COLD WAR SUBMARINES The Project 941/Typhoon was the largest undersea craft ever built. These two—of six completed—are at their remote base of Nerpichya, about six miles from the entrance to Guba Zapadnaya Litsa on the Kola Peninsula, close to the borders with Finland and Norway. (Rubin CDB ME) Other Submarine-Related Books by Norman Polmar The American Submarine Atomic Submarines Death of the Thresher Guide to the Soviet Navy (4 editions) Rickover: Controversy and Genius with Thomas B. Allen Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet (7 editions) Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy with Dorr Carpenter Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990 with Jurrien Noot POTOMAC BOOKS, INC. Copyright © 2004 by Norman Polmar. Published in the United States by Potomac Books Inc. (formerly Brassey’s, Inc.). All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Polmar, Norman Cold War submarines: U.S. and Soviet design and construction / Norman Polmar and Kenneth J. Moore—1st ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-57488-594-1 1. Submarines (Ships)—United States—History. 2. Submarines (Ships)—Soviet Union. 3. Cold War. I. Moore, Kenneth J., 1942– II. Title. V858.P63 2003 359.9'383'094709045—dc21 2003013123 ISBN 978-1–57488–530–9 (paperback) ISBN 978-1-57488-594-1 (hardcover) Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the American National Standards Institute Z39–48 Standard. Potomac Books, Inc. 22841 Quicksilver Drive Dulles, Virginia 20166 First Edition 1098765432 Epigraph It is the nature of human memory to rid itself of the superfluous, to retain only what has proved to be most important in the light of later events. Yet that is also its weak side. Being biased it cannot help adjusting past reality to fit present needs and future hopes. —Milovan Djilas Conversations with Stalin This page intentionally left blank Dedication This book is dedicated to the officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men who served in Soviet and U.S. submarines during the Cold War. They did their duty courageously and steadfastly. Although no shots were fired, many of these sub- mariners lost their lives to fires, flooding, and other accidents. It was the price paid for 45 years of Cold War confrontation and for the rapid development and application of technology. This page intentionally left blank Contents Perspective xi Acknowledgments xv Glossary xix 1 | Genesis 1 2 | Advanced Diesel Submarines 11 3 | Closed-Cycle Submarines 33 4 | U.S. Nuclear-Propelled Submarines 49 5 | Soviet Nuclear-Propelled Submarines 71 6 | Cruise Missile Submarines 85 7 | Ballistic Missile Submarines 103 8 | “Polaris—From Out of the Deep . .” 115 9 | The Quest for Speed 127 10 | Second-Generation Nuclear Submarines 147 11 | The Ultimate Weapon I 167 12 | The Ultimate Weapon II 183 13 | “Diesel Boats Forever” 201 14 | Unbuilt Giants 221 15 | Aircraft-Carrying Submarines 245 16 | Midget, Small, and Flying Submarines 255 CONTENTS ix 17 | Third-Generation Nuclear Submarines 267 18 | Submarine Weapons 293 19 | Fourth-Generation Nuclear Submarines 307 20 | Soviet Versus U.S. Submarines 323 Appendixes A | U.S. Submarine Construction, 1945–1991 335 B | Soviet Submarine Construction, 1945–1991 337 C | U.S. Submarine Reactor Plants 339 D | Soviet Submarine Design Bureaus 341 E | Soviet Ballistic Missile Systems 345 Notes 347 Selected Bibliography 385 Index 395 Author Biographies 407 xCOLD WAR SUBMARINES Perspective ubmarines had a vital role in the 45 years of the The Soviet submarine technological advan- SCold War—1946–1991. Throughout that con- tages for quieting, strengthened double flict, U.S. and Soviet submarines carried out intelli- hulls, higher speed, higher reserve buoyancy, gence collection operations and sought out and and deeper operations are advances which prepared to destroy opposing surface ships and are by and large not stolen or bought from submarines. In addition, from the early 1960s missile- the United States. Some technologies [classi- carrying submarines threatened nuclear attacks on fied deletion] are Soviet design decisions their opponent’s homeland. which are different from our decisions. The possibility of Soviet submarines near Amer- Other technologies ...are the result of Sov- ican coasts firing ballistic missiles, with a much iet engineered high-power-density material shorter time of flight than missiles launched from and hull strength material. The Soviets are the Soviet Union, presented a direct threat to U.S. ahead of us in these technologies.3 command centers, bomber bases, and even land- based strategic missiles, thereby forcing major By the end of the Cold War, U.S. and Soviet changes in the U.S. strategic posture. Similarly, U.S. submarines were radically different in design and missile submarines forced