Soccer & Society from Football Riot to Revolution. the Political Role Of

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Soccer & Society Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fsas20 From football riot to revolution. The political role of football in the Arab world Dag Tuastada a Center for Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway. Published online: 04 Feb 2013.

To cite this article: Dag Tuastad (2014) From football riot to revolution. The political role of football in the Arab world, Soccer & Society, 15:3, 376-388, DOI: 10.1080/14660970.2012.753541 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2012.753541

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From football riot to revolution. The political role of football in the Arab world Dag Tuastad*

Center for Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

In the Arab world, ideological resistance of supporters during football matches have coalesced with another rebellion, of youth breaking the chains of patriarchal power. The political implication of this social process is tremendous. As youth have experienced that they have had to yield to the will of parents and grandparents at home, and to the old dictators in the public ﬁeld, ﬁnding a social arena where one could liberate one-selves from the former implicated a congruent dissolution of authority ties also towards the latter. As football is a primary medium through which youth autonomy could be experienced, football has a seismic political potential. The role of ultras supporters in the Egyptian revolution and the political role of nationalist supporters in Jordan in killing political taboos are cases where supporters represent more than simply a barom- eter of political trends. The supporters have initiated struggles crucially affecting political developments in their countries.

Introduction As the most popular sport, and the form of popular culture with greatest world wide appeal, football has been referred to as ‘weapons of mass distraction’. But this ‘bread and circuses’ thesis’, comment Gilchrist and Holen,1 has been challenged by historians studying progressive struggle in and through sport. Popular culture is not epiphenomenal or marginal, argues Whannel, ‘it remains a central element in the political process’.2 Football is, Sugden argues, ‘like all collective human endeav- ours, a social construction which is malleable according to the social forces that sur- rounds it’.3 Sport, writes Delgado, is ‘located at the centre of culture, and certainly Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 ideology’.4 Only the uncertainty and passion of football competition, Strauken notes, referring to Faure and Suadu, ‘prevent it from perfectly reflecting social mechanisms’.5 Similarly, Gilchrist and Holen relate, ‘just as sports can reflect the dominant ideas of our society, they can also reflect struggle’.6 More than simply a reflection of political struggle, I will argue that in given circumstances football supporters might be at the heart of political struggle crucially affecting political developments. In authoritarian regimes with a suppressed or largely absent civil society, football has remained one of the few if not the only arena open for exposure of social and political identities, and the football arenas are where political messages are first communicated and struggle with authorities initiated. I will argue this mainly through a discussion of two empirical cases, on the political role of football in Jordan and Egypt.

*Email: [email protected]

Ó 2013 Taylor & Francis Soccer & Society 377

In Egypt, when 79 football fans were killed in Port Said in February 2012, this was not the result of panic and stamping from the unfortunate closing of gates. Al- Ahli fans were deliberately killed, stuck by knives and machetes, or thrown down from the terraces to the asphalt below and crushed to death. Newly elected Parlia- ment members saw the violence as payback time from contra-revolutionaries. It resulted from the fact that role of Al-Ahli football supporters in the revolution could hardly be overestimated. ‘There were two groups that were crucial for the Egyptian revolution to succeed, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Ahlawi ultras’,7 said the French expert on political Islam, Stéphane Lacroix. ‘The ultras were the most important’.8

Football and violence in the Egyptian revolution On the 25 January 2012, the anniversary of the start of the Egyptian revolution, Egypt’s emergency law originally imposed after the 1967 war with Israel, was lifted by the newly elected parliament. When Al-Ahli played Al-Masri in Port Said on the ﬁrst of February, this was the day before a second, concomitant anniversary, the ‘battle of the camels’ on Tahrir Square – the place where the main protests against the Mubarak-regime took place. The ‘battle of the camels’ refers to the attack by hundreds of horse and camel riders at Tahrir Square, wielding clubs and horse whips against the revolutionaries, accompanied by thousands of Mubarak supporters pelting demonstrators with stones and Molotov cocktails from roof tops surrounding the square, while the state television urged the protestors to leave the square. Three demonstrators died, about 600 were injured at the attack. The protest organizers after the attack thanked the ultras of Al-Ahli for their role in forcing back the mobs of the Mubarak supporters.9 The ultras of Al-Ahli, Al-Ahlawi, were founded in 2007. In 2009, during a match with their main rival, Zamalek, the supporters released banners and chanted slogans in support of the Palestinians in Gaza. Interpreting the incident as an illegal demonstration – solidarity demonstrations with the Palestinians were banned during the Mubarak regime, fearing for their relations with Western sponsors and that demonstrations could go out of hand – the police cracked down on both supporters groups, arresting scores of ultras. The incident marked the beginning of the animos-

