.103 Often, by securitizing migration the state is also seeking to safeguard social cohesiveness, a concept considered inherently connected to notions of vulnerability and security.104 Identity is, therefore, metaphorically attached to survival in the form “if we don’t do this, we won’t be us anymore.”105 In other words, society may need to be “defended or protected against cultural imports.”106

99Ibid. 100Stivachtis, Y. A., ‘International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security’, Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(1), 2008, p.7 101Ibid. 102Ibid. p.4 103McDonald, M., ‘Deliberation and resecuritization: Australia, asylum-seekers and the normative limits of the Copenhagen School,’ Australian Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 2011, p.288 104Ayoob, M., ‘The Security Problematic of the Third World’, World Politics, 43(02), 1991 p.261 105Buzan, B., et al., Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p.23 106Stivachtis, Y. A., ‘International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security’, Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(1), 2008, p.18

Here, Buzan and Wæver make a subtle distinction between the state and the nation, whereby the state refers to the government as an organisation (with associated capabilities, military and otherwise) whereas the nation refers to the more hidden cultural/identity group that the state ostensibly represents.107 This distinction is crucial in understanding why some migrants have come to be seen a security threat whereas many Western nations continue to receive fairly high levels of immigration in general (it is not immigration per se that is being considered a national security threat). Menz describes this well, stating that the “competition state of the early twenty-first century welcomes migrants, provided they fit into a set of carefully delineated categories.”108 Normally, this means fulfilling some specialised economic purpose. Humphrey emphasis how relatively small groups of migrants can dominate discourse, in the period 2006-

2011 asylum seekers made up just 1.4% of migrants to Australia109 yet commanded the bulk of news coverage.

This only further begs the question, why it is specifically asylum seekers arriving by boat (a group of migrants proportionately low in number and typically without organisation and resources) that are being designated a national threat by political elites and government? How are these people different to other types of immigrants? How are these people different from earlier unauthorised boat arrivals? These initial questions seem only more complicated having outlined the relevant theoretical frameworks. If threat is determined by intricate relationship between competing identities, symbolic associations, subtle notions of vulnerability and

107Buzan, B. and O. Wæver, ‘Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory’, Review of International Studies, 35(02), 2009, p.255 108Menz, G., The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies, OUP Oxford, 2008, p.25 109Humphrey, M., ‘Migration, Security and Insecurity’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(2), 2013, p.189

44 international context it would appear almost impossible to definitively isolate one explanative factor that may have led to unauthorised boat arrivals being considered a national security threat in Australia. Fortunately, opening the field of analysis up to include discourse provides solutions as well as posing problems. The way has been opened for language to be considered as significant data.110 In this approach talk is no longer ‘cheap’ or devoid of telling security information. In other words, the simplest way to assess how and why securitization has occurred is to look to what those securitizing claims themselves are saying.

This is not to say that the reasons given by actors making securitizing claims are indeed the primary reasons in a deeper sociological sense. Securitization Theory does not give us access to the ‘true’ motivations of actors, but this is by no means a failure of the theory, rather an honest admission.111 No theory can access the private conscience of others. What can be determined, however, is how discourse has changed. Securitization Theory suggests that for an issue to emerge as a security issue, there ought to be an identifiable change in the discursive framing of that issue within the language of political elites. Furthermore, because any change from normal politics must receive acquiescence from the public in liberal democracies, it can be assumed that the implementation of securitized policies suggests that securitizing claims have been at least sufficiently successful.112 It is in this way that Sjöstedt argues that the enactment of securitized policies can be considered an empirically observable signification of a previously successful period of threat construction.113

110Lahav, G. and M. Courtemanche, ‘The Ideological Effects of Framing Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties’, Political Behavior, 34(3), 2012, p.481 111Vuori, J. A., How to do Security with Words. A Grammar of Securitisation in the People’s Republic of China, University of Turku, 2011 p.14 112Buzan, B., et al., Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p.28 113Sjöstedt, R., ‘Ideas, Identities and Internalization: Explaining Securitizing Moves’, Cooperation and Conflict 48(1), 2013, p.146

By treating the securitization of asylum in Australia as an indication of successful threat construction, problems (both theoretical and methodological) associated with explaining the role of the audience can be largely avoided. Changes in the language of political elites should, therefore, suggest how threat has been constructed. If these discursive frames are not identifiable it would suggest that threat construction and securitization has not occurred in the way that it is currently thought, or that actors other than political elites have driven securitization in Australia. To guide investigation, this thesis will draw upon narratives identified in the literature as informing Australia’s experience with asylum seekers. These narratives will be used as hypotheses for thematically exploring which features have been the most influential in the securitization process. Furthermore, they will provide a framework with which to approach coding the language of political elites as data as a form of content analysis.

Huysmans and Buonfino have built upon this approach to explore how asylum seekers are framed in parliamentary speech in the UK,114 research that comes closest to the project at hand.

They found that while explicit conflation of asylum with security threats like terrorism are limited, there is persistent association of asylum with ‘unease’ to justify increased control. This finding conforms with the broader literature but ultimately remain superficial. A far more exhaustive mapping of discourse is needed to identify what exactly this unease is linked with, or being driven by, to arrive at meaningful answers to the pressing questions of migration and security in the New Millennium. Here, it should be noted that Huysmans and Buonfino were primarily searching for ‘terrorism’ as their paradigmatic association and then analysing how asylum seekers were framed, rather than searching for ‘refugee(s)’ as I have in the Hansard.

Moreover, this specific type of research has not been undertaken in Australia, where the asylum

114See Huysmans, J. and A. Buonfino, ‘Politics of exception and Unease: Immigration, asylum and terrorism in parliamentary debates in the UK’, Political Studies, 56(4), 2008, pp. 766-788

46 seeker issue has more clearly dominated electoral periods. Given that securitization can be interpreted as intimately connected with framing, it is necessary to know the framing devices in operation regarding the issue of refugees. Therefore, it is by exploring the implications and associations of discursive frames that I propose to ultimately assess how, and then why, unauthorised boat arrivals have come to be interpreted as a threat to national security in

Australia. Having described the aims and overarching structure of subsequent chapters, I will now move on to presenting the events of Vietnamese Refugee Crisis 1975-81 and introducing the dominant discursive conceptions of refugees in the speech of Australian political elites during that time.

Chapter II

Case Study One:

Australia and the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis (1975-1981)

Chapter II outlines the details of the first case study period of this thesis, the years of the

Vietnamese Refugee Crisis (hereafter VRC). Firstly, I will explain the details and context of the VRC. Secondly, I will introduce the primary source data gathered, utterances of Members of the House of Representatives relating to refugees. Here, I will identify the range of views present along with the most frequent and dominant narrative strands to understand how refugees were framed by political elites during the VRC. This will develop a comprehensive picture of the political narrative relating to refugees in the period 1975-1981. In subsequent chapters, I will contrast framing devices between the case study periods to assess the credibility of several key explanations of the securitization of humanitarian migration.

The attitude of Australian policy makers toward Vietnam and South-East Asia generally was informed by strategy and security. In this period, commitment to the Australia-US alliance remained the cornerstone of Australia’s national security. For that reason, I will outline the historical context and evolution of the conflict before moving on to Australia’s experience with the VRC itself. The US became involved in the conflict in Vietnam to secure the independence of South Vietnam and halt the spread of communism in Indochina. The strategic concerns of the West at that time were partly informed by the ‘Domino Theory,’ which predicted that communist insurgencies would endanger states that neighboured communist countries.115

115Porter, G., Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, University of California Press, 2005 p.229

Eventually, it was feared that this process would result in the spread of Communism southwards through Asia. The grand strategy of the US, therefore, was to prevent this possibility by intervening to stop the dominos falling. Known as the doctrine of ‘containment,’ the US sought to challenge what it saw as communist expansion.116 Whereas the conflict in

Indochina was initially a struggle for Vietnamese independence from French Imperialism, it came to be viewed through the lens of the Cold War. Australian policymakers saw the southward advance of Communism as a security threat. The move by Australian policy makers to revive conscription and raise a regular standing army preceded the decision to commit

Australian troops to the conflict in Indochina and was aimed as much at guarding against the escalation of conflict in West Papua (which then bordered Australian territory), demonstrating the multifaceted nature of Australia’s security relationship with South-East Asia at the time.117

If Indochina fell to Communism, it was thought, the threat that communist insurgents would be victorious in Malaysia and Indonesia would grow. Eventually, antagonistic communist forces could directly threaten Australian territory. Resistance of this advance was, therefore, necessary to ensure Australia’s national security. Australia had previously committed troops to the Malayan Emergency (a conflict between Commonwealth forces and communist insurgents spanning 1950-1960 in Malaysia) for similar reasons.118 Grand strategy placed geopolitical importance upon regions which otherwise might not have provoked military involvement from

Western governments. Joining the conflict in Indochina (already ongoing for decades before

American involvement) was important, not only to halt the global spread of Communism in

116DiLeo, D. L., George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment, UNC Press Books, 1991 p.187 117McNeill I., ‘The Australian Army and the Vietnam War’, Chapter 2 in J. Doyle et al. Australia's Vietnam War, Texas A&M University Press, 2002 p.20 118 For further reading see: Dennis, P. and J. Grey, Emergency and confrontation: Australian military operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966, Allen & Unwin, 1996

Asia but also to reassure the entire Free World of the resolve and protective ability of the United

States.119 This would function as a clear message to other powerful actors, such as the Soviet

Union, that Communist expansion would be countered, making commitment to the Vietnam

War of unparalleled global strategic importance. The United States and its allies were, therefore, willing to devote an extraordinary amount of resources to the conflict in Indochina to secure the independence of South Vietnam.

Ultimately, even this resolve was not enough: the VRC would begin with the Fall of Saigon to

Communist forces in April 1975, the event that materially, as well as symbolically, marked the victory of the Communist North Vietnamese and their local allies in South Vietnam. There was a perceived obligation amongst allies of the South Vietnamese regime that they could not abandon the local population to potential massacre at the hands of victorious invaders. Not only would former government officials and servicemen face reprisals at the hands of their enemies, those who had worked closely with Western governments were obvious targets. Those individuals considered high risk (including those American and allied officials remaining in the city) were subject to an emergency evacuation that grew to include thousands of terrified residents of Saigon. The evacuation of Vietnamese after the Fall of Saigon is illuminating.

Notwithstanding genuine concerns for the people of South Vietnam, commitment to evacuation is partly explained as an attempt to win the propaganda war after any hope of achieving a military victory in Indochina was extinguished.120 By becoming the protector of Vietnamese people against the threat of their own (new) government, the US would achieve a kind of moral victory.

119Ninkovich, F., Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p.361 120Le Espiritu, Y., ‘The ‘We-Win-Even-When-We-Lose’ Syndrome: US Press Coverage of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Fall of Saigon’, American Quarterly, 58(2), 2006, pp.329-30

Commitment to the theatrics of exodus extended to the point of confusion: in one case thousands of Vietnamese evacuees were left spending years on Guam, who, feeling that they were encouraged to evacuate their homeland, found their expressed desire to be repatriated to

Vietnam frustrated by American authorities who planned to resettle them in the US.121 Prime

Minister Whitlam was criticised for what Miller called at the time “blameworthy dilatoriness,”122 the presence of Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) transports in the theatre meant Australia was well placed to assist in large scale evacuation as the Americans had done.

This supposed abrogation of Australia’s responsibility for the people of Saigon was seen as evidence of callousness. Whitlam’s famous response to the evolution of the Refugee Crisis, that “Vietnamese sob stories don’t wring my withers”123 suggests that might be the case.

Nevertheless, these events preceded the bulk of the refugee exodus – 2 million refugees would leave Vietnam over the years succeeding the evacuation.124 Whereas most refugees left overland, the most dramatic manifestation of the VRC was the voyage of over a million ‘boat people’ to neighbouring nations. Usually, this voyage was beset with hardship. Often, leaving

Vietnam required extortionate payment to government officials to validate emigration and then departing in small boats hardly worthy of long open-sea voyages. Many died of extreme exposure, starvation and even at the hands of pirates, the presence of so many refugees fleeing with their valuables resulted in a surge in opportunistic piracy in the region. In the most

121See Lipman, J. K., ‘“Give us a Ship": The Vietnamese Repatriate Movement on Guam, 1975’, American Quarterly, 64(1), 2012, pp. 1-31. 122Miller, J., ‘Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January to June 1975’, Australian Journal of Politics & History, 21(3), 1975 p.3 123Neumann, K., ‘Oblivious to the Obvious? Australian Asylum-Seeker Policies and the Use of the Past’, in Neumann, K. and G. Tavan, (eds) Does History Matter?: Making and Debating Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Policy in Australia and New Zealand, ANU Press, 2009, p.50 124Vo, N. M., The Vietnamese Boat People, 1954 and 1975-1992, McFarland, 2005 p.1

51 exhaustive statistical investigation to date Rummel estimates 500,000 Vietnamese boat people died.125 Most boat people intended to find sanctuary, at least temporary, in neighbouring nations. Refugee camps quickly emerged throughout the region, most notably in Thailand,

Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong, which functioned as the major centres for first-asylum.126

Here, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereafter UNHCR) worked to process asylum seekers and arrange for their resettlement in those nations that participated in the UNHCR resettlement program. By some metrics, Australia only ranked behind the US and

Canada in importance as a receiving nation.127 Australia experienced the arrival of boat people first-hand in April 1976 when a boat carrying five Vietnamese refugees arrived in Darwin.

Over the next five years, 2059 refugees would arrive in Australia in this manner.

Table 2.1 Boat Arrivals by Calendar Year 1976-1988128

Year Number of Arrivals

1976 111

1977 868

1978 746

1979 304

1980 0

1981 30

1982-88 0

125Cited in Rummel, R. J., Statistics of Democide, Center on National Security and Law, University of Virginia, 1997 126Frost, F., ‘Vietnam, ASEAN and the Indochina Refugee Crisis’, Southeast Asian Affairs, 1980 p.354 127Inglis, C., ‘Australia's Refugee Policy in an International Context’, The Australian Quarterly, 66(4), 1994, p.16 128Phillips, J., ‘Boat Arrivals in Australia: a Quick Guide to the Statistics’, Parliamentary Library, 2014 Accessed Online: http://www.aph.gov.p.2u/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/ rp/rp1314/QG/BoatArrivals.

The period represented by the figures above is termed the ‘First Wave’ of unauthorised boat arrivals in Australia, which ended with a natural six-year lull in arrivals after 1982. To those accustomed to the contemporary manifestation of the boat people issue, these figures might seem surprisingly small. Part of the reason for this owes to how discourse relating to refugees in Australia has become conflated. For instance, ‘refugee’ and ‘boat people’ are often used interchangeably.129 Only a small fraction of the 56,000 Vietnamese refugees accepted during

1976-81130 arrived in Australia by boat. Any resulting confusion is not limited to the uneducated on the subject but is replicated at the highest levels of commentary, such as the possibly misconstrued claim by renowned lawyer and refugee advocate Julian Burnside that

Fraser accepted 25,000 boat people.131

After the Australian constitutional crisis in November 1975, Prime Minister Whitlam was dismissed and opposition leader Malcolm Fraser appointed to caretaker Prime Minister, marking a change in personalities that would greatly shape Australia’s response to the VRC.

In December that year Fraser secured his positon by leading the Coalition to a landslide electoral victory. Part of the Fraser government’s platform was to expand humanitarian intake programs for Vietnamese refugees, aimed at those individuals with familial or other relationships with the Australian nation. The fact that conservatives were more supportive of

Vietnamese resettlement than the greater public (61% compared with 51% of Labor voters)132

129O'Doherty, K. and A. Lecouteur ‘“Asylum seekers”,“boat people” and “illegal immigrants”: Social Categorisation in the Media’, Australian Journal of Psychology 59(1), 2007, p.5 130Brennan, F., Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of Queensland, 2003, p.29 131Smit, J. H., The Political Origins and Development of Australia’s People Smuggling Legislation: Evil Smugglers or Extreme Rhetoric?, Edith Cowan University, 2011 p.40 132Colebatch, H., ‘The ‘Boat People’ and the 1977 Election’, Quadrant: 52, 2015

53 is clear evidence that Fraser’s leadership and moral arguments in support of Vietnamese refugees was driving public opinion. Smit provides a compelling argument that this was indeed the case, citing research surveys which asked respondents to select the most desirable annual quotas for accepting Vietnamese refugees. At a time when only 1000 Vietnamese had arrived, respondents favoured capping numbers at 2000, yet after Frasers announcement that intake would be increased to 10,000 most surveyed responded with the 10,000-15,000 quota option- suggesting that the public was willing to accept executive leadership on the issue.133

Support from the political Right was obviously not ubiquitous. Xenophobic elements decried the acceptance of the Vietnamese refugees as Asian immigrants. For example, the far-right group National Action produced propaganda headed ‘Sink them Sort them out of the Water’ warning that,

“If Australia were ever to be a victim of a military Asian invasion the present ‘boat

people’ invasion would be its prelude”.134

This clearly draws parallels between unauthorised boat arrivals and Australia’s historical anti-

Asian invasion anxiety. Viviani, a preeminent scholar of Australia’s experience with

Vietnamese immigration, confirms that notions involving the threat of ‘Asian invasion’ and potential demographic swamping remained dominant features of base public discussion throughout the VRC.135 This context is especially important to note for this thesis, as explicitly racist views are less likely to be represented in on-the-record statements by politicians (that is

133Smit, J. H., The Political Origins and Development of Australia’s People Smuggling Legislation: Evil Smugglers or Extreme Rhetoric?, Edith Cowan University, 2011 p.48 134Clyne, M., ‘The use of Exclusionary Language to Manipulate Opinion: John Howard, Asylum Seekers and the Reemergence of Political Incorrectness in Australia’, Journal of Language and Politics 4(2), 2005 p.192 135Viviani, N. The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1984, p.79

54 to say, uttered by political elites in parliament). The political Left also had reservations about the entry of Vietnamese refugees. As previously stated, the Whitlam government’s slow implementation of evacuation operations was criticized in parliament as a strategy to evade responsibility for the welfare of the Vietnamese. In a well-known quote, Whitlam’s reaction to the idea of mass humanitarian resettlement of the Vietnamese is said to have been

I’m not having these f..king Vietnamese Balts coming into the country with their

religious and political prejudices against us136

It encapsulates the rationale attributed to Labor during involving the VRC. Here, ‘Balts’ is a slur referring to immigrants from the Baltics: it was thought that Vietnamese immigrants fleeing communism would be antithetical to Leftist politics in Australia, as had some Eastern

European refugees fleeing Socialism decades earlier.137 Whitlam defended his record over the handling of the Crisis in 2003, countering perceptions that his government was inactive in a reply to a Sydney Morning Herald article.138 Here, he points to the use of RAAF planes in removing orphans from Vietnam to Australia in April 1975 and announcements that

Indochinese students could defer their scheduled return home or secure permanent residency with sponsorship. He also emphasised that it was his government in 1973 that acceded to the

1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1961 Convention on the Status of Statelessness and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.139

136Mares, P., Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of the Tampa, Taylor & Francis Group/Books, 2002, p.74 137Viviani, N. The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1984, p.56 138Gough Whitlam to Gerard Henderson, 30 December 2002 in The Sydney Institute Quarterly Issue 19 Vol. 7 No. 1 March 2003 139Ibid.

During the 1970’s there was a desire on the part of political elites to renovate Australia’s international image. As the White Australia policy had become embarrassingly anachronistic, commitment to the multilateral resettlement of Vietnamese refugees could simultaneously prove Australia was a progressive, modern nation and that the abolition of official racism within the immigration department was a genuine move. Despite the fact that consciously developing an image can be interpreted as an inauthentic motivation, offering permanent settlement to boat arrivals was the first time that Australia had accepted humanitarian migration that was not selected on the terms of the government (or framed as in Australia’s economic or strategic interests) and is, therefore, indicative of a new era of humanitarian commitment.

Another example from this time was the settlement of thousands of East Timorese refugees in

Australia, who had been evacuated from their homeland to Darwin in fear of persecution from

Indonesian authorities as East Timor faced annexation in 1975.140

Recent scholarship has warned against adopting the narrative that Fraser’s administration should be lauded for acting in an ideally compassionate and humanitarian way towards

Vietnamese asylum seekers.141 In an article in The Australian titled “Fraser Was No Saint For

Vietnamese Refugees,” Foreign Editor Greg Sheridan argued that Fraser only began to accept sizeable numbers of Vietnamese refugees as a result of mounting international pressure.142

Researching Cabinet documents from 1979, Smit found that those in the Fraser Government privately planned to deter commercialized refugee voyages (people smuggling) with

140Wise, A., ‘Embodying Exile: Trauma and Collective Identities Among East Timorese Refugees in Australia’, Social Analysis, 48(3), 2004, p.25 141 See Stevens, R., ‘Political Debates on Asylum Seekers During the Fraser Government, 1977- 1982’, Australian Journal of Politics & History 58(4), 2012, pp.526-41; Stats, K., ‘Welcome to Australia? A reappraisal of the Fraser government’s approach to refugees, 1975–83’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2014, pp.69-87 142Sheridan, G. “Fraser Was No Saint For Vietnamese Refugees” The Australian, 26 March 2015

56 criminalization and harsh punishment.143 Stats argues that the Fraser government only committed to Vietnamese resettlement when it appeared the size of the VRC might threaten

Australia anyway, not out of any moral imperative.144 The theme that compliance with powerful allies has dominated Australia’s approach to humanitarian migration will be built upon when discussing the impact of grand geopolitical change in chapter VI.

Nevertheless, Fraser asserted the moral dimension to assisting Vietnamese refugees more than any other member of government. It should be noted Fraser had personal connection to the

Vietnam War- he had been Minister for the Army during some of its duration. He stated, “The government believed that there was an ethical obligation to provide safe haven for many of those whom we had supported in what had become a most misguided conflict.”145 Notions that the conflict had been ‘misguided’ or mistaken fed public disapproval for the war and only further entrenched a shared sense of victimhood. The South Vietnamese were seen to be victims of the same conflict that many Australians were. Reaction to the tragedy of the war, therefore, provoked sympathy for the Vietnamese as well as Australians. In the same way, therefore, as

Tempo argues that the Vietnamese refugees entered the United States as migrants with an already proven commitment to their new homes through political allegiance,146 those

Vietnamese coming to Australia occupied a comparable position. This provides an important contrast to the contemporary era in which the socio-political commitment of refugees to their host states is regularly scrutinised.

143Smit, J. H., ‘Malcolm Fraser's Response to 'Commercial' Refugee Voyages’, Journal of International Relations, 2010, p.103 144Stats, K., ‘Welcome to Australia? A Reappraisal of the Fraser Government’s Approach to Refugees, 1975–83’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2014, p.3 145Brennan, F., Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of Queensland, 2003, p.32 146Tempo, C. J. B., Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees During the Cold War, Princeton University Press, 2008

Over time, there was a gradual shift away from viewing the VRC through the lens of the

Vietnam War, and by extension the Cold War. This change is particularly illuminating as it marks the beginning of the end of the Cold War-refugee paradigm and, conversely, the manifestation of a dynamic still recognizable in contemporary international refugee issues.

Specifically, this relates to the adoption of refugee policy that pursues retrenchment from burdensome resettlement commitments by increasingly vetting claimants on the grounds of deterring non-genuine claims. By the 1977 Australian federal election the issue of boat arrivals was in the public consciousness, principally owing to the arrival of six boats in one day only weeks out from Election Day.147 Polls conducted that year indicated that the honeymoon period of support for Vietnamese refugees was over, Australians wanted tighter restriction. 80% of respondents now wanted fewer Vietnamese refugees.148 Fraser toughened his rhetoric in an appeal to voters – asylum seekers were not ensured permanent settlement and would be deported if necessary.149

A Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence report titled Australia and the

Refugee Problem had been released the previous year in 1976 and raised issues with Australia’s hitherto ‘ad hoc’ application of refugee policy. 150 Desirous to provide greater organization to resettlement Australia’s intake of refugees was increased to 20, 000 places a year from 1977 to

147Stevens, R., ‘Political Debates on Asylum Seekers During the Fraser Government, 1977-1982’, Australian Journal of Politics & History 58(4), 2012, p.527 148Morgan Gallup. 1977. Poll No. 191A. December 3–4 149Stevens, R., ‘Political Debates on Asylum Seekers During the Fraser Government, 1977-1982’, Australian Journal of Politics & History 58(4), 2012, p.530 150 Report from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and the Refugee Problem, 1976 p.798

1981, a level not seen since.151 Considering that net migration over these four years averaged

78,242152 25.56% of Australia’s immigration program at that time was comprised of humanitarian entrances. During these years, however, a backlash was developing as the VRC had entered new levels of complexity at every stage. Those nations of first-asylum became increasingly daunted as the numbers of Vietnamese reaching refugee camps in South-East Asia kept increasing. This rate of growth is clearly illustrated in the table provided below.

2.2 UNHCR: Boat Arrivals in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong153

Year Month Boat Arrivals

1975 377

1976 5,248

1977 15,657

1978 85,544

1979 - January 8,954

February 5,737

March 11,157

April 26,600

May 51,550

June 56,941

151Australia Refugee Council, ‘History of Australia's Refugee Program’, Accessed Online [12/08/14] http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/f/rhp-hist.php 152 Calculated from official numbers for years 1977-81 Phillips, J., et al., ‘Migration to Australia since federation: a guide to the statistics’, Parliamentary Library, 2010 153Cited in Frost, F., ‘Vietnam, ASEAN and the Indochina Refugee Crisis’ Southeast Asian Affairs, 1980 p.348

In addition to this, policy makers were concerned that the nature of those seeking asylum was changing. As Vietnam’s new government consolidated control over the reunified territories it increasingly persecuted local Chinese minorities, partly because they were considered class enemies and partly in response to geopolitical conflict between Vietnam and China that peaked in a border war in 1979. For Australian policy makers this meant two things. Firstly, the potential that the Vietnamese government would expel entire ethnic populations meant

Australia might be inundated with refugees. Secondly, because it had been several years since hostilities ended and those changes driving out the Chinese were primarily economic,

Australian policy makers suspected a greater number of those Indochinese applying for resettlement in Australia might be economic refugees whose life was not in direct danger or who were not being persecuted due to their political beliefs.

At this time, emigration from Vietnam was not slowing, it was peaking: the outflow of boats

“virtually quadrupled” from a monthly average of 7,398 in 1978 to a 27,767, refugees per month in 1979. This resulted in those ASEAN nations of first asylum refusing to accept any more refugees.154 That year the Thai government refouled over 40,000 ‘land people’ back into

Kampuchea, while the Malaysian government towed several asylum seeker boats back out to sea.155 These developments brought about a special meeting in Geneva in 1979 to coordinate the international response to the VRC. Success to this end resulted in the creation of the

154Stein, B., ‘The Geneva Conferences and the Indochinese Refugee Crisis’, The International Migration Review, 13(4), 1979, p.716; it should be noted that these ASEAN nations are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and, therefore, did not have any legal obligation regarding non-refoulment 155Ibid. p.717

‘Orderly Departure Program,’ which formalised arrangements to manage the exodus.156 The unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding formalizing their cooperation providing a level of organization of the refugee flow all the way to the source that has yet to be replicated in any major international humanitarian exodus. Under this policy,

Vietnam would limit and regulate departures, and those South East Asian nations of first asylum would recommit to temporarily host Indochinese refugees in camps under the assurance that Western migrant-receiving nations would eventually resettle them157 in an arrangement that would become known as an ‘open door for an open shore.’158

These points have important implications. The idea that Vietnamese refugees were now part of an ethnic expulsion revived Australian fears regarding uncontrolled mass migration, bringing them to the fore once again. While international law certainly recognizes that those being persecuted on owing to their ethnicity (as opposed to political beliefs) to be genuine refugees,

Australian policy makers had historically been wary of large population displacements in the neighbouring region due to ethnic conflict. Accepting refugees fleeing from direct political persecution seemed at once more manageable (involving a smaller pool of potential asylum seekers) and more politically appropriate, considering Australia’s moral obligations and even the prospects of migrant’s successful integration. Secondly, the articulation that later boat people were better considered economic migrants rather than genuine refugees marks the beginning of a popular narrative that will be further discussed when presenting contemporary discourse. Regardless of the legitimacy of these concerns (it is entirely possible that more

156Kumin, J., ‘Orderly Departure from Vietnam: Cold War Anomaly or Humanitarian Innovation?’ Refugee Survey Quarterly, 27(1), 2008, p.104 157Hathaway, J. C., ‘Labelling the Boat People: The Failure of the Human Rights Mandate of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees,’ Human Rights Quarterly, 15(4), 1993, p.686 158Thompson, L. C., Refugee Workers in the Indochina Exodus, 1975-1982, McFarland, 2010 p.151

61 economic refugees accompanied later asylum seekers as opposed to earlier waves of arrivals) the labelling of asylum seekers as economic refugees has been a dominant factor in the conflation of asylum with illegal migration in Australia. All of these factors meant that by 1979

An Age poll found that 67% of Australians thought either fewer or no Vietnamese refugees should be accepted- a significant change from two years earlier.159

Extensively reviewing the history of humanitarian migration in The Refugee in International

Society, Haddad confirmed that asylum seekers began to be thought of in more economic terms throughout the West from the 1980’s onwards.160 During the height of resettlement in 1981,

Immigration Minister Macphee warned the House of Representatives that a “boat load of illegal immigrants [was coming] under the guise of refugees fleeing Vietnam.”161 While Vietnamese resettlement continued through 1981 to 1989 there were no new unauthorised boat arrivals to

Australia and, subsequently, the issue was not subject to continuing levels of public debate and elite discourse. In the period 1975-1982, 2059 boat people had arrived in Australia while

56,000 more had come with government assistance by plane.162 In 1982 Australia announced that it would now assess Indochinese asylum seekers on a case by case rather than relying on blanket determination by the UNHCR in refugee camps.163

159Betts, K., ‘Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia’ People and Place, 9(4), p.40 160Haddad, E., The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, Cambridge University Press, 2003 p.152 161Stevens, R. ‘No, the Fraser era was not a Golden Age for Asylum Seekers.’ Sydney Morning Herald, Accessed Online [10/08/14 ] http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/no- the-fraser-era-was-not-a-golden-age-for-asylum-seekers-20120201-1qtce.html 162Brennan, F., Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of Queensland, 2003, p.29 163Ibid. p.31

On top of these economic considerations, Australian public opinion was growing more mistrustful of Vietnamese immigration, Jakubowicz acknowledges that perceptions that

Vietnamese communities in Australia were crime ridden and ghetto-like stimulated a desire to defend ‘social cohesion.’164 Allegations of criminality amongst Vietnamese migrants have not stood up to statistical analysis which places rates of offending below that of the general population.165 In some ways, Australia’s first multicultural experiment paved the way for the re-emergence of politicized immigration debates and the ideological milieu of Hansonism in the 1990’s. This development will be addressed in greater detail when assessing the impact that

Australia’s history has had upon the politics of immigration and asylum.

These facts combined meant that by the ‘Second Wave’ of Indochinese refugees occurred in

1989, Australia was more reluctant to receive them. This loss of will was being translated into harsher screening and, ultimately, resulted in fewer Indochinese being given refugee status

(despite the accounts of asylum seekers themselves being highly consistent with those earlier claimants who had been successful).166 Eventually, another multilateral forum was held in 1989 to find a more sustainable solution to the problem and the Comprehensive Plan of Action was formulated.167 By this time it was common for Indochinese asylum seekers to be overtly labelled as “economic refugees,” “economic migrants” or “illegal immigrants” ostensibly attracted to securing resettlement in wealthy Western nations rather than fleeing direct

164Jakubowicz, A., ‘Vietnamese in Australia: A Generation of Settlement and Adaptation’, Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research, Melbourne, 2004 p.9 165Ibid. 166Hathaway, J. C., ‘Labelling the Boat People: The Failure of the Human Rights Mandate of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees,’ Human Rights Quarterly, 15(4), 1993 p.690 167Ibid.

63 danger.168 For this reason, blanket recognition of refugee status was revoked by the UNHCR, resulting in fewer refugees being accepted.

Nevertheless, this level of cooperation between the countries of first asylum, countries of resettlement and the government of the refugee producing state (Vietnam) has not been replicated in other instances of persistent humanitarian migration flows from refugee- producing to refugee-receiving countries, despite the existence of comparable phenomena. The reasons for extensive Australian involvement are also significant, especially when considering contemporary justifications for deterrence as the centrepiece of policy in securitized asylum politics. Those in the Fraser Government thought that commitment to the Orderly Departure

Program and assurances of resettlement would, ultimately, reduce the number of asylum seekers that attempted to journey to Australia unauthorised by boat. Theoretically, this functioned to protect Australia from the problems associated with unauthorised boat arrivals, assuring the public that Australia’s borders were secure. It also meant fewer refugees would undergo the hazardous journey to reach Australia by boat. Fraser made no secret of this rationale stating, “the way to stop people coming in the back door was opening the front door wider.”169 Multilateral engagement and commitment to mass resettlement, while constituting a radically different approach, was being used to achieve the same policy objectives as deterrence inducing (essentially punitive) detention in subsequent decades.

Harsher screening practices and the eventual decrease in numbers of asylum seekers arriving in South-East Asian camps meant that by the late 1980’s and early 1990’s family reunion

168Ibid. 169Fraser, M. and M. Simons, The Political Memoirs, Melbourne: The Miegunyah Press, 2010, p.420

64 programs were the de facto biggest migration route for Vietnamese refugees entering Australia.

The 1990’s signals the end of the period of extensive Vietnamese migration to Australia. The smaller ‘Second Wave’ of unauthorised boat arrivals that occurred between November 1989 and January 1994, (although technically coming from Indochina being mainly Cambodian nationals) comprised a separate and distinct wave of migration which included Chinese nationals.170 This short period will not be treated as a case in its own right in this thesis, yet remains important in tracing government policy. While only 735 individuals arrived over a 5- year period, this wave took place under new laws relating to unauthorised arrivals. In 1989, the

Migration Act was amended to instigate a discretionary detention regime for suspected ‘illegal entrants’ (meaning any arrivals without a valid visa) to perform security and health screening and, subsequently, to determine the legality of their presence in Australia. The issue of asylum seeker boat arrivals would later remerge as a highly salient and divisive issue in 1999, as a spike in arrivals marked the beginning of the ‘Third Wave’ of boat people to Australia.171

The VRC has enjoyed a disproportionately high level of scholarship when compared with other similar global refugee movements, with Espiritu going as far as calling the 1975 migrant cohort to the US the most studied immigrant group in that nation’s history.172 Fortunately, this scholarship is not limited to the US, the Vietnamese diaspora remains one of the most rigorously internationally documented humanitarian immigration schemes. The level of multilateral organization involved in the VRC has meant the period has been used since as a positive example of successful large scale resettlement. In the same vein, detractors of

Australia’s securitized asylum policy in the New Millennium have used the historical case of

170Betts, K., ‘Boatpeople and Public Opinion in Australia’ People and Place, 9(4), 2001 p.36 171Ibid. p.37 172Espiritu, Y. L., ‘Toward a Critical Refugee Study: The Vietnamese Refugee Subject in US Scholarship’, Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 1(1-2), 2006, p.410

Australia’s management of the crisis as an example of humane resettlement, resulting in settlers who have made a valuable contribution to Australian life. Furthermore, continued public commentary on the issue of humanitarian resettlement by Fraser, and continued use of the example of his handling of the VRC in public debate has cemented the symbolic importance of the period for contemporary politics. The evolution of reaction to the VRC towards the governmentality of deterrence highlights how initially the Australian government understood the Vietnamese exodus firmly within the context of the Vietnam War, the Cold War and regional peace and security. I will now move on to introduce the primary data collected, detailing the range and relative dominance of narrative strands in operation in parliament during the period, which ultimately supports this assertion.

Refugees in Speech: Utterances in Hansard 1975-81

The data being cpresented is the number and types of references to refugees found during the

Vietnamese Refugee Crisis (almost exclusively referring to the Indochinese themselves). Every transcript of Lower House Official Hansard from 1975-1981 containing an uttered reference to

‘refugee(s)’ during the period has been downloaded and coded to form primary data. This resulted in 110 transcripts of sitting days contained over the 6-year period. Sources with superficial references lacking meaningful discursive association for analysis (that could not be coded according to a discursive frame) were excluded. The resulting cleaned data comprises of 50 sources containing 537 references which were coded into 86 distinct or semi-distinct frames. The frequency of each category was then tallied to allow for simple proportions and

66 percentages to be calculated to supplement content analysis. The most significant and frequent of these codes will be included in text below, along with adjoining quotations that succinctly illuminate the categories they represent. Because the period 1975-81 contained a relatively small pool of utterances regarding refugees compared to the later period of interest, some of those frames listed below may be rare, comprising just a handful of utterances throughout the period. However, by addressing their placement within the symbolic order, they can still illustrate strong symbolic linkages which provide an important reflection of the paradigm the speakers inhabited. Deeper analysis will be reserved for those thematic chapters where their discussion is better suited for the project at hand. The most dominant (frequent and widespread) framing devices from the period are tabled overleaf.

Table 2.3 25 Most Dominant Framing Devices in Refugee Discussion 1975-81

Code Sources Coverage in Coded Proportion of Sources (%) References Speech (%)

Pathos 19 38 27 5.03 (Refugees)

International 16 32 27 5.03 Legal Obligations

Humanitarian 17 34 22 4.09 Need

Australia’s 11 22 19 3.53 Wealth (obligation)

Australia’s 17 34 18 3.35 Generous Record

Vietnamese 15 30 18 3.35 Refugees

Defending 14 28 16 2.97 Record (on refugees)

Anti-Racist 11 22 15 2.79 (Immigration)

Limited 9 18 13 2.42 Capacity

Criticism (More 9 18 12 2.23 Can done)

More Expansive 7 14 12 2.23 (application of humanitarian intake)

Immigration 10 20 11 2.05 affects Unemployment

Vietnam War 9 18 11 2.05

Free World 5 10 11 2.05 (identity)

Anti- 8 16 10 1.86 Communist

Push Factors 8 16 9 1.67 (must be solved)

Demographic 8 16 9 1.67 Swamping (threat)

Valuable 8 16 8 1.49 Contribution (Refugees)

Growing 7 14 8 1.49 Problem (refugees)

Regional Peace 6 12 8 1.49 and Security

Pro-Migrant 6 12 8 1.49

Democratic 6 12 7 1.30 Identity (Australia)

Boat people 5 10 7 1.30 (are Bogus)

International 6 12 6 1.12 Standing

Cold War 5 10 6 1.12

I will now provide examples of those dominant discursive frames from the period to precipitate content analysis. In line with addressing information frames (rather than analysing personality politics, for example) I will attempt to provide quotations from a wide range of speakers, where possible. Some of those frames listed above are less illuminating in terms of analysis but had to be coded to ensure that data collection was exhaustive for methodological consistency.

Criticism of the government on the basis that more could be done to help refugees (without any adjoining policy argument), and conversely, utterances defending the government’s record on refugees without substantive meaning, are examples of these straightforward frames that were frequent yet contain little narrative content with respect to the variables of interest to this thesis.

Although this period was chosen as a case study because of the prominence of the VRC, it also contains references to refugees of other nationalities. The Lebanese, in particular, were discussed on several occasions and were the recipients of a sympathetic expansion in the

Special Migration Program (before the formal humanitarian entrance program was in operation) to allow greater numbers of Lebanese to escape civil war and migrate to Australia.173

Australian political elites of the period were, therefore, accustomed to discussing refugee problems within parliament and accepting de facto refugees prior to the establishment of

Australia’s formal humanitarian entry program. The plight of the Vietnamese was brought into focus on 18 occasions across 15 sources. As subjects, the Vietnamese dominated discussion on refugee in parliament, amounting to 3.35% of all speech. The Vietnam War itself was referenced within the boarder discussion of refugees 11 times across 9 sources. Weeks before

Saigon fell and the VRC began, Prime Minister Whitlam addressed parliament,

“Vietnam has a power over the Australian conscience for one particular reason. The

Australian people have accepted the truth—the bitter truth—that the intervention into

which they were led was disastrously wrong, that it only increased and lengthened the

agony of Vietnam.”174

173House of Representatives Official Hansard, 1 April 1976 and 10 March 1977 feature extensive discussion of Lebanese refugees. 174House of Representatives Official Hansard, 8 April 1975 p.1259

This quote reflects the zeitgeist of the war’s end. Statements relating to the Vietnam War tended to emphasis pathos relating to scale of the suffering, as well as the admission that the conflict

Australia had engaged in had become or perhaps always was, a sorry mistake. References to the war ranged from partisan criticism, “the situation in Vietnam was created by persons whom the Liberal and Country Party supported. They supported that sad and sorry situation…”175 to locating the conflict as the reason for the sole reason refugees wish to leave Vietnam- “It is only under very special circumstance, which have existed since the Vietnam War and which have built up pressures for these people, that they want to leave their own country.”176

With defeat looming in 1975, commitment to the Vietnam War began to shift away from military support to providing humanitarian assistance to those affected by the conflict.

Humanitarian need was brought into focus when discussion refugee issues 22 times across 17 sources, a dominant third-place ranking comprising 4.09% of all speech. Minister for Defence,

Hon. William Morrison stated on 2 September 1975,

“We were prompted by the humanitarian instincts that have motivated us all the way

through the last stages of the Vietnam War…Now the Liberal Party, the Party that took

Australia into the Vietnam War, comes and talks about immorality.”177

On 20th October 1981, Hon. Member for Hotham, Lewis Kent stated,

175House of Representatives Official Hansard, Member for Grayndler Mr Antony Whitlam, 13 October 1977 p.1984 176House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 October 1981, Member for Port Adelaide, Michael Young p.2194 177House of Representatives Official Hansard, 2 September 1975, p.832

“I think it is or humanitarian duty to accept a number of these people…Our immigration

policies should be based on our needs and our humanitarian obligations and they should

be administered with compassion and understanding.”178

On several occasions, parliamentarians referred to humanitarian need as being a distinct mode of value compared to the normal rationale of migrant selection involving selecting those best suited to fulfil the nation’s vocational needs. The Member for Perth, Ross McLean stated on

24 May 1979,

“the refugee program is quite separate and distinct from the family reunion migration

program and is a response to an international problem. It is a response we should make,

not only because we have committed ourselves to certain official international

obligations but also because the very nature of this horrendous situation demands a

spontaneous and humanitarian response.”179

Some parliamentarians went further, advancing the idea that in current circumstances humanitarian need should trump economic consideration. These utterances are significant as they address complicated relations explicitly and were, therefore, coded on 5 occasions as subcategory related to humanitarian need. For example, acting as Minister for Immigration and

Ethnic Affairs, Michael MacKellar stated on the 21st September 1978,

“Of course these are the two areas [family reunion and refugee intake] that can result

in some people being admitted to Australia who do not have the requisite skills or

qualifications which are in long-term demand in Australia and which can add to the

unemployment situation. However, the Government has made a conscious decision in

178House of Representatives Official Hansard 20 October 1981 p.2232 Emphasis added 179House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1979 P.2357

relation to these two categories of migrations which states that the humanitarian and

international obligations override the purely economic considerations.”180

The Member for Casey, Peter Falconer told parliament on March 31 1981,

“I should state, just to make sure that my own view is clear, that I believe that the net

economic effect of migration is of particular benefit to Australia; but the benefits are

not just economic. Our refugee resettlement policy, for example, must be based on some

concept of Australia’s regional role and our humanitarian responsibilities. In the short

term, this part of our intake cannot be justified on economic grounds…”181

Ross McLean echoed this view on 18 October 1979,

“Apart from people admitted as refugees and for family re-union, migrant entry criteria

should be developed on the basis of benefit to the Australian community, and the social,

economic and related requirements within Australia.”182

References that simply stressed the misery and suffering of refugees to promote sympathy without adjoining policy argument were coded separately as “pathos.” Despite being relatively lacking in the type of ideological content of interest to this thesis, this framing device constituted the most frequent frame during the VRC period and therefore, had to be included for theoretical consistency. It was coded on 27 occasions across 19 sources. For example, Peter

Falconer stated on 20 August 1980,

“I think everyone in this Parliament would have sympathy for the refugees in their

plight and in their efforts to find somewhere to settle.”183

180House of Representatives Official Hansard, 21 September 1978 p.1323 181House of Representatives Official Hansard, 31 March 1981 p.1107 182House of Representatives Official Hansard, 18 October 1979 p.2222 Emphasis added 183House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 August 1980 p.523

Speaking on behalf of a Parliamentary Delegation to ASEAN nations in response to the refugee crisis, Member for Kalgoorlie, John Cotter reported,

“We spoke with many refugees; we spoke with people who had experienced enormous

hardship, privation and starvation. We witnessed first-hand several of the terribly

compact refugee camps in countries that had received the boat people and in

Thailand.”184

The theme of humanitarian pathos is central to the subject at hand. Whereas compassionate consideration had previously been utilized to determine special immigration cases, the establishment of Australia’s formal refugee program transformed humanitarian commitment into a formal and regular self-conscious obligation. Accompanying discussion of refugee issues was a continual focus on Australia’s generous and long-standing record as a contributor to and receiver of migrants under the United Nations humanitarian resettlement program. Numbering

18 references across 17 sources, this frame constitutes one of the most widespread and frequent utterances of the period. Comprising 3.35% of all discussion, it achieved a dominant 5th placing in the symbolic order. This generosity was often framed in terms of Australia’s per capita contribution. Take the examples below.

