Burma Policy Briefing Nr 9 June 2012

Burma at the Crossroads

Maintaining the Momentum for Reform

The people of Burma/Myanmar1 are at a Conclusions and Recommendations critical juncture in their struggle for demo- cracy and ethnic reform. Decisions taken  After decades of division in national by leading parties and protagonists in the politics, the recent steps towards reconcilia- months ahead could well define the direc- tion and democratic reform by the Thein tion of national politics for many years to Sein government are welcome. The par- come. After decades of conflict and ticipation of the National League for military-dominated government, an epoch- Democracy in the April by-elections, new shaping time has arrived. ceasefires with armed ethnic groups and prioritization of economic Following the 1 April by-elections, the in- reforms are all initiatives that can contrib- clusion of the National League for Demo- ute to the establishment of peace and cracy (NLD) in the new parliamentary democracy. system of government could indicate that progressive reforms can be introduced  The momentum for reform must now under the 2008 constitution. Similarly, continue. Remaining political prisoners political discussions, as part of government must be released; a sustainable ceasefire ceasefires with armed ethnic opposition achieved with the Kachin Independence groups, could promote confidence that a Organisation and other armed opposition sustainable process can emerge towards groups; and the provision of humanitarian achieving national peace and reconcilia- aid to internally displaced persons and tion. other vulnerable peoples needs to be accelerated. Political transition, however, is at a very early stage. Since the 2011 accession to  The 2015 general election is likely to power by the government of President mark the next major milestone in national , a new energy and openness politics. In the meantime, it is vital that have occurred in many aspects of national processes are established by which political life. This reform potential has been wel- reform and ethnic peace can be inclusively comed by Western governments and developed. Burma is at the beginning of international institutions that have begun change – not at the end. to lift or suspend different sanctions.  The international community should At the same time, renewed conflict in the support policies that encourage reconcilia- Kachin and Shan states and the continued tion and reform, and which do not cause domination of government by new divisions. Burma’s needs are many, (armed forces) veterans suggest that there but local and national organisations are is a long way to go before a democratic and ready to respond. Aid priority should be representative system of government is given to health, education, poverty allevia- truly in place. For this to occur, consider- tion, displaced persons and other humani- able political and socio-economic reforms tarian concerns.

Burma Policy Briefing | 1 will have to become rooted on a pace that is tous times as these. As in any troubled unparalleled in Burma’s modern history. country in transition, socio-political change is by no means prescriptive. Once the genie At present, there remain uncertain and of change is out of the bottle – especially in untested scenarios by which reform can a failed or repressed state – dynamics are occur. Huge challenges exist in political, released that can engender new crises as economic and conflict transformation. All well as fresh opportunities in addressing the country’s parties and institutions are national challenges that have long needed faced with a time of unprecedented resolution. restructuring and change. As a result, very unexpected outcomes can A common focal point is 2015, when the occur. These can vary from political pro- next general election is scheduled. With gress to economic instabilities, or from pro-democracy and ethnic opposition ethnic reconciliation to new grievances as groups still on the political margins, how- the national landscape becomes one of ever, the steps by which sustainable peace “winners” and “losers” as citizens struggle and reform can be achieved are yet to be to adapt to the changing political realities. clarified and inclusively agreed. The diverse experiences in the countries of It is thus a vital moment to review the un- eastern Europe or China and folding political landscape to ensure that since the 1989 ending of the Cold War the momentum for reform continues. This provide many indications of the scale of requires a realism to guarantee that the different changes that Burma could face in country’s grave political and humanitarian introducing an era of modernization and needs are addressed and that the state fail- reform. Everything from internal politics ures of the past are not repeated. As Aung and economics to international geopolitics San Suu Kyi has cautioned, Burma is and trade will undergo pressures for reori- “beginning to see the beginning of change” entation and change. – not the end.2 In Burma’s case, there are many reasons to BACKGROUND: A LAND IN A “CONFLICT expect transitional pressures to be espe- cially acute. The post-colonial state stands TRAP” out as a foremost example of a land envel- Political events have moved at a remarkable oped in what World Bank analysis defines pace since a new government assumed as a “conflict trap”.3 Isolated, war-divided power in Nay Pyi Taw under President and impoverished, the country has been Thein Sein on 30 March 2011. At the time, under virtual military rule for five decades. the prospect of standing In particular, with ethnic minorities mak- for parliament or a government ceasefire ing up an estimated third of the 59 million with the Karen National Union (KNU) population, Burma is one of the most eth- seemed improbable. Just as unexpected, it nically diverse countries in Asia, and ethnic seemed inconceivable that a host of leading conflict has long underpinned political and Western figures – from Hillary Clinton and social decline. David Cameron to George Soros and Catherine Ashton – would visit the country On a positive note, events during the past and advocate the eventual lifting of year suggest that new ways can be found to sanctions. By any standard, the past year take the country forward with the involve- has been extraordinary, and the coming ment of key stakeholders on the different year could continue in the same vein. sides. Of historic significance, the admis- sion to parliament of NLD representatives A great deal of caution and imagination, and the spread of ethnic ceasefires in bor- however, is needed during such momen- derland states provide grounds for hope