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 ity between the ultras and the Egyptian police forces according to the blog of one of the Ahlawi-ultras.10 Also in 2009, Mohamed Aboutrika, a star player of Al-Ahli, removed his jersey during a televised match, showing his T-shirt reading ‘Sympa- thize with Gaza’ as a protest against the Israeli blockade of Gaza. Although About- rika faced repercussions he later conﬁrmed his stand in an interview with Al- Jazeera. He was later crowned the African football player of the year by the BBC, receiving more votes from listeners than more international famous players like Didier Drogba and Samuel Eto’o. In Gaza, youth would wear the red shirt number 22 of Aboutrika whenever Al Ahli was playing, singing ‘Palestine loves Aboutrika’; and ‘Gaza won’t forget you’.11 The essential role of football in political life of Egypt goes more than a hundred year back, to the anti-colonial struggle in the beginning of the last millennium. When Al-Ahli sport club was founded in 1907 it was as a cover for political activists ﬁghting against British colonial rule. Student unions formed a core of the anti- colonial struggle, but their unions needed premises where they could congregate and plan activities. For this purpose, Al-Ahli, meaning ‘national’ in Arabic, was 378 D. Tuastad

founded. The club came to embody the rebellion against colonization. At the time of its founding Al-Ahli was the only club where local Egyptians could be members. Following Egyptian independence in 1952 Al Ahli became tremendously popular not only in Egypt but all over Africa and the Arab world.12 The symbolizing of the struggle for liberation was paired with tremendous success in football. Today Al- Ahli is the most winning team in Egypt and Africa, and the club has also qualified an unprecedented three times for Fifa’s World Cup for club teams. Al-Ahli’s success in Egypt has only been rivalled by the other Cairo club, Zamalek, and the derby between these two clubs has evolved into the main sport event of the whole Arab world. The day the two clubs meet at the 80,000 sold out Cairo Stadium is one of the rare moments where no people can be found out in the streets, be it in Cairo or Gaza. Since the 2009 incident with the demonstration of solidarity with Gaza and sub- sequent police crackdown in the Al-Ahli – Zamalek match, ultras and police would fight every time Al-Ahli played. This proved to be a training ground for the crucial days of struggle during the Egyptian revolution. The main struggle of the revolution was for control over the highly symbolic space of the Tahrir Square in Cairo. Tahrir means liberation, and Tahrir Square, where the Egyptian protestors first gathered, is the major public town square at the heart of downtown Cairo, centred around the statue of the historic national hero Omar Makram who fought against Napoleons invasion to Egypt in 1798. It has since been the main site of all popular uprisings in Egypt, and controlling Tahrir Square was the immediate aim of the revolutionaries. As long as the protestors liberated and defended this space, it meant that the symbolic territorial heart of the country was theirs. The tens of thousands of demonstrators taking to the streets on 25 January 2011 increased to hundreds of thousands the next days. At the Tahrir Square a rare social mix of men and women, lower class and middle class, most young but some old, in suits, galabiyas (the traditional Egyptian garment), keffiyehs (the traditional Arab headdress), and jeans, some bearded, some fully veiled women, (munaqqabat), some bareheaded, stayed at the liberated zone to claim democratic change.13 Cru- cially, in order to stay at the Tahrir Square a frontline had to protect them. This frontline was organized by and mainly manned by the Al-Ahlawi ultras. The years of confronting the police had made the ultras the optimal guards of the revolution.