On 4 April 1979 Ross McLean stated,

“On a per capita basis we have a better record on refugee intake than any other

country.”185

184House of Representatives Official Hansard, 21 November 1979 p.3289 185House of Representatives Official Hansard, 4 April 1979 p.1542

Later that year on 21 November, John Cotter told parliament,

“Concern was expressed that not enough refugees were being taken into Australia but

we were able to point out that on a per capita basis our track record in this area is the

best in the world.”186

The following year on 20 August 1980 Peter Falconer stated,

“In the last financial year Australia received about 15,000 Indo-Chinese refugees and

on a population basis that was the greatest number received by any country.”187

Political elites argued that the government ought to adopt a more expansive definition of refugees on 12 occasions across 7 separate sources. This was a relatively frequent utterance in the period, comprising 2.23% of all speech. In a ministerial statement on the 24 May 1977, then Immigration Minister Michael MacKellar stated,

“There will be people in refugee-type situations who do not fall strictly within the

UNHCR mandate or within Convention definitions. Government policy will be

sufficiently flexible to enable the extension of this policy, where appropriate, to such

people.”188

It was far more common to frame the issue of refugees within Australia’s legal obligations to the international human rights regime. This occurred on 27 occasions across 16 sources and comprised 5.03% of all discussion, achieving the second most dominant placing in the symbolic order.

186House of Representatives Official Hansard, 21 November 1979 p.3290 187House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 August 1980 p.523 188House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1977 p.1715

On 24 May, MacKellar told parliament,

“As a matter of humanity, and in accord with international obligations freely entered

into, Australia has accepted a responsibility to contribute toward the solution of world

refugee problems.”189

On 20 August 1980, the Member for Hughes, Les Johnson argued,

“Australia is a signatory to an international convention which places the onus of

humanitarianism on us in a very justifiable way. All told, between 1975 and 30 June

1980 Australia has accepted for resettlement 37,913 Indo-Chinese refugees and

displaced persons.”190

In a Ministerial Statement on 8 April 1981, then Immigration Minister Hon. Ian MacPhee reiterated the government’s position,

“The granting of refugee status is a most important act. Those granted refugee status

have rights and privileges bestowed by the international convention and protocol

relating to the status of refugees which Australia has ratified.”191

Several categories coded in the period related to geopolitics. On the single occasion a direct reference was made to the Yellow Peril/ Asian invasion ideology it was presented in an ironic manner to challenge views as outdated and racist (rather than seriously rehashing images of

Asian invasion to explain boat arrivals and provoke fear).

189House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1977 p.1714 190House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 August 1980 p.524 191House of Representatives Official Hansard, 8 April 1981 P.1445

This was when Member for Prospect Dr Richard Klugman stated,

“It has overtones of a strong historical anxiety about being overwhelmed by Asia's

population. The local ZPG [Zero Population Growth] movement collects the Asian-

horde worriers.”192

On the contrary, political elites of the period emphasised the anti-Racist credentials of

Australia’s immigration regime 15 times across 11 sources, accounting for the 8th most dominant frame in the symbolic order. This makes sense given that abolition of the White

Australia policy was a recent occurrence and the government sought to prove Australia was genuinely moving towards a modern immigration system. On 20 October 1981, the Member for Port Adelaide, Michael Young reflected,

“[refugee resettlement] has been a great achievement for Australia, particularly in the

last five years, because although we had wrote for many years that White Australia has

gone, it has only been in the last five years that we have demonstrated that.”193

As Immigration Minister, MacKellar stated on 7 June 1978 “The Australian Government's attitude towards refugees is not based on ethnic composition; it is based on the fact or otherwise of refugee status.”194 And on 7 March 1979,

“…should a refugee situation develop in Rhodesia—of course, we hope that it does not,

then Australia is in a position to make a considered response to that situation, just as it

has a capacity to make a considered response to any refugee situation that may develop

anywhere in the world. I make the final point that refugees are refugees, irrespective of

the colour of their skin.”195

192House of Representatives Official Hansard, 19 April 1977 p.931 193House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 October 1981 p.2194 194House of Representatives Official Hansard, 7 June 1978 p.3149 195House of Representatives Official Hansard, 7 March 1979 p.688

Though not presented in the racially explicit tone of the past, political elites in the period remained cognisant of Australia’s vulnerability to demographic swamping from the north. 3 utterances across 3 sources were coded as references to the security of Australia’s northern border including the claim that the Vietnamese boat people were “invading our shoreline” by

Member for Hindmarsh, Clyde Cameron on 30 May 1978.196 The other instances pertained to the security concerned raised by the fact that early unauthorised arrivals had been undetected by Australian border protection authorities,197 demonstrating an early example of the linkage between unauthorised maritime arrival and implications that the executive is failing to manage border security.

The threat of demographic swamping was raised 9 times across 8 sources and constitutes a counter-narrative to discourse centring around Australia’s international obligations and non- discriminatory immigration. Usually, the focus of this danger was Asian neighbours to

Australia’s north. Take this quotation from the Member for Moore, John Hyde,

“We should bear in mind that their [Asia’s] populations are far greater than ours. If their

economies do not prosper there is the risk that we will experience refugee flows with

which we cannot cope. Refugees have already reached our shores and when that

happens there is nothing Australia can do about it, or would be prepared to do about it.

If vast numbers of people turn up on our shores in boats we cannot destroy them and

would not destroy them. Public opinion in our own country, thank the Lord, is such that

196House of Representatives Official Hansard, 30 May 1978 p.2784 197House of Representatives Official Hansard, Member for Moreton Hon. Jim Killen, 22 February 1978 p.38; House of Representatives Official Hansard, Member for Corio Mr Gordon Scholes 4 April 1978 p.912

we do not behave in that way. We would have no option but to share our wealth with

those people in circumstances that were not of our own choosing.” 198

On 9 May 1978, the Member for Dawson, Raymond Braithwaite directed a question to the

Minister for Immigration,

“In view of the reports from Vietnam of further boat loads of refugees being anticipated,

can the Minister guarantee that Australian immigration procedures and policies will be

sufficient to cope with these boat people as the trickle becomes a flood?”199

Evidently, the dominance of framing Vietnamese refugees as an international responsibility and humanitarian issue existed alongside views identifying demographic swamping from Asia as a threat Australia. A further three references were coded under a subcategory which acknowledges an explicit threat to Australian nationhood. On the 4th April 1978 the Member for Wills Hon. Gordon Bryant also used the word ‘invasion’ stating,

“There is no doubt that the people of Australia are concerned about the situation which

has developed—that it seems to be possible for anybody in the most unseaworthy vessel

to invade our shores. I know that it would be in the long term that we would have to

worry about hysteria generated by concern that tens of thousands of people were going

to invade our shores”200

198House of Representatives Official Hansard, 4 December 1980 p.413 199House of Representatives Official Hansard, 9 May 1978 p.2023 200House of Representatives Official Hansard, 4 April 1978 p.917

On 19 February 1980 The Member for Kingsford-Smith, Lionel Bowen stated,

“Mark my words, the numbers of displaced personnel in the region to our north can run

into millions in a very short space of time. They have nowhere to go. Not one ASEAN

country will accept one refugee. They will not do it, cannot do it, and that leaves us in

a very vulnerable position indeed”201

And warned again, on 9 April 1981,

“If a resumption in fighting takes place [in Indochina], Australia's very survival could

be at stake, not only in terms of military operations but in terms of mass migration of

millions of people.”202

The quotes provided directly above are the earliest examples of unauthorised arrivals being presented as a security threat within parliamentary discussion in the periods covered. The perception that the scale of the refugee problem was growing (and with it the potential problems confronting Australia) was uttered 8 times across 7 sources. Minister for Foreign Affairs the

Hon. Andrew Peacock informed parliament about the 1978 special meeting in Geneva to manage the Crisis,

“These initiatives resulted from our continued concern that present resettlement

programs are proving inadequate to cope with the outflow of refugees. The worsening

situation is, of course, causing growing concern not only to Australia but also to our

ASEAN neighbours and to the traditional resettlement countries which were mentioned

by the honourable member in his question.”203

201House of Representatives Official Hansard, 19 February 1980 p.42 202House of Representatives Official Hansard, 9 April 1981 p.1564 203House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 October 1978 p.2173

On the 24 May 1979, Ross McLean told parliament,

“The second point I make is that the present Indo-Chinese problem, which is of great

concern to Australia, is getting worse and not better. At the end of April 1979 the

number of refugees in transit camps was approaching 300,000. At the end of last year

the number was some 200,000. That sort of increase is expected to continue at a quite

alarming rate.”204

Politicians voiced support for Vietnamese refugees in several ways. Political elites presented themselves as pro-migration while discussing the issue on 8 occasions in 6 sources. On the 21

September 1978, Raymond Braithwaite stated,

“The policies we adopt towards Vietnamese refugees will also have to be applied to

other nationalities as other nations adjust their affairs, peacefully or otherwise. It is

important that migrants be not only accepted but also encouraged to enter the

mainstream of Australian Life.”205

On 31 March 1981, Peter Falconer declared,

“I should state, just to make sure that my own view is clear, that I believe that the net

economic effect of migration is of particular benefit to Australia”206

Another important frame utilized in support of refugees was the moral appeal to Australia’s obligations to the needy by simple virtue of being a lucky, wealthy nation that can afford to provide assistance. The idea that national wealth constitutes a responsibility to humanitarian

204House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1979 p.2358 205House of Representatives Official Hansard, 21 September 1978 p.1321 206House of Representatives Official Hansard, 31 March 1981 p.1107

81 aid and resettlement was an idea referenced 19 times across 11 sources. Comprising 3.53% of all discussion, this frame achieved a dominant 4th place in the symbolic order.

On 12 October 1977, the Member for Maribyrnong, Dr Moss Cass declared,

“I think we were not as liberal as we could have been. I think that this country is a rich,

lush, free country which can afford those sorts of people.”207

Ross McLean agreed that this fact added to Australia’s obligations to the Vietnamese,

“They forget the impact of external pressures on such a richly endowed country as

Australia… they forget the rising and quite proper expectations and demands of the

Third World and our obligations to refugees from this region, particularly our obligation

to refugees from Indochina”208

Member for St George, Maurice Neil added later on 15 April 1980,

“I believe that we must show to the world that we are prepared to take reasonable and

appropriate numbers of refugees and that we are prepared to open our doors to those

underprivileged persons who have no home”209

This type of moral argument is critical when assessing the effects that changing attitudes to national wealth have had on asylum policies in the developed world. Other frames that mobilized support for Vietnamese refugees related to identity politics. Australia’s identity as

Anti-Communist played a significant role in understanding both the geopolitics and moral imperatives of the crisis. To some, the issue was simple: Communism caused refugees and liberal-democratic nations received them. Political elites framed refugees within the context of

Anti-Communism on 10 occasions across 8 separate sources, constituting a frequent 1.86% of

207House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 October 1977 p.2024 208House of Representatives Official Hansard, 19 April 1977 p.933 209House of Representatives Official Hansard, 15 April 1980 p.1755

82 all speech. Hostility to Communism can be identified in Lionel Bowen’s declaration on 19

February 1980,

“Is it any wonder that those regimes, Marxist and barbarous as they are, will cause

people to flee?”210

On 20 August 1980, Member for North Sydney, Bruce Graham added,

“Many people have fled from Indo-China, without the approval of governments, to

escape from the environment of communism. We are all familiar with the reasons for

the historically famous Iron Curtain which stretches from the Baltic to the Black

Sea.”211

Similarly, refugee issues were framed as a component of the Cold War six times across five sources. Lionel Bowen encapsulated this view in the following statement,

“I want to make this point very clear: We would not have had the problems of refugees

if there had not been a conflict between the super-powers, with the United States

perhaps encouraging China in its attack on Vietnam. If a resumption in fighting takes

place, Australia's very survival could be at stake, not only in terms of military

operations but in terms of mass migration of millions of people.”212

On 19 February 1980 Minister for Trade and Resources Rt. Hon. John Anthony stated,

“The whole focus of attention should be on this aggression in Afghanistan and the

intentions of the Soviet Union in pursuing its international domination… look at the

misery, look at the flow of refugees which is being caused by that aggression of North

210House of Representatives Official Hansard, 19 April 1980 p.42 211House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 August 1980 p.528 212House of Representatives Official Hansard 9 April 1981 p.1564

Vietnam. Who was that aggression sponsored and supported by? It was sponsored and

supported by none other than the Soviet Union.”213

On 29 October 1981, as Michael Young debated Australia’s refugees, the Member for Fadden,

Donald Cameron interjected “-They are nearly all communist regimes that they are running from.”214

The sentiment that Vietnamese refugees enjoyed a special relationship with Australia because of the Vietnam War and longstanding engagement between the two nations was referenced 5 times across 5 sources. On two occasions in different sources the idea that the Vietnamese were allies of the Australian nation were uttered explicitly. For example, the Member for Tangney

Dr Peter Richardson condemned the inaction of the Whitlam government in abandoning the

Vietnamese,

“The Whitlam Government's proud refugee intake from Vietnam was only 76 people.

The rest, including workers at the Australian Embassy and others who had shown their

loyalty to Australia, were left to be imprisoned or slaughtered.”215

Similarly, references to Australia’s membership of, and commitment to, the Free World were made 11 times across 5 sources. Dr Cass told parliament,

“I do not think there is any argument that political refugees should be permitted to come

here. It is sometimes awkward because they come in unexpected numbers and at

213House of Representatives Official Hansard, 19 February 1980 p.38 214House of Representatives Official Hansard, 29 October 1981 p.2711 215House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 March 1977 p.631

unexpected times. But this is a rich, comfortable, free country and we can afford to take

such people who choose to come here in times of difficult”216

On 24 March 1977 the Member for Tangney, Dr Peter Richardson stated,

“Caring for refugees from brutality and murder around the world is a major problem

for all free nations. Australia is making a significant contribution towards helping to

solve this problem.”217

The following quotation from Fraser during his time as Opposition leader demonstrates how discursive frames such as the Cold War and the Free world are only semi-discrete and interrelated,

“…the Prime Minister asked why Vietnam invokes a very special kind of emotion,

concern and compassion in Australia. Why ought it not to do so when there are people

who wanted to have in some kind of freedom and who quite plainly oppose the

encroachment of Communist armies from the North resulting in the ending of freedom

for ever.”218

The framing techniques above are particularly significant for the subject at hand because they amount to ‘master frames’ involving international security. Accordingly, framing devices of this sort that invoke transnational grand strategy will be contextualised and further developed when discussing the impact of the changing international security environment in Chapter VI.

Australia’s identity as a democratic nation was closely related. This was emphasised within discussion of refugee issues 7 times across 6 sources. For example, when the Whitlam

216House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 October 1977 p.2023 217House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 March 1977 p.631 218House of Representatives Official Hansard, 8 April 1975 p.1261

85 government proposed a requirement that any Vietnamese refugees admitted to Australia undertake an oath to desist from political organization in 1975, Opposition member for Bruce,

Rt Hon. Billy Snedden stated,

“That would do our reputation as a democracy no good at all. We have passed the stage

of forcing our migrants to be second class citizens. This action is a direct attack on the

migrants of Australia and they ought properly to resent it.”219

On 24 May 1979, Ross Mclean stated,

“This is a global problem requiring a global response. In the democratic world this will

require more tolerant attitudes than are presently obvious. At the present time the

burden is being shared by too few countries”220

Later that year on 8 November Immigration Minister MacKellar told parliament,

“I can well understand the feeling of people who have been forced to flee from their

homelands because of persecution of themselves or their families and who have risked

their lives in order to seek for themselves and their families a new, secure and

democratic future”221

The valuable contribution humanitarian migrants have made to Australia was emphasised 8 times across 7 sources. On multiple occasions this argument was advanced by MacKellar when

Immigration Minister to defend the policies of the Fraser Government, demonstrating the political will behind the acceptance of the Vietnamese into the community.

219House of Representatives Official Hansard, 2 September 1975 p.834 220House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1979 p.2358 221House of Representatives Official Hansard, 8 November 1979 p.2765

On 24 May 1977, he stated,

“Many of our citizens were once refugees or displaced persons. They have found

security and prosperity here and have made a valuable contribution to our country.”222

The following year, he presented a similar argument, on 1 March 1978,

“One would expect that refugees might have difficulty in settling into a new

environment and in finding work within that new environment. Here again I believe

that the figures show that after a period of time refugees are finding work and are

settling well into the Australian community.”223

And yet again, on 16 October 1979 stating, “It is a fact that refugees have demonstrated a very great capacity to succeed in the Australian situation.”224

On 24 May 1979 Ross McLean argued,

“From 1939 to 1978 Australia accepted 325,000 refugees, including substantial

numbers of Poles, Yugoslavs, Hungarians, citizens of the Baltic States, and people from

many other corners of the world. We all know of the very worthwhile contribution these

people have made to Australia's post-war economic and social development. What I am

saying is that the refugee problem is not a new one.”225

The assertion that Australia’s responsibilities must be undertaken within the nation’s extant limited capacity to resettle and provide special services to humanitarian migrants occurred 13 times across 9 sources.

222House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1977 p.1713 223House of Representatives Official Hansard, 1 March 1978 p.280 224House of Representatives Official Hansard, 16 October 1979 p.2014 225House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1979 p.2358

For example, Peter Falconer argued on 2 April 1980,

“Within the limits imposed by our total migrant intake, Australia should continue to

give high priority to accepting refugees from Indo-China. While doing so, we should

make it clear to neighbouring governments that there are firm upper limits on the total

numbers we can be expected to absorb.”226

Similarly, the idea that refugee policy should be aimed at finding the right balance or fair share of refugees was enunciated at 5 points across 5 different sources. As Immigration Minister,

MacKellar told parliament,

“We face great challenges as a country of large-scale refugee resettlement but I believe

that this complex issue has been handled in a way that balances compassion and the

interests of the Australian community.”227

Dr Cass later added,

“The purpose of this exercise is to try to prevent the traffic in bodies… not that we are

against accepting our fair share of refugees. Both sides of the Parliament are at one on

this issue”228

Young declared on 29 October 1981,

“We on this side of the House support that policy of accepting our international

responsibilities for what is termed 'our fair share of refugees' in accordance with the

declaration of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.”229

226House of Representatives Official Hansard, 2 April 1980 p.1661 227House of Representatives Official Hansard, 25 September 1979 p.1490 228House of Representatives Official Hansard, 4 December 1980 p.431 229House of Representatives Official Hansard, 29 October 1981 p.2711

Political elites displayed cognizance of the relationship between immigration and unemployment when discussing refugees on 11 occasions across 10 sources. Comprising

2.05% of discussion, this frame achieved 12th place in the symbolic order in this period. The primacy of push factors in refugee issues was acknowledged on 9 occasions across 8 separate sources, relatively frequent for the period at 1.67% of all speech.

On 24 May 1979, Ross McLean argued that the refugee issue could only be solved by,

“placing pressure on the source countries of lndo-China to have a more compassionate

and understanding approach to this problem and, hopefully, to remove the causes of

this mass exodus”230

On 20 August 1981, Lionel Bowen warned parliament,

“the Government's approach is no more than a band-aid therapy. The real aim should

be to have policies which avoid the problems which cause massive outflows of

refugees.”231

Similarly, refugees were framed as a direct result of persecution and oppression 4 times across

4 sources. For example, Ross McLean told parliament,

“Overwhelmingly, the oppressive policies of the current governments in Indochina are

given as the main reason for escape. Most refugees have suffered discrimination or

persecution.”232

Dr Klugman elaborated on the experience of the Vietnamese,

“How are the Vietnamese persecuted? Persecution refers to the circumstances in which

life, liberty or security of a person is threatened. In the case of Vietnam, a person's life,

230House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1979 p.2359 231House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 August 1981 p.626 232House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1979 p.2358-9

liberty or security or all of them is threatened if that person belongs to a certain group

before April 1975 and that group has been determined by the present government to be

“guilty”.”233

Conversely, political elites argued that boat people were bogus refugees on 7 occasions across

5 different sources. Obviously, this frame is particularly relevant for the subject at hand and will be subsequently discussed in greater detail. Finally, several frames drew attention to the importance of regional geopolitics, including the assertion that Australia was directly responsible for the creation of Vietnamese refugees through involvement in the conflict, identified on 4 occasions in separate sources.

The Member for Batman, Brian Howe stated,

“The reality is that those people and their situation, tragic as it is, is very much

something that can be laid at the door of Australian Governments and particularly of

Liberal-National Party governments which involved themselves in the most inhumane

war in my understanding of modern history”234

This view was further displayed in debates over the refugee crisis on April 4 1979 when

Member for Hunter, Albert James interjected in parliament “We helped to create it.”235

The idea that Australia must cooperate with regional actors to manage refugee flows was voiced 3 times in 3 different sources. As Prime Minister, Fraser reported to parliament,

“I expressed appreciation of the way in which the Indonesian Government, on a number

of occasions, has brought about the intervention of refugee boats. Some boats get

233House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 October 1981 p.2240 234House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1979 p. 2360 235House of Representatives Official Hansard, 4 April 1979 p.1542

through, but quite plainly the cooperation of the Indonesian authorities is preventing

larger numbers of unheralded arrivals.”236

Later that month Ross McLean added,

“We must therefore continue to meet our international obligations and, at the same time,

continue to seek solutions at an international level by supporting, for example, the

concept of an island processing centre provided by Indonesia and administered by the

UNHCR; by placing pressure on the source countries of Indochina to have a more

compassionate and understanding approach to this problem.”237

Cooperation in this regard was framed as necessary for good relations and to ensure regional peace and security 8 times across 6 sources. Lionel Bowen told parliament,

“This need arises in the first place because of the large number of entries from Asia,

principally refugees. But, as the Minister's statement shows, this question is one which

has increasing implications for Australia's foreign relations and is not confined only to

our relations with Asia.”238

Ross McLean clearly articulated this idea on 24 May 1979,

“Unless we show a positive and tolerant attitude to the major problems of this area, we

may well find that in the not too distant future, when pressures of population on

resources become intolerable in South East Asia, that our right to exist in peace and

prosperity will be seriously challenged.”239

236House of Representatives Official Hansard, 22 May 1979 p.2153 237House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1979 p.2359 238House of Representatives Official Hansard, 4 December 1980 p.419 239House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1979 p.2359

Lionel Bowen later elaborated on 9 April 1981,

“The Minister also referred to Indo-Chinese refugees. I applaud the Government's

efforts and those of the thousands of Australian families who have helped in the

resettlement of these unfortunate people. We must continue our efforts in this regard.

But I come back to the point that it is only by fostering stability in our region that we

will avoid further war and racial conflict in our area events which are the genesis of all

refugee outflows.”240

On a further 6 occasions across 6 sources, political elites argued that the refugee issue must be addressed in a manner which protected Australia’s good image and international standing.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock expressed this view when delivering a ministerial statement to parliament on 9 May 1978, stating,

“Australia's response to refugee situations bears directly on our foreign relations and on our standing in the international community.”241

Conclusions on Conceptions of Refugees During the Vietnamese

Refugee Crisis

The single most frequent symbolic associations of discourse relating to the VRC pertained to the suffering of refugees, the humanitarian need that engendered and subsequently the obligations (legal and moral) that imposed upon Australia. The generosity of Australia and its commitment to those needs was routinely acknowledged and the government’s record on humanitarian migration was frequently defended in parliament, demonstrating the political

240House of Representatives Official Hansard, 9 April 1981 p.1562 241House of Representatives Official Hansard, 9 May 1978 p.2042

92 capital being sourced from moral posturing on refugees. The idea that a combination of geopolitics, political allegiance and close working relationships created a sense of kinship with

(or at least obligation towards) the Vietnamese people is represented in the data and undoubtedly played a role in the comparatively amicable integration of the Vietnamese into the Australian community. References placing refugee issues within the greater context of the

Vietnam War were frequent. However, those coded references explicitly acknowledging the

Vietnamese as allies only comprised a small portion of all speech relating to refugees.242

The concept of multiculturalism (official government policy since 1972), was mentioned in conjunction with humanitarian immigration only once in the period243 whereas the related but distinct idea of official anti-racism was relatively frequent and found strong expression in the national identity of Australia as a free and democratic country. It was these forms of identity talk that proved more dominant – centred not on the Vietnamese per se but instead around the identity of the Australian nation and its membership within a community of like nations

(whether that be free, democratic, liberal etc.). This data conforms to the historical evidence which places Australia’s motivation for global humanitarian resettlement regimes as highly contingent on international pressure and the will of powerful allies, as well as the perceived benefits of integration within the liberal international order centred around the leadership of the US. Acknowledgement that humanitarian motives had to be limited by Australia’s extant capacity to receive and integrate refugees were common and concerns were voiced that immigration negatively contributes to unemployment. Warnings about Australia’s vulnerability to demographic swamping occurred relatively frequently and were ultimately supplemented by the perception that the global refugee problem was growing.

242In this case, two references 243House of Representatives Official Hansard, Dr Cass 22 February 1978 p.84

Upon review of the discrete narrative frames identified in the data, it is important to note that the majority of discursive frames of interest to this thesis were already in operation during the

1970’s. In other words, as well as any substantive qualitative shift in rhetoric (different ideas and relations being uttered) the quantitative shift: the sheer frequency in which certain references have grown to dominate discourse and symbolic association is just as significant.

Shifts in the frequency of important ideas will become apparent in Chapter III when data from the period 2001-2013 will be introduced as the second case study.

It is important to appreciate that the outflow of Indochinese refugees did provoke latent fears of Asian invasion which were expressed in media at that time244 because these views were underrepresented by virtue of utilizing on-the-record parliamentary speech as data.

Furthermore, the data above is not totally reflective of public opinion. As previously introduced, by 1977 most Australians wanted to limit numbers of Vietnamese refugees. The period proves a necessary control, however, because (with rare exception) political elites did not frame asylum seekers as threat to be defended against, regardless of how problematic the

VRC was considered in parliamentary discussion. In some respects, the political reaction to boat arrivals during the VRC stands out as exceptional in the immigration history of Australia owing to a lack of executive control to communicate a message of deterrence to unauthorised migrants, a fact that will take on greater clarity and significance when Australia’s entire immigration history is analysed in Chapter IV.

244Viviani, N. The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1984, p.79

This case also stands as important proof that receiving self-selected refugees without punitive control is not beyond the realms of possibility for Australian policy makers. It demonstrates that, at times, Australian political elites have considered partially relinquishing sovereignty over the selection of (humanitarian) immigrants to achieve moral legitimacy and good standing with the international community as a trade-off that was in the national interest. Having introduced the events and circumstances of the VRC and overviewed the discourse that accompanied discussion of refugees by political elites in the period, I will now move on to discuss the discourse relating to refugees in Australia in the New Millennium.

Chapter III

Case Study Two:

Tampa and Beyond (2001-2013)

The second case study of this thesis will focus on the period 2001-2013. It is during these years that Australia has clearly exhibited the successful securitization of humanitarian immigration flows. Consequently, it is in this period that the issue has become most salient, contentious and subject to the highest levels of fixation by political elites and scholars alike.245 Literature exploring the issue highlights that under the Howard government, Australia’s policy towards asylum seekers entered the realm of oppressive,246 and has involved manipulating the cultivation of a moral panic with aims to engender support for the government.247 Specifically, this manifested in 2001 after the Tampa affair resulted in the introduction of the radical ‘Pacific

Solution’ to deter asylum seekers from Australia, marking that year as the beginning of Case

Study Two. The (re)securitization of the issue of unauthorised boat arrivals with the implementation of Operation Sovereign borders in 2013 has been chosen as a concise boundary to end the second case study period.

245 The most comprehensive explorations of the era are McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001; Brennan, F., Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of Queensland, 2003; Mares, P., Borderline: Australia's Response to Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the Wake of the Tampa, Taylor & Francis Group/Books, 2002 246See Marr, D., et al., Dark Victory, Allen & Unwin Sydney, 2003 247Clyne, M., ‘The Use of Exclusionary Language to Manipulate Opinion: John Howard, Asylum Seekers and the Reemergence of Political Incorrectness in Australia’, Journal of Language and Politics 4(2), 2005 p.174

Extending the period under review to 2013 (as opposed to alternatively treating the period’s end as the brief period of desecuritization with the election of the Rudd government in 2007) is particularly useful in determining shifts in the discursive justifications for securitization against the back-drop of the limited success of de-securitizing counter-narratives. Conversely, given that securitization constitutes an empirical fact either side of the desecuritized intermission surrounding 2007, treating the period as a whole provides greater insight into which discursive frames have achieved longevity and how they have evolved. I will begin by introducing the facilitating conditions and developments which immediately preceded the period. This will describe shifts in both the context of the global refugee problem and the ideological evolution of the issue’s reception in Australia. I will then trace significant events of the period chronologically, to chart changes in policy before finally introducing the primary source data from the period.

Global Immigration Trends into the New Millennium

Increasing political reaction against immigration has characterized industrialised nations over the final decades of the 20th Century and into the New Millennium.248 Traditional nations of immigration, such as the US, Australia and Canada (those same countries that contributed roughly 90% of resettlement places to the UNHCR in 2016)249 have become more reluctant in their acceptance of migrants.250 This development centres around the perception that some

248Menz, G., The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies, OUP Oxford, 2008, p.1 249Calculated from figures provided by UNHCR 2017, Global Trends 2016. Accessed Online http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf p.27 250Clyne, M., ‘The Use of Exclusionary Language to Manipulate Opinion: John Howard, Asylum Seekers and the Reemergence of Political Incorrectness in Australia’, Journal of Language and Politics 4(2), 2005 p.174

97 types of migrants might be a net drain on the economy rather than a driver of growth, or that immigration causes various other social problems for receiving host societies. Considering that Australia has conformed to this global trend, it is worth briefly explaining how discourse against illegal immigrants has provided the foundation of securitization of migration in

Australia before charting the events that have constituted the process. In-depth analysis focusing on the ideational dimension of economic factors will be reserved for extensive discussion in Chapter V.

Increasing focus on illegal immigration is just one expression of a growing fixation on transnational crime by Western governments.251 This has been driven by anxiety caused by the collapse of the (ostensibly) stable bi-polar order of the Cold War and fears that the international environment is becoming increasingly anarchic with a multiplicity of threats.252 The diversification of security analysts to incorporate issues such as transnational crime into the regular functions of governmentality can be partly understood as a transformation that was necessary to achieve relevance after their primary raison d'etre (the realpolitik of the Cold War and fighting the Soviets) had evaporated.

Regardless of how impactful that may be, running parallel to this process has been the tangible real-world growth of illegal and clandestine migration and its connection to organized crime.

For example, in 1999, it was estimated that roughly 1 million people were involved in illegal migration, totalling USD$20 Billion in business for the people smuggling industry.253 The

251Buzan, B., ‘Rethinking security after the Cold War’, Cooperation and Conflict, 32(1), 1997, p.9 252Ibid. ; Campbell, D., ‘Writing security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity’, University of Minnesota Press, 1992 p.7 253Millbank, A., ‘The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention’, Information and Research Services, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2000

Australian Federal Police (AFP) were quick to acknowledge these trends, declaring the rise of transnational crime a challenge to traditional notions of security in the 1990’s.254 Humanitarian immigration channels, despite ostensibly involving distinct modes of value, have not been exempt from the turn to immigration restriction. Running parallel to the international growth of illegal immigration networks was the daunting growth of the genuine refugee problem globally. Consider the numbers of refugees as a proportion of the world’s population over dates significant to the subject at hand. The UNHCR Population Statistics Database estimates the global number of refugees in 1975 was 3,529,434. By 2001, this figure had grown to

12,116,835 with 19.90 million people being considered at risk.255 It should be noted that throughout all of the periods covered in this thesis, only 1% of this global total have been located in the Oceanic region.256 In part, the sense that the scale of the refugee problem dramatically increased over the latter half of the 20th Century is explained by more accurate and exhaustive investigation on a global scale (until 1967 the 1951 Refugee Convention only applied to those displaced inside Europe pre-1951). Nevertheless, the statistics above demonstrate both a substantial net and proportionate increase in the number of refugees worldwide.

The magnitude of the issue in the contemporary era lends credibility to claims that no single nation (or indeed the combined effort of all regular contributors to the UNHRC resettlement program over any short space of time) can organize the resettlement of all asylum seekers in the foreseeable future, even if all inauthentic applicants were successfully vetted. Access to

254Pickering, S., ‘Border Terror: Policing, Forced Migration and Terrorism’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 16(3), 2004, p.225 255UNHCR Population Statistics Database, Accessed Online at http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=2.154623025.869839002.1494370754- 92612784.1494370754 256Inglis, C., ‘Australia's Refugee Policy in an International Context’, The Australian Quarterly, 66(4), 1994 p.15

99 information and improved visibility of the issue in the modern era feeds anxiety over massive demographic swamping that is above the national capacity to absorb might cripple receiving states. The perception of growing threat, therefore, has restored management of the problem

(in this case reasserting executive control though immigration restriction) rather than ideological capital, as the policy rationale of humanitarian migration issues. Furthermore, the ideological capital of accepting refugees was initially linked to the politics and rivalry of the

Cold War, which rapidly disappeared after the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991. The significance of this change and its subsequent impact on the international system will take on greater relevance in Chapter VI.

Australian Developments

Australia does not experience high levels of illegal immigration when compared to other advanced economies, such as the United States or the EU. Nevertheless, anti-immigration rhetoric has been incorporated into political debate and had a significant impact on public perceptions toward refugees. Specifically, because unauthorized boat arrivals are regularly labelled ‘illegals’ by political elites and news media, asylum seekers have become indistinguishable from illegal immigrants to large sections of the Australian public. Media reliance on government spokespeople for news and information regarding asylum seekers has lead McKay et al. to identify the relationship as an example of the ‘propaganda model’257 as developed by Chomsky and Herman.258 After reviewing language relating to unauthorized boat

257McKay, F. H., et al., ‘‘Any One of These Boat People Could be a Terrorist for All We Know!’ Media Representations and Public Perceptions of ‘Boat People’ Arrivals in Australia’, Journalism, 12(5), 2011, p.610 258Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N., Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, New York: Pantheon Books, 1988

100 arrivals in Australia, O'Doherty and Lecouteur argue that the way labels such as asylum seeker, boat person and ‘illegal’ are used interchangeably is one of the most dominant features of how discourse has evolved in the nation.259

The term ‘illegal(s)’ is lifted from rhetoric relating to illegal immigrants, those individuals whose presence in a nation is illegal, and applied to those who have arrived illegally (without a valid entry visa) in boats, even if the presence of those people might not be illegal per se, like in the case of those individuals who claim political asylum. Associations of illegality have influenced the public’s perception of asylum seekers and acts to legitimize subsequent punitive executive control. For example, the practice of detaining all unauthorized arrivals (illegals) draws ethical legitimacy from the fact that the public are accustomed to sanctioning the imprisonment of criminals.260 To accurately trace the evolution of discourse, it is important to remember information presented in the previous chapter: the conflation of refugees as illegals can be identified since the Fraser government first formulated its response to the arrival of boat people.

An example of the turn towards immigration restriction is the evolution of Australia’s detention practices. In 1992, the Migration Act was amended to replace the system of official discretion with a one of mandatory detention for all suspected illegal entrants. It was also at that time that powers for indefinite detention (possibly the most politically and legally controversial component of Australia’s securitized asylum policy) were imposed over the previous 273-day limit. At the time of inception, then Minister for Immigration Gerry Hand stated,

259O'Doherty, K. and A. Lecouteur ‘“Asylum Seekers”,“Boat People” and “Illegal Immigrants”: Social Categorisation in the Media’, Australian Journal of Psychology 59(1), 2007, p.5 260Pickering, S. and C. Lambert, ‘Deterrence: Australia's Refugee Policy’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice: Refugee Issues and Criminology, 14(1), 2002, p.68

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“The Government is determined that a clear signal be sent that migration to Australia

may not be achieved by simply arriving in this country and expecting to be allowed into

the community ... this legislation is only intended to be an interim measure.”261

This was until crisis could be averted, typical of securitizing claims. In reality, in part because those changes were uncontested by the Opposition, the policy has continued to the present day.

To put this ‘crisis’ in perspective, less than 1000 unauthorised entrants had arrived in Australia from 1989-1994 whereas half a million people were accepted as permanent migrants during that period.262 In 1993, the Refugee Review Tribunal was established. It was an institution that, over the course of the decade, increasingly became the target of government criticism because of its cost. A Social Policy Group Report published in 2000263 contains crucial pre-2001 information demonstrating the ideology of Australian policy makers. The report draws upon the example of judicial review as prime evidence of how refugee policy has become nonsensical in a changed world- that year the costs of maintaining the RRT had reached $14

Million, the same level of spending the Australian government actually contributed to the

UNHCR to protect the world’s most vulnerable people.264 To adequately trace the evolution of partisan politics in the transformation of the politics of asylum in Australia, it is important to note that the 1989 amendment to the Migration Act took place under the Hawke government and the 1992 amendment under Keating, both Labor Prime Ministers. Furthermore, the fact that the introduction of mandatory detention received bipartisan support demonstrates that,

261Phillips, J. and H. Spinks, ‘Immigration detention in Australia’, Parliamentary Library, 2013 p.6 262Inglis, C., ‘Australia's Refugee Policy in an International Context’, The Australian Quarterly, 66(4), 1994, p.18 Millbank, A., ‘The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention’, Parliamentary Library, 2000. 264Ibid.

102 regardless of party politics, the securitization of humanitarian migration in Australia constitutes a broad national shift.

International law clearly states that asylum seekers must not be punished for seeking asylum and, considering that detention enacted to conduct security and health screening cannot be reasonably expected to be indefinite, it logically follows that Australia’s detention system must be punitive. Indeed, deterrence, the raison d'etre of the system, tacitly relies upon this fact to operate. Furthermore, research and review by medical professionals is clear: indefinite detention in Spartan heavy-security institutions has a devastating impact on the psychiatric health of adults and children alike.265 It is worth briefly commenting on the ontological intersection between securitization, sovereignty and law. Obviously, in any single instance, domestic law can conflict with International Law or Human Rights but this fact does not obfuscate the securitization process. Conversely, it is the persistence of illegal practice over time, ‘outside’ normal politics that proves an issue has been successfully securitized: the issue is being preserved in a state of exception (although this may be subject to continued objection by members of society). Securitization blurs the lines of legality on a national scale through a direct appeal to sovereignty as the source of domestic law and, simultaneously, a trump card to deflect criticism when practices conflict with International Law.

Australian Election Study (AES) surveys demonstrate that Australia did experience an upswell of public opposition to immigration during the 1990’s, but this peaked in 1992 at 70% coinciding with peak in unemployment and had fallen to 35% in 2001.266 An important

265See Mares, S., et al., ‘Seeking Refuge, Losing Hope: Parents and Children in Immigration Detention’, Australasian Psychiatry, 10(2), 2002 pp. 91-96. 266Cited in McAllister, I., ‘Border Protection, the 2001 Australian Election and the Coalition Victory’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38(3), 2003 p.454

103 component of this political reaction was expressed, however, involved sections of the

Australian public becoming more vocally critical of Asian immigration and the policy of multiculturalism. This is probably not due to any independent increase in societal racism or xenophobia in the period (which can be identified consistently throughout Australian history) but a reaction to the growth of Australia’s Asian population who then became targets for discrimination. The growth of immigrant communities to levels that are ‘socially visible’ has been linked with anti-immigration reactions throughout Western democracies from the 1980’s onwards.267 Furthermore, media representations of Vietnamese immigrants continued to be negative throughout the decade, undeservingly conflating those communities with crime and ghettoization.268

Political criticism of (racial) diversity in immigration was most prominently articulated by

Pauline Hanson and her One Nation Party. Hanson was elected to parliament in 1996 for the seat of Oxley in Queensland. Support for One Nation peaked in 1998 where it received 22.7% of the first preference vote in Queensland and roughly 10% of votes in the federal election later that year.269 Gibson, McAllister and Swenson describe Hanson’s platform and as an appeal to the protectionist and self-sufficient “Fortress Australia” of the 1950’s. This resonated with working class Anglo Australia’s that interpreted Multicultural immigration, ethnic diversity and land rights for Aboriginal Australians as tax-payer funded industries that amounted to

‘reverse racism’ against White Australians.270

267Glover, R. W., ‘The Theorist and the Practitioner: Linking the Securitization of Migration to Activist Counter-Narratives,’ Geopolitics, History and International Relations 3(1), 2011, p.58 268Jakubowicz, A., Vietnamese in Australia: a Generation of Settlement and Adaptation, Bureau of Immigration, Multicultural and Population Research, Melbourne, 2004 p.8 269Gibson, R., et al., ‘The Politics of Race and Immigration in Australia: One Nation Voting in the 1998 Election’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25(5), 2002, p.823 270Ibid. p.824

104

Hanson’s return into public debate after leading One Nation to secure four senates seats in the

2016 Australian Federal Election proves that in some sections of the Australian community her views have longstanding salience.271 Whereas the One Nation platform shies away from explicitly endorsing a racist philosophy (whereby non-White people were considered inferior or unqualified to become genuine Australians) the party advocated severely limiting racial diversification and multiculturalism in order to protect social unity and preserve Australia’s traditional culture. This type of philosophy, whereby immigrants might be undesirable because of cultural incompatibility rather than biological inferiority, is typical of contemporary Far-

Right parties in Western nations,272 a theme that will be revisited in this thesis.

Clyne stresses that the Howard Government era must be understood within the context of

Hansonism because of the influence that the movement had upon political rhetoric, especially amongst conservatives.273 In part, this was because the emergence of One Nation rendered the

Far-Right a visible political force that was mobilized on immigration issues and this was an electoral demographic the Coalition sought to secure.274 In the ideological milieu of the era, the ‘Aussie Battler’ or mainstream working Australian, has been abandoned by liberal- progressive political elites who are conscious of being ‘politically correct’ and pandering to

271Koziol M. “One Nation Wins Four Senate Seats, Crossbenchers to Hold 11 seats” Sydney Morning Herald 4 August 2016 Accessed Online http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/one- nation-wins-four-senate-seats-crossbenchers-to-hold-eleven-seats-20160803-gqkn0h.html 272Faist, T., ‘How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse, 1978–1992’, West European Politics, 17(2), 1994, p.63 273Clyne, M., ‘The Use of Exclusionary Language to Manipulate Opinion: John Howard, Asylum Seekers and the Reemergence of Political Incorrectness in Australia’, Journal of Language and Politics 4(2), 2005, pp. 176-7. 274Burnside, J., ‘Refugees: the Tampa case’, Postcolonial Studies: Culture, Politics, Economy 5(1), 2002, p.19

105

‘vociferous’ interest groups.275 This mainstream Australian is, therefore, not being supported by the government and increasingly a victim of the pressures of globalisation (symbolised by

Asian immigration and multiculturalism). The growth of international clandestine migration and the (re)politicization of immigration in the 1990’s provides the context within which the conservative Howard governments was election in 1996. These anxieties crystalized as

Australia experienced a spike of asylum seeker arrivals in 1999, marking the beginning of the

Third and largest wave of unauthorised boat arrivals. The beginning of Third Wave (1999-

2001) can be identified against the lower arrival trends of the preceding years. Conversely, the steep decrease in 2002 marks the beginning of the restrictive Pacific Solution policy implemented to deter arrivals. Consider the figure below.

Fig. 1.2 Source: Australian Parliamentary Library276

275Clyne, M., ‘The Use of Exclusionary Language to Manipulate Opinion: John Howard, Asylum Seekers and the Reemergence of Political Incorrectness in Australia’, Journal of Language and Politics 4(2), 2005, p.177 276Phillips, J. and H. Spinks, ‘Immigration detention in Australia’, Parliamentary Library, 2013

106

Although most asylum seekers of the period had travelled from the Persian Gulf region, their voyage on boats to reach Australian territory typically disembarked much closer, usually in

Indonesia. On average, these boats carried more asylees than in previous waves, signalling that humanitarian migration was now more organized and, ultimately, that South-East Asian people smugglers had become involved in facilitating travel to Australia. Despite carrying more asylum seekers, the vessels themselves remained small fishing boats, often incapable of making a journey to Australia safely. The vessels are piloted by Indonesian fisherman, attracted to the

(relatively) well-paying job277 despite the risks or the fact that they do not have the means to provide adequate sustenance or provide safety to the potentially hundreds of people crammed aboard their small crafts. These constituent factors, vessels that can make the journey (however unsafely) to Australian territory, crew willing to engage in illegal activities and extensive international personal networks, combined to constitute a new and robust clandestine migration system in the region. These networks rely on (legitimate) travel agents, extensive familial connections and, in the last instance, connection to organized crime in the form of people smugglers.

Analysis by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) led to the description of the Indonesian people smuggling trade as an organic network “without a snake-head’ that can simply be cut off.278 In other words, the phenomenon is driven by the existence of a lucrative market, enabled by the relative ease of modern international travel (for example, until 2013 Iranians could fly to

Indonesia and receive a cheap visa on arrival) and the continued existence of asylum seekers

277Munro, P., ‘People Smuggling and the Resilience of Criminal Networks in Indonesia’, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 6(1), 2011, p.44 278Toohey, P., ‘Quarterly Essay 53 That Sinking Feeling: Asylum Seekers and the Search for the Indonesian Solution’, Black Inc, 2014. p.4

107 with enough money to employ smugglers. Typically, it is these decentralized market-driven criminal operations that are the most resistant to policing and most resilient over time.279 In practice, it has been Middle Eastern expatriates living in Java with connections to travel agents and extended family in source nations that liaise with Indonesian locals to transfer payment to be smuggled to Australia.280 Cisarua in central Java is the most common staging ground for those seeking to be smuggled into Australia.281 Deals, such as the discount offered to Afghanis and arrangements where payments are only accepted after successful smuggling ventures, are strong evidence of the stability of these ties. Furthermore, the continuity of these constituent factors has meant criminal networks have been able to survive large lulls in business, such that happened during mid 2000’s when the Pacific Solution barred unauthorised arrivals.282

The rapidity of the resumption of people smuggling operations after the Pacific Solution ended in 2007 is evidence that the analysis provided by the AFP is accurate. It is important to note, however, despite the issues high profile and persistent efforts to combat the trade by the AFP,

Indonesia did not introduce domestic legislation criminalizing smugglers until May 2011.

