COMMENTARY THE EUROPEAN CRISIS AND ’S UNPREDICTABLE ROLE IN THE BALKANS

The European Crisis and Turkey’s Unpredictable Role in the Balkans

ILYA ROUBANIS*

ABSTRACT This paper discusses Turkey’s role in the Balkans as part of the broader narrative of European integration. ‘Europeanization’ in the early 2000s was a political platform that was instrumental in allowing Turkey to forge a peace between the country’s estab- lished elite and moderate political Islam. In the context of Turkey’s alienation from the project of European integration, the relation- ship between Europe and Turkey is becoming narrowly transac- tional and there is no longer a ‘community building’ dynamic. Instead, the region emerges as a canvas of competing influences and mutually exclusive choices between Ankara and that ultimately contribute to ‘Balkanization.’

urope remains a normative su- Europe, well beyond the EU. How- perpower,1 setting standards ever, as the Brexit process suggests, Eand shaping political norms well functional interdependence does not beyond its member states. Even amid determine political cohesion, espe- an undeniable crisis of the project of cially in an increasingly multipolar European integration, both within world order. While Turkey is in many member states and in the regions respects a European economy, the around the EU, the functionalist fact that Ankara’s prospects for EU premise still appears valid. Integra- membership are dimming –along tion in one policy area creates a spill- with those of the Western Balkan over effect causing member states states– changes the frame of political and associated partners to coordinate engagement, providing scope for col- policy in another, paving the way for liding or even zero-sum encounters. an ever-closer union. Association * Institute of International Agreements, Deep and Comprehen- For more than a decade, there has Relations (IDIS), sive Free Trade Agreements (DCF- been a Turkish ‘post-Ottoman’ vision Greece TAs), and a Customs Union area of the Balkans that was not in conflict Insight Turkey create a space of free trade around with Europeanization per se. Turkey’s Vol. 21 / No. 2 / Europe that has a profound effect in ambition in the region to stand out 2019, pp. 75-89

DOI: 10.25253/99.2019212.06 2019 Sprıng 75 COMMENTARY ILYA ROUBANIS

Enlargement does not merely ‘as- What is clear from cases such similate’ states in a rule-based polit- ical order but also causes the EU to as the Dutch referendum reflect on its role, its mission, and against Ukraine’s Association its institutional apparatus. With the Agreement and the UK’s British, Irish, and Danish accessions, the EU moved to create a European 2016 Leave campaign is that Regional Fund and to reform the enlargement has become a common agricultural policy. The ar- rival of Greece in 1981 and of Spain heated debate often framed and Portugal in 1986 led to initiatives by anti-immigration rhetoric for a substantial cohesion policy, as a precondition of realizing the Single Market and guaranteeing democracy. But faced with the biggest wave of en- as a protector of Muslim minorities largement in 2004 –the so-called big and renew its political and economic bang expansion– Europeanization bonds with the region could be en- became a reform project. veloped into a greater narrative of regional integration. However, when Fifteen years following the big bang signaled out as a ‘European other,’ enlargement, the EU has success- Turkey is often driven to make the fully addressed the fear that consen- Balkans the testing ground of a more sus-driven bureaucratic processes zero-sum framing of diplomatic rela- might become dysfunctional. As tions with Brussels. This article makes newcomers came into the EU, polit- the constructivist argument that Tur- ical stakeholders were quickly assim- key’s perception of ‘national interests’ ilated. Parties found their place in the in the Balkans makes part of a ‘mu- European Parliament, in the Council tually constitutive’ dynamic between of Ministers member-states joined Europe and Turkey. As far as Turkey time-tested alliances, and the Com- is not part of the community-build- missioners empowered by adequate ing process, it may be seen as part of technocratic support rose to the chal- an alternative cluster of bilateral rela- lenge. Where concerns persist and tionships that undermines the narra- have in fact intensified, is the ability of tive of functional interdependence. EU institutions to effectively monitor the process of member-state-building on a micro-governance level, where What Europeanization? concerns are raised about corruption, rule of law structures, tax evasion, One should not confuse functional and the like.2 linkage with structurally enduring relations. A policy-by-policy pro- Given that failure, the promise of cess of integration does not tell the EU membership has lost much of whole story of European integration. its credibility both for Turkey and