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 They knew how to act collectively, to hit and run, to survive and escape prolonged exposure to tear gas, to change their front fighters so as to rest them periodically, to bang the drums to warn of police attacks, to identify provocateurs, to cheer and whistle when in need of tactical withdraws, to avoid collective running knowing the danger of stampings and panics, to regroup, and return fireworks, to suffer and endure pain as many having been subject to mistreatments and even torture at the police stations.14 Without this frontline the defence of the Tahrir Square had fallen. If this defence had fallen, the protests that eventually brought down the Mubarak-regime could have failed. The outcome of the revolution might actually have been different was it not for the sacrifices of those fighting in the frontline, the Ahlawi football ultras. It has been suggested that organized Al-Masri supporters were Mubarak-supporters.15 Thus, when Al-Ahli and al Al-Masri met in Port Said on the first of February 2012 the Al-Ahli supporters knew, having been on the frontline at Tahrir Square to protect the protesters, that their struggle against the police had a prize. They knew that in spite of the revolution the newly elected Egyptian leaders could not in a Soccer & Society 379

quick fix change or substitute the police apparatus, and that the blood feud would continue.16 Survivors have told that they were attacked by people aiming to kill them. Fif- teen year old Hossan Mohsen saw his friend Anas Hohieddin being thrown to death down from the tenth level of stadium terraces. ‘Then they came for me. I begged the nearest one not to throw me onto the concrete, as this would kill me. He laughed and said that that was the idea’. Unlike his friend Mohsen survived with a broken leg and twisted arm.17 The attackers had surged onto the field immediately after the game ended, armed with knives and machetes, chasing the Al-Ahli supporters. For this match, for the first time in memory, the police had not searched the spectators entering the stadium. ‘I was holding a black plastic bag containing water and food. No one searched it’, said Mohamed Helmi, an Al-Masri fan, some- thing he had never before experienced.18 At the exact moment of the mayhem, the stadium floodlight was suddenly turned off, and the gate of escape remained closed. As the police stood by people were slaughtered by knives and machetes, and thrown down from the terraces. Adding to suspicions that the ambush had been orchestrated by former regime elements was the fact that after the camel attack the previous year, a fact-finding committee found that two deputies from Mubarak’s party, the National Democratic Party, owning ranches for horses and camels, had paid camel and horse riders to attack the demonstrators, and having coordinated the attack with police forces.19 The ambush in Port Said had similar elements in terms of orchestration and destruc- tive determination. Essam Al-Eriam is a lawmaker and vice chairman of the political party of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. He is the head of the largest party in the Egyptian parliament, controlling a majority of seats along with allied parties. It was a ‘deliberate neglect’ said Al-Eriam, from the Muslim Brotherhood, referring to the lack of security at the stadium and lack of police interference to stop the attack. ‘It was a plot against democratic transition, a revenge’.20

Supporter resistance and the clash of generations Notably, the Al-Ahlawi ultras in Cairo reportedly had allied with another group in their struggle against the Egyptian security forces. Along with the Egyptian ultras

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 homeless youth and children, from 9 to 15 living outside under the bridges at Tahrir Square, participated. This group, referred to as wilad sis are socially marginalized young men and youth, unemployed or doing day work, operating in unrecognized neighbourhoods of Cairo, ‘ashwa’i. In November 2011 al wilad sis and Al-Ahlawi ultras moved to attack the premises of the Egyptian internal ministry, adjacent to Tahrir Square. The confrontation, which has been referred to as the second Egyptian revolution, led to as many as forty people being killed and more than 600 injured, mostly ultras and wilad sis.21 A distinctive feature of the wilad sis and the ultras is that they are both autonomous youth groups struggling to preserve a newfound autonomy and identity. To protect and display their autonomy they occasionally end up getting involved in street ﬁghts. This points to a commonality between ultras aggression and the Arab uprisings as both challenge forms of patriarchal power, at the political arena as well as at the football stadiums. One dimension of patriarchal power is the power of elderly men over the young. Demographers have pointed out how political violent unrest correlates strongly with 380 D. Tuastad

