IDEAS & ISSUES (STRATEGY & POLICY) Unrestricted Warfare Beyond the South Sea What we can learn about China’s pursuit of strategic influence from its engagement with Burma by Capt Wayland Blue

hina’s increasingly assertive stance in the South China >Capt Blue is an 0402 with the III MEF IMA program. As a civilian, he volunteers Sea along with a growing as the Director of Research and Evaluation for the Charis Project, a US 501(c)(3), and mutually hostile rela- and Shade Tree Foundation, a Thai NGO focused on health and education for Ctionship with the United States has Burmese migrant families. He previously served on active duty with HQBN, 3d brought the western Pacific into focus MarDiv, and various units in 1st MLG in billets including Platoon Commander, as a primary concern for U.S. security Company Commander, and Battalion Logistics Officer. He is a graduate of Expe- policy. The significant attention given ditionary Warfare School and holds a master’s degree in International Relations to the western Pacific and prioritization and Conflict Resolution from the American Military University. of China as a primary pacing threat for the Marine Corps, with impacts for force design, is well justified. At the same time, we must observe that China is pursuing its regional strategic objec- tives along multiple lines of effort and often beyond the South China Sea. The Indian Ocean is one such area, and it is here we can observe China’s complex employment of multiple instruments of national power to pursue its strategic interests. A key component of China’s strat- egy in the Indian Ocean is Burma (also known as ). Burma remains overlooked and often misunderstood be- cause of its history of isolationism under military rule until the civilianization of its government beginning around 2010. Additionally, the government of Burma China’s area of interest and influence in the Burma region. (Map Source: Nikkei Asian Review.) continues to receive intense and well- justified international pressure for on- going human rights abuses perpetrated Burma, as a formerly British colonial mation, and economic engagement on primarily by the country’s independent possession, experienced major combat the part of the Chinese government. military amid its long-running internal during World War II and was intended conflicts. However, Burma’s extremely as a staging point for Japan’s planned China’s Three Key Interests in Burma1 negative international image and ongo- invasion of British India. Now, it is a • Security and uninterrupted trade ing instability have created a critical strategic land avenue from Southern along the shared border between gap in a region otherwise significantly China to the Indian Ocean and the northern Burma and China’s Yun- aligned with U.S. interests. focus of significant diplomatic, infor- nan province.

