Av-8B Harrier Ii Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom I-Vi

Home , 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, Battle of Ramadi (2006), Pappy Boyington, USS Saipan (LHA-2), USS Tarawa (LHA-1)

0413&:$0.#"5"*3$3"'5t AV-8B HARRIER II UNITS OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM I-VI

Lon Nordeen

INTRODUCTION 6

CHAPTER ONE USMC AND AV-8B AIR SUPPORT 7

CHAPTER TWO OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH 14

CHAPTER THREE OIF I – VMA-214 21

CHAPTER FOUR OIF I – VMA-311 AND VMA-211 44

CHAPTER FIVE OIF I – VMA-542, VMA-223 AND VMA-231 55

CHAPTER SIX OIF II/III 63

CHAPTER SEVEN OIF IV 72

CHAPTER EIGHT OIF V/VI 84

APPENDICES 91 COLOUR PLATES COMMENTARY 92 INDEX 95

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 6 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION non-stop deployments toIraq thatfollowed from 2004through to2008. the intenseoperationsofOperation Iraqi Freedom I(2003)andthe included Operation reconnaissance (ISR)contributiontoCoalitionoperationsinIraq. This and andintelligence,surveillance make asignificantairsupport professionals haveaerospace allowed industry theAV-8B Harrier IIto thousands ofMarines, Sailors, ofDefense Department civiliansand continued needfortheair-ground task force, by aswell asintenseefforts and trainingrequirements. The dedicationoftheMarine Corpstothe (MEU) deployment deployment schedules,Asianforward commitments Afghanistan, whileatthesametimefulfillingMarineUnit Expeditionary limit providing duringthe airsupport War on Terror inbothIraq and systems integrationandtacticshavekepttheAV-8B viable. AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-AirMissile) and better GBU-51 reduced blastLGB, GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munition and downlinks, improved weapons (includingtheGBU-12 laser-guidedbomb, LiteningIIprecision targetingpod,videodataAN/AAQ-28(V) growth plan.New features suchastheNorthrop Grummana viable challengesandmaintainengine, manageserioussafetyandsupport development issueswiththeimproved Rolls-Royce Pegasus F402-RR-408 teamedtogethertoovercomeUS aerospace industry significant landing)community,and vertical Naval AirSystems Commandandthe II+ aircraft. equipped withamixofAV-8B Night Attack andradar-equippedHarrier and twonightattacksquadrons toseven lightattackunits. The latterwere A Over thepast15years theAV-8B communityhasbeenstretched tothe At thesametimeMarine Corps,theAV-8B STOVL (short-takeoff reduce its light attack (VMA) forcereduce from itslightattack(VMA) sixAV-8B dayattack through achallengingperiodthatsawtheUSMarine Corps fter Operation Storm Desert in1991,theAV-8B communitywent Southern WatchSouthern from 1996through support to2003, © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com USMC AND AV-8B AIR SUPPORT 7 www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing Osprey ©

he US Marine Corps is a combined arms force with ground, ground, with force Corps is a combined arms he US Marine combat support that train and fight together and aviation assets the Marine to conduct expeditionary Since warfare. manoeuvre

Operating the Marine Corps’ principal tactical aircraft types, personnel principal tactical aircraft Corps’ Marine the Operating II, has a slightly than the Harrier is faster The twin-engined Hornet was seen as a special the AV-8B the US Navy, by Although not flown were II squadrons and Harrier Corps Hornet Marine Multiple

Corps is essentially a light infantryCorps is essentially a to most armies, when compared force the sea, it relies and assault from on manoeuvre with the emphasis being aircraft, in the form of attack helicopters and tactical on aerial firepower to make F/A-18A/C/D) (and conventional AV-8B such as the STOVL of organic artilleryup for the limited availability the support. Indeed, tactical delivery by and accuracy of weapons offered range, firepower and gunfire naval artillery, by to those achieved far superior are aircraft attack helicopters. endured often communities have II and Hornet within the Harrier a Both aviation the years. over somewhat fractious relationship the US from compete for limited funding, which is secured programmes strike fighter that is a superb multi-mission The Hornet budget. Navy’s missions. performs and strike and reconnaissance the air-to-air role supported directly have variant equipped with the F/A-18A/C Squadrons With carriers. aircraft can operate from since the Hornet the US Navy Corps flying the F/A-18, fighter attack and Marine both the US Navy support Navy US benefited from have Corps the Marine within squadrons decades. the past three and upgrades to the aircraft over investments (CAS), for Close Air Support range and can carry ordnance greater more also has a much It depending on the mission and load configuration. a 6000 ft runway to but requires than the AV-8B, better safety record operate from. Corps CAS for Marine to provide developed machine’ case ‘Green amphibious assault ships and shorter operating from by forces ground Corps had to often work Marine The airfields to the battlefield. close funds for the to secure in a series of ‘budget wars’ Congress through to its unique vertical/short-takeoff and landing (V/STOL) Due AV-8B. II was more flight characteristics, and associated design, the Harrier maintenance and had a significantly more required challenging to fly, higher accident rate. air Corps and Coalition to meet Marine committed to OIF in order Corps, US Army the Marine the campaign. For for support requirements II and Harrier the Hornet in Iraq, or Coalition soldiers on the ground AIR SUPPORT AIR

USMC AND AV-8B AV-8B AND USMC T 8 CHAPTER ONE helicopter escort, airdefence andreconnaissance.helicopter escort, AV-8B andairtargets, ofsurface Harrier IIincludeattackanddestruction airstripsonland.Missionsand basingoptionsatseaoron short ofthe operationsduetoitsspeed,firepower thefullrangeofmilitary support tactical aircraft deployed forward onamphibiousassaultships that can personnelandflightcrews. support Cobra attackhelicopters,UH-1Nliaisonhelicoptersandseveral hundred CH-53 heavylifthelicoptersandasmallernumberofAH-1W Super of CH-46mediumlifthelicoptersor V-22 tilt-rotors, adetachmentof are assignedtoacompositesquadron. This unitalsoincludes asquadron personnelfromand about90support aMarine CorpsHarrier IIsquadron units ofthethree shipsoftheESG.Generally, sixHarrier IIs, ninepilots aviation elementprovides forthe1200Marines support assignedtocombat a commandelement,ground elements. force andcombatsupport The amphibious landingships. the personnelandequipmentofMEU-SOC,twosmaller (LHA) ship, whichcarriesmostoftheaircraft andmore thanhalfof Helicopter Dock (LHD)or45,000-tonLandingHelicopter Assault (ESG). The latterusuallyconsistsofone40,000-tonLanding Strikeamphibious assaultshipsassignedtoanExpeditionary Group oftheaviationcombatelementaMEU-SOCembarked inpart Since the1970sMarine CorpsHarriers have regularly deployed asa division-size (16,000+personnel)Marine Force Expeditionary (MEF). Unit-Special Operations Capable(MEU-SOC)aboard three shipstoa ofaforce thatcanrangeinsizepart from thesmallMarine Expeditionary Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commanderwhendeployed, being GPSweapons. Attack (JDAM) including laser-guidedbombs,Maverick missilesand,later, Joint Direct laser targetingpods,cannon,rockets andprecision-guided munitions, provided sincebothjetscarriedFLIR/ effective andaccurateairsupport, The AV-8B Harrier IIprovides uniquecapabilitiessinceitisthe only Aviation combatelementsare ofaMAGTF, alwayspart whichincludes AV-8B unitstypicallycomeunderthecontrol oftheMarine © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com during cruise their2004-05 (USNavy) spent timeassignedto Fifth Fleet USS USS (LHD-2), USSFort McHenry(LSD-43), photograph shows USSEssex destroyers andcruisers. This 2004 ships, plusanescort offrigates, several smalleramphibiouslanding and equipmentoftheMEU) more thanhalfofthepersonnel carries mostoftheaircraft and LHD/LHA(which one 40,000-ton The latter usuallycomposedof have been assignedto anESG. assault shipsoftheUSNavy that an MEUembarked inamphibious of theaviation combatelementof have regularly deployed asapart US Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier IIs Juneau (LPD-10). These vessels Germantown (LSD-42)and

USMC AND AV-8B AIR SUPPORT 9

and Desert Desert Shield on 28 February 1991, the 1991, the on 28 February Desert Storm www.ospreypublishing.com • . Marine Corps pilots completed 3380 combat . Marine Desert Storm Publishing The Marine Corps has long been a proponent of STOVL for CAS and CAS and for of STOVL a proponent has long been Corps The Marine the early 1990s the four AV-8A the 1980s and into Throughout II day Harrier higher performanceThe second generation, AV-8B the first tactical among VMA-542 were VMA-311 and from IIs Harrier the cessation of Following led to War , the ending of the Cold the wake of Desert Storm In strike operations. In 1969 it placed an order for the first of 110 AV-8A 110 AV-8A the first of for order placed an 1969 it In operations. strike aircraft these Siddeley, Hawker by the UK supplied from Harriers a training unit and squadrons ‘gun’ frontline equipping three subsequently Marine allowed service in 1971. Remaining until 1992, the AV-8As from albeit operations, in STOVL experience to gain valuable Corps aviation land-based worldwide through aircraft, in both pilots and at a high cost amphibious assault US Navy flying from and ‘blue water’ deployments carriers. ships and aircraft transitioned Skyhawk units equipped with the A-4M and five squadrons attack Corps an all-STOVL the Marine This gave II. Harrier to the AV-8B plus a large each, aircraft with 16-20 composed of eight squadrons force training squadron. in Operations a major role played attack aircraft of Operations II Units Harrier 90 – AV-8B Combat Aircraft (see Osprey Storm 1990, when August for further details). By and Desert Storm Desert Shield fully were VMA squadrons Corps six Marine Kuwait, invaded Iraq (the VMAT-203 while of the AV-8B, equipped with the day attack version two-seat TAV-8B and unit) operated a mix of AV-8Bs II training Harrier VMA-214) were (VMA-211VMA squadrons and The final two trainers. Night to the AV-8B the A-4M of converting from still in the process II, however. Harrier Attack in support Desert Shield of Operation sent to the region to be aircraft star performers. II was highlighted as one of the operation’s Harrier AV-8B Corps resolved within the Marine of the aircraft advocates Nevertheless, updates necessary weapons to incorporate engine, systems, sensor and to battlefield. II a key player for the future make the Harrier a significant of the One of the US armed forces. in the size reduction was the disbandment in contributions to these cutbacks Corps’ Marine VMA-331, based at to be activated, II squadron 1992 of the first Harrier This Carolina. North (MCAS) Cherry Point, Corps Air Station Marine apiece and one large with 20 AV-8Bs squadrons frontline left seven A small than 30 AV-8Bs/TAV-8Bs. II training unit with more Harrier and Evaluation Test Air also served with the Naval IIs number of Harrier China Lake, California, and Station Weapons Air at Naval Squadrons Maryland, as with the McDonnell as well River, Patuxent Air Station Naval Louis, Missouri. 1997) factory (Boeing from Douglas in St following the invasion of Kuwait. Eventually, three AV-8B squadrons and squadrons AV-8B three Eventually, of Kuwait. the invasion following Arabia while detachment flew airfieldsa six-aeroplane from in Saudi (LHA-4) in support of USS Nassau unit saw combat flying from a fourth Operation 5.9 million pounds of high II and delivered missions in the Harrier the 41 During cluster munitions and other ordnance. bombs, explosive lost were AV-8Bs five forces, days of intense strike operations against Iraqi in action to surface-to-air artillery missiles/anti-aircraft or operational prisoner. causes, with two pilots killed and two taken Osprey © 10 CHAPTER ONE combat element ontheNight Attack Harrier II.’ (via ATHS) inthesamelanguage,really forair support soldtheground and itsabilitytostrikeatnightwith theFLIRandNVGs andcommunicate additions, combinedwiththeimproved ofthe AV-8B engineperformance (UTM) –thesamesystemground commandersandFACs use. These (ATHS),System whichemployed theUniversal Transverse Mercanian send andreceive a 9-linebriefusingtheAutomatic Target Handoff the FLIRandcommunicate. The Night Attack jethadthecapabilityto at nightwiththeFLIRandNVGs, navigateusingthemoving mapand They gave usalotmore combatcapability–theabilitytoflyandstrike when itbecamethefirstMarine Corpsnightattacksquadron. He recalled; Arizona. LtColRuss Stromberg, whoisnow retired, wasCOof VMA-214 deliveries goingtoMarine Corpssquadrons locatedatMCAS Yuma, aircraft inSeptember 1989(production aircraft 167to232),withinitial upward-firing chaff/flare dispenserswere alsoaddedintheaftfuselage. Leading-Edge Root Extension (LERX),whichimproved agility. Four fight atnight.In addition,theNight Attack Harrier IIincorporatedalarger (NVGs). These improvements allowed AV-8B pilotstoeffectively flyand cockpit displaysandlightingcompatiblewithnightvisiongoggles upgraded head-updisplay(HUD),adigitalmoving map, two-colour equipped withaForward LookingInfrared (FLIR)sensorinthe nose,an (originally builtasthe87thAV-8B) wasrolled out,thisvariant being for CAS.In June 1987thefirstHarrier IINight Attack prototype aircraft (161produced) wasessentiallyaclearairstrikeaircraft optimised ASB-19 AngleRateBombingSystem (ARBS),theAV-8B dayattack withimprovementsforward fortheAV-8B. With itselectro-optical Hughes Even before Shield/Desert Desert Storm theMarine Corpswasmoving ‘When we firstgottheNight‘When Attack jetsthey were aeroplanes. brandnew The USMCreceived thefirstofits65production AV-8B Night Attack HARRIER IIUPGRADES © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com original AV-8B(Boeing over the F402-RR-406fitted inthe which provides increased thrust Royce F402-RR-408turbofan engine, variants are powered by the Rolls- been posedside-by-side. Both with aFLIRandan ARBS –have (66 builtfor the Marine Corps), fitted (FLIR), andtheNight Attack Harrier II Forward-Looking Infrared Sensor with the AN/APG-65 radar and for the Marine Corps), equipped AV-8B – the Harrier II+(116 built more advanced versions ofthe In thisBoeingphotograph the ) USMC AND AV-8B AIR SUPPORT 11 In 1990 the AV-8B Night Attack airframe airframe Attack Night the AV-8B 1990 In and Italy Spain 1990 the USA, September In commenced flight testing with the F402-RR-408 the F402-RR-408 testing with flight commenced lbs of 3000 not only provided engine, which thrustadditional also meant to be more but was fitted in the the F402-RR-406 durable than the higher thrust II. However, original Harrier challenges a series of technical engine experienced and a aircraft several in the crash of that resulted These of all AV-8Bs. fleet-wide grounding and impacted fleet operations adversely problems bearing and corrected Royce training until Rolls- was The F402-RR-408 engine blade issues. Corps into all Marine retrofitted eventually trainers TAV-8B as as well aircraft, Attack Night II+ jets. and later Harrier of the Hughes to fund the integration agreed Raytheon) AN/APG-65 multi-mode radar, (now F401-RR-408 engine and other systems II.enhancements into a new of the Harrier version II+, the jet was Harrier the AV-8B Designated capable of performing as an air defence now bomber and reconnaissance precision fighter, US Navy The the same mission. all in aircraft of 42 brand new funded the production to 262, and 233 aircraft (production II+s Harrier 164129, which was a radar integration test BuNo www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing Jackie Jackson, Boeing’s Chief Test Pilot for the AV-8B, performed for the AV-8B, Pilot Test Chief Boeing’s Jackson, Jackie ‘The in a huge increase II+, with its radar and FLIR, brought Harrier II pilots could also utilise within visual range air combat, Harrier For due to its unique has always been controversial programme The Harrier myriad flights in all three versions of the Harrier II. He noted; II. He of the Harrier versions myriad flights in all three the jet’s of these systems slightly increased The addition combat capability. in performance was not much difference really but there drag and weight, and the radar-equipped aircraft Attack Night -408-powered the between was in turning, but we saw a bit of a difference you Where II+. Harrier V-max The the bigger LERX. introducing made up most of that by jet perhaps Attack [maximum speed] was nearly the same, with the Night being 5-8 knots faster.’ Integration and 25 mm cannon. the IR-guided AIM-9L/M Sidewinder of the AN/APG-65 multi-mode radar and AIM-120 AMRAAM Corps and Marine Italian radar-guided air-to-air missile into Spanish, capability of the aircraft. the air combat dramatically improved IIs Harrier long-range surface navigation and surface attack, the radar provided For deliverymapping and weapons modes. performance loss rate. and higher than average and STOVL V/STOL conversion from a Night Attack aircraft) and the remanufacture of 74 and the remanufacture aircraft) Attack a Night from conversion II+ 263 to 336) to Harrier aircraft (production day attack aircraft AV-8B ran from aircraft the new/remanufactured of configuration. Production II+s for the Marine to late 2003, when the final Harrier 1996 through delivered. were Corps and Spain Osprey © The cockpit of the AV-8B Harrier II+, II+, Harrier AV-8B of the The cockpit CRT Honeywell includes two which Attack Night (the non-radar displays the left), to CRT, has only one aircraft communication- a centre-mounted and a Smiths keypad navigation instruments. plus back-up HUD, S-III-S Stencel II’s The Harrier SJU-4 ejection seat is also well this unusual angle from illustrated ) Carlson/Fotodynamics (Ted 12 CHAPTER ONE radar-equipped Harrier II+sandfourtosixAV-8B Night Attack aircraft. squadrons were equippedwith15AV-8Bs –usuallyamixoftentotwelve and reconnaissance strikeplatform. and control, andmaketheAV-8B amuch-prized intelligence,surveillance stations. capabilitywastorevolutioniseThis new battlefield command toground modified withadatalinkforreal timetransmission ofimagery Harrier IIs) andotherconflicts.AV-8B LiteningII podswere eventually had proven Storm tobelethalinDesert (whentheydowned atleastfour fire missiles–thelatter andshoulder-launchedIR-guidedsurface-to-air deliver precision laser-guidedbombsfrom above therangeofanti-aircraft enhanced precision, greatly reducing theriskofcollateraldamage,and modified software, wasbeingtested. stationfive, andincorporating Litening IIpodmountedonunderwing alternatives, andthuswasselected.By 2000anAV-8B withthe capable, costlessandwaseasiertointegrateintotheAV-8B thanother Northrop Grumman LiteningIIFLIR/laserdesignation podwasmore the available targetingpodsitwasdetermined thattheAN/AAQ-28(V) secured supplementalfundingfrom Congress forthisupdate.Aftertesting up-to-date FLIRtobeintegratedwiththeAV-8B. Crucially, theyalso (DCS) Aviation, tosignanurgentcombatcapabilityrequirement foran staff officersconvincedLtGen Frederick McCorkle, Deputy ChiefofStaff significant role infuture operationsacross theglobe. turned theAV-8B’s lossratearound, leavingtheHarrier IIready toplaya defence contractorsintoimproved andtraining engineering,support investment madeby theMarine Corps,USNavy and The substantial Progress intheseareas wouldbereviewed atanannualsymposium. toimproveinstigate corrective actionsnecessary andsafety. support a comprehensive programme thatwouldidentifyHarrier IIissuesand 1990s theMarine Corps,USNavy developed andtheaerospace industry maintenance issues.In tocounterthisalarminglossrate,inthe aneffort includingpiloterror,of causes engineandsystemsfailures, weather and 1980s and early1990smanyAV-8BsIn the were lostduetoavariety By late2002 allseven oftheMarine Corps’ frontline Harrier II The podallowed Harrier IIpilotstodetectandtracktargetswith In thelate1990sLtColRobert Claypoolandateam ofMarine Corps © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com in orange) (Boeing built into theaft fuselage (illustrated upward-firing chaff/flare dispensers Night Attack variant) are thefour versions ofthe AV-8B (includingthe Another newadditionto thelater in the nose(illustrated ingreen). – the AN/APG-65radar andFLIR shows theaircraft’s key features artwork of the Harrier II+clearly Created by Boeing, thiscutaway ) USMC AND AV-8B AIR SUPPORT 13 www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing Aside from the Litening II, the Marine Corps had also acquired also acquired Corps had Marine the Litening II, the Aside from and incorporated also developed upgrades were Continuous software The Marine Corps’ investment in the higher thrust Pegasus F402-RR-408 F402-RR-408 higher thrust in the investment Pegasus Corps’ The Marine support and training was about to pay off. safety, engine and improved six to eight Litening II targeting of procurement Another plus was the pilots to identify tactical which allowed II squadron, pods for each Harrier medium altitudes. targets from effectiveness. strike to enhance the AV-8B’s additional equipment (GPS) and the ATHS, System The latterPositioning a Global included of targeting data and imagery the digital exchange which provided units equipped with a Remote targeting pod and ground jet’s the between The installation of new (ROVER). Receiver Enhanced Video Operational station to be carried on centreline the Litening II pod wiring also allowed view four rather than underwing thus widening the sensor’s station five, up of the underwingThe freeing pylon also allowed of the ground. II. carried by the Harrier or fuel to be additional ordnance Flight This included many Operational system. weapons into the AV-8B’s C1.0 in 1999 to C2.0 in 2003, from (OFP) updates ranging Program upgrades These software H4.0 in 2006 and H5.0 and H6.0 in 2008. radar and Litening II pod the operability of the AN/APG-65 improved JDAM of integration with the many versions when it came to weapons laser/GPS guided bomb and (including Laser JDAM), the dual mode new also created The software AIM-120 radar-guided air-to-air missile. with closely more II to work Harrier the digital data links that allowed and land-based assets. All of other aerial (both manned and unmanned) 2002. from Terror on War the these upgrades would be put to the test in Osprey © ) This graphic, created by VMA-311 VMA-311 by created This graphic, slide for post-OIF I as a briefing Tactics Weapons and Aviation Marine the quality of shows 1, Squadron of a in the cockpit picture the CRT The view AV-8B. II-equipped Litening an identical from of the same target, pilot of an the to offered distance, equipped with a Lockheed F/A-18 Hawk Nite AN/AAS-38 Martin poorer pod is considerably targeting Hile (via Lt Col Mike The AN/AAQ-28(V) The AN/AAQ-28(V) Northrop II FLIR/laser Litening Grumman integrated designation pod was 1990s in the late with USAF F-16s service with Marine for and accepted 2000. August from AV-8Bs Corps phase its testing The pod completed and thereafter, shortly with NAVAIR issued with units were frontline to months prior examples several II pod includes The Litening OIF I. television device a charge-coupled and a laser systems and FLIR camera Imagery spot tracker/rangefinder. on the the pod is shown by viewed the pilot allows which CRTs, cockpit and and identify targets detect to clinical accuracy. LGBs with employ 2002 II pod was In late the Litening with a video data link so fitted the pilot by seen that the image a laptop to could be transmitted with fitted ground on the computer time imagery The real an antenna. greatly this system by generated since effectiveness, strike improved the aerial could monitor the FAC as if he was the ground from attack the pilot with in the cockpit sitting ) (Northrop Grumman 14 CHAPTER TWO F who recalled; missions wasColChrisMcPhillips, patrols. Operation joined otherUSaircraft for embarked inUSS to 15thMEU-SOC’s HMM-268 VMA-311 Detachment A,assigned January 1996whenAV-8Bs from The firstofthesewasconductedin southern Iraq ofOSW. insupport Arabian Gulf missionsover flew of MEU-SOCssailinginthe assigned totheaircombatelement Corps aircraft. by USAF, USNavy andUSMarine of thesemissionsbeingundertaken Iraq alone,withabout90percent hadbeenflownsorties over southern targets. By 1997,some28,800 air defencesandotherregime also periodicallyflown againstIraqi Iraqi AirForce (IrAF) MiG-25 on27December 1992.Airstrikeswere Iraq. These engagementsculminatedinaUSAFF-16shootingdown an In late 1992Iraqi flyingover forces beganfiringbackatCoalitionsorties Saudi Arabiainitiallycontributedaircraft toenforce theNo-Fly zones. Northern Watch andSouthern –theUSA,United Kingdom,France and No-Fly zones, thepatrolling oftheseareas beingcodenamedOperations Force-South West Asia(JTF-SWA) on26August 1992toenforce the UN USA sentsuppliestotheKurds ofOperation aspart Resolution 688inApril 1991demandinganendtotheseattacks,andthe the regime’s authorityintheseregions. The United Nations (UN)passed ground attackaircraft andhelicopters,were employed reassert tobrutally Hussein Ba’ath andhisruling Party. Troops, by fixed-wing supported SOUTHERN WATCH SOUTHERN OPERATION One ofthepilotsinvolved inthese Marine CorpsAV-8B Harrier IIs US CentralCommand(CENTCOM) establishedtheJoint Task Coalition victory inKuwaitCoalition victory torise upagainstPresident Saddam andShiitein thenorth populationinthesouthastheyused ollowing theendof1991war, Iraqi forces attackedtheKurds Southern WatchSouthern (OSW) Peleliu (LHA-5), © Osprey Publishing • Provide. Comfort www.ospreypublishing.com between (viaAuthor 1992 and2003 ) ONW and OSWsorties were flown support aircraft. More than100,000 US, British andFrench tacticaland the United Nationsandenforced by put inplaceover thecountryby Southern No-FlyZonesthatwere revealsin 2000, theNorthern and and issuedto defence journalists the British MinistryofDefence This mapofIraq, generated by OPERATION AV-8B Night Attack BuNo 163675 of VMA-311 Detachment A, 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-268 embarked in USS Peleliu (LHA-5) provides the

backdrop for this photograph of Capts Brad Gering, Paul Simmons SOUTHERN WATCH and Chris McPhillips. These men were among the first Harrier II pilots to fly missions in support of OSW in January 1996. LHA-5 deployed to the NAG in late 1995, after which air and ground elements of 15th MEU-SOC participated in training with the Kuwaiti armed forces. The six AV-8Bs of ‘Det A’ flew ashore to Ali-Al-Salem air base, from where they mounted sorties in support of OSW in coordination with USAF ‘We went to the CENTCOM AOR [Area Of Operations] as part of a A-10As. This Harrier II is armed normal deployment. When we arrived in the Gulf, the boat went to with an interesting combination Kuwait and we flew ashore with six jets and operated out of Ali-Al-Salem of AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface air base in Kuwait for several weeks in support of OSW. I was a new missiles, AGM-122 Sidearm anti- radiation missiles and AIM-9M air-to- captain on my first deployment, and as the junior guy OSW was my first air missiles (Col Chris McPhillips) combat experience. ‘At the time Ali-Al-Salem was still a mess, strewn with mines and The pilots of VMA-211 Detachment A, 11th MEU-SOC/HMM-166 pose wreckage from the Gulf War. We parked alongside some Kuwait Air Force together on the flightdeck of USS [KAF] F/A-18s. Essex (LHD-2) during the vessel’s ‘As the Night Attack guys we flew with NVGs and the Nav FLIR at 1996-97 deployment – the vessel spent a considerable amount of time night a lot, doing visual reconnaissance patrols looking for trucks and assigned to Fifth Fleet, sailing in the military activity. Our ordnance included IR Mavericks, AIM-9s and the Northern Arabian Gulf. ‘Det A’ went AGM-122 Sidearm ARM [Anti-Radar Missile, based on remanufactured ashore to Ahmed Al Jaber to fly OSW AIM-9C Sidewinder] for self-defence. We did not drop anything because missions while the carrier patrolled off the coast. These pilots are, in the the ROE [Rules Of Engagement] said we had to be fired on first. back row, from left to right, Capts Sometimes we would fly with a section of A-10As, which was interesting, David McCann, Greg Stankewicz, as they were so slow it was tough just flying in formation with them.’ Michel Gough, Vance Cryer and Steve Some AV-8B OSW sorties were flown from the ship, but frequently the Quintara, and in the front row, from left to right, Capt John Cane, Maj Todd detachment operated from forward bases in Kuwait, namely Ali-Al-Salem Schland, Maj Clyde Woltman and Capt or Ahmed Al Jaber. Harrier II pilots would usually fly one or two Sean Godley (Lt Col Vance Cryer) familiarisation flights over the Kuwait-Iraq border area to become familiar with mission rules and tactics. After that they were assigned OSW missions that could see them sent as far as 250 nautical miles into Iraqi airspace under the control of JTF-SWA, which was then located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. On a typical OSW air patrol, a flight of two or more AV-8Bs would take off from their amphibious assault ship or forward base in Kuwait equipped with two external fuel tanks and a mix of air-toground bombs (typically two Mk 82 500-lb dumb bombs or CBU-89 Gator cluster bombs) and AIM-9M Sidewinder air-to-air 15

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 16 CHAPTER TWO American ground forces remained inKuwait, by 200 aircraft supported began tovoice theiroppositiontoOSWfrom themid-1990s.Although increasingly unpopulartothepointwhere Russian andArabgovernments training nevertheless.’ had noradarforair-to-airoperations, we heldourown inaircombat missions –itwasgreat duty!AlthoughourAV-8B Night Attack aircraft and whendeployed inKuwait, whileatthesametime flyingOSW As previously mentioned,we alsoroutinely trainedwithKAFF/A-18s. there. and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS) inKuwait instructor whilewe were the Middle East,andwere thenvisitedby aMarine Aviation Weapons with theF-15AsofHawaiian AirNational Guard (ANG)enroute to onthewaytoPersianof trainingsorties Gulf. We gotsomegoodtraining asACTIs certified so wealot (WTIs), flew andweapons tacticsinstructors [ACTI].combat tacticsinstructor We hadfourpilotsworking towards being manage thistraining.Being the“old guy” inthedetachment,I was also the air out.AstheOIClead,it wasmyjobto syllabus thatwe neededtocarry was targetrecognition andintelforCENTCOM onground positions. three-ship whenthejetswere missioninOSW available. Our primary mainly senttwo-shipflightsintoIraq, andwetheoccasional alsoflew with tankerswhenaloft. We never gottodrop anyweapons. The unit around, Basra. This wassoclosetoourbasethatwe didnothave todeal OSW missions. KAF F/A-18brothers, sowe didalotofair-to-airtrainingaswell as flexibility ofshore-based operations. We were co-locatedwithour we tookwhatwebetter shapethanourairfield, couldgetaswe neededthe Ali-Al-Salem airbaseinsouthernKuwait. Althoughthatfacilitywasinfar Essex. were locatedatThe A-10sandotherUSAFassetsin-country of ourOSWoperationsfrom Ahmed AlJaber afterdisembarking from the dozen OSWmissions. We alsoexercised withtheKAF. We conductedall 11th MEU-SOCdeployment aboard USSEssex (LHD-2).He remarked; officer-in-charge (OIC)of ofHMM-166’sVMA-211 Detachment Aaspart (NAG) landingontheship. foravertical before thelongflightbacktoKuwait ortheNorthern ArabianGulf flight Harrier IIpilotswouldagainmeetrefuelling tankersforatop-off excellent footageofIraqi targetsandpointsofinterest. On thereturn magnification powerprovided oftheARBSandHUDvideoimagery Harrier IIhasavideorecording system,andthesix-times The by missilesorAAA,makinglifealittlemore interesting forthepilots. routine, butoccasionallytheflightswere engagedby radarsorfired upon which includednumerous active airdefencesites.Most were OSWsorties or airinterdiction withotherCoalitionaircraft. missioninconcert KC-10 orRAF Tristar or VC10) andfillup, before theirpatrol starting rendezvous withanaerialtanker(USNavy S-3B,USAFKC-135 or missiles forself-defence.AftertakeofftheHarrier IIpilotswould Even withtheUNmandate,US-ledoperationsagainst Iraq became ‘We specificgoal-orientedtrainingbothontheship focusedonvery ‘Aside from ourOSWcommitments,we alsohadaspecifictraining ‘Our AOR wastypicallyalongtheKuwait-Iraq border upto,and ‘We leftSan Diego inOctoberseveral 1996andtwomonthslaterflew In 1996-97,ColClyde Woltman (ret.), whowasthenamajor, was Many Harrier IIOSWmissionswere flown over theBasra area ofIraq, © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com OPERATION in the Arabian Gulf region, after 1996 the latter could not fly from Saudi Arabian air bases. The French withdrew all of their aircraft

from OSW operations in 1997. SOUTHERN WATCH Undeterred, the US government remained committed to enforcing the southern No-Fly Zone. During the periods when combat activity in the region intensified, following the foiled assassination attempt on former President George H W Bush during a visit to Kuwait in June 1993 or Operation Desert Strike in September 1996, for VMA-211 returned to OSW duties in example, precision strikes were performed by ship- and air-launched early 1998 when Detachment A went Tomahawk cruise missiles, rather than manned aircraft. Despite the ashore to Ali-Al-Salem from USS Tarawa (LHA-1) while the rest of 11th Clinton administration’s preference for unmanned strikes on air defence MEU-SOC/HMM-268 exercised in targets in Iraq, the US Navy continued to regularly deploy aircraft carriers Kuwait. In this photograph, taken and amphibious-ready groups into the NAG, and these forces were on 29 March 1998, a detachment maintainer has borrowed a USAF assigned ongoing OSW operations. missile-loading tractor to transport In early 1998 VMA-513’s Detachment A, led by Maj Dale Willey, four AIM-9M Sidewinders out became the first AV-8B unit to be trained up in the use of then new third to the VMA-211 dispersal area generation NVGs for shipboard takeoffs and landings prior to deploying (US Marine Corps) operationally later that year. Previously, a pilot would take off unaided at night, climb above 3000 ft and then don the goggles. Similar ‘doffing’ occurred upon recovery to the ship, and prior to penetration for an Instrument Flight Rules approach. The NVGs greatly enhanced safety around the boat, speed of launch, formation join ups and recovery. This NVG launch and recovery capability would subsequently become crucial for ambitious ‘Harrier Carrier’ night deck-cycles during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, allowing for greatly increased sortie throughput during the hours of darkness. The 15th MEU-SOC embarked in Essex left San Diego on 22 June 1998 for a six-month deployment. By 20 September the vessel was operating off Kuwait, the AV-8B Night Attack jets of VMA-513 Detachment A flying OSW missions in concert with US Navy F/A-18Cs and F-14Ds from Carrier Air Wing 14, aboard USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72). Harrier II pilots also flew CAS training missions over bombing ranges in Kuwait from Ali-Al-Salem air base. In mid November Essex and 15th MEU-SOC departed the NAG and returned to San Diego. Amongst the pilots assigned to VMA-513 Detachment A was then Capt (now Lt Col) Marcus Annibale, who recalled; ‘This was my second back-to-back deployment with the 15th MEU-SOC, and I was eager to prove my newly earned flight-leadership qualifications. I remember getting the chance to lead a division of four Harrier IIs over Iraq on an OSW on my birthday. These missions were considered combat, and they were a bit of a “cat-and-mouse” game – more like a “cat-and-rat” game, where we played the “Big Cat” and Saddam’s SAM operators and AAA gunners were the “Rats” that would bite your tail with a SAM up your tail-pipe if you got complacent over the No-Fly Zone. 17