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other Balkans states. Recently, the was already identified since the sig- chairman of the Centre for Liberal nature and ratification of the Lisbon Strategies in Sofia, Ivan Krastev, Treaty. made a useful distinction between ‘pessimists’ and ‘optimists’ on the As the European sovereign debt cri- subject of EU membership: “opti- sis was unfolding in 2009, President mists believe Turkey will join during Sarkozy underlined the need for the the Albanian EU presidency, while union to act as a single international pessimists believe Albania will join actor, by extending the principle of during the Turkish EU presidency.”3 unanimity in the Council to quali- In the current context, to suggest that fied majority voting, increasing the the EU suffers from “enlargement fa- scope for co-decision between the tigue” is an understatement. In the European Council and the European EU-Western Balkans Summit of May Parliament, reducing the number of 2018, in Sofia, Chancellor Angela Commissioners, creating the post of Merkel offered assurances that Bal- the President of the European Coun- kan countries retain their entitlement cil and creating a single and empow- to EU membership, as promised in ered office of an EU foreign minister. the Thessaloniki Council of June The underlying theme was that con- 2013. However, the President of the sensus was a fragile foundation for an European Council, Donald Tusk, was ever-growing union and there was in- careful not to overstate the “unrealis- creasing demand for majority-driven tic” perspective of fast track member- decision making. He referred ex- ship.4 In June 2018, France and the plicitly to enlargement: “No Lisbon Netherlands blocked the opening of Treaty, no enlargement… I would EU accession talks with North Mace- find it very strange for a Europe of 27 donia and Albania, calling for more that has trouble agreeing on workable reforms that would bolster the rule of institutions to agree on adding a 28th, law and transparency.5 a 29th, a 30th, a 31st, which would defi- nitely make things worse.”7 The jury is still out on whether it is Turkey and the Balkans that are fail- After a decade of economic crisis ing to reform, or the EU that lacks across the EU, the term ‘enlargement the political resolve to drive the tran- fatigue’ often goes hand-in-hand sitional process. What is clear from with the admission that Europe has cases such as the Dutch referendum lost confidence in the combined dy- against Ukraine’s Association Agree- namic of an ever-encompassing and ment6 and the UK’s 2016 Leave cam- ever-closer union. In the Sofia Sum- paign is that enlargement has become mit of 2018, EU leaders narrowed the a heated debate often framed by an- discussion to a transactional agenda. ti-immigration rhetoric. The EU’s There was a focus on the need to en- consensus-driven policy framework sure that ISIS fighters returning from undermines the credibility of the en- Syria do not go on to pursue terrorist largement process, a weakness that activity in Europe. There was great

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Turkish FM Çavuşoğlu (C), EU Neighborhood Policy Minister interest in ensuring that Turkey and Addressing the World Economic Fo- Hahn (R), High Balkan states continue to disrupt the rum in January 2019, U.S. Secretary Representative flow of migration into Western Eu- of State Mike Pompeo made clear of the EU for Foreign Affairs rope. There were extensive discus- that pre-existing alliances and insti- and Security sions on how Balkan states would be tutions must serve national interests. Policy Mogherini assisted for their cooperation. How- “Nations matter,” Pompeo professed, (L) hold a joint ever, there was little appetite to dis- making clear that the United States press conference cuss enlargement. stands critically against globaliza- within “Turkey- 9 EU High-Level tion. That statement was consistent Political Dialogue “I don’t want a Balkans that turns with a long-standing skepticism ex- Meeting” in toward Turkey or Russia; but I don’t pressed by Washington both vis-à-vis Ankara, on want a Europe that is functioning the United Nations and NATO. At November 22, with difficulty as 28 and tomorrow times, this criticism against interna- 2018. as 27, would decide that we can con- tional organizations is focused on CEM ÖZDEL / AA Photo tinue to gallop off, to be tomorrow 30 issues, such as member state defense or 32, with the same rules,” French expenditure, in which Turkey stands President Emmanuel Macron told the out as one of the five to eight coun- European Parliament in April 2018. tries that consistently meet the two “I do not think 2025 is a realistic date percent of GDP threshold set by al- for the EU enlargement; more im- lies. But, this does not mean that Tur- portant is the progress that has been key sees eye to eye with Washington. achieved by the candidates,” said Chancellor Angela Merkel on May Washington objects to Turkey’s S-400 17, in Sofia.8 In parallel, Washington’s deal with Russia while Ankara vehe- commitment to the Euro-Atlantic mently condemns Washington’s stra- “community” is waning. tegic alliance with the PKK’s Syrian