large youth bulges of the population. The larger proportion of youth, the larger the probability of social and political unrest.22 Youth bulge studies finds that behind political violence and uprisings there is a ‘clash of generations’. Where there are youth bulges, political violence is more likely. Education and lack of democracy strengthens the effect, the greater the expansion of higher education, and the more autocratic a country, the stronger the effect of youth bulges on political violence .23 Today 60% of the population in the Arab world, the most autocratic region in the world, are less than 25 years old. The population growth is 2.0%, double the world average.24 A distinctive feature of the youth generation in the Arab world is that it is much more educated than the parent and grandparent generation. The education system has the last decades been considerably expanded. While the generation born during the first half of the last century was largely illiterate, mass schooling spread in the second half. Now a radically higher proportion of youth fin- ishes higher education, a phenomenon Fargues refers to as the monopoly of knowledge of the young. Tension derives from the fact that their education is not converted into employment. Today youth unemployment in countries in the Arab world is up to 45%.25 The young have the education, the old the jobs. As long as the number of youth entering the labour marked exceeds those parting, this situation will persist, which means at least until 2025 according to demographic projections. Patriarchal power is vanishing as legitimate authority, challenged by authority based on knowledge from schools.26 When social tension generated from this situation spills over to the political field, this leads to social unrest and uprisings. A symptom if not a cause for how patriarchal ties have been weakened, have been observed at the football arenas where youth have congregated on their own. As young football fans start going to the football stadiums with people of their own age rather than their fathers, they experience a new autonomy from parental tute- lage.27 Football matches today constitute the most substantial form of patriarch- independent, autonomous youth gathering. The phenomenon of age group bonding through football has been referred to as ‘ordered segmentation’, based on studies of social organization and community in urban areas, where age, sex, ethnicity and territoriality are constituents of a larger structure. Inside lower class urban communities strong age segregation has been observed, where children are sent into the streets to play, unsupervised by adults, at –

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 an early age. The age groups defend and control territories within their community and at the football stadiums. When involved in conﬂict with external groups, largely independent segments within youth communities unite. A so-called ‘Bedouin factor’ marks socio-political organization of these groups, where ‘the friend of a friend is a friend; the enemy of an enemy is a friend; the friend of an enemy is an enemy; the enemy of a friend is an enemy’.28 This is relevant in order to understand the instrumental role of football supporters in the struggle to topple the autocratic Mubarak-regime. Whereas Al-Ahlawi allied with the pro-democratization forces, their opponents in Port Said, football supporters of the Al-Masri home team, appeared to be contra-revolutionary foot sol- diers of the previous regime. The resistance of some supporters thus does not indi- cate a shared political consciousness among Egyptian football supporters. What appears to be a common feature though, is that the opposition against the enemy side at the football arena reappears at the political ﬁeld. A kind of negative class- consciousness, rather than an anti-regime democratic ideology as such, could be Soccer & Society 381

seen as distinguishing the football supporters. A revealing case in this regard is the changing political role football has had in the Arab Hashemite monarchy of Jordan.

Football and politics in Jordan In April 2011 Wihdat, from a Palestinian refugee camp in Amman, played against Al-Ramtha, a Jordanian town from a tribal area north-east of the Jordanian capital. Wihdat could win the title this league round. The political circumstances surrounding the match were of political unrest in Jordan. For each week since the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt started in January 2011, more and more democracy activists had gathered also in Jordan. On the 24 March, the reform movement estab- lished a tent camp in Amman’s Jamal Amdel Nasser roundabout, a square smaller than the Tahrir Square in Cairo, but that could nevertheless be likened to it in terms of activists taking physical control over a space symbolizing a liberated zone. The protesters at the roundabout stated that they would continue their campaign until their calls for democratic reforms was met. However, on Friday 25 March the tent camp of a couple of thousand protesters was attacked by riot police and some 200 civilians identified as government supporters. One of the reform demonstrators was killed and 160 people injured.29 The reform movement had been desperate to emphasize that their struggle was not related to the Palestinian – Jordanian issue, but to a shared political goal of having democratic reform. Nevertheless, the waving of the Jordanian flag became a symbol for the opposing anti-democracy activists as if the reform movement represented a Palestinian threat to the Jordanian nation. At the Wihdat and Ramthe football match a striking feature was that the Pales- tinian symbols and chants which had been so dominant during the 1970s and 1980s were now totally absent. Most Palestinian refugees outside Palestine live in Jordan where they have been granted Jordanian citizenship. In 1970 Palestinian guerrillas challenged the Jordanian monarchy, and when the guerrillas were crushed thousands were killed. Expressions of Palestinian national identity in Jordan was subsequently heavily suppressed, save at the football arena where in particular the matches between Wihdat, the camp symbolizing Palestinian nationalism, and Faisali, the club close to the monarchy and of Jordanian elite forces, were marked by a startling display of communal identities. Wihdat-supporters wore the colours of the Palestin- fl