Pickering stresses that the AFP’s continued focus on barring entry to asylum seekers rather than securing conviction for those employed in the people smuggling trade reaffirms that, despite rhetoric vilifying people smugglers, the Australian government’s priority remains deterring self-selected asylum seekers from travelling to Australia.283 From 1999 onwards,

279Munro, P., ‘People Smuggling and the Resilience of Criminal Networks in Indonesia’, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 6(1), 2011, p.41 280Ibid. 281Toohey, P., ‘Quarterly Essay 53 That Sinking Feeling: Asylum Seekers and the Search for the Indonesian Solution’, Black Inc, 2014 p.5 282Munro, P., ‘People Smuggling and the Resilience of Criminal Networks in Indonesia’, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 6(1), 2011, p.40 283Pickering, S., ‘Border Terror: Policing, Forced Migration and Terrorism’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 16(3), 2004, p.217

108 several strategies were implemented by the executive to deter refugees attempting to reach

Australia by boat.

The Third Wave: Politics and Policy

Initially, in response to the rise in unauthorised entrants in 1999, the Howard Government implemented the policy of Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs) to deter unauthorised arrival.284

TPV’s were designed to simultaneously fulfil Australia’s legal obligation to offer asylum to genuine refugees while reclaiming the sovereign right of the nation to select settler migrants.

This was achieved by issuing a visa that was only valid for three years before the case had to be reassessed (for instance, it might be the case that positive developments within the asylees country of origin mean that they can return home in safety, thereby abrogating Australia’s legal obligation to renew protection). TPV’s did not grant all the benefits of permanent visas – recipients could not apply for family reunion and could not travel to and from Australia without invalidating their visa. This was to further dissuade asylum seekers from attempting unauthorised entry of the nation in hopes that, once granted refugee status, they could organize for their families to join them in Australia through family reunion, which came to be perceived as a type of loophole that allowing clandestine humanitarian resettlement above intended levels. Furthermore, TPV’s did not allow the recipient access to government programs such as housing assistance or help in seeking employment, evidence of the growing linkage of asylum issues with welfare in the contemporary period.285

284Mansouri, F. and M. Leach, ‘The Evolution of the Temporary Protection Visa regime in Australia’, International Migration 47(2), 2009, pp. 101-3 285Every, D. and M. Augoustinos, ‘‘Taking Advantage’ or Fleeing Persecution? Opposing Accounts of Asylum Seeking,’ Journal of Sociolinguistics, 12(5), 2008, p.650

109

Initially, legislation to strengthen border protection to combat the Third Wave was put to parliament in February 2001, predating the consequential events of the ‘Tampa Affair’ and the

9/11 terrorist attacks.286 The rejection of this legislation by the Beazley-led Labor Party in

Opposition effectively marked the end of decades of bipartisanship on humanitarian migration policy in Australia. Howard responded to mounting pressure to stop unauthorised boat arrivals by declaring that “using our armed forces to stop the people coming and turn them back [is] not really an option for a humanitarian nation.”287 This clearly shows that ethical/legal considerations were limiting the government’s policy options at that time. Evidently, changes in the political environment meant that these considerations were no longer binding commitments by the time Operation Relex (a border protection program that involved the naval interception of asylum seeker boats) commenced after the Tampa Affair later that year.

2001 was a federal election year and the Howard government wanted to reassure voters that

Australia had not become a ‘soft touch’ for illegal immigration288 by sending a strong message to any potential illegal immigrants.289 An opportunity to pursue this project arose on 26th of

August when the MV Tampa, a freighter on route from Fremantle to Indonesia, rescued 433 asylum seekers that were in distress travelling en route to Australia.290 The crew originally intended to return those rescued to Indonesia (which is not a signatory to the refugee

286Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000 287Cited in Brennan, F., Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of Queensland, 2003, p.60 288Burnside, J., ‘Refugees: the Tampa Case’, Postcolonial Studies: Culture, Politics, Economy 5(1), 2002, p.19 289Magner, T., ‘A Less than ‘Pacific’ Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 16(1), 2004, p.54 290Mathew, P., ‘Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa’, The American Journal of International Law, 96(3), 2002 p.661

110 convention) where their voyage began but were pressured by those aboard, many of who required medical attention, to travel to Christmas Island. To protect Australia from unauthorised arrival, the Cabinet decided to deny the Tampa’s request to dock and SAS teams boarded the vessel. Controversy was immediate: some commentators asserted that the

Australian government’s military boarding of the vessel could be in danger in breaching international laws against piracy!291 The asylees aboard the Tampa were taken to Nauru to be processed there, a move that became routine as part of the governments ‘Pacific Solution’ response to the surge in unauthorised arrivals.

The radical plan had three major components. Firstly, it gave power to naval authorities to board and interdict any unauthorised vessel in Australian waters “in spite of any other law.”292

Secondly, it involved the excision of territory from Australia’s ‘Migration Zone’ into a buffer- like region in which naval forces carried out this interception and where regular migration (and, therefore, asylum claims) could not be undertaken. Finally, Consequential Provisions legislation facilitated the forcible transfer of those interdicted asylum seekers to Third Nations, such as Nauru, where they did not have access to the Australian legal system.293 This convoluted arrangement with Nauru was secured as part of a deal involving financial aid to the impoverished nation. The fact that the government called for the Opposition to support the proposed legislation without debate, so it could be passed the evening it was introduced on 29

August, provides a clear example of exceptional urgency in the grammar of securitization.

Howard told parliament,

291McLeod, S. (29 August 2001) ‘Tampa situation May Become International Crisis’ Radio National, ABC retrieved: http://www.abc.net.au/pm/stories/s354583.htm 292Mathew, P., ‘Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa’, The American Journal of International Law, 96(3), 2002 p.661 293Ibid.

111

“I am seeking, unusually, the authority and the support of the parliament to facilitate

the passage of the bill through all stages in both houses of parliament tonight. I

appreciate the courtesy extended to me and to the government by the opposition in

giving leave for the introduction of this measure. I ask the opposition to support the

measure so that it can pass into law as soon as possible.”294

The image below illustrates the projection of power spatially, the creation of a regional security complex or sphere of influence in the Oceanic region.

Fig. 1.3 Source: Australian Parliamentary Library 295

Ashmore Reef, The Cocos and Christmas Islands represent the excised territory where unauthorised vessels are typically headed and, subsequently, interdicted by naval border

294House of Representatives Official Hansard, 29 August 2001 p.30570 295Phillips, J., ‘The ‘Pacific Solution’ Revisited: a Statistical Guide to the Asylum Seeker Caseloads on Nauru and Manus Island’, Parliamentary Library, 2012 Accessed Online: http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/B N/2012-2013/PacificSolution

112 security. Manus Island and Nauru are the (remote) locations of the regional detention centres.

The process of strategically exercising land from Australia’s migration zone was repeated twice over the following years. Firstly, in 2002 several islands in West Australia, Queensland and the Northern Territory were added the exercised region296 and finally, in 2006, the entire

Australian mainland was included under this formula so that any individuals who managed to reach the continent unauthorised were not technically within the Migration Zone.297 The impossibility to utilize Australia as a nation of first asylum has become formalized in legislation.

It was during this apparent crisis of border security that the terrorist attacks on September 11th took place in New York and Washington. This was the first time that Australia’s ANZUS alliance with the US has ever been activated. Circumstance cemented these ties in the midst of tragedy, Howard was in Washington as the attacks occurred and was due to present to

Congress the very next day. There, he reaffirmed Australia’s commitment to follow the leadership of the US. Over the succeeding years this came to mean an active role in two enormous expeditionary wars in Afghanistan (2001-2014) and Iraq (2003-2009). The Global

War on Terror (hereafter GWOT) followed directly from terrorist attacks in New York and

Washington in September 11th 2001 and constitutes a central component of the international securitization process in the New Millennium, especially with regards to immigration.298

296Migration Amendment Regulations 2002 (No. 4) 297Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 298Vultee, F., ‘Securitization: A New Approach to the Framing of the “War on Terror”’, Journalism Practice, 4(1), 2010, p.33

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Almost by definition, terrorism is particularly suited to supporting a simple ‘black and white’ frame (whereby terrorists are evil.)299 The sophistication of the attacks on 9/11 and the damage they wrought was without precedent and resulted in the meteoric rise of terrorism as a top tier international security issue. The construction of the GWOT as one of the most dominant security frames of the New Millennium has been widely acknowledged and studied.300 Whereas

2001 can be seen to mark the commencement of a new era of global geopolitics, it’s role in the subject at hand must be appraised accurately rather than overstated. The decision to refuse docking to the Tampa preceded the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and was just one step amongst several that already constituted securitization, a process well underway before the GWOT media frame evolved. While important, then, the significance of the GWOT is by no means a complete or singularly comprehensive explanation to the securitization of immigration and will be analysed in depth when considering changes in the global security environment in Chapter

VI.

In any case, global reactions to the September 11 terrorist attacks were important in the way they consolidated existing anxiety regarding immigration. In Australia’s case border security meant unauthorised boat arrivals entering Australian national waters. Furthermore, these asylum seekers were primarily from the Middle East and comprised of three major nationalities. They were: Iraqi nationals fleeing the murderous dictatorship of Saddam Hussein,

Iranians fleeing political persecution by the repressive Iranian government and Afghanis fleeing violence and persecution by the ultraconservative Taliban, particularly individuals from the persecuted Hazara minority ethnic group. These trends are significant for several reasons,

299Ibid. p.36 300Pickering, S., ‘Border Terror: Policing, Forced Migration and Terrorism’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 16(3), 2004, p.223

114 the first simply being that they have continued until the present day and therefore constitute the bulk of arrivals during the second case study of interest to this thesis.

The ethnicity and nationality of these refugees is significant for two major reasons. Firstly, in the GWOT period, the Islamic World has been constructed as the most significant cultural

Other and threat to the West. Subsequently, Muslims within the West, as well as those of

Middle Eastern backgrounds, have become noteworthy targets of societal prejudice and discrimination. This fact that must be addressed to comprehensively explore the securitization of humanitarian immigration in Australia and elsewhere. Humphrey describes how asylum seekers, irregular migrants Muslims and terrorists are being conflated as transnational categories of risk-management.301 Secondly, Australia’s relationship with its two most significant source nations of asylum seekers, Afghanistan and Iraq, was transformed through

Australian involvement with military conflict in those states. It is worth acknowledging here one major exception- the sizeable minority of unauthorised arrivals carrying asylum seekers from Sri Lanka following civil war. The asylum seekers comprised of individuals from the

Tamil ethnic group that had, since 1983, been host to a militant movement named the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers) that was engaged in an ethno-nationalistic conflict with the Sri Lankan state to achieve independence from the Singhalese ethnic majority.

A successful military offensive by the Sri Lankan government to secure victory over the Tamil

Tigers in 2008-09 resulted in an intensification of the decades long conflict which prompted an exodus of Tamil asylum seekers fleeing conflict. Refugees continued to leave their homes after the conflict had formally ended, accusing the Sri Lankan government of Human Rights abuses as it sought to consolidate control through repressive practices.

301Humphrey, M., ‘Migration, Security and Insecurity’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(2), 2013, p.191

115

The political climate surrounding 9/11 had enormous impact. By late September, the

Opposition capitulated, giving support to the proposed amendments to the Migration Act. Not only did Labor’s initial lack of support for the bill make the Opposition look soft on the issue of border protection, their backflip demonstrated a lack of alternative and legitimated the

Coalition’s hard-line approach. Consequently, conflating unauthorised boat arrivals with border security is seen as attributing to securing the Coalitions electoral success in 2001.302

The salience of strict border security is partly explained by the environment of fear which existed surrounding the September 11 terror attacks. In fact, this was the first time since the

Vietnam War that national security was the preeminent issue in a federal election.303

Exogenous shocks generally favour incumbent governments as the public rally in solidarity, a process which occurred in Australia and the United States.304 The emergence of the GWOT paradigm was not only an independent driver of securitization but immediately connected to the Tampa affair through contemporaneousness. Furthermore, many of those aboard the Tampa were Afghanis fleeing the Taliban’s oppression – the same regime implicated by association in the 2001 terror attacks.

Rather than the tragedy promoting sympathy for the victims of the Taliban (as I argue occurred with the shared victimhood of Australians and the South Vietnamese) the symbolic connection between Afghanistan and terrorism validated securitization. Muslim refugee masses have been regularly suspected of masking the flight of individuals who are a terror threat.305 The impact of this conflation is heavily supported by survey data from the time which found that those

302O’Doherty, K. and M. Augoustinos, ‘Protecting the Nation: Nationalist Rhetoric on Asylum Seekers and the Tampa’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 18(6), 2008, p.557 303McAllister, I., ‘Border Protection, the 2001 Australian Election and the Coalition Victory’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38(3), 2003, p.446 304Ibid. p.448 305Pickering, S., ‘Border Terror: Policing, Forced Migration and Terrorism’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 16(3), 2004, p.223

116 respondents that favoured a no-tolerance approach to asylum seekers were the same people who wanted to ban Muslim immigration.306 Members of the Howard Government articulated the issue facing government at that time. Defence Minister Peter Reith claimed “if you can’t control who comes into your country, that is a security issue.”307 Immigration Minister Philip

Ruddock warned Australia could be “overrun with large numbers of asylum seekers.”308

Foreign Minister Downer best typified the mentality of government- “at the heart of this [the

Tampa issue] is the protection of our territorial integrity.”309 By framing the Tampa affair as a crisis of border security and a challenge to Australia’s sovereignty, the securitization of asylum shifted from implicit to explicit. Asylum seekers were no longer symbolic symptoms of the problems facing Australia, they were direct perpetrators.

Subsequent controversy surrounding Australia’s new security posture was not limited to operational matters but extended to the presentation of the event by the government and the rhetorical strategy utilized by political elites in order to defend their policies. The government guarded against perceptions their approach was inhumane by demonising refugees as deviants receiving the treatment they deserve. The demonization of boat people as a political tool is best typified by the ‘children overboard’ scandal in which emerged during October 2001 when an unauthorised vessel named Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel 4 was intercepted north of Christmas

Island. In an effort to frame the asylum seekers as delinquent the Howard Government declared that individuals aboard were immorally holding the Australia nation hostage, threatening to throw their own children overboard should they not be granted entry. The accusation that the

Children Overboard Affair was a smear tactic on the part of the government is now certain: the

306McAllister, I., ‘Border Protection, the 2001 Australian Election and the Coalition Victory’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38(3), 2003 p.459 307Ibid. p.305 308Ibid. 309Ibid.

117 incident attracted enough controversy to warrant a Senate Committee investigation.310 Given the rather Orwellian title ‘an Inquiry into a Certain Maritime Incident’ the report found that the government knew that the events in question (asylum seekers holding their own children to hostage and throwing them overboard) had not transpired by the time it was announced publicly.

The falsehood of the governments message report did not dampen its success, demonstrating the appetite for xenophobic posturing in the Australian public at that time.311 By framing humanitarian migration within the context of border protection and territorial integrity, unauthorised entry becomes a violation of national sovereignty, both in terms of gatekeeping and migrant selection. This shift is indicative of the way the issue of refugees arriving by boat has become divorced from questions of humanitarian immigration in general and reformulated as securitized intergroup conflict (in-group and out-group). Emphasis on the illegality of their mode of arrival, ignoring that international law forgives illegal entry when those claiming asylum present themselves to relevant authorities,312 frames asylum seekers as criminals, or at least people willing to deal with organised crime in the form of people smugglers. These shifts in rhetoric function to essentialize asylum seekers as perpetrators, the direct objects of threat, a conceptual escalation from the abstract-symbolic threat of unmanaged migration.

310Senate Committee, ‘A Certain Maritime Incident’, Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2002 311Pickering, S. and C. Lambert, ‘Deterrence: Australia's Refugee Policy’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice: Refugee Issues and Criminology, 14(1), 2002, p.65 312Article 31 of the Refugee Convention states 1.1 “The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”

118

Changing Perceptions of Asylum Seekers

Associations of criminality have a significant impact on the reception of the issue of asylum seekers. The lifting of rationale previously associated with domestic criminal-law enforcement into transnational issues to has been identified as a central mechanism of the securitization process internationally. Securitization scholar Didier Bigo succinctly notes that in the contemporary period “the popular classes are contaminated by law-and-order visions of immigrants.”313 Furthermore, this development is increasingly utilised as a strategy of neoliberal governance to manage global disorder, whereas traditionally such conceptions

(criminal-justice) applied only to the domestic sphere or the ‘inside’ of a nation.314

Accordingly, attempts to combat people smuggling in the region increasingly began to involve multilateral engagement, beginning substantially with the Bali Process developed in 2002 to coordinate policing efforts, although the framework remains completely voluntary.

The establishment of new clandestine migration routes during the 1990’s has prompted a host of questions that go to the heart of the politics of humanitarian resettlement. The most succinct formulation being “do refugees have a right to choose their nation of asylum?” An answer to this would be undoubtedly illuminating, yet the reality remains that legal process regarding refugees is applied so imperfectly and with such variance that refugees remain a socially constructed group rather than ideal legal category. Consequently, competing discourses over these questions constitute the politics of asylum rather than confuse it. Uncertainty characterizes the highest levels of authority on the issue: the UNHCR is conspicuously silent

313Bigo, D., ‘Security and Immigration: toward a critique of the governmentality of unease,’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), 2002, p.66 314Pickering, S. and L. Weber, ‘New Deterrence Scripts in Australia's Rejuvenated Offshore Detention Regime for Asylum Seekers’, Law & Social Inquiry, 39(4), 2014, p.1006

119 on the question.315 This is most likely because of the enormous ramifications of weighing in on the issue either way: asserting asylees have a right to choose a nation of asylum would encourage further mass migration to (ostensibly) overstrained traditional nations of immigration whereas denying that right would legitimate restrictive measures that risk the welfare of hundreds of thousands of genuine refugees relying on host states for their protection.

Attached to these intellectual questions of legal rights and governance are popular passions more difficult to rigidly define but just as influential. To some, choice, agency and wealth on the part of asylum seekers has come to symbolise a capable and calculated self-interested that disqualifies asylees from genuine humanitarian resettlement programs that are viewed as essentially philanthropic.

It is in this way that a dichotomy has been constructed between ‘real’ deserving refugees, impoverished and languishing in UN camps and wealthy, self-selected refugees that can afford to ‘asylum shop’ and potentially abuse the generosity of a compassionate system for personal benefit. Those refugees arriving to Australia without authorisation ostensibly belong to the latter group and have been consistently demonized by governments seeking to legitimize their deterrence-oriented punitive policies. O'Doherty and Augustinos go as far as arguing that the metaphor of queue-jumping draws salience in Australia by offending the very values of fairness foundational to Australian identity.316 Johnson agrees that this has assisted the Australian government in presenting draconian policy as a defence of Australia’s standards of egalitarianism, rather than a violation of them.317 The idea that boat people are categorically different from other refugees feeds into the assertion that they are characteristically different.

315Mathew, P., ‘Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa’, The American Journal of International Law, 96(3), 2002, p.667 316O’Doherty, K. and M. Augoustinos, ‘Protecting the Nation: Nationalist Rhetoric on Asylum Seekers and the Tampa’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 18(6), 2008, p.413 317Johnson, C. ‘The 2001 Election Campaign: the Ideological Context’, in John Warhurst and Marian Simms (eds.), 2001: the Centenary Election, University of Queensland Press, 2002, pp. 32–49

120

Often, these claims are associated with perceptions that the willingness of those asylum seekers to pay (comparatively) large sums of money318 to criminals to enter the nation illegally amounts to queue-jumping ahead of refugees that have already been processed overseas and are, therefore, proven to be authentic and ‘deserving.’ Furthermore, features such as their ability to finance travel makes them appear wealthier and less deserving of charity (although formally, levels of wealth have no bearing upon whether somebody is a refugee) and engaged in a calculated attempt to secure residence in a developed nation, as opposed to desperately fleeing their home to escape danger. Unwillingness to go through the correct channels is also seized to cast doubt upon the authenticity of asylum claims, as is evidence that asylum seeks have destroyed or falsified documentation. The existence of states that are signatories to the Refugee

Convention closer to source nations is presented to question the motives of asylees (apparent safety from persecution can be found closer to home by most refugees who travel to Australia) fuelling the perception they are economic migrants attracted by the ‘pull factors’ of wealthy industrialized nations.

Arguments framing boat people as categorically different to other forms of refugees belie the fact that in comparison to other forms of asylum seekers, boat people have higher rates of acceptance after processing. This point is emphasised by Julian Burnside to challenge these views. He points to figures which put acceptance rates for those individuals claiming asylum after arriving legally at 40% compared to (some nationalities of) unauthorised arrivals who achieve 90% acceptance rates, Moreover, he presents a clear argument why this is the case: the incredible hardship and risks associated with travelling to Australia unauthorised by boat

318For example, fares paid over 2009-10 ranged from $4900 and $15 700, cited in Barker, C. ‘The People Smugglers' Business Model,’ Parliamentary Library, Research Paper no.2 2012-13, 2013

121 introduces a selective pressure to ensure only the most desperate refugees attempt the journey.319

However warranted thorough security and health screening for unauthorised entrants may be

(especially considering many asylees are coming from regions that are experiencing conflict and terrorism) it was, and remains, the indefinite nature of the governments detention policies that have been a major focus of criticism. Since international law requires that the detention of refugees be administrative rather than punitive, it follows that indefinite detention must be illegal because no administrative process can reasonably be indefinite. The legality of

Australia’s detention regime was tested in 2004 in the High Court case of Al Kateb vs Godwin.

Al Kateb had been born in Kuwait to Palestinian parents but, because Kuwait does not grant jus soli nationality to all born in their territory, was not granted Kuwaiti citizenship. He travelled to Australia unauthorised and, being unsuccessful in his asylum claim, decided to be repatriated to Kuwait or Gaza (the homeland of his parents) in 2002. Seeing as arrangements could not be made with those relevant authorities, he was unable to be returned. He applied for protection from the Australian government as stateless person but was rejected. A majority of justices (four vs three) ruled indefinite detention of an unlawful non-citizen was legal under the Migration Act and, furthermore, that this did not contravene Australian Constitutional Law.

As he could not be deported, limbo was ruled legal as Al Kateb’s fate.

Here, it is worth briefly discussing why the facts pertaining to this case are illuminating – they go to the heart of the philosophical intersection between the statist politics of international relations and the domestic-legal politics of sovereignty and citizenship, demonstrating how

319Burnside, J., ‘The Drowning excuse’, 2 April 2015c Accessed Online: http://www.julianburnside.com.au/the-drowning-excuse/

122 these concepts are mutually constituted at the deepest level. Rajaram and Gundy-Warr argue320 that ‘politics’ ought not to be simply thought of as occurring within powerful institutions, such as cabinet or parliament, but exists most meaningfully in spaces where practices of exclusion/ inclusion manifest, places typically thought of as the ‘periphery’ like borders. Here, the concept of Homo Sacer (an ancient Roman quasi-legal term referring to those living ‘outside’ the state) is utilized to describe the bare unpoliticized life, where rights are not afforded through institutional relationships. Rajaram and Gundy-Warr look to Australia, among other nations, to find detention centres and refugee camps provide the clearest example of this phenomenon in modern times, constructed spaces where the sovereign law is suspended (illegal practice is the rule).321 Illegal detention, therefore, is the preeminent symbol of national borders and intergroup relations in the modern era. Al Kateb’s story acts as a poignant reminder of the inherent international-relations dimension that informs the manifestation of refugee issues.

Another controversial component of the Pacific Solution’s detention practices was the lengthy detention of minors, the subject of a damning 2004 National Inquiry into Children in

Immigration Detention.322 The report clearly indicated the Australian government was in breach of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. Not all Coalition MP’s at this time supported the continued maintenance of such a strict border security policy. In 2005, five

Liberal backbenchers protested the government’s harsh stance introduced private member’s bills that would see detainees moved into community detention.323 In fact, by this time, the

320Rajaram, P. K. and C. Grundy‐Warr, ‘The Irregular Migrant as Homo Sacer: Migration and Detention in Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand’, International Migration, 42(1), 2004, p.34 321Ibid. 322Australia. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, ‘A Last resort?: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention,’ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2004 323Moylan, J. (24/5/2005) ‘Liberal Backbenchers Want Detention Policies Changes’ ABC 7:30 Report retrieved at http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2005/s1376203.htm

123

Howard government had trialled low security community detention for most women and children detainees, successfully avoiding some of the more harmful aspects of the Pacific

Solution by reserving Spartan high-security detention for single males and those considered risky. Nevertheless, propaganda framing unauthorised boat arrivals as economic migrants and illegal immigrants remains powerfully influential, despite the fact that 70% of those people detained under the Pacific Solution were found to be genuine refugees324 and acceptance rates were higher for particular source nations, such as Afghanistan at 90%.325 Most of these refugees were eventually settled in Australia. This leaves an inherent tension at the heart of Australia’s response to asylum seekers: convoluted detention arrangements are only necessary to deter unauthorised arrivals because they are not illegal immigrants that can be deported: they are genuine refugees and refoulment is illegal.

Eventually in 2007, those remaining in detention limbo, including Al Kateb and several other stateless individuals, were granted bridging visas to enter the community. This was part of several significant policy changes that year, centring around the election of a Rudd-led Labor government in December, marking the end of 11 years of Howard’s leadership. During the lead-up to the 2007 election, border security and immigration (and the politics of asylum) did not dominate debate to the extent they had earlier in the decade, especially when compared with the federal election in 2001. Concerns over other issues, such as Industrial relations

(specifically public disapproval of the Howard government’s WorkChoices Program), Health, and the Environment were the primary forces determining the 2007 election result.

324Phillips, J. and H. Spinks, ‘Background Note: Boat Arrivals in Australia Since 1976’, Parliamentary Library, 2010 Accessed Online: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bn/sp/boatarrivals. 325Burnside, J., ‘Refugees: the Tampa case’, Postcolonial Studies: Culture, Politics, Economy, 5(1), 2002, p.19

124

Desecuritizing Unauthorised Arrival

McDonald argues that the Rudd Government sought to pursue a strategy of Middle Power diplomacy which included a greater focus on multilateral engagement and Australia’s international obligations.326 Part of this holistic change included desecuritizing Australia’s asylum policy so that it was more humane and did not break international law or strain foreign relations. Newly appointed Immigration Minister Chris Evans stated, “the Rudd Labor

Government was elected on a platform that included a commitment to reform and a more humane treatment of those seeking our protection.”327 Toohey describes this possibility as a

“luxury of conscience”328 available to those in government at the time.

After the introduction of the Pacific Solution in 2001, the number of asylum seekers arriving by boat had dropped dramatically and Australia’s detention centres were nearly empty- evidence that high security detention and offshore processing was deterring would-be asylum seekers from risking the boat journey. Manus Island, though not officially closed, had been empty since 2004. Since 2005, the number of detainees on Nauru had not exceeded 100 individuals and, consequently, processing turnaround times had fallen considerably. Without new unauthorised boat arrivals to renew political salience of the issue (and with the threat apparently neutralised) the maintenance of such a strict and costly border protection policy appeared increasingly redundant. Because this short period illustrates underlying trends, it is an appropriate time to display information relating to unauthorised arrivals visually.

326McDonald, M., ‘Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia, Asylum-seekers and the Normative Limits of the Copenhagen School,’ Australian Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 2011, pp. 281-295 p.286 327Ibid. 328Toohey, P., ‘Quarterly Essay 53 That Sinking Feeling: Asylum Seekers and the Search for the Indonesian Solution’, Black Inc, 2014 p.3

125

Fig. 1.4 Source: Australian Parliamentary Library329

The graph simultaneously demonstrates the marked growth in unauthorised arrivals in the wider period 1998-2014 and highlights the success of the Pacific Solution as deterrence from

2002-2008. Elected in November 2007, the Rudd government went about dismantling the

Pacific Solution (specifically naval interdiction and offshore processing, officially closing both

Nauru and Manus Island detention centres) as well as the Temporary Protection Visa scheme.

Despite this, Rudd reaffirmed the role of mandatory detention as a crucial component of

Australia’s strong border protection, only this would now be implemented on-shore.

Furthermore, announcements in 2008 detailed the intention to allow greater discretion in

329Phillips, J. and H. Spinks, ‘Boat Arrivals in Australia Since 1976’, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Parliamentary Library: Australian Government, 2013

126 detention practices with detention being aimed at those thought to be a safety risk and excluding children. To reassure the public that these changes did not constitute a softening on illegal immigration these policy changes were coupled with rhetoric that demonized people smugglers and reaffirmed the government’s commitment to combatting the reprehensible trade. Smit notes the extremity of this rhetoric: Rudd called people smugglers the “absolute scum of the earth” engaged in “the world’s most evil trade.”330 This posturing was obviously meant to impart a sense that the government was resolved to continue fighting people smugglers.

Ultimately, the attempted desecuritization of the politics of asylum in Australia was short-lived.

This was not just driven by the success of the Coalition in Opposition advocating for strong border protection policies, many inside the Labor Government too were concerned the public would perceive the moves as undermining the integrity of Australia’s borders, opening the door to criticism that the government was soft on illegal immigration. In the words of awarded

Australian journalist Richard Cooke, Rudd’s experimenting with Australia’s border protection formula “caused great anxiety”331 to his colleagues. These fears were proven warranted as unauthorised arrivals grew to the highest levels ever experienced. The table overleaf highlights these trends.

330Smit, J. H., The Political Origins and Development of Australia’s People Smuggling Legislation: Evil Smugglers or Extreme Rhetoric?, Edith Cowan University, 2011 p.2 331 Cooke, R. ‘The People Versus the Political Class’ The Monthly June 2014, Accessed Online: at http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2014/june/1401544800/richard-cooke/people-versus-political- class?utm_content=buffer5d2ff&utm_medium=social&utm_source=Twitter&utm_campaign=buffer

127

Table 2.4 Requests for Protection Visas (Excluding Offshore Program) 2009-2014332

Year ‘Onshore’ requests for Protection Visas

2009-10 10, 578

2010-11 11,501

2011-12 14,436

2012-13 26,845

2013-14 18,718

This was just one issue among many that contributed to such an extensive lack of confidence in the Prime Minister that he was replaced as leader in a party room coup leadership spill on

23 June 2010. The fact that Rudd referenced immigration policy on his very last day in office as leadership speculation mounted, proves the significance of the issue at the highest levels and supports the assessment that the issue contributed to his replacement.333 Rudd stated,

"If I return as the leader of the Government and Prime Minister, I will be very clear of

one thing, this party and Government will not be lurching to the right on the question

of asylum seekers.”334

The following day, Deputy Prime Minister Julia Gillard, won the leadership of the Labor party unopposed to become Prime Minister. With respects to asylum policy, the Gillard government made a string of attempts to secure arrangements that assuaged the public concern that the executive had lost control of border security and immigration, all of which were ultimately

332Phillips, J., ‘Asylum Seekers and Refugees: What are the Facts?’, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 2013 333Stats, K., ‘Welcome to Australia? A Reappraisal of the Fraser Government’s Approach to Refugees, 1975–83’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2014 p.4 334 Gillard Moves on Rudd,’ ABC News, 23 June 2010, Accessed Online: 06/06/17 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-06-23/gillard-moves-on-rudd/878810

128 unsuccessful. One of the more embarrassing manifestations of this was the High Court’s rejection of the announcement of the “Malaysian Solution”335 policy under which the government intended to ‘people-swap’ unprocessed unauthorized entrants with individuals in

Malaysia already found to be genuine refugees. The court determined that it was illegal to transfer asylum seekers to that country, because Malaysia is not a signatory state to the Refugee

Convention and, therefore, cannot be expected to ensure the standards necessary to fulfil

Australia’s legal obligations.336

The steady increase in boat arrivals in the period 2009-13 resurrected concerns over border security that impacted the electoral cycle in 2010 and 2013. Ultimately, failed attempts at executive management of this issue made hard-line options attractive once again. In retrospect, no-tolerance regional processing appeared a harsh but successful policy. An opportunity to effectively reinstate the regional processing solution (without the move appearing a total backflip on the part of the Labor Party) came after a 2012 Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers released the Houston Report337 which advocated both increasing Australia’s overall humanitarian intake to 20,000 places per annum and processing unauthorised entrants regionally. Nauru regional Processing Centre was reopened by the Gillard government that year with bipartisan support (and condemnation by the UN).338 While the Houston Report shied away from appropriating the language of deterrence, the policy essentially reintroduced deterrence the policy rationale by euphemism, focusing on incentives and disincentives to

335Foster, M., ‘The Implications of the Failed 'Malaysian Solution': the Australian High Court and Refugee Responsibility Sharing at International Law’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, 13(1), 2012 336Ibid. p.7 337Houston, A. ‘Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers.’ August 2012 338Kirk, A. “United Nations Rejects Australia’s Off-shore Processing Plans” ABC Radio Australia 24 August 2012 Accessed Online http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/asia- pacific/united-nations-rejects-australias-offshore-processing-plans/1005572

129 manage the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors of humanitarian immigration.339 In a potentially unintentional validation of the Opposition’s growing vitriol on border security, Prime Minister

Gillard suggested it was normal for “Australians to be anxious when they see boats on the horizon.”340

McDonald raises the salient point that Gillard’s invitation for public debate about boat arrivals resulted in an escalated perception of threat, challenging the theoretical Copenhagen School stance that liberal practices (such as public debate in liberal-democracies) are intrinsically tied to desecuritization, whereas expedient or extraordinary executive practices are linked with securitization. The revival of anxiety over border security primarily related to backdrop of real world developments. None of the various solutions offered by the Labor government had slowed the rapid increase of unauthorised arrivals which now constituted the highest levels in

Australian history, peaking with 25,173 in 2013. That year, the Labor leadership changed again, in a strange reversal Rudd replaced Gillard to once again become Prime Minister!

Cognisant to continue offering proposed solutions to irregular migration, the government announced the “Papua New Guinea (PNG) Solution,” outlining the intention to secure permanent resettlement for those determined to be refugees on Manus Island within PNG itself.

In the lead-up to the 2013 Australian Federal election the threat to Australia posed by people smugglers and illegals was expounded by the Coalition. As leader of Opposition Tony Abbott repeatedly discredited the government by pointing to unauthorised boat arrivals as evidence

339Pickering, S. and L. Weber, ‘New Deterrence Scripts in Australia's Rejuvenated Offshore Detention Regime for Asylum Seekers’, Law & Social Inquiry, 39(4), 2014, p.1016 340McDonald, M., ‘Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia, Asylum-Seekers and the Normative Limits of the Copenhagen School,’ Australian Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 2011, p.290

130 the executive was dysfunctional. Abbott combined concerns over refugees, representing them both in terms of traditional security threat but also the broader societal threat refugees posed to

Australia’s ‘way of life.’341 Despite the discursive changes exhibited over the course of the

New Millennium, the framing of unauthorised arrival as a violation of sovereignty as territorial integrity (a key feature of Howard government rhetoric), appears to have achieved longevity.

Pickering and Weber argue that this legacy has left displays of executive control over boarders as a central pillar of demonstrating the Liberal party’s capacity to govern342 an insight that can probably be expanded to encompass both major parties. This is just one aspect in which rhetorical justifications for deterrence-based policies have become more nuanced, as Pickering and Weber identify has occurring during the second wave (Post-2007) of regional processing and detention.343

At the same time that the security-terror nexus of the GWOT media frame was weakening, rights-based counter-securitizing claims gained more traction and coherence (as reflected in the initial stance of the Rudd government). securitizing claims themselves had to adapt to remain performative. An example of these evolving justifications is the idea that the government is obliged to maintain hard-line border protection to deter irregular migration because of the danger of refugees dying at sea. The Australian Border Deaths Database puts the total number of refugees who have lost their lives attempting to flee to Australia at 1991 for the period 2000-2017, most of whom perished by drowning during the boat voyage.344 This argument coupled, somewhat ironically, with the fact that the Coalition could deflect criticism

341Ibid. p.287 342Pickering, S. and L. Weber, ‘New Deterrence Scripts in Australia's Rejuvenated Offshore Detention Regime for Asylum Seekers’, Law & Social Inquiry, 39(4), 2014, p.1008 343Ibid. 344Australian Border Deaths Database, Accessed Online: 02/02/2016 http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/thebordercrossingobservatory/publications/australian-border-deaths- database/

131 away from harsh detention practices by appealing to the fact that the Pacific Solution had stemmed irregular migration to the extent that there were no children in detention and processing turnaround times became expedient and humane. Julian Burnside cautions that moralistic calls about ending deaths at sea amount to an excuse345 because they are made by those who have long term interests in justifying an illegal and unethical detention regime and it is, therefore, disingenuous to frame government policy as motivated by humanitarian concerns.

Regardless whether it was the increasing sophistication of arguments for securitization or simply the rapid resumption of unauthorised arrivals from 2009 onwards, political elites were once again able to (re)securitized the asylum issue in 2013. To complete the grammar of securitization, the Abbott-led Opposition offered a definitive solution to combat the threat of illegal arrival through a no-tolerance approach that would utilize security forces to reclaim executive control of Australia’s borders. The plan, which would eventually become known as

Operation Sovereign Borders, was to reinstate interdiction, utilising the navy to intercept unauthorised boats traveling to Australia at sea and turn them back with force (when safe to do so). In September 2013, Abbott led the Coalition to electoral victory and implemented

Operation Sovereign Borders the following month.

Here, it is worth providing some figures that indicate public opinion at the time. Scanlon surveys found that the perception that unauthorised arrivals were illegal immigrants was still the single highest response given over the period, although it steadily fell from 54% in 2010 to

345Burnside, J., ‘The Drowning Excuse’, 2 April 2015 Accessed Online http://www.julianburnside.com.au/the-drowning-excuse/

132

48% in 2011 and 46% 2012.346 A large portion of the voting public at that time considered boat people illegal immigrants that ought to be stopped. The prominence of the issue of asylum seekers during the 2013 federal election period, and the centrality of border protection within the Coalition’s electoral platform, supports the claim of the Abbott Government it had a strong mandate to implement the policy of intercepting boats. While it is difficult to prove which

(inner) motivations of voters were consequential for any election result, data from July demonstrates that the Coalition was preferred over Labor on asylum seeker issues by a majority of respondents (53% to 34%).347

The introduction of Operation Sovereign Borders after the electoral victory of Coalition in

2013 provides a perfect example of a securitization process whereby the audience, in this instance the electorate, have accepted the securitizing claims of political elites, and validated an extra-ethical (violating international law) plan of executive action to safeguard against national security threats. In practice, Operation Sovereign Borders essentially resurrected the

Pacific Solution. In cases where it is unsafe to send back asylum seekers they are forcibly relocated to be processed regionally in Third countries, Nauru and on Manus Island (Papua

New Guinea). In some instances, where tow-backs risked damage to boats or the welfare of those people on board, operations involved providing purpose built vessels for asylums seekers to return to Indonesia.

Whereas 2013 has by no means marked a resolution in the controversy surrounding Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers, the implementation of Operation Sovereign Borders in 2013 provides the most cogent theoretical boundary for collecting primary source data related to

346Markus, A. and A. Dharmalingam, Mapping Social Cohesion, Monash University, Caulfield East, Australia, 2013 p.40 347Ibid.

133 threat construction as such. In fact, perhaps the most shocking expression of Australia’s turn to securitization occurred that year when the government took action to curb the flow of Tamil refugees to Australia by providing Sri Lankan authorities with naval vessels able to intercept those fleeing at sea,348 a blatant rejection of non-refoulment norms considering that the authorities in question were the alleged persecutors. The asylum issue will likely persist in a comparable form (exhibiting tension between Australia’s security and the welfare of detainees) for the foreseeable future notwithstanding any radical changes in trajectory. Malcolm

Turnbull’s successful challenge to Tony Abbott’s leadership of the Coalition in September

2015 hasn’t resulted in any substantive revision of policies aimed at asylum seekers. To maintain ideological coherence on the issue, the government is committed to ensuring those asylum seekers held in indefinite detention in Manus or Nauru will never be allowed to permanently settle in Australia. This acts to reinforce the principle that unauthorised entry amounts to queue-jumping and that no ‘preference’ should be given to illegal entrants in securing scarce resettlement opportunities on the Australian mainland. Consequently, asylum seekers in Narau and on Manus Island are experiencing an indefinite limbo which, considering current living conditions, amounts to blatantly unethical.

In conjunction with these moves, the military nature of Operation Sovereign Borders is used to justify maintaining a system of secrecy that restricts information regarding the arrival of asylum seekers into Australian waters and other operational matters.349 Amongst other things, this makes it difficult to ascertain the success (or otherwise) of current policies for the simple fact that independent information is lacking. The government’s information blackout extends to the

348Hall, B. Dogerty, B. ‘Sri Lanka to Use Aussie Gift Boats to stop People Smugglers’ Sydney Morning Herald 17 November 2013 Accessed Online http://www.smh.com.au/federal- politics/political-news/sri-lanka-to-use-aussie-gift-boats-to-stop-people-smugglers-20131116- 2xnwc.html 349Hodge, P., ‘A Grievable Life? The Criminalisation and Securing of Asylum Seeker Bodies in the ‘Violent Frames’ of Australia’s Operation Sovereign Borders’, Geoforum 58, 2015 p.127

134 detention centres themselves, where attempts by the media to review living conditions and assess the implementation of government policy have been continually frustrated. This has not stopped news of controversial events gaining national coverage, such as the death of Iranian detainee Reza Barati during riots in 2014. That same year the Australian Human Rights

Commission launched an investigation into the approximately 1000 children in detention at the time and found staff confirmed that conditions and practices were unsafe.350

In 2015, the Australian government pushed ahead with attempts to silence damning reports by introducing the Australian Border Force Act 2015 under which whistle-blowing is banned, justifying the sacking of employees that speak out about abuse in detention centres and in some cases allowing for those in question to be prosecuted. The use of this power was demonstrated in 2016 when whistle-blower Paul Stevenson (a psychologist previously awarded an Order of

Australia for work as a trauma specialist) after he labelled Australia’s offshore detention centres an “atrocity.”351 The logic of national security, therefore, has already crept into the realm of media censorship and altogether exhibits less transparency than needed for the ideal functioning of democratic principles that require the public to have access to information to meaningfully consider public policy.

In 2016, the High Court of Papua New Guinea ruled that the activities being carried out at

Manus Island Detention Centre were in violation of the constitution, subsequently leading to the PNG government announcing the intended closure of the facility.352 Later that year,

350Paxton, G., et al., ‘Perspective: ‘The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention (2014)’, Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 51(4), 2015, pp. 365-368. 351Doherty, B. “Offshore Detention Whistleblower Loses Job After Condemning Atrocity of Camps” The Guardian 21 June 2016’ https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/jun/21/offshore- detention-whistleblower-loses-job-after-condemning-atrocity-of-camps 352Tlozek, E. “PNG’s Supreme Court Rules Detention of Asylum Seekers on Manus Island is Illegal” ABC News 27 April 2016 Accessed Online http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-26/png-court-rules- asylum-seeker-detention-manus-island-illegal/7360078

135 attempting to remove asylum seekers remaining in immigration detention limbo, the Australian government struck a people swapping deal with the US during the final days of the Obama

Administration. Under this plan, some of those detained will be taken by the US in exchange for Australia’s resettlement of Latin American asylees. It is hard to gauge how effective this measure will be considering the great reluctance on the part of the new Trump Administration to take refugees.353 Again, even if the program is successful it does not promise to adequately solve the issue of those detainees not covered by the deal.

In the absence of plans detailing the plight of those refugees left in indefinite detention, arguments stressing the necessity of the governments strict border protection have only become more sophisticated. Rhetoric has evolved away from the starker presentation of a border security-terror-threat nexus in the immediate post-9/11 environment towards more nuanced arguments. In 2016, this process has completed its transformation in inversion. Accepting refugees was once presented as a critical component of Liberalism: now the necessity of restricting humanitarian migrants is presented as crucial to the continued existence of the liberal democratic state. The establishment of this paradigm can be identified in Turnbull’s adoption of the argument that the government’s no-tolerance offshore processing regime is necessary to ensure the long-term viability of multiculturalism itself, a message shared on his private blog.354 This clearly implies that forgoing strict immigration aimed at curbing cultural Others risks social cohesion or a complete revolt of the Australian public away from the multicultural project. The decision by the Labor Party in Opposition to avoid reigniting the divisive debate

353“US will Honour Refugee Deal with Australia that Trump Called Dumb” The Telegraph 22 April 2017 Accessed Online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/22/us-will-honour-refugee-deal- australia-trump-called-dumb/ 354Malcolm Turnbull MP Federal Member for Wentworth blog ‘Our successful multicultural society is built on secure borders’ 20 May 2016 Accessed Online: https://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/the-truth-is-our-successful-multicultural-society-is-built- on-secure-border

136 over asylum seekers in the 2016 federal election suggests that any alterations to the securitized practices currently in operation are unlikely in the short-term.

Refugees in Speech: Utterances in Hansard 2001-2013

422 sources displayed discussion of refugees in the 12 years comprising the second case study.