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affiliate (People’s Protection Units, YPG).10 But perhaps, the most bitter While the ‘taking our standoff between the two NATO al- lies is over Turkish demands for the jobs’ cliché was extremely extradition of Fetullah Gülen, which relevant for public opinion Ankara linked to the release of the in the countdown and the Pastor Andrew Brunson.11 In August 2018, President Erdoğan went as far aftermath of the 2004 big as to threaten that Turkey may look bang enlargement towards beyond NATO for partners.12 That is not the first time this threat has been Eastern Europe, the prospect put on the table. In August 2016, of welcoming Turkish citizens President Erdoğan wondered “what seems to evoke unique kind of strategic partners are we” while in a much-cited interview with resistance Hürriyet, retired Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz suggested that there was a strong movement in the Armed Forces that views Turkish interests as ship” with Turkey where cooperation more aligned to “Eurasia.”13 Setting a would continue but “the distant goal strictly national foreign policy trajec- of EU membership” would not be on tory that prioritizes national defense the table. In October 2018, the Euro- capability, Turkey appears willing to pean Parliament voted to withhold challenge NATO at the “molecular €70 million in pre-accession funding level” of military interoperability.14 even as member states and the Euro- The aftermath of the coup attempt pean Commission are trying to nor- has also seen European Parliament malize relations with Turkey. insistence on freezing the process of enlargement with Turkey. On April 26, 2017, members of the European Turkey as a ‘European Other’ Parliament called on the ’s Enlargement Commis- It is not accurate to suggest that Eu- sioner Johannes Hahn to seek alter- ro-Turkish relations have had a dif- natives to Turkey’s accession. Open- ficult two years. Indeed, the ques- ing the debate, European Parliament tion of Turkish EU-membership has President Antonio Tajani insisted been central to a broader discussion that “Europe is not an Islamopho- about the nature of the union. Today bic continent and is not closing the it is hard to believe that it was Brit- door on the Turkish people,” but he ain which historically championed insisted that Turkey must respond to enlargement, especially the Turkish human rights criticism. The leader of candidacy. In 1991, Prime Minister the European Conservatives and Re- John Major made the case for a Com- formists (ECR) Group, Syed Kamall, munity to “open to all the democratic called for “a more difficult relation- countries of Europe.”15 The ‘wider,