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 ian, forbidden, ag, and a special horn-honk from cars came to be associated with Wihdat support,30 while at stadium the Faisali supporters chanted ‘All the people of Wihdat sell tomatoes’, referring to the large tomato market in the camp and the low economic status of camp residents. ‘Shabab Wihdat, kolluhum fedayyi – Wihdat youth are all guerrillas’ and ‘Ma biddna hiin wa la sardine, bidna ‘anabil – we do not want wheat, or sardines, we want bombs’, Wihdat supporters answered, as a ref- erence to being receivers of UN-aid. Fights and brawls inevitably accompanied the Faisali and Wihdat derbies, which occasionally led to injuries and death.31 However, at the April 2011 Wihdat – Ramthe match symbolism of Palestinian- ness was suspiciously absent. ‘We are Jordanians, Palestinian Jordanians’, said the Club Director of Wihdat, Muhammad Assaf, as we saw Wihdat securing their vic- tory. Their team had ‘two Palestinians’, he said. That meant players being bought from teams in Gaza and the West Bank. Also, there were even Jordanians on the team, he said.32 As the game finished and Wihdat had won, the celebrating supporters unfolded a huge flag – the Jordanian flag. The expression of Palestinian identity, so strongly symbolized two decades earlier, was all gone. 382 D. Tuastad

While Palestinian nationalism had left the field, Jordanian nationalism had entered. In July 2009 the Faisali team, supported by ethnic Jordanians, played Wih- dat in Zarka, out of Amman in an attempt by sports authorities to better control spectator violence. ‘We don’t want to see any Palestinians’, chanted thousands of Faisali supporters, and ‘Wahid, itnen, talagha ya Abu Hussein – One, two, divorce her Abu Hussein’, they chanted. The queen of Jordan, Rania, is of Palestinian des- cent, so Al-Faisali supporters implied to have the Jordanian King (‘Abu Hussein’) divorce her, and by implication to have Jordan separate from the Palestinians.33 ‘Divorce her you father of Hussein, and we’ll marry you to two of ours’, Faisali supporters went on. Bottles were thrown at the Wihdat players and their fans from some of the Faisali fans, sparking a violent reaction. The coaches of the teams ordered their players off the field, fearing for their safety. Anti-riot police had to interfere to stop Al-Faisali supporters from lynching Wihdat team members and their fans. One and a half year later, as political unrest broke out in Tunisia, the two teams met again. As the police escorted the Faisali supporters, having lost, off the stadium after the match, stones were hurled at the Wihdat-fans guarded by police inside the stadium. This created panic, unrest and clashes with the police who tried to control the crowd. Fights erupted, with stone throwing, cars set on fire and property being damaged. Two hundred and fifty people were injured. The Jor- danian Minister of Interior, Saad Hayel Sror, came with a warning after the game: ‘Those who tried to take advantage of the incident, raising provocative statements should have instead sought to ease the tension and restore calm. Their statements pose a threat to Jordan’s rule of law and its integral unity’.34 Apparently the Minis- ter had Wihdat leaders in mind. The president of the Wihdat club, Tareq Khouri, was at the stadium, and witnessed the violence. After the match Khouri said that the police had deliberately attacked Wihdat fans, and incited the Palestinians. According to a report from American Embassy in Jordan the Wihdat fans were knowingly locked up inside the stadium and then mercilessly attacked by the police. Allegedly, Jordanian nationalists and the police had allied against the Jordanian Pal- estinians.35 Curiously it was the same kind of alliance, of Jordanian nationalists and security forces, that had attacked the democracy activists on 25 March 2011. Whether Fai- sali supporters had been part of the attack or not, one thing was clear; the chants of

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 Faisali-supporters from when their team played Wihdat had been transcended into nationalist public discourse in Jordan. What had been political taboos only a few years ago had ﬁrst been heard at the football stadiums, and were now repeated by Jordanian nationalists in public. Thus, in February 2011 a letter signed by members of the largest Jordanian tribes of unprecedented criticism of queen Rania, and by implication the Jordanian royal house was published, an offence punishable by three years of imprisonment in Jordan.36 Queen Rania stood accused of corruption, as the tribe leaders called ‘on the king to return to the treasury land and farms given to the Yassin [Queen Ranias] family’. ‘The queen is building centers to boost her power and serve her interests, against the will of Jordanians and Hashemites’, the tribal leaders wrote, comparing her to the wife of the deposed Ben Ali in Tunisia.37 Moreover, another powerful Jordanian nationalist initiative, The National Com- mittee of Retired Servicemen, based on retired military ofﬁcers, with 140,000 members organized in various regional districts, entered the political stage. ‘The sensitive relations between the Jordanians and the Palestinians could lead to civil war’, said its leader, General Ali Habashneh.38 Soccer & Society 383