These sources contained 3978 coded references which were sorted into 211 categories and subcategories. Again, the volume of this dataset necessitates that only the most dominant frames are selected for meaningful analysis for a paper of this length. Fortunately, by adopting this exhaustive approach to content analysis, it is precisely those frames that have been identified. For the remainder of this chapter, the presentation of the data gathered in Case Study

Two will focus on the most frequent and widespread discursive devices, before moving on to selected illustrative examples that were less common. Those frames better suited to discussion within their thematic context will be reserved for later chapters dedicated to comparison and analysis. The data collected demonstrates a significant diversification of symbolic association, reflecting a sheer increase in the frequency of debate over the issues in the contemporary period. In addition to comprising a longer period of study, Case Study Two exhibits a dramatic increase of coded references, 3978 over 12 years (averaging 331.5 per annum) when compared with the 537 over 6 years (averaging 89.5 per annum) of Case Study One. The most dominant discursive frames of the period are tabled overleaf.

137

Table 2.5 25 Most Dominant Framing Devices in Refugee Discussion (2001-2013)

Code Sources Coverage in Coded Proportion of Sources (%) References Speech (%) Scapegoating 65 15.40 86 2.16

Criticism of 52 12.32 86 2.16 Detention People 63 14.93 84 2.11 Smuggling (must be stopped) Australia’s 62 14.69 82 2.06 Generous Record Children in 46 10.90 79 1.99 detention Queue Jumping 54 12.80 78 1.96

Undeserving Vs 58 13.74 76 1.91 Deserving Refugees International 57 13.51 75 1.88 Legal Obligations Oppression, 61 14.45 67 1.68 Persecution and Conflict Soft on Illegals 44 10.43 66 1.66

Refugee- 50 11.85 60 1.51 Accepting Identity Danger, Deaths 44 10.43 60 1.51 at Sea Valuable 52 12.32 58 1.46 Contribution Magnitude of 48 11.37 58 1.46 the Global Problem

138

Humanitarian 42 9.95 53 1.33 Need Refoulment 40 9.48 53 1.33

Asylum Process 41 9.72 50 1.26 is being Abused Expedient 38 9.00 50 1.26 Refugee Policy Xenophobia, 38 9.00 50 1.26 Racism (Australia’s) Stopping the 41 9.72 48 1.21 Boats Boat Arrivals to 38 9.00 45 1.13 Australia (comparatively low) Costs (of 33 7.82 45 1.13 refugees) Growing 35 8.29 43 1.08 Problem

Sovereignty = 34 8.06 43 1.08 Territorial Security Screening 38 9.00 42 1.06 Arrivals

The order presented above merits discussion before I go on to compare the dominant narrative strands between eras. It ultimately embodies the symbolic order attached to refugees during the period, what refugees mean to political elites by association in the New Millennium. Again, the examples of content provided will be from diverse sources where possible (different speakers and years) to highlight the public nature of information frames. To maintain clarity, I

139 will not unduly repeat or elaborate on certain frames that have already been introduced and have remained uniform in content across time.

Whereas some discursive associations have maintained high ranking between periods (for example, references to Australia’s generous humanitarian record maintained a dominant 5th and 4th most frequent association during the VRC and in the New Millennium respectively) many of the most frequent and widespread utterances coded in New Millennium relate to issues that emerged during that period. As the Tampa affair unfolded, Prime Minister Howard famously reasserted the narrative of Australia’s generosity, stating on 29 August 2001,

“…it has to be said that, in the last 20 years, no country has been more generous to

refugees than Australia. After the Indochinese events of the 1970s, this country took,

on a per capita basis, more Indochinese refugees than any country on earth.”355

Similarly, emphasising the valuable contribution that refugees have made to Australian life increased between periods. This frame remained relatively dominant at 1.46% of speech, representing 58 utterances across 52 sources and rose from 18th to 13th most dominant placing within the symbolic order. For example on 13 February 2002 the Member for Throsby, Jennie

George argued,

“Our country is richer for the many refugees and migrants who have settled here.

Twenty-five per cent of the population in Throsby were born overseas and have

contributed to the rich tapestry of people living in a country noted hitherto for its racial

tolerance and vibrant mix of cultures.”356

355House of Representatives Official Hansard, 29 August 2001 p.30517 356House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 February 2002 p.141

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Speaking in support for the Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011, the

Member for Macquarie, Louise Markus told parliament,

“For over 60 years Australia's asylum and humanitarian program has brought many

people to our shores who have made valuable contributions to the nation and their local

communities.”357

This argument was not limited to dissenting voices or those in opposition: highlighting the valuable contribution of refugees was a feature common to all governments and parties. This touches on themes previously introduced- to achieve border security and continue to trade off political capital from refugee resettlement, the executive has not typically attacked the value of the refugee regime per se (which logically must remain worthwhile.) Rather, by strategically divorcing boat people from the refugee label they have been separated from the symbolic associations it carries. One consequence of this process has been to effectively disarm pro- refugee arguments, which can (tension notwithstanding) theoretically coexist with harsh policies that harm boat people.

Framing Australia’s national identity as explicitly ‘refugee-accepting,’ provides a strong example of this. This narrative strand grew substantially from 0.93% of speech during the VRC to 1.51% of all discussion in the New Millennium, 60 utterances in 50 separate sources. A lengthy inclusion by the Member for Deakin Phillip Barresi from 31 October 2006 serves as clear example historical narrative,

“This country has a proud record in taking refugees into its society, from right after

World War II, when they came from countries such as Poland in eastern Europe. In the

1950s we saw refugees coming from Hungary and Czechoslovakia...We have refugees

357House of Representatives Official Hansard, 25 May 2011 p.4505

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from the Balkan wars of the 1990s. People came from the Indochinese community in

the 1970s and from Chile and El Salvador, and, of course, in more recent times people

have come from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Refugees and migrants have enriched

this nation.”358

On 17 September 2009, the Member for Mayo, the Hon. Jamie Briggs went further,

“We have a very proud record in this country, as the member for Hindmarsh rightly

pointed out, over the last 200 years—over the last 60 years in particular—of accepting

people from a wide range of places. We are probably second to none in accepting people

who, for one reason or another, have fled from where they were living.”359

Framing refugee issues within Australia’s legal obligation to the UN Convention also remained relatively dominant at 8th place in the symbolic order, comprising 1.88% of all discussion with

75 utterances. Nevertheless, that constituted a fall from 2nd most dominant placing.

Emphasising that humanitarian need should drive the politics of asylum similarly remained frequent, comprising 1.33% of all speech with 53 uttered references, yet the frame fell in dominance from 3rd to 15th place in the symbolic order. These frames illustrate the fate of narrative strands that were dominant in previous decades: they remained relatively frequent but ultimately fell in coverage, increasingly drowned out by emerging frames that articulated the issues facing Australia with the advent of the Third Wave of boat arrivals. Interestingly, utterances criticising the scapegoating of refugees amounted to the most frequent reference of the period, comprising 2.16% of all discussion, 86 references in 65 separate sources. For

358House of Representatives Official Hansard, 31 October 2006 p.161 359House of Representatives Official Hansard, 17 September 2009 p.9911

142 example, as the events surrounding Tampa unfolded, the Member for Bowman Con Sciacca criticised those calling refugees illegal immigrants,

“In any event, it is crass and it is wedge politics at its worst to be using this sort of issue

to try to pick up a few cheap political votes. I think it is disgusting.”360

The following year, the Member for Rankin, Dr Craig Emerson argued,

“It is fair to say that, at least in the Post-War era, governments have not sought to use

immigration for political purposes and to yield political dividends at the ballot

box…[but] ever since that day in August last year, this government has persisted in

seeking to use the issue of asylum seekers to yield for itself political dividends.”361

When he was Prime Minister, Rudd adopted this rhetorical line, telling parliament on 22

October 2009,

“And he [Opposition Leader Malcolm Turnbull] has sat back and encouraged the likes

of all those opposite to engage in the most extreme comments possible in order to, first

of all, have a debate on this matter; secondly, to bring about fear in the community;

and, thirdly, to obtain political advantage from the above.”362

The sheer coverage of this frame highlights a surprising trend (considering assumptions sourced from secondary literature) regarding the frequency of rhetorical devices that can be considered counter-narratives to securitization in the New Millennium. For example, to guard against moral panic and place the issue in perspective, political elites argued that Australia’s experience of the refugee issue was comparatively small in global terms on 45 occasions in 38

360House of Representatives Official Hansard, 22 August 2001 p.30025 361House of Representatives Official Hansard, 26 June 2002 p.30025 362House of Representatives Official Hansard, 22 October 2009 p.10756

143 separate sources. Comprising 1.13% of all speech in the period, the frame achieved a relatively dominant 21st placing in the symbolic order. Acting as Deputy Chairman of the Joint Standing

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Colin Hollis told reported to parliament on

18 June 2001,

“One should bear in mind also—with some of the hysteria in the media, on talkback

radio and among opinion makers—that the overall numbers in Australia are minuscule,

even though unprecedented, when compared with the numbers of refugees around the

world, particularly in parts of Europe.”363

The Member for Parramatta, Julie Owens echoed these views, stating on 16 March 2010,

“The idea that world refugees are all looking towards Australia is simply false. The

number of refugees that arrive unauthorised in Australia is very, very small relative to

those arriving in other countries around the world.”364

The idea that Australian xenophobia was driving the issue crystalized in the period, rising significantly to 1.26% of discussion with 50 utterances across 38 sources. For example, the

Member for Calwell, Maria Vamvakinou told parliament on 13 February 2002,

“It was horrifying to see xenophobia and race used by some as a campaign weapon in

the last election. Pandering to the darkest elements of the Australian political psyche,

particularly at a time of intense economic insecurity, may well offer short-term political

advantages, however, it will do enormous damage to Australia both internationally and

domestically in the long term.“365

363House of Representatives Official Hansard, 18 June 2001 p.27684 364House of Representatives Official Hansard, 16 March 2010 p.2651 365House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 February 2002 p.81

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The Member for Fremantle, the Hon. Melissa Parke reflected on 24 June 2009,

“It was done as a part of the political positioning of the Howard government on the

issue of so-called ‘border control’; as part of the appeal to xenophobia; and as one of

several high-pitched tunes to be played on the dog whistle…”366

The content above demonstrates how securitization has been continually challenged by the parallel development of counter-narratives. Consequently, the securitization process cannot be equated with a total counterrevolution against the norms governing the international refugee regime and resistance to the process can be identified throughout the period. Naturally, it is this ideological schism which has fuelled and maintained the salience and controversy surrounding the issue. Several other frames that grew within the symbolic order serve as evidence. For example, emphasising that it is oppression and violent persecution that drives asylees to flee their homeland was the 9th most common frame in operation in this period, representing 1.68% of all discussion at 67 utterances. This constitutes a marked rise in the dominance of the frame when compared with the VRC where it comprised 0.74% of speech. This upswing corresponds to the frame’s adoption as a counter-securitizing claim in the period. This is clearly exhibited in a quote from the Member for Werriwa Laurie Ferguson on 18 March 2013,

“the level of boats coming to this country is very much to do with what is happening in

countries overseas in regards to human rights abuses, racism, discrimination, torture

and murder, than it does to do with the policies within this country itself.”367

In the face of government restriction, political elites stressing the issue of nonrefoulment grew to constitute the 16th most dominant frame in debate, encompassing 1.33% of all speech with

366House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 June 2009 p.7015 367House of Representatives Official Hansard, 18 March 2013 p.2493

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53 references. On 18 October 2010 the Member for Moreton Graham Perrett offered affirmation of this principle,

“In accordance with our international obligations and humanitarian spirit, we will not

return asylum seekers to a place where they are likely to be persecuted. I say that in

particular because many of my community are Hazara.”368

Concerned over the prospect of refoulment, Julie Owens told parliament on 12 February 2013,

“I was shocked last week to hear the shadow minister for immigration, Scott Morrison,

and the shadow minister for foreign affairs, Julie Bishop, declaring that if elected to

government they would return all Sri Lankan asylum seeker boats to Sri Lanka without

first testing any refugee claims. I was appalled to hear the shadow minister for

immigration and citizenship repeat his statement in the House this week.”369

The fact that criticism levelled at Australia’s detention regime comprised the second most frequent and widespread frame of the period illustrates a strong reaction against the form of

Australia’s deterrent practices. Political elites criticized Australia’s detention regime on 86 occasions across 52 separate sources, constituting 2.16% of all discussion.

On 18 June 2002, the Member for Melbourne Lindsay Tanner stated,

“After spending a couple of hours there it was very easy to see, even though this

apparently is the most hospitable of the detention centres, just why people in detention

are traumatised and in particular why they do things to themselves that many of us find

very hard to understand.”370

368House of Representatives Official Hansard, 18 October 2010 p.571 369House of Representatives Official Hansard, 12 February 2013 p.1019 370House of Representatives Official Hansard, 18 June 2002 p.3725

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On 16 March 2010, Julie Owens reflected,

“The Howard government actually started a funding program to assist people who had

been in detention centres and needed assistance in resettling, having spent so many

years in trauma. We cannot go back to that.”371

Coded as a related subcategory, criticism framing offshore detention practices as illegal or immoral gathered another 30 utterances, a further 0.65% of all speech. The Member for

Denison, the Independent Andrew Wilkie provided a clear example on 10 September 2012,

“The restoration of the Pacific solution is unlawful and illegal, because clearly, as a

signatory to the refugee convention, we have a legal obligation…when someone comes

to our shores, we should give them protection, hear their claims and, if their claims are

found to be accurate, to be justified, we should give them refuge and let them share this

country with us.”372

Political elites brought the growing costs of refugee issues into focus on 45 occasions in 33 separate sources, representing 1.13% of all discussion. This amounts to a marked increase in utterances regarding financial cost, up from 0.56% during the VRC. Drawing attention to the plight of minors in detention and the welfare of children refugees was frequent and distinct enough to warrant its own node. This represented 1.99% of all speech in the period with 79 utterances.

Clearly, drawing upon the emotive power of this device in Opposition, Gillard told parliament on 13 May 2003,

371House of Representatives Official Hansard, 16 March 2010 pp.2654-5 372House of Representatives Official Hansard, 10 September 2012 p.9983

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“Labor will free children from behind the razor wire. Labor will return detention centre

management to the public sector where it rightly belongs.”373

As Leader of the Opposition Kim Beazley echoed this call on 9 August 2006,

“Children should never be held in detention and no-one should be held indefinitely in

detention. Those two principles are impossible to enforce in another country. It is as

simple as that.”374

Ultimately, even the dominance of this rhetorical device belies the ascendency of securitization: apparently refugee children are marked by an innocence their parents do not possess. The legal and moral controversy surrounding Australia’s detention practices resulted in political elites repeatedly drawing attention to the need for expediency in processing refugees. This was identified on 50 occasions across 38 sources, constituting a relatively frequent 1.26% of speech. Offering an expedient policy alternative, Julia Gillard stated from

Opposition 13 May 2003,

“Labor will run a fast, fair and transparent processing regime on Christmas Island and

on mainland Australia that determines 90 per cent of refugee claims in 90 days. Genuine

refugees will be quickly identified and released while failed claimants will be quickly

returned.”375

On 14 May 2009, the Member for Melbourne Ports, Michael Danby echoed this emphasis,

“The Rudd government was elected on a platform of… ensuring that everyone who

tries to enter Australia is processed quickly and treated fairly. That is what the

373House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 May 2003 p.14007 374House of Representatives Official Hansard, 9 August 2006 p.30 375House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 May 2003 p.14007

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government is doing, and I am confident the Australian people will continue to support

this new and more humane, just, rational and effective policy.”376

The fact that so many of the most frequent narrative devices of the period can be considered desecuritizing arguments or counter-narratives to the securitization process (and have ultimately been unsuccessful) is further corroborating evidence that a distinct securitization process has occurred. This is significant because it indicates that public acquiescence to the process cannot be put down to ignorance or apathy: both sides of the debate have been adequately represented by political elites over several electoral periods. In Australia the audience either supports, or has been persuaded to acquiesce to, securitized politics for unauthorised arrivals.

Several frames that more clearly resemble securitizing claims achieved dominance in the period. One manifestation was the emergence of a complicated discursive nexus that equated sovereignty with territorial integrity and, therefore, border security. The argument that sovereignty was inseparable from border security was put forward on 43 occasions across 34 sources, achieving relative dominance at 1.08% of all speech. Linking refugee issues with health and security screening increased from two utterances during the VRC to 42 utterances in the New Millennium where it comprised 1.06% of all speech. The significance of these framing devices will be developed when discussing the impact of international security on the politics of asylum in Chapter VI. Among all securitizing claims, the call to ‘stop the boats’ provided the most concise performative injunction. It achieved 20th most dominant placing in the symbolic order with 48 utterances, 1.21% of all speech.

376House of Representatives Official Hansard, 14 May 2009 p.3990

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For example, Debating the Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and Other

Measures) Bill 2011, the Member for Wright, Scott Buchholz argued,

“This is an issue that Australian people want fixed. In my electorate people come up

to me and say, 'You've got to stop the boats.' Those who are most passionate and

emotional about trying to stop the boats are our newer Australians.”377

The following year, on the 13 March 2013 the Member for Solomon, Natasha Griggs told parliament,

“It is fair to say that Labor's management of this issue has been a disaster. The boats

must be stopped. There is no argument that people smuggling is a good result for

anyone. It is unsafe for asylum seekers and every year people die from taking this risk.

Stopping the boats is a priority in my electorate.”378

Building off this frame, the argument that softening Australia’s border integrity post-09

(dismantling the Pacific Solution) directly led to the spike of unauthorised arrivals was presented on 40 occasions across 29 separate sources, a further 1% of all discussion.

Rising to debate the Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and Other

Measures) Bill 2011, the Member for Murray the Hon. Sharman Stone argued,

“This action must go down as one of the most shameful episodes in our settlement

history: the episode of Labor dismantling a policy that was working and replacing it

with a strategy that gave people smugglers a whole new set of cash flow and profit.”379

377House of Representatives Official Hansard, 15 August 2012 p.8667 378House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 March 2013 p.1949 379House of Representatives Official Hansard, 15 August 2012 p.8657

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The general idea that Australia is ‘soft on illegal immigration’ crystalized in the New

Millennium comprising a frequent 1.66% of all discussion. Overwhelmingly, when this charge was not directed at the nation, it was levelled at the Labor Party and (to a lesser extent) the

Greens, as opposed to the Coalition. Similarly, the idea that the asylum process was being abused constituted 1.26% of all discussion – a dominant 17th place within the symbolic order.

Discussing refugees within the context of combatting people smuggling rose sharply to become the third most frequent discursive reference, comprising 2.11% of all discussion at 84 utterances. Content from these frames will be reviewed when exploring the impact of economic changes in Chapter V.

The queue-jumping metaphor can be clearly identified as dominant discourse in the period.

Encompassing 1.96% of all speech with 78 utterances across 54 sources, the frame constituted the 6th most frequent in operation. Sometimes the metaphor itself was enough to impart value and meaning. The Member for Forde Kay Elson told parliament on 9 August 2006,

“The majority of Australians support the strong stance the government has taken on

[the refugee] issue. They recognise that the Australian ideal of a ‘fair go’ is undermined

when people can queue jump or try backdoor measures to get what they want.”380

Often, however, the metaphor was linked with the issues of people smuggling and illegal immigration. On June 6 2002, Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs Gary

Hargrave stated,

“…even those who have come to this country as refugees, who have waited their turn

and come through the system do not want their status—the value they have in

380House of Representatives Official Hansard, 9 August 2006 p.36

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Australian citizenship and participation in the Australian community—undermined by

illegal queue jumpers.”381

The Member for O’Connor Hon. Wilson Tuckey reiterated this view on 24 June 2009,

“It is not a wise move to send signals to the people smugglers of the world that further

encourage them to entice people into a very risky process that can only be described, in

terms of Australia’s refugee policy, as queue jumping. Queue jumping is not to be

encouraged.”382

Emphasis on how queue jumping negatively affects the world’s most vulnerable crystalized in the speech of political elites, evolving into discourse that explicitly describes a dichotomy between smuggled, undeserving self-selected refugees and genuine refugees in UN camps. The device was so frequent it warranted its own related coded category, which constituted the 7th most frequent in operation, a further 1.91% of all discussion with 76 references across 58 sources. Philip Ruddock encapsulated this argument on 6 June 2001,

“The developed countries around the world are spending something like $US10 billion

to manage people who turn up on their borders and put their hands up, free enough to

travel with the money to do so, and say, ‘I am a refugee.’ They say that they are the

same as some of these people languishing in the most appalling circumstances around

the world you could ever see—‘I’m just like one of them.’ In truth they are not.”383

A quote from George Christensen further highlights its emotive application,

“I know that many decent Australians would welcome genuine refugees, but something

sticks in their throat when they see people from landlocked countries who fly to

381House of Representatives Official Hansard, 29 August 2001 p.3358 382House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 June 2009 p.7011 383House of Representatives Official Hansard, 6 June 2001 p.27497

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Indonesia and then pay thousands of dollars to get on a boat to sneak into this country,

to the detriment of people who are waiting in refugee camps in places like Africa.”384

On 25 June 2009 Member for Cowan Mr Simpkins argued,

“Those that languish in those camps are the ones that wait patiently for their

opportunity. They are the real thing: they are exactly the sort of people that we should

have in this country as refugees. They are the sort of people who are legitimate refugees,

such as the Karen people.”385

Framing the issue of boat people within the context of deaths at sea occurred on 6 occasions during the VRC where it comprised 1.12% of speech. It grew in dominance to representing

1.50% of discussion with 60 references across 44 sources in the New Millennium. Furthermore, it became a justification for securitized practice when it was not so used before. Introducing sweeping changes to the Migration Act in September 2001, Ruddock told parliament,

“…we are wanting people to avoid those hazardous, life threatening and life taking

voyages and to have their claims considered by the UNHCR in Indonesia or Pakistan,

rather than having them considered here, where they know they will get different

outcomes.”386

This frame was also utilized by subsequent governments. Minister for Immigration and

Citizenship the Hon. Chris Bowen stated, “The time for action was long ago but certainly cannot be delayed any further. Saving lives has been what this is all about.”387 By emphasising

384House of Representatives Official Hansard, 10 September 2012 p.9957 emphasis added 385House of Representatives Official Hansard, 25 June 2009 p.7187 386House of Representatives Official Hansard, 19 September 2001 p.31020 387House of Representatives Official Hansard, 14 August 2012 p.8500 Emphasis added

153 the need to stop deaths at sea at that time, the government attempted to evade notions that reimplementing offshore detention was a credibility-damaging policy backflip. On 12 occasions, political elites linked the need to stop deaths at sea with calls to stop the boats coming, illustrating how the issue became linked border protection. Morrison stated this plainly on 3 February 2010,

“For me, saving lives is a very good reason to take decisions to stop the boats.”388

The Member for Indi Sophie Mirabella argued on 27 June 2012,

“The reality is that, in order to stop the tragic loss of life and people drowning on the

seas, there needs to be a policy that actually works. There needs to be a policy that is

actually a deterrent to people smugglers.”389

Whether its genesis was cynical or earnest, avoiding deaths at sea has become a central justification for naval interdiction and harsh deterrence. The idea that refugees are a growing problem was uttered on 43 occasions in 35 separate sources in the period, comprising 1.08%.

This constitutes a proportional decrease, however, down from 1.49% of discussion during the

VRC representing a fall from the 19th to 23rd most frequent frame in operation.

Speaking in support of the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill

2006, the Member for Leichhardt, Warren Entsch argued,

“This debate is about 43 people in a leaky boat. The problem we have is that those 43

can very quickly become 430 or 4,300 because, even in this case, there were many lined

up to come after if they had seen that these people had got a successful outcome.”390

388House of Representatives Official Hansard, 3 February 2010 p.336 389House of Representatives Official Hansard, 27 June 2012 p.8240 390House of Representatives Official Hansard, 10 August 2006 p.31

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Discussing a 2013 Report titled Inquiry into Migration and Multiculturalism in Australia391 the

Member for Makin Tony Zappia told parliament on 15 May 2013,

“At a time when the movement of people around the world has never been greater,

when religious differences are causing conflict in so many places, when global refugee

numbers continue to rise, when population sustainability is a topic on the national

agenda, the report's findings are timely.”392

In part, the downturn in usage of this frame synergizes with the fact that political elites don’t necessarily need to think the refugee issue is growing to be concerned. In the contemporary era, policy makers are generally aware it is already a problem of enormous magnitude. Framing refugee issues within the global magnitude of the problem comprised 1.46% of all speech in the New Millennium, 58 utterances across 48 separate sources. This is a stark net and proportionate increase from two references during the VRC and signifies a growing tendency to view refugee issues within their larger and more serious international context, which will be further discussed in Chapter VI.

Political elites framed Australia’s policy towards unauthorized arrivals as harsh on 32 occasions across 25 sources, constituting a relatively frequent 0.80% of speech. This presentation was not solely limited to those arguing against offshore detention but occasionally granted by government itself, an admission recently echoed on public television by Prime

Minister Turnbull who stated, “It is a tough policy, I grant you that, it is a harsh policy”393

391Inquiry into Migration and Multiculturalism in Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Migration, Commonwealth of Australia, 2013 392House of Representatives Official Hansard, 15 May 2013 p.3427 393Beech, A., “Q&A: Malcolm Turnbull defends ‘harsh’ asylum seeker policy, denies Medicare privatization” ABC News, 21 June 2016 Accessed Online: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06- 21/q&a:-malcolm-turnbull-defends-tough-asylum-seeker-policy/7527990

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Conclusions on Conceptions of Asylum Seekers in the New

Millennium

The transformation of discourse surrounding asylum seekers during the New Millennium can be characterized by three major shifts. Firstly, discussion moved away from an abstract conception of refugees (international legal definitions, democratic identity, anti-racist humanitarian ideals, etc.), to one that is pragmatically based in Australia’s experience with unauthorised boat arrivals. To political elites in the 1970’s, the relations entailed in comprehending the issue were relatively simple and philosophically cogent – appreciation of the refugee Convention and work of UN bodies was their foundation in thinking about the global refugee problem. Refugees were unfortunate people driven to flee their homes by conflict or persecution by illiberal regimes overseas. Australia’s role, as a prosperous and free

Western democracy, was to transform sympathy into assistance and grant a portion of those people resettlement opportunities as an affirmation of good international citizenship within the liberal order. Refugees were a political issue, not a criminal one. As soon as asylees did become a symbol of organized crime in the form of people smuggling, political elites immediately reacted to control the practice.

Secondly, the persistence of controversy and debate over securitizing claims has solidified ideological contestation into opposing camps: those generally supporting securitizing injunctions and those arguing counter-securitizing narratives. As more asylum seekers began to journey to Australia and enter unauthorised, debates began to centre around the problematique of boat arrivals and, consequently, competing visions over what constitutes the ideal response. This drowning out effect has made unerring coherence around abstract principles not only impossible, but considering public demand to halt illegal incursion into

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Australian territory, politically untenable. This has favoured effective policy solutions at the expense of legal-humanitarian principles and prompted continued debate among political elites as to what constitutes the ideal balance on this continuum.

Thirdly, the data collected supports findings in the literature that more sophisticated arguments have evolved to justify securitized practice after desecuritization was briefly won by emotive counter-securitizing arguments like pointing to welfare of children in detention. Since then, securitizing formulations have also undergone sophistication to become more persuasive: referencing the need to stop deaths at sea or defend liberal multiculturalism’s long-term viability. The tension between pro-refugee arguments, stressing the fidelity of asylum seekers and calling to improve their welfare and, conversely, those demonizing unauthorised arrivals to cement securitized practices has resulted in a (unstable) synthesis. The value of the refugee regime is conceptually maintained but unauthorised boat arrivals are persistently rejected as illegitimate in government propaganda. Having addressed the empirical developments constituting the case studies of this thesis and introduced the dominant discursive strands of the periods, I will now move on to those remaining chapters that centre around the hypotheses that will guide thematic and paradigmatic analysis. It is this approach that will provide meaningful insights into which sociological changes have facilitated the securitization of humanitarian migration and identify the root causes behind shifts in the political sphere. This process will begin with Chapter IV, weighing the hypothesis that Australia’s history and national identity explains securitization against the primary source data collected to determine its accuracy.

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Chapter IV

The Historical Hypothesis:

Australia’s Colonial Legacy

Can Australia’s willingness to resort to highly securitized and restrictive gatekeeping, even in the case of genuine refugees, simply be put down to its history and national character?

It is necessary to analyse the impact that history, culture and identity has upon politics and the extent to which these factors inform and guide the behaviour of nation states. However, these factors must be placed within a greater context in order to fully appreciate their impact as variables. Consequently, this chapter will assess the extent to which the particular circumstances of national life (including Australia’s unique geography and history) drive the securitization of humanitarian migration in Australia. Because Australia’s immigration history is inseparable from questions of race and official racism, this chapter will also double as an introduction of the role of racism in Australian politics over time and its role in the securitization of asylum. This line of investigation will be supplemented by those remaining chapters pertaining to the international economy and international security environment, respectively. In McMaster’s comprehensive book overviewing Australia’s relationship with asylum seekers, a quotation by then Australian Human Rights commissioner Chris Sidoti that ostensibly encapsulates the Australian character is included to introduce the subject,

“Throughout our brief history Australians have had two obsessions, one is locking people up and the other is the yellow peril. Unauthorised boat arrivals bear the full brunt of both”394

394McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001 v.

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According to this theory, unauthorised boat arrivals act to trigger “well-rehearsed”395 moral panics regarding the prospect of demographic swamping or outright invasion from the North, a notion that has occupied a central place in the Australian national narrative. McMaster highlights the stark difference to different groups of refugees by pointing to news headlines in

1999- “Sanctuary” and “Safely Into Our Arms” described the arrival of refugees from Kosovo,

“Invaded!” and “Outcry Over Illegals” described a boat of Chinese.396

In a 1994 comparison between Australia and Canada, Glenn and Cox found Canada’s approach to humanitarian migration to be more judicially based and attributed Australia’s executive heavy, departmental approach to immigration as a manifestation of Australia’s historical immigration priorities.397 Conclusive insights would require greater clarity as to whether

Australia’s location and history has fostered the development of a national character that renders exclusionary tendencies more likely or whether Canada is simply sheltered from a greater number of unauthorized arrivals and, consequently, reactionary panic is not provoked.

Ibrahim’s account of the xenophobia and racism that marked the arrival of 600 odd Chinese boat people who arrived in Canada over 1999398 suggests the latter might be the case. While these people were asylum seekers, they were quick to be branded illegal immigrants, the same discourse that has accompanied securitization in Australia. Hier and Greenburg’s study into the symbolic representations of asylum seekers in Canada399 offers further supports this claim,

395Hyndman, J. and A. Mountz, ‘Another Brick in the Wall? Neo‐Refoulement and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe’, Government and Opposition, 43(2), 2008, p.257 396McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001 2001 p.2 397Cox, D., et al., ‘Illegal immigration and Refugee Claims’, in H. Adelman et al. (eds) Immigration and Refugee Policy: Australia and Canada Compared, 1, University of Toronto Press, 1994, pp. 283- 308. 398Ibrahim, M., ‘The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse’, International Migration, 43(5), 2005 p.173 399See Hier, S. P. and J. L. Greenberg, ‘Constructing a Discursive Crisis: Risk, Problematisation and Illegal Chinese in Canada’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 25(3), 2002 pp. 490–513

159 a result replicated in a study by Lynn and Lea into the same issue in the UK.400 The symbolic representation of asylum issues as an invasion against national sovereignty appears to be common to anti-asylum arguments internationally.

The significance of the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees in Australia becomes more pronounced when it is placed within the context of Australia’s entire immigration history. This is particularly important for the subject of this thesis, as exclusionary immigration practices of past eras (especially when aimed at restricting various types of undesirables) share features in common with the recent securitization of humanitarian migration channels which in some was is resurrecting imperial-era worldviews.401 Australia, where immigration restriction so unapologetically followed racial lines, provides a particularly good example to explore the charge that the securitization of migration from the late 20th Century onwards amounts to a

“New Racism”402 or the de facto revival of policies of racial exclusion in Western democracies.

While it should be acknowledged that ‘gatekeeping’ (regulating entry and exit from the nation) is a central and legitimate concern for all modern states,403 Australia is the only nation that strictly adheres to detaining all unauthorised arrivals indefinitely – even in the case of genuine asylum seekers.

400Lynn, N. and S. Lea, ‘A Phantom Menace and the New Apartheid': the Social Construction of Asylum-Seekers in the United Kingdom’, Discourse & Society, 14(4), 2003, pp. 425-452 401Ibrahim, M., ‘The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse’, International Migration, 43(5), 2005, p.171 402Ibid. p.164; see also Barker, M. The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe, Aletheia Books, 1982 403Roos, C., The EU and Immigration Policies: Cracks in the Walls of Fortress Europe, Springer, 2013 p.1

160

To fully understand how the management of immigration has occupied a central place in

Australian history, it is worth stressing how questions over immigration were fundamental to the development of national identity and the formation of the Australian state itself. Knowledge of this legacy is crucial to fully consider questions relating to what extent humanitarian migration has been securitized in Australia. As a colonial settler society, Australian authorities have always been interested in controlling migration. The colonial origins of the Australian state, like those of the United States and Canada, have rendered the foundation mythos of those societies as inexorably linked with immigration.404 In Australia, the primary role of strict selective migration has been to protect British hegemony. Uniquely, executive efforts to populate land seized by the British Crown were doubled with the British government’s desire to expel huge numbers of prisoners to ease pressure on local jails.

Convicts were forcibly relocated to Australia to begin building the Anglo-Celtic population and to secure land that had been dispossessed of the local Indigenous population. They would also provide cheap slave-like labour for the construction of the colonial infrastructure that would pave the way for the growth of the Australian colonies into productive territories. The reason for the over-strained criminal justice system in Britain in the first place was their overzealous incarceration regime, which sought to stamp out crime with a zero-tolerance approach. The fact that many convicts were sentenced to a brutal life of hard labour in foreign lands after being arrested for crimes that would in time be seen as misdemeanours, such as petty theft, means that the process of convict resettlement to Australia draws significant parallels with other forced migration flows described in this thesis. This is particularly true in the case of the Irish, who were typically deported for softer crimes than their English

404Castles, S. and E. Vasta, ‘Australia: New Conflicts Around Old Dilemmas’, Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004p.144

161 counterparts, in part because their expulsion doubled as removing political undesirables.

Accordingly, some of the first European Australians could be considered refugees.

Over time, immigration to the Australian Colonies became predominately comprised of free settlers from the British Isles who hoped to build a prosperous life for themselves and contribute to the creation of self-sustaining settler societies. Even at the time of Federation in

1900, almost all Australian migrants were racially Anglo-Celtic and came from a relatively similar British culture. Those born in Australia considered themselves first and foremost British subjects. The first major social contact between Anglo-Celtic Australians and migrants of plainly visible racial difference began in the 1850’s when Chinese migrants began to arrive during the gold rushes.405 Relations between the Chinese and Anglo-Australians were tense, primarily because the presence of the Chinese was resented. This resulted in violent confrontation on the Goldfields on several occasions. While opportunistic random anti-Chinese violence was common in other places, such as California, attacks on the Chinese in Australia took a level of organisation not seen elsewhere:406 a significant feature when considering how anti-immigrant political organisation would gain ‘national’ coherence.

The most powerful sentiment to emerge was the idea that the arrival of Chinese workers would introduce a downward pressure on the wages of White Australians. This logic was highly racialized, it was thought that the inferior Chinese accepted lower wages and subsequently undermined the ability for Whites to secure a level of welfare that they felt they deserved.407

405McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001 p.40 406Fitzgerald, J. Big White Lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia, UNSW Press p.38 407Jupp, J., From White Australia to Woomera: the Story of Australian Immigration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 p.8

162

Anger over Chinese immigration was manifested in racist propaganda which developed into political organisation, including within the trade union involvement.408 It was in this way that ideas of economic privilege and welfare became linked with the need for highly selective and restrictive immigration. The desire to formulate a unified immigration policy to be coordinated continent-wide is considered as a central pressure that facilitated enough cooperation between the Australian Colonies to Federate in 1900.409 Even Alfred Deakin, the first Prime Minister of

Australia, called federation a ‘miracle’410 that was able to succeed principally out of fear of invasion and Chinese immigration.411

The fact that the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act was one of the first pieces of legislation passed by the parliament of Australia is often cited as evidence of the strong historical connection between the existence of the Australian state, Australian national identity and preoccupation with the management of immigration.412 The legislation introduced a ‘dictation test’ that could be arbitrarily conducted in several European languages, ultimately functioning to provide authorities with the means to test undesirable applicants, principally Asian migrants, tests they had no hope of passing to gain admittance into Australia. Historian Keith Hancock supports the view that the exclusion of non-whites from the other grand nation-building programs of the day (such as the franchise to vote, maternity bonus, and the invalid and old age pensions) placed racial exclusion as a central ideological tenant of Australian nationhood.413 This is in contrast to other settler societies of the Pacific Rim (such as Canada,

New Zealand and the United States) which did implement racially based immigration

408Castles, S. and E. Vasta, ‘Australia: New Conflicts Around Old Dilemmas’, Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p.142 409Crock, M., Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, Federation Press, 1998,, p.13 410Macintyre, S., A Concise History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.137 411King, J., Great Moments in Australian History, Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 2009, p.113 412Crock, M., Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia, Federation Press, 1998, p.13 413McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001 p.41

163 restriction such as those aimed at the Chinese, but never conflated racial exclusion with nationhood to the extent Australia did.414 In fact, Australia was the only one of these nations to explicitly link nationality with racial purity in this sense, leaving the legacy of ‘White

Australia’ more memorable and sociologically pertinent than ‘White Canada’ and ‘White New

Zealand’ which, (although they existed as immigration policies) never came to dominate conceptions of national identity to as great an extent.415

The formation of a national Australian in-group through racial ideology left Asia as the main

Other or out-group of racial and cultural difference from White Australia.416 This dichotomy completed the psychological profile (which typically relies on this duality) of this new national identity. Racist political mobilisation over restricting Chinese immigrants had made

Australians sensitive to the prospect of Asian immigration. Australians felt Asia had to be guarded against – it was Australia’s major existential threat.417 This sentiment was (and remains) exacerbated by the experience of isolation in Australian culture, made famous by

Blainey’s ‘tyranny of distance.’418 The idea that Australia was a particularly vulnerable outpost of British (and by extension Western-European) civilization, surrounded by populous nations of radically different cultures made the British in Australia feel cut off from the core of their culture. In a more objective sense, this translated into security anxiety: Australia has always been geographically distant from major allies (such as Great Britain and later the United States) and, consequently, military aid might be far away or lacking. Indeed, the inability of the British

414Fitzgerald, J. Big White Lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia, UNSW Press, p.2 415Ibid. p.1; Fitzgerald, J., ‘Who Cares What They Think’ John Winston Howard, William Morris Hughes and the Pragmatic Vision of Australian National Sovereignty’, in Broinowski, A., (ed), Double Vision: Asian Accounts of Australia, Pandanus Books, 2004, p.23 416McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001 p.3 417Jupp, J., From White Australia to Woomera: the Story of Australian Immigration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 p.17 418Ibid. p.10

164

Empire’s security umbrella to protect Australia during the Second World War (instead advocating the territorial concession of the entirety of the Australian continent north of Perth to Brisbane to Japan) cemented these images of the vulnerable North.

Australia’s nascent self-conception as an ethnically White nation illuminates the colonies’ relationship with the British Empire in another critical sense. As previously stated, throughout much of the 19th Century and early 20th Century, Anglo-Australians considered themselves

British people in Australia. Their identity as Australians did not distinguish themselves from other British peoples. The features of national identity that would come to separate Australians from the British, including the cultural myths of egalitarianism, fairness, welfare and good working conditions were organised by Labor movement leaders who were often ‘rabid racists.’419 Australian exclusionary racism was not only a legacy of imperial racism but indeed more powerful than that which existed in the British Empire generally. British Imperial authorities were accustomed to dealing with racially diverse population and heavily invested in nascent race relations: most British subjects were Indian or African by 1900. Frustrated, the

British Colonial Office was opposed to Australia’s explicitly racist immigration policies. As early as 1861, the secretariat of the colonies in London, Joseph Chamberlain, warned the

Australian colonies that enforcing complete racial bans on immigration “is contrary to the general conceptions of equality which have been the guiding principle of British rule throughout the empire.”420 Therefore, the argument that racism was inseparable for these other ideological components which from the genesis of a distinctly Australian culture and nationality is supported.

419Jupp, J., From White Australia to Woomera: the Story of Australian Immigration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 p.8 420Megalogenis, G., Australia's Second Chance, Penguin UK, 2015 p.158

165

It is worth here briefly explaining the broad shift that racist ideology has undergone in Australia over the course of the nation’s history because it explains more contemporary forms of racism.

Scientific Racism, now discredited, was widely disseminated amongst academia in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries. This system proposed essential characteristic difference between human races based on genetics, leading to a hierarchy of superior and inferior races. Scientific

Racism was drawn upon to legitimate the Australian government’s draconian treatment of the

Indigenous population by appealing to the Anglo-establishment as singularly qualified to make decisions relating to the welfare of Indigenous Australians. An important part of the evolution of racism over the course of the 20th Century was the abandonment of Scientific Racism as totally unsubstantiated by the scientific and then broader academic establishment. Over time, this had led to the expression of overt displays of racial prejudice being met with hostility in most Western liberal democracies. Those arguments invoking innate biological difference, while still existing within society, are fringe in mainstream political debate. Van Dijk alleges that one consequence of this shift is that racial prejudice has become more subtly embedded and disguised in ideology and is, therefore, in some respects more insidious.421 In other words, racial prejudice has become masked as various forms of more legitimate discrimination and the anti-Racist project is more complicated.422

Broadly, the notion of biological hierarchy has been superseded by the idea of ‘cultural hierarchy’ where some cultures are superior to others. At the very least, the argument operates on the assumption that it is legitimate to defend native culture against foreign culture. This has become a central feature of the corporate identity of the modern state. Put simply, the idea of

421Van Dijk, T. A., ‘New (s) Racism: A Discourse Analytical Approach’, in S. Cottle (ed) Ethnic Minorities and the Media, 2000, p.35 422Ibid.

166 race has been overtaken by the idea of nation as the central organizing principle in society. This ideology draws strength from the fact that the formal invocation of national sovereignty has become the preeminent symbol of political legitimacy in the contemporary age.423 This is related to the emergence of New Racism as coined by Barker,424 who described this new tribe- like groupism in Western democracies. Barker identified important developments that characterizes the world-view of this new generation of far-right nativists. In this parlance, the legacy of Western Civilization must be protected to ensure the survival of the West’s superior culture, rather than lineage per se. Liberalism, Human Rights and parliamentary democracy are examples of this worthy tradition. Ostensibly, the functioning of these cultural artefacts relies on a patriotic unity that prevents sectarian dissolution.425 Foreigners can come to be a threat to the uniformity and coherence of native culture (considered here as a prerequisite for national stability) simply by exhibiting adherence to their own. Society, therefore, may need to be defended from cultural imports. For example, continued wearing of traditional garments associated with foreign cultures is regularly construed as an implicit unwillingness to integrate into the host society.426

In Australia’s case, it was only after the Second World War that the government slowly began to accept more ethnic diversity in immigration. This is significant for several reasons. The late

1940’s was the first-time Australia’s focus on securing Anglo immigration would be relaxed for the benefits of increasing the nation’s overall population. In 1947 Australia decided to cooperate with International Refugee Organisation (IRO) to permanently resettle European

423Andersen, B., ‘Imagined Communities.’ Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New York, Verso, 1991 p.3 424Barker, M. The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe, Aletheia Books, 1982 425Ibid. p.17 426Faist, T., ‘How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse, 1978–1992’, West European Politics, 17(2), 1994, p.61

167 refugees displaced by the Second World War.427 As these European refugees were being accepted, other refugees were being deported from Australia. Asian refugees of several nationalities fleeing brutal Japanese occupation had successfully found temporary asylum in

Australia, only to face deportation from the nation once hostilities had ended under the War- time Refugees Removal Act in 1949.428

The rationale for the different treatment of European and Asian refugees was intimately connected: populating the Australian continent with Europeans was to provide a bulwark against the potential of Asian demographic swamping or outright invasion, as had seemed a close occurrence during the Second World War. In other words, even the gradual (racial) liberalisation of Australia’s immigration program under the ‘Populate or Perish’ slogan was still ultimately aimed at the exclusion of Asian immigration to the continent. Considering this focus on the threat of Asia as Australia’s significant cultural Other, the introduction of legislation to deport Asian war-time refugees highlights the complicated space those individuals occupied in Australia. They were people worthy of protection according to

Australia’s self-conception as a free nation, but they were not welcome as citizens or permanent residents. The justification for the treatment of Asian refugees was made explicit in the highest levels of government, Calwell was wary that any exceptions made granting residency to Asian peoples may “open the floodgates” to uncontrolled immigration from the north.429 Racial anxiety was central – in Calwell’s words, commitment to deportation was necessary to prevent a ‘mongrel Australia.’ To illustrate just how impactful the idea of Australia’s empty North has

427York, B., ‘Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official Sources’, Information and Research Services, Parliamentary Library, 2003 p.10 428Nicholls, G., ‘Gone with hardly a trace: deportees in immigration policy’, In Neumann, K. and G. Tavan, Does History Matter?: Making and Debating Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Policy in Australia and New Zealand, ANU Press, 2009, p.12 429McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001 p.44

168 been in terms of international security, as early as 1905, US president Theodore Roosevelt warned Australia to relax racialized immigration restriction to allow for more European immigrants to populate the nation’s North as a strategy to guard against Asia power in the long- term.430

Considering that 200,000 European refugees would be accepted over the subsequent 15 years

(a substantial number comparable with modern quotas) clearly Asian refugees were excluded because they were thought undesirable immigrants. Rwandan and Algerian asylees of this time were also not considered.431 This conforms to the racialized logic of the period: even those

Southern European migrants being incorporated to bolster Australia’s population were considered less desirable than Anglo-Celtic immigrants.432 The government simply could not secure as many British migrants as it deemed necessary to achieve future security and prosperity for the nation. This remains an important point as it signifies that maintaining the

White Australian ideal was still influencing policy decisions during the 1940’s. It also illustrates that the acceptance of European refugees was conceived as a necessary trade-off rather than welcome move towards a more multicultural society. Furthermore, Neumann has established that the Immigration Minister of the time, Arthur Calwell, saw cooperation with the IRO’s resettlement scheme as a cheap immigration scheme to fulfil Australia’s strategic interests: humanitarian concern was not the motivating factor.433

It was not long after Australia had permitted some racial liberalization in its immigration programs that the Refugee Convention was drafted by the United Nations in 1951. However,

430Ibid. vii 431Every, D. and M. Augoustinos, ‘‘Taking Advantage’ or Fleeing Persecution? Opposing Accounts of Asylum Seeking,’ Journal of Sociolinguistics, 12(5), 2008, p.649 432McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001 p.43 433Neumann, K., Refuge Australia: Australia's Humanitarian Record, Thomas Telford, 2004, p.80

169 it was not until 1976 the Australia was finally forced to deal with self-selected refugees on boats. ‘Historical’ fears were still very much contemporary concerns for political elites formulating their response to Vietnamese boat people in the 1970’s. Foreign Affairs Minister

Don Willesee stated,

"I am concerned that the question of the Vietnamese refugees in Singapore and the

‘spectre of an armada’ sailing for Australia will now become the issue which will most

attract public opinion and potentially present the greatest problems"434

The prospect that granting unfettered entry to asylum seekers could open the door to extensive migration meant that there might finally be an impetus for the type of demographic swamping from Asia that concerned Australian governments. Cabinet decided that the response of the executive should ensure that this kind of outcome would not eventuate. Furthermore, those in government were conscious that any decision made would send messages to Australia’s northern neighbours- allowing unopposed entry for Vietnamese refugees could set a dangerous precedent encouraging unauthorised entry with respect to unrelated crises in the future.435 This precedent could influence future waves of people threatened with displacement and make them more inclined to enter Australia unauthorised. While the data introduced in chapter II highlights the extent to which the VRC provided a break with Australia’s history with explicit and official racism in immigration debates, it was also at this time that deterrence emerged from the rationale of those in cabinet, although it was not immediately articulated as such. Nevertheless, the government did not decide to utilize force in the form of naval interdiction. Drawing on the conflict in Indochina as a case study is useful because it proves that the fears of Australian

434Neumann, K., ‘Oblivious to the Obvious? Australian Asylum-Seeker Policies and the Use of the Past’, in Neumann, K. and G. Tavan, (eds) Does History Matter?: Making and Debating Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Policy in Australia and New Zealand, ANU Press, 2009, p.48 435Ibid. p.49

170 delegates and policy makers were not completely unfounded. Indeed, several developments over the course of the conflict in Indochina (such as the American defeat, the Vietnamese expelling of ethnic Chinese, the bombing of Cambodia) each resulted in hundreds of thousands more displaced people in the South-East Asian region – 2 million refugees over the course of the saga.436 In other words, it was the exact type of crisis that Australian policy makers had historically feared. Viviani identifies an important counterpoint that must be noted, the presence of millions of displaced refugees in South-East Asia did not result in tens of thousands of unauthorised entrants into Australia437 and the ultimate fear of Australian policy makers did not manifest at that time. This is important because the Indo-Chinese exodus remains the largest empirical example of millions of displaced people within Australia’s immediate region and, therefore, retains relevance regarding what could result from a crisis of similar magnitude in the future.