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 18 CHAPTER TWO exercised withassetsfrom the United ArabEmirates andKuwait. We transit totheMiddle East.Once intheArabianGulf theMEU-SOC II unitsbefore us,we trainedwiththeHawaiian ANGF-15s duringour our AV-8Bs were stillnon-precision employment assets. Quick capability, however, andGPShadjustbeenphasedin. Nevertheless, Night Attack aircraft hadbeenfittedwithARC-210 radioswithHave and radar-equippedjetswere stillbeingintroduced intothefleet.Our also hadthegun. There was notargetingpodtoensure precision strikes, in dive attackoperationsusingtheARBS,oremploy IRMavericks. We different aeroplane. We couldonlydeliver Mk80seriesunguidedbombs disaster relief orairassaults,providing overwatch, radiorelay etc. in theevent ofevacuations, helicopterescort with CAS,we alsoundertook thebattalion missionwithintheMEU-SOCwastosupport our primary We had sixAV-8B Night Attack aeroplanes, allwiththeARBS.Although in USSBoxer Detachment AassignedtoHMM-364 andthe13thMEU-SOCembarked missions duringtheearlystageofhiscareer flyingtheaircraft; final photounlessIpointeditout.It wasagreat forsure!’ birthday for thecamerachompingonacigar, althoughitwastoughtoseeinthe we formedupforaparadeformation photo-op. Ifondlyremember posing tanking. Prior toreturning to“mother” –Essex mission, –onmybirthday climbed andcrossed back“feet-wet” outtotheGulf forsome post-mission any “buggery” ontheground by theIraqis. Afterrejoining off-target,we out on ourtapesforintelligencedebriefs,confirmingtargetsandsorting dusty andpoorthevisibilitycouldbe. outourindividuallyassignedtargetsets.Istillremember to sort how humid, Trackers andtheseekerheadinIRMavericks –tohave alongstare time point, allowing ourthenrelatively poorsensors–nosecameras,Dual Mode AGM-65F IRMavericks. We executed aramp-down profile from anaction- jets were armedwithCBU-99 clusterbombs,AIM-9MSidewinders and were Iraqi Republican Guard andour barracks,armour andheadquarters, switches remained by JTF-SWA. offunlessdirected otherwise Our “targets” ofBasra.headed forourassignedtargetsnorth Of courseourMaster Arm as anair-to-airmissileloadout. VFA-115] were loadedwithLGBs, aswell while F/A-18s[from VFA-25, VFA-113 and sweeping outthehigh-blocksbefore us Iraq. The F-14 Tomcats [of VF-31] were ingressed across theshoreline “feet-dry” for formation” separatedby altitudeblocksand always achallenge–we formeda“gorilla- and commschecksonoursecure radios– Abraham Lincoln centred onthecarrierairwingaboard ‘We sailedfrom San Diego inDecember 1998,andlikeotherHarrier ‘Back then, duringmyearlytourswiththeHarrier II,itwasatotally ‘On myfirsttourwith ofthesquadron’sVMA-214, Iwaspart Lt ColJoseph Williams wasanotherAV-8B pilottocompleteOSW toourpatrolling‘Equally andpresence important wascapturingimagery ‘Our Harrier IIs formedanarmthat ‘We were ofalargestrikepackage part (LHD-4)from December 1998through toJune 1999. . Afterpre-mission tanking © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Storm (LtColMarcus Annibale destroyed during Operation The bridge inthebackground was ‘Det A’ hadcomeashore from LHD-2. from Ali-Al-Salem, sixHarrier IIsof mission inOctober 1998. Flying sortie inpreparation for anOSW Detachment A undertakes atraining Capt Jay Schnelle of VMA-513 Desert )

OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH

Capt Kelly Ramshur receives fuel went to Ali-Al-Salem and operated alongside KAF Hornets, some of from an S-3B Viking of VS-35, which were flown by ex-Marine Corps pilots. HMS Invincible was also operating from USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) in the NAG, during an OSW in the region at the time supporting OSW, so we flew our jets aboard the mission in late 1998. VMA-513 ‘Det vessel and trained with 800 Naval Air Squadron, which was equipped A’ provided aircraft for large strike with Sea Harrier FA 2s. We enjoyed a lot of good training exercises with packages that CVW-14, embarked different countries and services during that deployment.’ in CVN-72, sent into the No-Fly Zone on a near-daily basis. Interestingly, No-Fly Zone enforcement sorties, including AV-8B missions, continued, the S-3 is armed with an AGM-84E and between January 1999 and March 2003 Iraqi air defence sites tracked Harpoon anti-ship missile. Vikings and fired on US and British aircraft more than 1500 times. On a number of in the NAG typically carried out two roles in a single mission – sea-search occasions following the four-day Operation Desert Fox offensive in for vessels carrying contraband into December 1998, which was ostensibly aimed at curbing Iraq’s ability to the Iraqi port of Basra and aerial produce weapons of mass destruction following the expulsion of the UN refuelling for OSW strike package jets weapons inspection team, Coalition jets fired back with AGM-88 High-speed (Lt Col Marcus Annibale) Anti-Radiation Missiles. Air defence positions and communications nodes within the southern No-Fly Zone, were also regularly bombed. These armed confrontations continued until early 2003, with Iraqi defences downing a number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) but no manned aircraft. In the spring of 2002, with the Taleban regime removed from power in Afghanistan following Operation Enduring Freedom, the US and British governments turned their attention to Iraq once again. This time President George W Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair decided that permanent regime change was necessary following reports, which ultimately proved to be erroneous, that Saddam was developing weapons of mass destruction. From the autumn of that year units began to move into position for an invasion in early 2003. Prior to this, between July 2002 and 19 March 2003, US and British units in-theatre stepped up their operational tempo and flew some 8600 sorties over Iraq and conducted hundreds of air strikes on targets in the No-Fly Zone. Iraqi air defence sites bore the brunt of this pre-war offensive, Coalition aircraft striking at known anti-aircraft artillery, missile and command-and-control positions that were seen to pose a threat to the ground invasion. CENTCOM, commanded by Gen Tommy R Franks, had been working on an Iraq assault plan since early 2002. Initially, it called for drives toward Baghdad from Turkey in the north and Kuwait in the south, the invasion involving 250,000 US Army, Marine Corps and British troops supported by heavy air power. A key component of this force were the 70,000 Marines assigned to I MEF, which was composed of the 1st Marine Division (three regimental combat teams), the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) and supporting units. 19

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 20 CHAPTER TWO Intelligence), airdefenceandsupport. MACG-38 with‘C3I’(Command,Control, Communicationsand with helicopters(CH-53s,CH-46s,AH-1WsandUH-1Ns) and logisticssquadrons, MAG-16, MAG-29, MAG-37 andMAG-39 Marine LogisticsSquadron 13,MAG-11 withF/A-18s,EA-6Bs,C-130s MAG-13 (ledby ColMark Savarese) withfive AV-8B squadrons and operating bases (FOBs).Majorforward 3rd MAW elementsincluded at Ali-Al-Salem, AhmedAlJaber and15othersites,includingships CO of3rd MAW. The wing’s 451 aircraft and15,451Marines were based air (TACAIR) forOIF. support 13. The ship-basedAV-8Bs madeupnearlyhalfof3rd MAW’s tactical assault vessels, theseaircraft beingassignedtoMarine AirGroup (MAG) VMA-223, VMA-311 and VMA-542) were deployed ontheamphibious helicopter carrier. was alsocommittedtoOIF, butthevessel operatedexclusively asa San Diego fortheArabianGulf on6January 2003.USSSaipan (LHA-2) and 15thMEU-SOC,aboard USSTarawa from (LHA-2),departed embarked inUSS (LHD-3) restructured ofOIF. foroperationsinsupport 24thMEU-SOC, Bataan (LHD-5),USSBonhommeRichard (LHD-6)andUSSKearsarge Once thetroops hadbeenoffloadedinKuwait, AV-8B units aboard USS inJanuary USports 2003. departing ships, whichstarted amphibious vessels and11maritimepre-positioned refused toallow UStroops intoitscountry. abandoned, however, whenthe Turkish government secured areas around Basra. This planwaseventually forces advanced, whiletheBritish 1stArmoured Division and 2ndMEB(Task Force South) wouldtakeover as Kuwait onaneasternroute. The 101stAirborneDivision route andthe1stMarine Division from todrive north fromdrive Kuwait north toward Baghdad onawestern to attacksouthfrom Turkey, the3rd Division Infantry to Marine Corpsairassetswere underthecontrol ofMaj Gen James FAmos, Elements from fourMarine CorpsHarrier IIsquadrons (VMA-211, The Marine Corps’ move towarinvolved 20 The plancalledfortheUSArmy’s Division 4thInfantry Nassau (LHA-4),wasalready deployed totheregion, © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com ( to this one, andtheMarines loved it!’ on them–we addedasharksmouth so allthejetshadeyes painted Eyes” the “Evil attached to HMM-163, alsoknow as marked like thisin “Det A” nose. Ithinkitwas theonlymachine Harrier hadasharksmouth onits drop tanksand AIM-9s. This particular mission load-outonthejet–CBUs, OSW. You canalsoseeatypicalOSW “in thecontainer” [No-FlyZone]for cockpit ofthejetdenoted amission ‘The camels painted beneaththe Lt ColMarcus Annibale explained, background to thisphotograph, now paint scheme onthejetin Commenting ontheunique Willey andCaptJames Schnelle. Capt Kelly Ramshur, MajDale to right, are MajSteven Dunkin, John Rahe. Squatting, from left Jim Murphy, James Hurd and Carnesi andCaptsMarcus Annibale, left to right, standing, Maj Thomas ‘Det A’ in1998-99. They are, from A group shotofpilotsfrom VMA-513 and USSBoxer (LHD-4)(USNavy ) Richard (LHD-6), USSBataan (LHD-5) from top to bottom, USSBonhomme The remaining trio ofvessels are, side andUSSSaipan(LHA-2) to port. Kearsarge (LHD-3)off itsstarboard is USSTarawa NAG in April 2003. Leadingthevessels specially arranged photo-call inthe in history was captured during a of operations, thisuniquemoment ships hadsailedinthesamearea that sixlarge-deck amphibiousassault Task Force 51. Marking the firsttime assault ships, which together formed operated from theseamphibious provide support for IMEFinOIF Corps’ TACAIR assetsassigned to More than40percentoftheMarine Lt Col Marcus Annibale) (LHA-1), withUSS , whilstaboard Tarawa . We were were . We , OIF I – VMA-214 21 www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing Osprey ©

n addition to the 60 Harrier IIs deployed aboard amphibious ships, 16 amphibious aboard deployed IIs to the 60 Harrier n addition to sent supportVMA-214 (and were personnel) from AV-8Bs in 1942 as established First 2003. air base in February Ahmed Al Jaber The squadron was led to Kuwait by Lt Col Robert Claypool, who had Lt Col Robert by was led to Kuwait The squadron was some There good idea war was coming soon. pretty had a ‘We into trying can imagine the scramble that went to get all the pilots, ‘You From waves. in two to MCAS Cherry Point Yuma flew MCAS from ‘We They were than 60 OSW missions. flew we more in-theatre ‘Once had a couple of missions receive We night. flew day and by by ‘We II VMA-214 Harrier in a of the pilots who flewOne to Ahmed Al Jaber us the which made able to take 16 radar-equipped aircraft, were ‘We Marine Fighter Squadron 214, the famous ‘Black Sheep’ associated with Sheep’ 214, the famous ‘Black Squadron Fighter Marine and the F4U Corsair was Boyington ‘Pappy’ Gregory 2 ace Maj War World 1989. in late aircraft Attack Night the first unit to convert to the AV-8B 2002; VMA-214 in September assumed command of go since at the time I had a squadron would we discussion about whether which had maintainers, and 80 Marine nine pilots minus six aeroplanes, in support of 31st MEU-SOC. in Japan, to Iwakuni, been deployed colonel [Col Savarese] Our Yuma. at MCAS us with ten aircraft This left We was trying on the boats. and who to have to decide who to put ashore he decided that at sea. However, expected to be one of the two squadrons VMA-311] would give [VMA-211 and Yuma at MCAS the full squadrons VMA-214 to me, and that pilots and 48 troops three up six aeroplanes, 2003, this news 8 January on received We ashore. would be the full squadron date. which was just 30 days prior to our deploy to mention the acceptance not new guys, mission ready, including the three of six new additional Marines. jets and 48 in landing USAF KC-10s, by supported the Atlantic across were we there 2003. on 16 February at Ahmed Al Jaber arrived eventually We Spain. Rota, heading into the to be combat flights, with all aeroplanes considered and laser- being armed with two AIM-9L/M Sidewinders Zone No-Fly [ECM] countermeasures electronic as a defensive guided bombs, as well two fuel [chaff and flares], pod, a full complement of 180 expendables only had eight Litening II pods, tanks and a Litening targeting pod. As we or two 500-lb armed with a 1000-lb LGB lacked a pod were that aircraft II. Harrier up with a “podded” and paired LGBs indications of SAM activity and pilots reported seeing ineffective AAA.’ Maples; William was Capt was equipped II unit committed to the campaign that only Harrier with these machines deployed The squadron jets. with AV-8B+ entirely When radar control. lacked positive principally because Ahmed Al Jaber did on a near-daily basis as we of other aircraft, flying among hundreds it was critical to be able to look at the radar when in once in-theatre, – particularly ahead of you at air-to-air mode and see what was out there night or in bad weather.

OIF I – VMA-214 – I OIF I 22 CHAPTER THREE Operation air preparation phasepriortoaground assault,ashadbeenseenin team over aperiodofmanymonths.Initially, theplancalledforanintense of themissionandallowing ustowork ontacticsinpreparation forcombat.’ well by thetimewe deployed, thusstreamlining theadministrative elements Number 1foraself-lase attack”, forexample.Everyone theplaybook knew and standard tacticsintheplaybook,sowe couldsay, “We willuseprofile allow us tofocusontacticsandplanning. We hadbothadministrative stuff on thetimeittooktocover theadministrative aspectsofthe missionand discussed inatypicalpreflight briefandstandardised themsoastocutdown create the“Black Sheep” playbook,whichtook allthetopicswe usually squadron. One ofthethingswe didjust prior toarrivinginIraq wasto deployment, asCaptMaples explained; flying missionsintoIraq thankstothepreparations ithad made priorto but mostofourtimepre-OIF wasspentonISR.’ mission playedendofOSWwe out.At gottodeploy thevery weapons, and multipurposecockpitdisplays,inorder togetafullpicture ofhow a intelligence planning. We wouldrecord thepodimagery, aswell asHUD to helpcreate reports thatwere sentupthechainofcommandforusein at base. The intelguyswouldcollectthetapespost-missionandusethem on 8mmtapesanddebriefintheflightlineintel[intelligence]centre back time weasISRplatforms,since oftenflew couldrecord targetimagery cover twicetheterritory, andwehomeinasection.At usuallyflew that ofthemissionsothatwe could would splitupforthetacticalportion complex withthelargerformation.If there were indeedfourofuswe but occasionallyweasadivisionoffouraircraft flew –thingsbecamemore these were onanhour-by-hour basis,sowe alwayscarriedtheECMpods. a numberofmobileSAMthreats inthearea, andwe were notsure where centreline, plusLGBs. There were AN/ALQ-164 ECMpodonthe outboard stationsandan February-March 2003; number ofOSWmissionsin the earlystagesofOIF.’ site forAV-8Bs inOSWandduring remained turnaround theforward [FARP] from 8April, Ahmed Al Jaber armingandrefuellingforward point Baghdad] asa upandrunning of Numaniyah [60milessoutheast ship-based units.Until we gotAn – we regularly sawAV-8Bs from the to thebasesimplyrefuel andrearm Ahmed AlJaber, in somanyjetsflew The aerial campaign plan for OIF had been created by a multi-service The aerialcampaignplanforOIF hadbeencreated by amulti-service ‘I wasaseniorcaptain,sectionleaderandaviationsafetyofficer for the VMA-214 hadbeenableto‘hittheground running’ whenitcameto ‘Most ofour OSW missionswere by asectionoftwojets, performed ‘We carriedAIM-9Msonthe Capt Maples completeda wasamajorfuelpitat ‘There Desert StormDesert some12years earlier. However, aheightened © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (via Author Map created by Rock Roszak ) OIF I – VMA-214 23 after this Marine Corps aviation was given Marine Corps and Marine protect To the task of providing support for thethe task of providing assault north Marine the 1st by as operations around as well Division, day once OIF an average On Basra. provided MAW had commenced, 3rd II and Hornet 120 to 150 Harrier strike sorties,while about 100 Cobra also attack helicopter sorties were the way for advancing to pave flown These sorties Corps units. Marine Tactical the assigned each day by were Center. Air Operations Army units in the field, a no-bomb given line (unless pilots were to perform a CAS by directions www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing The air tasking orders (ATOs) for USAF, US Navy, Marine Corps, RAF Corps, Marine Navy, US for USAF, (ATOs) orders The air tasking Air Component Forces Combined Moseley, T Michael USAF Lt Gen Iraq, air superiority over The Coalition expected to quickly achieve in 2003 was smaller to that The Coalition air component deployed operational tempo during the final weeks of OSW had seen many of the many of the had seen of OSW the final weeks during tempo operational duly meant This started. even OIF had before targets neutralised planned simultaneously commenced almost assaults on Iraq and ground that the air from troops Iraqi that this would prevent was hoped once OIF started. It much-needed infrastructure. other and destroying wells to oil setting fire assigned to OSW and, (RAAF) units Air Force Australian and Royal Combined Air Operations at the OIF developed were OIF subsequently, Arabia, and distributed air base, in Saudi Sultan at Prince Center (CAOC) to the Mediterranean thousands of miles from across spread to forces in the CAOC. employed were than 70 Marines More Garcia. Diego Hagee Michael Gen with I MEF CO Maj had met Commander (CFACC), the employment regarding an informal agreement in late 2002 to thrash out conflict in Iraq. in any future assets aircraft wing Corps fixed of Marine could be and Prowlers IIs Harrier that Hornets, agreed and Hagee Moseley RAF US Navy, the USAF, from alongside aircraft placed on the daily ATO with the understanding that the primary but of Marine mission and RAAF, sorties was to support I MEF operations. Any excess Aviation for its ATO. to the CFACC support had been fulfilled would be offered Center (DASC) at Ahmed Al Jaber Air Support Direct Corps’ The Marine of operations. area I MEF’s primarywould thus have of air assets over control ongoing surveillance situation using satellites, allowing of the ground with the CAOC These assets would provide and UAVs. manned aircraft imageryup-to-date reconnaissance and post-strike of emerging targets assessments once they had been attacked. were , although in OIF most combat aircraft in Desert Storm employed could munitions. Some equipped with FLIR/laser pods and laser-guided Weapons. Fused Sensor JDAM or CBU-105 new also deliver precision interdiction battlefield air through was to shape the frontline Air power and close air support the advance (BAI/CAS), which helped to accelerate into Iraq. forces of ground Osprey © MAG-13’s command and control command and control MAG-13’s rather OIF I were during relationships diagram as this briefing complicated, VMA-214 squadrons AV-8B illustrates. VMA-211, (land-based in Kuwait), and VMA-542 VMA-311 (on VMA-223, amphibious assault ships) reported subordinate was which MAG-13, to of 3rd the commanding general to ) Hile (Lt Col Mike MAW 24 CHAPTER THREE USAF A-10s provided CASforthesebattles, punishingIraqi forces. USAF A-10s forces thatusedambushtactics.Harrier IIs, Hornets, Cobras and around thecityofAnNasiriyah withtenaciousSaddam Fedayeen irregular anyone gotintheaeroplane.Some jetshad25 mmgunpodsfittedtoo.’ launch. Eachaircraft hadallsixbucketsofchaffandflares checkedbefore our RHAW [radarhomingandwarning]gearhadtowork orwe didnot unaccounted for, sowe alsocarriedtheAN/ALQ-164 jammingpod.All the air-to-airthreat. There were manyRoland andSA-8mobileSAMs things travelling ontheroads. wewithSidewinders At flew for thestart and madelifedifficultforbothairgroundforces. was encounteringincreased resistance. Worsening weather reduced sorties Basra and theMarine Corpswasmoving around AnNasiriyah, where it into Iraq –nearlyhalfwaytoBaghdad. British forces hadsurrounded of thearmy’s 3rd Division Infantry hadpenetratedmore than150miles Corps totheeastandUSArmywest. Within aday, elements towardsand headednorth Baghdad inatwo-pronged attack–theMarine approached Basra whileUSforces moved through theborder defences of IMEFand24assignedby theCFACC. On theground, British troops 259 missionsduringthefirst24hoursofcampaign,235insupport feltthefullweight ofCoalitionairstrikes. 3rdthe country MAW flew additionalmunitionsontheoutboard storescould alsocarry stations. Mk 82/83bombsandclusterwere carried.Land-based Harrier IIs carried. For orstrikesagainstarea helicopterescort targets,generalpurpose concern aboutIraqi withoperations,AIM-9L/Mswere fightersinterfering two GBU-12s andtwoexternalfueltanks.Earlyon,whenthere wasa two externalfueltanksandGBU-16s, whilethesecondjetwasloadedwith none were ever employed. AIM-9L/M air-to-airmissileswere alsocarriedfor self-protection, but Rockeye clusterbombsandAGM-65E/F Maverick missiles. air-to-surface andMk831000lbgeneralpurposebombs,CBU-99/CBU-100 500 lb GBU-16 1000lbLGBs, Mk82 IIs includedGBU-12 500lband employed by Marine CorpsHarrier directed by theDASC. Weapons ashelicopter airassaultescort) reconnaissance, airinterdiction and operations(CAS,armed air targets, dayornight,andother OIF includedattackingsurface could beattacked. boxes, where anyIraqi forces located frequently assignedtopatrol kill Marine Corpsstrikeaircraft were more aheadofadvancing columns. FAC) wasestablishedten miles or On 23March Marine Corpsunitsfoughtaseries of intensebattles ‘We were goingaftertankdivisions,Republican Guard divisionsand Lt ColClaypoolobserved; On 20-21March 2003(Day One ofOIF),Iraqitargetsacross military Typically, oneaircraft inaflightoftwoAV-8Bs carriedaLiteningIIpod, Harrier IImissionassignmentsin © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (Capt C W DelPizzo land-based VMA-214 during OIFI Lt ColRobert Claypool was COof ) OIF I – VMA-214 25 www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing The following day more than 1500 sorties were flown in support of the flown than 1500 sorties were day more The following particularly this period, working VMA-214 was heavily tasked throughout controlled [MAG-13], Air Group to the Harrier reported we ‘Although in many resulting a challenge on 27 March, was still posing Weather SAM launches II pilots had seen plenty of AAA and sporadic Harrier Coalition ground advance, with targets being hit around Baghdad and Baghdad with targets being hit around advance, Coalition ground storms and affected by adversely operations were Air and ground Mosul. in central and southern poor weather despite Yet sand, however. blowing a point 50 miles V Corps reached the lead elements of the US Army’s Iraq, Coalition air units flew some 1400 late on 25 March. south of Baghdad of strikes against the Republican including hundreds sorties that day, positions south of Baghdad. division holding Guard recalled; units as Lt Col Claypool Corps Hornet closely with the Marine a close also had due to our unique geographical location we Col Savarese, by F/A-18D and two its three and with MAG-11 relationship working saw plenty We co-located with us at Ahmed Al Jaber. F/A-18C squadrons, the ships, fly as they would launch from as well, IIs of the sea-based Harrier maintainers as their FOB. Our their missions and then use Ahmed Al Jaber supporting the aircraft, their second mission of the and rearm would refuel the carriers had an Typically, boat. to their and then they would recover day, an hour to get everythingopen deck for about ten hours, having taken ready end of the day to close the deckfor flight operations and another hour at the was our job to fill in the gaps in that It day. – this made for a 12-hour down a ten-hour day.’ to work the Bonhomme Richard allowing coverage, the day conditions improved, the end of Towards sortiesscrubbed. being the 28th US forces intensified. On operations in Iraq and air and ground from V Corps approaching with the US Army’s on Baghdad, converged Infantry The 3rd the southeast. Corps from and the Marine the southwest on 28-30 March their advance slowed Division and the 1st Marine Division and rest. for re-supply becoming increasingly this period, although the latter were throughout as Lt Col Claypool recalled; 30 March by rare However, several misdirected air strikes by A-10s hit Marines of Task Task of A-10s hit Marines air strikes by misdirected several However, caused were attacks on blue’ These ‘blue casualties. causing Tarawa, Force the location of friendly forces. in reporting an error by Osprey © ) Maj Doug Glover Harrier IIs from VMA-513 are parked parked are VMA-513 IIs from Harrier on the brand blast walls between Al Ahmed at new hardstanding F/A-18Cs Behind them are Jaber. from and F/A-18Ds VMFA-251 from ( VMFA(AW)-533 26 CHAPTER THREE prior toOIFcommencing. VMA-214 learnedalotfrom theunit targeting podexperience, and lot ofhigh-timepilotswithextensive JDAM. The 524thwasmannedby a F-16s coulddrop bothLGBs and Litening IIpods. This meantthatthe Block 40 aircraft beingfittedwith appeared tobeinevitable),allofits (six more arrived lateroncehostilities with 12F-16CGsinDecember 2002 Mexico, AFB,New Cannon from toKuwait deployed had FS 524th with theLiteningIIpod. The only unitatAhmedAlJaber equipped ordnance, butwe hadtheLiteningIIpod.’ armed reconnaissance mission. They mighthave hadthefueland exhausted allofourbombsandwere low running onfuelattheendof an A-10 guysrelied ontargetcoordinates thatwe gave themafterwe had they were talkingtoaFAC ontheground. On numerous occasionsthe difficultwiththesensors they hadunless ft, whichmadetheirjobvery to spottheirtargets. The ROE prohibited usfrom flyingbelow 10,000 thejettoldmethattheyreliedbase whoflew onbinocularsinthecockpit effectiveness by itssensors.Indeed, anumberoftheguysItalkedwithon asimilarmission. spot toperform The A-10wasalsolimitedinits speed thantheHarrier II,soittook longerforthejettoflysame had amuchlongerloitertime. ataconsiderablyslowerThe A-10alsoflew super 30mmgun.It thesamekindsofFAC flew missionsaswe did,but capacityofthejet; by theweapons-carrying struck Groupto the332ndAirExpeditionary atthebase.CaptMaples was examples ofwhichwere flown by nofewerthanfive squadrons assigned Ahmed AlJaber. One suchmachinewastheA-10A Thunderbolt II, the otherstrikeaircraft typesthat itshared ramp spacewithat familiarwiththeoperational capabilitiesof VMA-214 hadbecomevery capture ofBasra. Marines initiatedOperation James, whichultimatelyresulted inthe forces inplacesothattheycouldbesurrounded. That samedaytheRoyal surrounding Baghdad. The goalwastocauseattrition andholdthese bulk ofthesefocusedonpoundingmechanisedunitsandartillery not really usethemeffectivelyfrom thosealtitudes.’ reason todoso,andIdecideddownload allgunpodssincewe could pod. Itoldmyguysnottogobelow good 10,000ftunlessthere wasavery after thefirstweek ofthewar, we dropped theSidewinders andDECM ofus. SAMs, couldnotmakeittoouraltitudesandfellwell short Thus, drop abombonit. The rest ofthestuff, likesmallershoulder-launched since we couldfollow themissile’s smoketrailbacktothelaunchsiteand However, VMA-214 wasnotthe A-10hadanimpressive load-outofbombs,IRMavericks‘The andits Having beenin-theatre foralmostsixweeks by theendofMarch, On 30March 3rd MAW againstIraqi 300sorties flew targets,withthe ‘Our guesswasthattheIraqis were choosingnottoexposethemselves © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com up to OIF I( Corps engineersintheweeks leading were hastilyconstructed by Marine dispersal areas for visitingaircraft throughout OIFI. The orange II unitsfor refuelling andrearming extensively by ship-basedHarrier Ahmed Al Jaber, which was used Forward Operating Baseat layout ofthecritically important This detaileddiagram shows the Lt ColMike Hile ) OIF I – VMA-214 27 ‘3rd MAW had its Tactical Air Tactical its had MAW ‘3rd Command Center [TACC] located [TACC] Center Command our operations building’,right next to we ‘so Capt Maples, explained and talked there went frequently [Marine the MAWTS tactics with Tactics and Weapons Aviation instructors that augmentedSquadron] also had a We during OIF. MAW 3rd [Instructor II IPs number of Harrier who flew with us as augmentPilots] in the and they worked aircrew, we So when on the ground. TACC of the fight.had a unique perspective www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing By late March the mission tasking for VMA-214 was beginning to to VMA-214 was beginning the mission tasking for late March By close coordination flew required ‘Early on in the war we a lot of CAS, which or neutralised suppressed ‘With threat the air-to-air and air-to-ground strikes with interdiction on 1 April, flown 1000 sorties than were More of of supportingVMA-214 was assigned the role the rescue 1 April On mission, and we ‘I was assigned to fly a night armed reconnaissance The first section had two sections committed to the operation. ‘We I flew a number of missions with MAWTS IPs, and their experience certainly and IPs, I flew of missions with MAWTS a number my warfighting II’. ability in the Harrier improve me to allowed recalled; change, as Capt Maples on and As the conflict wore a lot of LGBs. employed and we with the FAC, further armed reconnaissance north, carried out more we our guys moved The on the battlefield. in an attempt to find out what was occurring or anticipated was based on the known load-out on our aircraft ordnance the frontlines. to deal with once over expected to have target sets we Lt Col Claypool determined, after talking with his weapons late March, by no longer needed to carryand tactics leads, that we AIM-9s for the air took them We pods for the SAM/AAA threats. or AN/ALQ-164 threat pod was only The AN/ALQ-164 put them back on. off the jets and never The otherwise. unused station, which remained carried on the centreline our fuel burn and reducing drag, thus increasing pod caused more EW of the jet.’ the manoeuvrability also restricted our time on station. It ring south of in a defensive divisions deployed Guard Republican on Iraqi Republican The three again being the primaryBaghdad focus of air strikes. the capital included the Medina around divisions in position Guard to Division Armoured the Al Nida south of the city, Division Armoured city of Al Kut. near the Division Motorised the east and the Baghdad and captured who had been seriously injured Lynch, US Army PFC Jessica seven was ambushed during the battle for Nasiriyah when her supply convoy Scott, who participated in this mission, recalled; Capt Jeffrey days earlier. our had changed TACC that the the word got planning when we were We got rescue. War] of [Prisoner to PoW had been reassigned We mission. altitudes and call signs, about frequencies, TACC the all the details from attempt. participating in the rescue other units that were for as a diversion building in Nasiriyah Party out to strike the Ba’ath went 121, US Army Force Task Operations Special Joint the nighttime raid by Army Rangers and Jumpers, Pararescue Air Force Forces, Special Osprey © The pilot of an AV-8B+ from VMA-214 VMA-214 from AV-8B+ The pilot of an of taxies out at the start Al Jaber at Note 2003. April an OIF mission in 2 War World the name of legendary Maj Gregory ace and unit founder beneath the Boyington ‘Pappy’ has VMA-214 of the aircraft. cockpit of adorning long had a tradition name its jets with Boyington’s ) (Maj Doug Glover 28 CHAPTER THREE again, IgotLitening IIpodfootageofmywingman landing. We later to theroad!” So we went there, and Ilandedfirst.Having thentaken off Maj riskisonme”, Gen Amos replied “The we said,“Yeah, we willgo not seentheroad andremarked thatthere were risksinvolved. When to landonaroad southofBaghdad. Canyou doit?”My wingmanhad section outinthemorning.Maj Gen Amosremarked, “Iwant you guys day hewalkedinandIwasthe middleofabrief. Iusuallyledthefirst into ourready room andwatchvideotapesdrinkcoffeewithus.One billeted rightnextdoortohimatAhmedAlJaber, andhewouldwalk in thefightwhencampaignmoved north. VMA-214 was further recalled thebackground behindoperationsfrom deepinsideIraq; from sitejust90milessouthoftheIraqi aforward capital.LtColClaypool throughout theoperation.’ for us. The LiteningIIpodsonourjetshadbeenhugelyimportant but sadtohearthattheyhadalsofoundalotofdeadbodies. were toldtowatchCNN.It the target. Things went offwithoutahitch,andwe gotthePoW out. We Specter thatwas onstation,andlethimunleashhisweapons systemson planwastomark targetsforanAC-130cluster bombs.Our secondary anyone causedproblems, we wouldtargetthemwiththree LGBs and throughout thehelicopter’s timeontheground. Our planwasthatif pretty brave move. We keptaclosewatchoutforanyenemyactivity CH-53 parking onalawnedarea inthemiddleof thecity. That wasa Nasiriyah, awayfrom thehospital,hadworked,indoors. keepingeveryone attackinthesouthern area ofthat thedistractionofdiversionary data linktotheFAC with Task Force Tarawa. The LiteningIIpodrevealed liked, we couldstillbeclearlyheard by theresidents ofNasiriyah. AAA threat inthearea. Althoughwe couldn’t getaslow aswe wouldhave progressing. We gotdown aslow aswe safelycouldgiven theSAMand beneficial totheirsituationalawareness ofhow theextractionwas that we were lookingatinthecockpit. This inturnproved tobegreatly FAC wasabletoreceive avideodownlink ofthepod-generatedimagery via Pioneer antennaserected by Task Force Tarawa ontheground, our latest version, whichhadavideodata link.Using thePioneer datalink on thehospitalwithourLiteningIItargetingpods–we hadthevery extraction phaseoftheoperation. to goinandcover thecriticalPoW up thesecondsection,andwe were station. My wingmanandImade the tankerthencomebackon pair ofjets,allowing themtogo would comeandrelieve thefirst were beingheld. The secondsection Saddam Hospital, where thePoWs SFOD-D(Delta Force) on 1st ‘Maj determinedthattheHarrier Gen IIshouldremain Amoswasvery As theMarine Corpsadvanced onBaghdad, Harrier IIunitsbeganflying ‘Despite notdropping anyordnance, rewarding thiswasavery mission helicoptertaskedwiththeextractionshowed upontime,the ‘The ‘We wassentviathe setupasearch pattern,andoursensorimagery ‘Our gameplanwastokeepeyes wasgreat toseetheyhadrescued Jessica Lynch, © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (US Marine Corps) on longstretches ofhighway airfields, whileotherswere situated Some madeuseofrecently captured during thefinalstages ofOIFI. FARPs setupsouthofBaghdad running. This was justoneofmany being refuelled ‘hot’, withitsengines Iraq on3 April 2003. The AV-8B+ is and RefuellingPoint (FARP) within Squadron 271ataForward Arming personnel from Marine Wing Support A VMA-214 Harrier IIisrefuelled by OIF I – VMA-214 29 www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing On 2 April the 1st Marine Division engaged elements of the Iraqi the Iraqi engaged elements of Division the 1st Marine 2 April On Infantry elements of the 3rd continued, and on 3 April fighting Heavy at the against US forces launched a counter attack Fedayeen Baghdad of the 2nd Brigade Infantry Division morning the 3rd The following the situation their assault on Basra, completed forces British 6 April, On with armoured made another ‘Thunder Infantry Division The 3rd Run’ was heavy fighting with and there into Baghdad poured American forces Hussein statue of Saddam the pulled down US Marines 9 April, On put four Harrier IIs on the road and filled them with gas. A shortthem with and filled on the road while IIs Harrier put four which an airfield seized Numaniyah, at An troops Coalition later IIs Harrier finally, then C-130s and, initially used as a FARP, helicopters here.’ and rearmed refuelled – we 8 April from 7 and its push north as it continued on Highway Division Baghdad units seized US Army 27. Elsewhere, Highway on River Tigris the toward bridge across a makeshift the city of Karbala and erected around ground and headed for Baghdad. River the Euphrates Airport. International defending Baghdad forces engaged Iraqi Division Republican engaged entrenched Division Marine That same day the 1st continued their forces British units southeast of the capital, while Guard for these attacks, and air support was provided Heavy on Basra. advance and in northern Iraq. Basra Baghdad, around strikes continued interdiction The 1st Marine suffering heavy losses in the process. airport on 4 April, as it Division the Al Nida meanwhile, fought with elements of Division, 6 southeast of Baghdad. pushed up Highway that was dubbed the ‘Thunderconducted a surprise assault on Baghdad infantry main battle tanks and M2 Bradley of M1A1 Abrams dozens Run’, the city the southern suburbs towards racing through fighting vehicles at defences. Moving Iraqi of remaining to test the strength in order centre completely off caught enemy troops to have appeared a fast pace, the force arms and rocket-propelled small from taking heavy fire Eventually guard. caused panic among the the tanks inflicted serious damage and grenades, fought to within 12 Division That same day the 1st Marine defenders. heavily on continuous CAS. relying of Baghdad, miles of the centre officials had fled. government in the city having quickly deteriorated once up southeast of Corps units linked north,Marine US Army and Further constant into the city following Army retreated as the Iraqi Baghdad artillery aircraft, attacks by and tanks. involved and this time the troops on 7 April, Baghdad into vehicles Hussein’s intersections and one of Saddam of several in control remained Airport the runways opened was cleared, International palaces. Baghdad and C-17s and C-130s started and supplies. US Marines flying in troops on into Baghdad. and pressed under fire Bridge Diyala crossed Coalition day. following the and militia units in urban areas Fedayeen Baghdad, home their attacks on targets in and around pressed aircraft and another seriously damaged. in one A-10 being shot down resulting on television and later in live and this image, covered Square, in Firdos regime newspapers worldwide, came to define the defeat of the Ba’athist until of Baghdad areas several fighting continued in Sporadic in Iraq. the final Corps overran as the US Army and Marine into 10 April well conducted Coalition air strikes were Numerous pockets of resistance. the day. throughout Osprey © 30 CHAPTER THREE because itwasthe minaret ofthemosque”. His confusionwasunderstandable. I couldsee”, heexplained, “butIstillthoughtthathadthewrong one over theradiotoconvincehimofthis.“Iwaslooking at thebiggesttower through hisFLIR”. Harrier”, Locherrecalled, “Iaskedhimtotellme what hecouldsee tour asaFAC. and reflected hisexperienceasaMarine aviatoronhissecondcombat brief.with ashort His expeditiouscontrol ofthetwoshipswassavvy, to level thatthing”. He passedthetower’s coordinates toButler, along “All daywe hadbeentakingfire from the tower. IwantedtheHarriers almost sincethebeginningoffight,andLocherwantedthem dead. they hadjustoneLGB andtwoMaverick missiles.Andnot muchfuel”. quick andgoodtoaccomplishwhatneededdoing.“Between themboth Harriers thatbothheandtheywouldhave checkedin,butknew tobe tenaciously carriedontheirfight.Locherwasexcited whenthetwo made upacorneroftheAbu Hanifah Mosque. There, Iraqi fighters it allday”. tohitatower trying –theyhadbeentakingRPGandmachinegunfire from FAC cameupontheradio”, Butler remembered, “and saidthattheywere awake sincethedaybefore, theairfightatpalace.“The wasstillrunning wanted inthetribalhellholethatwasAfghanistan.Locher, whohadbeen Locher’s secondtourofcombat–he’d already seenmore fightingthanhe’d Battalion. Anaviatorwhohadpreviously flown UH-1NHueys, OIFwas Capt Aaron “Sulu” Locher, theFAC assignedtoCharlieCompanyoftheFirst helicopters flyinglow overhead Baghdad whentheywere directed tocontact “Mover 01”flight,hadjustfinishedahigh-cover foragroup of escort from Above –Marine AirCombatOver Iraq; described by formerHornet pilotJay Stout inhisOIFvolume in centralBaghdad, andthenearby Imam Abu Hanifah Mosque were mission over Saddam’s Palace, Azimiyah onthebanksof Tigris River Maj Mark Butler andhiswingmanCapt Tyler Bardo. The detailsoftheir ‘Butler hadthecorrect target,butitstilltookseveral more exchanges ‘“A tallround building”, Butler replied. ‘“After Ipassedthegridcoordinates ofthemosquetower to thelead Iraqis inandaround‘The themosquehadbeensnipingatMarines tower thatLocherwantedhitwasactuallyoneofminarets‘The that ‘Maj Mark “Butts” Butler andhiswingman,Capt Tyler “Hefty” Bardo, Amongst thepilotstoseeactionon10thwere VMA-214’s © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Hammer (Capt C W DelPizzo damage hasto beavoided atallcost in urbansettings, where collateral critically important whenfighting spot thatneededto be struck – troops coulddesignate theexact the assaultonIraqi capital, as CAS weapon for theHarrier IIduring The ‘LMAV’ becamethepreferred downtown Baghdadon10 April 2003. its way north to attack targets in II+ from VMA-214 willsoon beon Jaber-basedHarrierthis AhmedAl Maverick missileundereach wing, Armed withasingle AGM-65E Laser ) OIF I – VMA-214 31 ‘“Do you have time for a practice run?” run?” time for a practice have you ‘“Do wing on his Bardo With was willing. ‘Butler “I told Locher. remembered was flawless”, ‘“It still in was set up for his run. Bardo ‘Butler pilot transmitted, the Harrier ‘“Wings level”, Locher replied. hot”, cleared ‘“You’re let the bomb fall. “Thirty Butler away”. ‘“One Religious centres and other cultural features were were features other cultural and Religious centres This on very to strike only lawful occasions. rare by was being used The minaret them. was one of and so now to launch attacks, enemy combatants target. that made it a valid met the criteria because as he was concerned Locher asked, in close so many friendly troops were there got to get this right”. “We’ve proximity. an attack on and set up for he swung around the tower. this time – and that real him to set back up for me a thirty-I wanted him to give and ten- the radio”. call over second time-to-impact that the jets were formation. Locher checked and toward friendly troops pointed away from the target. had the target indicating that he was in his dive, his bomb. to drop in sight and was prepared www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing ‘“Ten seconds . . .” ‘“Ten the tall structure. ‘There below was a puff of dust on the ground recounted. Locher ‘“That bomb hit exactly at the base of the tower”, wasted no time. the FAC had been for naught. Still, of their work ‘All he could shoot one of the Laser Mavericks so that ‘Hefty’ reset ‘“We display for watched his Maverick Bardo the cockpit of his aircraft ‘In too at the mosque until they were flew the section of Harriers ‘Butler Nothing more. Nothing OIF. throughout This was a common problem it was a dud”. “Unfortunately and told them “I had them set up for another run with their Maverick, of the tower”. to aim for the bottom of the top third “I was starting to get nervous recounted. were – we was carrying”, Butler The two on fuel as well”. and getting low attracting some AAA now, the roof from as Locher and his team watched on the tower dived Harriers of his Litening slewed the crosshairs Butler his aircraft of the palace. Inside that the two Harriers When the display indicated the minaret. pod over “Target the radio to Bardo, the laser and called over in range, he fired were on”. laser’s captured, that Butler tower was locked on to the the indications that the weapon the over call “Wings level” Butler heard He with his laser. was marking was no indication there Still, hot”. “Cleared response, radio, and Locher’s to launch. was ready that the Maverick and out of the dive pulled his aircraft close and had to abort the run. He him out of followed Bardo aborting”. 01’s “‘Mover called out to Locher, seconds”. The Harrier startedThe Harrier a climb back to altitude and a turn away seconds”. the target. from Osprey © Lt Col Robert Claypool (rear) and (rear) Claypool Lt Col Robert up catch William Maples try to Capt the closing with their sleep during II pilots Harrier of OIF I. stages than 1900 the unit flew more from 236,000 lbs of and delivered sorties and February 19 between ordnance flew VMA-214 Initially, 2003. 1 May but as the conflict a day, 30-32 sorties 20-24 to reduced on it was wore ) W DelPizzo (Capt C a day sorties 32 CHAPTER THREE Miraculously, onlyoneMarine waskilled. in combat)beingpresented to98men. Purple Heart (awarded forinjuries sustained sustained heavycasualtiesaswell, withthe Marines ofFirst Battalion Fifth Marines Fedayeen deadranintoseveral hundreds. The next morning.Estimatesof Iraqi and Abu Hanifah Mosque foughtitselfoutby the base.’ were outoffuelandheadedbackforthe into aclimbingturntothesoutheast. They from there anymore”. turned intorubble. We didn’t getshotat smashed exactlyontarget”,entire topofthattower Lochersaid. “The down onthestreet. the minaret athird ofthewayfrom rained thetop. Chunksofmasonry centre thepipper, keepitslewedonthetarget’. He did. The missilestruck from where ithadbeenhungunderneathhisaircraft’s leftwing. stick andsimultaneouslymadethecall“Rifle”. The Maverick rocketed away Butler wasbouncingoffthemosque.He squeezed thetriggeroncontrol “Cleared hot”. Bardo’s missilefinallylockedontothelaserenergythat level”.he calledout“Wings Locherreplied justashehadthree timesearlier. captured thetower inhisFLIRdisplayandfired thelaser. At thesametime on atthismomentintimetohelptheircomradesunderfire. eyebrows”. Regardless, backhomeweren’t theinstructors beingcounted Weapons and Tactics backhomeraisingtheir Instructors [WTIs] row wasjustaskingfortrouble”, heremembered. “Icouldjustseethe risk. “Flying atthesametarget,from thesamedirection, fourtimesina wentmore perfectly”. quickpassifeverything He hewastakinga knew the dive. “It wasmake-or-break time”, Butler said.“We hadtimeforone The battle for Azimiyah PalaceThe battleforAzimiyah andImam ‘Above him,Butler arced thetwoHarriers ‘“I never sawanythingsopretty aswhenthatmissilecameoffand ‘Butler remembered, “Ikeptthinkingtomyself, ‘Don’t fuckthisup, ‘Butler brought thetwojetsaround foronemore attack.Again,he © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (Lt ColRobert Claypool) of choice during theconflict GBU-12 LGBwas theunit’s weapon in OSW/OIFI. The 500-lb served as VMA-214’s scoreboard A sectionofconcrete blast pen wall (Lt ColRobert Claypool ) Ahmed Al Jaber on18 April 2003 of, andon, theCO’s Harrier IIat Pilots from VMA-214 poseinfront OIF I – VMA-214 33 ‘I’m really proud of what the Marines did of what the Marines proud really ‘I’m noise from a takeoff or landing every 15 a takeoff or landing every noise from 15 minutes and ongoing intense operations flew first we long-term fatigue. At created as the conflict and later, 30-32 sorties a day, backed off to 20-24 sorties on, we a wore maintenance team was able to great My day. had to work though we keep this going, even parts to Ahmed Al Jaber. to get spare hard The pace of intense operations and reduced after time. us down sleep wore and got to I MEF fought in all directions here. got to fly in support of and my boys Baghdad, was bombing. It did we did recce, all that – we a privilege to see it, and be a part of it.’ really www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing Kirkuk, a town in the north, fell to Kurdish fighters assisted by Special Special by assisted fighters north, in the to Kurdish fell a town Kirkuk, 2003 with ‘Shock on 19 March had commenced operations Offensive or aircraft vehicles armoured in tanks, the campaign FACs Throughout opposing divisions against the Iraqi directed air strikes were Intense VMA-214 of Sheep’ 2003, the ‘Black until 1 May 19 February From ‘The only surprises I had when looking back just after the fighting had Forces that same day (11 April), and Mosul was occupied by Coalition by was occupied Mosul and April), day (11 that same Forces air support, with heavy rushed 90 Tripoli, Force Task Marine too. troops it days later – three Tikrit of hometown Hussein’s miles north to Saddam under of Iraq with most over, OIF I was 15 April By troops. fell to US Coalition control. 27 days and after in Baghdad, leadership targets strikes on Iraqi and Awe’ cities of of the major in general control were forces of combat Coalition Bush President 1 May, On Tikrit. and Kirkuk Mosul, Basra, Baghdad, activities in Iraq. an end to major combat declared strike efforts, assisted in kill box had often OA-10 such as the F/A-18D or and attack strike aircraft in coordinating always involved and were in increased The demand for CAS units. helicopter CAS for advancing Corps campaign as the US Army and Marine the later stages of the Baghdad. approached and of enemy vehicles in literally hundreds resulting advance, I MEF’s abandoned tanks, forces Iraqi Frequently, other targets being destroyed. personnel carriers (APCs), artilleryarmoured when they and vehicles units of Iraqi the combat effectiveness came under air attack. As a result, way. if its equipment was not damaged in any affected even was adversely the task given also routinely fitted with Litening II pods were IIs Harrier command centres in kill boxes, of attacking point targets such as vehicles detect could effectively and bridges, since pilots flying these aircraft to the pod. tactical targets from medium altitudes thanks and 236,000 lbs of ordnance than 1900 sorties,flew delivered more some of the squadron losses. Lt Col Claypool reviewed zero suffered its time in Kuwait; highlights from maintenance was and how mid-April by were we tired ended was how sleeping in were we know, As you able to sustain such a high ops tempo. out next and they were not insulated or air-conditioned, They were tents. The combination of jet to the runwayoperated 24 hours a day. – and we Osprey © The MAG-13 Harrier IIs of VMA-513 VMA-513 IIs of Harrier The MAG-13 Al Ahmed space at ramp shared types from TACAIR with USAF Jaber Air Expeditionary Group, the 332nd Nos 1(F) and IV(AC) the RAF’s both equipped Sqns (the latter of GR 7s) and Hornets with Harrier photograph, This formation MAG-11. an is led by 2003, April on 30 taken Air National of the Michigan A-10A right A-10’s the To FS. 172nd Guard’s and VMFA-251 from is an F/A-18C whilst GR 7, a No 1(F) Sqn Harrier 524th FS is one of 18 its left to Al Jaber Ahmed that called F-16CGs VMA-214. from AV-8B+ and an home, can be seen Behind the formation Note ramp. TACAIR the MAG-11/13 live carrying are that all of the aircraft ) (Capt Ed Bahret ordnance COLOUR PLATES 34 1 (LHA-5) USS Peleliu 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-268, A, Detachment VMA-311 BuNo 163675 of AV-8B 1996 January Ali-Al-Salem, and 2 USS Essex (LHD-2) MEU-SOC/HMM-166, 11th A, Detachment VMA-211 Bu No 164145 of AV-8B 1997 January Al Jaber, Ahmed and 3 USS Essex (LHD-2) 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-163, A, Detachment VMA-513 BuNo 164121 of AV-8B 1998 October Ali-Al-Salem, and