2 | Burma Policy Briefing that an era of inclusive reform is under note that many veterans from earlier eras of way. But first, some very uncharted terri- political change say that a consistent im- tory has to be negotiated. pediment has been quite fundamental: a common lack of understanding and realism The country is now entering its fourth era about the seriousness of the challenges of political and constitutional transforma- facing the country.5 Indeed, with armed tion since independence. On each previous conflicts breaking out at the dawn of occasion, division rather than inclusion independence in 1948, many critical issues marked the path of national politics. The have never been discussed face-to-face by result has been the state failure and ethnic leaders and divided communities on the st conflicts that have continued into the 21 various sides. century. Two interlinked themes, especially, mark a It is vital therefore to learn from experi- narrative of state failure: economics and ences in the past to ensure essential change politics. today. A land devastated by the Second World War, Burma’s state of strife contin- In the case of the economy, reports dating ued through the parliamentary era of the back to the British colonial era persistently 1950s, General ’s “Burmese Way to reflect a lack of realism about the socio- Socialism” after 1962, and the military economic and humanitarian situation. SLORC-SPDC regime after 1988.4 There has been no shortage of grand plans: notably the Pyidawtha welfare system in the parliamentary era of the 1950s, Ne Win’s quasi-Marxist “Burmese Way to “ We are beginning to see the beginning of change Socialism” after 1962, and the “market- oriented” policies of the SLORC-SPDC Aung San Suu Kyi after 1988. Reliable data is however scant, and no one delivered the development and national progress that the country desper- ately needed. It appears as if the obvious In particular, it should not be forgotten that natural resource potential of the country the landscape initially appeared just as blinded successive generations of leaders to potent for political change during the last the true living conditions of the people. time of national upheaval in 1988-92. The Instead, by 1987, Burma had slid to Least country’s two largest parties, the Burma Developed Country status at the United Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and Nations (UN), an impoverished position insurgent Communist Party of Burma where it remains today. (CPB) collapsed; the democracy movement revived; the NLD won the 1990 general A similar history of unreality and division election; and ceasefires resumed for the marks the different eras of politics. Three first time in three decades between the different groupings have survived the tur- central government and ethnic opposition bulent events over the years: the armed forces. Ultimately, however, conflict and forces or Tatmadaw, pro-democracy parties political stasis continued under a new and the country’s diverse ethnic groups. incarnation of military government led by However, no inclusive dialogue has been Snr-General . achieved that has brought them together in a sustained process towards peace and As in any “conflict trap”, different reasons democracy. can be ascribed for state failure. But as the country passes through another time of Periodic promises of reconciliation have government transition, it is important to occurred. There were occasional peace talks

Burma Policy Briefing | 3 and manoeuvres for political reform in the urgent attention in the months ahead. parliamentary era of the 1950s; a nation- From politics to society, a Pandora’s Box of wide “Peace Parley” and Internal Unity new dynamics has been opened. Advisory Board under Ne Win’s military socialists in the 1960s; and two general THE PRESENT LANDSCAPE: elections, a national convention and ethnic A COUNTRY IN CHANGE ceasefires during the 22 years of SLORC- SPDC rule. But none was truly inclusive A number of key areas stand out as integral nor reflected political needs within the to the success of reform transition in country. Rather, the country remained one present-day Burma: politics, ethnic conflict, of the most conflict-torn in the world. economics, social and humanitarian affairs, and the international dimension. On all Now in 2012, the country has embarked on issues, it is a critical time. another time of constitutional change. At such a vital moment, it is important that POLITICS the country is able to rise above the legacy of past failures. It is on the basis of modern In politics, the most important transforma- needs, dynamics and aspirations that solu- tion in the national landscape is taking tions must be achieved. For this reason, place since the mid-1970s when the coun- there are greater hopes in contemporary try’s previous constitution was introduced. society for progressive reforms than in the All citizens and parties are affected, and it isolationist days of the past. Even under remains uncertain in what forms the key long years of military rule, life on the groupings in national politics will exist or ground has never been static. align a year from now. The Tatmadaw, pro- democracy parties and ethnic nationality The challenge, however, remains of bring- groups are all in the midst of change. ing the different sectors in politics and society together. Reconciliation and reform In government and organisational terms, require both realism and that stakeholders the Tatmadaw is by far the most advanced move outside their comfort zones and in transition. The ruling SPDC ceased to make difficult – even daring – moves. For exist with the advent of a new military- example, bold steps have been taken in the backed government last March; 25 per cent recent accommodation between the gov- of seats in the legislatures are reserved for ernment and NLD that seemed unimagin- military nominees; the Tatmadaw-created able a year ago. On the other hand, the Union Solidarity and Development Party same hopes for change were expressed in (USDP) won over 70 per cent of constitu- the aftermath of the NLD victory in the ency seats in the 2010 general election 1990 general election. Similarly, the Kachin (which the NLD boycotted); and President people supported peace efforts under the Thein Sein and other leading USDP figures reform roadmap of the SLORC-SPDC. in the new government are ex-generals Ultimately, however, conflict re-ignited from the former regime. under the Thein Sein government last June, prompting a further humanitarian crisis in Initially, therefore, Tatmadaw-dominated the country.6 rule appeared to continue, with the USDP expected to act as a civilian front for mili- Such tragedies and regression are a warning tary interests. Contrary to opposition pre- not to take national progress for granted dictions, however, indications have grown during the present time of change. Burma over the past year that Thein Sein and his faces a host of complex crises that must be advisers want to make the new “democra- addressed – all with the capacity to cy” system work. In a much-quoted speech undermine stability and each requiring on his government’s first anniversary,

