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The relationship between and after independence – Interdependences as key variables for sustainable peace

Arnold H. Kammel

Throughout its history Sudan has been di- tive status in the North, as defined under to cause displacement. This is very much vided between its Arab heritage, identified the CPA, or become part of the South not due to the unresolved existing strong with northern Sudan, and its African heri- taking into consideration the outcome of interdependences between the two states tages to the South. Especially since colo- the independence referendum of South that are currently hindering melioration in nial times, tensions have existed between Sudan. the relationship. Therefore it is necessary the two parts resulting in two civil wars to take a closer look on these interdepen­ between 1955-1972 and 1983-2005. The As foreseen by the CPA, a referendum on dences and to analyse the possibilities and conflict has often been portrayed as an the independence of South Sudan was the urgent necessities for implementation ethnic conflict between the largely Arab, held in January 2011. With an overwhel- of the respective agreements, including Muslim North and the predominantly ming majority, the South Sudanese popu- their impact on the bilateral relations as Christian, African, Animist South. However, lation voted in favor of separation from well as economic and political stability. the root causes go deeper and can best be Sudan. It has to be noted that contrary to described as conflicts between politically the outside expectations, the referendum Oil and economically marginalized groups in was held in a fair and peaceful manner. Al- the peripheral areas of the country and ready in the forefront of the proclamation Oil and the oil revenues have been at the the elites of the major urban centre in the of the referendum results, Sudanese Presi- very heart of the struggle between Sudan capital of Sudan, . dent Bashir publicly stated that he would and South Sudan. South Sudan is the most accept the outcome of the referendum oil dependent country in the world, with The Comprehensive Peace Agreement as it represented the will of the Southern oil exports accounting for almost the tota- (CPA) of 2005 is the most crucial mile­stone people. Nonetheless, it became obvious lity of exports, and for around 80% of GDP, in the ongoing political development that some important issues between the directly and indirectly. For Sudan, the oil of Sudan, ending ’s bloodiest war two split states had not been entirely sector has been pivotal in the last decade, between the northern and the southern resolved before the break-up of Sudan - to amounting to over half of government part of the country. In fact, the agreement large extent leftovers of an incomplete revenues and 95% of exports. established a seven-year transition period, implementation of the CPA. de-facto autonomy for southern Sudan, a After the independence of South Sudan, unity government in Khartoum, and incor- While 9 July 2011 signaled the end of Sudan is confronted with huge macro- porated agreements on security, bound- the CPA’s interim period and brought the economic and fiscal challenges. Although aries, revenue sharing from southern oil continent of Africa a new state, Sudan’s both countries are now independent, they fields and the administration of three transition to peace is still far from com- have remained interdependent in terms of contested areas straddling North and plete – the ongoing violence in the the oil industry. Being a landlocked count- South. The CPA also led to the elaboration border areas is threatening to spiral out ry, South Sudan so far has the only chance of a new constitution foreseeing national of control, many of Sudan’s humanitarian of exporting all of its crude via a pipeline elections to be held in 2009, followed by and political problems remain unresolved through Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red a referendum on independence for the and there are serious threats to civilians in Sea. About 75 percent of the total oil South in 2011. In fact, two referenda were both Sudan and South Sudan. After more production originates from areas in South supposed to be held by the January 9th than two decades of civil war, it was hoped Sudan, while the entire pipeline, refining, 2011 deadline. The first stipulated a vote that this separation would finally lead to and export infrastructure is located in on the future status of South Sudan. The a peaceful coexistence of the two states. Sudan. This situation has caused conten­ second would determine whether , Unfortunately, independence has so far tion between the two countries over the a region which straddles the North and not brought stability, as ongoing border use of the pipeline infrastructure and South, will maintain special administra­ clashes and internal violence continue export transit fees.