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 4 USS Boxer 13th MEU-SOC/HMM-364, A, Detachment VMA-214 BuNo 163870 of AV-8B 1999 March-April Gulf, Arabian North (LHD-4), 5 24th MEU-SOC/HMM-263 and I MEF/ATF-E, A’, ‘Det VMA-231 BuNo 165391 of AV-8B 2003 March Gulf, Arabian Northern USS Nassau (LHA-4), 6 2003 April Al Jaber, Ahmed VMA-214, BuNo 165580 of AV-8B 35

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 36 7 (LHD-6), USS Bonhomme Richard I MEF/ATF-W, VMA-211, of BuNo 164119 AV-8B 2003 March Gulf, Arabian Northern 8 Gulf, Arabian North USS Bataan (LHD-5), I MEF/ATF-E, VMA-542, BuNo 165004 of AV-8B 2003 April 9 (LHD-6), USS Bonhomme Richard I MEF/ATF-W, VMA-311, BuNo 165583 of AV-8B April Arabian 2003 Northern Gulf,

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (LHA-1), Northern Arabian Gulf, April 2003 April Gulf, Arabian Northern (LHA-1), 10 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-161 and I MEF/ATF-W, A, Detachment VMA-311 BuNo 164566 of AV-8B USS Tarawa 11 June 2004 Asad, Al VMA-214, BuNo 165429 of AV-8B 12 July 2004 Asad, Al VMA-542, BuNo 164556 of AV-8B 37

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 38 13 USS Essex 31st MEU-SOC/HMM-265, A, Detachment VMA-211 BuNo 165595 of AV-8B 2005 2004February September to Asad, Al (LHD-2) and 14 2005 February Asad, Al VMA-311, BuNo 165397 of AV-8B 15 2005 October Asad, Al VMA-223, BuNo 164562 of AV-8B

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 16 USS Essex 31st MEU-SOC/HMM-265, A, Detachment VMA-211 BuNo 165006 of AV-8B 2006 2005February September to Asad, Al (LHD-2) and 17 2006 April Asad, Al VMA-513, BuNo 165568 of AV-8B 18 December 2006 Asad, Al VMA-211, BuNo 165578 of AV-8B 39

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 40 19 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165, A, Detachment VMA-311 BuNo 165595 of AV-8B 2007 April 2006 to November Asad, Al (LHD-4) and USS Boxer 20 April Al Asad, 2007 BuNo VMA-231, 164570, AV-8B 21 13th MEU-SOC/HMM-163, A, Detachment VMA-513 BuNo 165587 of AV-8B 2007 September June to Asad, Al (LHD-6) and USS Bonhomme Richard

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 22 2007 November Asad, Al VMA-542, BuNo 164567 of AV-8B 23 2008 March Asad, Al VMA-311, BuNo 165570 of AV-8B 24 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165, A, Detachment VMA-311 BuNo 163870 of AV-8B June-July 2008 Gulf, Arabian Northern (LHA-5), USS Peleliu 4141

1 6 The Mk 82 Mod 2 bomb is identifiable by the two yellow This GBU-38(V)2/B JDAM is composed of a Mk 82 Mod 2 bands indicating it is filled with H-6 explosive as opposed to thermally protected 500-lb warhead, KMU-572 guidance kit the Tritonal fill used by the USAF’s Mod 1 bomb, with its single and a DSU-33 radar proximity sensor, which began replacing yellow band. Many Mod 2s were repainted from the late 1980s the Mk 43 target-detecting device from about 2000. The in Light Ghost Grey, making them look similar to the grey GBU-38’s first AV-8B deployment was also with VMA-513 from BLU-111, which has three yellow bands identifying its March 2006, with the first example being expended in combat PBXN-109 explosive fill. This particular Mk 82 features the on 11 May. BSU-33 conical fin and a Mk 43 target-detecting device, which was retired from frontline service in October 2004. 7 AGM-65E Laser Maverick mounted to a LAU-117A(V)2/A launch 2 rail. The ‘LMAV’ became the preferred CAS weapon for the The 1000-lb BLU-110 is the largest warhead employed by the Harrier II in OIF, especially in urban settings, because troops AV-8B. Physically identical to the earlier Mk 83, it differs by being could designate the exact spot that needed to be struck. filled with PBXN-109 explosive, as indicated by the three yellow Originally a Marine Corps-only weapon, the US Navy quickly bands on the nose. This bomb features a conical fin and a adopted the ‘LMAV’, and some were even loaned to the USAF TP M904E4 mechanical nose fuse. The latter was retired in 2011. until it began receiving its own AGM-65E-2s in 2011.

3 8 The GBU-51 LGB can be distinguished from the GBU-12 by the The 150-lb class LAU-10D/A is a thermally protected rocket yellow band aft of the warhead suspension lugs. This identifies launcher that carries four 100-lb class 5-in diameter Zuni rockets the 500-lb warhead as a BLU-126/B thermally protected Low that mount a variety of warhead and fusing combinations. This Collateral Damage Bomb, which differs from the BLU-111 particular launcher is carrying Mk 352 fused Mk 34 Smoke warhead by having only 27 lbs of PBXN-109, instead of the warheads mounted on Mk 71 Mod 1 wraparound fin aircraft normal 236 lbs. For guidance, both the GBU-12 and GBU-51 rockets (WAFAR). Unlike 2.75-in rockets, the Zunis enjoy can be fitted with Raytheon MAU-169 or WCU-10 or Lockheed a reputation for being extremely accurate. Martin MAU-209 kits and an MXU-650 aerofoil group. The GBU-51 became available for combat use in March 2007. 9 The General Electric GAU-12U Equalizer is a 25 mm five-barrel 4 Gatling gun that uses a linkless feed system from a 300-round This 1000-lb GBU-16 LGB is built around the BLU-110 thermally magazine in the Harrier II’s GFK-11/A49E right fuselage pod to protected warhead, as can be seen by the two two-inch wide the 275-lb gun in the GAK-14/A49E-10 left pod (shown here). yellow bands, the first of which is obscured by the guidance The feed system is powered by engine bleed air. The Equalizer section’s adapter collar. Like the GBU-51, for guidance it can be can fire up to 4200 rounds per minute, but is normally fitted with Raytheon MAU-169 or WCU-10 or Lockheed Martin restricted to 3600 rounds per minute, with a muzzle velocity of MAU-209 kits, combined with a MXU-667 aerofoil group. The 3600 ft per second. latter includes not only the tail assembly but the fins that are attached to the guidance section and the adapter collar.

5 This GBU-32(V)2/B JDAM is composed of a Mk 83 Mod 5 thermally protected 1000-lb warhead, KMU-559 guidance kit and a MXU-735 nose plug. The weapon’s first operational deployment with the Harrier II came in March 2006, when VMA-513 replaced VMA-223 at Al Asad. In most cases, the warheads used with the bombs on this page are interchangeable (i.e., Mk 83 and BLU-110, or Mk 82 and BLU-111) without altering the designation of the bomb, the GBU-51 with its BLU-126 being the exception. 43

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 44 CHAPTER FOUR S AND VMA-211 OIF I– VMA-311 aircraft carrier. The shipwasnot really designed toembark twoHarrier II vessel hadneverThis particular previously operatedasanexclusively fixed-wing acompositesquadron of30aircraft –24helicoptersand six Harriers. carrying “Harrier carrier” duringthetripfrom San Diego totheNAG. Savarese andtheMAG-13 staff, todiscusshow toreally maketheshipa opposite numberin VMA-311, LtColMike Hile, aswell asColMark we outtoBonhomme flew and herecalled; flying offNassau, formedAmphibious Task Force East. embarked inBataan, alongwithasix-aircraft detachmentfrom VMA-231, a w ra Ta Harrier IIs, andthesix-aircraft detachmentfrom VMA-311 aboard from VMA-211 and VMA-311, alongwiththestaffofMAG-13. These sustained operations. assault shipstocreate Amphibious Task Forces Eastand West for24-hour is whatallowed ustooperatefrom whatIlikedtocallanattackcarrier.’ unique aeroplane, itcangoanywhere andoperatefrom anywhere, which myself –ittakeseveryone. The beauty oftheHarrier IIisitsflexibility. A from theseamentoprivate firstclasstothecaptainofship launching aircraft. Everyone onthisshiphasownership oftheaeroplane, requirements’. wasechoedbyThis view MAG-13 CO,ColMark Savarese; than ever. We torespond cantailoroursupport todifferent mission amphibiousNavy/Marinenoted atthetime,‘The teamismore flexible mission change,BonhommeRichard’s CO,CaptJon FBerg-Johnsen, to prepare forround-the-clock AV-8B operations. When askedabout this the 3rd Battalion, 1stMarine Division, disembarked, allowing theship unit. With theLHD’s arrival in-theatre, more than1000Marines from while filled toover-capacity. both geographicalandpoliticalreasons, andthosethatwere available were much appreciated in-theatre capabilitysinceairfields were limiteddueto ‘Typically, L-class amphibiousassaultshipsandtheircrews are usedto ‘Our troops boarded theshipinSan Diego on15January 2003,and Lt ColKevin S Vest wasCOof VMA-211 duringitsOIF deployment, Aircraft, personnelwere crews andsupport splitamongtheamphibious ship’s‘The companyplaysanenormousrole inthe“ballet” thatis Bonhomme Richard embarked jetsfrom VMA-211 and VMA-311, Tarawa sailing intheNAG. This Marine CorpsSTOVL strikeforce wasa from forOIF–flew amphibiousassaultships offensive airsupport ome 60AV-8Bs –more than45percentof3rd MAW’s fixed-wing , formedAmphibious Task Force West. VMA-542 and VMA-223, was hometoasix-aeroplane detachment from thelatter Bonhomme Richard asthehomefor22jets served Richard twodayslater. Ithenmetwithmy © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com OIF I – VMA-311 AND VMA-211 45 ‘The this step to achieving first ‘The next step was to actually fly was Woltman Lt Col Clyde squadrons in it. We used our transit We in it. squadrons the bugsto iron the NAG time to and two squadrons the out on how would work company the ship’s take offs and landingstogether on of ordnance. and the loading the aboard goal was to get the jets ship and start flying, allowing everybody to get back into the for both day operational groove a Adopting and night flights. to the approach walk, run” “crawl, got everyone to task at hand, we patterns, fly carrier qualification was vessel day and night, while the so that area Diego still in the San as many sorties as possible so as to the deck personnel to develop allow them to allowed that procedures on the flightdeck, aeroplanes move them in waves, launch and recover them and then go and rearm refuel the time we and do it all again. By we off the coast of Kuwait arrived confident in our abilities pretty were to undertake sustained combat .’ Bonhomme Richard operations from officer during executive MAG-13’s and and he helped Col Savarese OIF, for OIF; prepare COs the squadron www.ospreypublishing.com • as effective as they could be. For example, I had a as they could be. For as effective Richard Publishing ‘We also had to get used to having two Harrier II squadrons embarked embarked II squadrons also had to get used to having two Harrier ‘We with each working were the units together so that they brought ‘We in a vessel that was really designed to have only one aboard. Lt Col Hile Lt Col Hile only one aboard. designed to have was really that in a vessel of each unit and then worked and weaknesses and I looked at the strengths II operations from to make Harrier to combine the two in order out how Bonhomme in experience, so was weak department as Lt Col Hile’s ordnance stronger when it them and my folks ended up running combined we it. However, serviceable flight equipment [helmets, g-suits, masks came to providing so Lt Col Hile’s VMA-311 had eight, maintainers and etc.] I had only three squadron kept our individual maintenance, we In that area. unit controlled achieving the common goal of together towards identities but worked had to do the same things also We up and operating. keeping the aircraft in almost every – other area. Supply Intel, in Operations, trip the entire spent We rather than competing with each other. other, could we got in-theatre so that the minute we ourselves preparing over combat operations. execute we had a divert option ashore if required. had a divert option ashore we Osprey © This briefing graphic, created created graphic, This briefing unit details the VMA-311, by squadrons various of the strength OIF I during MAG-13 assigned to Hile) (Lt Col Mike A mix of AV-8B Night Attack and Attack Night AV-8B A mix of from II+ aircraft Harrier AV-8B sit alongside VMA-211 and VMA-311 of LHD-6 as the a CH-53E on the bow on the eve the NAG heads for carrier IIs embarked The 24 Harrier of OIF I. flew more in Bonhomme Richard the conflict during than 850 sorties ) Gering (Col Brad 46 CHAPTER FOUR reassigned from 15thMEU-SOCto MAG-13 attheendofFebruary. OSW missionstotalling36.4 hours by thetimedetachment was missions ninedayslater. VMA-311 Detachment Ahadcompleted 23 arrived intheNAG on10February flying OSW 2003andstarted proficiency andpractisedtheirtacticswiththeLiteningIIpod.Tarawa towards theNAG Harriertakeoffs andlandingstomaintain IIpilotsflew for theCENTCOM AOR on6January 2003. Whilst LHA-1steamed HMM-161, aboard Detachment A,whichhadjoined15thMEU-SOCanditsaircomponent, totalling81flyinghourspriortoOIFcommencing.’ OSW sorties combatflightsfrom thisdateonwards.to support 58VMA-311 flew commenced on10March, andwe alsousedtheFOBatAhmedAlJaber targets ontheground inIraq Night onthesefirstsorties. OSWmissions Blake flew VMA-311’s firstOSWmissions,thepilotsidentifyingtactical our scheduledOSWmissionthatday. The nextdayMajs Annibaleand expected near-termevents. Due topoorweather, we were notabletofly visited turnaround operationsashore.support On 5March Maj Gen Amos at AhmedAlJaber forthefirsttime–we sent22Marines tothebase oversortie Kuwait on3March, andthefollowing daywe utilisedtheFOB Ahmed AlJaber toreceive OSWin-briefs. itsfirsttraining VMA-311 flew units were briefedonOSWoperations,asherecalled; Lt ColMike Hile andseveral otherseniorpilotsfrom boththeHarrier II firing andseemedtobegivingup, we didnotwanttobombthem.’ units –mightsurrender quicklyoncethefightingbegan.If theywere not troops alongtheborder withKuwait –especially thoseintheartillery once intheAOR, andprepared ofwarinMarch. forthestart ofwhatitcouldseeontheground. geometry We continuedourtraining Litening IIpodanddevelop tactics foritsuseincombatbasedonthe tofamiliarisemyselfwiththe gave meanopportunity These sorties ship’s engines. repairs couldbecarriedoutonthe in Guam byextradayssothat afew were call forced toextendourport the NAG wasnotuneventful aswe Bonhomme Richard . Our passageto of theMAG-13 staffaboard subsequently deployed withtherest ‘Harrier Carrier’ conceptwork”. I I wantyou tohelpmemakethe me, “Clyde, we are goingtowarand postmyCO,Col Savarese,new told workShortly inmy afterIstarted group executive officerforMAG-13. MCAS Yuma, Iwaspickedupas Preceding VMA-311 in-theatre by afulltwoweeks wasitssix-aircraft ‘On theafternoonof26February, we were flown by helicopterto Shortly afterBonhommeRichard arrived intheNAG inlateFebruary, ‘We hadreceived someintelinthefinalweeks ofOSWthat theIraqi ‘As we gotclosertotheAOR, we increased ourlevel offlighttraining. ‘In August 2002, whilst serving at ‘In Augustat 2002,whilstserving Bonhomme Richard andbriefedusontheorder ofbattleand Tarawa San justpriortothevessel departing Diego © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (Col Brad Gering) tally justforward of theintake one-off ‘sharksmouth’ andabomb the aircraft beingadorned witha commander, MajBradford Gering, them was assigned to detachment and RobSchroder. The AV-8B+ behind Matt Parker andMajsDavid Forrest Krippendorf, MajBrad Gering, Capt right, are CaptsDavid Moore andBen Craig Shaffner. Standing, from left to Duane Rivera, Michael Black and row, from left to right, are Capts aboard LHA-1 during OIF. Inthefront Pilots assignedto VMA-311 ‘Det A’ RIGHT into Iraq (MajDougGlover) departed theFOBandflown back tasked withattacking oncehehad potential targets thathewould be procedure, beingupdated on strapped into thejetduring this 2003. The pilotusuallyremained at Ahmed Al Jaber FOBon28March whilst beingrefuelled andrearmed This VMA-311 jetwas photographed OIF I – VMA-311 AND VMA-211 47 on what we on what we As Lt Col Hile mentioned earlier in this in this earlier mentioned Col Hile As Lt ‘The once in-theatre faced we biggest hurdle chapter, when OSW came to an end end to an OSW came when chapter, briefed the ‘Harrier Amos and his staff Gen Maj part units on the play in they would Carrier’ This news posed Coalition victory. ensuring a aboard a challenge to the squadrons something of explained; Vest , as Lt Col Richard Bonhomme fly between could only was the fact that we was 0200 hrs hrs. Bonhomme Richard and 1200 assault ships L-class amphibious one of five whilst the NAG, in IIs operating Harrier Ahmed Al Jaber. VMA-214 flew its jets from TLAM attacks on Baghdad. Shortly after the after the TLAM Shortly Baghdad. attacks on ready VMA-211’s missile strikes I walked into Bonhomme Richard aboard room was the first day of the war to be told know now that I would actually be leading the first section was an It the ship into Iraq! from IIs of Harrier did not drop we though mission, even eventful units This was because the Iraqi any weapons. to be in had been sent to appeared we area in the had been thoroughly We mode”. “capitulation briefed in the lead up to OIF on the strict positive identification criteria in place for this campaign. of OSW Coalition aircraft the final weeks During troops a lot of leaflets telling Iraqi had dropped that if they capitulated they would not be hurt. certain things that they could do with were There their equipment, like put their artillery in travel mode, that would indicate they had capitulated.’ www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing OIF began during the night of 19-20 March 2003 when USAF F-117s OIF began during the night of 19-20 March enemy territoryVest; Lt Col was pilots over of the first One ‘Things the following quickly on the ground started to happen pretty MAG-13 was tasked with organising its squadrons in such a way that they in such was tasked with organising its squadrons MAG-13 0200 hrs to the given were We to I MEF. coverage could supply 24-hour day and both to cover that our pilots would have 1200 hrs slot, which meant two teams – a day team and into the squadron broke night operations. I duly officer, experience. I kept myself and my operations night team – based on schedule so that and two experienced pilots on the daytime Goth, Mike Maj up the less-experienced junior pilots when not flying missions.’ could train we and 40+ Hussein struck at a bunker suspected of housing Saddam (TLAMs) Missiles Land Attack hit key military government and Tomahawk morning Coalition forces The following Baghdad. sites in and around V Corps thrusting the US Army’s into Iraq, major advances initiated three the southwest, from Baghdad towards into Iraq of Kuwait the border across and I MEF heading north southeastern Kuwait from Corps’ the Marine and penetrating southern Iraq Division 1st Armoured Army’s the British immediately IIs, including Harrier Coalition aircraft, heading for Basra. CAS for the and provided commenced strikes on battlefield targets forces. ground advancing Osprey © ) US Navy A Night Attack Harrier II from II from Harrier Attack A Night Bonhomme to returns VMA-211 at the end of a night mission Richard VMA-311 and VMA-211 OIF I. during the 0200 1200 hrs to allocated were meant which I, OIF hrs slot during undertake had to that the squadrons Pilots missions. and night both day and day duly split up into were on their flying based night teams ( experience 48 CHAPTER FOUR through intheintel shopbackatbasepost-mission. but nowhere nearasnicethecolour TV thatwe ranthepodfootage raster-scan, green-image multi-functiondisplays. These were usuallyokay, could prove tobetougheven withthepodasourjetswere fittedwith as directed by theFACs. Sometimes, targetidentification from thecockpit carried GBU-12s orGBU-16s, aswell asthepod,andwent aftertargets day. We didnotintentionallysetouttoflyISR missions –we always nicelyfrom– youmediumaltitude24 hoursa couldseethetargetsvery the FLIRpicture achieved by theLiteningIIpodwasremarkably clear to gettinggoodintelonpotentialtargets. older, lesscapableNite Hawk podwasoftenfoundwantingwhenitcame Marine Corps,astheF/A-18didnothave thiscapabilityatthetime.Its fitted withaLiteningIIpodquicklybecametheweapon ofchoiceforthe advantage oftheLiteningIIpodwhenever possible.Indeed, theHarrier II trips tothetankersinbetween bombingtargetaftertarget. We took operation, initiallyflyingalotofmissionsthatusuallyinvolved multiple inwhatprovedterritory tobeatargetrichenvironment. We rana24/7 Stormexperienced inDesert , despitespendingplentyoftimeover enemy action in1991duringthefreeing ofKuwait, explained; removed thisthreat inOIF, asMAG-13’s LtCol Woltman, whosaw targets from mediumaltitude. The advent oftheLiteningIIpodallbut SAMs in above theSAMandAAAthreat, atmediumaltitude.’ of asuitablyequippedHarrier IIthe abilitytodothisby dayornight, ofthemall.LiteningIIgave thepilot the targetbeingmostimportant dictated weapon engagementparameters, withpositive identificationof targets from mediumaltitude.Stringent ROE requirements inOIF aircraft forstrikesbecauseofitsability topositively identifytactical-size Soon aftercombatoperationsbegan,theHarrier IIbecamethepreferred the LiteningIIpodwastoHarrierII’s missioneffectivenessinOIF; stay motivated tohelptheguysonground’. Marines whentheyare callingforourassistance.It’s notrouble atallto hoursare long,butthemotivation comesfrom the pilot, added,‘The theCoalitioneffort’.support CaptDuane Rivera, thedetachment’s junior Maj Gering toldreporters duringOIF. are working non-stopto ‘They to whatisgoingonrightnow’, ‘Our pilotsare contributinggreatly Marines, ninepilotsandsixAV-8Bs. detachment, whichconsistedof84 member of VMA-311, ledthe Maj Bradford Gering, asenior oftheATO.VMA-311 insupport coordinated through MAG-13 and Tarawa regular flew dailysorties VMA-311 Detachment Aaboard ‘We endedupdoingalotofISR because theaccuracyandfidelityof ‘I personallydonotrecall beingshotatasaggressively asIhad The AV-8B hadsuffered lossestoIraqi AAAandshoulder-launched capabilitiesofthetargetingpodwere immediatelyappreciated.‘The VMA-311 COLtColHile wasquicktorecognise justhow important With thecommencementofOIF, Desert StormDesert because the jet lacked the ability to accurately attack becausethejetlackedabilitytoaccuratelyattack © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com photograph (ColBrad Gering) ‘Det A’ jetare clearly visibleinthis The various markings uniqueto this patrols over Baghdadon1May 2003. Maj Bradford Gering’s Harrier II OIF I – VMA-311 AND VMA-211 49