60 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2020 • Economic cooperation and access crisis triggered renewed targeted U.S. in border security. It also allows China to natural resources. sanctions against key Burmese officials to intervene in Burma’s internal poli- • Direct access to the Indian Ocean to and a negative ruling against Burma tics by using EAOs as proxies when the diversify supply lines from the Persian in the International Court of Justice. central government is uncooperative. Gulf and increase energy security by However, the justifiable international Although the bilateral relationship be- bypassing the Malacca Strait. condemnation presented a renewed op- tween the two countries is old, Burmese Burma is also critical in Chinese pres- portunity for the Chinese government political ideology is generally realist and ident Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initia- to further its influence. suspicious of foreign intervention owing tive (BRI). It has received significant di- to the long history of isolationism un- rect investment in BRI projects such as China Leveraging Isolation and In- der military dictatorship. Burma’s join- the China/Myanmar economic corridor stability ing of ASEAN in 1997 and increasing linking Yunnan province with central The strategic importance of Burma security cooperation along the shared Myanmar and the deep-water port of and the opportunity presented by its border with India can be understood as Kyaukpyu.2 Access to Kyaukpyu on the isolation for the Chinese government efforts to balance against China’s influ- coast of Burma’s northeastern Rakhine are longstanding. Although China sup- ence in the region.9 Additionally, the State also holds the potential for force ported the Burmese newly civilianized government outright projection in the eastern Indian Ocean. (BCP) engaged in an insurgency in the defied Chinese interests by suspend- north along the Chinese border until ing the Chinese-backed Myitsone dam Background its collapse after the withdrawal of that hydroelectric project in 2011.10 China’s Engagement with a newly civilian- support in the late 1980s, China avoided dual engagement is comparable to the ized Burma was a cornerstone of the directly threatening the Burmese gov- concept of indirect means to achieve Obama Administration’s pivot to the ernment. This strategy was paradoxi- strategic objectives explained by Sun Pacific.3 However, prospects for reform cally to maintain Burma as an avenue Tzu.11 have proved disappointing. Long-run- to the outside world by avoiding U.S. After the BCP’s collapse, the Bur- ning conflicts between the central gov- intervention in a possible Communist mese government reached ceasefire ernment and multiple Ethnic Armed takeover during the height of the Cold agreements with several EAOs. Some, Organizations (EAO) primarily operat- War when China perceived itself being including the agreement with the ing near the border with China esca- encircled elsewhere in Asia.7 UWSA, remain intact but often tenu- lated in 2011 and remain intractable.4 These EAOs nominally represent the interests of large non-Burmese ethnic groups and have as their stated objective The strategic importance of Burma and the opportu- autonomy and ethnic self-determination in the context of a more decentralized nity presented by its isolation for the Chinese govern- federal system. Several major EAOs, ment are longstanding. such as the United Army (UWSA) also engage in narcotics traf- ficking to fund their operations.5 Due In 1988, China increased engage- ous. The UWSA, which allegedly also to broad local support and significant ment with Burma by withdrawing sup- receives arms from China, controls ter- defensive capabilities possessed by port to the BCP and increasing trade ritory along the borders of both China many EAOs, defeating them outright at the same time Burma was receiv- and .12 Armed with extensive would likely be a pyrrhic victory for ing international condemnation after defensive capabilities, including artil- the central government. However, the pro-democracy protests and subsequent lery and anti-air systems, the UWSA is Burmese military, which remains legally military crackdowns. Ongoing criti- essentially autonomous.13 However, its autonomous from the civilian govern- cism and economic sanctions allowed leadership maintains it does not wish ment and has significant authority in China to become Burma’s primary to formally secede from Burma. Nev- internal security issues, is chronically trading partner and important source ertheless, as the most powerful EAO heavy-handed in its counter-insurgency of investment, as well as the biggest it has significant ideological influence operations causing collateral damage arms supplier. However, at the same with other groups engaged in direct and large-scale civilian displacement. time, the Chinese government main- conflict. This is especially the case for In particular, actions against the tained relations with some BCP de- those that form the Brotherhood Alli- Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army in scendant EAOs, most importantly, the ance, active in northern Burma, and Rakhine state, an Islamic insurgent UWSA.8 which consists of the Kachin Indepen- group, lead to mass killing and large The pattern of dual engagement with dence Army (KIA), Ta’ang National scale displacement of predominantly both the central government and oppos- Liberation Army, Myanmar National Muslim civilians commonly referred to ing sub-national groups continues to the Democratic Alliance Army, and Arakan as Rohingyas.6 The resulting Rohingya present and serves China’s key interest Army (AA).14

Marine Corps Gazette • November 2020 www.mca-marines.org/gazette 61 IDEAS & ISSUES (STRATEGY & POLICY)