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The CPA had called for the establishment the border between the two countries: later than two weeks after the signing of of a National Petroleum Commission (NPC) where the border is, and what type of bor- the agreement. Due to the deadlock in the to formulate public policies, approve new der it is. While a series of agreements were relationship between the two states, the oil contracts and monitor the implemen- signed in Addis Ababa on 27 September implementation was delayed. tation of existing ones. The CPA foresaw 2012, the status of the contested areas of a share of 50% of revenue from all oil the border and the explosive question of In March 2013, a security agreement was produced in South Sudan for the Govern- Abyei (as described below) were left unre- signed providing a clear timeline and ment of Southern Sudan, a net of 2% to solved. Besides the dominating issue of oil framework for the establishment of the the producing state and a deduction to go reserves in the border region, also the fer- Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ). into the Oil Stabilization Fund, if revenues tility of the land in the so-called Tamazug It furthermore committed the two states go above a certain quota. However, the border states is a confrontational issue to hinder groups operating in the other’s CPA did not solve the interdependence as this region contains important grazing territory, and to withdraw from the SDBZ, issue after secession and failed to pro­ areas for nomads and pastoralist groups, which runs 10 km north and south of vide provisions on a post-independence which traditionally agreed upon flexible the border, except in the 14-Mile Area of oil-sharing mechanism or transit fees. In grazing arrangements between themsel- Northern Bahr el Ghazal/East . The turn, following the secession, Sudan‘s ves long before discussions began about a agreements foresee a force of 90 officers government in Khartoum asked for transit national border dividing their territory. The drawn from each side, and a contingent fees of $32-36/barrel (bbl), while South Agreements of September 2012 commit of UNISFA observers. There are a number Sudan countered with less than $1/bbl. On both sides to a framework that looks very of formal problems with the security January 20, 2012, South Sudan announced like the 30 July 2011 Agreement for the agreement. The border is over 2,000 km that it would shut its production until a Border Monitoring Support Mission, a long, and thus it is simply impossible for fair deal was reached on transit fees, or an similarity which should make one pause, such a small force to effectively ensure its alternative pipeline was built. The Agree- given the non-implementation of the prior demilitarization. ment on Oil and Related Economic Matters agreement. signed in Addis Ababa in September 2012 A special case – the unresolved status now stipulates the formula of $1/bbl as In Article 14 paragraph 1 of the Agree- of Abyei transit fees and $1.60/bbl for processing ment, both sides commit to “regulate, fees and between $6.50/bbl and $8.40/bbl protect and promote the livelihoods of The Abyei area is an area of Southern for transportation fees. border communities without prejudice Sudan that was transferred to Northern to the rights of the host communities, Sudan for administration purposes in 1905. Before shutting down the oil production in and in particular those of the nomadic However, the exact boundaries and size of January 2012, South Sudan was producing and pastoral communities especially their the area transferred were never known or approximately 320,000 barrels per day, seasonal right to cross, with their livestock, agreed upon, as no maps were left behind ranking the new state as the third largest the international boundaries between the showing the area’s transferral to the North. producer in sub-Saharan Africa after Parties for access to pasture and water.” The area has been inhabited by the Ngok Nigeria and Angola. After resuming oil This intention is in conflict with the article Dinka tribe, divided into nine chiefdoms. production in April 2013, there was danger that follows, emphasizing that the primary During the years, however, Arab tribes that it would be stopped again in June interests to be considered under the from the North (called Misseriya), moved 2013 when Sudanese President al-Bashir agreement are those of the host commu- southward in search for water and pasture threatened to halt exports within 60 days nities and the security implications of such for their livestock, and intermingled with unless the south withdraws support for movement. By interpreting this clause, it the Ngok Dinka. The two tribes lived in rebels opposed to his rule. On July 26, the has been made clear that the border could peace until the outbreak of the civil war order was postponed to allow the African be shut at will by the Government of the between the North and the South in 1955, Union to investigate the claims that South Republic of South Sudan or the Govern- when the Dinka allied with the Southern Sudan is supporting the rebels. ment of Sudan in the case of ‘security movement, while the Misseriya stood concerns.’ with the Government in Khartoum. The Border demarcation and grazing rights Government of Sudan and the Sudan Already before independence, the idea of People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) tried Two years after South Sudan became a demilitarized ‘soft border’ was brought to resolve the Abyei dispute during the Africa’s newest nation-state its border with up which nomads and the pastoralists negotiations process starting in 2001, but Sudan is neither delimited nor demar­ were permitted to cross. The border is failed to reach an agreement. The disco- cated. There are two analytically separate under the supervision of a Joint Border very and development of oil in the Abyei issues involved in the negotiations over Commission, which was to be formed no area, although in a relatively small quantity