Richard

Bonhomme ‘The II Litening of the combination pod and well-trained pilots who could who could pilots well-trained pod and a typical bombing gave do buddy a wide range of II formation Harrier days, the old In mission capabilities. would have , you such as in Desert Storm to knock out four to six bombs to drop Litening II pod a target, but with the could use one bomb per you and LGBs a good image of one guy had We tank. on a tank and a GBU-16 who dropped another On flipped it upside down. sent to were IIs occasion Harrier of Baghdad, 100 miles southeast Al Kut, tank battalion. to find an Iraqi found, when Although no tanks were www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing The Al Kut attack was particularly noteworthy, as according to to as according attack was particularly noteworthy, The Al Kut Col Savarese also explained that Al Kut was the scene of another was the scene of another also explained that Al Kut Col Savarese as a few bacon, as well North’s Lt Col Oliver pilots saved of our ‘One II pilots from was one of the Harrier S Blake Peter VMA-311 pilot Maj ‘There tanks, trucks including in had been a lot of targets there, the pod’s mission footage was reviewed by one of the enlisted intel guys one of the enlisted by mission footage was reviewed the pod’s these into a village he spotted tank tracks. Following the ship back aboard multiple tanks hidden among he quickly discovered near Al Kut, the target and went This was brand new marked intel, so we buildings. The accuracy, one at a time. back after sunset and picked the tanks off II/Litening II/LGB of the Harrier capability and effectiveness combination was amazing.’ from IIs of 12 Harrier single wave ‘a Col Savarese, ; Bonhomme Richard from memorable mission for Harrier IIs down and he went broadcaster, News was embedded as a Fox others. He The helicopter didn’t near Al Kut. in a UH-1 with some engine trouble on the Once An Numaniyah. crash, but I think they had to land close to enemy artillery, from fire immediately started they ground receiving had a We mortars the east. or such, with enemy infantry in from moving airborne at the time, and our pilots engaged, taking IIs section of Harrier delaying out the enemy position closest to the helicopter and providing rescue Marine allowing action against the enemy infantry west, moving wasn’t It of there. to get those guys out helicopters into the landing zone was one of the guys in North found out that Oliver until afterwards we of that.’ proud pretty were We that helicopter. who attacked targets in and around Al Kut; Bonhomme Richard and artilleryrevetments the city it met positions, but when I MEF reached done our job properly, had meant that we us this really For little resistance. north.’ rolling opposition ahead of the Marines having softened up Iraqi succeeded in completely destroying the Republican Guard Baghdad Baghdad Guard the Republican succeeded in completely destroying tank battalion, which had been found one and only armoured Division’s after it had been intelligence team hiding in Al Kut, MAG-13’s by returning a Litening II targeting pod on a Harrier on video by captured to push on Al Kut I MEF’s That one mission allowed a sortie.from continue without a pitched battle’. Osprey © ) Black Capt Michael VMA-311 ‘Det A’ pilot Capt Michael pilot Capt Michael A’ ‘Det VMA-311 over this self-portrait took Black Night AV-8B The 2003. April on 4 Iraq jet behind him boasts an Attack bomb tally beneath its impressive ( cockpit 50 CHAPTER FOUR rearming Harrier IIs attheex-IrAF baseatAlNumaniyah, five milessouth from refuelling theboat,andthatwaswhen wefurther started and multiple basingoptionsfortheHarrier II. benefits oftheMarine Corps’ planning and concept of expeditionary their shiporAhmedAlJaber. Such operationsagainunderscored the readiness awaitingthecalltoattacknearby targets,before flyingbackto Here, theirjetswere swiftlyrearmed andrefuelled andthenkepton ship orAhmedAlJaber, strikeatargetandthenlandatoneoftheseFARPs. from theirshipsintheNAG. Often, AV-8B pilots wouldflyfrom their troopsweapons thatallowed andsupport Harrier IIs tooperate400miles section ofhighwaysouthBaghdad –bothwere stocked withfuel, in Iraq, oneatAnNumaniyah (aformerIraqi airbase)andanotheron a back intothefightasquicklypossible.Later, twoFARPs were established refuel andrearm ship-basedjetsbetween missionssothattheycouldget maintainers from the‘Harrier Carriers’ were senttoAhmedAlJaber to with onebomb. This wasusuallyenoughtodestroy atank-sized target.’ with thetargetingpodandLGBs, ifyou couldseeit,you couldhitit was onthetarget,twoGBU-12s were dropped toknockitout.Basically, an SA-6SAM,andlockthemupwiththeLiteningIIpod.Once thelaser and,ononeoccasionnearAlKut, go intotheseareas, locatetanks,artillery had apretty goodideaofwhere lookingfortheenemyonceinIraq. tostart – was,marking thisclearlyonhismaps. Armedwiththisintelligence,he and/orarmour–includingtanksandarmoured personnelcarriers artillery When thepilotwalkedtohisaircraft, hehadageneralideaofwhere the of thesetargetsduringourpre-mission briefingsaboard BonhommeRichard. andarmourinparticular,Iraqi artillery andwe studiedoverhead imagery to engagethem”. We hadextremely detailedinformationonthelocationof controlling agency, “If you canfindanylegitimatetargets,you are cleared missions almostexclusively. We wouldflytoakillbox andbetoldby a neutralising thethreat posedby thewell-equipped Iraqi Army; ‘As ourforces –Marines we aswell hadtofly as Army–headednorth, Lt Col Woltman wasoneofthosepilotswhomadeusetheFARPs; With theAV-8Bs providing toIMEF, criticalsupport asmallgroup of ‘Consequently, unlesswe hadproblems withtheweather, we were ableto ‘For thefirsttwoweeks ofOIF airinterdiction-typeVMA-211 flew Lt Col Vest wasinthevanguard oftheoperationsspecificallyaimedat © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (US Navy) after thefirstfew days ofOIFI this size were employed by Harrier IIs port wing. Relatively few weapons of a 1000-lb GBU-16LGBbeneathits March 2003. This aircraft iscarrying its takeoff run from LHA-1 on25 A VMA-311‘Det A’ AV-8Bcommences OIF I – VMA-311 AND VMA-211 51 ‘Being the XO of MAG-13, I I of MAG-13, the XO ‘Being of Al Kut. We had fuel bladders and bladders had fuel We Kut. of Al site, and at the available ordnance ready sit on the ground pilots could and when CAS as to fly standby 200+ ended up flying We requested. amply sortiesthat facility, from the the flexibility of demonstrating II. Harrier as often as the get to fly quite didn’t administrativejunior pilots due to the When assigned demands of my job. sortie a mission, pilots would in tried We jet was available. whatever up of the two- to optimise the make After highway. traffic along a nearby its position and condition,reporting permission to engage received we it with a single GBU-16 and destroy to the returning On 1000-lb LGB. to assess the damage, and look area for additional targets, I was locked missile launch up and received ground several indications from and expended I manoeuvred threats. chaff in an attempt to defeat the but after a few seconds I radar, indications of a second received at an altitude that were We launch. the range of the smaller was beyond SAM systems that had locked onto the nose to preserve us. I lowered energy and then began a climb to www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing Pilots from VMA-211 and VMA-311 remained in the thick of the action in the thick VMA-311 remained VMA-211 and from Pilots the eastern side of from moving forces ‘Concern was raised again over aircraft sections so that one of the jets would be a radar bird, as the pilot in jets would be a radar bird, sections so that one of the aircraft when it came to locating situational awareness had more the latter aircraft II Night be a Harrier The other machine would targets in poor weather. but sent into Iraq, pods on all of the aircraft tried to have We jet. Attack due to serviceability available not enough issues – our were if there would fit the quickly – we technicians could usually fix them quite than the jet as the latter was a bit lighter Attack Litening II to the Night jets, two of which sometimes sent out a formation of three We AV-8B+. only.’ pods and one LGBs would have Iraqi shot at by very to the they were through end of OIF I. Occasionally the near-constant attacks from from to defend themselves attempting forces heVMA-211 was targeted during a mission of Kaczorowski Capt Brian air. on 8 April; Musser Richard flew with Maj the country and supply lines in central Iraq. to harass Coalition troops with no indication of mass After about ten minutes of searching that was positioned to engage vehicle spotted a revetted we movements, Osprey © ) Lt Col Mike Hile Lt Col Mike Capt Jason Duncan, Sgt Gonzales Sgt Gonzales Duncan, Capt Jason Sgt Harrison technician), (avionics Mike and Lt Col (ordnanceman) An at camera the Hile pose for the evening during FARP Numaniyah Corps The Marine 2003. April of 10 established a FOB at this former the final days IrAF airfield during and rearm and used it to of OIF I, the capture during AV-8Bs refuel of Baghdad ( A section of AV-8B+s from VMA-311 VMA-311 from AV-8B+s A section of The jet closest Iraq. into head north Maj Peter by flown the camera, to with a GBU-12. is armed Blake, Lt with MAG-13’s The second jet, in the cockpit, Woltman Col Clyde II pod a Litening is carrying ) Blake (Lt Col Peter 52 CHAPTER FOUR city. One Marine diddieandtenwere woundedinthisincident, buthad the streets togetfire ofBaghdad from pocketsofresistance trying stillinthe the ground were doingamovement tocontact. They were moving through that theycouldreally putthingsintoperspective, however. The Marines on Marines ontheground. It wasonlyafterreturning to because theyfelthelplessand felttheycouldnothelptheirfellow to killasniper. We are going tohave tofigure outanotherwaytodothis”. friendlies incloseandIcan’t puta500-lbbombinto the sideofaMosque said, “Wait asecond,we cannotusefixed-wing airhere. We have toomany pilots couldheartheMarines callingforhelpontheground. Their officer and anotherwounded,there wasalotofpanicover theradios.My fire, andIhadasectionof VMA-211 jetsoverhead. One Marine waskilled Suchdestruction. rigidROE tous. wasaconstantsource offrustration mandated by 3rd MAW –despitetroops ontheground requesting their could notbemet–especiallywiththe10,000fthard deck restriction Numerous potentialtargetswere outbecause oneorbothcriteria ruled estimate stipulatedby thetheatre commanderwere ofcriticalimportance. didnotcontravene thecollateraldamage ensuring thatitsdestruction directly over thebattlefield.In OIF, positively identifyingthetargetand our brethren ontheground, eitherthrough interdiction missionsorviaCAS missionhastraditionallybeentoprotect Marine attackpilots,ourprimary a departure from thewaywe hadoriginallybeentrainedtoflythejet.As bomb.just asinglesmart From aHarrier IIpilot’s perspective, thiswasquite go outandprecisely identifytargets,andthenclinicallyengagethemwith would lower thepotentialforcollateraldamage. bombing,andifso,deviseawaytoattackitthat the targetwasworth aboard theship. This wouldgive MAG-13 thechancetodecidewhether ofitforreview back to engagethetargetorsimplytakevideoimagery damage issues,hecouldcallthecontrolling agencyandeithergetpermission aboutcollateral pilot wasuncertain to beavoided ifatallpossible.If the all high-riskbuildingsthatneeded schools, hospitalsandmosqueswere collateral damageinanattack– something thatcouldpossiblysuffer make sure itwasnotlocatednear positively IDthetargetandthen before employing ordnance; of positively identifyingtheirtargets throughout OIFontheimportance Vest, repeatedly briefedhispilots the area.’ which itdropped awayandwe left for about12to15seconds,after expend chaff. The missiletracked regain altitude,whilecontinuingto ‘When thepilotscamebacktoshiptheywere shakingtheirheads ‘When ‘On oneoccasionnearamosqueinBaghdad, Marines were takingsniper thingwe brought‘I thinkthemostimportant toOIFwasourability ‘For VMA-211, thetrickwasto Capt Kaczorowski’s CO,LtCol © Osprey Publishing • Bonhomme Richard www.ospreypublishing.com

24 April (CaptMichael Black 2003 ) during apatrol over Baghdadon took thisphotograph ofhiswingman VMA-311 ‘Det A’s’ CaptMichael Black OIF I – VMA-311 AND VMA-211 53 There was a loophole when it it was a loophole when There we put a GBU-12 500-lb LGB into LGB 500-lb a GBU-12 put we injured have could we the mosque have would we and Marines more amount of caused a tremendous to an importantcollateral damage killing many site, possibly religious would We the process. civilians in killed the sniper and potentiallyhave the war in thewon the battle, but lost to speak. people, so of the Iraqi eyes for the concept That was a hard first until theypilots to understand at themselves.’ had experienced it for www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing and its embarked VMA-311/211 team were VMA-311/211 team were and its embarked Bonhomme Richard VMA-311’s, and ten pilots of six aircraft the the end of OIF, By CO of the largest Hile, Lt Col Mike statistics, these impressive Despite the “airfields” success were II’s contributor to the Harrier overlooked ‘An came to the various ROE enforced during OIF. If Marines on the ground on the ground Marines If during OIF. enforced ROE came to the various lifted and limitations were all altitude faced with a deadly threat, were expected to do everything comrades on possible to assist their pilots were ‘This Stout, meant everything short of of Jay the words In the ground. with their 9 mm pistols’. raising the canopy and opening fire II pilots flew on all but ten of these days. for 96 days, and Harrier deployed OSW during the cruiseThirty-two were per cent of the missions flown in support of OIF sorties, 50 per cent were tactical reconnaissance training missions. Overall, 18 per cent were operations and the remaining VMA-311/211 pilots flew 680 sorties for a total of 1230 flying hours. the and April, March operational tempo throughout intensive the Despite 80-85 per cent. the team was between full-mission capable rate for AV-8B 141 271 GBU-16s, GBU-12s, 601 VMA-311/211 delivered OIF, During 49 Mk 83s, ten AGM-65E cluster bombs, Mk 82s, 64 CBU/Rockeye were These weapons rockets. Zuni laser-guided missiles and four Maverick 12 artillery 65 vehicles, with destroying pieces, 25 tanks, eight credited one launchers, one bridge, one SAM site, rocket APCs, 18 buildings, five positions. 15 other defensive and aircraft 183 combat sorties for a had flown in Tarawa A embarked Detachment expended included 57 Weapons total of 337.9 combat flying hours. Maverick, four Mk 82s and an AGM-65E 30 GBU-16s, GBU-12s, in the destruction of 12 artilleryresulting tanks, nine pieces, seven APCs, ten buildings and one aircraft. five vehicles, supporting tactical aviation squadron major combat operations naval to Carriers’ the ‘Harrier felt that the contribution made by during OIF, it deserved;the victory did not get the recognition in Iraq mostly operated – the amphibious assault ships which the aircraft from with “airfield”, carrier is a ready-to-deploy Any aircraft in the NAG. communications links, maintenance, berthing and messing facilities to build an airfield months required of the many Instead inherent. already is only the loading and transit time operations, there TACAIR to support operational – which in this case these bases are to contend with before for combat can be prepared aircraft Additionally, was only six weeks. Osprey © ) served as a served Lt Col Mike Hile Lt Col Mike command centre for MAG-13 during during MAG-13 for command centre OIF I ( Having returned to LHD-6 still armed still armed LHD-6 to returned Having AV-8B this with both GBU-12s, is rolled VMA-311 II+ from Harrier lashing down position for into back April 2003. on 18 on the flightdeck has a small bomb This aircraft beneath the cockpit. tally marked Bonhomme Richard 54 CHAPTER FOUR having limitedperformance.’ vulnerable toSAMsandAAA, STOVL aircraft beingparticularly disproves theearlierreputation of no combatlosses. This also during OIFtheHarrier IIsuffered Marine Corps’ professionalism that the aircraft’s capabilityandtheUS leadership. It testimonyto isfurther commitment by theMarine Corps’ years ofinvestment and inherently sounddesignandto these impressive results isduetoan the Harrier IIwasabletoachieve all Tikrit asthey“secured” Iraq. That downtown Baghdad on theirwayto Corps whomarched through to strikeenemytargets,anditwasbethesoldiersofUSMarine of shipping.Every from Harrier a“Harrier IIsortie Carrier” waslaunched brought moretransported, combatfirepower toOIFthananyothertype theyhelicopters ontheirflightdecksandtheMarine infantrymen US Navy amphibiousassaultships,withthe60Harrier IIs and91 capable towards theendofmajorcombatoperations. supply limitations,thisdropped to aslow as65percentfullmission a readiness rateinthehigh90percentages. However, and duetosupport while theoneHarrier IIsquadron ashore inKuwait arrived in-theatre with capable readiness afterarriving, orquicklyclimbedtothatlevel shortly squadrons afloateithermaintained ahigh80to85percentfullmission operations throughout OIF. The readiness ratesofallfourHarrier II the amphibiousassaultshipsgreatly aidedthesustainmentofflight when tankerswere notavailable. Lastly, themaintenancefacilitiesaboard a “tanker ontheground” tohelpsustainflightoperationsdeepintoIraq a facility noother TACAIR aircraft wasabletouse. This FARP as served campaign, theHarrier IIs utilisedaFARP 60milessouthofBaghdad – were required deepintoIraq. need fortankerassetsuntilmissions Harrier IIs to operatewithoutthe Arabian Gulf, thisallowed deployedforward inthenorthern amphibious assaultgroups were of operation.Also,asthe to “plug andplay” intoanytheatre within theship, andthusare ready communication linksare contained the casein ready them,whichwas tosupport thatmaynotbe flight toanairfield before makingthetrans-world during theirtransit,insteadof ‘With theendofmajorcombatoperationsonecouldarguethatsix ‘With ‘As oftheOIFaerial part Desert ShieldDesert . Vital © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com targets during OIFI(LtColMike Hile were responsible for destroying 483 According to thisgraphic, Harrier IIs as a smallIraqi flag( adorned withabombtally, aswell Gossen. This aircraft hasalsobeen Capts John Havner, Bart Haynes and the aircraft, from left to right, are and Brian Kaczorowski. Sitting on Maj John Thomas andCapts Antolino Lt Cols EdSexton andMike Hile, are Majs John Crane andPeter Blake, Dale. Standing, from left to right, exchange officer) andCapt Arnold Jason Duncan, FtLtSteve Long(RAF Anderson, MajRudy Whalen, Capt from left to right, are CaptScott LHD-6 attheendofOIFI. Kneeling, a squadron photograph aboard The pilotsof VMA-311 posefor Lt ColMike Hile ) ) OIF I – VMA-542, VMA-223 AND VMA-231 55 was chosen as the primary “Harrier Bataan Capt (now Lt Col) Michael Perez, who had who had Perez, Lt Col) Michael Capt (now , Kearsarge aboard sailed to the NAG ‘Having ‘ Carrier” of Amphibious Task Force East because Force Task of Amphibious Carrier” Force East. The 16 jets from VMA-542 aboard VMA-542 aboard from The 16 jets East. Force VMA-223 from ten AV-8Bs joined by were Bataan to flightdeck free leaving Kearsarge’s for OIF, IIs The six Harrier support helicopter operations. . Reporting Nassau aboard VMA-231 remained of of units in the trio MAG-13, up through for responsible East were Force Task Amphibious to 1200 hrs through flying operations from 2200 hrs each day. with year seen combat in OEF the previous (LHD-1), was in USS Wasp VMA-542, embarked one of the pilots assigned to the unit for OIF; checked into the CENTCOM once the vessel all of its jets to VMA-223 cross-decked AOR The unit had a six-jet detachment . Bataan 22nd MEU-SOC with to deploy preparing 2003, (LHD-7) in March Jima USS Iwo aboard to embark available IIs so it only had ten Harrier sailed for the NAG. when the vessel in Kearsarge www.ospreypublishing.com • , which had been on a scheduled deployment to the region to the region , which had been on a scheduled deployment Nassau

Publishing n mid January 2003, Harrier II squadron VMA-542 embarked in in VMA-542 embarked II squadron 2003, Harrier n mid January on the 20th of that Norfolk from vessel and sailed with the Bataan had left VMA-223 onboard, , with Kearsarge days earlier, month. Eight disembarked more more disembarked Bataan late February, by off Kuwait arrived Having than 1500 Marines from Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 2, along with (RCT) Team Combat Regimental from than 1500 Marines pilots and support IIs, Harrier and 220 tons of cargo. 175 vehicles Task shifted among the trio of ships in Amphibious then personnel were the same port bound for the NAG. Once in-theatre they would join up in-theatre Once the same port bound for the NAG. with detachment of AV-8Bs a six-aircraft 2002. LHA-4 had since late August on board. HMM-263) to 24th MEU-SOC’s VMA-231 (assigned from East. Force Task formed Amphibious these vessels NAG, in the Once I Osprey

during a night recovery on a night recovery during

VMA-231 had A’ ‘Det VMA-231 The six jets of been at sea with 24th MEU-SOC/ USS Nassau HMM-263 aboard to months prior five for (LHA-4) The OIF I. their commitment to in this the camera closest to AV-8B+ had the BuNo 165391, photograph, dubious distinction of being the OIF I lost during be II to only Harrier while approaching when it crashed Nassau 1 April 2003. The pilot successfully April 2003. 1 165391 remained and BuNo ejected be it to afloat long enough for ) (US Navy recovered VMA-223 AND AND VMA-223 OIF I – VMA-542, VMA-542, – I OIF 56 CHAPTER FIVE of the units in forward positions theunitsinforward of revealed thatalot as theimagery proved tobeusefulCENTCOM, what wasthere. These missions give totheinteltypesconfirm sites, recording relevant targetdata to pods. We went inandlookedatthese – toreconnoitre withourLitening II defences were thoughttobelocated where Iraqi ground forces andother as we were given specifictargets– about twoweeks intotal. committed tothisoperationfor March, and VMA-542 remained Forcemy firstSouthern missionon9 so thattheenemywouldnotknow Iflew whenOIFhadproperly started. dayovernumber ofjetsintotheairevery Iraqi positionsintheNo-Fly Zone became Operation Amphibious Task Force EastcommittedHarrier IIs toOSW. This soon both shipscouldoperatesuccessfullyonawarfooting. usually deployed withjustsixHarrier IIs onboard, we feltconfidentthat daunting numberofAV-8Bs tohave onanamphibiousassaultship, which This leftbothvessels with24aircraft each.Althoughthiswasasomewhat the west coast“Harrier Carrier” BonhommeRichard ofjets. , asitwasshort night orwhere callwasgoingtobe! thenextport mindset where thefocuswasmore onwhatwasshowing nextonmovie with asmuchordnance onthemaspossible,ratherthanhavingapeacetime Carrier” concept,whichsaw TACAIR unitsputtingaircraft into theair that theship’s crew were operationsandthe“Harrier familiarwithwartime flown from thevessel whileitsailedoffthecoastofPakistan. This meant six-aircraft detachment,assignedtoHMM-365 and26thMEU-SOC,had earlyOEFmissionsoverit hadsupported Afghanistanin2002. VMA-223’s ‘We togooduse, putthesesorties ‘Once intheNAG, outtheallocationofaircraft, andhavingsorted ‘Once we arrived onstationintheNAG, we senttwoofouraircraft to Southern ForceSouthern , where thegoalwastoputamassive © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com sailed for theNAG (USNavy) embark inKearsarge whenthevessel it onlyhadten Harrier IIsavailable to Iwo Jima(LHD-7)inMarch 2003, so with 22ndMEU-SOCaboard USS II detachment preparing to deploy to VMA-223 cross-decked allofitsjets checked into theCENTCOM AOR, Virginia sixdays earlier. OnceLHD-3 2003, thevessel having onlydeparted USS An AV-8B+ prepares to landaboard opposing pylon ( wing andaGBU-12LGBonthe Litening IIpodbeneathitsstarboard on 7 April 2003. The jetcarries a LHA-4 atthestart ofanOIFImission accelerates alongtheflightdeck of A VMA-231 ‘Det A’ Harrier II+ Bataan Kearsarge (LHD-3)on3February . The unithadasix-Harrier US Navy) OIF I – VMA-542, VMA-223 AND VMA-231 57 ‘At the start of the war we still start the still war we of the ‘At had deserted, these sites leaving these one of On undefended. did get shot at we missions, however, was though the tracer AAA. Even by home to it brought a few miles away, in a combat indeed were us that we a training and not just flying zone, a bombing range. mission over II pods than had fewer Litening flight were and there aircraft, when limitations for landing carrying GBU- a pod and a 1000-lb could not bring we Since 16 bomb. specialists back home quickly out that the time-of-fall for figured would be and GBU-16 the GBU-12 10,000 ft,less than ten seconds from would be the so the winds at release same all the way to the ground. a GBU-16 when dropping However, in a dive-delivery 25,000 ft, from with 50-knot computed winds at that altitude but surface winds of terminal only ten knots, the bomb’s affected accuracy could be adversely during its 40-second time-of-fall. the large blast radius Fortunately, usually associated with the GBU-16 made up for this modest inaccuracy. www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing ‘Our number one focus once OIF commenced was knocking out Iraqi one focus once OIF commenced was knocking out Iraqi number ‘Our for no wind model figures II had this time pilots flying the Harrier ‘At both the bomb and the pod back aboard because of weight issues relating issues relating because of weight pod back aboard both the bomb and the performance began to when the weather hovering II’s to the Harrier landing. before the GBU-16 sometimes had to drop we warm up, Weapons Air this, so the test pilots at Naval complained about Everyone flights China Lake, in California, flew a series of quick proving Station of the pod and the smaller 500-lb to clear the carriage in their AV-8Bs and this helped out significantly. GBU-12, was worried that artillery – as CENTCOM – either guns or rockets at Coalition mass destruction of weapons such as gas shells could be fired forces against Iranian such weapons fired had frequently Iraq troops. and for, searched actively We in the 1980s. War during the Iran-Iraq attacked, artillery – they both did the or GBU-16s either with GBU-12s agile and could be was more my experience the GBU-12 trick. In size. impact thanks to its smaller just before effectively more manoeuvred been had previously aircraft the high-altitude delivery as the of LGBs, ordnance that would always drop as a CAS machine viewed exclusively deck the implementation of a 10,000 ft hard With or less. 8000 ft from pilots clearly something had to be done to allow for bomb delivery OIF, in Weapons required. that the ROE with the accuracy LGBs to deliver Osprey © so that their pilots could be so that their pilots could was to put to was Force Southern mission on 18 May 2003. The 2003. May mission on 18 The pilot of this Night Attack Harrier Harrier Attack The pilot of this Night is just moments VMA-542 II from away from the signal to being given Southern on an Operation launch Force aim of the of jets into number a massive positions in Iraqi over day air every the No-Fly Zone so that the enemy when OIF had not know would remained VMA-542 started. properly for this operation to committed Both this in total. weeks about two behind it are II and the Harrier aircraft ) with GBU-12s (US Navy armed Two aircraft from VMA-542 taxi VMA-542 from aircraft Two Ahmed at out on an OSW mission jets the 2003, on 5 March Al Jaber from ashore been flown having Bataan fully briefed on the specifics of the fully briefed surface-to-air Patriot MIM-104 flight. can be seen behind missile batteries ) Corps US Marine ( the aircraft 58 CHAPTER FIVE this three timesononeday–before goingbacktotheship. would cycle through AhmedAlJaber timesaday–Irecall afew doing “Harrier Carriers” intheNAG ships.During theinitialphaseofOIFwe jets ataFARP, alongsideother jetsthatcamethrough thebase from augmentation couldrefuel, rearm anddoanyquickmaintenance ontheir target. It waspretty amazingtoseehow asinglesquadron with land atAhmedAlJaber andrearm andrefuel, before hittinganother tanker andthengoafterasecondtarget.If we neededweapons, we would weapons afterthisinitialattack,we wouldrefuel from aMarine KC-130 would conductamissiondirectly from thecarrier, andifwe stillhad however, flyingCASforthepenetrationby theMarines intoIraq. We through acorridorrightover ourship. The nextnight we went in, tohitSaddam Husseinmissiles trying andIraqi airdefence targetsflew information aboutourtroopsmoving north. team visitedtheship, andtheygave usfeedbackaboutthewarand on theprogress ofthewar. About tendaysintotheconflictaFox News in-theatre. We worked sohard thatoftenwe didnothave agoodgrasp OIF, aswe knew were ourtroops doinggoodwork supporting of this,IwasaddedtoonetheLSOrotations. It was“good” busyduring planningforthenextday’sthen undertake missions.Asidefrom doingall a plannedmission,goflyit,thencomebacktotheship, land,debriefand flight programme whilethelattergot somerest. day, andit was theirjobtoprepare missions fortheguyswhowere onthe created planningteamsmadeupofpilotsnotscheduledtoflythenext time itwastoolatetorepeat thiscycle forthenextday’s events. We quickly themissionandthengoflyit,by which planning, traintoperform were beingtaskedwithwere socomplexthatwe neededtodomore planning forfuture missions. We soonfoundoutthatthemissionswe outonnights,flyingaslate0200hrsandthenworking on started fromother shipflew 0200hrsto1400hrs,sowe splitdaysandnights.I and getsomesleep. Our shipworked from 1400hrsto0200hrs,andthe I hadtowave othersaboard, planandflycombatmissionsthentry lead andthe forthesquadron, soIhadmyhandsfullduringOIF.WTI ‘On thefirstnightofwarwe didnotflybecausemanyofthecruise ‘Following hoursofsleep, afew pilotswouldgetup, briefandpractise ‘On Bataan Iwasoneofthelandingsignalofficers[LSOs], asection © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com range (USNavy) to theaircraft’s somewhatmodest drop tanksbeneaththewingsdue USgallon OIF Iwithoutapairof300 pylon. Harrier IIs were rarely seenin Litening IIpodonthestarboard inner of thisweapon beingoffset by a beneath itsport wing, theweight carrying a 1000-lb GBU-16LGB on 23 March 2003. The aircraft is up ready for takeoff from Bataan this Harrier II+ of VMA-223 islined ‘eyes’ beneathitswindscreen, just aft ofitsradome, aswell as Sporting asmallsetofteeth