We insist not to change anything relating to the [election system]. If we accepted this, it would lead to the Palestinians constituting a majority, and the Jordanians a minority. Especially now that we have 1.2 million Palestinians here in Jordan, with Jordanian passports. They should have civil rights, but not political rights!

What was previously contained at the football stadiums is now loose in public. By challenging the throne the Faisali supporters had paved the ground for making unlawful criticism of the throne part of public political Jordanian discourse. The message of Faisali-supporters, and of the nationalist camp, has been to purify the monarchy and preserve the unity between the King and the tribes. This has made Palestinians fearful that their citizenships could be revoked, and with the different categories of citizenship in Jordan and previous revoking of some of Palestinians’ citizenships, there is experienced substance to this fear.39 Football has thus been an arena for the killing of political taboos in Jordan. Communal instigation initiated at the terraces has led to communal violence, threat- ening the relative harmony Jordan has experienced since the 1970 civil war. The calls for democratization in Jordan has generated a reaction from nationalist Jorda- nians who fear democratization as it could imply that Palestinians, a majority in the country, gain political control over the country, marginalizing currently privileged ethnic Jordanians. To know where Jordan is heading, from status quo to democratization or civil war, the next Faisali – Wihdat derby should be closely observed. Whereas the Al-Ahlawi ultras in Egypt were instrumental in the democratic uprising, Faisali supporters in Jordan are instrumental in blocking attempts at democratic transition. Football constitutes an arena for both kind of expressions, as aggrieved youth express political sentiments and identities in both cases, albeit with opposite political messages. To explain such political ambivalence a distinctive feature of football fan consciousness might be discerned. Such consciousness is by nature oppositional, as fan political orientation evolves from who one opposes at the stadiums.

The negative class-consciousness of football supporters ‘Each team works together to try and occupy as much of the ‘territory’ of the other as it can, culminating in attempts symbolically to ‘conquer’ the other side’s strong-

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 hold by kicking the ball into the goal’, Cheabi observes.40 What is symbolic at the football ground is real at some of the terraces where physical control over stadium space has come to define the specific supporter culture of supporter groups like the ultras. In certain circumstances there is a further connection from this competition at the terraces, and competition between communities, towns, ethnic or religious groups at large. Barner and Shirlow have argued, based on studies from Northern Ireland, that in a divided society the football ground is more than a physical space defended by fans, it represents a metaphor for a wider landscape also perceived as in need of protection.41 Supporting certain football teams means not only to defend their home territory; it means to preserve their religion, people, their own ways of being against a perceived enemy. There are a few additional incidents in the Arab world that could be interpreted in this way. In Syria in 2004 in Qamishli, a Syrian town near the border to Turkey and Iraq with a majority of Kurdish inhabitants, the Kurdish supporters of the Kur- dish al Jihad club waved Kurdish flags and pictures of George Bush who had called 384 D. Tuastad