A major conflict in northern Burma and as an example of how China may 9. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “The Vexing Stra- threatens China’s border security and leverage instability to pursue its interests tegic Tug-of-War over Naypyidaw: ASEAN’s BRI projects to which China has re- elsewhere in the developing world. The View of the Sino–Burmese Ties,” Journal of sponded by leveraging its relationship model of non-kinetic interventions in Current Southeast Asian Affairs, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012); and Saira Basit, “In- with both the Burmese government and an unstable environment aligns with 20 dia-Myanmar Relations and the Management the UWSA, and others, to position itself the concept of unrestricted warfare. of Transnational Militant Threats,” Journal of as the primary international peace bro- The conflict domains are blurred, but Strategic Security, (Tampa, FL: University of ker in the conflict. Chinese facilitated China’s behavior remains inherently South Florida Board of Trustees, 2018). negotiations have met with some success competitive—preparing space for fol- by bringing previously excluded groups low-on operations. 10. United States Institute for Peace China to the negotiating table and leading to A critical challenge is, as Sun Tzu Myanmar Senior Study Groups, “China’s Role some reductions in conflict.15 However, said, to know the enemy.21 To do so in Myanmar’s Internal Conflicts,” United States the most influential EAOs, the KIA and more comprehensively, we must look Institute for Peace, (2018), available at https:// UWSA, continue to challenge the cen- beyond the immediate problem-set of www.usip.org. tral government’s limited offers while the South China Sea in deciphering 11. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles, kinetic engagements with Brotherhood our primary pacing threat’s subsequent (Leicester: Allandale Online Publishing, 2000). Alliance members are ongoing.16 phase-lines in a still ambiguous but very Critically, the AA, which is the new- real competition. 12. “The United Wa State Army and Burma’s est EAO and has received significant Peace Process.” backing and logistical support from the KIA and UWSA, poses the great- Notes 13. Joe Kumbun, “Protected by China, Wa est threat to the central government by 1. Yun Sun, “China’s Strategic Misjudgment on is Now a De Facto Independent State,” The its ongoing offensive in the Chin and Myanmar,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Irrawaddy, (2019), available at https://www. Rakhine states.17 The AA’s activities Affairs, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012). irrawaddy.com. have met with severe retaliation from 2. John Reed, “China and Myanmar Sign Off 14. “China’s Role In Myanmar’s Internal Con- the Burmese military causing signifi- flicts.” cant civilian casualties. Additionally, on Belt and Road Projects,” Financial Times, (2020), available at https://www.ft.com. the AA is active in areas near the Chi- 15. Ibid. nese-backed Kyaukpyu port project. 3. John Brandon, “A Strategic Pivot in U.S.- Although there is no official contact Relations in 2012,” Asia Founda- 16. Ibid. between the Chinese government and tion, (2012), available at https://asiafoundation. the AA, the AA has signaled its inter- org. 17. Iftekharul Bashar, “: Myan- est in maintaining good relations with mar’s New Front of Conflict,” Nanyang Tech- China, as well as shown preferential 4. Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “KIO,” nological University, (2019), available at https:// treatment by threatening Indian-backed (2018), available at https://ucdp.uu.se; and www.rsis.edu.sg. investment projects.18 The lack of di- International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: A Vio- lent Push to Shake Up Ceasefire Negotiations,” 18. Nan Lwin and Hnin Pwint, “Arakan Army rect intervention does not exclude the to ‘Tax’ Large Projects in Myanmar’s Rakhine, possibility that Chinese policymakers International Crisis Group, (2019), available at https://www.crisisgroup.org. Chin States,” , (2019), available are apathetic to Burma’s internal sover- at https://www.irrawaddy.com. eignty and prioritize access regardless of 5. Bertil Lintner, “The United Wa State Army who happens to be locally in control. and Burma’s Peace Process,” United States In- 19. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. W. stitute for Peace, (2019), available at https:// K. Marriott, Project Gutenberg, (2006), available Way Ahead www.usip.org. at https://www.gutenberg.org. China’s immediate intentions in Bur- ma, particularly its strategy of dual en- 6. Eleanor Albert and Lindsay Maizland, “The 20. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted gagement with the central government Rohingya Crisis,” Councel on Foreing Rela- Warfare, (2019), available at http://www.cryp- tome.org. and EAOs, remain opaque. However, its tions, (2020), available at https://www.cfr.org. significant economic involvement and 21. The Art of War. role in peace negotiations facilitate, as 7. Fan Hongwei, “China-Burma Geopolitical Relations in the Cold War,” Journal of Current Machiavelli counsels, the impression Southeast Asian Affairs, (Thousand Oaks, CA: of good faith while pursuing ulterior SAGE, March 2012). motives.19 Heavy conflict may be bad for business, but peace likely means 8. “The United Wa State Army and Burma’s decreased access. Peace Process.” Burma is a critical case both as a current line of effort for China’s stra- tegic objectives in the Indian Ocean

62 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • November 2020