OIF I – VMA-542, VMA-223 AND VMA-231 59 ‘As our troops moved north north moved our troops ‘As during weapon favourite ‘My toward Baghdad, it took us almost took us almost it Baghdad, toward fly northan hour to the target to tankersWhen the carrier. from areas the took off from we available, were southern Iraq up over fuelled ship, of the headed. One and then II is that the benefits of the Harrier almost jet can operate from planners soon Mission anywhere. did not need to out that we figured in constant use tankers, which were but could other aircraft, demand by at land at a newly established FARP because it OIF was the GBU-12 versatile. and was simple to employ or in it in a dive can deliver You flight, and it is verylevel nimble – I do some seen the weapon have amazing turns in the final attack was the second favourite phase. My as it is foolproof Laser Maverick, and almost impossible to goof up. just uncage it, the seeker sees You the the laser illumination from targeting pod and you shoot it. www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing ‘It was a point of pride for VMA-542 that its Harrier IIs were the first were IIs VMA-542 that its Harrier a point of pride for was ‘It would we as to be most interesting, allocation in OIF proved ‘Target An Numaniyah. We would take off from the ship, get close to Baghdad to Baghdad get close the ship, off from would take We An Numaniyah. needed our ordnance to see if anyone controllers and check in with the our bombs go and drop would we this was indeed the case, If straight away. after this initial still had weapons we If the ship. and then head back to and go into the CAS stack refuel land at An Numaniyah, would strike, we for an air support request. base at An at the old MiG to land in Iraq Coalition tactical jet aircraft in order had conducted emergency repairs after the Marines Numaniyah to make the airfield functional as a FARP. and it would tell us which the CAOC from on the ship get the daily ATO and is often not that predictable, however, War, to attack. were we kill box Iraqi entered would check in with the DASC as we on most occasions we rather than attack targets for CAS air space, only to be sent to other areas flexible to a more soon moved We assigned kill box. in our previously game plan, as on every single sortie was a change – I never I flew there OIF was a very dynamic, the ATO! I had briefed from box to the kill went very received challenging for us. As you campaign, which proved real-time nearest the out where had to figure for a new you kill box, coordinates could I go on fuel and still hit the target, or did I low tanker was, how the ship for or even Jaber or go back to Ahmed Al need to land and refuel in the cockpit to help us cards had detailed briefing We ordnance? more on our toes. out the best options, but we still had to stay figure Osprey © ) Maj Doug Glover A close-up view of the VMA-542 jets VMA-542 A close-up view of the southern taking on fuel high over for Typically 2003. on 29 March Iraq II is Harrier Attack the Night OIF I, II pod while the a Litening carrying with a GBU-12. is armed AV-8B+ bomb black also have Both aircraft of their engine symbols just forward ) (Maj Doug Glover intakes A section of Harrier IIs from IIs from A section of Harrier up their fuel tanks top VMA-542 VMGR-452 over a KC-130T of from 2003. on 29 March Iraq southern by taken was This photograph seat the back from Capt Doug Glover VMFA(AW)-533 from of an F/A-18D their while he and his pilot waited were AV-8Bs ‘The refuel. to turn and Coordination filling the Strike Reconnaisance [SCAR] role Armed of their Litening the capability due to the ‘During recalled. Glover II pods’, when airborne phases of OIF I, critical in limited were tankers Hercules aircraft Corps only Marine supply, Air [Forward flying SCAR or FAC(A) missions were (Airborne)] Controller the with taking fuel from tasked KC-130Ts’ ( 60 CHAPTER FIVE offensive inOIF. flownCoalition sorties duringtheair nearly eightpercentofthetotal Marine CorpsandRAFcontributed CAS. The Harrier IIs oftheUS strategic targetsordesignated as rest were ofthestrikesorties against Guard andregular army units. The forces, whichincludedRepublican were directed againstIraqi ground cent ofthestrikes(12,000DMPIs) were unguidedbombs.About 60per precision-guided weapons and9251 munitions ofwhich19,948were (DMPIs), delivering 29,900 thattargeted19,900Desiredabout 20,700sorties Mean Points ofImpact fighters orbomberscapableofdelivering weapons. These strikeaircraft flew debris atAnNumaniyah. the site,noHarrier IIengineswere dingedordestroyed by Iraqi gravel or duringOIFI.Despite thehighforeign-objectsorties damagepotentialat forthem. the runway The AlNumaniyah FARP 203Harrier supported there on8April, relying onahovering UH-1Huey helicoptertoilluminate Capt Sam SchoolfieldandMaj Keith Blakely madethefirstnightlandings light wasvisiblethrough nightvision gogglesonly. It wasa‘big blackhole’. An Numaniyah FOBoperatedlightsoutandhadnocovert lighting– by LtColKen M Woodward, were areal attention-getter. The co-located it wassoclosethatfirefights innearby AlKut were visibleatnight.’ poor condition,yet closetotheMarines, –indeed, whoneededairsupport 8000-ft cratered runway, whichhadonlyrecently beenliberated.It wasin takeoffandlandingcapabilityallowedshort ittolandonAnNumaniyah’s needed gasiftheywantedmore thanonepassover thetarget. The jet’s supply. After flyingthe200+milesupfrom theNAG, Harrier IIpilots because asthecampaignprogressed aerialtankerswere increasingly inshort night operationsfrom acarrieror blacked-out FARP couldbedaunting. there wasalwaysthepotentialforenemyground fire andduststorms, while they foundatargetandattackedit.OIFImissionswere challengingbecause troops, butmore frequently theywere vectored toanopenkillbox, where could lastuptofive hours. CASforMarinesThey flew andCoalition and dropped theirordnance inbetween. These were longmissionsthat refuelled goingandcoming,eitherintheairoratAnNumaniyah FARP, operating inthe“bombtruck” role. intoIraq,The pilotsrangedfarnorth aftertheconflicthadcometoanend; OIF Ishortly tankers inlateMay 2003.’ andwe eventuallyhomewiththeaidofcarriers thendeparted, flew squadron offtheshiptoAhmedAlJaber flew andjoined VMA-214. The During OIF, theCoalitionfielded1801aircraft ofwhich1356were Night landings attheAnNumaniyah FARP, whichwascommanded FARP‘The usedduringOIFIatAnNumaniyah proved necessary “Tigers”‘The from flew “Harrier Carriers” throughout thecampaign, VMA-542 pilotCaptJennifer Dolan spokeaboutherunit’s in efforts ‘After togohome,butour theheavyfightingended,unitsstarted © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (US Marine Corps) vehicles during thecampaign destroying 74 tanks andtracked Harrier IIforce was credited with of Al Diwaniyah during OIFI. The litter anIraqi militarycomplexwest Knocked out T-55 MainBattle Tanks OIF I – VMA-542, VMA-223 AND VMA-231 61 Harrier II pilots flying from from flying II pilots Harrier highly effective were ‘I think we Commandant Randolph Pate, Gen dropped more than 122 122 than more dropped Bataan most of which tons of ordnance, 500- and 1000-lb laser-guided were targets were than 470 bombs. More these strikes. As already hit during ship-launched chapter, noted in this hit their targets frequently AV-8Bs – a FARP and then landed at and, in the final Ahmed Al Jaber – to Al Numaniyah of the war, week and then attack and refuel rearm back flying other positions, before underscored This again to their ship. Corps’ the benefits of the Marine concept expeditionary and planning team of had an incredible because we together’, individuals working great explained. ‘Everybody Col Savarese that we 110 per cent to ensure gave had both the equipment and the top had we and I believe readiness, commanders too’. notch squadron 1956 to Corps from of the Marine takeoff and 1959, once said ‘vertical www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing Lt Col Paul Rupp, who served as MAG-13’s operations officer throughout operations officer who served as MAG-13’s Rupp, Lt Col Paul folks in the trusted the ground well by were IIs ‘I think the Harriers pilots flew II 2003), Harrier 24 hours to 13 April OIF (19 March During also modified VMA-214 were A number of Litening II pods used by multiple basing options synonymous with the Harrier II. multiple basing options in the campaign; such a key role played explained why the AV-8B OIF, in effective extremely only was the aircraft of operations. Not theatre tactical They had tremendous efficient. combat, it was also extremely always were IIs meant the Harrier which availability, readiness aircraft in OIF when it came The jet was not used to its full potential to go. ready FOBs, but it takes a lot of support and and logistics to keep to FARPs operational.’ and FOBs FARPs ‘The days a week. seven II is its flexibility’, beauty of the Harrier a day, that can is a unique aeroplane ‘It Savarese. CO Col Mark noted MAG-13 which is why they could fly from anywhere, and operate from go anywhere as I dubbed our amphibious assault ships in OIF. carriers”, our “attack than 2000 sorties flew and 26 days of combat operations, we more During expended more IIs than 3000 combat flying hours. Harrier logged more some 900 dropping in support of I MEF, than 750,000 lbs of ordnance were And thanks to the Litening II pod, pilots 500- and 1000-lb LGBs. a kill rate of 75 per cent with this ordnance’. able to achieve UAVs Pioneer video from and transmit live so that they could both receive imagery to review and identify FACs This enabled ground via a downlink. time. potential targets in real Osprey © crowd the crowd ) Maj Doug Glover (LHD-5) in the NAG (LHD-5) in the NAG class amphibious Wasp Bataan Harrier IIs from Bataan IIs from Harrier Ahmed Al Jaber FOB on the morning on the morning FOB Al Jaber Ahmed refuelled 2003 are as they April of 2 heading back to prior and rearmed in targets more attack to Iraq into northwards drive of I MEF’s support on Baghdad ( on 25 April 2003. Harrier IIs from IIs from Harrier 2003. April on 25 operated VMA-223 and VMA-542 OIF I, during the vessel from and dropping completing 884 sorties 262 LGBs and 128 unguided general targets. bombs on Iraqi purpose Another An AV-8B hovers over the deck of the deck over hovers AV-8B An USS assault ship can be seen in the ) (US Navy background 62 CHAPTER FIVE Division, andthatisexactly whatwe did.’ Mattis andhisMarines of1stMarine it couldbeusedagainstmygood friend Gen equipment theAlNida Division hadbefore My jobwasto destroy pieceof every goodaboutour air-ground team. feel very theMarineto support ontheground. We hold ground. force multiplier, butitcannottakeand –airpowerground truth isanenormous however; notion thatairpower alonecanwinwars, II podshasgiven usamazinggranularity.’ magnification andclarityoftheirLitening jumped inonthisthing,andthe other targets. The Harrier IIs have really role indestroying enemyarmourand AV-8B Harrier IIhasplayed aprominent and theyoperated24hoursaday. The we endedupwithtwo“Harrier Carriers”, them ontwolargeamphibiousships.So concentration ofourHarrier IIs andput the poorweather. We tookasignificant waschallengingdueto hidden artillery from adistance.Findinginfantry the priorities were thingsthatcouldkillour Marinessupport ontheground. Our Leathernecks” ofthe3rd MAW have takentotheair, dayandnight,to fundamental feature forresponsive offensive airsupport’. the aircraft madeduringOIFvalidated STOVL basingflexibilityasa ‘the AV-8B Harrier IIhasfulfilledthosecharacteristics. The contribution capability is,therefore, vitaltoMarine aviation’. According toColSavarese, ofamphibiousoperationsinthefuture.support Obtaining aSTOVL landing characteristicsare anultimaterequirement forallMarine aircraft in ‘At theendofday, Marine Airexists ‘OIF hasbroughttothe everyone Maj Gen Amosshiedawayfrom the ‘Just asMarine aviatorshave doneinprevious conflicts,the“Flying Col Savarese’s boss,Maj Gen James Amos,remarked; © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (US Navy) targets were hitduring thesestrikes 1000-lb bombs. More than470 – primarily laser-guided and 500- more than122tons ofordnance pilots flyingfrom thevessel dropped taken on24 April 2003. Harrier II visible inthisaerial viewoftheship in the ‘Harrier Carrier’ Thirteen ofthe24 AV-8Bs embarked Ahmed Al Jaber (MajDougGlover) he taxiedoutonamissionfrom on themorning of2 April as 2003 photographed by CaptDougGlover foreground) and VMA-542 were These jetsfrom VMA-223 (inthe Bataan are OIF II/III 63 www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing Osprey ©

fter the end of OIF I, Marine Corps units transitioned from from units transitioned Corps of OIF I, Marine fter the end all the summer of 2003 activities. By combat to peacekeeping that was a general perception as there had left Iraq, IIs Harrier

However, widespread looting in many cities and towns plagued Iraq, plagued Iraq, looting in many cities and towns widespread However, a violent insurgency began literally garrisoned Iraq, As Coalition forces Corps regiments consisting of two Marine 2004 I MEF Force, March In I MEF’s concept, task force Corps air-ground the Marine Following killed and their 2004, four American contractors were 31 March On A