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seriously. “I really feel strongly about To reduce the effect of this, as people are getting through their letter boxes leaflets from Leave Europeanization in Turkey saying ‘Turkey’s going to join the EU’ to the prospect of imminent – not true,” said David Cameron.19 EU membership is naïve and Anti-enlargement and anti-immigra- perhaps shallow. For Turkey, tion rhetoric have always gone hand- being part of Europe has been in-hand. President Nicolas Sarkozy often blended anti-Turkish with an- an iconoclastic movement as ti-enlargement rhetoric,20 presum- old as the Republic itself ably to shield the French centre-right from its continuous leakage of voters to the Front National. “I want to say that Europe must give itself borders, not deeper’ mantra was consistent that not all countries have a voca- with the idea that enlargement fo- tion to become members of Europe, cused minds on the single market. beginning with Turkey which has no “We shall put in place the last mea- place inside the European Union,” sures needed to complete the single Sarkozy said during the 2007 Pres- market–a single market that will ex- idential campaign.21 That Turkey’s tend way beyond the borders of the membership of the EU is “unthink- Twelve, even before the new member able” has been a consistent feature states join,” Major told the House of of his political message. Chancellor Commons in 1991. Merkel too did not shy away from questioning Turkey’s entitlement to Fifteen years later, ar- an EU membership during her first gued that EU enlargement towards term.22 Turkey but also the Balkans and even Ukraine was “a natural drive” that no Part of this language of Europe’s es- one had the political capital to de- sential incompatibility with Turkey lay.16 Given a long British tradition has its roots in a long tradition of co- of spearheading the drive for Turkish lonial and post-colonial discourse. A EU membership, it is ironic that the moment of clarity emerged in 2004, 2016 Leave campaign raised the spec- when the U.S. President George W. ter of imminent Turkish membership Bush stated that Turkey belongs in to the EU to heighten the fear of “the the EU and that Europe is “not the floodgates of immigration,”17 while exclusive club of a single religion.” A pointing to the exit.18 On the other day later, he received the answer from side of the argument, the British President Jacques Chirac, which went prime minister was warning public as follows: opinion that Turkish imminent EU membership was an idle threat, that If President Bush really said that in the is, a lie that people should not take way that I read, then not only did he

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go too far, but he went into territory anti-Islam parties gain political influ- that isn’t his (…) It is not his purpose ence. In sum, the question of Turkey and his goal to give any advice to the is not only polarizing but also a ral- EU, and in this area it was a bit as if lying flag for Europe’s sovereigntist I were to tell Americans how they right. should handle their relationship with Mexico.23 Turkey as a ‘European Insider’ Chirac’s allusion to Turkey as the Mexico of Europe brings light to To reduce the effect of Europeaniza- another media frame that informs tion in Turkey to the prospect of im- European public opinion. A few de- minent EU membership is naïve and cades of constructivist literature am- perhaps shallow. For Turkey, being ply demonstrate that opinion poll part of Europe has been an icono- respondents address questions in clastic movement as old as the Re- a manner consistent to their emo- public itself. The status of the army as tionally significant reference-group, the guardian of the constitution and which is often the nation. In this con- guarantor of the Republic’s western text, it is anticipated that migrants are trajectory is not merely symbolic. conceived by Western European con- Turkey has a long history of military stituencies as a threat to collective na- interventions in politics –1960, 1971, tional goods, such as education, jobs, 1980-1983, 1997– which, rather than and welfare. resulting in long-term direct mili- tary rule, were usually short periods While the ‘taking our jobs’ cliché was of institutional reform followed by a extremely relevant for public opinion dictated transition to civilian govern- in the countdown and the aftermath ment. This institutional veto power of the 2004 big bang enlargement to- was imbued with a sense of cultural wards Eastern Europe, the prospect significance as it was almost always of welcoming Turkish citizens seems recognized in the name of preserving to evoke unique resistance. Turks are the course of a certain kind of Turkey. seen as particularly threatening to in- group symbols and myths –religion, Prior to the demise of the Otto- culture, and way of life– especially man Empire and the emergence of in countries that have experienced the Turkish Republic, the very term large migration waves in the 1960s. ‘Turk’ was a diminutive adjective For example, the least negative pub- referring to the Muslim and largely lic opinion attitude towards Turkish illiterate peasants of Anatolia.25 Turk- EU accession is observed in Spain, ish nationalism essentially invested while the largest opposition is ob- this term with racial and national sig- served in Germany, Austria, and the nificance. But, the dual significance Netherlands.24 Europe’s crisis height- of the term was persevered, haunting ens anti-Turkish prejudice, just as modern Turkish society. However, sovereigntist, anti-immigration, and in the late 1990s, and early 2000s