4 | Burma Policy Briefing Thein Sein claimed: “Our vigorous consti- including the KNU and Army- tutional democratic transition has now South (SSA-S). systematically reached a peaceful path”.7 Opposition groups, however, remain very This, in turn, raises a number of key ques- cautious. There have been too many dis- tions. What kind of political system is appointments in Burmese politics before going to emerge; will Tatmadaw, USDP for careless optimism now. Concerns have and related business interests continue to centred on three main issues. dominate; and, just as critical, how will pro-democracy parties like the NLD and Firstly, there are suspicions that, like Ne the different ethnic organisations operate Win’s military junta in 1962-64 and the in the new political landscape? SLORC in 1988-90, the new Tatmadaw- backed government’s initial strategy has For the moment, new developments are been to win itself a breathing space to en- emerging by the day, and there are unlikely trench itself in power by offering dialogue to be quick answers. But in the past year, to political and ethnic opponents. Secondly, Thein Sein’s actions have won growing although they have been allowed more acceptance and praise. He has begun the freedom, it is unclear how the NLD and long overdue release of political prisoners; other opposition groups can influence national reform and amend the 2008 con- stitution.8 USDP and Tatmadaw represen- tatives continue to have a huge majority in “ Our vigorous constitutional democratic transition has the national legislature assemblies; a number of political prisoners are believed now systematically reached a peaceful path. to remain in jail;9 and the 88 Generation Students and other pro-democracy sup- President Thein Sein porters question how democratic reforms can be taken forward under a political system that is still dominated by Tatmadaw undertaken dialogue with Aung San Suu interests. And thirdly, there are doubts Kyi and the NLD; established a national about how united the government, Tatma- human rights commission; offered new daw and USDP leaders are behind Thein ceasefires to armed ethnic forces; promised Sein’s political actions. to target poverty alleviation; suspended work on the unpopular Chinese-backed The reality is that, in the secretive world of ; and shown willingness to Tatmadaw politics, nobody really knows. build bridges with the West, including Since the government’s inception, rumours visits to Burma by US Secretary of State have persisted of a division between “re- Hillary Clinton and UK Prime Minister formers” and “hardliners” in the corridors David Cameron. of power in Nay Pyi Taw. More recently, speculation has grown that the veteran Such initiatives have opened up the pros- strongman Snr-General Than Shwe has pect of progressive routes to change inside completely retired and that Thein Sein has and outside of parliamentary processes. In seen off a power struggle with the apparent response, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD stepping down of Vice-President ex-Gen- contested the 1 April by-elections, winning eral , a perceived hard- 43 of the 45 available seats and defeating liner who has become a Buddhist monk.10 the USDP and other political parties at the But, with a younger generation of officers ballot box. Equally important, ceasefires taking over the Tatmadaw leadership, the have been agreed with the majority of balance of power between “military” and armed opposition forces in the country, “civilian” officials is still not clear. The

Burma Policy Briefing | 5 Tatmadaw is not to be discounted in Bur- failure of the new political system. After six mese politics. As commander-in-chief Vice decades of division, it will require a Snr-General reminded sustained effort to ensure that peace is the country on Armed Forces Day, it is the achieved in the borderlands, and that a Tatmadaw’s constitutional duty “to play the stable political system emerges in which leading role in the national politics”.11 ethnic voices are equitably heard.