It is entirely likely that the flow-on effects from a refugee crisis of comparable size to the

VRC in the region would result in far more asylum seekers utilizing Australia as a nation of first asylum (or attempting to) in the contemporary era. Legal and clandestine migration networks are now far more established internationally. Australia regularly received more unauthorised entrants annually during the 2000’s than the total number of unauthorised entrants who arrived unauthorised during the VRC and most of those asylees were from further abroad than South-East Asia. It would be naïve to expect the Asia-Pacific region will not experience the mass displacement of people or major refugee crises in the foreseeable future, for several reasons. Firstly, no continent is immune to such macroscopic events over any considerable length of time. Secondly, state-building, a phenomenon underway in most

436Sutter, V. O. C., The Indochinese Refugee Dilemma, Louisiana State University Press, 1990 p.2 437Viviani, N. The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1984, p.159

171 developing nations, is characterized by Zolberg as a refugee generating process.438 Thirdly, the Asia-Pacific is shaping to be a stage on which major hegemonic power transitions will take place this century, shifts that can easily lead to flashpoints and conflict. Finally, the now- certain impacts of climate change upon the planet has elevated the prospect of enormous population displacement from a potential danger to a clearly emerging problem for future government. To provide just one example in the region, Bangladesh experiences material conditions particularly vulnerable to climate change. While the nation is highly populous, most of its land mass is a low-lying silt delta and is, therefore, prone to flooding. As the globe warms, the glacial melts that feed the delta will accelerate and cause the severity of flooding to increase. At the same time the sea level will rise and warmer weather will facilitate more extreme weather events such as monsoons. Chairman of The Global Military Advisory

Council on Climate Change, Munir Muniruzzaman recently stated that over the course of this century Bangladesh could lose 20% of its land mass in this manner, leading to a potential crisis in excess of 30 million refugees!439 This is significant- while research into the potential impact of climate change on conflict has been inconclusive, mass migration remains the critical mechanism in how violent conflict is expected to emerge in relation to environmental pressures.440

While questions relating to counterfactual worlds (and associated predictions) are empirically problematic, they are necessitated by appeals to deterrence which inherently involve judgements about the behaviour of people potentially being deterred. This is especially pertinent when the human costs associated with deterrent measures are high, such as

438See Zolberg, A. R. ‘The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 467(1), 1983, pp. 24-38 439Muniruzzaman, quoted in Carrington, Damien ‘Climate Change Will Stir Unimaginable Refugee Crisis, Says Military’ The Guardian, 1 December 2016 440Barnett, J., ‘Security and Climate Change’, Global Environmental Change 13(1), 2003, p.8

172 institutional child abuse. Pickering and Lambert argue that the place of deterrence as the cornerstone of Australia’s asylum policy has remained taken-for-granted for decades.441 For government, the ethical implications that punitive systems have in this form is clear. The legitimacy of deterrent policies depends upon whether the practises in question are influencing people’s behaviour.442 This philosophical dimension of deterrence is particularly relevant in the case of people fleeing for their lives, where threats of further punishment (such as imprisonment), might fail to adequately impact on people’s rational choice. If punishment is not having the desired deterrent effects, the entire punitive process simply exacerbates human suffering for little societal benefit and, therefore, becomes ethically problematic from the point of view of the criminal-justice system (from which the rationale of punishment is typically lifted and applied to other areas such as refugees).443 Critical analysis as to the real-world impact of deterrence-based policies is, therefore, necessary to assess their conceptual legitimacy.

Australia’s move towards deterrence took place in an era of bipartisanship on questions of race, immigration and refugees. Bipartisan solidarity on immigration remained intact throughout the

1980’s and 1990’s, only formally diverging in 2001. During this era, Howard was an important figure in shaping Australia’s cultural and political transformation into the contemporary period, drawing certain narratives into the mainstream that persist through to the present. Part of this influence involved reopening discussion upon the role of multiculturalism. According to

Markus, Howard’s ideological motivation can be summed up as a fight against political

441Pickering, S. and C. Lambert, ‘Deterrence: Australia's Refugee Policy’, Current Issues in Criminal Justice: Refugee Issues and Criminology, 14(1), 2002, pp. 65-86. 442Ibid. p.66 443Pickering, S., ‘Border Terror: Policing, Forced Migration and Terrorism’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 16(3), 2004, p.215

173 correctness, which to him was synonymous with thing like ‘immigrant lobby’ and the

‘aboriginal lobby.’444

Furthermore, the Howard era reflected demographic shifts in the Australian political landscape during the late 1990’s. Sections of the electorate who traditionally voted Labor, many of whom had lost employment in one of the three recessions to hit Australia in 16 years (1974-5, 1982-

3 and 1990-1), were frustrated by the sentiment that their own party had betrayed them in favour of societal Others.445 This resulted in a noteworthy electoral swing of sections of the working class towards voting for the Coalition,446 a phenomenon that entered popular consciousness with the phrase ‘Howard’s Battlers.’ Asian immigration was not the only process that reignited debate about race- the relationship between Anglo Australians and Indigenous groups was also changing in that decade. The Keating-led Labor government sought to move ahead with land rights for Aboriginal Australians and promote justice and reconciliation- a commitment enshrined in Keating’s famous 1992 Redfern Speech, now considered one of the most significant acts of oration in Australian history. A major opportunity to pursue this goal had been presented in 1992 with the landmark High Court case Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2).

Native Title provided the means for Indigenous Australians to secure access to their traditional lands, empowering indigenous communities. Reactionary dissenters gravitated to the (Liberal)

Opposition.

444Markus, A., ‘John Howard and the Naturalization of Bigotry’, In Gray G. and C. Winter (eds), The Resurgence of Racism, Clayton: Monash University Department of History, 1997 p.82 445Megalogenis, G., Australia's Second Chance, Penguin UK, 2015, p.252 446McAllister, I., ‘Border Protection, the 2001 Australian Election and the Coalition Victory’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38(3), 2003 p.450

174

Howard’s views about the role of ‘vociferous’ politically correct interest groups would foreshadow rather than conflict with some of the more extreme views of Pauline Hanson and the New Right in the 1990s. Howard’s introduction of strict gun control, precipitated by a mass shooting in 1996, drew votes away from the National Party towards the new One Nation

Party.447 Hanson’s calls to severely restrict immigration to maintain an authentic homogenous

(essentially Anglo)448 ‘Australian’ culture acts as a pertinent example of the culture-based New

Racism explained above and closely resembles international trends of the period, including the rise of similar parties in Europe like Le Pen’s National Front in France and Haider’s Freedom

Party in Austria.449

Attitudes that had developed in parallel became cemented together in political mobilization in this period. In Australia, opposition to Asian immigration, reaction against indigenous culture to defend ‘traditional’ Australian nationhood, and opposition to accepting refugees clustered together.450 Resistance to environmental regulation and multiculturalism have become tied to these features internationally.451 Australia’s modern reaction to refugees has been identified as an example of New Racism.452 Hage explicitly links Howard’s adoption of a more

447Megalogenis, G., Australia's Second Chance, Penguin UK, 2015 p.260 448Fraser, C. O. and M. R. Islam, ‘Social Identification and Political Preferences for One Nation: The Role of Symbolic Racism’, Australian Journal of Psychology, 52(3), 2000, pp. 131-137 449Clyne, M., ‘The Use of Exclusionary Language to Manipulate Opinion: John Howard, Asylum Seekers and the Reemergence of Political Incorrectness in Australia’, Journal of Language and Politics 4(2), 2005, pp.177 450Johnson, D., et al. ‘Perceptions of the Intergroup Structure and Anti-Asian Prejudice Among White Australians’, Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 8(1), 2005, p.56 451Swank, D. and H.-G. Betz, ‘Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe’, Socio-Economic Review 1(2), 2003, p.227 452See Corlett, D. (2002). ‘Asylum Seekers and the New Racism’, Dissent 8, pp. 46-47.

175 unapologetically patriotic Australian national culture (in the image of the US) as a reaction to social anxieties brought about by perceived ‘Anglo-decline.’453

There is no question the Howard Government’s campaign to demonize boat people drew upon racial elements. Ruddock’s 2002 comment that refugees “run like camels if they escape”454 authorities clearly draws on animosity towards Middle Eastern Muslims. The ‘racialization’ of discussion relating to the Islamic religion in Australian politics offers further insight into how

New Racism operates upon cultural foundations. Paranoia following 9/11 built upon these social trends but also directed the brunt of the West’s racism and prejudice towards Muslims and Middle Eastern immigrants. Though Hansonist ideology was initially aimed at those of

East Asian descent, McAllister argues that this mobilization against the threat of racial disunity easily transformed into opposition towards Middle Eastern and Islamic immigrants in the following decade.455 The racialization of anti-Islamic attitudes will be analysed in greater depth where it provides greatest insight for the topic at hand- when considering changes in the international security environment in Chapter VI.

453Hage, G., White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society, Routledge, 2012. pp.179-81 454Cited in Klocker, N., ‘Community Antagonism Towards Asylum Seekers in Port Augusta, South Australia’, Australian Geographical Studies, 42(1), 2004 p.13 455McAllister, I., ‘Border Protection, the 2001 Australian Election and the Coalition Victory’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 38(3), 2003, p.445

176

Representations of History, Identity and Nation

in Speech

For the remainder of this chapter I will assess the extent that representations of history, race and nation in Australia have translated into the habitus of political elites by looking to utterances in parliament. Those coded categories that refer to Australia’s (immigration) history and refugees will be compared and assessed. Because this marks the beginning of thematic analysis, it is worth recalling how I will approach paradigmatic investigation. Formally,

“security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.”456 Broad social discussions (those that do not necessarily take place inside formal political institutions) are crucial in the intersubjective construction of identity and threat and, over the long term, certainly influence questions of national security. In Banal Nationalism457 Billig explains how this can take place at the seemingly most mundane levels of every day speech through deixis- a concept drawn upon by O’Doherty and Augoustinos to understand the construction of asylum seekers as a threat in Australia.458 While a whole range of voices containing discursive content are, therefore, significant in the sociological construction of threat (voices from the media, anti- immigration organizations and non-governmental advocacy groups, for example) the Lower

House of Parliament is the only institutional space where the presence of securitizing moves and the associated justifications are necessarily present. Obviously, in the case of Australia, the executive is contained within the Lower House.

456Wæver, O., ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in R. D. Lipschutz (ed) On Security, New York: Columbia UP, 1995, p.57 457See Billig, M., Banal Nationalism, Sage, 1995 458O’Doherty, K. and M. Augoustinos, ‘Protecting the Nation: Nationalist Rhetoric on Asylum Seekers and the Tampa’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 18(6), 2008, p.557

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Here, agents making securitizing claims will attempt to be most persuasive to their audience when providing formal justifications for securitization. Accordingly, whether that audience includes the voting public, or primarily remains other political elites, does not strictly matter for the purposes of this investigation. Consequently, even those symbolic associations and arguments that potentially amount to complicated euphemism (such as that New Racism being expressed through symbols of national exclusion or moral panics over illegal immigration) are still accurately appraised in their neologistic form. Because this thesis seeks to address the discursive content of threat construction, following the chain of causation backwards from events empirically identified as moments of securitization, this is their most important form.

By sidestepping epistemological quandaries of inner motivation by looking to empirical

(public) symbols, this approach is faithful to the aims of Securitization Theory itself. Those passages and sentences selected have been exclusively drawn from uninterrupted fragments in which the speaker is debating or discussing asylum seekers, to ensure that any ideological material provided is data is paradigmatically associated with refugees even when the included quotation may lack the word ‘refugee(s)’ itself.

For the rest of this chapter, and those following, I will attempt to discuss each discursive frame within its most appropriate thematic context. In other words, I will address those frames most related to Australia’s immigration history below, reserving those frames better discussed within the context of economics in Chapter V and discourse relating to international security in chapter

VI. Given that the politics of asylum have become more controversial within the securitized

New Millennium period, it exhibits significantly more debate on the issue. This net increase in both utterances and the number of discursive frames in operation in the period represents a

178 trend in which discourse has become more contested and has, subsequently, diversified and fractured. This means that in many cases, simple increases in the frequency of a discursive frame may not represent an overall upswing in the rate of the frames invocation, or its relative dominance in relation to other discursive frames.

It is those framing devices which have also grown as a proportion of all discussion and outranked others that have undisputedly acquired a more dominant meaning within the symbolic order. Furthermore, it is the growth of these frames that have been consubstantial with securitization process and will, ultimately, offer the best insight into threat construction.

I am not supposing that all those discursive associations responsible for the construction of asylum seekers as a threatening phenomenon will be represented by frames that have grown as a proportion of speech. In fact, people have inherent psychological tendencies to preference negative associations over positive ones. This suggests that sheer increases in the frequency of negative linkages with a symbol (even in instances where this did not translate into an increase of overall proportion) would still have a consequential impact on societal attitudes. Rather, I am supposing that those frames that have achieved greater dominance must represent significant change, and simultaneously, that focusing upon this information overcomes limitations of qualitative analysis. Given the sheer size and diversity of frames identified it is these growing strands that will primarily be incorporated into the main text. The dominant frames relating to Australia’s history and identity have been tabled below to guide discussion.

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Table 2.6 Major Framing Devices relating to History and Identity

Discursive Code Case 1 Case 2 Proportionate Shift Northern Border 5 24 ↓ 0.33% Demographic 9 19 ↓ 1.19% Swamping Nation of Immigrants - 27 ↑ 0.68% Anti- Racism 15 16 ↓ 2.39% Multiculturalism 1 25 ↑ 0.46% Democratic Identity 7 12 ↓ 1% Refugee-Accepting 5 60 ↑ 0.58% Identity Xenophobia 4 50 ↑ 0.52%

Political elites discussing refugees drew attention to Australia’s northern border on 5 occasions during the VRC, constituting 0.93% of all speech. Invocations of this frame rose to 24 utterances in the New Millennium, however, this represented a proportionate decrease to 0.60% of all discussion. Emphasis on Australia’s Northern border is not simply a feature of an inherited narrative regarding the North. Geography dictates that the only logically possible avenue for traditional security threats to Australia (the invasion of foreign state actors, militaries, etc.) is from the north. Even when incorporating the idea that uncontrolled migration constitutes a non-traditional security threat it is only the region to the north of Australia that contains population sizes that provoke the anxiety associated with potential demographic swamping. For comparison, whereas inundation of land in the Pacific will eventually force mass emigration from Pacific Island nations459 (which may very well result in extensive migration to Australia) the most populous independent nation in the Pacific, Fiji, has fewer than 1 million residents.

459See Barnett, J., ‘Security and Climate Change’, Global Environmental Change 13(1), 2003, pp. 7- 17.

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Political elites linked refugees with demographic swamping on 9 occasions during the VRC.

This constituted a relatively dominant 17th placing in the symbolic order, representing 1.67% of all discussion. This proves concerns over demographic swamping extended beyond just those in cabinet at that time. The frame underwent a net increase to 19 utterances in the New

Millennium, which proportionately translated to a decrease to 0.48% of speech. As far as concerns over demographic swamping persist, it is not voices linking these fears with refugee issues that have grown parallel to the securitization process. There have been calls for securitization theory to be expanded to contend with images as well as vocal utterances as symbols that construct threat.460 An image analysed by McDonald demonstrates why this is necessary.

Fig. 1.5. ‘Stop Illegals Now’ Source: McDonald (2011)461

460Vuori, J. A., How to do Security with Words. A Grammar of Securitisation in the People’s Republic of China, University of Turku, 2011 p.30 461McDonald, M., ‘Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia, Asylum-Seekers and the Normative Limits of the Copenhagen School,’ Australian Journal of Political Science, 46(2), 2011, p.289

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In this example of Coalition political advertising, the threat of northern invasion is depicted visually with arrows reminiscent of war-time propaganda. This mirroring processes acts to bridge the gap with earlier historical narratives and propaganda which included more explicitly racial dimensions. Modern political advertising, therefore, can draw salience from the fact moral panics regarding demographic swamping from undesirables is a historical fear in

Australia.462 According to Barthes seminal work on semiotics, it is context that necessarily anchors the chain of signifieds, a function he argued was always ideological.463 Vuori draws upon the significance of Barthes in security framing- although images seem to have a kind of

‘natural’ (unconstructed, uncontrived) meaning they are still bound by conventional meaning.464 In other words, when presented with this image, Australians can ‘read it’ because they already know what it means. As discussed in Chapter II, the only uttered reference to the

‘yellow peril’ ideology in parliament during the VRC was made to lampoon xenophobic attitudes as passé.

If political elites have indeed draw upon similar narratives to justify threat construction, then these references already involved far more subtle manifestations in the last half of the 20th

Century. The proximity of the period 1975-81 to the era of official racism in Australia might prompt expectations that speech during the VRC would contain more openly racist attitudes.

Reviewing the data, however, challenges this assumption in important ways. Even when the supposed racism of the Australian public toward Vietnamese refugees was acknowledged,

462Hyndman, J. and A. Mountz, ‘Another Brick in the Wall? Neo‐Refoulement and the Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe’, Government and Opposition, 43(2), 2008, p.257 463Barthes, R. and S. Heath, Image, Music, Text, Fontana Press, p.38 464Vuori, J. A., ‘A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves with a Global Referent Object’, Security Dialogue 41(3), 2010, p.260

182 these acknowledgements fell short of endorsement. For example, on 3 March 1981 Dr Klugman told parliament,

“The rapidity of the change, the scale of the change and its high visibility have been

dramatic. In many ways it is a testimony to the tolerance and/or flexibility of the

existing population that this change has met with so little overt antagonism. This study

[Keys-Young Report into Indochinese refugees in Fairfield] suggests that people are

experiencing anxiety, anger, hostility, etc. over this ‘invasion’ but that there still exists

a significant capacity for people to adapt to and accept newcomers.”465

Questions of racial discrimination were salient during the 1970’s. It was at that time the

Australian government was consciously moving towards multiculturalism and enshrining non- discriminatory policy as law. The Racial Discrimination Act, centrepiece legislation of the

Whitlam Government, was passed in 1975. The zeitgeist of the Whitlam-era, including calls for social and political change, helps to explain how progressive programs, such as the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees, were possible at all.466 The Vietnam War (specifically growing opposition to it) provided an exogenous shock to the political establishment that encouraged political change.

As previously mentioned, the resettlement program for Vietnamese refugees provided an opportunity for Australia to manifest its newly proclaimed anti-racist credentials, simultaneously affirming the end of White Australia and proving the litmus test of multiculturalism. Locating the politics of asylum within the paradigm of multiculturalism,

465Lower House Official Hansard, 3 March 1981 p.353 466McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001 p.48

183 however, only occurred on a single occasion during the VRC. This frame rose to include 25 references across 24 separate sources in the New Millennium, constituting a relatively frequent

0.63% of all discussion. Consider this quote by the Member for Cook, Hon. Bruce Baird in his valedictory speech in parliament on 11 September 2007. It provides an illuminating example of how multiculturalism has been written into the Australian mythos of immigration and refugees.

“I would also like to speak briefly about multiculturalism—a core Australian value.

This wonderful country was built on multiculturalism and our social cohesion is a

testament to the multicultural policies of the last 35 years. We welcomed migrants from

war torn Europe and those fleeing communism in the 1960s. Later we opened our arms

to Vietnamese refugees, many of whom arrived in boats. We have accepted six million

migrants since World War II and today 28 per cent of our population was born overseas.

The diversity of Australia’s people has enriched, not hindered, our progress.”467

On 10 August 2006, Hon. Simon Crean reflected from the other side of politics,

“On Australia Day 2002 in my first major speech as Leader of the Opposition, I spoke

of the riches that migrants to this country had brought us: economic, social and cultural.

I believe fundamentally in multiculturalism in this country. I believe it has made

Australia a greater place. I said that Australia had successfully settled millions of

people, rich and poor, and refugees, while becoming a diverse but united and peaceful

people. This immigration policy, I might add, has essentially always had bipartisan

support.”468

467House of Representatives Official Hansard, 11 September 2007 p.67 468House of Representatives Official Hansard, 10 August 2006 p.22

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The idea that refugees represent multiculturalism has grown to occupy a central place of the discursive milieu across the political spectrum. Considering that resistance to multiculturalism is an increasingly established feature of New Right politics, this has significant implications.

During the VRC it was more common to link refugees with the government’s commitment to non-discriminatory anti-racist policy, rather than multiculturalism per se. This framing device also serves to illustrate the general impact that increased debate and contestation has had on the fragmentation of certain narratives. The 15 references framing refugee policy within the context of anti-racism during the VRC amounted to 2.79% of all discussion – the 8th most dominant discursive association. Yet the frame’s 16 references in the New Millennium only translated to 0.40% of discussion, demonstrating a dramatic fall in its placing within the symbolic order.

In Australia, gauging the impact of (racist) conservative nationalism must be balanced against historical currents of progressive anti-racist liberalism. This results in a tension that makes it difficult to give full coherence to providing characteristic Australian xenophobia as an explanation for the securitization of migration. In other words, if progressive anti-racist sentiments have sometimes negated reactionary xenophobia and facilitated comparatively large humanitarian programs without securitization, any analysis of the role of racism and xenophobia must be accompanied by a deeper understanding of the contextual conditions that have determined which of the competing forces of openness or exclusion have prevailed.

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It is worth exploring the interplay between inclusion and exclusion that Jupp recognizes characterizes Australia’s experience as a rich case for analysing migration.469 Representations of refugees in Australian discourse reflect this dichotomy, typically falling into clearly pro- refugee or anti-refugee ideological arguments.470 It is not enough, however, to crudely frame practices of nationalism as inherently linked with racism and locate nationalism as the driving force of anti-asylum attitudes in Australia. While it is true that anti-asylum arguments draw upon ideas of nationalism and national character, so too do many pro-asylum arguments,471 a claim supported in the empirical data gathered in this thesis. In the literature, this tension is clarified by the distinction between ‘ethnic’ nationalism (which does tend to result in exclusionary xenophobia by reformulating difference along ascriptive racial or cultural lines) and ‘civic’ nationalism, which, in many cases, provides the foundation for multiculturalism and inclusivity in liberal-democracies.472

Many frames that rally support for refugees still draw upon national identity. The idea that

Australia is a ‘nation of immigrants’ was frequent enough to warrant its own code. This device accounted for 27 references across 23 sources in the New Millennium, comprising a relatively frequent 0.68% of discussion. To provide an example, Member for Throsby, Steven Jones reflected on 12 May 2011,

“Australia is a nation built on immigration. Indeed, this phrase has been repeated so

many times that it is almost a part of our commonsense.”473

469Cited in Every, D. and M. Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Australia in Pro‐and Anti‐Asylum Seeker Political Discourse’, Nations and Nationalism, 14(3), 2008, p.564 470Mummery, J. and D. Rodan, ‘Discursive Australia: Refugees, Australianness, and the Australian Public Sphere’, Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 21(3), 2007, p.351 471Every, D. and M. Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Australia in Pro‐and Anti‐Asylum Seeker Political Discourse’, Nations and Nationalism, 14(3), 2008, p. 564 472See Kaufmann, E. and O. Zimmer, ‘‘Dominant Ethnicity' and the ‘Ethnic‐Civic’ Dichotomy in the Work of AD Smith’, Nations and Nationalism, 10(1‐2), pp. 63-78. 473House of Representatives Official Hansard, 12 May 2011 p.3842

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Speaking from Opposition on 12 February 2003, Julia Gillard told parliament,

“I think it is important to start with an acknowledgment that the all-important truth of

the Australian story is that we are a nation of migrants, apart from our Indigenous

peoples. Migrants have built this nation. They have come from all around the world—

some under the great Post-War immigration program, which was aimed at

strengthening and populating the nation; some under the skilled program; some as

refugees.”474

Explicitly framing Australia’s national identity as ‘refugee accepting,’ already described in

Chapter III, was even more common. This argument was advanced on 5 occasions during the

VRC and grew to include 60 references in the New Millennium, a proportionate increase of

0.93% to 1.51% of all discussion and strong evidence that the frame has grown in dominance.

In some respects, this sentiment has superseded framing Australia’s obligation towards refugees as part of the nation’s democratic identity. This frame was the 22nd most utilized device during the VRC when it comprised 1.30% of discussion with 7 references across 6 different sources. Despite marginally rising in frequency to 12 references in the New

Millennium, the proportionate usage of the frame decreased to 0.30% of speech, representing a dramatic fall in the symbolic order. The assertion that the acceptance of refugees is a democratic duty has weakened over time.

Politicians reflected on what refugee issues meant for democratic identity in other ways. On 19 occasions in the New Millennium, political elites decried the emergence of partisan debate on immigration as damaging and counterproductive, comprising a relatively frequent 0.48% of all speech.

474House of Representatives Official Hansard, 12 February 2003 P.11600

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When the refugee issue was being debated in parliament on 1 September 2001, Member for

Bowman Con Sciacca warned parliament,

“[A]s a result, there is resentment of refugees, which unfortunately has led to some

circles of unrest within the community. That is the consequence of turning is

immigration issues into political footballs.”475

Nearly a decade later, on 15 June 2010, the Member for Banks, Daryl Melham stated,

“The worst part of all this is the signal that is going out to the community. The two

areas where there should be bipartisan support and where both sides should sit down

and talk to one another are Aboriginal issues and immigration. This country was

founded on migration. We have taken in refugees and we should be proud of it. These

people are now being demonised. They are called illegal when they are not. The term

is ‘asylum seekers’. If they are not genuine refugees, they are sent back home.”476

This conforms with larger trends. As previously covered, linking the politics of asylum with scapegoating constituted the single most frequent and widespread frame in the New

Millennium period. Similarly, political elites argued that the politics of asylum was being driven by xenophobia on 4 occasions during the VRC, which rose significantly to comprise 50 references during the New Millennium. This shift represents a proportionate growth from

0.74% to 1.26% of all discussion, elevating the frame to the 19th most dominant in operation.

In the same period, the idea that Australia’s response to asylum seekers was a kind of overreaction was advanced on 14 occasions across 12 separate sources, constituting a further

475House of Representatives Official Hansard, 19 September 2001 p.30957 476House of Representatives Official Hansard, 15 June 2010 p.5347

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0.35% of discussion. For example, on 20 September 2001, the Member for Throsby Colin

Hollis told parliament,

“People…expressed surprise to me that Australia, which for so many years had had

such a good record, was now overreacting to a problem that many other countries have

dealt with in a much more sympathetic and humane way.”477

Member for Melbourne Ports Michael Danby went further on 23 November 2010,

“The fact that there are boats arriving in Australia in an unauthorised manner is an issue,

but it is far from the overblown, hysterical, end-of-days issue painted by the

opposition.”478

On a further 4 occasions in the same period, political elites explicitly linked Australia’s overreaction to asylum seekers to the nation’s historic invasion anxiety. On 17 March 2010 the Member for Braddon Peter Sidebottom argued,

“As of 2001, in particular, those opposite [the Coalition], who were then in government,

have used this for overtly political reasons, realising that the whole issue of

immigration, particularly what is deemed to be unlawful immigration, has always been

a psychological lever in Australia’s culture.”479

477House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 September 2001 p.31112 478House of Representatives Official Hansard, 23 November 2010 p.3458 479House of Representatives Official Hansard 17 March 2010 p.2747

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Later that year on 18th October, the Member for Moreton, Mr Graham Perrett reflected,

“There is something in the Australian character that makes us terrified of small wooden

vessels filled with people who come with hope. Is it because we are a nation formed by

people from vessels which ran up a flag saying to the Aboriginal people, ‘This is now

our land’? Maybe that is why it is a big part of the Australian psyche.”480

Political elites specifically linked controversy over refugees with Hansonist xenophobia on 8 occasions during the New Millennium.This reference can be identified in a statement on 12

February 2003 by the Member for Chisholm Anna Burke,

“Mr Ruddock argues that if economic benefits of immigration can be demonstrated and

the Australians do not feel the cost of immigration is too high, they will not be tempted

by Hansonite type backlash.”481

On 10 May 2011, the Member for Fraser Dr Andrew Leigh used it to criticize the (Coalition)

Opposition,

“On migration we saw the return of Hansonism wrapped in a blue ribbon. Whereas the

former member for Cook, Bruce Baird, would stand up for principle, the current

member for Cook is only willing to spread fear.”482

The idea that the global rise of the Far Right is a reaction to mass immigration was articulated on 3 occasions in the New Millennium.

480House of Representatives Official Hansard 18 October 2010 p.573 481House of Representatives Official Hansard, 12 February 2003 p.11684 482House of Representatives Official Hansard, 10 May 2011 p.3445

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This sentiment was articulated clearly by the Parliamentary Secretary for Multicultural Affairs and Settlement Services Laurie Ferguson on 18 June 2009,

“This [the management of refugees] has led to xenophobia and racism in northern

Europe. Countries such as the Scandinavian nations, which never had these problems

before, are swinging towards political conservatism, racism and even neo-Nazism

because of the huge pressures.”483

These most recent frames were rare but achieve relevance in demonstrating the emergence of new or complex relations in discourse. Taken holistically, the data included above raises important questions. Certainly, political elites themselves are frequently arguing that xenophobia and scapegoating is driving the securitization of humanitarian migration in

Australia. Yet within parliament itself, the types of arguments that might be considered typical examples of such xenophobia were rare. Refugees were framed as a threat to social cohesion in Australia on only 5 occasions during the New Millennium, 0.13% of speech. Coded as a related subcategory, the idea that refugees should share Australia’s democratic,484 or

Christian485 culture respectively, occurred once each. Similarly, the claim that immigrants should integrate was made in relation to refugees relatively infrequently, on 2 occasions during the VRC and increasing to 13 utterances in the New Millennium. Proportionately, this constitutes a marginal decrease from 0.37% to 0.33% of all speech. The idea that unauthorised arrivals must be stopped because Australia has a sovereign right to vet prospective migrants was advanced on 5 occasions during the VRC and rose to comprise 24 references in the New

Millennium. Proportionately, this represents a decrease from 0.93% to 0.60% of all speech.

483House of Representatives Official Hansard, 18 June 2009 p.6522 484House of Representatives Official Hansard, 25 June 2009 p.7188 485House of Representatives Official Hansard, 16 March 2009 p.2729

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These narratives persist in Australian discourse but the data collected demonstrates it is not those particular framing devices which have gained traction over the periods in question concurrent with the securitization process.

The scarcity of framing devices relating to societal security in the data begs the question: If xenophobia and demagoguery are driving the asylum seeker debate in Australia, how is this manifesting in performative speech acts, or securitizing claims? Obviously, agents typically wouldn’t present their own arguments as racist or xenophobic. However, the fact that it is not traditional symbols of xenophobia that have grown to achieve dominance means that it is other devices that are proving to be the truly performative utterances. Answers relating to which frames have been performative will crystalize when addressing emergent economic and security factors in Chapters V and VI.

Conclusions on Representations of Historical Identity in Refugee

Discussion

In many respects, the commitment to anti-racist rhetoric outlined by the data during the VRC has been empirically vindicated as a genuine move in Australia. From that time onwards, the nation has maintained a large and diverse immigration program. Australia’s entire migration intake (including skilled and family reunion) remained capped at 190,000 places for the year

2016-2017, one of the largest programs in the world per capita. It is difficult to reconcile the

192 apparent contradiction within Australian politics, whereby the acceptance of high levels of immigration (and migrant diversity) is a fact, and on the other hand xenophobia and racism remain driving forces in immigration policy and securitization, especially in the case of unauthorised arrivals. Framing Australia as broadly racist or ‘anti-immigration’ is far too simplistic- it does not make sense against the backdrop of persistent large and diverse immigration schemes. Figures from 2015 suggest 28% of Australia’s 24 million residents were immigrants, Luxembourg was the only OECD nation with a higher proportion.486

At the very least, then, a qualification must be introduced that Australia’s xenophobia is expressed towards certain migrants, particular nationalities or cultural groups. In Australia, this shift from traditional targets of racism (Asians) to Muslim people has been embodied by

Hanson herself, who has shifted the target of her anti-immigrant rhetoric between these groups accordingly. These ease at which this transformation has taken place altogether demonstrates how contingent and arbitrary the forces governing discriminatory attitudes can be.

Accordingly, greater emphasis must be placed on the facilitating factors that motivate these attitudes, rather than looking to circumstances of their expression.

Nevertheless, in the face of reactionary xenophobia, multiculturalism persists as a relevant ideological force in Australia. Scanlon Foundation surveys 2013 through 2015 found a response range of 84-86% amongst those questioned487 agreeing with the assertion multiculturalism has been successful and beneficial to the nation – an approval rating so high

486Newland K., ‘The Maritime Approaches to Australia’ in Newland et. al. All at Sea: Policy Challenges of Rescue, Interception, and Long-Term Response to Marine Migration, Migration Policy Institute, 2016, p.149 487Markus, A. and A. Dharmalingam, Mapping Social Cohesion, Monash University, Caulfield East, Australia, 2013, p.4

193 that it would be difficult to find comparable issues that elicited such national agreement. A solution to the apparent internal contradictions described above can be found in an eloquent explanation provided by journalist Richard Cooke.

“Paul Keating invented a strategy that was then expanded and perfected by John

Howard: placate the business community with high levels of immigration, and crack

down on asylum seekers to create the appearance of control.”488

The scapegoating of unauthorised migrants is a formula utilized to reconcile this dissonance, alleviating public anxieties with dramatic displays of executive control. An individual upsetting this delicate balance by entering Australia unauthorised must be severely punished. The unauthorised migrant has come to function as a fetish and breaking this convention promises to have grave consequences. This formula has significant ramifications in the long-term. The public’s trust of official migration schemes is contingent on the assurance that migration falls within executive control and is, therefore, quality assured and congruous with the national interest. Whereas once it was non-European immigrants who were identified as undesirables, in the contemporary period it is those associated with the criminal-deviancy of illegal immigrants and unauthorised arrivals. The data introduced above suggests that much of

Australia’s gradual (racial) liberalization has been genuine, allowing for a deeper understanding of paradigmatic change. The legacy of such profound colonial immigration restriction, then, has not primarily been to maintain a regime designed to defend racial privilege and British hegemony, although initially that was the purpose. Instead, continuity can be located in the inheritance of strict, executive-led protection of the continental space as a highly

488Cooke, R. ‘The People Versus the Political Class’ The Monthly June 2014, Accessed Online: at http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2014/june/1401544800/richard-cooke/people-versus-political- class?utm_content=buffer5d2ff&utm_medium=social&utm_source=Twitter&utm_campaign=buffer

194 regulated and wealthy nation. Accompanying this heritage is a public culture quick to equate uncertainty over the management of immigration, especially in the North, as a direct expression of governmental incompetence and a risk to national welfare. Even if Australia is not directly envied by Asian populations to the north (as historical narrative suggests) the self-conception of Australia as the ‘Lucky Country’ manifests endogenously to prioritize the strict defence of order in the face of global (dis)order.

Maintenance of Australia’s position as a high-wage nation with first-rate living conditions and robust state welfare has increasingly relied on the strategy of vetting prospective settlers to cater to mass skilled immigration. Here, historical sentiments of national identity begin to blur with economic perceptions of the national interest. In the following chapter I will address the ways the political elites have linked refugees to economic issues within the context of significant changes in the global economy between the periods in question. Ultimately, it is those framing devices relating to wealth and economics which have grown to dominate discourse and conceptions of refugee issues over those traditional images of the threat posed by racial and cultural Others, regardless of how much this powerful legacy may subtly inform the national psyche.

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Chapter V

The Economic Hypothesis:

Globalization and Structural Economic Change

Having explored the extent to which the securitization of humanitarian immigration in

Australia can be attributed to unique geo-historical factors, this chapter will focus on placing the securitization of asylum in a broader global context to gauge the impact of world-economic change. Put succinctly, it will address the question: have the structural economic changes associated with globalization driven the securitization of (humanitarian) migration? Is it simply the case that asylum seekers have become rebranded as illegal economic migrants in the contemporary era?

The bulk of securitization literature primarily addresses the phenomenon in Europe. Expanding the scope of analysis to include international comparison, therefore, not only allows for parallels to be drawn with the Australian example but widens the breadth literature that can be drawn upon. The strength of adopting an international level of analysis is that it acknowledges the universal nature of securitization, treating the emergence of ‘new walls’ around Oceania,

Europe and the US-Mexico Border as examples of the same process.489 These heavily policed regions are partly a reaction to the sheer increase in human movement between states and the transnationalization of crime that has accompanied this process. Limiting illegal migration is a major function of these securitized regions. Put simply, as immigration restriction has become

489Pickering, S., ‘Border Terror: Policing, Forced Migration and Terrorism’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 16(3), 2004, p.213

196 ideal, targeting illegal immigrants is the logical first step for authorities. Humanitarian migrants are increasingly framed as constituting part of this illegal movement by policing apparatus’ despite the legality of their movement being enshrined in humanitarian law. In addition to traditional border policing, these regions now experience a significant increase in maritime patrolling and the interdiction of overwater irregular migration. Australia maintains the strictest of these regimes490 but comparable examples, including the interdiction of Latin

American refugees by US authorities in the Caribbean and the interception of asylum seekers in the Mediterranean by European governments, also involve returning asylum seekers without due processing, consequently sharing dubious legality.

Given that purely historical explanations for securitization in Australia have proven insufficient, adopting an international level of analysis is crucial in uncovering the systemic changes apparent in a globalized world that can distil the securitization of immigration as an explainable political phenomenon, rather than a result of parochial or circumstantial factors.

This is especially salient given the immigration trends described in Chapter IV and the fact that none of the identified ‘push’ or ‘pull’ factors that influence global humanitarian migration are set to change in the foreseeable future.491 Firstly, this will require briefly assessing the genesis of migration flows in the contemporary (Post-War) era and the entwinement of international migration with global economics. I will then introduce literature that identifies common strands in the emergent nexus between economic conditions and the securitization of migration.

Finally, by looking to the speech of political elites, I will assess the extent to which the

490Newland K., ‘The Maritime Approaches to Australia’ in Newland et. al. All at Sea: Policy Challenges of Rescue, Interception, and Long-Term Response to Marine Migration, Migration Policy Institute, 2016, p.150 491Dancygier, R. M., Immigration and Conflict in Europe, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.3

197 securitization of asylum in Australia has been driven by economic conditions, or more accurately, perceptions of economic issues within discourse.

As an industrially advanced liberal democracy, Australia has undergone many of the broad changes exhibited by the West’s relationship with international migration generally.

Specifically, the largest trend in global migration over the last recent century has been a shift from Europeans emigrating to the ‘traditional’ nations of migration (North America, Australia and New Zealand) to individuals from non-OECD nations immigrating to OECD nations.492

For example, during the ‘Golden Era’ Post-War boom (1945-1975) it is estimated that 20-30 million people relocated to Western Europe, roughly 8% of the world’s population!493 Menz argues that the changing nature of the world economy, especially the evolution of Western states to post-industrial, highly skilled service and technology based Neoliberal ‘Competition economies,’ has been a major factor in the swing against immigration.494 As manufacturing jobs shifted offshore or became technology intensive, migrant receiving nations have increasingly catered immigration programs to securing individuals who are highly skilled.

This, in turn, has been exacerbated by high levels of competition between those nations attempting to attract skilled migrants who can provide a competitive edge in certain industries or help meet the nation’s demand for scarce services. This preeminent focus on performance can even be identified in the internationalization of Australian-style citizenship testing that is being replicated in parts of Europe.495 The turn to skills in post-industrial societies has meant

492Hugo, G., ‘A New Paradigm of International Migration: Implications for Migration Policy and Planning in Australia’, Parliamentary Library, 2004, p.6 493Schnapper, D., ‘The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity’, West European Politics, 17(2), 1994, p.127 494Menz, G., The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies, OUP Oxford, 2008, p.25 495Löwenheim, O. and O. Gazit, ‘Power and Examination: A Critique of Citizenship Tests’, Security Dialogue, 40(2), 2009, p.148

198 that migrants can no longer be absorbed into unskilled low-paying jobs, as they had been during the previous decades of the Post-War boom. It is increasingly difficult for unskilled individuals to be accepted into immigration programs at all. The significance of this shift for the subject at hand relates to how humanitarian migration channels, and to a lesser extent family reunion programs, stand in contrast to the tradesman’s entrances which have increasingly become the norm (a strategy that Australia has long employed). The global relevance of these sentiments on public opinion can be identified in calls for the adoption of an Australian style points system as part of the anti-immigration rhetoric surrounding the Brexit referendum496 and the intention to adopt a comparable program in the US.497

Economic integration (especially between the industrialized West and developing states) has freed labour as well as capital and allowed for practical migration opportunities to wealthier developed states. In the year 2000, 40% of international migrants were within the West.498 The fact that economic liberalization has run parallel to increased policing of national borders in the Post-Cold War period is a tension that has been described by Hollifield as a paradox of control.499 The ideology of liberalization has applied more to capital than to human movement.

This presentation is ultimately unnecessary, in post-industrial society, structuring immigration policy on economic lines is clearly aimed at maximizing capital as opposed to gaining migrant-

496Riley-Smith, B. ‘Bring in Australian Points Based Immigration System by 2020, ex-Cabinet Ministers Say’ The Telegraph, 7 August 2016 Accessed Online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/07/bring-in-australian-points-based-immigration-system- by-2020-ex-c/ 497Daniel, Z and R. Whalan, ‘Donald Trump’s new Australia-inspired US immigration plan unveiled at frosty press conference’, ABC News, 3 Aug 2017 Accessed Online: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-03/trumps-new-us-immigration-plan-to-be-based-on- australias/8769338 498Adamson, F. B., "Crossing borders: international migration and national security." International Security, 31(1), 2006, p.170 499See Hollifield, J. F., ‘Migration and International Relations: The Liberal Paradox.’, in Entzinger, H. et al. (eds) Migration between Markets and States, England, Ashgate 2004

199 labour as such. Nevertheless, leaving philosophical tensions aside, increased border policing can simply be understood as a natural response to the enormous growth of human movement across borders in the lead up to the New Millennium. This does not only include permanent migration but increasing levels of temporary entry due to tourism and business. The subsequent growth of the international travel industry has provided the infrastructure for clandestine migration to grow along with legal routes. With organized crime developing similar international capacities in the globalized age, the impetus for governments to regulate these population flows is straightforward.