major changes in Soviet capabilities. In view of the importance of undersea naval development and strategic forces deployments. craft—both torpedo/cruise missile attack and Soviet and U.S. submarines of the Cold War strategic missile submarines—it is useful to exam- era had the same origins: Their antecedents were ine how and why this divergence occurred. German U-boat developments of 1943–1945, The causes of this divergence in submarine design especially the Type XXI, the most advanced sub- can be found in (1) differing naval missions, (2) marine to go to sea during World War II. The U.S. differing technical/operational priorities, (3) dif- version of the Type XXI was the Tang (SS 563) fering levels of industrial competence, and (4) class, with similar features being incorporated in differing approaches to submarine design organi- the K1-class “killer” submarines and 52 conver- zations and management. sions of war-built submarines in the so-called Significantly, for much of the Cold War the U.S. GUPPY program.1 The Soviets adopted Type XXI Navy had a highly centralized, authoritarian features in the Whiskey and Zulu designs and their organization. The head of Naval Nuclear Propul- successors.2 The U.S. and Soviet (as well as sion held de facto control of submarine develop- British) submarine communities also had major ment, with virtually unqualified power to veto—if interest in German closed-cycle, or “single-drive,” not enforce—key design decisions.4 Indeed, the submarine propulsion systems, with these sub- incumbent of this position, Admiral H. G. Rick- marines being evaluated in the postwar period by over, by the early 1960s was able to deter any infu- Britain and the Soviet Union. sion of design ideas or concepts from outside of But the undersea craft produced by the respec- the senior officers of the nuclear submarine com- tive navies rapidly diverged in their designs from munity—the so-called submarine mafia—unless it the Type XXI model. In 1985 the U.S. Assistant Sec- corresponded with his views and goals. Those goals retary of the Navy for Research, Engineering, and were based largely on a U.S. Navy plan of 1950 to Systems Melvin R. Paisley observed: develop a series of submarine propulsion plants PERSPECTIVE xi progressing from the 13,400-shaft-horsepower It is convenient to address nuclear-propelled plant of the pioneer Nautilus (SSN 571) to 30,000, submarines of the Cold War in terms of “genera- 45,000, and, ultimately, 60,000 horsepower.5 tions” (see table 2). While this categorization is not In contrast, the Soviet Union had several design precise, it is a useful tool. bureaus engaged in submarine development during Many individuals and organizations assisted in the Cold War (see Appendix D). Those bureaus the writing of this book. They are gratefully were, to a large degree, in competition in submarine acknowledged in the following pages. But all opin- design, although ostensibly each specialized in dif- ions and conclusions—and such errors that may ferent types of submarines. Further, the Soviet appear—are the responsibility of the authors. regime pursued to various stages of fruition inno- —Norman Polmar vative proposals from qualified (and at times Kenneth J. Moore unqualified) submarine designers and naval offi- cers. This, in turn, led to the examination of innu- TABLE 1 merable submarine designs and concepts, which Cold War Submarine Construction* contributed to the highly innovative submarines United States Soviet Union produced by Soviet design bureaus and shipyards. World War II programs Innovation in itself does not necessarily result completed Aug. 1945–1951 in quality or capability. This volume seeks to diesel-electric 23 61 examine the process of submarine design and the closed-cycle — 1** results of those efforts to produce submarines by total 23 62 the two super powers during the Cold War, and to Cold War programs assess their success in translating innovation into completed 1945–1991 capability. diesel-electric 21 399 During the 45 years of the Cold War (1945– closed-cycle — 31 1991) the United States and the Soviet Union put to nuclear-propelled 170 231 sea a combined total of 936 submarines, of which total 191 661 401 were nuclear propelled (see table 1). The Sov- Cold War programs iet regime allocated considerably more resources to completed 1992–2001 the design and construction of submarines during diesel-electric — 3*** the Cold War than did the United States. This Sov- nuclear-propelled 22# 17## iet emphasis on undersea craft continued after the total 22 20 1970s, when major efforts were undertaken to con- Notes:* Does not include two Soviet midget submarines (Project 865) struct large surface warships, including nuclear- and the single U.S. Navy’s midget submarine X-1 (SSX 1). propelled missile cruisers and aircraft carriers.