for the Syrian President to stop supporting Saddam Hussein. This resulted in the police shooting into the crowd, killing nine Kurdish spectators. The killings led to spontaneous demonstrations in Qamishli, and soon also to surrounding villages and even to Damascus and beyond the borders of Syria to embassies in Europe. Tens of more Kurdish protesters were killed in Syria before the rioting was crushed.42 In Lebanon the football league have been played without supporters being allowed to enter the stadiums because the communal tensions at the stadiums were about to spread to society at large, forcing the authorities simply to forbid spectators to enter the stadiums when matches are played.43 It could then be argued that in the Arab world where lack of channels for free political expression has been a distinctive feature of the political system, organized support for football clubs have been a way through which youth could break patriarchal chains, and that the autonomy and opposition experienced at the football arenas have in numerous cases been transcended into society at large. However, the political struggle of ultras and other hard-core supporters during the Arab spring is not necessarily connected to an interest in the democratic struggle per se. As Scott has outlined, there is a difference between a riot and a revolution, related to the political consciousness of the insurgents.44 Ranajit Guha, a leading scholar of the Subaltern Studies group, writing on anti-colonial peasant rebellion in India found that defending the territory of the caste, the tribe or the vil- lage against intruders historically represented the core of the struggle against the British empire. It was not a nationalist political struggle initially, but eventually the struggle of rural subalterns merged with the struggle of the Indian nationalist leaders. Hence the anti-colonial resistance gained the momentum needed to end colonial rule. Guha observed that the self-awareness of the subaltern anti-colonial insurgents resulted from a series of negations, where the initial deﬁnition of class described their enemies rather than themselves. This political consciousness Guha termed a ‘negative class consciousness’, as it was based on enemy perceptions rather than ideological insight and conviction.45 Congruently there is no common political or ideological denominator of supporters’ political orientation, it might be left or right wing, secular or Islamist, pro- regime or anti-regime. But crucially, in the political volatile situation of the Arab world – with the youth struggling for breaking patriarchal ties and the socio-politi- –

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 cal arenas for participation largely lacking save for football coalescing the street power of the football fans with the organization of revolutionaries (or contra-revolutionaries) might be just what it takes to bring down a regime or start a civil war.

Conclusion Rather than ‘weapons of mass distraction’, football in the Arab world have served as a kind of weapons of the weak, to borrow Scott’s term referring to the resistance of marginalized groups.46 At the football stadium suppressed political identities and opinions might be openly expressed, although in a disguised form where the masses preserve anonymity. The safe distance and ability to operate collectively reduces the danger of individual persecution. This make the football arena a location for those ‘rare moments of political electricity when, often for the ﬁrst time in memory, the hidden transcript is spoken directly and publicly in the teeth of power’, to borrow Scott’s formulation.47 Soccer & Society 385

In the Arab world such ideological resistance have coalesced with another rebellion, of youth breaking the chains of patriarchal power. The political implication of this social process is tremendous. As youth have experienced that they have had to yield to the will of parents and grandparents at home, and to the old dictators in the public field, finding a social arena where one could liberate one-selves from the former implicated a congruent dissolution of authority ties also towards the latter. As football is a primary medium through which youth autonomy could be experienced, football has a seismic political potential. Massive suppressed political energy of youth has been released by the Arab spring. In the political uprisings the ideological resistance of football supporters have been transcended into active, street fighting political participation. However, the nature of football supporters’ opposition is intrinsically incoherent as the basic feature of solidarity is age congregation, while ideologically the distinctive feature is negation – related to ones enemy perception of the opponent. Therefore, in an ethnic divided political context, groups might ally with the regimes’ security forces as these are the enemies of ones enemy. Ideologically multifaceted though, in the Arab world today the youth is an engine for regime change, as the first steps taken to open resist the autocrats are largely originating from aggrieved youth. When football supporters with their passionate energy allies with larger congre- gations of the youth segments, as the Muslim Brotherhood youth and Al-Ahlawi in Egypt, and the momentum spreads to the society at large, the lesson from the Arab spring is that football in given circumstances might spark riots and even political revolution.

Notes 1. Gilchrist and Holden, ‘Introduction’, 152. 2. Whannel quoted in Gilchrist and Holen: 152. 3. Sugden, ‘Critical Left-realism and Sport Interventions in Divided Societies’, 262. 4. Delgado, ‘Sport and Politics. Major League Soccer, Constitution, and (The) Latino Audi- ence(s)’, 41. 5. Stroeken, ‘Why “the World” Loves Watching Football (and “the Americans” don’t)’, 10. 6. Gilchrist and Holden, ‘Introduction’, 152. 7. ‘Ultras’ refers to football fans renowned for fanatical and elaborate display of support. Ultras have occasionally been involved in football violence.