The Politics of Reaction

While the meteoric rise of terrorism as a top tier international security issue goes some way to explaining the securitization of national borders, researching securitization in Europe

Huysmans has identified that terrorism was presented as a potential threat associated with globalized immigration from the 1990’s onwards. Moreover, Huysmans argues that this formulation evolved from the gradual linking of migration with insecurity and danger since the

1980’s.500 This linkage is far more generalized than the formulation ‘migrants might be terrorists’ but rather ‘immigration is risky.’ This difference is significant as it incorporates a host of symbolic associations that may be more widespread or subtle (and, therefore, persistent) then the direct accusation that terrorists may abuse the asylum process to enter enemy states.

The construction of a migrant-threat nexus, predates the modern preoccupation with the migrant as a potential terror threat.

500Huysmans, J., ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), 2000, p.751

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The most significant factors in the global (re)politicization of immigration in the lead-up to the new millennium were economic: the growing sentiment that migrants are contributing to unemployment or that immigration had reached burdensome levels for host societies. In the

Post-War era, government primarily viewed migration through an economic lens – immigration could strengthen the labour market and the health of the national economy.

Accordingly, it was the general understanding among European policy makers that Europe’s new immigrants were migrant workers, the immigration regime was not intended to select permanent settlers that would grow the national population or become ‘intergenerational.’

Australia never conformed to this model. Australian policy makers did intend for mass immigration to increase the nation’s population and for those migrant communities to raise families until, ultimately, they were assimilated into Australian national life. Academic exploration of subject, and the development of migration studies as an intellectual field, initially reflected this labour focused economic lens.501 By viewing migration as a market driven feature it was understood as a necessary component of modern economics and, therefore, essentially beneficial. It was not until later decades that questions of society and culture (and, consequently, security) came to occupy equally central places within the intellectualization of immigration issues in the way that they do today. This shift has been described as the evolution of immigration issues from ‘low politics’ (economics, crime etc.) to

‘high politics’ (security and civilization).502

501Adamson, F. B., "Crossing borders: international migration and national security." International Security, 31(1), 2006 p.172 502Faist, T., ‘How to define a foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse, 1978–1992’, West European Politics, 17(2), 1994, p.51

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Considering that racist nativists generally remained on the political fringes in liberal democracies during this period, it was within the paradigm of economic debate that voices against immigration re-entered the mainstream. Initially, in response to visibly growing migrant communities in several European states in the 1970’s, immigrants began to be framed as economic competitors to the native-born population.503 The anti-immigration argument centred around the risk that immigrants take job vacancies that would normally be afforded to native residents, contributing to national underemployment and hardship. In the US, the idea that immigrants were ‘parasitic’ drains on the economy has continued to grow in strength from the 1980’s onwards.504 It persists despite the reality that mainstream economic analysis acknowledges cheap undocumented labour as a critical component of the economy of the US

(to the extent that should all illegal immigrants actually be removed from the nation there would be a significant retraction in the market). Here, it is important to note that while the threat that immigration risks exacerbating unemployment is often abused as propaganda, under certain conditions immigrants do place downward pressure on wages and conditions for low skilled natives505 making the issue a real, if often exaggerated, risk.

In the case of the US, macroscopic economic analysis rejects the notion that illegal immigrants are draining the economy, demonstrating how anti-immigrant mobilization does not have to be grounded in the ‘real’ (here, the argument that illegal immigrants must be removed to protect national wealth is misguided, considering national wealth would diminish from their removal)

503Ibid. p.53 504Glover, R. W., ‘The Theorist and the Practitioner: Linking the Securitization of Migration to Activist Counter-Narratives,’ Geopolitics, History and International Relations 3(1), 2011, pp.85 505Menz, G., The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies, OUP Oxford, 2008, p.12

202 and is better considered a social movement, rather than a value neutral or deterministic reaction to changing economic conditions. When it is the case that immigration is introducing pressures against certain classes (while ultimately growing national wealth), the issue is better considered a problem of economic distribution.

It is this divorcement between actual economic indicators and widespread social perceptions that forgives the need for hardcore economic data to be analysed in this chapter- especially when it is those very perceptions as against objective fact, that go on to dominate discourse.

Obviously, a review of political speech will provide a more accurate gauge of the discursive impact of the economic climate upon the political realm than extensive economic calculation.

Rational appraisals have not dampened the evolution of a moral panic against illegal immigrants in the US and the subsequent militarization of the US-Mexico border to restrict illegal immigration is the most acute expression of the securitization of immigration in the modern era.506 Australia differs from the other advanced economies: cheap unskilled migrant labour (either illegal undocumented workers or those on temporary work visas) does not form a significant part of the national economy. Hugo acknowledges that the only noteworthy exception is the acceptance of seasonal temporary working visas for harvest jobs.507

Regardless, illegal immigration frames have also grown in strength in Australia.

National governments, whose primary responsibility lay with their own natives ahead of foreigners, are expected to manage immigration that is no longer in the national interest. This

506Tirman, K., ‘Introduction: The Movement of People and the Security of States’, in Tirman, J. (ed) The Maze of Fear – Security and Migration after 9/11, New York, The New Press, pp.1-16 507Hugo, G., ‘Temporary Migration and the Labour Market in Australia’, Australian Geographer 37(2), 2006, p.212

203 dissatisfaction, felt in some measure throughout the industrialized world, found political expression in the growth of anti-immigration rhetoric amongst mainstream politicians and the emergence and subsequent growth of new Far-Right Nativist Parties (hereafter FRNPs).508 This trend has been accelerated by the general diversification within the political spectrum brought about by the post-material turn in policy interests, coupled with a growing disillusionment with the traditionally powerful major parties of established democracies.509 Huysmans argues that the scapegoating of migrants and asylum seekers has become an increasingly attractive political strategy as a direct result of the declining legitimacy of the Post-War political order as such.510

A popular perception exists that the natural gravitation of major parties in two party systems towards the political centre has produced an indistinguishable bureaucratic elite that can afford to disregard the interests and concerns of the average person. This has led to the assertion that votes for FRNP’s are, like some votes cast for other fringe political parties, ‘protest votes’511 motivated by the desire to rebuke established elites and express general economic dissatisfaction rather than genuine expressions of ideological solidarity with Far-Right groups, many of which espouse extreme and racist views.

Considering that Trump’s US Presidential Election campaign and the vote Brexit campaign both drew upon this new wave of so-called ‘populism’ and won popular support, (in addition to the fact that electoral support for FRNP’s themselves has steadily increased in Western

508Van der Brug, W., et al., ‘Anti‐Immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote?’, European Journal of Political Research, 37(1), 2000, p.590 509Huysmans, J., ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), 2000, p.769 510Ibid. 511See Van der Brug, W., et al., ‘Anti‐Immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote?’, European Journal of Political Research, 37(1), 2000 pp. 77-102.

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Europe from the 1990’s onwards) this interpretation is increasingly unhelpful. Protest votes that secure electoral majorities and change governments are better considered normal electoral politics. Evidentially, in these instances, large sections of other classes have joined with the traditional lower socio-economic support base of FRNP’s.

It is worth taking some time to fully explore the complexity of the relationship between economic conditions and support for FRNPs. Ivarsflaten found that when reviewing voting data from the early 2000’s, anti- immigration rhetoric was the only platform common to all those FRNP’s that achieved electoral success,512 highlighting the contemporary salience of xenophobic rhetoric. Opposition to immigration is, therefore, the platform that unites these groups regardless of what other issues may be included within their political platform and, perhaps more importantly, the feature which underlies their cross cultural (global) appeal. This strongly suggests that it is also the platform that is reaching Middle Class voters. At the very least, immigration restriction and economic insecurity have become inexorably linked within the political paradigm of FRNP’s.

The perception that support for European Far-Right groups was growing as a reaction to economically burdensome asylum regimes was reproduced by the Australian government as early as 2000 to justify greater executive control of humanitarian migration – lest Australia develop extremist groups that threaten social order.513 Whereas this fierce renewed combination of racist nationalism, scapegoating and demand for economic protectionism

512Ivarsflaten, E., ‘What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases’, Comparative Political Studies, 41(1), 2008, p.3 513Millbank, A., ‘The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention’, Information and Research Services, Parliamentary Library, 2000

205 mirrors past support for Fascism in Europe, FRNPs don’t have historical (institutional) connection to 20th Century Fascism and have emerged to articulate contemporary grievances, overwhelming associated with the pressures of globalization.514 Put it simply it is the ‘losers’ of globalization that have come to support new-Right movements.515

This view is heavily supported by data gathered by Swank and Betz who found when comparing stats across several European states that universal welfare provided a significant suppressive pressure on the number of votes received by FRNP’s, a fact proving correlation between economic pressure and the success of Far-Right political messages.516 It is for this reason that Swank and Betz argue that conceptions of welfare must be revised to accept that one of its most important functions in the contemporary era is as a compensatory mechanism517 to insulate classes from the predictable macroscopic impacts of the neoliberal economic policies pursued by government. This conforms with theoretical expectations. The financially insecure (the unemployed and unskilled) constituted the initial support base of FRNP’s and remain an over-represented core demographic, despite the growth and diversification of the movement.518 Either economic anxiety is acting as a facilitating condition for an audience receptive to the xenophobic politics or, conversely, nations with universal social security benefits entice prospective far-right voters to remain within the political mainstream.

514Swank, D. and H.-G. Betz, ‘Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe’, Socio-Economic Review 1(2), 2003, p.218 515Menz, G., The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies, OUP Oxford, 2008, p.258 516Swank, D. and H.-G. Betz, ‘Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe’, Socio-Economic Review 1(2), 2003, p.232 517Ibid. p.224 518Ibid. p.222

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Interestingly, despite centring around classes squeezed by deepening inequality in the developed world, FRNP’s have forgone agitating for greater socialized services and economic redistribution in favour of reaffirming support for neoliberal economics but substituting a more authoritarian conservatism as a solution to emergent social issues.519 This is despite the fact that retrenchment from welfare in favour of privatization has been identified as an exacerbating factor on the financial stresses of those same unskilled classes.520 Nearly a decade before being awarded Euromoney’s International Treasurer of the Year in 2011, Wayne Swan warned parliament about repackaging financial insecurity into a projected national (in)security,

“This bill [Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures)

Bill 2002] is about playing up border security to divert attention from the insecurities

that are being felt at home. It is about using the insecurity of our borders to mask the

insecurity felt by Australian families.”521

Partly, the ideological orientation of FRNPs owes to the circumstances of, and motivations for, their formation. Strong currents of anti-establishment sentiment can be identified throughout their political development. It is not, however, big capital that forms the ‘ruling elite’ within this ideological paradigm as in some other anti-establishment movements. This role is reserved for liberal-progressive careerist politicians who are ostensibly aligned with the politically correct climate of globalism for personal gain, essentially selling-out their parochial constituency.

519Ivarsflaten, E., ‘What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe? Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases’, Comparative Political Studies, 41(1), 2008, p.6 520Ibid. p.5 521House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 June 2002 p.4047

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This reactionary current has meant FRNPs have developed in contrarian opposition to the now- mainstream values of the liberal-progressive left: environmental protection, civil rights and tolerant multiculturalism.522 In part, this is why they so fervently advocate a protective nationalism that favours the native in-group at the expense of costly programs that favour

‘foreigners’ – humanitarian migration programs, foreign aid and various forms of multiculturalism, etc. Moreover, adherents reject the apparatus of progressive globalists- namely bureaucracy and propaganda, as a poor substitute for true social unity, which is assumed to be prerequisite condition for the superior liberal-democratic tradition they seek to defend.523 Despite these movements notably lacking mobilization over campaigning for redistributive social services, they have been linked welfare in more indirect but, nevertheless, fundamental way.

Welfare Chauvinism

The development of the welfare state has crystallized a relationship of state obligation towards its citizens.524 One consequence of the costly myriad of services modern states have developed for their constituents has been evolution of new expressions of community antagonism. This is driven by complex prejudicial social judgements as to which groups are net drains on social security as opposed to those who are productive contributors. Welfare has emerged as another scarce resource that is aggressively contested in the same manner as job vacancies. This

522Swank, D. and H.-G. Betz, ‘Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe’, Socio-Economic Review 1(2), 2003, p.227 523Barker, M. The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe, Aletheia Books, p.21 524Nadig, A., ‘Human Smuggling, National Security, and Refugee Protection’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 15(1), 2000, p.3

208 argument favours prioritizing these services to the deserving: those who have contributed to the social contract of welfare through tax revenue as against those groups who have not. This appeals to both moral fairness and acts to safeguard the long-term sustainability of the welfare state. Cognizance of the structural economic challenges posed to the viability of welfare states has been identified as an increasing aspect of the securitization process in Europe and

(considering the salience of economic arguments against boat people) I would argue, also

Australia.

Welfare chauvinism is particularly suited to arguments against immigrants because they have not, as yet, contributed to the state in which they have recently arrived. Faist points to the example of Germany to illustrate how these judgements easily take on racial and social dimensions: criticism that immigrants seek to secure welfare in Germany is reserved for racial

Others and not applied to the longstanding policy of accepting ethnic Germans from elsewhere in Europe. Obviously, none of these immigrants have contributed to the coffers of social security.525 It is for this reason that the political reaction against immigration, despite being presented as a non-discriminatory (or perhaps more accurately, as a legitimately discriminatory) consequence of the corporate identity of the state, can be placed within the larger paradigm of social cohesion. Anti-immigrant platforms mirror and cluster with rhetoric aimed at other types of ostensible out-groups. Prejudicial Australians display negative attitudes towards both racial minorities and refugees.526 This conforms to modern expressions of societal prejudice which tend to centre around the defence of privileges for the in-group.527 Welfare

525Faist, T., ‘How to define a foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse, 1978–1992’, West European Politics, 17(2), 1994, p.64 526Schweitzer, R., et al., ‘Attitudes Towards Refugees: The Dark Side of Prejudice in Australia’, Australian Journal of Psychology, 57(3), 2005, p.171 527Van Dijk, T. A., ‘New (s) Racism: A Discourse Analytical Approach’, in S. Cottle (ed) Ethnic Minorities and the Media, 2000, 33-49

209 chauvinism, then, can be considered a feature of this same discourse milieu. It is persistently aimed at immigrants and minorities who are among the poorest and most disenfranchised in society even while (in Australia at least) government assistance has expanded to include

‘middle class welfare’ that tends to benefit wealthier individuals. Therefore, it is the targeting of these out-groups, rather than dispassionate appraisals of cost, that defines injunctions of welfare chauvinism.

Research by Schweitzer et al. into attitudes towards refugees proves that this connection between perceived economic competition and negative attitudes towards immigrants extends to Australia. Perceived “realistic threat” is the most robust indicator for perceived “symbolic threat.”528 In other words, if citizens believe that migrants and refugees are a ‘realistic threat’ to themselves (usually an instrumental resource threat, a competitor for jobs, services or status) it is highly likely that those people consider immigrants a ‘symbolic threat’ threat to the nation at large. Usually, this is expressed in prejudice toward the norms, values and culture of the migrants in question.529 Whereas the data demonstrates correlation, it does not prove the causative direction of this relationship. It might be the case that financially insecure citizens experience more acute vulnerability to the perception of resource scarcity and, therefore, this fear over instrumental resource competition makes them more receptive to anti-immigration messages. Conversely, it may be that those citizens who internalize anti-immigrant narratives are more likely to believe in the reality that resource competition is a serious problem. What is clear is that ‘realistic threat’ is the strongest indicator (of any measured) of prejudice towards refugees in Australia.

528Ibid. p.171 529Ibid.

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Europe’s experience with the securitization of migration is not just a useful comparison to establish empirical connections with the Australian example- the relationship between

Australia and Europe as part of an intersubjectively defined community of like-nations provides symbolic meaning to political elites. Accordingly, it is worth briefly elaborating on the securitization of migration in Europe and how it has been interpreted in Australia. This contrast between the increasing liberalization of inter-Europe travel, employment and residency, coupled with a tightening of migration opportunities for Third country nationals to gain entry to the Eurozone has been termed ‘Fortress Europe’ and is regularly discussed in securitization literature.530 Reflecting a reification of the liberalization paradox, the inception of the Schengen Zone in Europe simultaneously freed movement within the Continent but restricted human movement into the zone. In the EU, the term ‘migrant’ has evolved to connotate someone from the ‘Global South’ and is essentially used to refer to non-Whites.531

Conversely, white-collar employees of multinational companies are rarely referred to as

‘immigrants’ in developed nations.532 These terms function intersubjectively to provide transnational unity between European nation-states with similar interests in managing

(restricting) undesirable immigration. The significance of this racialized aspect becomes apparent when considering how European states have intersubjectively constructed a categorical schema to achieve a geopolitical homogenization of deterrence.

530For further reading on Fortress Europe see Huysmans, J., ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), 2000, pp.751-777 ;Caviedes, A., ‘The Open Method of Co-Ordination in Immigration Policy: a Tool for Prying Open Fortress Europe?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11(2), 2004, pp. 289-310. 531Baldwin-Edwards, B. and M. A. Schain, ‘The Politics of Immigration: An Introduction’, in Baldwin-Edwards, M. and Martin A. Schain (eds) The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe, Frank Cass, 1994 p.17 532Schnapper, D., ‘The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity’, West European Politics, 17(2), 1994, p.128

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Humphrey describes the four zones in operation that constitute Fortress Europe.533 Each one acts as a barrier with to insulate the core (the EU itself) from asylum flows. The second zone includes Eastern Europe. The third zone includes North Africa, Turkey and the Former Soviet

Union, whereas the outermost peripheral zone includes Black Africa, the Middle East and

China. This is the zone where governmentality is singularly focused on dissuading any potential migrants. This scheme illustrates how the governmentality of deterrence has become truly global in scope. Deterrence, therefore, informs how meaning is given to international rationale when dealing with refugee flows. In Australia, references to deterrence within discussion on refugees increased from 4 utterances during the VRC to 38 instances in the New

Millennium. This represents an increase from 0.74% to 0.98% of all discussion.

For example, on the 15 August 2012 the Member for Bennelong John Alexander told parliament,

“We can be generous in our humanitarian program, we can lift our intake to 20,000

people a year and do our bit to help the most vulnerable people in the region, but we

also need to manage policies that deter people from taking that dangerous journey.”534

Often, the appeal to deterrence was maintained through pure necessity. Later that year on 10

September, the Member for Cook, Scott Morrison argued,

“Deterrence policies are necessary. I accept that the policies we have advocated carry

a heavy moral burden.”535

533Humphrey, M., ‘Migration, Security and Insecurity’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(2), 2013, p.187 534House of Representatives Official Hansard, 15 August 2012 p.8673 535House of Representatives Official Hansard, 10 September 2012 p.9988

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Representations of Europe’s experience with asylum seekers were reproduced in the speech of

Australian political elites. For example, the fact that European nations deal with unauthorized asylum seekers in a more humane way (without resorting to harsh and costly mandatory imprisonment) was advanced as a critique of Australian policy. Framing other countries as fairer in this way was identified on 9 occasions in the New Millennium. On 20 June 2001, the

Member for Throsby, Colin Hollis argued,

“Other countries are dealing with much greater numbers of people. They are dealing

with them in a more humane way and they are not having the riots.”536

Conversely, this idea was countered on several occasions by the assertion that an excessively liberal and burdensome humanitarian immigration regime was a direct cause of problems in

Europe, and was a situation that Australia risked replicating. This converse claim that other nations should follow Australia’s superior system of strict restriction was put forward on 9 occasions during the same period. For example, the Member for Canning, Don Randall told parliament on 17 March 2007,

“I learned that the British are in awe of our migration tracking system. In fact, they say

to us, ‘We would love to have the ability that you have to track people who come in

and out of your country because, quite frankly, we’ve really got no idea.”537

Following international outcry relating to the issue of deaths of asylum seekers attempting to cross the Mediterranean after the widely-publicized images of drowned child refugee Alan

Kurdi in 2015, Prime Minister Tony Abbott lobbied European states to adopt Australia’s zero- tolerance approach to irregular maritime arrivals as the only effective preventative measure to

536House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 June 2001 p.28250 537House of Representatives Official Hansard, 27 March 2007 p.39

213 stopping further loss of life.538 These developments demonstrate the ways in which the securitization of humanitarian migration is entering the realm of reflexive and self-conscious: a shared political project. This is significant considering the extent to which the international humanitarian immigration regime has relied on shared international norms. Any diminishment of lateral pressure poses a serious risk to a system with its basis in intersubjectively maintained norms as opposed to material self-interest.

Economic Perceptions and the Speech of Political Elites

Australia generally conforms to the economic changes identified with securitization in Europe.

Australia imported large amounts of migrant labour during the immediate Post-War period

(although the fact that authorities always expected these migrants to settle amounts to a significant difference). The 1970’s marked the end of this era, the economy was stagnating, inflation still occurring and unemployment was rising. In part, this was brought on by the 1973

Oil Crisis which saw the price of fuel climb dramatically which adversely impacted other sectors of the economy. It was this environment that provided the economic backdrop for VRC.

It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that job scarcity would create a political backlash against immigration. This process did generally occur during the 1970’s in Australia. The Whitlam government responded to the faltering economy by radically dropping immigration quotas to

50,000: the lowest levels since the Second World War.539

538Newland K., ‘The Maritime Approaches to Australia’ in Newland et. al. All at Sea: Policy Challenges of Rescue, Interception, and Long-Term Response to Marine Migration, Migration Policy Institute, 2016, p.152 539Brennan, F., Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of Queensland, 2003, p.29

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Evidence that perceptions relating to the economy was influencing attitudes towards humanitarian migration can be identified in the fact that Trade Unions formed some of the most vocal opposition to the intake of refugees in the 1970’s: unemployment was relatively high and the Waterside Workers Federation protested the ‘preferential treatment’ being given to refugees.540 As previously explained in Chapter IV, in Australia, the Labor Party (as well as trade union movement more generally) has been a powerful force in immigration restriction and at times blatant racism. One broad shift over recent decades has been that trade unions no longer oppose humanitarian immigration or even general immigration as strongly as they did in the past. Menz explains this shift as a compromise- accepting the modern inevitability of migration, trade unions would rather support managed documented migration than risk undocumented illegal migration which threatens to introduce even greater downward pressure on wages and industry standards.541 Australia has undergone this transformation- many

Vietnamese refugees were absorbed as low skilled workers, pejoratively described as ‘factory fodder.’542 In particular, this referred to employment in unregulated textile manufacturing in sweat-shop-like conditions.

These shifts are prescient considering the topic at hand. If trade-based affiliations have traditionally been a locus of anti-refugee sentiment and are now less so, what sectors have driven the politicization of immigration that explains securitization in the New Millennium?

The fact that dissatisfaction with immigration peaked in 1992 with economic recession

540Viviani, N. The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1984, p.79 541Menz, G., The Political Economy of Managed Migration: Nonstate actors, Europeanization, and the Politics of Designing Migration Policies, OUP Oxford, 2008, p.264 542Askola, H., The Demographic Transformations of Citizenship, Cambridge University Press, 2016 p.112

215 conforms to the theoretical expectation that high unemployment exacerbates xenophobic attitudes. However, Australia has maintained economic growth throughout the New

Millennium, in which immigration levels have remained extremely high throughout, concurrent with resurgent xenophobia directed at boat people. Overall, this period was one of more economic growth and stability than the 1970’s when responses to the VRC were first formulated, meaning that the securitization of humanitarian channels cannot be crudely attributed to the overall state of the economy in different periods. Tabled below, the major framing devices relating to national wealth help explain.

Table 2.7 Major Framing Devices Relating to National Wealth

Discursive Code Case 1 Case 2 Proportionate Shift Australia’s 18 82 ↓1.47% Generosity Australian Wealth 19 13 ↓3.02% Unemployment 11 10 ↓1.8% Unskilled/ 2 19 ↑0.11% Uneducated

Extra Support 5 36 ↓0.03% Cost 2 45 ↑0.57%

The most significant shifts in discourse related to self-conceptions of Australia’s national wealth and a transformation of how the costs of humanitarian immigration are understood. The starkest change has been a significant decline in the invocation of the idea that Australia’s wealth and prosperity constitute an independent obligation towards the world’s needier peoples. In data collected, instances of this frame decreased from 19 to 13 between case study periods. When those numbers are represented proportionately it becomes evident how far the

216 frame has slipped down the symbolic order. The frame comprised 3.35% of all references during the VRC, a dominant placing of 4th most frequent rhetorical device, yet it only amounted 0.33% of all discussion in the New Millennium. Political elites no longer present national prosperity as an argument to accept refugees. Increasing emphasis on cost-burden and financial stress has effectively countered the dominance of sentiments constructing Australia as a wealthy nation that can afford to assist unfortunate foreigners.

Discussion of refugee issues within the paradigm of Australia’s generosity and generous record remained a frequent and dominant framing device across both case study periods. At 18 references, the frame comprised 3.53% of all speech during the VRC and, whereas the frame proportionately fell to comprise 2.06% of all discussion at 82 references in the New

Millennium, the position of frame in the symbolic order rose from the fifth to the fourth most dominant in operation.

Drawing attention to the relationship between (humanitarian) immigration and unemployment was comparatively frequent during the VRC, when 11 utterances comprised 2.05% of all speech. In the New Millennium this had decreased to 10 utterances comprising just 0.25% of discussion, a significant reduction in the dominance of the linkage. Political elites tended to utilize other frames to discuss the intersection between immigration and the economy. In small part, this frame has been supplanted by the straight assertion that humanitarian migrants are an economic ‘burden,’ but this too was only represented in 8 utterances- just 0.20% of all speech.

Part of the reason for this will become apparent below. Framing immigrants and refugees as a risk to unemployment levels has become archaic. The target audience of these framing devices

217 might not be at risk of being displaced by an unskilled refugee in Australia, where even manufacturing has become a skilled and regulated industry. Yet anybody can appreciate the salience of cost-pressures, even the unskilled who now rely on government funding for services. Consequently, it is arguments that trigger images of financial wastage and economic burden that have come to dominate anti-immigration arguments. Accordingly, the idea that refugees are unskilled migrants has reflected this shift, coming to include their lack of education and the cost-impact this has on government services.

The idea that refugees are unskilled or uneducated migrants increased from 2 to 19 references between periods, representing an overall shift from 0.37% to 0.48% of all speech. A quote by

Member for Reid Laurie, Ferguson on 1 June 2005 clearly illustrates the concepts described above,

“these people [refugees] will cost the Australian taxpayers more money per capita

because many of them have had very disrupted education, if any education. They have

lived in dire circumstances in rural areas, and they have very major family dislocations.

If you treat them with the same level of assistance per capita as before, it will not go

very far.”543

A prescient prediction of the direction of economic narrative regarding asylum seekers provided above was put forward by Rivett commenting on the VRC in 1979.544 By commenting on the potential that voters would eventually pressure the state to optimize wealth and services by managing population levels, Rivett offers a convincing explanation for this shift. The political economy of advanced democracies has favoured this trend over time as the voting

543House of Representatives Official Hansard, 1 June 2005 p.230 544Rivett, K., ‘Towards a Policy on Refugees’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 33(2), 1979, p. 138

218 public have pressured their representatives to retrench from costly commitments based on abstract ideals in in favour of more pressing self-interest.

The idea that refugees are unskilled is not just emotive rhetoric. Categorically, refugees are often from underdeveloped nations with limited education and vocational training when compared with the standards of developed migrant-receiving nations. This is further exacerbated by the fact that they have fled from conflict or difficult circumstances that interrupt the natural progression of schooling and careers on the part of asylees. Years consumed escaping danger and seeking asylum elsewhere, coupled with the impact of trauma caused by these environments can all be obstacles to refugees becoming productive members of their adopted society.

Awareness of these facts has been exhibited in the speech of Australian political elites, stressing that refugees are special immigrants that require extra support from government. Framing this extra support as necessary maintained relative dominance between case study periods: it comprised 0.93% of speech during the VRC with 5 utterances and 0.90% of speech in the New

Millennium representing 36 references. For example, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic

Affairs Michael MacKellar told parliament in a ministerial statement on 24 May 1977,

“Many refugees are not simply migrants beset by a few additional problems. They are

often persons who are distressed and disoriented and who need specialised settlement

assistance.”545

545House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 May 1977 p.1714

219

In the contemporary era, these references were more specific. For example, the Member for

Fadden Hon. Stuart Robert told parliament on 17 September 2009,

“There is no question about that…the change will avoid exempting torture and trauma

affected refugees who may only have a temporary issue. They will have a range of

support measures, considered some of the best in the world, to assist them with the

issues they are working through.”546

It is by drawing upon this cost-burden nexus that the securitization process has expanded in salience, evolving away from explicit notions of survival (national security) to a broader, economic type of survival in the image of middle class sustainability. Humphrey contends it was this wider conception that grew to prominence during the 2010 Australian Federal election.547 Within this context Australia must maintain the integrity of its borders and deter asylum seekers, not because they are belligerent or subversive but simply because the alternative is economically unfeasible. This conflation can be identified in Tony Abbott’s linkage between unauthorised boat arrivals and the public’s fear of unchecked population growth during the ‘big Australia’ population debates preceding the 2010 federal election. This line of rhetoric, in turn, functions to ignore the considerably larger migration categories which, considering Australia’s low natural birth rate, are the de facto cause for population growth in the nation.

The potential for dog whistling (earnest or otherwise) over economic threats continued to be evident in early stages of the 2016 electoral period with Immigration Minister Peter Dutton’s warning that any proposed alteration of the government’s strict border protection would result

546House of Representatives Official Hansard, 17 September 2009 p.9930 547Humphrey, M., ‘Migration, Security and Insecurity’, Journal of Intercultural Studies, 34(2), 2013, p.179

220 in “illiterate and innumerate” refugees entering the nation.548 Such an eventuality would threaten the nation’s economic prosperity by increasing strains on the welfare services necessary to support unemployed migrants. The quote provides a succinct example of how moral panics over immigration have come to centre around the impact on government services

(welfare and education) in addition to the traditional emphasis on immigrants filling unskilled roles in the labour market. Few Australian’s are concerned about an illiterate refugee taking their job. The disparaging tone of the statement implies it is audience-centred, which in turn highlights the persistent salience in framing refugees as an economic threat. Several narrative strands drawn upon by political elites cast doubt on the authenticity of asylum seekers by framing them as economically motivated. Take the major devices tabled below.

Table 2.8 Major Framing Devices Relating to Illegal Migration

Discursive Code Case 1 Case 2 Proportionate Shift

Bogus 7 23 ↓0.72% Welfare Chauvinism 3 14 ↓0.21%

Payment 2 37 ↑0.43% Economic Migrants - 25 ↑0.63%

Asylum Abused - 50 ↑1.26% Pull Factors 4 37 ↑0.19%

People Smugglers 6 84 ↑0.99%

548Bourke, L. “Peter Dutton says ‘illiterate and innumerate’ refugees would take Australian jobs’ Sydney Morning Herald 18 May 2016 Accessed Online http://www.smh.com.au/federal- politics/federal-election-2016/peter-dutton-says-illiterate-and-innumerate-refugees-would-take- australian-jobs-20160517-goxhj1.html

221

As predicted from the secondary source literature reviewed, instances of political elites framing refugees within the context of welfare chauvinism were identified in both case studies. This was coded whenever welfare for immigrants was presented in clear dichotomy with that for natives. For example, on 10 September 2012, the Member for Dawson George Christensen argued,

“The Greens may love that idea, and there are a few bleeding hearts who would love

that idea, but I think to myself that, if the government can afford to pay $300 a week

for people to housing illegal immigrants, what the hell are we doing with the homeless

in this country?”549

This device occurred 3 times during the VRC, constituting 0.56% of speech. While it rose to include 14 utterances in the New Millennium as a proportion of all speech it fell to 0.35% of discussion. Similarly, explicitly framing refugees as welfare cheats occurred only twice during the VRC and comprised 5 utterances in the New Millennium. Direct accusations that boat people were motivated to rort the welfare system were, therefore, very rare.

The related idea that boat people are bogus (non-genuine) was presented on 7 occasions during the VRC which, comprising 1.30% of all speech, amounted to the 23rd most dominant frame in operation. Proportionately, the device fell to represent 0.58% of speech in the New Millennium comprising 23 coded utterances. While remaining relatively frequent then, it is not these discursive devices which have grown in performative impact. In the New Millennium, it was far more common for political elites to insinuate refugees were illegitimate by arguing they were economic migrants, an articulation that was distinct to this period. Framing refugees as economic migrants obviously implies they are not genuine refugees and was identified on 25

549House of Representatives Official Hansard, 10 September 2012 p.9973

222 occasions in the New Millennium, representing a relatively frequent 0.63% of speech. For example, Minister for Home Affairs Jason Clare told parliament on 14 May 2013,

“Most of these people are not refugees. They are economic migrants, people looking

for a better life, people looking for a job. They are not entitled to asylum in

Australia.”550

The broader assertion that the asylum process is being abused was even more frequent. It constituted the 17th most dominant framing device in the New Millennium, representing 50 utterances which comprised 1.26% of all discussion. For example, the Member for Hughes

Danna Vale told parliament on 23 August 2001,

“I rise to support the Migration Legislation Amendment (Immigration Detainees) Bill

(No.2) 2001 because it contains measures that are necessary in order to protect the

principle of providing refugee asylum in Australia from those who are intent upon

abusing the system.”551

The following year, speaking in support for the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1)

2002, the Member for Ryan Michael Johnson argued,

“One of the steps the government and Minister Ruddock have taken is the restructuring

of the immigration program. This has played an important part in gaining the

confidence of the Australian people. We do not want people abusing the process. We

do not want rorters coming in here.”552

550House of Representatives Official Hansard, 14 May 2013 p.3095 551House of Representatives Official Hansard, 23 August 2001 p.30111 552House of Representatives Official Hansard, 12 December 2002 p.10293

223

Once again, the dominance of these frames owes to their performative ‘catch-all’ ability. They function to cast doubt on asylum seekers and the system while shying away from direct accusations that asylees are bogus, delinquent or frauds. These accusations are costly as they are highly contested and challenged by empirical facts such as high acceptance rates. For example, an asylum seeker may be accused of abusing the system by paying a people smuggler or passing through a signatory state in transit to Australia even if they are genuine refugees.

Notions of abuse fed the narrative that Australia had become a soft target for illegal entry/immigration. Framing Australia (or similarly, the Labor party, etc.) as soft on illegal immigration grew to constitute the 10th most dominant framing device in the New Millennium, comprising 66 coded utterances which represented 1.66% of all speech. This narrative can be identified in a statement by the Member for Mitchell Alan Cadman when rising to support the

Migration Legislation Amendment (Immigration Detainees) Bill (No. 2) 2001

“The process of establishing refugee status can be long and complex, but, typically,

Australia—generous and almost soft-hearted and soft-headed—gives open access to

court appeal after court appeal and tribunal after tribunal.”553

George Christensen echoed this imagery on 11 September 2012,

“Many of the people on board these boats are not fleeing anything. They are not

repelled; they are drawn. They are drawn to Australia and this soft-touch

government…”554

These rhetorical devices were complemented by repetitious calls that all failed (asylum) claimants must be returned overseas, which comprised a further 0.80% of all speech, 32

553House of Representatives Official Hansard, 23 August 2001 p.30105 554House of Representatives Official Hansard, 11 September 2012 p.10207

224 utterances. In some respects, this frame insinuates that Australia does not already strongly conform to this policy or that failed claimants do regularly reside in Australia illegally.

The fermenting of moral panic over illegal immigration has run parallel to a shifting worldview that increasingly locates Australia as the conceptual centre of refugee flows. The idea that pull factors determined refugee issues in Australia appeared on 4 occasions during the VRC and grew to comprise 37 utterances across 34 separate sources in the New Millennium. This represents a proportionate increase of the frame’s usage from 0.74% to 0.93% of speech.

Building off the narrative of pull factors, the idea that Australia’s first-rate legal standards constitute an extra incentive for asylees to travel to Australia as opposed to elsewhere was mentioned 26 times in the period, constituting a relatively frequent 0.65% of all discussion.

This concept was termed ‘Convention plus’555 by Phillip Ruddock, referring to the ostensible fact that Australia provides refugees with standards above and beyond what is dictated by the

UN Convention.

By far the largest framing device related to illegal immigration, however, was the injunction to stop people smuggling. Framing refugees within the context of people smuggling rose from 6 references which comprised 1.12% of speech during the VRC, to 2.11% of all discussion in the

New Millennium, 84 utterances across 63 separate sources. It achieved a dominant 3rd place within the symbolic order which, considering that the most frequent framing devices of the

New Millennium drew attention to scapegoating and detention practices respectively, makes this frame the most dominant and widespread securitizing claim in the era. As soon as it became clear that organized crime was profiting from smuggling Indochinese refugees to Australia in

555House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 June 2002 p.4066

225 the late 1970’s, the government moved decisively to combat the trade by introducing the

Immigration (Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 1980 which aimed to punish people smugglers.

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs Ian Macphee told parliament,

“This Bill is directed at people who may attempt to bring people to Australia without

first obtaining permission for their entry. It is intended to deal with anyone who

attempts to introduce to Australia, by sea or air, passengers who have not obtained prior

authority for travel to Australia. I emphasise that it is not directed at the passengers

themselves, whose situation may not be of their making and who may well qualify for

consideration as refugees and, eventually, for resettlement under refugee programs.”556

By the New Millennium this distinction was blurred. Introducing the Migration Legislation

Amendment (Transitional Movement) Bill 2002 as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Phillip Ruddock stated,

“The government’s actions…were in response to an increase in people-smuggling

activities which led to larger numbers of persons using vessels to seek to enter Australia

unlawfully. That legislation gave support to the government’s intention that

unauthorised boat arrivals should not be allowed to reach the Australian mainland.”557

Here, those (genuine) refugees aboard are included with the people smugglers under the formulation ‘unauthorised arrivals,’ to be rejected. Sometimes, emphasis on the criminality of people smugglers was placed at the forefront.

556House of Representatives Official Hansard, 1 May 1980 p.2517 557House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 March 2002 p.1105

226

Debating the asylum seeker issue in parliament on 24 June 2002, the Member for Hume Alby

Schultz stated,

“All people commenting publicly on these matters in Australia should at least inform

themselves of the global nature of the issue, the complexities, the involvement of

criminal gangs, and the sheer determination of many people to live in Australia.”558

References to criminal elements were identified on 20 occasions in the New Millennium, comprising a relatively frequent 0.50% of all speech. The conflation of boat people with criminality is highlighted by comparisons with individuals who have entered Australia by other means. ‘Plane people,’ those claiming asylum after initially arrival as legal temporary visitors, are not met with the same hostility, executive control or punishment as unauthorized boat arrivals. This is despite the fact that plane people experience lower rates of acceptance after having their claims processed – in theory, they should be seen as less likely to be legitimate.

The member for Moreton, Graham Perrett, put this irony to parliament on 14 May 2013,

“In terms of people arriving by plane, where there is nowhere near the hysteria, less

than 50 per cent of those seeking asylum have been found to have genuine cases. We

need to put that in that context.”559

Inglis rightly points out that these seeming inconsistencies would be strange if it weren’t for the internalized logic of deterrence: the ever-looming threat that unauthorised boat arrivals will dramatically multiply.560 Conversely, the executive maintains greater control over airports and air travel is not associated with anarchic mass migration in the same way that movements across

558House of Representatives Official Hansard, 24 June 2002 p.4230 559House of Representatives Official Hansard, 14 May 2013 p.3106 560Inglis, C., ‘Australia's Refugee Policy in an International Context’, The Australian Quarterly, 66(4), 1994, p.18

227 land and sea can be. More importantly, there is a qualitative difference being incorporated in judgments about the types of people arriving to Australia by different methods. O'Doherty and

Lecouteur note how this process is contingent on the visibility of migrants and subsequent symbolic associations. Visa over-stayers are often young people from the United Kingdom and the US561 and are much less visible in Australia through sharing the dominant dress, phenotype and language as mainstream Australians. They, therefore, do not typically trigger identification from the wider community and (whenever their nationality is acknowledged) their national identity is not prejudicially associated with the deviancy562 of boat people.

Boat people of the Third Wave have been highly visible, both in terms of their mode of arrival which attracts significant publicity and their appearance as ‘foreign’ looking peoples, exhibiting Middle Eastern phenotypes and often dressing in a noticeably different manner.

Racial prejudice has then sustained conflating Middle Easter arrivals with criminality,563 terrorism and foreign ideologies, important features which will be addressed in Chapter VI.

This desire to manage regional disorder goes some way in explaining why asylum seekers arriving by boat (as opposed to those arriving by other methods or through Australia’s official offshore program) have received the brunt of negative perceptions from the Australian public, politicians and the media: it is they who most acutely symbolize global disorder and are, therefore, subject to the greatest displays of executive control. Compare this to the figure provided overleaf.

561O'Doherty, K. and A. Lecouteur ‘“Asylum seekers”,“boat people” and “illegal immigrants”: Social Categorisation in the Media’, Australian Journal of Psychology 59(1), 2007, p.9 562Pickering, S., ‘Border terror: Policing, Forced Migration and Terrorism’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 16(3), 2004, p.213 563Ibid.

228

Fig. 1.6 Australia: Number of Overstayers 1990-2003564

The symbolic conflation of asylum seekers with illegal immigration is starkly illustrated when the dominance of anti-illegal frames is considered against Australia’s experience with illegally present individuals. The 2001 figures above placed unauthorised boat arrivals at 4,175 whereas there was an estimated 58,748 people already in Australia illegally present565 Recent data from

2014 suggests 62,100 individuals were illegally present from over-staying their visas,566 a decrease from the 1990 height provided above. Considering this amounts to 1.2% of the 5.5 million567 people granted temporary visiting visas to Australia each year, the problem is not particularly acute and does not incite significant controversy. The powerful cultivation of moral

564Cited in Hugo, G., ‘A New Paradigm of International Migration: Implications for Migration Policy and Planning in Australia’, Parliamentary Library, 2004 p.34 565O'Doherty, K. and A. Lecouteur ‘“Asylum seekers”,“boat people” and “illegal immigrants”: Social Categorisation in the Media’, Australian Journal of Psychology 59(1), 2007, p.9 566Whyte, S. ‘More than 62,000 People Living Illegally in Australia’ Sydney Morning Herald 26 December 2014 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/more-than-62000-people-living-illegally-in- australia-20141226-12dxod.html 567Ibid.

229 panic over illegal immigrants, therefore, has taken place over a period where the rate of the problem has been decreasing.

Distinctions like those above highlight the limits of utilizing macroeconomic analysis to predict trends in the politics of immigration. Stivachtis argues that the theory government’s decrease immigration intake in weaker economic climates and vice versa is too simplistic, it fails to explain the more consequential impacts: the rationale and criteria employed when deciding which migrants are desirable (or not) on top of these economic conditions.568 This often involves complicated social prejudices that exist independently of economic context.569 Speech regarding illegal immigration in Australia primarily functions as a neologism to refer to asylum seekers who have attempted to enter the nation illegally. Furthermore, evidence that the method of arrival (unauthorised by boat) is primarily influencing Australian attitudes is supported by previously introduced survey data, which shows that even those members of the Australian public that desire strong deterrent policies for boat people remain generally sympathetic and supportive of ‘real’ refugees selected in Australia’s offshore humanitarian immigration.570

Those individuals selected offshore are seen as worthy recipients of refugee status. While this may at first appear as a tension, the distinction is central to certain frames capitalized upon by political elites, such as referring to boat people as queue jumpers described in Chapter III. The narrative relies on constant reaffirmation of Australia’s generosity with respect to ‘proper’ humanitarian entrants while serving to justify harsh treatment of the undeserving. Ideas of

568Stivachtis, Y. A., ‘International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security’, Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(1), 2008, p.5 569Ibid. 570Louis, W. R., et al., ‘Why Do Citizens Want to Keep Refugees Out? Threats, Fairness and Hostile Norms in the Treatment of Asylum Seekers’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 37(1), 2007, p..54

230 personal wealth heavily inform these judgements, primarily because boat people have been able to afford payment to a smuggler.

The issue of this payment was only raised twice during the VRC, comprising 0.37% of discussion but rose to 37 coded references or 0.80% of speech in the New Millennium. A quote by George Christensen from 11 September 2012 highlights its emotive function,

“There are legal ways to enter the country, but there are also illegal ways. Paying

$10,000 to one of the vile people-smuggling scum to get on a boat to go to Christmas

Island is an illegal way of entering our nation.”571

Increased debate placing humanitarian migration within the realm of economics cannot be crudely interpreted as transformation towards scapegoating to validate cutting costs. The financial costs associated with humanitarian resettlement have grown substantially and diversified over recent decades. Nevertheless, some references to cost in the New Millennium were presented in a manner that was clearly meant to engender outrage. On 12 March 2013, the Member for Riviera, Michael McCormack stated,

“They are not helped by hordes of asylum seekers and by illegal refugees arriving on

our shores. We are paying upwards of $170,000 per illegal boat person arrival.”572

Framing refugees within discussions of financial cost increased substantially between periods from 2 utterances during the VRC to 45 references in the New Millennium. This represents a

571House of Representatives Official Hansard, 11 September 2012 p. 10206 572House of Representatives Official Hansard, 12 March 2013 p.1691

231 proportionate increase from 0.56% to 1.13% of all speech. In some cases, narratives decrying greater economic hardship have been presented in connection to weak border protection and asylum seekers. On 15 August 2012 Scott Morrison argued,

“The budget surplus is blown just like the borders have been blown for so many

years”573

The salience of this line of argumentation is evidenced by fact the political elites have picked up framing devices explicitly linking Australia’s generous humanitarian programs as contingent upon strictly ordered migration (essentially referring to the offshore detention regime). Framing Australia’s generous resettlement program as contingent on strict migration was counted 23 times in the New Millennium, comprising 0.58% of all discussion. Another quote by Scott Morrison encapsulates this presentation,

“In any one year, less than one per cent of the world's 10 million refugees will be

resettled. In any one year, 9.9 million people will miss out. These places are precious.