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the interchangeable use of the term tiations was for the AK Party move- ‘Europeanization’ with ‘moderniza- ment was amply demonstrated in tion’ in Turkey provided a window April 28, 2007, when rumors started of opportunity with domestic politi- of an imminent military intervention cal resonance. By engaging with the and tanks made their presence in the EU, there were hopes that the dual streets of İstanbul. The army stood significance of the term ‘Turk’ could down because it was made clear that achieve a viable synthesis. another intervention would be the end of the road for Turkey’s European Ankara implemented a series of po- project. Europeanization in Turkey litical reforms 26 paving the way for appeared to be valued as a process the Customs Union in December rather than merely as a means to an 1995.27 But when the Turkish military end. dictated the resignation of the Islamic government in 1997, the process of And there were broader implications EU negotiations came to a standstill for the ‘West’ and democratization and moderate political Islam realized from Turkey’s ‘success story.’ As the that Europe was not merely a project Arab spring saw the collapse of dic- that should be of interest to the ‘other tatorial regimes across the Middle half of Turkey.’ Gaining the status East, an article in El Pais hailed Tur- of an EU member state in the early key rather than the EU as the model 2000s provided the moderate Islamic for democratic development in the AK Party movement with a legitimat- Islamic world. 29 After all, Turkey was ing platform for the modernization able to guarantee not only upward so- or ‘Europeanization’ of civil-military cial mobility and economic develop- relations. ment, but also substantial individual rights. Having transcended the con- The AK Party government more than tradiction between Islam and mo- welcomed EU demands for civilian dernity, Turkey had quadrupled the control over the military, the dim- size of its economy, reduced its public inution and reform of the National debt from 75 percent to 40 percent of Security Council, the reform of the GDP, tripled per capita income, and judiciary, and the reform of the office saw its risk premium fall to levels that of the President. Erdoğan’s first gov- were envied by most EU member ernment set out to align Turkey with states of the southern periphery at European rule of law standards, with the time. Perhaps more significantly, Islam but not against modernity, and Turkey was bridging the gap between perhaps for Europe, but not against Anatolia and coastal Turkey, while Turkey. AK Party portrayed itself Europe’s divide between East and as an Islamic version of European West was widening. Christian-Democracy, as a champion of individual rights, the rule of law, Of course, there were also more ‘tra- and traditional values.28 How power- ditional’ narratives about Turkey, ful resource the process of EU nego- which reduced the success of Turkey

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to a case of ‘moral evolution,’ referred to as ‘Islamic Calvinism.’30 But the Over the course of the last emerging consensus was that Turkey had carved for itself not only a place three years, there has been in Europe, but also a role in Europe. an atmosphere of “with us or against us,” often forcing Turkey as a ‘Free Radical’ in the Balkan states to make Balkans mutually exclusive choices Across this historical period, Turkey’s role in the Balkans was seen in Europe as part of the broader relationship lim’ and ‘Turk’ have often been used with the project of European inte- interchangeably.31 gration. In the context of the Turkish economic and political miracle of the But, economic growth broadened 2000s, Ankara’s role in the Balkans the scope for Turkish protection of was rooted in tradition but held the these populations in the Balkans. In promise of modernization. In sum, the 2000s, Turkey emerged as a ma- the synthesis between a ‘Turk’ in the jor power in Official Development sense of the devout Muslim of Anato- Assistance, despite being a middle lia, and a ‘Turk’ in the sense of a mod- income country. TİKA (Turkish In- ern European citizen were achieving ternational Cooperation and Devel- their Balkan synthesis. opment Agency) has offices in Alba- nia, Serbia, and Bosnia, disbursing For decades, Turkey has hosted Mus- aid that protects and promotes the lim refugees from the Balkans, who Ottoman legacy in the Balkans, and were viewed as Turks in Bulgaria, socially empowers Muslim minority Bosnia, or Greece by virtue of their populations.32 At the same time, religion if not of their language. Be- Turkey has become a major source tween the late 19th century and early of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 1920s, four million Tatars, Turks, creating industrial, financial, logis- and Circassians moved to the Otto- tical, and telecommunications value man heartland that is today Turkey; chains across Southeastern Europe.33 about one million Anatolian Turks were forced to move from the Bal- Passing the $2 trillion milestone in kans to Turkey, even prior to the 2015, Turkey is the region’s power- formal exchange of populations with house. Turkish trade with Southeast- Greece in 1923; in excess of 800,000 ern Europe surged from €364 mil- Muslims moved between 1945 and lion in 2002 to €3 billion in 2016.34 1989 to Turkey from Bulgaria and And, Turkish companies in the re- the former Yugoslavia. In sum, Tur- gion were more prone to so-called key is a regional demographic hub ‘greenfield investment,’ which came in a region where the terms ‘Mus- hand-in-hand with employment,