fighter aircraft were not needed for the rebuilding and peacekeeping roles roles and peacekeeping not needed for the rebuilding were fighter aircraft gradually of I MEF were Elements planned for the war-weary country. late September 2003 By in Iraq. units arrived withdrawn as other Coalition back to the USA, or on their way home. were most Marines authority factional violence the collapse of government and following the country throughout civil disorder and anarchy Virtual erupted. military of a significant dictated the presence to stabilise the situation force end the By up. and army could be trained police force until a new Iraqi British 12,000 the US Army, than 120,000 soldiers from of 2003, more Spain, Italy, The Netherlands, servicemen and 13,000 troops Poland, from to keep the peace. 25 other nations had been sent to Iraq and Ukraine Hussein the expectation of an American assault, Saddam With to develop. the distribution of arms, ammunition, funds and trained had ordered so that the war in Iraq to all of the major population centres militia forces long after he had been could continue as a guerrilla-type campaign operations gradually expanded (supported Insurgent power. from removed neighbouring countries), with from cells terrorist al-Qaeda infiltrating by and later expanding to the attacks concentrating firstly in central Iraq These attacks disrupted efforts to restore south and north of the country. water and sewage, which in turn normal services such as electricity, popular supportquickly eroded for Coalition efforts at nation rebuilding. operations to take over Iraq to western returned totalling 24,000 troops, which had 82nd Airborne Division, in the country the US Army’s from The Marine in the countryremained after OIF I trying to keep the peace. in the border Iraq-Syria the porous the job of patrolling Corps was given The Fallujah. triangle, which included the city of Sunni and the west very challenging, and they were Iraq found operations in western Marines with insurgents. firefights in many serious involved organised under MAG-16 (Forward), MAW included 3rd deployment which included 130 helicopters and transport – CH-46, control, aircraft CH-53 and UH-1 transport and AH-1W attack helicopters and C-130 transport operations. – to support aircraft Marine Marines , led by Resolve Valiant Operation bodies mutilated in Fallujah. of Fallujah. began four days later with the surrounding I MEF, from of the city had been than a third campaign, more a week-long Following Air support and heavy casualties inflicted on the insurgency. captured AH-1W Cobra attack helicopters, USAF AC-130 by was provided OIF II/III OIF 64 CHAPTER SIX Afghanistan, to support Afghanistan, tosupport Taskforce April 2004,thecarrierhadsentallsixHarrier IIs ashore toKandahar, in deployment withFifth Fleet. ArrivingoffthecoastofPakistan in supplied sixjetsto22ndMEU-SOC’s HMM-266for squadrons thatreceived thecalltodeploy, despitetheunithavingalready 3rd MAW, underMAG-16 control. The VMA-542 wasoneofthe MAG-13support. wasdulyordered tosupplyHarrier IIs toaugment attack helicopters,Marine Corpscommanderscalledforincreased air theirpositions. insurgents tofortify By late2004,manycivilianshadleftthecityof300,000,allowing insurgent stronghold from whichmanyattackswere regularly launched. Iraq andabroad. Over thenextseveral months,Fallujah grew intoan perceived tohave beenafailure duetopoliticalinterference from within been handedover totheinsurgencyby September. eventually theFallujah Brigade wasdissolved andallofitsweapons had calm thesituationdown. Althoughthisinitiallyseemedtowork, Maj Gen Muhammed LatifandarmedwithUSweapons, wassentinto concerns. The 1100-strong Fallujah Brigade, ledby formerIraqi Army civilian deathsinFallujah –theworld’s mediaalsohighlightedthese raised by theinterimIraqi government and aboutthelevel ofdestruction guided munitions. gunships operatingatnightandUSAFF-16sdropping JDAMprecision- department, andthepilots hungouttheredepartment, toget outofthesun. protect themfrom thesun. We hadonebuildingfortheentire maintenance the baseatthattime. We hadaramptopark thejetsonbutnoshadeto the firstunitsdeployed there, sothere was not alotofinfrastructure on was aboutamile-and-a-halffrom thesquadron spaces. We were among after VMA-542. AlAsadwasaustere then,andwe lived inatentcitythat had orders formynextposting whenIdeployed. We reached Iraq just and, finally, foreightweeks asIalready AlAsad.Iwasonlyin-country Point.to MCASCherry From there we headedtoSpain, thenontoQatar VMA-214 duringOIFI; Capt William Maples, whohadflown from AhmedAlJaber with Lt ColMark Everman. Amongstthepilotstodeploy withtheunitwas Harrier IIs from MCAS Yuma-based VMA-214 ‘Black Sheep’, ledby Aviation LogisticsSquadron (MALS) 14. thereafter by themainbodyof185Marines from VMA-542 andMarine Harrier IIs reached homeon18May theirnew 2004,followed shortly western Iraq. Point, Afterflying8400milesfrom MCASCherry the AV-8Bs, stoppinginSpain andQatar enroute toAlAsad airbase,in 13 May atransatlanticcrossing withtenofitsVMA-542 undertook Pointat MCASCherry toloadgroundcrew equipment.On andsupport days theunitwasready USAFandciviliancargoaircraft arriving todepart, again afterreceiving orders on1May 2004todeploy toIraq. Within 12 and hisXO, Lt ColRussell Sanborn, readied the‘Tigers’ forwaronce As insurgentoperationsintensified,testingthecapabilitiesofCobra US forces hadsuffered 27fatalitiesduring However, by 1May combatinthecityhadbeenhaltedduetoconcerns ‘We leftasaten-aeroplane group from MCAS Yuma andinitiallyflew Within daysoftheirarrival the‘Tigers’ were joinedatAlAsadby ten Point,Back atMCASCherry VMA-542’s CO,LtColChester Arnold, Linebacker. © Osprey Publishing Valiant Resolve, whichwas • Wasp’s operational www.ospreypublishing.com OIF II/III 65 www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing ‘Most of our sorties were undertaken by two-jet sections. We flew a mix We undertaken two-jet sections. of our sorties by were ‘Most ‘The in Fallujah on the ground emphasis was on supporting the Marines could in 2004, which meant that we was not so restrictive ‘The ROE ‘It was “bad-guy” land, so there were frequent rocket and occasional and occasional rocket frequent were there land, so “bad-guy” was ‘It of airborne CAS, convoy escort and ISR. It was during our deployment was during our deployment escort and ISR. It of airborne CAS, convoy became the insurgents’ really device [IED] explosive that the improvised to not only seek out on the Litening pod relied We of choice. weapon and in the ground guys planting them, but also to detect disturbances activity – this was a telltale had been recent there where alongside roads sign that an IED had been buried there. had Litening we on a daily basis, and with FACs worked We and Ramadi. not carrying during this were GBU-16s We capability. pods with ROVER with the large 1000-lbperiod due to the collateral damage issues associated and the Laser the smaller 500-lb GBU-12 primary Our were weapons bomb. 25 mm cannon a lot. GAU-12 II’s also used the Harrier and we Maverick, the gun with clinical to employ altitudes in order descend to lower collateral is a very that offers low accurate weapon The GAU-12 accuracy. ID potential targets far can positively altitudes you risk. And at lower dive When making a strafing run, would use a 20-degree we easily. more squadron during daylight hours. Our dives at night and 10- to 30-degree to. refer charts would frequently gun attack profile that we had standard The risk of fratricide and collateral damage was considerably smaller with hung the altitude. And once you the cannon when used at the correct both maintenance and pilot training, through guns on the jets and worked became a weapon fact the GAU-12 system. In to be a reliable it proved during OIF II. of choice for the FACs mortar attacks from outside the base. From takeoff to landing we were were we takeoff to landing mortar the base. From outside attacks from air-defence [Man-portable with an existing MANPADS flying in an area tactics to help defeat the SAMs. At had to develop so we systems] threat, II units, a C-130 squadron that time Al Asad was home to the two Harrier flew in VMFA(AW)-242 helicopter units, and in August and numerous MAW under 3rd were We with 12 F/A-18Ds, so the air base was busy. to MAG-16. assigned control, Osprey © Lt Col Russell Sanborn, CO of Lt Col Russell Sanborn, a KC-130T tanks from VMA-542, of VMGR-452 overhead Lake 2004. on 22 September Tharthar his tanks, off Once he had topped to led his wingman back Sanborn ) Corps (US Marine Fallujah 66 CHAPTER SIX went togreat lengthstointegratethemselves intothegeneralpopulace. moving battleline,thus makingtheenemyhard toidentify–theinsurgents action thanthe‘Harrier Carriers’ hadbeeninOIFI. There wasalsono I. The missionswere asAlAsadwasconsiderablycloser tothe muchshorter to, by dropping bombs’. them. We canmaketheenemyfleeby our presence alone, or, ifwe need enemy doesnotlikefastmovers, astheyknow we willrainmetaldown on in midJune; OIF IIdeployment, andhetoowasquotedina3rd MAW press release it isabsolutelydevastating totheenemy.’ get theMarine ontheground andtheMarine intheairworking together, “air-to-mud” thetroops warriorsby ontheground. supporting When you to comeandhelpthem.In theMarine Aircommunity, we focusonbeing They understandthatourfellow Marines are over here, andthatwe need see usgo,butwe know thisiswhatwe signedupforandwhatourjobis. and thesquadron ready togo. Idon’t thinkourfamilieswere pleasedto Point.to leavingMCASCherry Everyone didagoodjobgettingthemselves quickly. We were prepared very forthis,however, havingtrainedhard prior at AlAsad,Harrier IIpilotCaptChristianRizzostated; littered withthecarcasses ofex-IrAF fighters. numerous Soviet-style concrete bunkersandhardstands. The basewasalso inIraq. airfield Includedlargest military initsvast infrastructure were cratered by CoalitionbombsduringOIFI,asAl Asad wasthesecond IrAF fighterbasewasinpoorshape.Its andtaxiwayshadbeen runways tactics andtechniquesformissionplanningweapons employment.’ not seemuchoftheotherunit.However, there wascross-pollination of the samefor VMA-542. We were onoppositemissioncycles, sowe did schedulesfor the flightandsupport VMA-214, whileLtColSanborn did VMA-542. LtColEverman developed own maintenanceequipment,asdid one another. Indeed, we hadallofour two unitsoperatedindependentlyof administration andmaintenance,the we worked outofthesameareas for whilst Iwasthere in2004.Although and VMA-542 tookthenightshift VMA-214 operatedonthedayshift VMA-542 senttenjetsandsodidwe. coverage forIMEFinthefield,so – No Go” itemforflight. chaff andflares, andtheywere a“Go carried afullloadofexpendables,both MANPADS threat, sowe always Combat operationsinOIFIIwere ratherdifferent tothoseflown inOIF ‘We have great targetingcapabilityfrom adistance,dayandnight. The Capt Philip Kendro wasoneofthepilots assigned to VMA-214 for its ‘It wasahastily arrangeddeployment,happeningvery witheverything In apress release issuedby 3rd MAW after shortly VMA-542 arrived When theHarrier IIunitsarrived atAlAsadinMay 2004theformer ‘3rd MAW wanted24-hour ‘We never discountedthe © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (US Marine Corps) the twinunderfuselage pods and its300-round magazine, in 25 mmfive-barrel Gatlinggun, General Electric GAU-12U Equalizer Harrier IIswere fitted withthe Lake Tharthar.Most AlAsad-based overKC-130T on22September 2004 takes onfuelfrom a VMGR-452 Lt ColSanborn’s wingmanalso OIF II/III 67 , on 8 November. Fajr Al Harrier II pilots flew a variety of missions ranging from ranging of missions II pilots flew a variety Harrier to rotate VMA-214 2004 it came time for August In fixed-wing was to provide mission ‘The squadron’s armed reconnaissance and convoy escort to CAS. When escort to CAS. and convoy reconnaissance armed pilots would escort, AV-8B performingtasked with convoy across snaking for vehicles cover’ ‘high typically provide distinctive II’s Harrier at night – the Al Anbar Province the convoys. to attacks on a deterrent provided engine noise hit-and-runor locating attacks, insurgents’ to the Reaction a mortar or a rocket the point of origin of proved attack, Litening II’s The Harrier OIF II-VI. challenge throughout asset when undertakingII pod was a valuable missions. such the to mark release press MAW home, and in a 3rd remarked; CO Lt Col Everman Sheep’ occasion, ‘Black aerial reconnaissance targeting capabilities, CAS, precision have We and escorts convoys. for helicopters and thanks to personnel adapting accomplished our mission that have of them – roles required to fulfil the roles VMA-214 supported OIF in significantly changed since Although gone well. has the deployment 2003. Overall, www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing ‘Our presence has given the Marines on the ground a boost of of a boost on the ground the Marines given has presence ‘Our (who with Lt Col Sanborn at Al Asad, remained VMA-542, however, in Operation would play a key role VMA-542 REIN (reinforced) we didn’t expend as much ordnance as we did the first time we were here, here, were did the first time we as we expend as much ordnance didn’t we aren’t bombs because we ways besides dropping contributed in other we’ve people. at war with the Iraqi scanning areas by for convoys reconnaissance can provide We confidence. our to know great what to expect. It’s ahead and letting them know at in constant fighting get some sleep had helped some Marines presence which can be enough to of force, might do a show we night. Sometimes, The here. are we know they make sure We is happening. disband whatever risen to in the heat, they have here Out been spectacular. have Marines going to knew were we We every met the challenges. have occasion and for us and we the next MEU is on the horizon until relieved, fill in here contingencies.’ for future preparing are The two unit reinforcements. overseeing 2004) had become CO in June detachment from first of these took the form of the six-aeroplane to which came ashore VMA-214 that was assigned to 11th MEU-SOC, 2004 with the (LHA-3) in September Wood USS Belleau Al Asad from the following occurred The second unit reinforcement of HMM-166. rest II which had been the Harrier VMA-211, from month when six aircraft with HMM-265, in Essex detachment of 31st MEU-SOC embarked the leader of a This last merger made Lt Col Sanborn VMA-542. joined from than 350 Marines supported more force II by Harrier 22-aeroplane two coasts. from squadrons different three Corps/US – an eight-day combined US Marine Fajr or Al Fury Phantom charged with ridding that saw 13,350 troops Army offensive Army/Iraqi had been due to rotate The ‘Tigers’ 4000 insurgents. around of Fallujah received but Lt Col Sanborn in October, back to MCAS Cherry Point at Al Asad in order for the unit to remain CENTCOM permission from to support the start of Osprey © (LHD-2) is seen underway Essex (LHD-2) is seen underway USS in the NAG on 9 September 2004, the 2004, September on 9 in the NAG Fleet Fifth being assigned to vessel CENTCOM operations support to had At this time the carrier in Iraq. 31st MEU-SOC/HMM-265 embarked, IIs including six Harrier the latter These Detachment VMA-211 A. from Asad Al to ashore went aircraft was this photograph after shortly of a becoming part A’ ‘Det taken, commanded II force Harrier 22-strong ) (US Navy Lt Col Russell Sanborn by 68 CHAPTER SIX for more thanaweek thankstothe hard work anddedicationof our aircraft thatare sharing thelimitedairspaceover thecitywithyou. you are allottedso as nottointerfere withattacksbeingmadeby other environment, closetoMarines engagingtheenemy, time withintheshort airspace. You have tobeable tofindthespecifictargetinurban around Fallujah challenging becauseofthecongested have beenparticularly expended, we stillusedourLiteningIIpodsforreconnaissance. Operations ground. Even thoughthere were where manysorties noordnance was recon teamsduringraidsandproviding on-callCASforthetroops onthe unit. The taskshave varied, includingconvoy atnight,supporting escort time we have kindofground fulfilledjointtacticalairrequests forevery same time,andyouare expectedtodoallofthesethingsperfectly. juggling multipletaskssuchasnavigationandtheLiteningIIpod atthe immediate attack.Asasingle-seatpilotintheHarrier II,you are always in aninstantthetroops canbeincontactwiththeenemyandneed 3rd MAW press release issuedduringAl Fajr; 300+combathoursduringtheeight-dayevolutioninFallujah.flew more thantentonsofordnance, 220rounds of25mmammunitionand resulting indirect hitsonhighvalue targets.In total,theunitdelivered airspace over Fallujah. to prosecute theirtargetwhencalled, ortheywouldbe‘kickedout’ ofthe paced andeffective command-and-control system.Pilots hadtobeready the ground inthenarrow streets andalleywaysofFallujah. It wasafast- intense andfluidurbancombatenvironment encountered by Marines on ‘keyhole CAS’integratedthehighvolume ofCASassetsavailable intothe and efficient,ultimatelyproving toberesoundingly successful, – employed againsttheinsurgencyinFallujah. Designed tobeworkable Corps officerswhoplannedtheCASsystem–dubbedas‘keyholeCAS’ were nocasualtiesduetofriendlyfire. by aircraft operatingover Fallujah, andthere machine gunrounds hadbeen‘sent down range’ 391 missilesandrockets and93,000 cannonand the operation,319precision-guided munitions, by 3rdperformed MAW aircraft. By theendof flown of CAS sorties insupport casualties. About 80percentofthefixed-wing insurgents forced outaftersufferingheavy December, whenthecitywasoverrun and were dropped. The fightingcontinueduntil of theassault,andfourMk82500-lbbombs weresorties flown over thecityonfirstday Marine CorpsandUSArmyartillery. Some 24 F/A-18Ds, F-16CJsandAC-130Hs, plus assault force received from airsupport ‘We have beenabletomaintainanear-constant presence over Fallujah ‘We have flown over theskiesofIraq forsixmonthsnow, andinthat ‘You have toalwayskeepyour guard because upduringthesesorties, Capt Ryan Hough, aHarrier IIpilotwith VMA-542, wasquotedina VMA-542 delivered someofthefirstbombsdropped inAl Fajr, The absenceofany‘blue-on-blue’ incidentswasduetotheMarine Aside from theHarrier IIs, theCoalition Al Fajr were © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com cannon pods( II carries a ‘LMAV’. Bothjetshave LGB andtheNight Attack Harrier The AV-8B+ isarmed withaGBU-12 operating over Iraq inOctober 2004. USAF photographer aboard aKC-10 formation for thebenefitof VMA-214 ‘Det A’ adoptalineastern A sectionofHarrier IIsfrom USAF ) OIF II/III 69 Fellow Harrier II pilot Capt Charles Charles II pilot Capt Harrier Fellow mission planning and spend lots of time ‘We talking to is having trouble the FAC ‘If maintenance Marines. They have worked worked have They Marines. maintenance a day, hours twelve days a week, seven tirelessly, for six months.’ release; in the same press noted DelPizzo any so as to avoid movements tracking friendly issues arising frompotential collateral damage fly with the same maps We attack. the targets we can in their hands so that we have that the FACs a target using landmarks.easily be talked onto all they can that the pilots know is imperative It also are There ground. about the fight on the of, to be aware have that we many restrictions no-fire other aircraft, including closed airspace, damage and limited potential for collateral areas, assets. air and ground communications between to strike may not get approval HQ, we Division have here The pilots that are a particular target. www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing When VMA-542 finally departed Al Asad in mid November, its place VMA-542 finally departed Al Asad in mid November, When were and we been tasked to go to OEF, had originally squadron ‘My VMA-542 a few weeks up to replace showed and ten aircraft troops ‘My as the parent Harrier II unit in-theatre was taken by VMA-311, led by VMA-311, led by was taken by II unit in-theatre Harrier as the parent Woltman; Lt Col Clyde for Yuma training to perform at MCAS that mission during work-ups command I did a pre-deployment after I took over much of 2004. Soon site surveyAfghanistan, but within days of my return to not are you told me, “Clyde, MAW] [CO of 3rd Stalder Keith Gen Maj button, hit the reset We going to Iraq”. are You going to Afghanistan. unit. of my and I headed to Al Asad in advance packed up the squadron was concerned about how early was that the General I went The reason assets on base, and the fixed-wing between being coordinated things were was VMA-542 that time, he wanted me to do an assessment for him. At VMA-214 VMA-211 and along with the detachments from based there, asked me my opinion of how The General up. shown that had recently simple in my view – put was pretty It all the Harriers. should employ we them all in one site under one commander. VMA-214 detachments. VMA-211 and with the too worked and we later, under the command Yuma I left six jets and some personnel back at MCAS training them up in preparation Kane, who was in charge of John of Maj in Japan, at MCAS Iwakuni, to MAG-12 for a six-month deployment trained for many years for this very usually back home, so we trained for many years eventuality us to enter a digital [CAS] page that allows have We in Iraq. here do well then tells you The aircraft data into our system without writing it down. depicts your to be on target, graphically things like time and speed required and in the head-up display, designates the target map, moving on the route to the designation. All located in relation are “friendlies” where shows even of this is particularly missions, as it helpful when conducting nocturnal that in turn makes providing a night mindset the pilot to develop allows a lot easier.’ dark” CAS “after Osprey © ) Two AV-8Bs from VMA-214 ‘Det A’ VMA-214 ‘Det A’ from AV-8Bs Two wingtip of the left hold station off conducting to prior a USAF KC-10 evolution refuelling a twilight aerial Sheep’ ‘Black The 2004. on 3 October Asad Al IIs to six Harrier deployed (LHA-3) USS Belleau Wood from the aircraft 2004, in September until February theatre in remaining committed heavily were They 2005. during Fallujah over operations to (USAF this period 70 CHAPTER SIX “keyhole CAS” in The cooperationbetween troops onthe ground andMarine Airduring would inturnaskmetodrop abombonthatlocationwithin90seconds. the latter, IwouldimmediatelypassthisinformationontomyFAC, who whether thecontacthewasseeing wasagoodguyorbadguy. If itwas ground, communicatingwiththemandusingoursensorstoconfirm for thetroops, lookingdown from 15,000-18,000 ftatMarines onthe that haddirect, face-to-facecontactwiththeenemy. Iwasflyingoverwatch was inthesesituations. windstorm”. We quicklycametorealise how beneficialtheLiteningpod during “keyholeCAS”–you were effectively “juggling ballsina have resulted inmidaircollisions. busyinthecockpit Things gotvery area –strayingintoairspaceassignedtoUAVs orother TACAIR could “keyhole CAS”duringAl Fajr , andwe madesure thatwe stayed inour the badguys. There were coordination issueswe neededtofollow for would talkwithaFAC ontheground thatwasassignedtotroops engaging who tolduswhere we were neededmost.En route tothatlocation,we Harriers andHornets. seeing over thecityduringAl Fajr atthattimewere Marine Corps primarily worked over Fallujah –indeed,theonlyotheraircraft Irecall thewholeareasupported ofoperationintheSunni triangle, we since May. MALS-14, whichhadbeenatAlAsadhelpingtomaintaintheAV-8Bs operational demands. We alsorelied teamfrom heavilyonthesupport We didjustthat. The unit waslargerthannormal,butthensowere our happen. The strength oftheMarine Corpsisitsabilityto“task organise”. non-commissioned officersin-theatre. In typicalfashion,theymadeit responsibility fortheintegrationofthree unitsontheshouldersof directives andstandard operatingprocedures. Iplacedmuchofthe relationships witheachotherandhadbeenfollowing thesamepolicies, While ingarrisonbackatMCAS Yuma, we hadestablishedworking shared commonprocedures. same group [MAG-13] andwe all we were allHarrier guysfrom the pretty as smoothlyfrom thestart, kicked offoperationsthingsran into a“super squadron”. Once we overall COandwe made VMA-311 all three unitsin-theatre. Iactedas pilots, andtheirprocedures, from heading toJapan. at additional support Yuma priorto detachment relied on VMA-513 for deployed, Maj Kaneandhis and 31stMEU-SOConce May 2005.AssignedtoHMM-262 ‘Here we hadadenseurbanenvironment withMarines ontheground ‘Upon takingofffrom AlAsadwe wouldtalkwithourinitialcontroller, arrived atAlAsadontheeve ofAl‘VMA-311 Fajr. Althoughwe actualintegrationofthedetachmentswasimmediateandefficient. ‘The ‘At AlAsadwe combinedthe Al Fajr wasjustabeautiful thingtobeinvolved in. © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com sortie (ColClyde Woltman) Litening II-equippedHarrier IIonthis certainly have beenpaired upwitha Laser Maverick. Itwould almost with aGBU-12andan AGM-65E mission on7January 2005, isarmed photographed returning from a particular aircraft from the unit, replace toVMA-542. at AlAsad This In November 2004 VMA-311 arrived OIF II/III 71 ‘As a TACAIR guy, I was used to having a lot used to I was guy, TACAIR a ‘As constant to provide required were ‘You of things going on at one time. You needed to You at one time. going on of things and location monitoring airspeed be constantly into another pilot’s did not stray so that you other aircraft numerous were there airspace – and altitudes, at higher and lower Fallujah over with their missions. did not want to interfere we and the city, on station over while overwatch often had to “yo-yo” my wingman and I during a mission. I might work FACs between my wingman work and have with one FAC with work would both with another one, or we our – LGBs and “buddy lase” the same FAC www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing , as Fajr in Al on the ground to support the Marines there were ‘We the Litening pod was to us throughout valuable how ‘I cannot overstate in the FACs also a limited number of ROVER-equipped ‘There were and VMA-311 primarily used GBU-12s operation the Fallujah ‘During when they needed someone to be killed, they needed it done immediately, needed it done immediately, when they needed someone to be killed, they for us. formula worked well That not later on. could the pod you With a bit too. used our radar – we the deployment we The only complaint hrs. see everything at 0200 even ground, on the in OIF I the year in the cockpit. As on the display screens had centred raster scan displays in the jets, and they were the green still had we before, been when it came to viewing pod footage. not as good as they could have TV in would fly back home and look at the tapes on a we mission end At “Damn, to say, heard routinely which point pilots were at room, the ready I did not see that on my screen”. All Marine to be a big help. and they too proved forces, field with ground could see thanks to the pilots, and they could also see what you are FACs and FACs Air background, a common Marine link. Sharing ROVER spoke the same language when it came to II pilots effectively Harrier was still targets. Although ROVER locating, identifying and destroying a new system in late 2004, and had only been issued to a handful of FACs, , nevertheless. Fajr impact on “keyhole CAS” missions in Al it had a positive The “LMAV” and the 25 mm cannon. Laser Mavericks -16s, AGM-65 the target picking out in urban CAS, the FAC to be a solid weapon proved with his handheld laser designator and the seeker head in the missile which the weapon, this point the pilot fired detecting the laser spot. At the pilot and where on to hit the target precisely could usually be relied wanted it to.’ the FAC when working with the same FAC we would separate our two aircraft by by our two aircraft would separate we with the same FAC when working I chance of a midair collision. Sometimes the altitude, thus reducing my wingman while which was 40-50 miles away, would head to the tanker, until I came back to mode with the same FAC in overwatch remained remained This way we point he would go and get gas. him, at which relieve supporting, for once you were we with the troops in constant oversight of what was going on in the good situational awareness had developed do not want to do was both go away and lose it. Ideally, battle, what you was exhausted, ordnance until all your on overwatch to remain wanted you at which point you had to be relieved. Osprey © An air strike by Harrier IIs is called Harrier by An air strike hideout insurgent in on a suspected US by of Fallujah on the outskirts K Company, assigned to Marines Regiment, 5th Marine 3rd battalion, the during Division, 1st Marine opening hours of Operation 2004 on 8 November Fury Phantom ) Corps (US Marine 72 CHAPTER SEVEN OIF IV thereby settingarecord fortheHarrier II. seen theunitrackupmore than3000flyinghoursinjustthree months, 24 hoursaday, seven daysaweek. This exhaustingoperationaltempohad Marine alsocalledAlAsadhome. Corpshelicoptersandtransports process ofbeingrelieved by VMFA(AW)-224) andlargenumbersof VMA-211. AsingleF/A-18Dsquadron (VMFA(AW)-242 wasinthe VMA-311 andtwosix-aeroplane detachmentsfrom VMA-214 and the 1980s.In January 2005thebasewashometotenHarrier IIs from concrete aircraft shelters,ithadbeenbuiltby Yugoslavian contractorsin west ofBaghdad. andmore Boastingtwolongrunways than30large large ex-IrAF base,formerlyknown asQadisiyah, wassituated112miles 1stMarinesupporting Division operationswere basedatAlAsad. The a representative government. Iraqi electionwhere, forthefirsttime,citizens went tothepollselect determined tocreate anenvironment forasuccessful 30January 2005 insurgency inthisarea from February 2004,1stMarine Division was Marine Corpsthrough to containthegrowing to2006.Having struggled troublesome AlAnbarProvince,the particularly inwestern Iraq, tothe up theIraqi Armyandpoliceforce. CENTCOM assignedthesecurityof more securityandtrain than20nationsdulysenttroops tobothsupport increased throughout 2004andinto2005across Iraq. Armedforces from the Iraqi government. However, insurgentoperationssystematically A Since arrivingin-theatre inearlyNovember 2004, VMA-311 hadflown Most ofMAG-16’s fixed-wing TACAIR unitsthatwere taskedwith short multi-nationaloccupationfollowedshort by arapidturnover to in April 2003,theUSgovernment hadhopedforarelatively s previously noted,following thesuccessfulconclusionofOIFI © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (Capt Matt Merrill) was assignedto VMFA(AW)-242 while theF/A-18D intheforeground revetment belonged to VMA-311, AV-8B+s parked insidethecovered patrol on28February 2005. The two across Al Asad during aperimeter numerous dispersalareas scattered M1A1 Abrams stopped by oneofthe was protected atalltimes. These personnel to ensure thatthebase on dedicated Marine Corps security insurgent attacks, theairfieldrelied kilometres. Highlyvulnerable to fence thatran for more than23 air basesinIraq, withaperimeter Al Asad was oneofthebiggest OIF IV 73 ; Blitz River www.ospreypublishing.com • , the ACE completed 190 sorties completed 190 totalling 300 flying , the ACE Blitz River Publishing In February Marine Corps and Iraqi Army forces initiated Operation Operation initiated Army forces Corps and Iraqi Marine February In operations VMA-311 and now of Kane, formerly XO Lt Col John and of aircraft choose which missions to fly based on availability ‘We ‘During with to Iraq, ended its 13-month deployment MAW 3rd 1 March On Having overseen a relatively trouble-free Iraqi election, the two Harrier election, the two Harrier Iraqi trouble-free a relatively overseen Having throughout Al Anbar Province, with a special focus on the city with a special focus on the Al Anbar Province, throughout Blitz River government the Iraqi been asked by have ‘We of Ramadi, in central Iraq. F Richard Gen stated Maj our security operations in the city’, to increase at the time. ‘Our Division, 1st Marine Commanding General, Natonski, and terrorists, forces anti-Iraqi job is to locate, isolate and defend against the between a peaceful transition of power intent on preventing who are Government.’ Transitional and the Iraqi government interim Iraqi was tasked MAW, of 3rd (ACE) Combat Element officer for the Aviation assets for TACAIR with supplying is a challenge It than aircraft. requests more always have We mission priority. into a bind. do not put anyone we ensure but we to fulfil all of the requests, had to carryVMA-311 have the load while the F/A-18D of The AV-8Bs picked up the slack and done a have The “Tomcats” out. swap squadrons with the flexibility of movement provides The ACE phenomenal job. the aviation boasts the most lethal firepower element of surprise. Marine and the ACE the between The coordination has in its arsenal. MAGTF of this operation. combat element has been the key to the success ground to 2nd MAW for air operations being handed over the responsibility its also left Iraq, MAG-16 Milstead. Robert Gen Brig led by (Forward), Woltman Lt Col Clyde 3 March On MAG-26. place being taken by at Al Asad. Kuckuk Lt Col Robert VMA-311 to command of turned over II MEU detachments returned to their ships and VMA-311 continued VMA-311 to their ships and II MEU detachments returned leave, was sad to see the detachments Al Asad alone. ‘It operations from Woltman. VMA-311 CO Lt Col Clyde recalled but their time was up’, our operational their departure Upon ‘They had performed admirably. continued “business as usual”’. we although proportionally, tempo dropped of 215 that saw the capture hours in support offensive of the ground suspected insurgents, 50 rifles and 300 mortar rounds’. Osprey © A plane captain guides a VMA-311 jet VMA-311 a A plane captain guides a successful Asad after Al in at back Coalition for mission air support 2005 on 27 February in Iraq forces ) Corps (US Marine 74 CHAPTER SEVEN fruits ofourlabourin-theatre.fruits power ofthecountry. tolarge parts More cities litbore testament tothe have beenabletokeepthecitiessecure sothatIraqi engineerscould restore what we are doing here. With ourassistance,thetroops ontheground lights multiplyingaswe spentmore timeover them.It is atestamentto the ground, thengraduallythecitiesbegantogetpower andwe couldsee release dated16May 2005.‘In November we hardly sawanylightson Maj Rob Schroder, VMA-311’s operationsofficer, ina2ndMAW press three timesournormalamountsincearrivinghere’, explained aircraft of VMA-311 returned hometoMCAS Yuma. ‘We have flown development and(5)influence. (3)emerginggovernancesecurity forces, support andboost(4)economic working five simultaneousobjectives –(1) expandand(2)trainIraqi leadership,under thenew withIIMEF’s campaignstrategyfocusingon departure ofIMEF. Security operations inAlAnbarProvince continued command ofallMarine CorpsassetsandpersonnelinIraq withthe Division, withtwoRCTs) ledby Maj Gen Stephen Johnson, hadassumed units returned tothe May, aftertwomonthsofhightempooperations,boththeairandground Al Asad,itsMarines securityoperationsinBaghdad. performed In mid While theAV-8Bs andhelicoptersof15thMEU-SOCoperatedfrom mission inIraq. Every oneofuswouldstayifwe hadtheopportunity’. have beenhere ourflyinghourshave tripled. We are alsodoingareal-world 8 April 2005.‘It isgoodfortacticalaircraft togetofftheship. Since we Maj Shawn Steranduerg, COof‘Det A’, ina2ndMAW press release from 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165.‘We are gladtobehere’, stated flown ashore toAlAsadfrom BonhommeRichard on11March of aspart throughout Harrier IIs from VMA-513 Detachment A River Bend untilwe leftinMay’. off attheendofApril 2005,andwe supported along theSyrian-Iraq border. The operationkicked about targetingsomeofthesources of theproblems Operation supplies were outtothewest ofthecity, sowhen points thatfedtheactioninRamadiandprovided targeting pods. We thattheinsurgentstrong knew convoy andprovided escorts withour support and talkingtoourfriendsontheradios. We ran welladversaries from very flying,lookingdown we gottoknow thecity, ourground forces andour flying inMarch andApril wasover Ramadi,and the start’, LtColKuckuk explained.‘Much ofthe the commandrelationships were goodfrom very CO oftheHornet squadron basedatAlAsad,so general of2ndMAW, theCOofMAG-26 andthe rotations were thecommanding suchthatIknew In asix-monthtour, May 2005,afterserving the200Marines andten Six weeks earlier, attheendofMarch, IIMEF(including2ndMarine Aircraft from alongsidesixVMA-311 flew Itookover‘When thesquadron, command River we Bend were started excited River Bend , thelatterunithaving Bonhomme Richard © Osprey amphibioustaskgroup. Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com throughout itstimeinIraq (USNavy ) areas alongtheSyrian-Iraq border) River Bend May, having supported Operation ‘Det A’ remained shore-based until sent ashore to Al Asad inMarch 2005. LHD-6 justprior to theaircraft being 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165, landson 513 ‘Det A’, assignedto An AV-8Bfrom VMA- (targeting problem OIF IV 75 www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing ‘VMA-311 has flown more than 3400 sorties totalling 6200 flying sorties 3400 than ‘VMA-311flying 6200 totalling more flown has same press added in the Kuckuk, CO, Lt Col Robert Schroder’s Maj that proof are We started days since we 12-hour here. worked have ‘We become accustomed to flying most at Al Asad the pilots had to ‘Once in Afghanistan and Iraq early 2005 the intense pace of operations By F/A-18D units a chance to rest and AV-8B frontline to give order In VMA-223 II operations, in OIF Harrier break a three-month Following way we in any on the ground main job is to support‘Our the Marines hours. We have shown the Marine Air community that, given proper proper given that, Air community the Marine shown have We hours. well.’ can perform and supplies, our aircraft maintenance extremely release; all the holidays, through breaks, with no environment in an austere working and hit our got in the groove we Once can still keep a fast tempo. Marines at a high tempo for an extended period kept operating we “battle rhythm”, took a couple of Yuma at take up to two weeks that could Tasks of time. well together really worked of our Marines was because all It days out here. for their next mission. ready get our birds and came together to pilots spend Yuma, at Back of darkness. the cover of their mission under being here night. Since flight time at of their overall about 10-20 per cent per cent of their overall of 70 upwards flown pilots have the “Tomcat” than flying in the day. at night is different Flying flight time in darkness. not 80 per cent of their sorties at night. It’s flown guys who have I have This without seeing sunlight. unusual for some of our pilots to go weeks is a 24-hour war.’ and and aviation forces, Corps ground was significantly impacting Marine a long war on two fronts. that they had to plan for senior officers realised Air units were to the heightened operational tempo, many Marine Due than twice normal at more utilising the flying hours on their aircraft the normal flying hours per month planned example, peacetime rates. For Al operating from hours, but aircraft at this time was 23.2 for an AV-8B of 59.2 hours per month. up an average racking Asad were flying VMFA-142, and preserve their airframes,crews reserve-manned 2005 to at Al Asad in February VMFA(AW)-224 F/A-18A+s, joined All combat support for ongoing operations in Al Anbar Province. provide had enhanced Litening II pods fitted now jets in-theatre TACAIR Marine raw video to FAC this system being able to direct-feed as standard, their primary terminals and ‘C3I’ systems. Aside from missions ROVER and Hornets escort IIs and CAS, Harrier convoy of armed reconnaissance, units frequently Finally, the job of ISR overwatch. given also routinely were to intimidate high-speed flybys low-level, performed ‘show-of-force’ as required. insurgents or deliver ordnance 2005, on 26 August MCAS Cherry from arrived Point and 150 Marines XO, VMA-223’s Georgia. home to NAS Atlanta, to return VMFA-142 allowing release; press in a 2nd MAW remarked Lancaster, Lt Col David us with a great assets provides reconnaissance one of the air wing’s can. Being Whether it be providing to take on. ready are challenge, and one that we asset to a valuable are we surveillance our presence, support or just showing firstThis is not the to insurgent activity. and a deterrent Marines the ground flew 2003, we In in support of OIF. deployed have time the “Bulldogs” a lot have We . the amphibious assault ship Bataan combat operations from who served ago.’ still in the squadron years with us two of Marines Osprey © 76 CHAPTER SEVEN into Iraq. This meantthatwe were well prepared foraerialcombat.’ Operation some aerialexercises withEgyptian AirForce andUSAFfighterunitsin training missionsduringourpre-cruise in work-ups, andalso participated sent toattackourbasesfrom withinSyria. We had flown alotofair-to-air received intelligence reports statingthathijackedairlinerscouldpossiblybe for atimewhenflyingalongtheborder withSyria. This wasbecausewe had fitonthatdeployment weaponry wasthefactthatwe carriedlive AIM-9s posed areduced collateraldamagerisk. The mostuniquethingaboutour accurate asaGBU-12, buthadasmallerwarheadthatmeantitsemployment Maverick missilewouldreplace theGBU-12. The “LMAV” wasjustas the leadaircraft. thesameload,except aLaser The secondjetwouldcarry cannon podandtheLiteningIItargetingpod,whichwasusuallycarried by checked outby aground patrol. would thenplotthisinformationonamap, anditwouldeventually be differential. We wouldsendpossibleIEDlocationsback totheFAC. He sense where theground hadbeendisturbedatnight duetotemperature at forIEDs. The FLIRintheLiteningIIpodwasgreat forthis,aswe could CAS wasnotneededatthetime,FAC wouldgive usanarea tolook predominantly KC-130s, butsometimesUSAFKC-135s andKC-10s. If throughout theoperationwesortie relied – ontankersupport crossing ofinsurgentsalongtheIraq-Syrian border. During almostevery Operation oursixjets. all ofthepeopleandequipmentneededtosupport commence operationswith VMA-223. AsanMEUdetachment,we had arriving atthebasewe were moved tothesouth sideofAlAsadto consisted offourradar-equippedandtwoNight Attack jets,andupon problems, asIraq wasabenignenvironment toflyin.Our detachment Capt Jeremy Gettings wasoneofthepilotsassignedto‘Det A’; six Harrier IIs infrom flew Tarawa of13thMEU-SOC/HMM-163. aspart ‘Our standard load-outwastwoexternalfueltanks,aGBU-12, the25 mm wastoprovide‘Our firsteffort CASfortwoMarine battalionsduring ‘Flying few offtheboatandintoAlAsadpresented uswithvery A monthlater VMA-211 Detachment Areinforced VMA-223 whenits Bright Star over Egypt before reaching theNAG andflyingoff Steel Curtain inearlyNovember. Our missionwastoslow the © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (US Navy) Red Seaonitsway to theNAG while theshipwas operating inthe from Tarawa 13th MEU-SOC/HMM-163, takes off VMA-211 Detachment A, assignedto An AV-8B Night Attack aircraft from on 9 September 2005 on9September 2005 OIF IV 77 . Nassau www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing , on 15 October 2005, the Marine 2005, the Marine , on 15 October Curtain prior to Steel weeks Several at Al Asad, after the national elections 22nd MEU-SOC arrived Shortly thus II MEF, to replace arriving back in Iraq 2006 I MEF began In VMA-513 started personnel from 2006 maintenance February In The Marine Corps continued to undertake security operations in Iraq, Corps continued to undertake in Iraq, security operations The Marine Corps had worked hard to create a positive climate for the Constitutional a positive to create hard Corps had worked security II MEF provided on 15 December, months later, Two Referendum. both occasions. kept busy on were IIs national elections. Harrier for the Iraqi A (part Detachment of HMM-261) flying in from VMA-223’s II unit was Harrier an entire This was the only time during OIF when in Iraq. 16 AV-8Bs VMA-223 having no fewer than based at Al Asad, until in-theatre would remain squadron and the parent A’ Both ‘Det than 1700 sorties, more had flown then the ‘Bulldogs’ 2006. By March some 14.5 tons of of 4700 flying hours and delivered totalling in excess munitions against targets in Iraq. precision-guided to Iraq Corps deployment large-scale Marine the startmarking of the third units – on included both air and ground This rotation since OIF I in 2003. of air operations over assumed control and MAG-16 MAW 3rd 8 February I MEF 28 February On and MAG-26. 2nd MAW from Al Anbar Province Corps assets and personnel in Iraq. assumed command of all Marine flew MCAS ten aircraft in from arriving at Al Asad, and on 7 March in to Iraq had deployed the first time the ‘Nightmares’ This was Yuma. the unit having been heavily committed than detachment strength, more PAO MAW to operations in Afghanistan since 2002. Interviewed a 3rd by chief for White (quality assurance Travis Gunnery Sgt on 16 March, with an increased focus on the training of a new Iraqi Army and police the training of a new focus on Iraqi with an increased quash the insurgency. eventually hoped would that CENTCOM force the law were manned units charged with enforcing Losses among locally insurgents to efforts Sunni by heavy during this period due to increased 2005, early November In force. Army and police target both the Iraqi border. along the Iraqi-Syrian Curtain Steel ran Operation RCT-2 was being made in the war against the insurgency by Although progress media, especially to the world’s sell’ operations such as this, it was a ‘hard were so high – no fewer than 500 Marines as Coalition casualties were campaigns due to wounded in the 2004-05 killed and many more the by losses suffered The and mortarambushes, rocket attacks and IEDs. still. higher appreciably were civilian population in Iraq Osprey © ) This VMA-211 ‘Det A’ jet was jet was A’ ‘Det VMA-211 This Ramadi high over photographed The unit’s on 9 December 2005. to committed heavily IIs were Harrier saw which , Curtain Steel Operation and Coalition forces Corps Marine insurgents prevent to hard working Syria from Iraq access to gaining Gettings (Maj Jeremy 78 CHAPTER SEVEN 2006, with VMA-513 flyingmyriadarmed reconnaissance missionsand the Harrier IIoneofthemostversatile TACAIR assetsinIraq during knows helpisonlyaradiocallaway.’ contact withenemyforces cancountonourbombsbeingtarget. He aspect oftheJDAMsystemisthat itmeansthattheMarine riflemanin the munitionsneededtodestroy itwithoutassistance. The mostimportant designators. The Harrier isnow abletopickoutthetargetandemploy onthe groundMarine mark thetargetswithvarious infantryman laser JDAM, ourjetsare lessreliant onhavingeitheranotheraircraft ora add tothefront ofthebombtoimprove itsstabilityinflight. With control finsandareceiver antenna. There isalsoasmallstrakekitthatwe JDAM tailfinkittoourjets. The kithousesaGPSguidancesystem, impossible forustoprovide themwithCAS.’ ground Marines wouldn’t beable tocallthepilotsin,thereby makingit illuminate itwithourlaserdesignator. If communicationswere bad,the the oldsystem,pilotmightnothave beenabletofindthetargetand conditions orbadcommunicationssignals.If theweather wasbadwith and focusonfindinganotherone.JDAMisnotaffectedby weather and theGPScoordinates are entered, thepilotcanforgetaboutthattarget VMA-513 pilotCaptBen Hutchins wasalsoquotedasfollows; explained LtColPrice ina3rd MAW press release dated11April 2006. hit targetsmore accurately, therefore makingusamore efficientsquadron’, operationally inIraq. feature thisnew onourjets,we ‘With willbeablethe out withlive bombstodirectlytheground combateffort’. support difference iswe are notflyingwithanytrainingordnance. Allthejetsgo here. Our jobremains unchangedfrom backhome. virtually The only as to work onthejets. We have gonethrough manytrainingevolutions such Marines ontheground. stay inIraq the foraboutseven months,withitsmainjobbeingtosupport deployed duringbothOIFIandII’.He addedthat VMA-513 plannedto ofmyMarines– afew have been second andthird deployment withus upon us. We have Marines ontheir to meetorexceed theexpectationslaid and webitofoureffort willgive every best tocompletethejobassignedus, the samePAO ‘we willbedoingour set ourbootsontheground’. ready tofixandflyjetsfrom whenwe work centres established. We hadtobe aircraft inorder tounpackandhave the body oftheunitarrived priortothe VMA-513) explainedthat‘the main The combinationofJDAM,the LiteningIIpodandROVER made ‘We canload500-and1000-lbgeneral purposebombsfittedwitha Aviation ordnance chiefMSgtMarc Senecal of VMA-513, added; JDAMisa“fire‘The andforget” weapon. Once thetargetisidentified In April VMA-513 becamethefirstHarrier IIsquadron toemploy JDAM GSgt ChristopherEvans remarked, ‘Our Marines are more thanready Unit CO,LtCol Willis Price, told Desert TalonDesert before we deployed. The Marines are excited aboutbeing © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (Lt Col Will Price) for seven years following OIFI heavily utilisedby theMarine Corps on 26June2006. This facility was seen from an AV-8B flyingoverhead The vast expanseof Al Asad airbase, OIF IV 79 frequently being called on to provide CAS. CAS. provide on to being called frequently they enemy before the is to neutralise job ‘Our told Rountree John Maj Marines’, can harm our exist, why we ‘That’s MAW. 3rd from a PAO And without our that role. of proud are and we be nothing more would we Marines, ordnance Capt surveillancethan a manned aircraft’. Guy Berry added, ‘The shop has the ordnance that everydifficult job of ensuring that Harrier our flightline has serviceableleaves on weapons and missiles that bombs it – precision-guided on the ground. to supportwill work the Marines also in charge of loading and are “ordies” Our carry that we checking the countermeasures in www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing One of the ‘ordies’ referred to by Capt Berry was LCpl Nicholas Nicholas Capt Berry to by was LCpl referred of the ‘ordies’ One on the jets so the pilots can is putting bombs main responsibility ‘Our the Al Asad, with on to tally 4519 flying hours from VMA-513 went VMA-214 by April from had been reinforced The ‘Nightmares’ of ten Ray was CO of the detachment, which consisted ‘Lt Col John had sent a pilot ahead we in-theatre prior to our arrival weeks ‘Several always flew and typically undertook in sections of two aircraft, ‘We the jet to protect ourselves from SAMs’. from ourselves the jet to protect Angular; to have we leave any of our birds put the bombs on the targets. Before of all make sure We carrying they are munitions. the proper make sure to perform also have voltage and we been removed, the safety pins have that there to make sure carryingchecks on Harriers Mavericks AGM-65 – these could launch a running the aircraft through no stray currents are missile accidentally.’ 95 per cent sortie completion rate. an impressive achieving squadron pilot Sheep’ as ‘Black A, although not in the traditional way, Detachment explained; Maples William and two-time OIF veteran Maj were We maintainers and support dozen staff. pilots, six jets and several which was in turn part of 11th MEU-SOC assigned to HMM-166 ACE, took four radar and det, we for a Harrier Typically . Peleliu in embarked portand exercises visits did the standard We jets with us. Attack two Night MEU, including the entire Kuwait and once off the NAG, to en route was offloaded for sustainment training. Lt Col Ray had arranged the ACE, to stay on the boat due to a concern about FOD [foreign for the Harriers object damage] at the airfields in Kuwait. ATO and get us on the air operations with MAG-16 of us to coordinate started flying missions in support We the ship. from for sorties Iraq into took off We the NAG. within days of us reaching RCTs of the Marine met up with USAF tankers we where the carrier and flewfrom into Iraq, then did another We supporting forces. ground and took on fuel, before conducting a late missions, before and flew more mid-mission refuelling long sorties that These were mission tanking and flying back to the boat. typically lasted between six and six-and-a-half hours. Iraq. in western units on the ground support for Marine missions direct being looked and rearm, occasionally flew into Al Asad to refuel We majority the vast However, of MAG-16. Austin Lt Col Eric by after there Osprey © ) Corps US Marine Ordnance technicians of VMA-513 VMA-513 of technicians Ordnance mount a 500-lb GBU-38 JDAM on AV-8B under the wing of an and ‘fire is a The JDAM 2006. 2 April means that which weapon, forget’ is identified and the once the target into entered are GPS coordinates the guidance system, the bomb’s about the target pilot can forget another one. on finding and focus by affected is not This weapon being guided conditions, weather set into coordinates the ground to On INS and GPS. by the system the delivered VMA-513 2006 May 11 insurgent against first GBU-38 strike positions ( 80 CHAPTER SEVEN is incredible’. MajWTI KaneAndersonwas alsoinvolved inthismission; different pointsofimpactatnearlythesametime andtakeoutabuilding from theoldwayofdoingthings. To have twodifferent bombshit two XO LtColOssen D’Haiti remarking, ‘It wastooeasy, especially coming 2007. On 9November thesquadron usedJDAM inangerforthefirsttime, would subsequentlyremain in-theatre formore than200daysuntilMarch in theHMM-166ACE togetcombattimeintheirlogbooksoncruise.’ Harriers –were training intheKuwaiti desert. We were theonlyaircrew ourselves whilsttheMEU–bothground elementandACE, barthe Marines ontheground atwarduringthe two monthswe hadPeleliu to staple mission. We derived great satisfactionfrom directly supporting much noiseaspossible.Convoy huntingforIEDs,wasanother support, plenty ofshow-of-force passes,flyinglow andfastinorder tomakeas occasional LGB inresponse toanon-callCASrequest. We performed than traditional“bombtrucks”. We did,however, gettodrop the us more asISRplatforms,thankstoourLiteningpodsandROVER link, especially duringanightlanding. challenge. You hadtobeonyour gamethroughout themission,but had foundtheship. Comingbacktotheshipat nightwasalwaysa to ignore –thelighttheygave offcouldeasilytrickyou intothinkingyou conditions wastough. There were alsoburningoilplatformsthatyou had summer. Trying tofind theshipinmiddleofnightsuchweather milky, hazy cloudthatoftenblightedtheNAG duringthespringand environmental factors. We dubbedthearea the“soup bowl” duetothe became criticallyimportant. Managing fuelinthefinalstagesofwhatwere longmissionstherefore outovercarrier andthenflew theNAG, where there were notankerassets. spread across thecountry. We onthewaybackto tankedin-country with theclosestonetousbeingasoutherntracknearBasra –therest were were ofthelot.Alltankertrackswere thetoughestsorties over Iraq, in theNAG. the AV-8B+, thusofferingthepilotmore margin ofapositive performance the Night Attack jethadadistinctadvantage duetoitbeinglighterthan temperatures. In theseconditions adversely affectedby high to hover atheavierweights is back totheship–AV-8B’s ability concerned aboutbringingtheweight excessively hotandwe were as theweather wasalready getting relatively lightloadfortheHarrier II, fitted withgunpods. This wasa and allouraircraft were permanently and oneGBU-12 onthesemissions, and endedonPeleliu. commencedfromof oursorties In September VMA-513 wasreplaced atAlAsadby VMA-211, which ‘More oftenthannotwe brought ourordnance back,asIMEFvalued intheNAG‘Visibility couldbeaffectedby someweird, andunique, ‘Although Ihadflown missionsduringOIFIandII,these quiteafew ‘We usuallycarriedtwofueltanks © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com from theirmission(USMarine Corps) disarm them whenthey returned Harrier IIbefore they took off and fellow ‘ordies’ would arm every with the ‘Nightmares’, andhis Kyler, an ordnance technician a sortie over Iraq on10 July2006. LCpl Kyler Buckner after completing are directed inat Al Asad by Two AV-8Bsfrom VMA-513 OIF IV 81 where it was part of 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165. where Boxer www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing ‘The entire ACE went ashore to Al Asad, Lt Col Chris Papaj and and to Al Asad, Lt Col Chris Papaj ashore ‘The went ACE entire Keeping the Harrier II flying in the oppressive heat of an Iraqi summer heat of an Iraqi II flying in the oppressive Harrier the Keeping as part to the NAG briefly return VMA-542 2006 also saw September at Al Asad, having A arrived VMA-311 Detachment November In ‘We answered a request from 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, who confirmed 6th Marines, Battalion, 3rd from a request answered ‘We HMM-165, with their helicopters, being housed on the north side of the unit and, towards VMA-211, a KC-130 joining base and our six Harriers Maj Peter Blake led the AV-8B detachment; led the AV-8B Blake Peter Maj was a challenge, as VMA-211 technician Cpl John Ortega recalled. ‘The Ortega recalled. VMA-211 technician Cpl John was a challenge, as Corps inventory on in the Marine to work aircraft the hardest are Harriers airframe vibration can The resulting so much power. because they have new learn something every day when You pull some of the wiring loose. Thanks to the efforts of Cpl Ortega and his fellow servicing the Harrier’. would ultimately complete some Avengers’ Island maintainers, the ‘Wake 2700 missions totalling 5200 flying hours. VMA-214 . Like Jima in Iwo of 24th MEU-SOC/HMM-365 embarked the carrier, from operated their six jets exclusively the ‘Tigers’ A’, ‘Det in Basra (including 42 sorties over flying a number of missions into Iraq Arabian LHD-7 sailed into the before forces) ground support of British an upsurge in the fighting in Afghanistan. following Sea in from flown that they had known anti-Iraqi forces in a building that they wanted that they wanted in a building forces anti-Iraqi that they had known turned into rubble. in all weather JDAM has the capability to be dropped can You the clouds. or below above from conditions – it can be dropped means it does not have to see the target which also generate coordinates, accurate is more The JDAM heel of the laser-guided bomb. – the Achilles’ the angle of impact, which increases can also programme You and reliable. 4 JDAM, which is able to using Block are We the accuracy of the bomb. which enables has new software, The aeroplane targeting. use relative means being able to put the simple terms, this In targeting. relative and then letting the software targeting pod cursor onto the aim point have This is a unique capability that we to the JDAM. transfer coordinates in the naval the only aircraft is presently the Harrier Indeed, just received. while the F-15E is the only other aeroplane inventory capability, with this targeting at the moment.’ with relative in-theatre Osprey © An AV-8B Night Attack from VMA-214 VMA-214 from Attack Night AV-8B An 11th assigned to A, Detachment commences MEU-SOC/HMM-166, the flightdeck along run its takeoff Uniquely, 2006. on 5 May of Peleliu flew A’ ‘Det IIs from Harrier exclusively Iraq over operations months while two for LHA-5 from MEU-SOC/HMM-166 of 11th the rest in Kuwait training conducted ) Corps (US Marine 82 CHAPTER SEVEN tanker support during ourdeploymenttanker support thatwe were abletoleave the detachment flagshipwiththe Vietnam-era “Tomcat” onitstail. Night Attack jet. We soonhaditflyingagain,theHarrier becomingour didn’t have timetofixtheaircraft, sowe tookownership ofthebroken itsjetshometoMCAS Yumato ferrying inMarch 2007. The “Avengers” VMA-211 oneofourjetswhenthe unithadamaintenanceissuejustprior be flyingnightmissionsonlyforweeksatatime. six weeks, before switchingtoanothertime. This meantthat you could the-clock operations. You wouldbeononeoftheshiftsforamonthto each otherinorder toprovide ourtroops witharmedHarriers forround- “Avengers”, we worked morning,middayandnightcrews thatoverlapped added twosectionstothe day.VMA-211 flightscheduleevery With the toavoid collateraldamagethatinevitablyalienatedthelocalpopulation. effort we didnotdrop alotofbombsbecausethestrictROE, andtheconcerted at anyone thatthreatened theground forces. Althoughwe were busy, very insurgents placingIEDsorsettingupambushes. We hadtobeready tostrike SEALs. We wouldconductoverwatch orroute reconnaissance, lookingfor patrols andraidscarriedoutbyunitsNavysupported Marine infantry flyingmissions. conscious ofthatwhenwe firststarted We frequently Haditha andArRutbah, where theMEUcommandelementwasbased. Study Group companiesfrom Boxer Report. Our infantry ashore, itwasontheeve ofthetroop “surge” recommended by theIraq transitioned intoitscounterinsurgencyphase. When 15thMEU-SOCwent second time,we didnotdrop thatmuchordnance sincethewar had in 2003,wemission.Going dropped backthe bombsonalmostevery of whoarrived overhead. regardless thattheywouldbegettinganidenticallevelknew ofsupport sign “Torment” toensure thataviationplannersandground unitsalike closelyasaHarrierworked very Team inIraq. Indeed, we allusedthecall ourownpatches onourflightsuitsandbriefedflew schedules,we Although we stillwore ourHMM-165 VMA-211 or VMA-311 formation. got thejobdonejustaswell as anall from VMA-211, andthesemixed sections were occasionallypaired upwithaviators maintained ourown aeroplanes. Our pilots andstandalone detachmentthatflew attached toHMM-165,we operatedasa Marines well. andofficerstreated usvery of VMA-211 atthetime,andhehis “Avengers”. LtColBrad Gering wastheCO spaces andtheready room withthe same area as VMA-211, sharingmaintenance the southside. We lived andworked inthe the endofourdeployment, USAFA-10son ‘Unlike Harrier unitsat Al Asadbefore or afterus,we enjoyed somuch ‘Our MEUjetswere all radar-equippedHarriers. We endedupgiving ‘Both ourdetand VMA-211 operatedaround theclock. We usually ‘Sectarian violencewasontheincrease across Iraq, andwe were very deploymentdifferent toOIFI. wasvery ‘This The firsttimeIwasinIraq we were‘While stilladministratively © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com went in Ramadi, went inRamadi, TACAIR types(LtCol Willis Price) Harrier IIs, amongstotherCoalition the city, andtheserelied onCAS by Combat Operation Posts throughout a numberofpatrol basescalled strategy relied onestablishing the general hospital. The Coalition the localgovernment buildingand of key locationsinRamadi, including forces fought insurgents for control US Navy SEALsandIraqi security force of US Army, USMarines Corps, November ofthatyear. A combined andcontinueduntil in June2006 Battle ofRamadi, which commenced extensive actionsupporting the 8 July2006. The ‘Nightmares’ saw from a VMA-513 Harrier IIon taken Iraq, western in governorate Ramadi, thecapitalof Al Anbar An aerial viewofthecity OIF IV 83 ‘VMA-211 went home in March 2007, but we stayed 2007, but we ‘VMA-211 home in March went in Al of the sectarian violence had settled down ‘Much A flewVMA-311 Detachment 1200 hours with six of the ISR for the battalions in-country during this period. VMA-231 get acclimatedfor an extra month so as to help would fly a section with a We to operations in Iraq. VMA-231 pilot asVMA-311 pilot as the flight lead and a the wingman, thus giving the latter a chance to experience in-theatre. airspace etiquette and ROE the frequencies, 2007, and I left in April the time we by Anbar Province this.’ helped achieve like to think that we Al Asad. jets from www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing ‘The big benefit of having KC-130 refuelling support at the same support at the same refuelling ‘The big benefit of having KC-130 via the ‘The the FAC the Litening II pod and connection between up in the showed when we ‘The in-theatre volatile situation was pretty airfield was responsive aerial refuelling that gave us more time on station us more that gave aerial refuelling airfield was responsive would take off We stations for fuel tanks. without trading two weapons the duty our fuel tanks from and immediately replenish Al Asad from before Window”, to fill a “Vulnerability then fly for an hour KC-130, on station for could remain going back to the tanker again so that we had so if we nearly always airborne, were The KC-130s another hour. The tanker guys could get fuel and stay out longer. we in contact troops it. asked for fuel anytime we very supportive, providing were fact, it got terminal was very In important to us whilst in Iraq. ROVER if it was was compromised mission effectiveness your to the point where commander always wanted to see ROVER The ground unavailable. seeing so as to minimise the risk of collateral were footage of what we be employed. damage should ordnance pilots got Our put the MEU ashore. and that was why CENTCOM NAG, also supported and looking for IEDs, and we very reconnaissance good at road too, and the flying out of Al Asad had Scan Eagle UAVs We raids at night. the bulk provided we lot. Nevertheless, used them a on the ground Marines external fuel tanks off our jets. Our typical load for a section of two typical load for a section of two our jets. Our external fuel tanks off one LGB, JDAM, one 500-lb GBU-12 one 500-lb GBU-38 was AV-8Bs cannon and a five-inch 25 mm the GAU-12 Laser Maverick, AGM-65E This diverse also carried a Litening II pod. pod. Each aircraft rocket Zuni one usually only delivered flexibility since we us excellent load-out gave engagement at that time. per weapon Osprey © Iwo Jima Iwo The full set of equipment that the L3 Remote comprised Video Enhanced Receiver Operational Corps Marine as used by III), (ROVER commanders and ground FACs from time imagery view real to AV-8Bs, by pods carried Litening II ROVER systems. and UAV F/A-18s piece of equipment became a critical since it significantly in Iraq in the war and awareness enhanced situational (L3) command and control (LHD-7). This aircraft, awaiting awaiting This aircraft, (LHD-7). in November takeoff for clearance with a 500-lb GBU-38 is armed 2006, wing pylon on its inner port JDAM ) (US Navy Like VMA-513 ‘Det A’ before it, it, before A’ ‘Det VMA-513 Like its conducted A’ ‘Det VMA-542 the from OIF missions exclusively of its amphibious assault flightdeck ship – in this case USS 84 CHAPTER EIGHT I OIF V/VI contact, we are there them’. tosupport ground, andthen,ifwe have troops in information alongtotheMarines on the – andthosetypesofthings. We passthe enemy activity, suspiciousactivity–IEDs out there we are searching various pointsfor things have quieteneddown, sowhenwe go the unit’s deployment toAlAsad.‘Recently told a2ndMAW PAO several weeks into ground’, squadron pilotMaj Mark Riedy role istoprovide CASfortheMarine onthe Point toreplace Harrier’s VMA-211. ‘The infromVMA-231 flew MCASCherry F/A-18 Hornets andAV-8B Harrier IIs. AH-1W Super Cobras,KC-130J Hercules, CH-46 Sky Knights,CH-53Super Stallions, to ensure theyhave theguidanceandresources forcontinuedsuccess.’ tested crews, andare doingthingsextremely well, andourmajorfocusis again. The squadrons thatare here are mannedby experienced,combat- component for Task Force Tarawa, anditisappropriate thatwe are here we were ready togo. In OIFIin2003,MAG-29 hadbeentheaviation of weeks ofgoodturnover withMAG-16. When 3February camearound had great work-ups andexercises toprepare us. We have alsohadacouple led by ColJohn Kennedy. Recalling theswitchover, Kennedy noted; Hanifen, replaced 3rd MAW. Finally, MAG-16 wasrelieved by MAG-29, a secondtime,andweek later2nd MAW, ledby Brig Gen Timothy operations. On 9February 2007,IIMEFtookover operationsinIraq for infrastructure security andalsopayformerinsurgentgroups tosupport ofthepopulation,repairinsurgency strategytowinthesupport broken Multinational Forces Iraq. approach The new focusedmore onacounter- left behindare capableofproviding security’. them protect thelocalpopulationand tohelpensure thattheIraqi forces President, ‘to helptheIraqis toclearandsecure neighbourhoods,tohelp in AlAnbarProvince. The aimofthe‘surge’ was,inthewords ofthe a netincrease of21,000UStroops in-theatre, ofwhich4000were Marines 3rd Battalion, 4thMarines) andsentadditionalforces toIraq. This meant Al AnbarProvince (namely13thMEU,1stBattalion, 6thMarines and personnel, aswell assomeelementsoftheMarine Corpsin A monthafterMAG-29 arrived inIraq MAG-29 hadoperationalcontrol ofall2ndMAW squadrons, whichflew ‘I have derived agreat senseofsatisfactionfrom takingcommand,having ofthe‘surge’,A part Gen David Petraeus assumedcommandofthe violence inIraq. The President extendedthetourofdutyforUSArmy Newwhich hecalled‘The Way Forward’ orthe‘surge’, toquell n January 2007President George W Bush strategy, announcedanew © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Ed Darack (Ed one AGM-65E onthesecond AV-8B+ GBU-38s ontheleadjetandatleast tanks, thesebeingreplaced by two neither aircraft carries external drop Iraq on1May 2007. Unusually, KC-130T over thedeserts ofwestern VMA-231 holdstationbehinda A sectionofHarrier II+sfrom ) OIF V/VI 85 Lt Col Brian Annichiarico, CO of CO of Annichiarico, Brian Lt Col done a have Marines ‘I think my regimental commander on the use of commander on the use of regimental joint processed to day we aviation. Day we Typically, tactical air strike requests. schedules for different three working were to be hit – targets that were such requests now two days from now, days from three also responsible were We and the next day. time to for diverting air operations in real of support needs in their areas battalion I coordinated addition, operations. In with the forward-based air wing to ensure had two We that it dealt with our requests. while I was in-theatre squadrons Harrier VMA-231 there, and VMA-542, with A”. “Det VMA-513’s support from VMA-231, remarked at the same time; the same at remarked VMA-231, is the first This so far. fantastic job a few and in years, deployment squadron everybody the bit to was chomping at them mentally to prepare tried We come. over could prior to coming as much as we of just a few is not the work It here. that has made the squadron Marines but the efforts of everysuccessful in Iraq, to do what the “Aces” person that allows not fix a maintainer does they do best. If then the helicopter or a jet or a helicopter, www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing As Lt Col Annichiarico noted, VMA-231 had not deployed to Iraq to Iraq deployed VMA-231 had not As Lt Col Annichiarico noted, maintainers, this mission tempo was the job of the hardworking Sustaining and coming ordnance us launching and dropping long as they see ‘As VMA-231 and other supported Hermley Shawn Maj II pilot Harrier support and prioritise aviation for one my job to coordinate was ‘It since OIF I, although it had supported MEUs that had deployed elsewhere that had deployed since OIF I, although it had supported MEUs flew 1738 2007, the ‘Aces’ and September March since then. Between combat sorties totalling 5158 flight hours. was a primary Reidy; whose motivation concern of pilots like Maj been trying to make a habit out We’ve motivated. back, they stay pretty them maps and picking out doing, showing of telling them what we’re not just about going to, and telling them that it’s that we’re the areas support to the Marines.’ providing out there – we’re bombs dropping serving whilst as the units during their time in Iraq TACAIR Marine in Al Anbar Province, at Camp Fallujah, for RCT-6 Air Officer Regimental 2008; to February 2007 through January from This also included advising the battalions. Army and four Marine jet cannot fly, and the guys on the ground don’t get the support. the If don’t on the ground and the guys jet cannot fly, may be the support get they need, then there don’t guys on the ground accept, and so on and so forth. to forced It are additional risks that they works it The reason that whole chain works. me how ceases to amaze never out there.’ of the individual efforts is because so well of the Marines Osprey © ) Corps US Marine An AV-8B from VMA-513 Detachment Detachment VMA-513 from AV-8B An A of 13th MEU-SOC/HMM-163 closes of Bonhomme on the flightdeck 2007 on 15 September at Richard mission in the the end of a training Coalition The unit supported NAG. both LHD-6 from in Iraq operations late June to Asad from Al and 2007) September (US Navy VMA-231 completed its first, and its first, completed VMA-231 Asad between Al to deployment last, the 2007, and September March combat sorties flying 1738 ‘Aces’ 5158 flight hours during totalling AGM-65E, with an Armed this period. on a routine departing is this aircraft of the squadron’s Much OIF patrol. spent searching time in the air was suspicious enemy for Iraq western planting of especially the activity, IEDs ( 86 CHAPTER EIGHT joined theneighbourhood watch,andthey the “good-bad” guysbecameourfriends and were notasbadthe “bad-badguys”. In time both “badguys” and“good-bad guys” who saw thatfrom thegroundside aswell. We had dug aholeintheroad, you gotblown up. We became tight,andtheword got outthatifyou situation around ontheground. Our ISR the air-ground teambegantoturnthe the battalionsinAlAnbarProvince, andhow wesee thehighlevel provided ofairsupport one ofmymostrewarding tours,asIgot to commenced. Being assignedtoRCT-6 was events andthenmonitorthemoncetheyhad from anIED. UAV, anAK-47ortrailingawire asitsoperatorwouldseeaguycarrying the ROE, theconfirmationthatagroup washostileoftencamefrom a from mannedaircraft –oftenaHarrier –tolookatsomething.Following see whatisgoingon”. In thesameway, we sometimesreceived cueing commanders whowouldsay, “You mightwanttopullupthisfeedand both Marine UAV operatorsandScanEaglecontractpersonnel. in RCT-6, havingarrangedthiswiththeUAV missioncommanders– targets suchasthisforhoursonend. We couldaccesstheUAV videofeed which hadtheendurancetoremain over thebattlefieldsearching out although there were nightcontactstoo. We usuallyfoundthemviaaUAV, IED emplacers. These engagementstypicallytook placeduringtheday, indeed rightontargetandnearbyfriendlieswere safe. centre couldalsoseetheMGRSgrid,andconfirmthatpilotwas to makesure thepilotwasrightontarget. The fire cellatthecommand MGRS grids,andhecouldtrackthepathofjetduringitsattackrun all thedataonground onthe ROVER and includingthepodview RaytheonAN/ASQ-28FLIR. the new dirty” integrationwiththeLiteningpod,asjetwasscheduledtoreceive Hornet’s ROVER displaygota“quick-and- pod wasseeing,plusallthecoordinates. The longitude, sotheFAC could seejustwhatthe coordinates onit,aswell asthelatitudeand Grid[Military Reference System] grid Harrier’s ROVER displayhadtheMGRS that oftheHornet. The difference wasthe Litening podhadamuchnicerdisplaythan some reason thefeedfrom theHarrier’s andtheirmotherhadaROVER.everyone For units.Indeed,and forward itseemedlike ROVER FAC, withevery inbattalionHQs Hornet carriedLiteningpods. We alsohad ‘It wastheregiment aircentre’s job toplan ‘Every onceinawhilewe wouldgetacallfrom oneoftheUAV mission Iwasin-theatre RCT-6‘While foughtasuccessfulcampaignagainst ‘For theFAC, hisdisplaywasbetterfrom theHarrier, andhecouldsee ‘By thattimeboththeHarrier andthe © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com (US Marine Corps) battlefield illuminationatnight by Harrier IIunitsin-theatre for This system was periodically used them on14March at 2008 Al Asad. over to the AV-8Bs parked behind from atrailer before moving them unload SUU-25flare dispensers Ordnance Marines of VMA-542 Kearsarge (USMarine Corps) VI exclusively from theflightdeck of Harrier II. ‘Det A’ supported OIF V/ based at Ali whilstrepairing the assistance from USAFpersonnel Marine Corps received valuable in ahard landingatthebase. The 163876, which hadbeendamaged to repair AV-8B Night Attack BuNo wing stand), on11 October inorder support equipment(includinga from Kearsarge, alongwiththeir in to Ali airbase, near An Nasiriyah, from VMA-223 ‘Det A’ hadto beflown Marine Corps maintenance personnel OIF V/VI 87 ‘Seeing the role aviation played in this phase in this aviation played the role ‘Seeing helped locals to point out the foreign fighters. fighters. foreign point out the locals to helped if out that figured us, but did not like They to work they had some security, they wanted counter the insurgency. with us to also was veryof OIF was It interesting. an air attack witness the effects of sobering to this created and the problems awry, that went to regain commander who had for the ground the trust this from of the locals. I walked away on incident with a very perspective different than I had of aviation fires the employment if a situation on, even then prior to it. From I ordnance, for employing met the ROE in June 2007. Capt Keith Bucklew, Bucklew, 2007. Capt Keith in June Richard www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing ‘On several occasions I had to have conversations with the Ops O O with the Ops conversations occasions I had to have several ‘On to support peacekeeping, 13th MEU-SOC/ support of the ‘surge’ In ‘From integrating with VMA-231 to getting and keeping the birds VMA-231 to getting and keeping the birds integrating with ‘From [Operations Officer] and pilots from one particular squadron in order to one particular in order and pilots from squadron Officer] [Operations as opposed to seeing on the ground, were explain to them what it was we it was up to the battalion commander Ultimately, their view the air. from of operations, and as his area to decide if he wanted to engage a target in air support only if it job to provide it was my Air Officer the Regimental was requested.’ to IIs A and its six Harrier VMA-513 Detachment HMM-163 sent Bonhomme Al Asad from always asked myself the following question – “I know you are a bad guy are you “I know question – following always asked myself the of collateral damage?” is the risk but should I as there and I can strike now, in the sky as they circled voices the frustration in pilots’ heard I routinely hunting somebody that they knew us was up to no good, and above no collateral damage issues, battalion continued clearly were although there was tough to take at times. It want them hit”. do NOT we to say “No, operationally ready, the Marines have done a great job. We were less kinetic were We job. done a great have the Marines operationally ready, VMA-513, and in most of to Al Asad with than in my 2006 deployment performedour missions we surveillance in operations in support of Marines VMA-513’s training officer for the detachment, remarked at the time; training officer for the detachment, remarked VMA-513’s Osprey © ) VMA-542 plane captain PFC Craig captain PFC Craig plane VMA-542 Phelps conducts last minute Al II+ at on his Harrier checks The 2007. November Asad on 17 the OIF mission supported ‘Tigers’ to 2007 September through from 2008 such – the last of four April to OIF I through from deployments OIF VI Corps (US Marine Checks completed, a Harrier II+ a Harrier completed, Checks the taxies out from VMA-542 from dispersal and heads for squadron on 17 long runways Asad’s Al one of ‘Tigers’’ One of the 2007. November their missions during primary called was deployment final Iraq sections saw which ‘aeroscout’, tankers for IIs searching of Harrier the Iraqi oil across stolen carrying Once a Turkey. or Syria to desert a heli- found, was suspicious tanker consisting Reaction Force Quick borne called in by was of infantry primarily the vehicle investigate to VMA-542 ) Corps (US Marine 88 CHAPTER EIGHT brief OIF VI commitmenttoanend. October, thusbringing VMA-223’s east intotheIndian Ocean in theNAG departed andsailedfurther had notbeenthere.’ received if22ndMEU-SOC otherwise capabilities thattheymightnothave fact thatwe were overhead providing appreciatedunits we supported the unusual. Icantellyou theground keeping aneye outforanything was spentgatheringinformationand from thecarrier. LtColJohn Adams wasthedetachmentcommander; On thisoccasion,however, thesixHarrier IIs theirOIF missions flew of22ndMEU-SOC/HMM-261embarked in which waspart return voyage home,itsplacebeingtakenby VMA-223 Detachment A, 27 pilotsand250maintainers. the air’. While atAlAsad, VMA-513 swelled VMA-231’s ranksto16jets, was goodtosee VMA-231 outhere, working hard keepingthebirds in with ‘Det A’, we arrived, it mechaniccommenting,‘When theairframe throughout thisperiod. with themissionfocusremaining onconvoy andIEDsurveillance escorts inthefirst30daysthat‘Det A’and 671sorties operatedfrom AlAsad, of thoseimages.’ could sendimagesfrom thepod,and italsogreatly enhancedthequality The move toadigitaldatalinkhelpedimprove therangeover whichwe what we couldsee,thushelpinguswith thepositive IDofpotentialtargets. ROVER terminalsontheground, FAC andcommandcentres couldsee guys emplacingIEDs.Since ourLiteningIIpodscouldsendanimageto focused more onscanningtheterrainfrom higheraltitude insearch ofbad areas.in rural We numerous alsoflew convoy route search missions. We The ‘We were taskedwithproviding oncallCAS, butthemajorityofourtime In September VMA-513 ‘Det A’ returned toBonhommeRichard forthe LCpl Adam Horn wasoneofthemaintenancepersonnelsentashore Bucklew addedthatthedetachment hadcompleted545flyinghours Kearsarge amphibiousgroup © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Kearsarge. (Capt Eric Hugg strength (ten aircraft) to Al Asad Harrier IIunitto deploy insquadron moment, as VMA-311 was thelast 2008. This proved to beanhistoric deployment to Al Asad on27March in therain atthestart oftheunit’s take off from MCAS Cherry Point AV-8Bs from VMA-311 prepare to Iraq on30March (CaptEric 2008 Hugg) East onthefinallegoftheirflightto USAF KC-10 tanker over theMiddle Two VMA-311 aircraft refuel from a ) OIF V/VI 89 The Desert By then responsibility for Harrier II II Harrier for responsibility then By officer for ‘I was the maintenance On 15 October 2008 VMA-311 VMA-311 2008 15 October On operations from Al Asad had been had been Al Asad from operations which had VMA-542, to passed on deployment for its OIF in-theatre arrived operate The unit would in September. 2008. April the base until from serving was Gettings with Jeremy Maj this time; during the ‘Tigers’ This was my second VMA-542. and the major to Iraq, deployment was the this time round difference of our One capability. JDAM AV-8B’s primary missions was called “aeroscout”, for tankers carryingsearching stolen oil The bad guys desert. the Iraqi across stealing both oil and gas and then were returned to MCAS Yuma from Al Asad. from Yuma to MCAS returned in-theatre, had ten aircraft ‘The “Tomcats” than 2000 missions flewand we more Maj with them during the deployment’, from Whalen told a reporter base newspaper. Yuma , the MCAS Warrior our missions, we majority of the vast ‘On we However, found something of interest. feedback of what it did not always receive one occasion, our actually was. On aviation maintenance officer, successfully located Charles DelPizzo, Maj fly as many didn’t We the air. an IED from This is deployments. hours as in previous was a year to what it fight now a different www.ospreypublishing.com • Publishing On 30 January 2008, 3rd MAW, led by Brig Gen Randolph Alles, Randolph Alles, Gen Brig led by MAW, 2008, 3rd 30 January On at VMA-311 Whalen, who was second in command of Jerome Maj replaced 2nd MAW at Al Asad. Two months later VMA-311, with 160 months later Two at Al Asad. 2nd MAW replaced to II unit to deploy became the final Harrier and ten AV-8Bs, Marines A, assigned to 15th MEU-SOC/ Detachment VMA-311’s June Al Asad. In , briefly supported OIF and maritime in Peleliu HMM-165 embarked the NAG. operations from is being minimal ordnance ‘Because PAO, MAW Al Asad, told a 3rd time was spent doing nontraditional of the squadron’s most dropped, any counter- intelligence surveillance missions. In and reconnaissance Obama Barack when Senator example, For intelligence is key. insurgency, 2008, I was asked to perform route visited Ramadi on 22 July using did this by We underway. getting prior to his convoy reconnaissance activity or anything that the Litening II pod to locate any suspicious looked out of the ordinary’. trucking the stuff to Syria or Turkey. Once a suspicious tanker was found, a suspicious Once Turkey. or trucking the stuff to Syria consisting primarily of infantry was Force Reaction a heli-borne Quick launched to investigate.’ Osprey © ) Marine Corps ordnance personnel ordnance Corps Marine ‘Det VMA-311 A’ from service the for system the linkless feed in the Harrier magazine 300-round pod fuselage right GFK-11/A49E II’s on 15 of LHA-5 on the flightdeck supported A’ ‘Det 2008. September VI exclusively in OIF Coalition forces whilst it sailed in the Peleliu from ) (US Navy NAG The ‘view from the office’. Capt Eric Capt Eric the office’. ‘view from The high over this self-portrait Hugg took historic VMA-311’s the Atlantic during in March Iraq to final deployment Hugg 2008 (Capt Eric 90 CHAPTER EIGHT closed 15dayslater. airlifted from officially thebaseon16December 2011andtheairfield its operationsatAlAsad. The lastremaining civilianpersonnelwere equipment atthebase,andinMarch 2010theMarine Corpsconcluded In 2009-10,personnelfrom IIMEFremoved themajorityofsupport remained oneofthelastAmerican-occupiedbasesinAlAnbarProvince. an Iraqi AsUSforces withdrew airfield. from thecountry, AlAsad in 2004,andmyopinionthatisaclearsignwe are winningthefight.’ been replaced by anotherAV-8B deploying unitsincewe started toAlAsad community, astothebestofmyknowledge thisisthefirsttimewe have not any, which was agoodthing. ago. Indeed, our“ordies” were loadingthebombs,butwe weren’t dropping VMA-311 wasindeedthefinalAV-8B Harrier IIunittooperatefrom been amilestonedeployment hascertainly fortheHarrier ‘This © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com NAG (USNavy) in2008 in Ramadiduring LHA-5’s timeinthe the Marine Corps, ‘2/5’ was stationed most highlydecorated battalion in Lt Col Todd Eckloff, onitsnose. The the battalion’s commandingofficer, Marines, aswell asthenameof the insigniaof2ndBattalion, 5th This VMA-311 ‘Det A’ jetwears (US Navy) in OIF from theflightdeck ofLHA-5 missions conducted by Harrier IIs HMM-165 flewsomeofthelast VMA-311 ‘Det A’ of15thMEU-SOC/ commissioning inMay 1980. NAG deployments sinceits Peleliu hasconducted numerous assault shipinactive service, The last Tarawa classamphibious APPENDICES APPENDICES