That is why it is crucial that we decide who comes to this country and the circumstances

under which they come. That is why it is crucial that Australia runs our immigration

program—not people smugglers who gamble with lives and sell hope to the highest

bidder.”574

A no-tolerance approach to unauthorized migration is no longer simply presented as an absolute sovereign right to achieve territorial integrity but as a defence of the international refugee regime: the liberal ideal itself. It illustrates the growing sophistication of arguments being

573Pickering, S. and L. Weber, ‘New Deterrence Scripts in Australia's Rejuvenated Offshore Detention Regime for Asylum Seekers’, Law & Social Inquiry, 39(4), 2014, p.1021 574House of Representatives Official Hansard, 3 June 2013 p.4883

232 raised against potentially damaging criticism that is aimed at the harsh illiberalism of

Australia’s regional detention system. This argument synergizes with the Turnbull

Government’s assertion that the securitization of borders is also necessary to defend multiculturalism in Australia. In some respects, these arguments act as a nuanced “throffer” (a speech act whereby an offer is heavily informed by contrasting threat) progressive Australia can keep humanitarian migration and multiculturalism within securitized borders, or not at all.

Conclusions on the Impact of Economics on Refugee Issues

The research I have undertaken identifies the emergence of a new language representing economic issues and refugees. Reviewing the content of discourse supports the idea that

Australia is experiencing the same kinds of economic impacts as other developed nations. The evolution of Neoliberal economic competition has solidified the corporate identity of the state

(already the preeminent modern symbol of political legitimacy through the image of sovereignty) as truly corporate: of and related to complicated financial management. To remain competitive, national governments pursue productivity and filling increasingly skill-heavy job vacancies. Skilled immigration, therefore, becomes a central pillar of this new economic paradigm but requires increased vetting of migrants to optimize performance. As the economy becomes advanced, unskilled job vacancies dwindle. The enfranchised pressure their representatives to avoid costs that will be passed on to the electorate. Initially, as the welfare state crystalized in the 20th Century, it involved robust socialized services. Concerns over the sustainability and long-term viability of this formula has, subsequently, introduced pressures to retrenchment from welfare. The emergence of welfare as a scarce resource has amplified

233 financial pressures within the unskilled classes and revived political attitudes that are dictated by resource competition.

The experiential concurrence of financial pressure with the visual symbols of globalization (the appearance of visibly foreign people and multiculturalism) has formed strong psychological associations whereby many citizens in the developed world identify the negative impacts of globalization as concurrent with mass immigration. As cost-burden is symbolically conflated with foreigners, rejection of the Other (retrenchment from multilateral engagement, aid and immigration) provides a logical avenue to reclaim national prosperity and social order. This emergent globalist/nativist dichotomy between native and foreigner characterizes contemporary politics in the developed world. It is within this context that welfare chauvinism has emerged as a powerfully persuasive argument in mobilizing public reaction as individuals make strategic claims to secure resources for the in-group. Reproduced internationally, the phenomenon has led to the dramatic revival of nationalist movements centring around nativist identity and hostile to immigrant populations and multilateralism.

Because Australia does not experience high levels of illegal immigration typical in other developed nations (low skilled undocumented workers who might undercut standards and wages) rhetoric has transformed away from the immigration-unemployment nexus to centre more around the notion of burdensome cost as such, rather than traditional representations constructing foreign workers as competitors for job vacancies. The perception that Australia’s first-rate services are extremely costly synergizes with the self-defined generosity of the

Australian people which is tested by foreigners who abuse the system. Nevertheless, the securitization of asylum in Australia can be rightly considered a manifestation of the global

234 anti-immigration movement, regardless of the fact that in this case, political elites are primary sourcing political capital by displaying executive control over asylum seekers. It is discursive devices that represent refugees within the context of globalization that have functioned to provide polemical weight to threat construction.

Incessant and varied narratives, such as boat people being attracted to the pull factor of

Australia’s wealth, abusers with criminal connections who are willing to take advantage of

Australia’s generosity, etc. continually demonize the Other. This makes sense within the context of a securitization process. Securitizing claims are highly contested and must be laboured with an extraordinary amount of threat construction and argumentation that functions to erode neutrality and persuade the audience of exceptional politics. Once the conflation of boat people with criminal-deviance is widely internalized, the public will acquiesce to their imprisonment and simple injunctions that the government must combat crime can function as performative utterances for the radical changes that constitute a securitization processes. These calls to fight crime (in form of people smugglers) and halt illegal entry have, consequently, manifested as the most dominant performative utterances in the context of securitizing claims

– even more so than explicit appeals to sovereignty and national security.

The more acute financial pressure becomes, the more images of burdensome waste generate powerful emotions. In the contemporary era, the perception that the executive, or any party, are soft on illegal migration or incompetent gatekeepers has become untenable: carrying a heavy penalty in both the news cycle and, ultimately, in electoral performance. Structural changes within the (political) economy, therefore, have introduced a clear motivation to

(re)turn towards immigration restriction and to draw capital from anti-illegal immigration

235 attitudes, even in those cases where the individuals being punished are genuine refugees meant to be afforded legal protections. To understand how these shifts have been able to occurr, the circumstances in which this project has been pursued must adequately understood. This will require addressing major changes in the international security environment and how these shifts have been reproduced ideationally in the discourse of political elites.

236

Chapter VI

The International Security Hypothesis:

The Refugee Regime Within Macrosecuritized Systems

Chapter VI continues to place Australia’s securitization of humanitarian immigration in an international context. Chapter VI departs from investigating changes through the lens of economics to consider the impacts of dramatic shifts in the global security environment. This will involve a more traditional overview of the politics of international relations, Great Power politics and alliance systems. A recent trend in the theoretical development of Securitization

Theory has been to reconsider the scale of the phenomenon. This advancement is particularly useful for this thesis as it allows for the different levels of analysis (national, international) to be incorporated in a way that shares the same theoretical and philosophical architecture.

The founders of Securitization Theory, Buzan and Wæver, have turned their attention to exploring ‘macrosecuritization,’ that is, when securitization manifests in ‘security constellations’ which may contain several sovereign states.575 This is a crucial distinction – the state is almost always the referent object of security. Macrosecuritizations require a referent object that is a ‘universal’ that can transcend parochial, national or ethnic identities. However, universal in this sense does not refer to ‘everybody.’ Completely universal referent objects, such as humanity in general, have not proven to be successful master frames. The Copenhagen

School recognises that securitization is particularly suited to ‘middle sizes’ and draws less

575Buzan, B. and O. Wæver, ‘Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory’, Review of International Studies, 35(02), 2009, pp. 253-276.

237 resonance at the individual (human security) and system level (humanity, large collectivities).

Firstly, I will comment on the theoretical implications of adopting different levels of analysis before going on to describe the two macrosecuritized systems of interest to this thesis.

Several things explain why securitization is suited to middle sizes. Addressing the smaller end of the scale, it appeals to common sense that very small groups of people often don’t command enough strategic interest to mobilize security forces to intervene on behalf of their welfare.

Humanitarian intervention is an aspect of warfare that may revolve around human security as the referent object,576 and is increasingly seen as a legitimate function of militaries in some circumstances – even if such action might otherwise violate territorial sovereignty. This provides the potential for an important shift in securitization away from purely ‘national’ security. Despite this, the fact remains that states and their militaries are often reluctant to pursue human security alone and, consequently, securitizing moves in which human security acts as the referent object are rarely successful.

Traditionally, small groups of people acting alone would not have been easy targets for securitization, as the threat to the survivability of states from such few enemies was negligible.

Technological developments and the rise of terrorism, however, challenges this conception.

Powerful militaries and national-security forces now consider terrorist groups (often comprising few members) and combating terrorism among their highest priorities. Small groups of people have, therefore, been the targets of comprehensive national securitization in recent times. When considering that the damage and death caused by terrorism has been

576Watson, S., ‘The ‘Human’ as Referent Object? Humanitarianism as Securitization’, Security Dialogue, 42(1), 2011, pp. 3-4

238 minimal in nations like Australia, this is a significant development. Conceptually, it mirrors the idea that comparatively small groups of unauthorized migrants are legitimate targets for securitized politics. Nevertheless, in these instances securitization is still firmly rooted in the behaviour of nation-states. States have always reacted defensively to violent transgressions of any size should they be aimed at their citizens or within their sovereign territory. Obviously, it is this logic of groupism and third-party defence that underlies national security in the first place.

On the other hand, there are reasons why larger scale attempts at securitization are less common. Put simply, as the entities being constructed as referent objects grow in size, the potential for inter-group incoherence and various other organizational/ symbolic obstacles grow too, rendering success less likely. IR establishes why this is expected. The monopolization of violence (security) is inextricably linked to the sovereignty that states are so reluctant to relinquish. Finally, there is a simple reason why securitization centres around national sizes- the contemporary international system of nation states is primarily a set of reified constructs resulting from previously successful securitizations. The experience of

‘foreign’ threat and, subsequently, the enmity and unity it provoked, was instrumental in the development of modern nation states as such. In other words, a national space can be understood as a region in which the population has become incorporated to collectively defend the territory from all Others. Identifying states as entities that are particularly amenable to securitization owing to their size, therefore, begs the question and mistakes the causative relationship. This is especially clear when taking into consideration the historical fluidity of nationalities, the varying geographic size of states and, frankly, granting that counterfactual worlds could have produced a radically different collection of nations than we see today.

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Securitization, therefore, is a phenomenon that can occur at any scale and can theoretically be applied to both large and small scales of human relations.

The tendency towards groupism is an engine for human behaviour, an idea well integrated into most approaches to IR.577 Taking a sociological approach also highlights how the appeal to defend the in-group from other human out-groups appeals to human intuition. History empirically proves that belligerent human groups are the most realistic threat to the survival of any polity. The reality of intergroup conflict and the potential for collectivities to persist over long periods of time allows for groups to enter into self-reinforcing dichotomies of enmity and allegiance. This strengthens emotional “we-feelings,”578 assisting the ideational development of larger scales of identity. Conversely, attempts to securitize issues that have not incorporated the politics of inter-group conflict have been less successful. Repeated attempts to securitize climate change, according to the danger it poses to the entirety of humanity and life on earth in general, provides a pertinent example. Perhaps this is primarily a result of the inherent difficulty in amalgamating competing interests in a classic collective-goods problem, however, the inability for human beings to intuitively appreciate the threat posed by (experientially subtle) changes in temperature certainly inhibits mobilization on the issue. Put simply, it is easier to securitize inter-group relations than abstract concepts: a foreign refugee symbolizes existential threat whereas ecological collapse does not.

577Wohlforth, W. C., ‘Realism and Foreign Policy’, in Smith S. A. Hadfield and T. Dunne (eds) Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, Oxford University Press, 2008, p.97 578Adler, E., ‘Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations’, Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 26(2), 1997, p.255

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Interest in the scale of securitization is not just limited to the abstract. The evolution of macrosecuritized systems has had significant impacts on world history. To succeed, these formulations must draw upon transnational features that can unite groups of people beyond their mutually- exclusive territorial existence. Historically, this has included religious collectivities, which have at times subsumed and ordered the security interests of separate (and potentially rival) sovereign states. An example of this is when European states launched crusades to protect ‘Christendom’ in the face of growing Islamic power.579 This example clearly illustrates the notion of ‘universals’ that is applicable to macrosecuritized politics- anybody can be Christian (the label does not refer to ascriptive identity markers such as race or territory of residence) but not everyone is Christian. This is crucial because it allows

Christendom to be secured against non-Christendom in the zero-sum manner that makes security sensible as a concept.580

The relevance of universal philosophies in facilitating macrosecuritization has persisted into the modern era. The most important manifestation of this phenomenon in the 20th century was the Cold War, which dominated the global security environment and ordered the world’s two largest alliance systems. The Cold War sheds light on the nature for security constellations and the security communities they allow to emerge. For instance, there is no doubt that the military threat posed to the European continent by the power of the Soviet Union accelerated European integration for the purposes of collective defence. This exogenously imposed motivation for cooperation facilitated the development of credible trust and commitment to non-violent conflict resolution amongst several European states. In turn, this reality allowed for the

579Buzan, B. and O. Wæver, ‘Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory’, Review of International Studies, 35(02), 2009, p.257 580Bigo, D., ‘International Political Sociology’ Chapter 9 in P.D. Williams, Security Studies: An Introduction, Hoboken, Taylor and Francis, 2008, p.123

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European community to manifest as a ‘cognitive region’581 or identity which did not previously exist in any meaningful way beyond geography. The European Union provides the best example of supra-sovereign institution of integrated nation states. How the emergence of genuine communities and the creation of intersubjective symbolic orders impacts the subject at hand will be explained later in this chapter.

In theory, security communities do not have to be comprised of so-called liberal states, or have liberal ideas of engagement philosophically underpinning cooperation. The Warsaw Pact nations formed a security constellation while sharing Communist ideologies. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine transnational fascist constellations.582 Moreover, cognitive regions can form around other ideological goals – Adler uses the example of Southeast Asian nations engaging around the concept of ‘development’ rather than the shared civic culture of democracy.583 The necessary feature to facilitate this type of constellation, therefore, is not one specific ideology but the shared existence of an ideology. This allows for language to be coordinated to develop into an intersubjective symbolic order that denotes threat.

It is likely, however, that any non-liberal security constellations would exhibit authoritarian politics and rely on sheer power and coercion to a greater extent. For example, the USSR relied on military interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in order to maintain a favourable political order and protect the constellation. Engagement based on liberal-democratic lines

(which involves a civic culture that promotes trust in institutional non-violent conflict

581Adler, E., ‘Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations’, Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 26(2), 1997, p.256 582Ibid. p.257 583Ibid. p.258

242 resolution) allows for trust between allies to grow and develop. According to Adler this is the critical difference that separates a security ‘community’ from a simple alliance system which may essentially revolve around dominance. The fact that several Eastern European states previously within the USSR’s sphere of hegemony gravitated towards integration in the

European security community, is strong evidence that coercion played a consequential role within the Soviet alliance system.

Fortunately for comparative analysis, the periods under analysis in this thesis belong to two distinct macrosecuritized systems. In the period 1975-81 Australia was a member of the ‘Free

World’584 American-led alliance bloc. The influence of Cold War politics upon humanitarian immigration in the period has been previously outlined and will be given greater clarity below.

Australia continued to be a committed member of the US-led international order from 2001-

13, which now manifested as the GWOT. While these examples provide important parallels and continuity (in so far as Australia remained a steadfast and stable supporter of the US-led international alliance system) the macrosecuritized systems differ in their structure, both materially and ideologically. These groupings are the two most significant macrosecuritizations of recent history and are, consequently, the first to garner academic attention.585 An overview of these systems, as well as their associated symbolic orders, will help locate meaning within the language of political elites with respect to (inter)national security.

584Buzan, B. and O. Wæver, ‘Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory’, Review of International Studies, 35(02), 2009, p.254 585Ibid.

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The Cold War as a Macrosecuritized System

Understanding the potential of macrosecuritizations to form into international security communities is crucial when exploring the impact of the international security environment upon how states perceive, and receive, humanitarian migrants. The success of the universalism within the Cold War frame can be seen in its cross cultural and global reception.586 Most of

North America, Western Europe, Oceania and Japan were stable members of the Free World bloc. Importantly, this connection did not only extend to formal security commitments: it also related to an emerging culture that permeated through the capitalist world order.

The existence of this ideational aspect is critical as it allows for symbolic orders to develop the intersubjectivity necessary for the shared construction of threat. For example, France and Japan may have experienced radically different histories, cultures and geography but political elites in both nations understood that ‘Socialism’ threatened ‘democracy’ and were broadly united against it. The universalist framing of the Cold War Macrosecuritization, therefore, did not simply globalize the threat of Communism, it also globalized the scope of those opposing it.

This cultural construction is a central component in explaining why the US and its allies felt obliged to assist nations and peoples whose identity previously seemed distinct or insignificant- such as the South Vietnamese.

586Buzan, B. and O. Wæver, ‘Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory’, Review of International Studies, 35(02), 2009, p.254

244

Cold War politics dominated the era in which the modern international refugee regime developed. Initially, Eastern European refugees made up the majority of asylees coming to the

West during the Cold War period. They were often utilized a source of political capital in the

West.587 The flight of these refugees was portrayed as evidence of the authoritarian and oppressive nature of the Communist World. Conversely, their acceptance in the West reaffirmed the identity of the Free World. Furthermore, this took on an important ideological dimension, in the antagonistic bipolar world order the refugee flow to the West was construed as proof of the superiority of liberal-capitalism, and the inferiority of Communism. At the very least, Western policy makers felt that refugees could not be sent back to persecution, or where their life might be in danger.

This sentiment is explained by Loescher- initially in the 1920’s, refugees were conceived of as exiles who their state did not want.588 In the competitive climate that emerged immediately after the Second World War, however, refugees were better understood as people who would be in great danger should they be returned home, even if their own states wanted them returned.

This was the case regarding millions of Russian nationals displaced by the war. While many did not support the Soviet system and feared returning to oppressive conditions, Russian officials pressured other governments to forcibly repatriate them, in part to save face.589 The status of these displaced people provoked intense debate between Western and Soviet delegates at early UN conferences, cementing the significance of East-West relations in the international refugee regime from its inception.590 At the time of drafting the 1951 Refugee Convention,

587Loescher, G., Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, Oxford University Press, 1993, p.55 588 Ibid. p.55 589Ibid. 590Ibid. p.49

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American officials wanted to limit the obligations of the UNHCR to the mandate of the organisations predecessor, the IRO. This meant only assisting the resettlement of displaced persons in Europe and managing the flow of refugees of from East to West on that Continent.

Recent events such as war in Korea and the Partition of India had caused millions of people to be displaced, reminding Western governments to be wary of committing to an organisation that was obliged to assist every refugee when it appeared that refugees would be generated indefinitely on a global scale. Australia had great reservations that the Convention might challenge the sovereignty of migrant-receiving nations to select desirable migrants, especially if Australia was obliged to assist anyone displaced by conflict in the neighbouring region.591

Australian representatives did not want ocean to be considered frontiers that can be crossed in the same ways that European borders had been: Australia wanted to retain control of its northern coastline.592

Accordingly, the 1951 Refugee Convention limited the definition of refugees to those individuals displaced in Europe before 1951, essentially those disrupted by the Second World

War. This limitation was later omitted by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Nevertheless, when it suited the United States to accept non-European refugees (such as

Cubans and later, the Indochinese) the perception was that these refugees were, in the words of Tempo, ‘Americans at the Gate’ and that their admission would positively strengthen the nation through global legitimacy and competitive advantage.593 This demonstrates a counterpoint to prevailing contemporary associations, asylum seekers have not always been

591Ibid. p.57 592Neumann, K., ‘Oblivious to the Obvious? Australian Asylum-Seeker Policies and the Use of the Past’, in Neumann, K. and G. Tavan, (eds) ‘Does History Matter?: Making and Debating Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Policy in Australia and New Zealand’, ANU Press, 2009 p.82 593Tempo, C. J. B., Americans at the gate: The United States and refugees during the Cold War, Princeton University Press, 2008. p.3

246 conflated with instability and insecurity in their adopted homelands. Nevertheless, the primary motivation for orchestrating humanitarian intake into US always remained ideological symbolism.594

Australia firmly conformed to this dominant Cold War paradigm. In fact, almost all migrants coming to Australia through humanitarian channels had been people leaving Socialist nations

(or were originally from nations that were now under Communist control at the time of their admission). The largest groups of displaced Europeans that Australia had accepted through the

IRO resettlement program from 1947-1952 had been from Poland, Yugoslavia and the Baltic states.595 Similarly, the next single biggest influx of refugees was in 1956 with the intake of

9562 Hungarian refugees after the failed Hungarian Revolution.596 One notable exception, although still bound within the dynamic of the Cold War, was Australia’s involvement resettling Chileans tied to Allende’s Socialist government after a successful right-wing coup.

When asylees did not fall within the simple dichotomy of political persecution within the Cold

War, they were unlikely to be accepted. Take, for example, Australia’s involvement processing thousands of West Papuan refugees from 1963-1973 fleeing into Papua New Guinea (at that time a territory administered by Australia) from persecution by Indonesian authorities in West

Papua. While hundreds were allowed to stay on humanitarian grounds they were not considered candidates for resettlement and most were deported back to Indonesian authorities. In a move foreshadowing later developments, it was also the first time Australia organised the detainment

594Loescher, G., Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, Oxford University Press, 1993 p.150 595York, B., ‘Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official Sources’, Information and Research Services, Parliamentary Library, 2003 p.10 596 Ibid. p.12

247 of asylum seekers on Manus Island. Here, it is important to note that Australia only endorsed the 1967 Protocol in 1973 – until that time there was no legal obligation to assist refugees from outside of Europe. Neumann notes, however, the fact this phenomenon was not considered a precedent or relatable occurrence when Vietnamese boat people began arriving in 1976 demonstrates how differently these groups of refugees were conceived.597 This mindset was reflected internationally, Western policy makers simply did not consider displaced people in the Third World as refugees in the same way that those asylees fleeing Communist persecution were.598

The case of the VRC marks a continuation of the Cold War refugee paradigm599 but also a unique manifestation.600 In other words, while it fit within the dominant Communist/Free

World dynamic it is the only time that a major resettlement scheme to Western settler societies involved ‘Third World’ peoples. This raises the question, why did the United States and its allies commit to the resettlement of Indochinese when they had been reluctant to accept large numbers of non-European refugees? After 1973 Australia did have a legal obligation to assist those Vietnamese claiming asylum in Australia under international law. Yet Australia joined in extensive international resettlement efforts, ultimately accepting far more refugees than would have ever arrived by boat. Only 1.5% of Indochinese refugees that eventually settled in

Australia reached the country as a nation of first asylum.601 The simple answer can be found

597Neumann, K., ‘Oblivious to the Obvious? Australian asylum-Seeker Policies and the Use of the Past’, in Neumann, K. and G. Tavan, (eds) Does History Matter?: Making and Debating Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Policy in Australia and New Zealand, ANU Press, 2009, p.51 598Haddad, E., The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, Cambridge University Press, 2003 p.151 599Brennan, F., Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of Queensland, 2003, p.38 600Loescher, G., Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, Oxford University Press, 1993, p.76 601McMaster, D., Asylum seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne University, 2001 p.54

248 in the behaviour of US policy makers. Under these specific conditions refugees were a perverse symbol of success, proving the North Vietnamese reprehensible and leaving the US to reap political capital from saving hundreds of thousands of lives. Clearly, Australia’s place (both cultural and strategic) within the Free World was having a marked influence on the formulation of refugee policy and the eventual acceptance of large numbers of Indochinese for resettlement.

When considering how little attention policy makers gave to other displaced peoples in the region (even when those people were reaching Australian territories) being able to identify the

Indochinese as refugees within the Cold War dynamic emerges as the paramount reason for their acceptance and resettlement.

The Global War on Terror as a Macrosecuritized System

As the global threat of Communism diminished in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the US risked losing the advantageous position of leading the world’s most comprehensive and powerful alliance system. Despite Huntington’s infamous thesis that “civilizations”602 would become the macrosecuritized blocs in the Post-Cold War era, this state of affairs was not immediately realised. In fact, the US struggled to frame grand strategy in a way that amalgamated the disparate interests of the nations it desired to maintain leadership over. This era abruptly came to an end with the September 11 terror attacks and the revival of a directly violent threat to the US and, by extension, its allies.

602Huntington, S. P., ‘The clash of civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 1993 pp.22-49

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The rapid rise of Islamic terrorism as a top-tier international security issue stimulated images of civilizational clash in the public consciousness. Western policy makers feared that the

‘Islamic World’ was experiencing a revival in religious parochialism that endangered the region’s seamless integration into the liberal globalism that they equated with future peace and security.603 Terrorism simultaneously gave impetus to the securitization of state borders and immigration channels and propelled the ideational construction of the Islamic World as a threatening space. This ideological development seemingly ignores the fact that, whereas general labels such as the Islamic World connotes images of a monolithic bloc of nation-states with some semblance of allegiance or shared interested, this does not have strong basis in reality. Nevertheless, this has not dampened broad conflations between Jihadi terrorism, violent extremism the religious fundamentalism of the Middle East.

Trump’s Muslim travel ban, signed on March 6 2017 to protect the US from foreign terrorism, proves how these brute association can impact the highest levels of decision making.604

Presenting these disparate phenomena as connected might seem ambiguous, but it is these general conflations that master frames seek to establish. Vultee illustrates with the example of the US-Mexico border: it is not particularly evident why the threat of Islamic Terrorism should inform the militarization of preventing illegal immigration from Mexico, but it has.605 US

President George W. Bush presented America’s post-9/11 position as a call to arms606 requesting assistance in a new global grand strategy. Some scholars, Buzan included, have

603Barnett, T. P., ‘The Pentagon’s New Map’, Esquire, 1, 2003, p.121 604 Thrush, G. ‘Trump’s New Travel Ban Blocks Migrants from Six Nations, Sparing Iraq’, The New York Times, March 6 2017 Accessed Online: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/travel- ban-muslim-trump.html 605Vultee, F., ‘Securitization: A New Approach to the Framing of the “War on Terror”’, Journalism Practice, 4(1), 2010, pp. 33-47. p.44 606See Graham, P., et al., ‘A Call to Arms at the End of History: a Discourse–Historical Analysis of George W. Bush’s Declaration of War on Terror.’ Discourse & Society, 15(2-3), 2004, pp. 199-221.

250 interpreted this reaction as an opportunistic attempt to reassume America’s leadership over a large security constellation.607 Modern technologies have revolutionized expressions of governmentality, transforming border security into a cyberspace where foreign threats are under surveillance globally and risk assessments are made before would-be terrorists even meet national borders.608

The GWOT Macrosecuritization does not only involve achieving greater domestic security through policing apparatus’ but has involved massive national wars and military expedition.

President George W. Bush made it clear that the US would combat those groups or states that sheltered, funded or in any way assisted terrorists. Al Qaeda, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, were operating out of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan at that time. When it became apparent that the Taliban would not cooperate in bringing the perpetrators to justice, the US invaded Afghanistan on grounds of national security. By claiming that states were either ‘with or against’ the US in their global efforts, the zero-sum division between kinship and enmity fundamental to securitizing claims was invoked. This signalled the emergence of a new fully- fledged macrosecuritized system. Whereas the Cold War Anti-Communist Macrosecuritization primarily drew upon the shared threat of militaristic encroachment by Communist or Soviet- allied forces for mobilization, the GWOT Macrosecuritization does not primarily seek support to geopolitically balance against certain belligerent states (although the concept of Rogue

States provides some continuity here). Instead, it draws upon the shared interest of states to guard against terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors.

607Buzan, B., ‘Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ be the New Cold War?’, International Affairs, 82(6), 2006, pp. p.1101-2 608Amoore, L., ‘Biometric Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror’, Political Geography, 25(3), 2006, pp. 336-351 p.337

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In practice, this has centred around the shared threat of Jihadi terrorism and resulted in increased policing and control of Muslim populations across several states. For example,

Chinese authorities face the prospect of Islamist insurgency organising Uighur nationalism.

Russian authorities are fighting Islamist/ separatist insurgency in Chechnya and Dagestan.

Many European states fear terrorist attacks in their major cities which can be committed by small groups or even lone perpetrators. These examples demonstrate why such a radical restructuring of the global strategic was possible. This unusual transformation did not immediately change the balance of power between competing Great Powers and, consequently, there was little resistance to its formulation by the US. Mayer argues that this has led to a homogenization of rhetoric surrounding the security interests internationally.609 On November

12 2001, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1377610 declaring terrorism a significant threat to international security and calling upon states to address the issue. This legitimized the strategy and actions of the United States and, subsequently, encouraged other actors who intended to bandwagon.611

The GWOT Macrosecuritization has had extremely significant impacts on the international humanitarian migration regime. It has been argued that Australia’s enthusiastic response to the

War on Terror (readily joining of the United States’ wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) and its affirmation of a strong border protection stance and securitization of asylum seekers were all features of the same increasingly militarised and statist foreign policy outlook during the

609Meyer, C. O., ‘International Terrorism as a Force of Homogenization? A Constructivist Approach to Understanding Cross-National Threat Perceptions and Responses,’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22(4), 2009, p.647 610Rosand, E., ‘Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism,’ American Journal of International Law, 2003, pp. 333-341 611McDonald, M., ‘Constructing insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post-2001’, International Relations, 19(3), 2005, p.297

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Howard era (1996-2007).612 Furthermore they were indicative of a sovereignty-focused politics, which changed regional policy from “engagement and openness to watchfulness and security.”613 This nexus is not limited to Australia: the emergence of terrorism as top-tier threat to international peace was recognised as a characteristically new challenge. Whereas previous threats to international order involved the types of armaments and large scale capabilities that only nation-states or powerful actors might possess, terrorism could be perpetrated by small groups of people and lone individuals. By its very nature, therefore, combatting terrorism requires a level of population management more akin to law-and-order policing than the traditional targets of national security.

The emergence of the individual-as-security-threat has driven anxiety over ‘risky’ populations.

Western states, perceiving themselves as a target for terrorism (almost exclusively Jihadi) have increased entry screening and biometric surveillance of all individuals entering national borders, visitors as well as potential migrants. This turn to security and order was reflected in official rhetoric. The notion of international citizenship present throughout the Indochinese

Refugee Crisis was formally challenged. The 2002 White Paper stated previous devotion to the ideal was ‘a trap for ideologues and the naïve.'614 It was within this context that government ministers expounded unauthorised migration as a security threat in Australia. As discussed in

Chapter III, usually this notion relied on ambiguous identity of unauthorised arrivals. The potential link between terrorism and boat people was, however, sometimes replicated at top levels.

612 Ibid. 613Wesley, M., ‘Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 2001’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 56 (1), 2002, p.62 614Fitzgerald, J., ‘Who Cares What They Think’ John Winston Howard, William Morris Hughes and the Pragmatic Vision of Australian National Sovereignty’, in Broinowski, A., (ed), Double Vision: Asian Accounts of Australia, Pandanus Books, 2004, p.22

253

Government MP Peter Slipper stated there was,

“An undeniable link between illegals and terrorists . . . Many of these illegals come

from Afghanistan [and] it is not beyond the realms of possibility that some people

gaining illegal entry into Australia this way are people who have been involved in

terrorism or who do represent a threat to this country.”615

Defence Minister, Peter Reith validated this sentiment, claiming humanitarian immigration regimes could become “pipelines” for terrorists.616 As the war on terror frame grew into a discursive reality it incorporated Islamic fundamentalism as a belligerent force- identifying it a major threat to international peace. The essentialization of terror-risk onto Muslim people in general, and Arabs in particular, meant that migrants from those groups bore the brunt of new anti-immigrant and border control practices.617 Those Muslims/Arab populations already within Western nations also drew increasing suspicion from the greater population who questioned their loyalty and feared they may constitute a ‘fifth column’ of internal enemies.

This type of phenomenon is typical in times of conflict when certain minority groups might come to be seen as internal enemies within the context of interstate war, such as when Australia interned Germans, Italians and Japanese during World War Two. Conversely, why haven’t the victims of Islamic fundamentalism been spun into political capital for the West like previous waves of refugees fleeing totalitarian ideologies? The simple answer is that Middle Eastern

Muslim refugees have been feared as perpetrators of conflict whereas the South Vietnamese

615McDonald, M., ‘Constructing Insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post-2001’, International Relations, 19(3), 2005, p.306 616Pickering, S., ‘Border Terror: Policing, Forced Migration and Terrorism’, Global Change, Peace & Security, 16(3), 2004, p.223 617Stivachtis, Y. A., ‘International Migration and the Politics of Identity and Security’, Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(1), 2008 , p.2

254 were largely accepted as victims (at least by policy makers). This difference is the result of how the prevailing geopolitical climate has impacted on the symbolic order.

Ibrahim identifies the (re)securitization of migration in the industrialized West as mirroring earlier practices of racial exclusion during the imperial era, point to the reception of unauthorised boat arrivals in Canada.618 Though New Racism often falls short of discrimination based on race it still draws upon long standing prejudices and racial/ cultural anxieties relating to essential character traits of the Other. Dunn argues that this has certainly occurred with the

‘racialization’ of Islamic prejudice in Australia which dominates contemporary public discourse.619

An example of how this ideology functions can be found in the work of Hopkins, who found that when Muslim people are harassed or discriminated against in the West, reactions tend to be aimed towards those people sporting markers of cultural identification rather than purely because of Middle Eastern facial features, for example.620 This is how the construction of intersubjective symbolic orders is central to the assessment of risk – a robed and beared Muslim man is a potential Islamic Fundamentalist. Islamic Fundamentalists are, in turn, potential terrorists or sympathizers.621 The racialization of discourse has essentialized Islam as a characteristic upon Muslim people. Muslim refugees then, cannot symbolize a flight away from fundamentalism, to Western eyes, they categorically share in the symbolic identity of their oppressors and always signify the Other.

618See Ibrahim, M., ‘The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse’, International Migration, 43(5), 2005, pp. 163-187 619Dunn, K. M., et al., ‘Contemporary Racism and Islamaphobia in Australia: Racializing Religion’, Ethnicities, 7(4), 2007 p.567 620See Hopkins, P. (2004) ‘Young Muslim Men in Scotland: Inclusions and Exclusions’, Children’s Geographies 2(2): 257–72 621Dunn, K. M., et al., ‘Contemporary Racism and Islamaphobia in Australia: Racializing Religion’, Ethnicities, 7(4), 2007, p.567

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Meyer found that while the GWOT media frame initially acted to homogenize discourse surround security rhetoric (a measure of success for master frames) it has become less homogenous over time.622 Similarly, linkages between terrorism and other issues have become harder to ideologically sustain. Looking to newspaper headlines to chart the evolution of the

GWOT frame over time, Vultee found it has become increasingly “fragmented and contested.”623 This insight is reminiscent of Weldes who identified the reason for this: security frames have a high onus of proof and require “considerable ideological labour”624 to remain dominant. With respect to the relation between terrorism and the politics of asylum, this shift has been facilitated by a distinct lack of evidence – the vast majority of refugees have simply not been or become Jihadi terrorists. Huysmans and Buonfino found that with respect to parliamentary speech the UK, linking the threat of terrorism with asylum seekers diminished significantly after 2002.625

The unsubstantiated nature of allegations that humanitarian channels will be abused by terrorists was echoed in 2016 by US Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, who claimed that not one of 800,000 refugees accepted into the US since 9/11 had been charged with terrorism or related offences and called for Australia to follow the US in increasing humanitarian migration quotas.626 Australia’s only experience with an act of terrorism

622Meyer, C. O., ‘International Terrorism as a Force of Homogenization? A Constructivist Approach to Understanding Cross-National Threat Perceptions and Responses,’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22(4), 2009, p.660. 623Vultee, F., ‘Securitization: A New Approach to the Framing of the “War on Terror”’, Journalism Practice, 4(1), 2010, p.34 624Weldes, J., Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, University of Minnesota Press., 1999 p.16 625Huysmans, J. and A. Buonfino, ‘Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK’, Political Studies, 56(4), 2008, pp. 766-788 p.778 626Vincent, M. ‘United States Planning to Increase Refugee Intake, calls on Australia to Follow Suit’,ABC News, 30 June 2016 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-30/us-calls-for-australia-to- increase-refugee-intake/7557578

256 committed by a Muslim refugee was the December 2014 ‘Lindt Café Siege’ when gunman

Man Haron Monis took 18 hostages in a Sydney Café. Although this attack did result in three deaths (Monis killed one hostage while he and another hostage were killed in the ensuing raid by authorities) and was considered an ISIS-affiliated terrorist attack at the time, Monis’ documented history of mental illness and lack of organizational connection with terrorist groups has meant that the Australian government do not consider the case an example of international terrorism. Put simply, the argument that refugees might be terrorists has lost mainstream credibility, a feature that will emerge in the data below.

Representations of International Security in the Speech of Political

Elites

I will now test the assumptions introduced above against the primary source data collected that relates to IR and the changing nature of international security. This will act to gauge the extent to which these broad (yet often ambiguous) worldviews have impacted on securitization in

Australia by looking to the speech of political elites in parliament. For the remainder of this chapter, insights will be drawn from identifying appropriate frames for comparison, in addition to tracing the relative dominance of particular frames across the periods in question. For example, it is totally expected that refugee issues were framed as being part of the Cold War at a much higher rate during that era than afterwards. Looking to shifts in the dominance of the

Cold War frame across time, therefore, will not yield meaningful results. Accordingly, in those cases, an analogue must be identified to draw sensible insights. It is by evaluating difference,

257 therefore, that the importance of geopolitical change can be gauged. The major framing devices that related to international security are tabled below.

Table 2.9 Major Framing Devices Relating to International Security Discursive Code Case 1 Case 2 Proportionate Shift (%) Cold War 6 2 ↓1.07% Free World 11 5 ↓1.92%

Terrorism 1 18 ↑0.28% Security Threat 3 8 ↓0.36%

Territorial Integrity 6 43 ↓0.04% Screening 2 42 ↑0.69%

Push Factors 9 33 ↓0.84%

The data collected for this thesis supports theoretical assumptions sourced from the literature: the politics of the Cold War dominated the attitudes of policy makers towards refugees during that era. During the VRC political elites explicitly located the global refugee issue within the dynamic of the Cold War on 6 occasions, comprising a relatively frequent 1.12% of discussion.

Naturally, locating refugee issues within the context of the Cold War scarcely occurred after the fact, twice in the New Millennium. It was more common during the VRC to frame refugee issues within the context of anti-Communism, identified on 10 occasions. Significantly, this constituted 1.86% of all discussion on refugees, the 15th most common discursive device.

Similarly, framing refugee issues within the politics of the Free World and Australia being a

‘free country’ constituted 2.05% of discussion during the VRC, representing 11 utterances. In the New Millennium the usage of this frame had fallen to 5 instances, only 0.13% of speech.

While the centrality of these frames confirms that the symbology of allegiance (with reference

258 to international security) was certainly dominant during the VRC, explicitly framing refugees as allies was rare across both case study periods, occurring only twice in each.

Finding modern analogues, locating Islamic Fundamentalism or Jihadi terrorism as the driving forces in the flight of refugees occurred on 8 occasions during the New Millennium, comprising

0.20% of all speech. On 17 September 2007, Michael Danby argued,

“Let us remember who some of the people were on that Tampa ship. They were Afghan

refugees—from the country that we now have troops in, trying to prevent the re-

establishment of the Taliban, the very people who caused those people to flee—the very

victims of Islamist violence we are righteously fighting…”627

When debating the emerging refugee crisis in Syria, the Member for Cowan Luke Simpkins stated on 3 June 2013,

“It is a sad reality that in places around the world—in Iraq, in Syria particularly and in

Egypt—it is usual that groups such as Christians are targeted by Islamicist

extremists.”628

Similarly, the idea of conflict a between the Islamic World and the West was referenced 4 times during the New Millennium, only 0.10% of discussion. Even then, these linkages were not arguments being advanced, but warnings.

627House of Representatives Official Hansard, 17 September 2007 p.73 628House of Representatives Official Hansard, 3 June 2013 p.4884

259

For example, in response to the attacks on 9/11, the Member for Parramatta Ross Cameron told parliament,

“It is my view that the objective of those who acted in Washington and New York was

to provoke a war between the West and Islam. The act itself was intended to foment

Western hostility to Islam and, by the magnitude of the US response, to consolidate

Islamic hostility to the West.”629

It was more common to emphasise the role of the Taliban’s oppression in causing refugees, a frame identified 20 times in 18 separate sources. Prior to 9/11, the Member for Calwell Dr

Andrew Theophanous criticised government,

“They think they are winning votes, for example, when they condemn refugee

claimants- people who come to Australia from places like Afghanistan, for God’s sake.

That is the place run by the Taliban—the people who destroy 2,000-year-old Buddhist

temples and statues.”630

On 17 March 2010 Michael Danby reflected that in the preceding period,

“The horror of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan caused an outpouring of about three

million refugees, hundreds of thousands of whom tried to find asylum in Western

countries.”631

Political elites drew sympathetic attention to Hazara victims of the Taliban on 8 occasions, which was coded as a connected subcategory. Although there are limits to inferring public opinion from the speech of political elites, the data collected proves the longevity of sentiments

629House of Representatives Official Hansard, 26 September 2001 p.31573 630House of Representatives Official Hansard, 7 March 2001 p.2535 631House of Representatives Official Hansard, 17 March 2010 p.2756

260 acknowledging Australia’s special relationship with the Vietnamese. In fact, references to

Vietnamese refugees remained more frequent during the New Millennium than references to refugees of any other nationality! 31 references across 30 different sources placed discussion of the Vietnamese at 0.78% of all speech whereas the second most common nationality of discussion was Iraq at 19 references, 0.48% of speech. The fact that political elites argued that contemporary refugee issues are unlike the VRC to justify government policy further validates the legitimacy those events have accrued in Australian history.632

Political elites acknowledged that comparable levels of support had not been voiced in relation to subsequent refugees. The Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regimes were also national enemies of Australia, yet asylum seekers fleeing them suffered rejection by Australian authorities. This nuanced frame, pointing to the irony of rejecting and demonizing the victims of your national enemies, was coded on 22 occasions across 16 sources in the New Millennium. Criticizing the proposed Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002, the Member for Calare Peter Andren stated,

“…the government is saying the asylum seekers are the threat to our security. This is a

further demonising of these people, most of whom have fled their countries because of

the very tyrannical forces we are so ready to join the US in fighting.”633

On 10 June 2005, the Member for Grayndler Anthony Albanese clearly put the argument to parliament,

“These people, most of whom were fleeing the Saddam Hussein and Taliban regimes—

which were evil enough for us to send Australian men and women to war to fight—

632Counted on 7 occasions 633House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 June 2002 p.4053

261

were sent to the middle of the desert, and worse still we excised our borders and sent

people to Nauru.”634

The argument that Australia’s obligation towards refugees stems from being directly responsible for their plight (Australia’s direct involvement in armed conflict) became less dominant between periods, despite Australia’s direct military involvement in Iraq and

Afghanistan providing empirical continuity. The frame was presented on 4 occasions during the VRC and 8 times during the New Millennium. Proportionately this represents a downward shift from 0.74% of all discussion down to 0.20%. The warning that military action typically exacerbates refugee issues emerged in the New Millennium to comprise 0.38% of discussion, representing 15 utterances.

Some concerns were raised that Communist infiltrators and terrorists might be among those

Vietnamese coming to Australia by boat or as refugees.635 Therefore, in the same way that political elites have raised concerns that refugees from the Islamic world may be committed to an ideology hostile to their new host societies, so too did Australians fear cultural enemies might arrive as refugees during the Cold War. Obviously, the symbolic conflation between

Islam and terrorism is far more developed in the contemporary era and, accordingly, was a linkage put forward more frequently in the New Millennium. Terrorism was only linked to

Vietnamese boat people once in during the VRC. In the New Millennium, linkages between terrorism and refugees were made on 18 occasions, constituting 0.45% of all discussion.

634House of Representatives Official Hansard, 10 November 2005 p.148 635House of Representatives Official Hansard, 4 April 1978 p.913

262

Arguing in support of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Identification and

Authentication) Bill 2003, the Member for Forde Kay Elson stated,

“It is important to minimise the opportunities for identity fraud because it does not just

impact on the integrity of our immigration program. At an organised level, it is linked

to international terrorism and organised crime. It endangers Australian safety and

security.”

When presented in conjunction with other issues it lent polemical weight to securitizing claims.

For example, on 2 May 2013, the Member for Dawson George Christiansen stated,

“The sheer scale of Labor's border protection failure now surpasses the population of

most towns in my electorate of Dawson. And people in my electorate have genuine

concerns about their country throwing its doors open to economic refugees, to people

smugglers, to human traffickers and, potentially, to terrorism threats.”636

The performative power of invoking terror-threat is indisputable, yet these linkages were not always made as assertions of fact. On a further 10 occasions in the New Millennium, political elites argued that conflating terrorism with refugees was unfair and must be avoided. In the aftermath of 9/11, Michael Danby told parliament,

“We must not conflate the desperate boat refugees who happen to be of Muslim faith

with these few extremists.”637

636House of Representatives Official Hansard, 2 May 2013 p.4339 637House of Representatives Official Hansard, 17 September 2001 p.30786

263

The following year, the Member for Lyons Dick Adams argued that these issues should

be kept separate,

“Our problem is to ensure that we are dealing with the two issues, one being terrorism

and the other being Australia’s responsibility towards world refugees.”638

Another complex countersecuritizing frame to emerge during the New Millennium period was the idea that terrorists seek to provoke intergroup conflict and that, consequently, demagoguery must be avoided to combat the aims of terrorists. This was coded on 4 separate occasions.

Although infrequent, this frame illustrates what is meant by the ‘high cost’ of maintaining security master frames. It can be identified in a quote from September 2001 by Anthony

Albanese,

“If we are to defeat terrorism truly, we must support its antithesis—tolerance and

humanity; humanity and compassion in our nation’s domestic policy as well as in our

attitude to international affairs. Australians of Arab descent have been unjustly targeted

as a result of recent events.”639

It is important to note that the linkage between unauthorised migration and terror-risk is not limited people from the Middle East or Muslims. Political elites also pointed to this risk regarding Tamil asylees. Indeed, the Tamil Tigers were a one of the oldest and most established terrorist organizations in the world before being largely defeated by Sri Lankan military forces in 2009. Nevertheless, considering the insurgency was centred around territorial separatism it is unlikely that those with connections to the Tamil Tigers would carry out violent attacks on targets within Australia and, therefore, constitute a security threat in the traditional sense.