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1992. In sum, Turkey appeared as a Turkey no longer appears champion of regional stability. to invest in the project of However, it would be naïve to believe European integration either that Turkish influence was devoid of as a process or as an end. controversy. The visit of Turkish For- eign Minister Davutoğlu in October Euro-Turkish relations are 2009 to Bosnia became an opportu- more frequently framed as a nity to express a nostalgic vision for the resurgence of an idealized Pax transaction, especially in the Ottomanica in the Balkans, with current context of a Turkish common political values, economic economic crisis interdependence, cooperation, and cultural harmony. That vision was received with some degree of skepti- cism,37 but was also seen as a promise and therefore; political leverage.35 of “zero problems and maximum co- Turkish Foreign Direct Investment operation with neighbors.” After all, in the Western Balkans has contin- the ethnic minority parties Turkey ued to soar from $3.6 billion in 2002 supports in North Macedonia, and to $16.2 billion in 2016, focusing on Bulgaria have often played a con- strategic sectors such as highways, structive role, advancing minority energy, telecommunications, airlines, rights without undermining political and banking.36 stability or indeed the region’s Euro- pean trajectory. However, overt po- Turkish influence was not necessar- litical influence in the Balkans often ily perceived as a threat to the pro- triggers skepticism, and, at times, a cess of Europeanization. Often, it nationalist backlash.38 was quite the contrary. In April 2010, President Abdullah Gül persuaded Since the attempted coup in July 2016 Serbia’s President, Boris Tadic, and in Turkey, the occasional backlash the Bosniak member of Bosnia and has evolved into a zero-sum confron- Herzegovina's tripartite presidency, tation between Brussels and Ankara Haris Silajdzic, to sign the so-called across the Balkans. The EU does not İstanbul Declaration, reaffirming a share the view that the network of shared “commitment to take all nec- the U.S.-based Muslim cleric Fetul- essary steps to ensure regional peace, lah Gülen was behind the movement stability and prosperity.” Tadic, em- to overthrow the legally elected gov- powered by the Serbian Parliament’s ernment.39 At the same time, Turkey formal recognition of the Srebrenica has taken the view that EU member genocide (March 30, 2010), visited states refused to extend solidarity and the city on July 11 to mark its 15th an- perhaps even welcomed the prospect niversary; in turn, Silajdzic agreed to of regime change. Over the course of make his first trip to Belgrade since the last three years, there has been an