AV-8B HARRIER II UNIT OSW/OIF DEPLOYMENTS TO OSW February-June 2003 – VMA-311, I MEF/ATF-W, USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) AND OIF I-VI February-June 2003 – VMA-311 ‘Det A’, 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-161 and I MEF/ATF-W, USS Tarawa (LHA-1) VMA-211 ‘WAKE ISLAND AVENGERS’ November 2004-May 2005 – VMA-311, Al Asad November 2006-April 2007 – VMA-311 ‘Det A’, 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165, USS Boxer (LHD-4), and Al Asad OSW March-October 2008 – VMA-311, Al Asad January 1997 – VMA-211 ‘Det A’, 11th MEU-SOC/HMM-166, USS Essex June-July 2008 – VMA-311 ‘Det A’, 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165, USS (LHD-2) Peleliu (LHA-5) May-June 1998 – VMA-211 ‘Det A’, 11th MEU-SOC/HMM-268, USS Tarawa (LHA-1) VMA-513 ‘NIGHTMARES’ OSW/OIF February-May 2003 – VMA-211, I MEF/ATF-W, USS Bonhomme Richard OSW (LHD-6) September 2004-February 2005 – VMA-211 ‘Det A’, 31st MEU-SOC/ May-June 1997 – VMA-513 ‘Det A’, 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-161, USS HMM-265, USS Essex (LHD-2) and Al Asad Peleliu (LHA-5) and Ali-Al-Salem September 2005-January 2006 – VMA-211 ‘Det A’, 13th MEU-SOC/ October 1998 – VMA-513 ‘Det A’, 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-163, USS Essex HMM-163, USS Tarawa (LHA-1) and Al Asad (LHD-2) and Ali-Al-Salem OIF September 2006-March 2007 – VMA-211, Al Asad March-May 2005 – VMA-513 ‘Det A’, 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165, USS VMA-214 ‘BLACK SHEEP’ Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and Al Asad March-September 2006, VMA-513, Al Asad June-September 2007 – VMA-513 ‘Det A’, 13th MEU-SOC/HMM-163, USS OSW Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) and Al Asad September 1996 – VMA-214 ‘Det A’, 13th MEU-SOC/HMM-163. USS Tarawa (LHA-1) VMA-542 ‘TIGERS’ March-April 1999 – VMA-214 ‘Det A’, 13th MEU-SOC/HMM-364, USS Boxer (LHD-4) OSW/OIF OSW/OIF February-May 2003 – VMA-214, Ahmed Al Jaber February-May 2003 – VMA-542, I MEF/ATF-E, USS Bataan (LHD-5) May-August 2004 – VMA-214, Al Asad May-November 2004 – VMA-542, Al Asad September 2004-February 2005 – VMA-214 ‘Det A’. 11th MEU-SOC/ November 2006 – VMA-542 ‘Det A’, 24th MEU-SOC/HMM-365, USS Iwo HMM-166, USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) and Al Asad Jima (LHD-7) April-June 2006 – VMA-214 ‘Det A’, 11th MEU-SOC/HMM-166, USS September 2007-April 2008 – VMA-542, Al Asad Peleliu (LHA-5) AV-8B HARRIER IIs INVOLVED VMA-223 ‘BULLDOGS’ IN OIF I-VI

OSW/OIF OIF I February-May 2003 – VMA-223, I MEF/ATF-E, USS Bataan (LHD-5) August 2005-March 2006 – VMA-223, Al Asad VMA-231 ‘Det A’, 24th MEU-SOC/HMM-263 and I MEF/ATF-E, December 2005-March 2006 – VMA-223 ‘Det A’, 22nd MEU-SOC/ USS Nassau (LHA-4), 2-5/03 HMM-261, USS Nassau (LHA-4) and Al Asad BuNos 164560, 164570, 164571, 165003, 165390, 165391 September-October 2007 – VMA-223 ‘Det A’, 22nd MEU-SOC/HMM-261, USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) VMA-223, I MEF/ATF-E, USS Bataan (LHD-5), 2-5/03 BuNos 163863, 163864, 164569, 165354, 165355, 165380, 165384, VMA-231 ‘ACES’ 165385, 165386, 165387 VMA-542, I MEF/ATF-E, USS Bataan (LHD-5), 2-5/03 BuNos 163880, 164140, 164150, 164151, 164551, 164554, 164556, OSW/OIF 164557, 164559, 165001, 165004, 165307, 165309, 165310, 165311, 165312 February-May 2003 – VMA-231 ‘Det A’, 24th MEU-SOC/HMM-263 and I MEF/ATF-E, USS Nassau (LHA-4) VMA-211, I MEF/ATF-W, USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), March-September 2007 – VMA-231, Al Asad 2-5/03 BuNos 163872, 164119, 164128, 164152, 165006, 165423, 165425, VMA-311 ‘TOMCATS’ 165569, 165588, 165590 VMA-311, I MEF/ATF-W, USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), 2-5/03 OSW BuNos 163869, 164142, 164153, 165398, 165418, 165427, 165428, January 1996 – VMA-311 ‘Det A’, 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-268, USS Peleliu 165566, 165573, 165574, 165583, 165591 (LHA-5) and Ali-Al-Salem 91

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 92 APPENDICES VMA-223 ‘Det A’, 22ndMEU-SOC/HMM-261,USS 9/05-1/06 and AlAsad, (LHA-1) VMA-211 ‘Det A’, 13thMEU-SOC/HMM-163,USS 165383, 165387,166287 8/05-3/06 VMA-223, AlAsad, Wood (LHA-3)and VMA-214 ‘Det A’, 11th MEU-SOC/HMM-166,USS 165311, 165380,165381 5-11/04VMA-542, AlAsad, 165581, 165586,165589 5-8/04 VMA-214, AlAsad, 165578, 165579,165580,165581,165584,165586,165587,165589,165592 Jaber,2-5/03 VMA-214, AhmedAl USS Tarawa VMA-311 ‘Det A’, 15thMEU-SOC/HMM-161andIMEF/ATF-W, to VMA-214 atMCAS Yuma 2002. on22January was rebuiltintoHarrier II+BuNo165580, which was delivered air-to-air after missiles.In2000, beingdamaged,thisaircraft missiles, AGM-122 Sidearmanti-radiationmissilesand AIM-9M an interestingcombinationof AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface Ali-Al-Salem airbaseinKuwait. The Harrier IIswere armed with VMA-311’s ‘Det A’ flew OSWmissions for several weeks from on 26 April 1989. Inearly1996 thisaircraft andfive othersin Night Attack Harrier IIanddelivered to VMA-311 atMCAS Yuma AV-8B buildnumber150, BuNo163675 was constructed asa Ali-Al-Salem, January 1996 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-268, USSPeleliu (LHA-5) and AV-8B BuNo163675of VMA-311 Detachment A, 1 Richard VMA-513 ‘Det A’, 15thMEU-SOC/HMM-165,USS 165573, 165583,165584,165591 VMA-311,11/04-5/05 AlAsad, (LHD-2) VMA-211 ‘Det A’, 31stMEU-SOC/HMM-265,USS (LHA-4) OIF III OIF II BuNos 164128,164545,164553,165006,165421,165425 BuNos 163876,163879,164559,164562,165311,165354,165356, BuNos 163880,164151,164554,164556,164557,165001,165307, BuNos 163869,164148,165417,165426,165429,165578,165580, BuNos 164553,165397,165421,165424,165567,165568,165570, BuNos 163874,164117,164566,165422,165430,165572 BuNos 163874,164143,165397,165422,165427,165428,165430, BuNos 164119,164128,165567,165587,165588,165595 BuNos 164134,164154,165389,165570,165582,165592 BuNos 163870,164146,165418,165420,165576,165582 BuNos 163863,163864,165003,165357,165384,165386 (LHD-6)and and Al Asad, 12/05-3/06 and AlAsad, and Al Asad, 9/04-2/05 and AlAsad, (LHA-1),2-6/03 Al Asad, 7/04-2/05 Al Asad, 3-6/05 © Osprey COLOUR PLATES Essex T Belleau Bonhomme Nassau arawa Publishing