638House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 February 2002 p.164 639House of Representatives Official Hansard, 26 September 2001 p.31573

264

Tamil asylum seekers (along with other non-Muslim asylum seekers) prove that while Jihadi terrorism has generally informed heightened precautions pertaining to border security, these resultant practices are ubiquitous and enacted non-discriminately. This further illustrates the convenient nature of espousing terror threat to justify detention practices which already existed to deter any and all asylum seekers from attempting to travel to Australia unauthorised.

The direct claim that refugees were a threat to the Australian nation was only identified on 8 occasions during the New Millennium, making the assertion surprisingly rare in a period empirically dominated by the securitization process. Debating the Migration Amendment

(Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 on 9 August 2006, Kay Elson told parliament,

“The nature of ‘illegal entry’ means that many people arrive without any documentation

and it is totally appropriate that we thoroughly ascertain the suitability of anyone

entering this country. To do otherwise would pose a potential security risk to our nation

in these uncertain times.”

Sometimes, this tone was more direct. For example, on 14 May 2013 George Christensen argued,

“When this government sets new benchmarks for porous borders on a daily basis,

Australians rightly question how many illegal arrivals are genuine refugees who will

become tomorrow's citizens and how many are using the back door to become a threat

to our nation.”640

Similarly, the explicit claim that the executive must act with exceptional urgency to neutralize the threat of unauthorised arrivals (the orthodox grammar of securitization) was only identified

640House of Representatives Official Hansard, 14 May 2013 p.3108

265 on 4 occasions in the period. Finally, the claim that national security conceptually trumps humanitarian considerations occurred 3 times in both case study periods, representing a proportionate decrease from 0.56% to only 0.07% of discussion. The converse argument, that asylum seekers do not constitute an existential threat, was uttered 11 times in the New

Millennium. Speaking from Opposition on 3 June 2003, the Member for Griffith Kevin Rudd argued,

“…the real threats to Australia’s national security. I contrast them with what I would

describe as the manufactured threats to Australian national manufactured threats such

as the government’s argument some years ago on the back of the Tampa crisis that this

country was about to be invaded by refugees.”641

The related claim that there are far bigger threats than refugees was advanced on a further 3 occasions. As covered in chapter IV, even the weaker (in so far as it is more ambiguous) claim that refugees threatened Australia’s social cohesion was only advanced on 5 occasions.

Political elites framed the securitization process as a reaction to 9/11 on a further 5 occasions.

The related argument that hostility towards Muslims explains the securitization of asylum was more common, coded 13 times across 11 different sources. On 21 June 2005, Peter Andren argued,

“I said in August almost four years ago the Tampa episode was being exploited to create

the desired anti-asylum-seeker sentiment— indeed what was, in its effect, an anti-

Muslim sentiment.”642

641House of Representatives Official Hansard, 3 June 2003 p.15802 Emphasis Added 642House of Representatives Official Hansard, 21 June 2005 p.81

266

On 18 March 2013, the Member for Calwell Maria Vamvakinou told parliament,

“Some of the more recent challenges include the heightened concern about terrorism,

which has impacted, often adversely, on Australians of Islamic faith. The intense focus

on boat arrivals, many of whom are, in recent times, fleeing conflict in the broader

Middle East and Sri Lanka, has become a matter of public concern and debate.”643

Mirroring insights drawn from Chapter IV, the data above demonstrates that those securitizing claims that have been successful (the actual performative utterances which have manifest in exceptional security practice) have been frames other than those brute articulations of threat, either terroristic or sociocultural. Furthermore, the frames presented above demonstrate why this is the case: explicit claims that refugees are an existential threat (or that Islam is a cultural threat) are highly contested and, therefore, costly in credibility. Agents making securitizing claims are trying to be most persuasive and it is, therefore, not surprising that they have gravitated to general formulations that trade off notions of threat but sidestep the need for rigorous justification to that end.

For example, data introduced in Chapter III demonstrates that the idea that the unauthorised entry of refugees was a violation of Australia’s territorial integrity was a far more dominant framing device relating to national security than any described above. This framing device occurred 6 times in the VRC, and increased to 43 utterances across 34 sources in the New

Millennium.

643House of Representatives Official Hansard, 18 March 2013 p.2307

267

In 1978, the Member for Bradfield David Connolly questioned if the emergent phenomenon of unauthorised refugee arrivals constituted a security threat,

“In recent months we have seen an increase in the number of refugees who have arrived

off the Australian coast. We must again question whether their presence represents a de

facto military threat or merely an illegal incursion into Australian national

sovereignty”644

In the New Millennium, these linkages became more direct. For example, on 26 June 2002 the

Member for Wentworth Peter King argued,

“…incursions along our northern coastline, in particular, have meant that the issue of

processing protection visas expediently has become quite rightly part of the question of

border security.”645

As a proportion of all speech, this frame underwent a marginal decrease between periods from

1.12% to 1.08% of discussion. Nevertheless, its position within the symbolic order rose to 24th most frequent, confirming a paradigmatic shift whereby refugees have increasingly come to be considered within the context of territorial integrity. The idea that unauthorised entrants must be adequately screened increased significantly in frequency and proportion between periods.

The argument appeared twice during the VRC and 42 times in the New Millennium, representing a significant increase from 0.37% to 1.06% of all speech. For example, the

Member for Hume Albert Schultz stated on 25 June 2001,

“We are not…required to permit full access to the Australian community until we know

who they are and we have undertaken health character and security checking.

644House of Representatives Official Hansard, 4 April 1978 p.914 645House of Representatives Official Hansard, 26 June 2002 p.4405

268

Immigration detention in Australia is consistent with the UNHCR’s detention

guidelines and Excom’s conclusions on this matter.”646

Arguing in support of the proposed Migration Amendment (Duration of Detention) Bill 2004, the Member for Forrest Geoff Prosser declared,

“We place in detention people who arrive unlawfully until their claims to remain are

determined. In many cases we must also find out who they are, where they are from

and whether they have criminal records or health concerns. To do otherwise and let

them free into the community is to risk their disappearances, as many other countries

have discovered, to their great frustration.”647

Altogether, this device provides a more accurate encapsulation of the modern nexus between risk, immigration and governmental obligation towards refugees. The frame acts as a catch-all to address various concerns of the public and policy makers alike, bridging concerns over potential terror-risk to the necessity of establishing the identity of asylum seekers to determine their claims. Several other discursive frames describe international relations without necessarily relating to macrosecuritized great power politics or traditional representations of threat. These frames, tabled overlfead, demonstrate subtler shifts in ideology relating to

Australia’s relationship with the world and bear exploration.

646House of Representatives Official Hansard, 25 June 2001 p.28485 647House of Representatives Official Hansard, 3 March 2004 p.25807

269

Table 2.10 Major Framing Devices Relating to International Relations

Discursive Code Case 1 Case 2 Proportionate Shift (%) UNHCR 27 75 ↓3.15% (legal obligation)

International 6 23 ↓0.54% Standing Regional Peace and 8 6 ↓1.34% Security

Regional Cooperation 3 32 ↑0.24%

Growing Problem 8 43 ↓0.41% Magnitude 2 58 ↑1.09%

Aid 1 35 ↑0.71% Push Factors 9 33 ↓0.84%

As previously reviewed in Chapter III, invoking the International Human Rights Regime as a legal obligation remained an important frame informing political elite’s understandings of refugee issues. This argument was put forward on 27 occasions during the VRC, comprising

5.03% of all speech: the second most dominant discursive frame employed. In the New

Millennium, 75 instances of this frame only accounted for 1.88% of all speech, representing a downward shift to 8th most dominant framing device. This drop is significant. In the same way as the party line on Anti-Racism has persisted but weakened in dominance, the fracturing of this frame has allowed for other voices to grow in influence. Some of these shifts have been subtle changes in how refugees are seen to impact upon regional peace and security. The idea that refugee issues must be addressed in a way that is cognisant of Australia’s respectable international standing and foreign affairs image, has become less dominant over time. It was advanced on 6 occasions during the VRC, representing 1.12% of all speech but fell proportionately to comprise 0.58% of discussion in the New Millennium at 23 utterances.

270

Similarly, the idea that refugee issues must be solved in order to safeguard regional peace and security fell dramatically. It was the 20th most dominant framing device during the VRC when

8 references comprised 1.49% of all discussion. In the New Millennium the frame constituted

6 references, comprising just 0.15% of discussion. The independent motivation to accept refugee to alleviate regional tension has been drowned out of discourse. However, the conceptual inversion that regional cooperation was necessary to successfully manage refugee issues themselves, grew significantly. This frame was presented on 3 occasions during the VRC and grew to include 32 utterances in the New Millennium. Proportionately, this shift represents an increase from 0.56% to 0.80% of all discussion. Developing this, the idea that solutions to refugee flows must involve frameworks that are regional or international in scope was presented on a further 35 occasions in the New Millennium, comprising a relatively dominant

0.88% of all discussion.

As previously introduced, political elites warned that the international refugee problem was growing on 8 occasions during the VRC. This represented 1.49% of all speech, the 19th most frequent frame in operation. It fell proportionately but remained frequent at 1.08% of all discussion in the New Millennium comprising 43 utterances. It became more common, however, to stress that boat arrivals to Australia are relatively low in global terms. This reference occurred twice during the VRC and grew to include 45 utterances across 38 separate sources in the New Millennium. This frame has achieved relative dominance, growing from

0.37% to 1.13% of all speech. Conceptually, this line of argument was linked with the enormity and magnitude of the global refugee problem, a frame that rose from just two utterances during the VRC to 58 in the New Millennium. This shift represents a proportionate growth of the

271 frames usage from 0.37% to 1.46% of all discussion making the frame the 14th most dominant in the contemporary period. Evidentially, this backdrop has played an important role in shaping political elite’s understandings of refugee issues.

While Minister for Immigration and Multicultural affairs, Ruddock told parliament on 30

August 2001,

“the protection of Australia’s borders are very much related to maintaining the integrity

of the immigration program and also maintaining the integrity of our capacity to assist

in relation to refugees, deal with asylum issues and also cope with what is in fact a very

significant international problem.”648

Providing continuity 11 years later, Ruddock elaborated on September 10 2012,

“The difficulty has always been that there are many more people in those circumstances

than we are able to help or the rest of the world is able to help. When you see that 10

million people have been found to be refugees and 40 million people have been

displaced, the enormity of the problem can be understood.”649

Earlier that same year the Member for Parramatta, Julie Owens put it bluntly on 20 August,

“The world refugee problem has no answer; it certainly does not have an answer that

Australia can come up with today. If we took 49.5 million asylum seekers today, there

would still be a hell of a lot waiting for safety. So it is not a problem we can solve. We

can only play our part.”650

648House of Representatives Official Hansard, 30 August 2001 Emphasis added 649House of Representatives Official Hansard, 10 September 2012 p.9968 650House of Representatives Official Hansard, 20 August 2012 p.9079

272

Inadvertently signalling the dramatic scale of the global refugee problem has proven a counterproductive strategy for those attempting to challenge the politics of panic by emphasising Australia’s relative insulation from this global anarchy. Knowledge of magnitude of the contemporary global problem has only driven anxiety that cements deterrence as a sensible strategy to maintain. The idea that climate change will significantly exacerbate the international refugee problem emerged in the New Millennium and was identified on 31 occasions across 26 different sources, representing a relatively frequent 0.78% of all discussion. The Member for Kingsford-Smith, Peter Garrett encapsulated this frame, warned parliament on 9 October 2006,

“The paper outlines…the likelihood of climate change refugees—if that is the right

term, and there may be a better term—on a scale that renders the trickle of asylum

seekers the government is intending to divert to Nauru and resettle in third countries

tiny in comparison.”651

Rather than securitization merely representing a reaction away from globalization towards inward-looking state security, the discourse surrounding refugees in parliament has demonstrated greater acknowledgement of the international complexity of the issue over time.

Political elites argued isolationism was unfeasible twice during the VRC and on 7 occasions in the New Millennium. Similarly, on a further 9 occasions in the New Millennium political elites argued that domestic-legal changes within Australia would never fundamentally solve the international refugee issues.

651House of Representatives Official Hansard, 9 October 2006 p.73

273

It was far more common to discuss the international dimension of refugee issues by referring to the emergent context of source and transit countries. The idea that there are transit countries that operate as staging grounds for the on-flow of refugees from source regions was raised on

19 occasions across 16 separate sources in the New Millennium, comprising 0.48% of all discussion. The related idea that increased organization and assistance at the source (refugee- producing regions) is necessary to solve mass refugee flows was put forward on 20 occasions in the same period, constituting a relatively frequent 0.50% of all speech. These concepts were often presented as connected. For example, as Minster for Foreign Affairs the Hon. Alexander

Downer told parliament,

“A critical element of our strategy is to strengthen regional cooperation against people-

smuggling and to do that by improving the technical capacity of source, transit and

destination countries to deal with these problems.”652

A quote from 19 March 2009 by the Minister for Home Affairs Bob Debus demonstrates how these ideas constitute a forward-defence in the governmentality of deterrence,

“Customs and Border Protection will also lead government efforts to engage

internationally with source and transit countries so that we may comprehensively

address and deter peoplesmuggling—specifically, by early intervention initiatives to

provide alternatives to displaced people and refugees in source and transit countries”653

The direct claim that aid and reconstruction were necessary to combat mass refugee flows grew significantly from a single reference during the VRC to 35 references across 29 separate sources in the New Millennium, 0.88% of all discussion. Altogether, these conceptions

652House of Representatives Official Hansard, 13 May 2003 p.13976 653House of Representatives Official Hansard, 19 March 2009 p.3339

274 highlight the worldview of policy makers. Understandings of refugees with IR have transformed from viewing refugees as a consequential feature of macrosecuritized conflict towards a perspective revolving around Australia being at the theoretical centre of refugee flows. As covered in Chapter V, framing refugee flows in terms of pull factors increased between periods from 0.74% to 0.93% of all speech. This marginal increase takes on greater relevance when compared with the fact that framing refugees flows within the context of push factors fell in the symbolic order from 1.67% to 0.83% speech between periods. There has been a paradigmatic shift of perspective from pushes (conflict, refugee as subject) to pull (Australia as a magnet for immigration).

Conclusions on Representations of International Politics in Refugee

Debates

Contemporary asylum policy emerges from the core goal of deterrence to project new meaning to Australia’s international relations. The frames above represent how the central problematique of refugees has shifted away from the cause of their flight (and the associated conflict) towards their personal embodiment of anarchic immigration and the strategies deemed necessary to mitigate the phenomenon.

The significant difference in Australia’s reception of boat people in the 1970’s did not lay in public opinion in so much as the reaction of politicians. Political elites saw in Vietnamese refugees an opportunity to secure Australia’s international image and its role as a responsible

275 member of the international community. Those in the Fraser government certainly thought that to ‘make politics’ with humanitarian crises would unfavourably impact on their election prospects.654 The Indochinese refugee crisis was no safer a predicament for Australian policy makers than the global refugee flows of the New Millennium. Viviani supports the perspective that the millions of displaced people within sailing distance of Australia during the VRC is the situation that has most closely mirrored long standing Australian fears of uncontrolled swamping from its northern (Asian) neighbours.655

Nevertheless, Fraser confirmed in his memoirs that those in government thought any attempts to shirk from official resettlement quotas would only encourage unauthorised arrivals. Once the decision was made to accept Vietnamese refugees, political elites were committed to selling that decision to the public: emphasising the neediness of refugees and the contribution humanitarian migrants could make to the nation, as well as Australia’s responsibility regarding war in Indochina. One the other hand, Middle Eastern refugees in the New Millennium period have been persistently demonized and the construction of the people as criminal-deviant- terrorist has helped to cultivate a moral panic against ‘illegal immigration.’

The evolution of symbolic orders within transnational communities is significant as it can have a profound impact on norms in international relations. For example, Bigo notes that the term migrant itself has become a de facto threatening symbol cross-culturally in Europe. Migrants

654Brennan, F., Tampering With Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem, University of Queensland, 2003, p.32 655Viviani, N., The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1984, p.79

276 simply mean instability.656 Shifting norms can pave the way for emulation elsewhere, like those calls for European governments to match Australia’s strict policy of naval interception for unauthorised refugee boats in the Mediterranean. The GWOT Macrosecuritization combines traditional anxieties (the resurgent fear of civilization-threatening anarchy) with modern hypergovernance: the desire to mitigate the problems posed to international relations and state governance by the forces of globalization.657 Hypergovernance seeks state collaboration to reclaim order, a process accelerated when states culturally identify in a self-conscious manner as a community. Just as Western liberal democracies formed the cultural core of the Free World bloc, they remain the core referent object of the GWOT macrosecuritization. Although some of these states can be considered less committed members (for example, France and Germany disapproving of military adventurism in Iraq) there is, nevertheless, a synchronization of narrative and ideology throughout the West that constructs a dichotomy between the vulnerable cities of the developed world and the risky Islamic world. It is safe and orderly Western spaces that must be secured from the menace of terrorism, leaving the cities of the Middle East doubly at risk, from both Jihadi terrorism and now Western arsenals.658

Although the Free World persists in this material sense (as a collection of the same core units) the constellation has gradually retreated from the intersubjectively shared symbols of its traditional identity: Anti-Communism/ Anti-Authoritarianism, open borders and markets and being pro-immigration, including political asylum. To whatever extent cultural coherence remains in what was the Free World, the bloc is best considered one with a new emerging

656Bigo, D., ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), 2002, p.71 657Humphrey, M., ‘Securitization of Migration: an Australian Case Study of Global Trends’, Cuerpos, Emociones y Sociedad, 15(6), 2014 p.86 658Graham, S., ‘Cities and the ‘War on Terror’’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(2), 2006, p.258

277 culture, changing values and, therefore, distinct interests. Primarily these emerging interests relate to challenges facing government in the globalized era: mass immigration, transnational organized crime and terrorism, rather than a true revival of the type of macrosecuritized contest that existed during much of the 20th Century. This conforms with insights from the literature.

Huysmans and Bigo recognize that the securitization process has not been characterised by the emergence or identification of new enemies per se, as much as the expansion scope of policing powers. This has taken place through the elevation of risk-prevention strategies above previously enshrined liberal ideals of civil liberty and procedural fairness by government, through incremental institutional shifts among security professionals.659 Images of civilizational clash and Great Power rivalry may constitute an impetus for public acquiescence of the securitization process: a facilitating condition. However, they are not the key drivers in the contemporary period, in so far as they are not the symbols being presented (speech acts) that are reified in action. Moreover, in an era where such pronouncements might appear archaic, they do not need to be.

The essentialization of criminal-deviancy onto asylum seekers, in which aspects of global disorder are combatted as crime with state authority in the image of criminal-justice is a call to arms with far greater performative power in peacetime. In this way, emphasis on the criminal connections of smuggled refugees inform notions of broad categorical risk and constructions of the deviancy/delinquency of asylum seekers bridge traditional notions of (foreign) threat with the modern preoccupation with combatting crime. Refugees represent a security threat that does not have its genesis in international relations (the realm of power politics generated

659Bigo, D., ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,’ Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1), 2002, p.74 ; Huysmans, J., ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(5), 2000, p.752

278 by the relative relations of foreign nation-states) but in globalized relations, the new symbolic meanings attached to the anarchic movement of asylum seekers and the implications that this carries for executive governments and the public interest they represent. Refugees are the preeminent symbol of the emergent nativism/globalism dichotomy, acutely symbolizing the ideological contests of contemporary politics.

Placed historically within surrounding periods, the acceptance and integration of large numbers of Indochinese refugees in Australia during the 1970-80s can be understood as an achievement that was possible for two major reasons. Firstly, the international security environment itself.

The primacy of Cold War politics and the Vietnam War allowed for political elites to mobilize identity politics in support of Indochinese refugees and were, most importantly, exogenously provided the motivation to do so. Consequently, Australian political elites were left to source political capital from undertaking these policies. It was not necessarily sharing we-feeling with the Vietnamese that motivated policy makers but the desire to cement Australia’s placement within the favourable macrosecuritized system of the US-led world order. No comparable exogenous mechanism exists in the New Millennium. Put bluntly, it was the VRC that constitutes a major exception and the (re)securitization of humanitarian migration can be understood as a resumption of Australia’s traditional stance, meaning highly vetted immigration programs strictly motivated by the national interest. Technically, it is not just the dissolution of the Cold War system which has consequentially impacted on humanitarian immigration. Australia’s membership within the new GWOT macrosecuritized system has further accelerated these processes already underway.

279

It is worth noting significant impacts this has had upon partisan politics. As previously discussed, support for refugees was higher among Liberal voters than the general population during the Fraser era. The political ‘Right,’ after all, were more self-consciously opposed to the Communist bloc. This importantly mitigated parochial strands of conservatism to mobilize support for refugees in the Cold War paradigm. Conversely, concerning the GWOT media frame, Courtemanche and Lahav found that left-leaning liberal-progressives as a group are highly suspicious of arguments of societal security.660 They don’t tend to believe foreign cultures can ambiguously threaten the nation. In the same research, blatantly material (violent) threats generated indistinguishable non-partisan displays of hostility from the public.661 In combination, these shifts have driven a partisan shift whereby the ‘Left-Right’ political spectrum impacts on attitudes towards refugees. Recent scholarship (2016) by Canetti et al. confirms that the perception of threat from refugees (and subsequent negative views that favour their restriction) now cluster around self-identified Right Wing people.662 Whereas comparison with Israel proves this correlation is reflected internationally, Australians were even more likely to hold negative views towards refugees at lower levels of threat perception than their

Israeli counterparts!663

The intersubjective resurrection of foreign threat in the form of Islamic terrorism has taken place on top of structural changes that had already motivated political elites to restrict immigration channels. These arguments do not need to involve dramatic presentations like the ostensible clash between transnational referent objects like Islam and the West. Somewhat

660Lahav, G. and M. Courtemanche, ‘The Ideological Effects of Framing Threat on Immigration and Civil Liberties’, Political Behavior, 34(3), 2012, pp.483 661Ibid. 662Canetti, D., et al., ‘Threatened or Threatening? How Ideology Shapes Asylum Seekers’ Immigration Policy Attitudes in Israel and Australia’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 29(4), 2016 p.601 663Ibid.

280 ironically, the securitization of asylum has paralleled a diminishment of imagining refugee issues within the context of grand macrosecuritized systems and civilizational master frames.

Terrorism offers a persuasive argument for increased government control, reinforcing the feasibility of immigration-restriction projects, yet it is not the a priori motivation for immigration restriction. Emotive moral panic against undesirable and anarchic immigration is an independent motivation that preceded (and continues to outweigh in speech) the convenient justification of terror-threat. This has left political elites with a clear avenue to address a continuing problem, their long-term diminishing legitimacy in established democracies.

Utilizing conspicuous displays of executive control, political elites can source latent political capital from anti-(illegal) immigration platforms. This image of governmental competence is achieved even in those cases when executive control is aimed at scapegoats (that is to say, genuine refugees).

The chronology of the events covered in this thesis determines that it is impossible to provide terrorism, or the greater cultural threat posed by Islamic revivalism, as the root causes of the securitization of humanitarian migration. Nevertheless, the indisputable role of terrorism and the growth of GWOT media frame in the securitization process indicate that these factors have propelled its evolution, and at times dominated its expression. The argument that unknown and undesirable migrants must be detained and screened acts as catch-all performative utterance to simultaneously fulfil other goals, namely retrenchment from costly refugee obligations and the punitive deterrence for would-be asylees while functioning as an outlet of xenophobic anxiety over cultural others.

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Furthermore, the global dimension of the Islamic-Terror-threat nexus, and its role in securitization internationally, provides the blueprint for a homogenization of discourse that is self-reinforcing. As previously covered in Chapter V, structural conditions have already driven the turn towards nativism and immigration restriction throughout many OECD nations. This highlights the potential for the formula to be replicated: for discriminatory immigration restriction and retrenchment from the international refugee regime to crystalize as shared interests feeding back into the governmental culture of the US-led security bloc and other developed nations. This would constitute a stark inversion of the central importance formerly placed on refugee-acceptance as an expression of shared identity within the Free World.

These insights carry important negative and positive implications. Firstly, because Australia’s commitment to humanitarian migration has been primarily tied to a desire to uphold the image of international citizenship (particularly towards powerful traditional allies such as the US) the motivation to continue such programs could dramatically weaken if international norms and their associated moral expectations shift. The securitization of humanitarian migration worldwide is evidence this process is already underway. Indeed, international criticism of

Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers (such as from the UNHRC) has done little to prevent the ‘lurch to the right’ which, after Labor were unwilling to contest the Coalition’s hard-line detention regime during the 2016 federal election period, has essentially adopted a bipartisan consensus.

Conversely, the experience of the VRC demonstrates the positive influence political elites can have and their necessary role in proactively managing migration crises. It proves the consequential impact of moral appeals and higher forms of identity politics. In the last instance,

282 the orchestration of Vietnamese resettlement relied on ideational commitment, clearly demonstrating how abstinence from reactionary xenophobia is possible and how public support can be secured through conviction and bipartisan solidarity. These identity-based sources of capital are an intrinsic possibility of human life, theoretically possible at any times regardless of external conditions. Furthermore, whereas the motivation to engage in mass resettlement was exogenously informed, Australia proved it had the internal capacity to undertake the process. All this occurred at a time when unauthorized boat arrivals were unprecedented and

Australia was far less multicultural. By emphasising narratives of political kinship and the worthiness of refugees, therefore, political elites went some way in abating reactionary fears and were able to manage ordered humanitarian migration, constructively working to mitigate the crisis. This left government with the flexibility to accept self-selected refugees, circumventing the need to rely on (potentially illegal) detention polices and their associated human costs. While deterrence remains the unquestioned rationale of refugee policy, the sentiment that every undocumented refugee is a ‘potential terrorist’664 is a powerful justification to marginalize human considerations and counter moral objection. Images of international security continue to dominate IR in the contemporary era, but this notion of security is increasingly an expression of institutional risk management more akin to the wars on crime and illegal immigration rather than traditional representations of foreign threat.

Consequently, modern images of macrosecuritized civilizational clash conform to the modern impetus towards hypergovernance, rather than the inverse.

664Glover, R. W., ‘The Theorist and the Practitioner: Linking the Securitization of Migration to Activist Counter-Narratives,’ Geopolitics, History and International Relations 3(1), 2011, p.86

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Findings and Conclusions

Investigating securitization must be approached from the ideational realm of social construction. By comprehensively mapping the variables involved and undertaking an ordered process of elimination, those most fundamental paradigmatic features can be clearly identified.

This investigation has reaffirmed the formative roles of history on discourse and narrative upon nation. Currents of exclusionary nationalism continue to drive Australia’s relations with refugees. The national organization of immigration restriction was the raison d'etre of the

Australian state and this legacy is inherited as discernible threads of xenophobia that persist to the present day. Australia’s national identity also strongly exhibits narratives of liberalism and, since the introduction of multiculturalism as official policy, tolerant anti-racism has increasingly become interwoven into this liberal-democratic landscape that challenges traditional prejudices. Therefore, identifying the legacy of Colonial racism as the preeminent explanation for the securitization of humanitarian migration in Australia conflicts with the true extent to which Australia has moved away from racial discrimination in immigration, irrespective of how strongly strictly ordered migration remains a key fixation of the national character. Perhaps more importantly, overemphasising Australia’s history also functions to ignore the global nature of the transformation towards combatting clandestine migration: a process driven by international forces.

Global forces also determined the nature of Australia’s involvement with the international refugee regime to begin with. A crucial facilitating factor in the creation of humanitarian immigration program and its maintenance over the 20th century was the international political

284 dynamic of the Cold War which heavily informed the mutually constituted evolution of allegiance and enmity that characterised relations between the two macrosecuritized systems.

The symbolic categorisation of people between these camps provided motivation to assist allies at the same time as smearing enemies, portraying them as refugee producing tyrants while the

Western World remained free and refugee-receiving. This ideological environment also served the basis for propaganda justifying the decisions of political elites after the fact. The macrosecuritized system of the Cold War had to be maintained on the basis of national interest.

Sections of the public may have decried the decision to accept Vietnamese refugees but the issue remained in realm of serious international politics and security and in the hands of professionals: public perceptions were to be allayed and assuaged. Accordingly, discussion of refugee issues during 1975-81 centred around images of the macrosecuritized security environment, commitment to the intersubjectively shared interests of the Free World and defence of the liberal international order.

The stability of a symbolic order, determined by external material forces, facilitated ideological coherence around the value of the international refugee regime at the bipartisan level. This became impossible to maintain when discourse was disrupted and fragmented by incessant debate over the emergent problematique of anarchic human movement (refugees and illegal immigrants alike) in the globalized period. When the Cold War ended, the primary factor driving support for previous waves of refugees evaporated along with it. In the Post-Cold War world, immigration is increasingly understood as a threat to economic prosperity and state security. A gap has emerged between popular conceptions of economic conditions and the

‘reality’ of economic conditions as understood by professional economic analysis, verifying that ideational forces can be just as consequential as material factors. Financial insecurity and

285 modern cost of living pressures have reignited instrumental resource competition as a central motivating factor in political attitudes.

The crystallization of illegal immigration as an emotive political issue has allowed politicians to revive partisan debate relating to (undesirable) immigration and, ultimately, opened avenues for the de facto resurgence of racially charged xenophobic debate. Anti-illegal immigration platforms are a clear ‘black and white’ framing device that is ontologically complete and hard to counter – crime cannot be sanctioned. This, coupled with the gradual erosion of liberal- democratic norms excluding racialized social commentary and partisan immigration debate, has led to the increased viability of demagogic posturing being presented in public platforms.

Rhetoric against illegals increasingly functions neologistically to facilitate racist reaction and identity politics. The international and cross-cultural dimensions of this are important: the

Western bloc remains (even if mainly imagined) a macrosecuritized system of alliances that share in a self-conscious membership of a community of nations. The meteoric rise of Jihadi terrorism as an international security threat has revived this tendency to homogenization.

Through a process of broad symbolic conflation, the (Fundamentalist) Islamic World has been identified as the prime psycho-social Other of this new macrosecuritized system. Terror-threat facilitated and accelerated immigration control, with Muslims bearing the brunt.

The powerful conflation between these phenomena has made their causative relationship to the securitization process previously hard to disentangle. Has the pervasive sense of insecurity brought about by the modern threat of terrorism coupled with the dissolution of real world borders provided impetus to securitize migration and scapegoat undesirable immigrants? Or was the radical transformation in the international security environment apparent as the GWOT

286 a convenient opportunity to pursue the project of (selective) immigration restriction already identified as in the best interests of advanced economies in reaction to structural economic change? The findings of this thesis suggest that, in Australia at least, it appears the latter is the more accurate description. New financial pressures and the perception that conditions are declining in migrant-receiving welfare states has reintroduced a motivation for chauvinism in the social realm as individuals make strategic, identity-based claims for scarce resources. The financial pressures of modern globalization are the prior facilitating conditions, Muslims/ illegals are the target and authority-seeking political elites have the motive to bridge these phenomena with securitizing claims and propaganda. Most importantly, it need not be the case that political elites are explicit in framing immigration restriction as a necessary course of action within the dichotomy of macrosecuritized conflict between Islam and the West, to benefit from anti-Islamic xenophobia. Those mobilized on societal security grounds are attracted to platforms of uncompromising border protection even if the linkage to Islamic terrorism is absent from discussion.665 Clearly, further research is needed to delineate the extent to which these grand forces have become conflated. Conducting similar research into political speech in other nations is critical before the relationship between these forces can be confidently discussed as having any kind of theoretical relationship. Nevertheless, based on conflation alone, the interconnection between these factors will likely continue.

Located within the macroscopic, events like Tampa symbolise an opportunistic pursuit of long term projects which are themselves driven by structural-material pressures and the intersubjective construction of shared interests among groups. Undertaking a comprehensive

665In qualitative research in 2016 Denis Mueller found fear of Islamisation to be the single-most correlated belief when predicting negative attitudes towards asylum seekers of those factors surveyed. Muller D. (2016) ‘Islamisation’ and other anxieties: voter attitudes to asylum seekers, Melbourne: The University of Melbourne.

287 review of discourse allows us to gain insight into what these interests are, in the case of

Australia, involving a fierce defence of the national space. This defence is not primarily aimed at a new foreign enemy but revolves around a continued protection of the ordered ‘inside’ from the ungoverned ‘outside.’ Over-emphasising the GWOT narrative (in which Western states have, in some measure, turned away from liberalism and multicultural immigration as a risk prevention strategy to defend against the foreign threat of Jihadi terrorism) mistakes the securitization of migration as exogenously informed. This view suggests that the manifestation of terrorism and extremism in the Islamic World is causing immigration restriction in other regions. However, locating the motivation for securitization as intersubjectively, yet endogenously constructed and identifying the relationship that exists between economic narratives that favour immigration restriction and the use of terrorism to justify executive power, provides a fundamentally deeper understanding. In some respects, it also represents a deeper problem. Now that the relationship between modern financial pressures and resurgent native nationalism is established in the literature, agents desirous to comprehensively address the risk this poses to the liberal international order (including maintaining a robust international asylum regime) would be tasked with addressing enormous socio-economic forces.

The absence of this kind of leadership is already having significant impacts. The apparent inability of national governments to guard against emergent modern problems has accelerated a decline in legitimacy among the traditionally established political classes in democratic systems. In turn, this has left political elites pressured to reclaim authority by other means, in this instance, mobilizing national identity by trading off images of intergroup-conflict and sourcing political capital from the type of posturing over security stewardship traditionally associated with autocracy and eschewed by liberals. Muslims, constituting the prime cultural

Other within the securitized master frame of the contemporary era, are the most obvious

288 candidates for social exclusion: they are the preeminent out-group in the dichotomy implicit in identity politics. The Trump Presidency provides a clear manifestation of the nexus between anti-Muslim anti-Immigration autocratic posturing.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to interpret the securitization of humanitarian immigration as simply a regression into the retrograde politics of past racist illiberalism in Australia, or elsewhere. The securitization process is a response to characteristically modern challenges.

Strict border security and unapologetic unilateralism are not being advanced as a new form of isolationist non-engagement in the New Millennium. Conversely, they are presented as a necessary component along with redoubled international and regional efforts to solve what is now truly understood as a global problem. The need to invest in aid and (re)construction in refugee producing regions and to intervene and cooperate at the source to solve of global refugee flows, are established features of the modern discursive landscape. Increased international cooperation between governments and policing apparatus’ is a necessary goal to that end, but one that threatens to further solidify a managerial hypergovernance that benefits state power at the expense of human security. Potentially, the fact that many states may soon share in the perception that the coordinated hypergovernance of mass human movement is in their national interest could accelerate dangerous trajectories whereby authorities rely on the type of militarized interdiction and regional processing that has become the norm in Oceania.

If this involves similar practices of high security internment it could represent such extensive refoulment that the Refugee Convention becomes an empty symbol.

In Australia, the detention of unauthorised arrivals is used to fetishistically demonstrate executive control over migration and border security in the face of the unpredictable anarchy

289 of the international realm. To this end, humanitarian migrants are regularly framed as illegal immigrants by political elites that have professional access to information that ought to disallow such inaccuracies. This demonstrates a concerning transformation of the norms governing the international refugee regime away from nonrefoulment towards state sanctioned hypergovernance. Ironically, it is this very anarchy, once enshrined in international humanitarian law to protect mass refugee flows from repressive state authorities, that is now insufferable to modern states. Any political capital drawn from the moral superiority of refugee acceptance, in Australia at least, now centres around settlement and the maintenance for a world class immigration system with a longstanding humanitarian component which offers robust support for migrants to successfully integrate. Conversely, it no longer revolves around the absolute necessity to refrain from non-refoulment or the symbolic reception of asylees fleeing as such away from tyrannical regimes towards the Free World. There has been a reimagination of the symbolic meaning of pull factors: once championed by Western nations as evidence of their superiority, they are now abhorred within the framework of deterrence.

Entrenched in the rationale of governance, deterrence has developed sophisticated ideological arguments in its defence that frame the liberal ideals of multiculturalism, political asylum and welfare as contingent on zero-tolerance border protection. Paraphrasing Howard’s statement that using the military against refugees was not an option for a humanitarian nation highlights a shocking inversion in ideology. Now using the military against refugees is the only option for a truly ‘humanitarian’ nation. Altogether, these developments highlight challenges for future governments. Expounding irregular maritime migration as a threat to the Australian nation has cemented the need to assuage public concerns with displays of harsh mandatory detention. Yet, to function in the advent of actual mass refugee flows, this system will require an enormous escalation of the role of oppressive state apparatuses to levels that are either

290 politically unpalatable to begin with or involve shocking abuses of human rights. It would be impossible for the offshore detention system to function amidst a crisis in which actual nation- threatening demographic swamping was underway (it would not be logistically or financially plausible to transfer hundreds of thousands of people to Nauru, for example). The embracement of anti-refugee posturing by the Australian government may severely limit policy options available to the executive in the advent of massive refugee crises in the immediate region, as occurred after the Vietnam War. Furthermore, if cooling attitudes toward refugee resettlement continue trending amongst traditional migrant receiving nations, places allocated to regular humanitarian streams diminish and developed nations retrench from international aid to refugees at the source, it is precisely these anarchic mass movements which will occur in the advent of state collapse and conflict. Highly organized multilateral engagement with long term resettlement commitments, the strategy that secured regional order and sheltered Australia from the bulk of the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis, will be more difficult to orchestrate in the future. Unfortunately, it is precisely these long-term multilateral arrangements with robust burden sharing which will be necessary to avoid calamitous geopolitical upheaval as the impacts of climate change accelerate into the future.

Methodologically, this thesis offers new ways to investigate gaps in knowledge. Securitization

Theory can be used to identify periods of distinct threat construction. Content analysis can then be performed on the speech of those agent’s instrumental in the securitization process.

Exhaustive coding allows for the symbolic order to be constructed, clearly illustrating paradigmatic change. Because securitizing agents are attempting to be most persuasive, they utilise audience-centre arguments for salience, trying to persuade the audience to acquiesce securitizing claims and justifying exceptional politics with sophisticated ideology. Determining which frames have been performative, and the discourse they advance, provides insight into

291 what the facilitating conditions of securitization were and which arguments have been most persuasive and consequential. On the contrary, the necessary limitation of material that this ordering process involved has unfortunate drawbacks. Specifically, the kind of material reviewed (political speech in parliament) has a different intended audience than political speech presented in certain print media or talk-back radio, for example. More research is needed into the speech of political elites in other forums and in other media to determine the variance in discourse aimed at different ‘audiences.’

Nevertheless, the data collected gather for this thesis is an indispensable component, the only singularly necessary bridge in establishing the causative chain inferred by Securitization

Theory. By focusing on empirical data over theoretical assumption, this thesis highlights the extent to which the performative utterances of securitization can centre around issues that don’t necessarily involve the invocation of traditional violent threats, such as conflict with foreign state actors. Securitizing claims don’t even need to rely on emergent violent threats like terrorism, or the more ambiguous societal threat of foreign civilizations. The securitization of humanitarian migration can follow on simply from achieving mandates to militarize efforts against international crime and illegal immigration and, in this case, the persistent conflation of refugees with illegal immigrants. The data conforms to the theoretical assumption that securitization necessarily involves the grammar of urgent action and the presentation of exceptional executive action to neutralize threats. But these need not be in response to crises and events that are dramatic exogenous shocks.

Therefore, this thesis strongly supports the findings of scholars of securitization such as Bigo who have identified the securitization process as intractably interwoven with modern

292 governmentality, the preoccupation with risk management and increasingly desperate attempts by elected officials and state agencies to regain public approval through postures of stewardship.666 It is a process endogenous to modern government as such, not a result of radical emergent externalities. The empirical correlation between the declining political legitimacy and the erosion of liberal-democratic norms precluding ethno-religious identity politics points to the alarming manifestation of Schmittian panic politics: long recognized as culpably tainted by authoritarian demagoguery. This thesis expounds these dangers. Securitization need not draw on extreme political messages, it can take the form of the banal speech of governmentality. This is in some ways more shocking, the erosion of human security does not require conspicuous moments of dramatic executive intervention in response to war-like exogenous shocks, it can escalate incrementally through the logic of governmentality. These injunctions are difficult to counter and are theoretically just as likely to become perpetual features of the political landscape as are emergency powers resulting from traditional crises like war, which despite being more extreme are typically delineated in time and space.

This thesis accommodated complicated problems regarding the role and composition of the

‘audience’ of securitization through a process of theoretical sidestepping. Adequately explaining the audience remains underdeveloped in securitization theory and more research is needed to satisfactorily incorporate this crucial component of the conceptual framework. In particular, this will be necessary to determine the intricacies of causative direction between public attitudes and security talk by political elites. This is important given the audience- centred nature of securitizing claims and that the subject matter closely relates to the politics of xenophobia and racist populism. In other words, it is likely that securitizing claims made in

666Bigo, D. (2002). ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 27(1): p.65

293 parliament will be self-censored away from more extreme reactionary views which may indeed be presented to certain sections of the public in forums where there are less costs associated for doing so. Further research is required mapping discursive associations in other forms, including the speech of political elites in less formal settings and inclusions from print media and the internet to contrast results. Carefully reviewing the chronologies of narrative construction would then offer insights into the extent political elites have been forced to respond to public pressure and securitize asylum, or conversely, the extent to which propaganda drives public opinion.

Given the paucity of utterances clearly containing the full grammar of securitization in the entirety of data collected, it might even be tempting to question the value of theorizing security through speech after all. On the contrary, the continued divorcement of signification of threat from its traditional objects leaves accessing the ideational realm as the only avenue for accurately appraising non-traditional security threats. Undertaking this research is all the more important within the contemporary context of populist politics and the anti-intellectual obscurantism it can inspire. Moreover, this thesis also finds that the idea that open public debate and democratic representation of issues is inherently linked with desecuritization in the form of ‘normal politics,’ is rejected by the data. It is wrong to assume that if time is taken to debate issues in democratic institutions, political elites will manage to wrest back control of security issues from the mission-creep of exceptional, extra-ethical practices on the part of executive authority. If debates consistently ignite fears over national-security, or construct dichotomies of intergroup conflict, pervasive insecurity will result. When issues that are presented as urgently serious but become trapped in intractable debate, radical solutions that offer certainty and finality become clear alternatives. Within a fractured and contested political landscape, mobilization to this end comes in the form of catch-all framing devices that align the broadest

294 sections of community interests. It is these formulations which break through the ‘drowning- out’ effects of highly contested discursive spaces. Ontologically neat injunctions (that crime must be stopped or all entrants must be screened) are superior to archaic appeals to civilizational clash in an era where invoking racial or nationalistic extremes can be costly to credibility. Nevertheless, the turn to security demonstrably fosters groupism and occurs at the expense of the welfare of societal Others (symbolised in this case by genuine refugees held in detention limbo). These concerns become posteriori considerations in line with the logic of security.

The success of contemporary securitization in deterring boat arrivals risks equating the effectiveness of militarization with good, sustainable public policy. This process also masks the human cost of draconian policy by frustrating efforts by the media and other professionals to fully divulge information pertaining to individuals in detention and asylum seekers turned- back without due process. These costs must be adequately disclosed for the public to meaningfully sanction executive practices in liberal-democratic states. At worst, if linked with further retrenchment from international humanitarian aid, it amounts to a kind of denialism equating insulation from the global issue as a solution which does not address root causes.

Fortunately, Australia is far from altogether abandoning international aid, humanitarian resettlement or international engagement to address international refugee issues. Australians remain overwhelmingly supportive of refugees that have come through official channels and who are seen to be genuine.667 On the other hand, this demonstrates the success that persistent demonization has on public attitudes. Ultimately, anti-refugee propaganda belies the success

667Markus A. Mapping Social Cohesion: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys, Scanlon Foundation, Monash University, 2016, Accessed online 11/07/17 at http://scanlonfoundation.org.au/wp- content/uploads/2016/11/2016-Mapping-Social-Cohesion-Report-FINAL-with-covers.pdf

295 and functionality of the refugee regime in the long term. It is not (except perhaps in the case of

Palestinian people) those same refugee crises that previously existed in the 20th Century that persist in severity to modern times. Eventually, solutions to these crises have been achieved and refugee resettlement plays a crucial component to that end. Demographically, waves of refugees to Australia have clearly had their source in serious conflicts which have forced asylees to flee. History demonstrates that it is not indiscriminate masses of economic migrants from poorer countries that have travelled to Australia by boat. Reactionary rhetoric also ignores the success of refugee acceptance in Australia, where humanitarian entrants have proven themselves as hardworking and compliant settlers in the fact of xenophobic propaganda to the contrary.

Looking back to the experience of Europe after the Second World War or to international organization during the Vietnamese Refugee Crisis proves what is possible when ideological coherence facilitates strong multilateral commitment to burden-sharing in refugee resettlement.

This was made possible by a higher kind of identity politics that secured public confidence through overt moral conviction at a bipartisan level, rather than drawing political capital from engaging in one-upmanship on security stewardship: a process which is ultimately bottomless.

The inability for democratic states to resist regression into authoritarian posturing in an era of relative peace sets a dangerous precedent for an uncertain future. Fortunately, correctly identifying the impact of intersubjective identity politics as the foundational motivation for the international asylum regime highlights how ideational values play just as important a role as material conditions, even on questions of high-politics and international security. Within the ideational realm especially, flexibility can be exhibited to meet new challenges and the intrinsic potential that renewed moral conviction can suddenly appeal to the national interest is a possibility proven by the recent past.

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