The question, then, remains how Tatma- Events in the past year have continued to daw-USDP roles will evolve under the new move at a fast pace. Reflecting the changing political system. For the present, Tatma- political landscape, there are currently over daw-USDP dominance remains certain 50 ethnic organizations – both electoral under the 2010 electoral landscape. But and armed – seeking to represent national- following the NLD victories in most seats ity interests in the country.13 in the April by-elections, government leaders know that the USDP is likely to face On an innovative note, the Thein Sein gov- defeat in the next general election – if ernment rolled out a new ceasefire process genuinely democratic polls become in late 2011 that has come to include nearly established. As a first step, the Tatmadaw all armed opposition groups in the country, 14 has responded by replacing 59 junior whether large or small. Contradicting this members with officers of senior rank to trend, Tatmadaw operations intensified in strengthen its authority in the legislatures.12 north-east Burma after the ceasefire with Meanwhile ex-General , the the Kachin Independence Organisation lower house speaker, and other USDP (KIO) broke down last June, fuelling per- leaders are seeking to energize their party. ceptions that either Thein Sein does not But, as all citizens are aware, the USDP have day-to-day authority over the Tatma- now has a struggle on its hands if it is to daw, or that the government is playing a 15 democratically survive in the new political very strategic game. era. The Tatmadaw-USDP nexus will be Such doubts about “divide and rule” tactics challenged. further increased after Thein Sein ordered The next general election in 2015 will the Tatmadaw to halt offensive operations therefore mark a major event for all parties against the KIO in December – a commit- in Burma – government as much as opposi- ment that was repeated in March but did 16 tion – to work towards. A script has not yet not interrupt Tatmadaw attacks. At the been written, and the NLD and other pro- same time, the government persisted in democracy parties will also find the road using a different group of negotiators, led difficult. They are emerging from many by the USDP official ex-General Aung handicaps and years of repression. Having Thaung, to talk with the KIO rather than accepted the new political system by stand- the Rail Transport Minister ex-General ing in the polls, they now have to prove to , who has been successful in the people that the 2008 constitution is meetings with other armed groups. Against reformable and that they can bring real this backdrop, antipathies on the opposing democratic change to the country. In short, sides further deepened. after a 50-year interruption, Burma is re- Why the KIO has been treated so differ- embarking on an ostensibly parliamentary ently to other ethnic forces under the Thein road but the destination is not yet certain. Sein government has yet to be explained, ETHNIC CONFLICT but opposition groups believe that it is for a variety of political and economic reasons.17 A second key issue – ethnic conflict – is The KIO has long been a major voice for likely to be just as integral to the success or ethnic aspirations and a challenge to suc-

6 | Burma Policy Briefing cessive government ambitions since its under the Thein Sein government. Thou- 1961 foundation. Equally important, the sands more government troops have been inhabit strategic and rushed to north-east Burma; the KIO has resource-rich borderlands with China, responded with guerrilla attacks; over including the northern Shan state through 70,000 civilians have been displaced; and which the planned oil and gas pipelines to extrajudicial executions and other gross China will pass. In the same region, fur- human rights abuses are reportedly wide- thermore, the allied Shan State Army- spread.21 In one of the most isolated border North (SSA-N) has also come under extra regions of Asia, a major humanitarian Tatmadaw pressures and attack in recent emergency is under way, with international years for what Shan leaders believe are the relief largely confined to organisations same political and economic reasons.18 operating from the government side.22

For their part, KIO leaders claim that the This, in turn, has created a major dilemma government strategy to weaken the Kachin for the international community which, cause began even before Thein Sein came until now, has encouraged the reform to power.19 For although the KIO followed initiatives of the Thein Sein government. the SLORC-SPDC roadmap through 17 The renewed violence has occurred on years of ceasefire, its supporters were not Thein Sein’s watch and, unless resolved, allowed to form a party to stand in the 2010 will define domestic and international perceptions of the new government. “The situation in Kachin States is inconsistent “ The Kachin people should no longer be denied the with the successful conclusion of ceasefire agreements with all the other major opportunity that a ceasefire and a political agreement can groups,” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki- bring for peace and development. moon recently warned. “The Kachin people should no longer be denied the opportunity UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that a ceasefire and a political agreement can bring for peace and development.”23

general election. Instead, the estimated Ultimately, it will be for the peoples of 8,000 KIO troops were ordered to break up Burma to resolve the continuing state of into under Tatmadaw strife. Routes to peace do exist. In early control – a demand that KIO leaders re- May, it was reported that President Thein jected. At the same time, the government Sein himself would take charge of a re- accelerated hydro-electric and other eco- formed “Peace Committee” which will be responsible for all ceasefire talks, including nomic deals with China, bypassing the local 24 people and furthering Kachin resentment. those with the KIO. A government pro- posal has also been generally accepted by For the moment, President Thein Sein has combatants on the different sides that suspended work on the controversial peace talks should start at the regional or Myitsone Dam with China. Nevertheless, state levels before moving to the central the perception has continued among many (union) level and, eventually, include Kachin people that Tatmadaw strategists political affairs. These objectives were want to impose military rather than sketched out in Thein Sein’s announcement political solutions in the Kachin case.20 of a new “Union Peace-making Work Committee”, chaired by Vice-President Dr The evidence has been mounting. For while (an ethnic Shan), on 19 ceasefires spread with other ethnic forces, May.25 Subsequently, a new government the KIO has become increasingly isolated team, led by Rail Transport Minister Aung

Burma Policy Briefing | 7 Min, travelled into KIO territory for talks, – reform towards a “federal” system of raising hopes that fighting could be ended. government remains a popular goal.