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 8. Personal conversation, March 2012. 9. Kirkpatrick, ‘Egyptian Soccer Riot Kills More Than 70’, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 02/02/world/middleeast/scores-killed-in-egyptian-soccer-mayhem.html. 10. Shawky, ‘The Ultras Book. Ethnography of an Unusual Crowd’, http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/634376. 11. Kenyon, ‘Aboutrika Triumphs in BBC Poll’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/ africa/7828436.stm. 12. ‘Al Ahly: Spirit of Success’, http://www.ﬁfa.com/classicfootball/news/newsid=1031856. html. 13. Ryzova, ‘The Battle of Cairo’s’, http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/489. 14. Ibid. 15. Montague, ‘How Egypt’s Revolution Descended into Tragedy on Night of Violence in Port Said’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/news/9058104/How-Egypts-revolution-descended-into-tragedy-on-night-of-violence-in-Port-Said.html. 16. Ryzova, ‘The Battle of Cairo’s’. 17. Reem, ‘Stolen Lives’. 18. Morsy, ‘Port Said on the Defensive’. 386 D. Tuastad

19. Phelps and King, ‘Hosni Mubarak Supporters Attack Protesters’, http://articles.latimes. com/2011/feb/02/world/la-fg-egypt-violence-2011020. 20. Kirkpatrick, ‘Egyptian Soccer Riot’. 21. Ryzova, ‘The Battle of Cairo’s’. 22. Fargues, ‘Demographic Explosion or Social Upheaval?’. 23. Urdal, ‘A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence’. 24. Arab Human Development Report 2009. ‘United Nations Development Programme. Regional Bureau for Arab States’. 25. Ibid. 26. Fargues, ‘Changing Hierarchies of Gender and Generation in the Arab World’. 27. This is similar to what have been referred to elsewhere. In Spain, following the end of the Franco-rule, youth supporters headed towards a ‘generational clash’, confronting patriarchal ties, paving the way for the organization of ultras, writes Spaaij and Vinâs (‘Passion, Politics and Violence: A Socio-historical Analysis of Spanish Ultras’, 83). Also when the ultras culture emerged in Italy in the late 1960s it was as an arena for the construction of youth bonding, the football stadium constituting the ideal arena for this, writes De Biasi and Lanfranchi (99) (‘The Importance of Difference: Football Identities in Italy’). In Europe, the average age of Ultras is 20, with most members being 16 to 25 years (Pilz and Wölki-Schumacher, ‘Overview of the Ultra Culture Phenomenon in the Council of Europe Member States in 2009’, 6). 28. Dunning, Murphy and Williams, ‘Spectator Violence at Football Matches: Towards a Sociological Explanation’. 29. ‘Jordan king urges unity after unrest’, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ ALeqM5i19u8L6xrVqsx8IQNz1WDRkSbZtg?docId=CNG.82fce0- d1e069b2865b114176f57c0264.5d1. 30. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World. 31. Tuastad, ‘The Political Role of Football for Palestinians in Jordan’. 32. Conversation during football match, Amman, April 2011. 33. Montague, When Friday Comes. 34. Omari, ‘Probe continues into Friday football-related violence’, http://www.jordantimes. com/?news=32549. 35. ‘Jordanian Football Game Halted Amidst Anti-regime Chants, Hooliganism Towards Pal- estinians’, http://wikileaksupdates.blogspot.com/2010/12/jordanian-soccer-game-halted- amidst.html. 36. ‘Jordan’, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/jordan/ index.htmlactu. 37. Habib, ‘Jordan Tribes Break Taboo by Targeting Queen’, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hF2bnxbMFqWrESNtwFFzDuHeL6lQ. 38. Interview Amman April 2011. 39. In the summer of 2009 Jordan started revoking thousands of Palestinans’ citizenships

Downloaded by [109.162.208.108] at 14:17 30 June 2014 (Abu Toameh, ‘Amman revoking Palestinians’ citizenship’, http://www.jpost.com/Mid- dleEast/Article.aspx?id=149341). 40. Chehabi, ‘The Politics of Football in Iran’, 233. 41. Bairner and Shirlow, ‘Loyalism, Linﬁeld and the Territorial Politics of Soccer Fandom in Northern Ireland’, 173. 42. Macleod, ‘Football Fans’ Fight Causes a Three-day Riot in Syria’, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/football-fans-ﬁght-causes-a-threeday-riot-in-syria- 566366.html. 43. Montague, When Friday Comes. 44. Scott, Weapons of the Weak. 45. Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India. 46. Scott, Weapons of the Weak. 47. Scott, Dominance and the Art of Resistance.

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