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compared to other areas in Sudan, has, Economic matters: Debts and sanctions arms embargo on all non-governmental undoubtedly, been another complicating entities and individuals operating in Dar- factor. The American envoy to the nego- The secession of South Sudan was a major fur. Resolution 1591 (2005) expanded the tiations process intervened and offered financial blow to Sudan, which lost 75% of scope of the arms embargo and imposed certain proposals to the two parties which its five billion barrels of known oil reserves. additional measures including a travel they eventually accepted. Those proposals With separation, Sudan retained the ban and an assets freeze on individuals were reflected in one of the protocols full burden of its extant sovereign debt. designated by the Committee. As a con- concluded under the CPA which dealt with Khartoum has repeatedly endeavored to sequence of the independence of South the “Resolution of the Abyei Conflict”. The link that debt, estimated at more than $40 Sudan, the UN Security Council Committee CPA’s main features were as follows: billion - much of it in arrears - to the oil concerning Sudan has confirmed that the talks. Juba has refused to assume part of sanctions do not apply to the Republic of - The territory is defined as the area of the the debt, arguing that the south rec­ eived South Sudan. nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to no benefits from the loans incurred by in 1905. Khartoum during the war. Almost 90% On European side, in March 1994 the EU is owed to bilateral and commercial imposed an arms embargo on Sudan in - Abyei‘s residents will be citizens of both creditors, and Khartoum is now struggling response to the civil war in the southern Western Kordofan and Bahr al-Ghazal to make debt payments. Sudan’s external part of the country. In January and June states. Abyei will be governed by an elec- debt is estimated to have grown by 27% 2004 this embargo was modified to also ted Executive Council. since 2008 from $32.6 billion to $41.4 cover technical and financial assistance bil­lion in 2011. The IMF forecasts that the related to arms supplies and to exempt - Revenues from oil produced in Abyei will debt level will reach $43.7 billion in 2012 any supplies to UN, EU and African Union be divided by a set formula among the and $45.6 billion in 2013. The latter repre- institutions in Sudan and supplies related central government, the Government of sents 83% of Sudan’s 2011 GDP, which was to demining operations. In May 2005, the Southern Sudan, Bahr al-Ghazal, Western $55.1 bil­lion. According to the Agreement EU implemented the UN sanctions on Su- Kordofan, the Misseriya, and the Ngok. on certain economic matters agreed upon dan as a result of the conflict in Darfur by in Addis Ababa in September 2012, Sudan merging them with the existing EU arms - At the same time in 2011 southerners will assumes all external debt, but South embargo on Sudan. The arms embargo vote whether or not to become indepen- Sudan agrees to join an appeal for debt was also amended to allow assistance and dent, Abyei’s residents will vote to either relief to the international community. supplies provided in support of implemen­ retain special administrative status in the tation of the CPA. As a reaction to the north or be part of Bahr al-Ghazal, regard- The second issue affecting the Sudanese independence of South Sudan, the EU less of how the southern people vote in economy concerns the sanctions imposed amended the arms embargo to cover both their referendum. by the international community. The USA Sudan and South Sudan in July 2011. imposed economic and trade sanctions on - The presidency will establish an Abyei Sudan in 1997 in response to its alleged Expats and citizenship Boundaries Commission to define and connection to terror networks and human demarcate the Abyei area. rights abuses. As a consequence of the As a consequence of separation, also the deterioration of the situation in Darfur, population of Sudan was divided. In the the embargo was strengthened in 2007. follow-up to secession, individuals of sou- Nevertheless, the referendum did not In 2010, the US announced it was easing thern origin resident in Sudan were being take place mainly due to a dispute over sanctions on agriculture equipment and deprived of their Sudanese nationality who will participate. A 2009 protocol services which allowed half a dozen com- without any right to contest the decision: estab­lishing the conduct of the referenda panies to obtain export licenses. estimates of the number affected ranged de­fined eligible voters as all residents of between 500,000 and 700,000 individuals. Abyei, including nomadic herders. How- On UN level, pursuant to resolution 1591 From the Sudanese side, it was also made ever, the SPLM claimed that all residents (2005) a special Security Council Commit- clear in the context of secession that no spending over seven months in the pro- tee concerning the Sudan was established dual citizenships would be extended vince should be eligible to vote – a claim on 29 March 2005 to oversee the relevant leading to a situation where these indi- strongly opposed by Khartoum. So far, it is sanction measures and to undertake the viduals - most of them refugees from the unclear whether and when the promised tasks set out by the Security Council in civil war - were technically illegal in Sudan referendum would take place. sub-paragraph 3 (a) of the same resolu­ after secession because they lacked official tion. With the adoption of resolution 1556 residency papers. (2004), the Security Council imposed an

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The Addis Ababa agreement on the status of nationals signed also in September 2012 now provides for the continuation of “four freedoms” – continued freedom of people to reside, move, acquire and dispose of property, and pursue economic activities on both sides of the border. A Joint High Level Committee was tasked with the implementation of the agreement.

The way ahead

Beside the existing interdependences be­ tween the two sovereign states of Sudan and South Sudan which are hindering a sound and sustainable relationship between the two entities, the internal situation in both countries is also ne- gatively affecting the status quo and peaceful negotiations. Both countries have ex­perienced changes in government in recent months indicating power struggles within the ruling parties of both coun- tries in the forefront of SPLM leadership elections and presidential elections in South Sudan due in 2015 and presidential to be held in the same year.

Nevertheless, the question that needs to be addressed is not whether the two countries can agree on dealing with and resolving the existing interdependences - above all, to effectively implement any of a number of signed agreements. In con­ crete, the acceptance of these agreements by the respective political classes and population is of key importance. As long © Austria Institut für Europa- as the internal political situation in both und Sicherheitspolitik, 2013 countries is not stabilized and the power Alle Rechte vorbehalten. struggles continue, it will be rather im- possible to think of a solution that would Nachdruck oder vergleichbare Verwendungen von Arbeiten des Austria Instituts für Europa- und lead to lasting peace and prosperity in a Sicherheitspolitik (AIES) sind auch in Auszügen region strongly affected by decades of civil nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung gestattet. Die war. This cannot be achieved by the two im AIES-Fokus veröffentlichten Beiträge geben ausschließlich die Meinung der jeweiligen Auto- countries alone; they will need the backing rinnen und Autoren wieder. of the international community in order to Schlossgasse 6 more effectively support the development A-2344 Maria Enzersdorf of a just and sustainable peace. Tel. +43 (0)2236 411 96 Fax. +43 (0)2236 411 96-9 E-Mail: [email protected] www.aies.at Arnold H. Kammel is Secretary General of the AIES. Layout: EGENCY Medienbüro Patrick Meyer

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