There is, however, still a long way to go in A particular concern among ethnically- establishing a sustainable peace process. based parties – both electoral and armed – After decades of conflict, militant leaders is the lack of effectiveness in ethnic repre- are adamant that they will not give up on sentation in the new parliamentary system their long-term political demands. They under which the three legislatures (lower also want an end to what they regard as and upper houses and 14 state/region long-standing Tatmadaw practices of assemblies) are dominated by the USDP “divide-and-rule”. and military appointees.27 These worries escalated further after the NLD’s apparent Thus four main elements have been pro- “landslide” victory in the April by-elec- posed by ethnic opposition parties to halt tions, reviving memories of how “first past the cycle of violence; a nationwide cease- the post” elections marginalised minority fire; humanitarian relief; joint negotiations parties in the parliamentary era (1948-62) through such alliances as the United and favoured large, centrally-based parties Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) that among the Burman-majority. As Sai Saw includes the KIO, KNU and SSA-N; and Aung of the Shan Nationalities League for political agreements that will be concluded Democracy warned UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “64 years of conflict cannot be terminated by six months of negotia- “ It is clear there are more steps to the peace process tions and deliberations inside the parlia- ment”.28 than a signed ceasefire arrangement with the government . Such issues are not insuperable. However, Naw Zipporah Sein, KNU Secretary-General ethnic parties continue to insist that the 2008 constitution and 2010 general election can only be considered to mark an incep- through a national process similar to the tion to a process of change – not a conclu- 1947 Panglong conference that drew up the sive solution. Further ceasefire agreements ethnic principles for the new Union. “We and political progress are regarded as es- are trying to build a peace with the govern- sential before the 2015 general election. For ment for the whole country”, explained this reason, Aung San Suu Kyi’s willingness Naw Zipporah Sein, Secretary-General of to support a “second Panglong” has met the KNU. “It is clear there are more steps to with widespread approval.29 President the peace process than a signed ceasefire Thein Sein, too, invoked the memory of arrangement with the government.”26 Panglong when he pledged to prioritise “the political process for national reconso- Equally important, ethnic electoral parties lidation” on his government’s first anniver- must also be brought into the peace and sary. “We will make no deception in our reform process at some stage. Their voices stride to the goal of eternal peace,” he said. are presently diffused. Sixteen ethnic par- “We will do the job with trust based on ties won seats in the 2010 polls, while Panglong spirit.”30 several more are still active that won seats in the 1990 general election but did not In summary, the ethnic stage is delicately stand again in 2010 due to arrests, political set. Optimism has been growing that the restrictions and their rejection of the 2008 country faces a better opportunity for peace constitution. Nevertheless, cooperation on and reform than in decades. The April addressing national challenges is increas- meetings, for example, by KNU delegates ing, and – as with armed opposition groups with President Thein Sein and Aung San

8 | Burma Policy Briefing Suu Kyi could become historical land- the same time, fundamental reforms have marks. But the and the been started on such essential areas as ex- legacy of failures since independence warn change rates. A growing business dyna- that much has yet to be achieved. mism is apparent in and other conurbations, and the number of foreign ECONOMICS tourists is steadily increasing. The ethnic crisis inevitably impacts on the Combined with political reform, these third major challenge facing the country: developments have prompted a return in economic reform. Many of the major international financial assistance that had energy and infrastructure projects with effectively been cut off since 1988. Western neighbouring countries are located in the governments have started lifting sanctions, ethnic borderlands. Three, in particular, Japan has cancelled over US$ 3 billion of stand out: the oil and gas pipelines from the debt and is helping with the planned Rakhine coast to China’s Yunnan province, opening of a stock exchange in 2015, and the Kaladan Gateway project with north- the World Bank and other international east India, and the Dawei Development institutions are setting up offices in- Project with southern Thailand. Such pro- country. According to the International jects are ground-breaking in one of the Monetary Fund, “’s new govern- ment faces a historic opportunity to jump- start development and lift living stan- dards…with appropriate reforms”.32 “ Myanmar’s new government faces a historic Despite such encouragement, the immedi- opportunity to jump-start development and lift living ate living conditions of the majority of people are little changed. Burma currently standards . stands below all its neighbours at 149th out of 187 countries in the UNDP Human International Monetary Fund Development Index. UN and other inter- national analysts warn that, without invest- ments in “education, health, rural develop- most rapidly developing regions of Asia. ment and infrastructure”, Burma could fall It will thus be vital that economic change victim to the “resource curse” of other under the new political system truly bene- impoverished but economically high- 33 fits the people and not simply international potential countries. Despite the country’s investors and the local business elite. After abundant energy resources, an estimated 75 decades of conflict and government mis- percent of the population do not have 34 management, financial reform is at a Year access to electricity. Zero where modernization is concerned. Equally important, evidence is growing that Burma ranks third from bottom, next to economic change could become the source Afghanistan, on the 2011 corruption per- of new grievances if not equitably planned ceptions index of Transparency Internatio- and implemented. Criticisms have been nal. growing. The Shwe Gas Movement has On a much-praised note, the Thein Sein called for the suspension of the oil and gas government has appointed independent pipelines to China until adequate environ- advisers and embraced discussion of mental and human rights safeguards are in reform on many long-overdue issues.31 place.35 The KNU and various community- Agriculture, energy, poverty alleviation and based organizations are concerned about addressing corruption have all been identi- business cronyism and the imposition of fied as key areas for national progress. At the Dawei Development Project without