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The 38th EU-Turkey Joint Consultative Committee was atmosphere of “with us or against us,” In July 2018, President Recep Tayyip held in Brussels often forcing Balkan states to make Erdoğan held a swearing-in ceremony in April 2019 to mutually exclusive choices. in Ankara, following the approval of work on issues Turkey’s new system. With the excep- such as the latest situation on In March 2018, six Turks residing in tion of Bulgaria, EU leaders largely EU-Turkey Kosovo were “rendered” to Turkey snubbed the occasion, as the Venice relations, the for being members of the so-called Commission warned about the ero- Customs Union, Fetullah Gülen Terror Organization sion of checks and balances. How- and visa dialogue. (FETÖ). The Turkish intelligence ever, leaders from North Macedonia, DURSUN AYDEMİR / agency MİT and its counterpart in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, AA Photo Kosovo organized the transfer, report- Kosovo, and Serbia were present, rec- edly without the knowledge of Prime ognizing Turkey’s special gravity in Minister Ramush Haradinaj.40 The the region, political and economic. EU condemned the “deportation.”41 That was not an isolated event. In May Perhaps more significantly, the con- 2018, President Erdoğan announced a frontation between Turkey and Brus- political rally in Sarajevo, which came sels in the Balkans is gradually taking after the prohibition of similar rallies a more ‘systemic turn.’ To the extent in EU member states. Once again, Sa- that Turkey no longer considers itself rajevo was placed in a difficult spot, a stakeholder in the project of Euro- having to tolerate a symbolic act of pean integration, its relationship with Turkish defiance of the EU in Bos- Greece is increasingly framed in a nia.42 And pressure of this kind is more ‘geopolitical’ language, recently mounting, as Bosnia and Herzegovina culminating in the public compari- is home to private schools founded by son of military capability in terms of the Gülen movement which Ankara troops, tanks, fighter-jets, and sub- has demanded to be closed.43 marines between NATO allies. This

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and Turkish Official Development The fear of ‘contagion’ binds Assistance is called into question.46 The fear of ‘contagion’ binds Tur- Turkey systemically to key systemically to Europe, but does Europe, but does not inspire not inspire a sense of solidarity that a sense of solidarity that resonates with the feeling of a com- munity. Gone are the references to resonates with the feeling of Islamic Calvinism, as the relationship a community between Brussels, Ankara, and Wash- ington appear more confrontational. The image of Turkey has backtracked into that of the European other, in confrontational dynamic is no longer cultural, political, geographic, and tamed by an understanding of mem- of course, religious terms. In Turkey bership in a common Euro-Atlantic too, the prospect of Europeanization ‘community,’ or indeed the prospect has been disowned by the ruling AK of EU membership. Party movement, but also the nation- alist MHP, as a project wholly foreign to Turkish national interests. Interdependence versus Community Building The implication for Balkan states, of- ten seen as devoid of political agency, Turkey no longer appears to invest and forced to choose between ‘spon- in the project of European integra- sors’ is often a mutually exclusive tion either as a process or as an end. choice between Europe and Turkey. Euro-Turkish relations are more fre- Rather than a regional powerhouse, quently framed as a transaction, es- Turkey is now framed as a factor of pecially in the current context of a Balkanization, that is, political and Turkish economic crisis. According to potentially economic fragmentation the Bank of International Settlements, that runs contrary to the grand narra- Turkish banks have foreign-denom- tive of normative regional alignment. inated loans to the tune of $148 bil- Far from being a European neighbor- lion and €100 billion.44 Much of that hood, the part of Southeastern Eu- debt was issued by European lenders. rope that is not assimilated by the EU Spanish banks hold more than $80 bil- is treated as a region in which Turkey lion of Turkish debt, French banks $40 asserts its claim to a near abroad, as billion, and Italian banks about $20 a great power, often in opposition billion. To put things in perspective, to Brussels. The difference with the this exposure is comparable to Greek 1990s is that Europeanization no lon- sovereign debt exposure in 2009.45 ger appears as a community-building narrative within and around Europe, To a certain extent, Turkey’s crisis inclusive of Turkey. Instead, there is is also a European crisis and a Bal- a movement towards a more flexible, kan crisis, as industrial investment sovereigntist future for the region

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Rouya Turkiyyah is a quarterly academic journal published by SETA Foundation since 2012. It covers a broad range of topics related to domestic and foreign policy of the Middle Eastern countries focusing mostly in their politics, economy and social problems. Rouya Tur- kiyyah seeks to furnish a new regional perspective, through the allocation of new spaces for serious discussions on the World Affairs but more specifically in the Middle East affairs.

rouyaturkiyyah.com90 Insight Turkey edited by Ramazan Yıldırım