• www.ospreypublishing.com (LHD-4) VMA-311 ‘Det A’, 15thMEU-SOC/HMM-165,USS 165586, 165588,165589 VMA-211,9/06-3/07 AlAsad, (LHD-7), 1 VMA-542 ‘Det A’, 24thMEU-SOC/HMM-365,USS (LHA-5), 4-6/06 VMA-214 ‘Det A’, 11th MEU-SOC/HMM-166,USS 165586, 165588,165589 3-9/06 VMA-513, AlAsad, The pilotsafely ejectedfrom thestricken fighter. over MCAS Twenty-Nine Palms, California, on21June 2000. fire andcrashedwhileconductingaroutine trainingmission assigned to VMA-211 untilitsuffered in-flight acatastrophic Ahmed Al Jaber airbaseinKuwait. The aircraft remained participated inOSWmissionswiththe unit’s ‘Det A’ from 1992. Transferred to VMA-211 several years later, theHarrier II was delivered to VMA-513 atMCAS Yuma on15 September AV-8B buildnumber218, Night Attack aircraft BuNo164145 Ahmed Al Jaber, January 1997 11th MEU-SOC/HMM-166, USSEssex AV-8B BuNo164145of VMA-211 Detachment A, 2 VMA-223 ‘Det A’, 22ndMEU-SOC/HMM-261,USS Richard VMA-513 ‘Det A’, 13thMEU-SOC/HMM-163,USS 165390, 165593,166287 3-9/07 VMA-231, AlAsad, (LHA-5), 6-7/08 VMA-311 ‘Det A’, 15thMEU-SOC/HMM-165,USS 165589, 165591,165595 VMA-311,3-10/08 AlAsad, 165390, 165393,166287 9/07-4/08 VMA-542, AlAsad, (LHD-3) 9-10/07 OIF V/VI OIF IV BuNos 164571,165427,165428,165583,165584,165595 BuNos 163869,163870,164566,165568,165572,165578,165582, BuNos 163880 BuNos 164134,164148,164570,164580,165581,165592 BuNos 163869,163870,164566,165568,165572,165578,165582, BuNos 165420,165567,165569,165582,165587,165590 BuNos 164557,164558,164560,164567,164570,165306,165388, BuNos 163870,164117,165567,165569,165580,165581 BuNos 165382,165420,165566,165570,165577,165584,165587, BuNos 164557,164558,164560,164567,164570,165306,165388, BuNos 163864,163876,164562,165357,165384,165387 (LHD-6)and and AlAsad 1/06 , 164140, 165001,165004,165005,166288 , 11/06 to4/07 Al Asad, 6-9/07 (LHD-2)and Boxer Peleliu Peleliu Iwo Jima Bonhomme Kearsarge

APPENDICES 3 7 AV-8B BuNo 164121 of VMA-513 Detachment A, AV-8B BuNo 164119 of VMA-211, I MEF/ATF-W, 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-163, USS Essex (LHD-2) and USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), Northern Arabian Ali-Al-Salem, October 1998 Gulf, March 2003 AV-8B build number 198, Night Attack Harrier II BuNo 164121 AV-8B build number 196, Night Attack Harrier II BuNo 164119 was delivered to VMA-311 at MCAS Yuma on 2 February 1991. was delivered new to VMA-311 at MCAS Yuma on 10 The aircraft has served with several squadrons since then, and December 1990. Seeing action from LHD-6 during OIF I, the undertook a number of OSW missions with VMA-513 ‘Det A’ in aircraft returned to Iraq with VMA-211 ‘Det A’ in September October 1998 whilst land-based in Kuwait. It is presently 2004 when it departed LHD-2 with the rest of 31st MEU-SOC/ assigned to VMA-542. HMM-265 and flew to Al Asad. After serving with various squadrons since then, the fighter was lost on 18 July 2010 4 while attacking the Pinecastle bombing range in Florida. The jet AV-8B BuNo 163870 of VMA-214 Detachment A, was assigned to VMA-542 and flying from LHD-3 in the final 13th MEU-SOC/HMM-364, USS Boxer (LHD-4), stages of 31st MEU-SOC/HMM-262’s pre-deployment work- North Arabian Gulf, March-April 1999 ups at the time. The pilot ejected safely. AV-8B build number 179, this Night Attack Harrier II was delivered to VMA-214 at MCAS Yuma on 31 January 1990. 8 It was one of six jets assigned to VMA-214 ‘Det A’ embarked AV-8B BuNo 165004 of VMA-542, I MEF/ATF-E, in Boxer in 1998-99, and it flew a handful of OSW missions. USS Bataan (LHD-5), North Arabian Gulf, April 2003 The aircraft subsequently served with VMA-513 and AV-8B build number 260, radar-equipped Harrier II BuNo 165004 participated in OIF II, deployed with 15th MEU/HMM-165 was delivered to VMA-231 in 26 May 1995. Assigned to various aboard USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) in 2005. The aircraft units over the past 18 years, it saw combat in OIF I with flew from Al Asad with the detachment between March and VMA-542. The jet is presently serving with VMA-231 once again. June 2005, and returned to Iraq with VMA-513 in March 2006. It was transferred to VMA-211 at Al Asad in September of that 9 year, remaining in-theatre until March 2007. The aircraft AV-8B BuNo 165583 of VMA-311, I MEF/ATF-W, participated in VMA-311 ‘Det A’s’ deployment with 15th MEU/ USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), Northern Arabian HMM-165 aboard USS Peleliu (LHA-5) in 2008, flying some of Gulf, April 2003 the final OIF VI missions from the vessel in June-July 2008. AV-8B build number 320 was a remanufactured aircraft that BuNo 163870 is presently assigned to VMA-214. used parts from BuNo 163690. Delivered to VMA-311 at MCAS Yuma on 28 March 2002, the jet was one of 12 Harrier IIs 5 embarked by the unit in LHD-6 in January 2003 and sent to the AV-8B BuNo 165391 of VMA-231 ‘Det A’, 24th NAG for OIF I. It returned to Iraq with VMA-311 in November MEU-SOC/HMM-263 and I MEF/ATF-E, USS Nassau 2004, when the squadron conducted a six-month tour of duty (LHA-4), Northern Arabian Gulf, March 2003 flying from Al Asad. BuNo 165583 was also part of VMA-311’s AV-8B build number 286, this aircraft was delivered to VMA- ‘Det A’ that disembarked from LHD-4 in November 2006 and 542 on 11 June 1999 and later transferred to VMA-231. One of flew OIF IV missions from Al Asad. The aircraft is presently six aircraft embarked by ‘Det A’ in LHA-4 in late August 2003 assigned to VMA-211. for the vessel’s scheduled deployment to Fifth Fleet’s AOR, it had the dubious distinction of being the only Harrier II to be 10 lost during OIF I when it crashed while approaching Nassau AV-8B BuNo 164566 of VMA-311 Detachment A, 15th during a night recovery on 1 April 2003. The pilot successfully MEU-SOC/HMM-161 and I MEF/ATF-W, USS Tarawa ejected and BuNo 165391 remained afloat long enough for it to (LHA-1), Northern Arabian Gulf, April 2003 be recovered. AV-8B build number 251 was delivered to VMA-223 at MCAS Cherry Point on 29 July 1994. Eventually assigned to VMA-311, it 6 was one of six jets that formed ‘Det A’ within 15th MEU-SOC/ AV-8B BuNo 165580 of VMA-214, Ahmed Al Jaber, HMM-161 aboard LHA-1 in January 2003. Assigned to April 2003 detachment commander Maj Bradford Gering, this aircraft was AV-8B build number 317, radar-equipped AV-8B Harrier II+ adorned with a one-off ‘sharksmouth’ and eventually wore a BuNo 165580 was delivered to VMA-214 on 18 January 2002. bomb tally just forward of the intake. This aircraft subsequently This remanufactured aircraft used parts from AV-8B day attack served with VMA-513 at Al Asad between March and September aircraft BuNo 163675 (see profile 1). Note the bomb tally just 2006, before being transferred to VMA-211 in-country when the forward of the intake and the name of legendary World War 2 unit squadron replaced the ‘Nightmares’ – all ten jets from the ace and unit founder ‘Pappy’ Boyington beneath the cockpit. latter squadron were handed over to the ‘Wake Island Avengers’. VMA-214 has long had a tradition of adorning the CO’s jet BuNo 164566 is presently serving with VMA-214. with Boyington’s name. BuNo 165580 was one of ten Harrier IIs that VMA-214 sent to Al Asad for four months in May 2004 11 as part of OIF II. Subsequently transferred to VMA-311, the AV-8B BuNo 165429 of VMA-214, Al Asad, June 2004 aircraft spent more time patrolling over Iraq and the NAG in AV-8B build number 301 was delivered to VMA-311 at MCAS June-July 2008 as part of the unit’s ‘Det A’, embarked in Yuma on 2 October 2000, and by early 2004 it was assigned to LHA-5 with 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165. These missions were VMA-214. The aircraft was one of ten Harrier IIs sent to flown exclusively from Peleliu, rather than from Al Asad. Al Asad in May 2004 following an upsurge in violence in Iraq. It BuNo 165580 is presently serving with VMA-513. is presently assigned to VMA-513. 93

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 94 APPENDICES BuNo 165595 with ispresentlyserving VMA-513. from thebaseby VMA-311 betweenMarch andOctober2008. Harrier II Al Asad OIFdeployment, beingoneoftenjetsflown HMM-165 fromLHD-4. This aircraft alsoparticipatedinthefinal unit’s sixHarrier IIsflyinginto Al Asad with 15th MEU-SOC/ returned toIraqwith VMA-311’s ‘Det A’ inNovember the 2006, Asad following Essex’s arrival intheNAG. BuNo165595 LHD-2. The AV-8Bs spentanumberofmonthsashoreat Al the unitas‘Det A’ with31stMEU-SOC/HMM-265aboard it was oneofsixHarrier IIsdeployed fromMCAS Iwakuni by on 21February 2003. Assigned to VMA-211 thefollowing year, BuNo 163188 anddelivered to PointVMA-231 atMCAS Cherry AV-8B buildnumber332was remanufactured usingpartsfrom Al Asad, September to 2004 February 2005 31st MEU-SOC/HMM-265, USSEssex AV-8B BuNo165595of VMA-211 Detachment A, 13 BuNo 164556 with continuestoserve VMA-542. Al Asad withtheunitbetweenMay andNovember 2004. from LHD-5with thisaircraftVMA-542 in2003, alsoflew from PointCherry on6October1993. Having seenactioninOIFI AV-8B buildnumber241was delivered to VMA-542 atMCAS AV-8B BuNo164556of VMA-542, Al Asad, July2004 12 September 2001. Flown from Ahmed Al Jaber by VMA-214 during BuNo 162943 anddelivered to VMA-513 atMCAS Yuma on6 AV-8B buildnumber 306was remanufactured usingpartsfrom AV-8B BuNo165568 of VMA-513, Al Asad, April 2006 17 BuNo1650062005-06. ispresentlyassignedto VMA-513. months at Al Asad withDetachment A fromthesameunitin OIF Iwith VMA-211 embarked inLHD-6,andthenspentfour Pointat MCAS Cherry on4October1995. Itsaw combatin AV-8B buildnumber262,thisaircraft was delivered to VMA-231 Al Asad, September to 2005 February 2006 31st MEU-SOC/HMM-265, USSEssex AV-8B of BuNo165006 VMA-211 Detachment A, 16 with VMA-231. at BuNo164562of duty Al Asad in2005-06. currently serves participated inOIFIIIduringthe‘Bulldogs’’ seventh-month tour PointMCAS Cherry on7February 1994. The aircraft AV-8B buildnumber247was delivered new to VMA-223 at October 2005 AV-8B BuNo164562of VMA-223, Al Asad, 15 is presentlystillassignedto VMA-311. with thesquadronto Al Asad inNovember BuNo165397 2004. I. Transferred to VMA-311 thefollowing year, the jetdeployed aircraft went towar withtheunitfrom Ahmed Al Jaber inOIF Delivered to VMA-214 at MCAS Yuma on8July 1999, the a radar-equipped Harrier IIusingpartsfromBuNo161589. AV-8B buildnumber287, BuNo165397 was remanufactured as February 2005 AV-8B BuNo165397of VMA-311, Al Asad, 14 © Osprey (LHD-2)and (LHD-2)and Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Helmand Province, at2215 hrson14 September2012. destroyed ina Taleban attack onCampBastion, in Afghanistan’s when itwas oneofsixHarrier IIsfromtheunitthatwere BuNo165568September 2006. with was stillserving VMA-211 spent afullyear at Al Asad –itwas assignedto VMA-211 from OIF I,thejetreturned toIraqwith VMA-513 inMarch and 2006 19 Bastion on14 September2012. 165568, endinthe ittoometafiery Taleban raidonCamp with thisunitand Asad in2006-07 VMA-211. And like BuNo the ‘Black Sheep’from Ahmed Al Jaber andspentayear at Al November 2001, BuNo165578 alsosaw combatinOIFIwith 163203. Delivered to VMA-214 atMCAS Yuma on30 AV-8B buildnumber315 was createdusingpartsfromBuNo December 2006 AV-8B BuNo165578of VMA-211, Al Asad, 18 assigned to VMA-311. ‘Det A’ disembarked fromLHD-6.BuNo165587 ispresently months at Al when Asad inthesummerof2007 VMA-513 of 31stMEU-SOC/HMM-265. The Harrier IIspentthreemore which went ashoreto Al Asad fromLHD-2alongwith therest for itwas OIFI.InSeptember2004 part of VMA-211’s ‘Det A’, however, Ithadbeentransferred22 July 2002. to VMA-214 by year-end, BuNo 162960, was delivered to VMA-211 atMCAS Yuma on AV-8B buildnumber345,remanufactured usingpartsfrom (LHD-6) and Al Asad, Juneto September 2007 13th MEU-SOC/HMM-163, USSBonhommeRichard AV-8B BuNo165587of VMA-513 Detachment A, 21 the Taleban attack onCampBastion on14 September2012. transferred to VMA-211. BuNo164570 was alsodestroyed in mount ofunitCO, LtColBrian Annichiarico), after which itwas colourful one-off scheme depicted here,denotingitsroleasthe six monthsat Al Asad with (wearing VMA-231 in2007 the VMA-214’s ‘Det A’ between April andJune 2006. The jetspent MEU-SOC/HMM-263, andthenflew over IraqfromLHA-5with OIF Iflyingwith VMA-231’s ‘Det A’ fromLHA-4aspartof24th Pointat MCAS Cherry on19 October1994. Itsaw combatin AV-8B buildnumber255,thisaircraft was delivered to VMA-231 AV-8B164570, VMA-231,BuNo 2007 AlAsad, April 20 deployment. BuNo165595 iscurrently assignedto VMA-513. whentheunitcompletedfinalHarrier IIOIF 2008 The aircraft was sentback to Al Asad with VMA-311 inMarch when 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165, disembarked fromLHD-4. it returned toIraqwith VMA-311 ‘Det A’ inNovember 2006 Spendingtimeashoreat 2004-05. Al Asad duringthiscruise, aboard LHD-2as‘Det A’ with31stMEU-SOC/HMM-265in VMA-211, theaircraft was oneofsixHarrier IIsdeployed Pointat MCAS Cherry on21February 2003. Transferred to using partsfromBuNo163188. Itwas delivered to VMA-231 AV-8B buildnumber332,BuNo165595 was remanufactured Al Asad, November to 2006 April 2007 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165, USSBoxer (LHD-4)and AV-8B BuNo165595of VMA-311 Detachment A, and dulydeployed withtheunitto Ahmed Al Jaber

APPENDICES/INDEX 22 2008 when the ‘Tomcats’ completed the final Harrier II OIF AV-8B BuNo 164567 of VMA-542, Al Asad, deployment. BuNo 165570 is presently assigned to VMA-211. November 2007 AV-8B build number 252, this aircraft was delivered to VMA-223 24 at MCAS Cherry Point on 16 August 1994. BuNo 164567 made AV-8B BuNo 163870 of VMA-311 Detachment A, its OIF debut with VMA-231 at Al Asad in March 2007, and it 15th MEU-SOC/HMM-165, USS Peleliu (LHA-5), was one of ten jets left at the base by the ‘Aces’ for incoming Northern Arabian Gulf, June-July 2008 VMA-542 in September of that year. It remains in service with AV-8B aircraft build number 178 was delivered to VMA-214 at the ‘Tigers’ in 2013. MCAS Yuma on 5 February 1990. Its first exposure to OIF came between March and June 2005 when it went ashore 23 from LHD-6 to Al Asad with VMA-513’s ‘Det A’ as part of 15th AV-8B BuNo 165570 of VMA-311, Al Asad, MEU-SOC/HMM-165. BuNo 163870 returned to Iraq with the March 2008 ‘Nightmares’ in March 2006, and was transferred to VMA-211 AV-8B build number 328 was remanufactured using parts from six months later when VMA-513 ended its OIF IV deployment. BuNo 162953 and delivered to VMA-214 at MCAS Yuma on 30 The veteran jet patrolled Iraq and conducted maritime April 2002. It saw combat with the ‘Black Sheep’ from reconnaissance mission over the NAG during the final months Ahmed Al Jaber in OIF I in 2003, and was part of the unit’s of OIF VI whilst serving with VMA-311’s Detachment A ‘Det A’ that came ashore to Al Asad from LHA-3 in September embarked in LHA-5. BuNo 163870 is currently assigned 2004. The aircraft returned to Al Asad with VMA-311 in March to VMA-214.

INDEX

References to illustrations are shown in bold. BuNo 164566 37, 93 Blakely, Maj Keith 60 BuNo 164567 41, 95 Boyington, Maj Gregory ‘Pappy’ 21, 27 A-4M Skyhawk, US 9 BuNo 164570 40, 94 Bright Star, Operation 76 A-10 Thunderbolt, US 15, 16, 24, 29, 82 BuNo 165004 36, 93 British Army: 1st Armoured Division 47 A-10A Thunderbolt II, US 26 BuNo 165006 39, 94 Bucklew, Capt Keith 87–8 Abu Hanifah Mosque attack, Baghdad 30–3 BuNo 165357 38, 94 Buckner, LCpl Kyler 80 AC-130 Specter, US 28, 63–4, 68 BuNo 165391 35, 55, 93 Bush, George H W 17 Adams, Lt Col John 88 BuNo 165429 37, 93–4 Bush, George W 19, 33 AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters, US 8, 23, BuNo 165568 39, 94 Butler, Maj Mark 30–2 63, 64, 84 BuNo 165570 41, 95 Ahmed Al Jaber air base, Kuwait 15, 16, 21–33, BuNo 165578 39, 94 C-17 Globemaster, US 29 25, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 46, 46, 47, 50, 57, 58, BuNo 165580 35, 93 C-130 Hercules, US 29 59, 60, 61, 62, 64 BuNo 165583 36, 93 Cane, Capt John 15 Al Anbar Province, Iraq 72–83, 84–90 BuNo 165587 40, 94–5 Carnesi, Maj Thomas 20 Al Assd air base, Iraq 72, 72–83, 73, 80, 86 BuNo 165595 38, 40, 94 CBU/Rockeye cluster bombs 53 Al Fajr/Phantom Fury Operation 67–71 cockpit 11 CH-46 helicopters, US 8, 84 Al Kut, Iraq 49, 50, 51, 60 Night Attack aircraft 6, 9, 10, 10–11, 12, 15, CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters, US 8, 28, 84 Ali-Al-Salem air base, Kuwait 15, 15, 16 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 34, 45, 47, 49, 51, 57, Claypool, Lt Col Robert 12, 21, 24, 24, 25, 27, Alles, Brig Gen Randolph 89 59, 68, 76, 76, 79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 92 28–9, 31, 33 al-Qaeda 63 upgrades 10–13 Cryer, Capt Vance 15 Amos, Maj Gen 28, 46, 47, 62 weapons and ordnance; BLU-110 1000-lb An Nasiriyah 24–5 bomb 42, 43; GAU-12U Equalizer DelPizzo, Capt Charles 69, 89 An Numaniyah FARP, Iraq 22, 29, 50–1, 51, 59, 25 mm Gatling gun 42, 43, 65, 66, 71, 76, 83; Desert Shield, Operation 9–10, 54 60, 61 GBU-12 6, 48, 50, 51, 53, 53, 56, 57, 59, 59, Desert Storm, Operation (1991) 6, 9–10, 12–13, Anderson, Maj Kane 80–1 65, 68, 70, 71, 76, 80, 83; GBU-16 LGB 1000-lb 22, 23, 49 Angular, LCpl Nicholas 79 bomb 42, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 57, 58, 65, 71; D’Haiti, Lt Col Ossen 80 Annibale, Capt Marcus 17–18, 20, 46 GBU-32(V)2/B JDAM 42, 43; GBU-38(V)2/B Dolan, Capt Jennifer 60 Annichiarico, Lt Col Brian 85 JDAM 42, 43, 79, 83, 84; GBU-51 LGB 500-lb Duncan, Capt Jason 51, 54 Arnold, Lt Col Chester 64 bomb 6, 42, 43; Laser Maverick (AGM-65E) Dunkin, Maj Steven 20 ASB-19 Angle Rate Bombing System (ARBS) 10 30, 42, 43, 53, 59, 65, 70, 71, 76, 79, 83; Austin, Lt Col Eric 79 LAU-10D/A 150-lb rocket 42, 43; Mk 82 Mod Enduring Freedom, Operation 19 AV-8B Harrier II, USMC: 2 bomb 42, 43 Evans, GSgt Christopher 78 BuNo 163675 15, 34, 92 Azimiyah Palace, Baghdad 30 Everman, Lt Col Mark 64, 66, 67 BuNo 163870 35, 41, 93, 95 BuNo 163876 86 Bardo, Capt Tyler 30–2 F/A-18 Hornets, USMCA 7–8, 18, 23, 68, 84 BuNo 164119 36, 93 Berg-Johnsen, Capt Jon F 44 F-14 Tomcats, US 18 BuNo 164121 34, 93 Berry, Capt Guy 79 F-15E Strike Eagle, US 81 BuNo 164145 34, 92 Black, Capt Michael 46, 47, 49, 52 F-16 Fighting Falcon, US 14, 26, 64, 68 BuNo 164556 37, 94 Blair, Tony 19 Fallujah, Iraq 63, 65, 71 II BuNo 164562 38, 94 Blake, Maj Peter S 46, 49, 51, 54 Fallujah Brigade 64 95

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 96 INDEX McCann, CaptDavid Mattis, GenJames62 Maples, CaptWilliam21–2,25,26,27, MANPADS, insurgent air-defence weapons65,66 Lynch, PFCJessica27,28 Locher, CaptAaron‘Sulu’30–2 Litening IIpods(AV-8B HarrierII)12, Linebacker Latif, MajGenMuhammed64 Lancaster, LtColDavid75 Kuwait AirForce(KAF)15,16 Kuckuk, LtColRobert73–4,75 Krippendorf, CaptBen46, Kirkuk, Iraq33 ‘keyhole CAS’68,70,71 Kennedy, ColJohn84 Kendro, CaptPhilip66–71 KC-135 Stratotanker, US76 KC-130 Hercules,US KC-10 tankers,US76, Kane, MajJohn69–70,73 Kaczorowski, CaptBrian51–2, Johnson, MajGenStephen74 JDAM systems13,64,78, James, Operation26 Jackson, Jackie11 Iraqi Freedom Iraq Army;AlNidaArmouredDivision27,29, Improvised ExplosiveDevices(IEDs)76,77,80, Hutchins, CaptBen78 Hile, LtColMike44,45,46,47,48, Hermley, MajShawn85–7 Harrison, Sgt Hanifen, BrigGenTimothy 84 Hagee, MajGenMichael23 Gough, CaptMichel Goth, MajMike47 Gonzales, Sgt Gering, LtColBradford Franks, GenTommy R19 Forrest, MajDavid46, Fleet AirArm800NavalSquadron,UK19 Hurd, CaptJames Hough, CaptRyan68–9 Horn, LCplAdam88 HMS Invincible Godley, CaptSean Glover, CaptDoug59 Gettings, CaptJeremy76,89 79–80 86, 88 58, 5961,62,65,67,68,71,75,76,80,83, 26, 28,31,33,48,49,50,51, 84–90; battleforBaghdad29–33 II/III 63–71;IV72–83;V/VI‘Surge’(2007) 25, 27,60;T-55 tanksdestroyed Armoured Division27;RepublicanGuards18, FO planningandorganisation19–20;Medina 62; BaghdadMotorisedDivision27,29,49; 82, 83,84,85,88 Taskforce 64 , OperationI(2003)6,17,21–62; 51 51 19 20 15 15 15 59, 84 88 47 15, 46, 47 79, 80,81,89 47, 48, 54 51, 56, 51, 53–4, 60 13, 21,24, 48, 82 31, 64–6, 56, 57, 54 © Osprey Ramshur Ramadi, Iraq65, Rahe, CaptJohn Quintara, CaptSteve Provide Comfort, Prince Sultanairbase,SaudiArabia23 Price, LtColWillis78 Phelps, CaptCraig87 Petraeus, GenDavid84 Pate, GenRandolph61–2 Parker, CaptMatt46, Papaj, LtColChris81–3 Ortega, CplJohn81 Obama, Barack89 North, LtColOliver49 Nite Hawktargetingpod(F/A-18) Natonski, MajGenRichardF. 73 Nasiriyah, Iraq27–8 Murphy, CaptJim Mosul, Iraq33 Moseley, LtGenTMichael23 Moore, CaptDavid46, Milstead, BrigGenRobert73 MiG-25 (IrAF)14 McPhillips, ColChris14–15, McCorkle, LtGenFrederick12 Schnelle, CaptJames Schland, MajTodd Savarese, Col25,44,45,46,49,61,62 Sanborn, LtColRussell64, SAM/AAA threats25–6,27,28,48,50,51,54, Saddam Hussein14,47,58,63 Saddam HospitalMission,Nasiriyah27–8 Rupp, LtColPaul61 Rules ofEngagement(ROE)15,26,48,52–3,57, Rountree, MajJohn79 Rolls-Royce PegasusF402-RR-408engines6, Rizzo, CaptChristian66 Rivers, CaptDuane46, River Blitz River Bend Riedy, MajMark84,85 Remote OperationalVideoEnhancedReceiver Ray, LtColJohn79 Southern Watch Southern Force Simmons, CaptPaul Shaffner, CaptCraig46, Senecal, MSgtMarc78 Scott, CaptJeffrey27–8 Schroder, MajRob46, Schoolfield, CaptSam60 Steranduerg, MajShawn 74 Steel Curtain Stankewicz, CaptGreg Stalder, MajGenKeith69 65, 79 65, 82,86,87 10, 11 (ROVER) 13,71,78,80,83, 14–20, 21,22,23,46,47,53 Publishing , CaptKelly , Operation73 , Operation74 , Operation76,77 , Operation56,57 , Operation(1996–2003)6, Operation14 82 20 20 15 19, 20 15 • 15 47 18, 20 47, 74,75 47 15 47, 48 www.ospreypublishing.com 47 65, 66 15 83, 86,88 13, 48 14, USS Bataan USS AbrahamLincoln US MarineCorpsAviation squadrons: US MarineCorps:1stDivision25,29,44,62, US Army;3rdInfantryDivision25,29;82nd UH-1 Hueyhelicopters,US60 Tikrit, Iraq54 Task ForceTarawa 27–8,84 Stromberg, LtColRuss10 Stout, CaptJay30,53 Woodward, LtColKenM60 Woltman, LtColClyde15,16,45–6,48–9,50–1, Williams, LtColJoseph18–19 Willey, Maj Dale17, White, SgtTravis 77–80 Whalen, MajJerome89–90 Vest, LtColKevinS44–5,47,50,52–3 Valiant Resolve,Operation63–4 USS Wasp 55,64 USS T USS Saipan USS Peleliu USS Nassau USS Kearsarge USS Juneau USS IwoJima USS Germantown USS FortMcHenry USS Essex USS BonhommeRichard USS Boxer USS BelleauW VMA-542 9,20, VMA-513 VMA-311 9,14, VMA-231 VMA-223 20, VMA-214 I,10,18,21–33OIF VMA-211 71, 72–3 Airborne Division63;M1A1Abrams 51, 69–71,73 44–54, arawa 20,20,44–54, command andcontrolstructure,OIR 62, 64–9, 74, 8587–8, VMA-513 DetachmentA17, targeting resultsduringOIF53, command andcontrolstructure,OIR 90; AlKutattack49;briefinggraphic 70, 7272–83, 40, 44–54, 84–90, structure, OIR 75–80, scoreboard 23; SaddamHospitalPoWsmission27–8; 22; commandandcontrolstructure,OIR Baghdad 30–3;'BlackSheep'playbook 79–82, 32, 353747,60,61,64–71, control structure,OIR 67–71, 72,76, 8,1517,18,38,39, 18,20,35,40,81,82 45, 56,74, 14,15,34,41,79,80, 20,20, 20,20,36,44,55–62, 8 9,20,44, 25, 333970,77–80, 35, 4044,55–62, 17, 20,3436383944–54, 55,56,81, 85 86, 88–90;commandandcontrol 81; AbuHanifahmosqueattack, 20,20,55–62, ood 67,69 65, 6681, 38, 44,55–62, 8 47, 50515253,54 32 8 36, 374044,55–62, 15, 17,20, 23 20 73, 81–3, 76, 7780–2;commandand 17,18,19 85, 88 55, 55–62,77 20,20,25,36,40, 83 76 83, 85–90, 23 56, 86,88 34, 363738 88, 89,89–90, 56, 5861,62 55, 5683,84 67, 67–71 24, 272830 81, 8990 58, 616275 18, 203440 79, 8085–90; 68, 6972, 54 , 69–71, 86, 87; 72 57, 59 23 23; 45, 47 45; Related Titles ISBN SERIES No. TITLE 978 1 84176 801 4 Combat Aircraft 46 US Navy Hornet Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Part One) 978 1 84176 802 1 Combat Aircraft 47 F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom 978 1 84176 787 1 Combat Aircraft 49 Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat 978 1 84176 803 8 Combat Aircraft 52 US Navy F-14 Tomcat Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom 978 1 84176 730 7 Combat Aircraft 53 F-15C Eagle Units in Combat 978 1 84176 847 2 Combat Aircraft 56 US Marine Corps and RAAF Hornet Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom 978 1 84176 848 9 Combat Aircraft 57 AH-64 Apache Units of Operations Enduring Freedom & Iraqi Freedom 978 1 84176 885 4 Combat Aircraft 58 US Navy Hornet Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Part Two) 978 1 84176 909 7 Combat Aircraft 59 F-15E Strike Eagle Units in Combat 1990–2005 978 1 84176 992 9 Combat Aircraft 60 B-1B Lancer Units in Combat 978 1 84176 994 3 Combat Aircraft 61 F-16 Fighting Falcon Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom 978 1 84176 993 6 Combat Aircraft 64 B-2A Spirit Units in Combat 978 1 84603 182 3 Combat Aircraft 68 F-117 Stealth Fighter Units of Operation Desert Storm 978 1 84603 205 9 Combat Aircraft 70 F-14 Tomcat Units of Operation Enduring Freedom 978 1 84908 444 4 Combat Aircraft 90 AV-8B Harrier II Units of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm

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© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com First published in Great Britain in 2013 by Osprey Brad Gering – VMA-211; Col Robert Kuckuk – VMA-311; Publishing Col Chris McPhillips – VMA-311; Col Mark Savarese – PO Box 883, Oxford, OX1 9PL, UK MAG-13; Col Russ Stromberg – VMA-214; Col Kevin Vest PO Box 3985, New York, NY 10185-3985, USA – VMA-211; Col Clyde Woltman – MAG-13 and VMA- 311; Brig Gen Russell Sanborn – VMA-542 E-mail: [email protected] Osprey Publishing is part of the Osprey Group © Osprey Publishing. Access to this book is not digitally © 2013 Osprey Publishing Limited restricted. In return, we ask you that you use it for personal, non-commercial purposes only. Please don’t upload this All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the ebook to a peer-to-peer site, email it to everyone you know, purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as or resell it. Osprey Publishing reserves all rights to its digital permitted under the Copyright, Design and Patents Act content and no part of these products may be copied, stored 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form by any in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, recording or otherwise means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, (except as permitted here), without the written permission photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior written of the publisher. Please support our continuing book permission. All enquiries should be addressed to the publishing programme by using this e-book responsibly. publisher. Every effort has been made by the Publisher to secure A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the permissions to use the images in this publication. If there British Library has been any oversight we would be happy to rectify the situation and written submission should be made to ISBN: 978 1 78096 310 5 Osprey Publishing. PDF e-book ISBN: 978 1 78096 311 2 ePub ISBN: 978 1 78096 312 9 Front Cover On 16 May 2006 Maj Guy Berry and Capt Keith Bucklew of VMA-513, flying from Al Asad, in central Iraq, completed Edited by Tony Holmes a challenging mission. Taking off in their AV-8Bs during Cover Artwork by Gareth Hector the early hours of the morning, the two pilots were originally assigned convoy escort. However, shortly after Aircraft Profiles by Jim Laurier leaving Al Asad the pilots were instructed by the Marine Index by Mike Parkin Corps Direct Air Support Center (DASC) to fly to a site Originated by PDQ Digital Media Solutions, UK southeast of Fallujah to support Marines on the ground tracking insurgents after an ambush. Once on the scene Capt Bucklew used his Litening II www.ospreypublishing.com FLIR/LST targeting pod to monitor a house that insurgents were thought to have fled into. At this point the pilots were Acknowledgements cleared by a Forward Air Controller (FAC) to attack the Many individuals supported the development of this book, house with a laser-guided AGM-65 Maverick missile. Maj Berry duly illuminated the target with the laser fitted in his including Dr Fred Allison, Hank Cole, Lt Col Theodore Litening II pod while Capt Bucklew began his missile run Herman, Mary Joscelyn, Steven Little, Michael Monahan from north to south. His weapon struck the target with and Vlado Zavich. Thank you also to Marine Corps Public clinical accuracy. Affairs Officers (PAOs) Maj Stacy Reidinger and Lt Megan Moments later the Litening II pod’s FLIR detected the heat signatures of insurgents entrenched around Greathouse. The editor would also like to thank Maj Doug the house, and Maj Berry alerted the Marines to their Glover for the provision of OIF I photographs. presence – they were soon located and routed out. Other Finally, the author would like to thank the following Marine insurgents fled in a vehicle, which the Harrier II pilots Corps aviators: Capt Keith Bucklew – VMA-513; Lt Col followed from a discreet distance using their FLIR. Having seen the vehicle park near another house, Maj Berry related Marcus Annibale – VMA-513; Lt Col Brian Annichiarico – this information to Marines on the ground. VMA-231; Lt Col Peter Blake – VMA-311; Lt Col Charles Instructed to maintain surveillance on the enemy DelPizzo – VMA-542, VMA-214 and VMA-311; Lt Col throughout the mission, the pilots took it in turns to ‘yo-yo’ out to a tanker to refuel. After a long mission that lasted Mark Everman – VMA-214; Lt Col Jeremy Gettings – nearly six hours, and saw each Harrier II visit the tanker VMA-311; Lt Col Shawn Hermley – VMA-231; Lt Col four times, Maj Berry and Capt Bucklew were eventually Mike Hile – VMA-311; Lt Col Joseph Williams – VMA- relieved and flew back to Al Asad shortly after sunrise 214 and VMA-311 ‘Det A’; Lt Col William Maples – (Cover artwork by Gareth Hector) VMA-214; Lt Col Michael Perez – VMA-542; Lt Col Willis E Price – VMA-513; Col Robert Claypool – VMA-214; Col © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com