Burma Policy Briefing | 9 consultation among the local people.36 And health, education, agriculture, environment on 12 May, the UNFC warned the govern- and media as well as conflict resolution. ment that all ceasefires could be suspended There are still registration and legal barriers if Tatmadaw operations “to protect foreign to be overcome. But initial indications from investments” in its campaign against the the Thein Sein government suggest that the KIO were not suspended by 10 June. “We importance of NGOs will not be denied.39 oppose and object to the killing of our own In short, civil society is “gaining ground”, ethnic people in the country for the inter- and community-based groups are putting ests of foreign countries,” the UNFC said.37 much needed realism back into the socio- political environment.40 Clearly, therefore, the establishment of a financially viable government and an eco- For these reasons, there are hopes that the nomic system that guarantees equal oppor- country could make rapid progress on tunity and rights to all citizens will be addressing basic social and humanitarian essential. As with any government in the needs in the next few years, provided that world, the state of the economy could well political progress and ethnic peace become become its Achilles heel, and popular pro- established. Pioneering donor projects such tests in 1988 and 2007 warn that, without as the Three Diseases Fund (3DF) and substantive progress, economic grievance Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund may become quickly expressed in the (LIFT) are being followed by other major streets. Recent protests over electricity initiatives, including the Global Fund to shortages in Mandalay and Yangon are Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria further reminders that expectations for real which returned to the country in 2011 after economic improvements are high. a five year absence due to government and international restrictions.41 SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS The present humanitarian landscape, nevertheless, continues to provide many Economic performance will also have grounds for concern. By any international critical influence on the fourth major standards, Burma remains an “aid orphan”, challenge within the country: social and with overseas development assistance esti- humanitarian affairs. If compared with a mated as low as US$5 per capita annually.42 decade ago, the general health and social Decades of conflict and isolation have conditions are much better researched and taken a heavy toll. Malaria remains a understood today – both domestically and leading cause of morbidity and mortality; internationally. Sadly, much of this new only 40,000 people have antiretroviral focus only occurred in the aftermath of the therapy in a country where an estimated 2008 , in which an esti- 240,000 are living with HIV; tuberculosis is mated 140,000 people died.38 almost three times the world average; forced labour and grave human rights Significantly, too, in recent years the energy abuses continue in the ethnic borderlands; and professionalism of local non-govern- and there remain over 150,000 refugees in mental and community-based groups have neighbouring countries as well as up to half been steadily increasing. Under the BSPP a million 'internally displaced persons' and SLORC-SPDC, regulations remained inside Burma itself. 43 tight and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) generally emerged from faith, Social and humanitarian needs are clearly cultural or business-based groups. But in immense. As aid experiences in Cambodia 2012 there are ever more independent and other conflict-damaged countries have organisations working in such vital areas as shown, however, an influx of international

10 | Burma Policy Briefing support is not in itself a solution and, liamentarians have visited the European indeed, can cause a new range of social and parliament; the European Union, Australia, human rights problems without political Canada and Norway have already sus- reforms.44 The key is effective working on pended most restrictions; Aung San Suu the ground with local communities, with Kyi is scheduled to visit Europe in June for the most vulnerable and needy prioritised the first time in 24 years; talk of interna- for humanitarian aid. “What we need is tional war crime tribunals has muted; and sustainable, sound aid,” Aung San Suu Kyi only the USA, although lifting investment advised in early May, which is only possi- sanctions, wants to keep basic elements, ble, she said, “if people can defend their notably an arms embargo, on the law books rights”.45 to maintain pressure. Change in Burma is “incomplete” and cannot be “guaranteed”, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION a U.S. State Department official recently 46 This leads to the fifth challenge facing the warned. country: the international dimension. The problem for the West, however, is that Again, the past few months have witnessed governments are returning to the Burma extraordinary change. A year ago, Burma stage very late. Recent events raise as many was still being spoken of in Western circles questions as they answer in international in the same breath as North Korea. Today geopolitics and the future identity of the Burmese state. The reality is that Burma is a fragile player, caught between China, India “ What we need is sustainable, sound aid and Thailand, on a strategic crossroads in Asia that is now undergoing dynamic Aung San Suu Kyi change.47 Western influence is likely to be limited. Not only have Burma’s border politics long been inextricably linked with its neighbours, but the modern powers of the long-standing paradigm from the China and India already have significant SLORC-SPDC era of “Asian engagement investments and security interests in the versus Western boycotts” is ending, and country.48 ASEAN, too, is an active stake- Western diplomats, businessmen, academ- holder, with Burma scheduled to become ics and other international visitors are the 2014 ASEAN chair. Meanwhile Japan lining up to enter the country. From US and South Korea are also seeking to expand Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to UN trade with the country. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the procession has been remarkable. Asian diplomats often say that it is possible to over-estimate the importance of their Quite how these new international rela- relationships with the Burma government. tionships will play out, however, is un- But already under the SLORC-SPDC the certain. In a world where the security focus scramble for influence and resources had is often on Iran, North Korea, Zimbabwe begun. The consequences in international and other “rogue” states, Western diplo- geopolitics will be immense, with major mats have privately decided that encour- infrastructure and energy projects either on agement for President Thein Sein is the the drawing board or already under way. best strategy to foster democracy and ensure that the Burma government does Among Asian governments, progress and not return to its “pariah state” ways. stability in Burma are especially important for India, Thailand and , which Western sanctions are unravelling; lower also have refugee, disease, narcotics and house speaker Shwe Mann and other par- other social burdens to bear. But it is

Burma Policy Briefing | 11 China, with its unique “Paukphaw” reconciliation and reform. Any visitor to (fraternal) relationship, that stands out in the country will recognize the growing both influence and concerns. China is the hopes for modernization, democratic largest foreign investor; over 70 Chinese reform and peace that have long been companies (state and private) are listed in denied to Burma’s peoples by decades of the hydropower, mining, oil and gas conflict, isolation and military-dominated sectors;49 the Chinese population in Burma government. is growing; and the completion of the oil and gas pipelines from the Rakhine state The process of change, however, is just coast will see the fruition of China’s long- beginning. This is not the first time that standing “two oceans” goal (i.e. access to Burma has appeared on the brink of both the Pacific and Indian oceans). essential reforms. There is a long legacy of Clearly, by comparison to China, the West state failure and neglected humanitarian has a very long way to go in Burma in a needs that must be addressed if the century where it is Asian influence on the tragedies of the past are not to be repeated. ascendance. The admission of NLD representatives to parliament, the agreement of new ceasefires The coming years will therefore be critical with armed ethnic groups, and the in how international politics impact on government’s prioritization of economic Burmese affairs under the new system of reform indicate the potential for a new government. The long-standing division realism and inclusion in national politics between the West prioritizing the pro- that could lead to solutions. Nevertheless, democracy movement and Asian neigh- the road ahead will be rocky and many bours engaging with the former Tatmadaw pressing challenges remain to be addressed. government may be ending. New relation- For reconciliation to continue, the release ships and policies, however, have yet to be of remaining political prisoners and a sus- settled, and many challenges lie ahead. For tainable Kachin ceasefire are of paramount the present, the international landscape importance. It will then be important for appears calm. But Chinese officials have the different parties in national politics – already warned that, after “decades” of Tatmadaw, democratic and ethnic – to avoidance, it hopes that the U.S. decision to achieve processes inside and outside of engage in Burma is not “aimed at Beijing”.50 parliament by which dialogue and reform It is thus vital that the international com- momentum can continue. Precedent from munity does not return to the practice of previous political eras warns that failure to supporting opposing parties in Burmese achieve national inclusion only leaves political affairs. There are many warnings instabilities and state failure for the future. from Burma’s post-colonial history during Economic change, too, must mark an which China and the USA have backed integral part of Burma’s reform process and different parties over the decades.51 At the not become the source of new divisions and very moment when reconciliation and grievances. mutual progress are needed, such actions could once again pull the country apart. Finally, this is also a time of uncertainty and critical importance for the interna- CONCLUSION tional community. The divisions between Western boycotts and Asian engagement By any international standard, Burma is a are ending. But for the moment, future land that has undergone dramatic change relationships and policies are yet to be in the past year. Important steps have been defined. In recent months, a rush has initiated by the new government under accelerated for influence and resources in President Thein Sein that could help Burma. Thus it is important that interna-

12 | Burma Policy Briefing tional engagement should not, as in the 5. This view has been expressed to TNI-BCN by past, sustain divisions in the country. different veteran political, military and Rather, international engagement should community leaders during the past view years. be based on supporting national peace and 6. For an analysis, see, “Conflict or Peace? reform. Ethnic Unrest Intensifies in Burma”, TNI-BCN Burma Policy Briefing Nr 7, June 2011. In summary, there currently appear many 7. See, “All must try to see national race youths more initiatives for socio-political change who brandished guns using laptops: Govern- in place in Burma than ever before, and ment not divided into hard-liners and soft- these provide grounds for optimism that liners”, New Light of Myanmar, 2 March 2012. the country will face a brighter future. One way or another, decades of isolation are 8. This was the reason why NLD MPs were initially reluctant to enter the legislatures by coming to an end, and the political swearing to “safeguard” the 2008 constitution. landscape could look very different by the Hpyo Wai Tha, “NLD Maintains Stance on time of the next general election in 2015. Oath Standoff”, , 27 April 2012. This in no way, however, diminishes the Given the current USDP-Tatmadaw domina- seriousness and urgency of the challenges tion, doubts continue over how easy it will be facing Burma’s peoples. Failure now will for pro-democracy parties to amend the con- only doom the country to another stitution. Amendment proposals need to be unnecessary cycle of suffering. supported by at least 20 per cent of parliamen- tary representatives and can only be adopted with 75 per cent of votes in the legislatures. See also note 27. 9. See e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Ban NOTES Should Press for Lasting Reforms”, 28 April 2012; Benjamin Zawacki and Donna Jean Guest (Amnesty International), “New rights, old 1. In 1989 the State Law and Order Restoration wrongs in Myanmar”, Asia Times, 26 May 2012. Council military government changed the official name from Burma to Myanmar. They 10. “VP has ‘become a monk’: govt official”, are alternative forms in the , Myanmar Times, 21-27 May 2012. The govern- but their use has become a politicised issue. ment has two Vice-Presidents, the other being Although this is changing, Myanmar is not yet Dr Sai Mauk Kham who was elected by the commonly used in the English language. For upper house. Tin Aung Myint Oo was the consistency, Burma will be used in this report. Tatmadaw choice. This is not intended as a political statement. 11. New Light of Myanmar, 28 March 2012. 2. BBC News, “Aung San Suu Kyi cautious on 12. The exact intentions behind this move are Burma reform”, 3 October 2011, still unclear. While the experience of Tatmadaw http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific- representatives has increased, it is also thought 15152767 possible that senior officers might behave more 3. World Bank Policy Research Report, Break- independently in parliamentary affairs. ing the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Develop- 13. For a post-election overview, see, “Ethnic ment Policy (World Bank and Oxford Univer- Politics in Burma: The Time for Solutions”, sity Press, Washington D.C., 2003). For a TNI-BCN Burma Policy Briefing Nr 5, February Burma analysis, see e.g., Martin Smith, State of 2011. Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma (East-West Center Washington, Policy 14. See e.g., “Ending Burma’s Conflict Cycle?: Studies 36, 2007), pp.3-25, 52-7. Prospects for Ethnic Peace”, TNI-BCN Burma Policy Briefing Nr 8, February 2012. 4. In a 1997 shake-up, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was renamed the 15. A third possibility is also sometimes alleged: State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). that local Tatmadaw units misrepresent the situation on the ground to central command.

Burma Policy Briefing | 13 But given the considerable domestic and representation, taking between 37 (Shan) and international publicity, this seems unlikely in 45 (Chin) per cent of the seats. For an election the present Kachin crisis. analysis, see, “A Changing Ethnic Landscape: Analysis of Burma’s 2010 polls”, TNI-BCN 16. Soe Than Lynn, “Order to end attacks puts Burma Policy Briefing Nr 4, December 2010. ceasefire back on table”, Myanmar Times, 19-25 December 2011; Sai Wansai, “President Thein 28. Shan Herald Agency for News, 1 May 2012. Sein: Real Reformer or Pretender?”, Shan 29. Lawi Weng, “Ethnic Leaders Back Suu Kyi's Herald Agency for News, 20 December Call for Panglong 2”, The Irrawaddy, 15 2011; note 7. November 2010. 17. See note 6. 30. New Light of Myanmar, 2 March 2012. See 18. The Shan ceasefire leader Hso Ten and Shan also note 7. politicians such as Hkun Htun Oo were sen- 31. See e.g., the papers delivered by tenced to long jail terms under the SPDC. The and other participants at the National SSA-N ceasefire also broke down last year. It Workshop on Economic Development, 19-21 has since been resumed; Shan political prisoners August 2011. released; and the government has also agreed a ceasefire with the allied SSA-S. But the 32. International Monetary Fund, “Myanmar Tatmadaw has continued to be accused of 2011 Article IV Consultation”, IMF Country launching attacks; see e.g., “SSA North: Burma Report No.12/104, May 2012, p.3. Army breaching truce 13 times”, Shan Herald 33. Simon Roughneen, “Commodity Prices, Agency for News, 1 May 2012. Cronyism Threaten Burma’s Economy: UN”, 19. See note 6. The Irrawaddy, 10 May 2012. 20. See e.g., Kachin Development Networking 34. Ibid. Group, "Lessons from the Kachin 'development' 35. Shwe Gas Movement, Letter to President experience", May 2012. Thein Sein, 1 March 2012. 21. Human Rights Watch, “Untold Miseries: 36. See e.g., Karen News, “KNU questions role Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in of Govt’s business linked ‘peace talk’ advisors”, Burma’s Kachin State”, 20 March 2012. 10 May 2012; IRIN, “Myanmar: Humanitarian 22. Access to aid for those afflicted by the con- cost of economic development”, 27 February flict has been a contentious issue. See e.g., “UN 2012. Aid Finally Reaches Kachin IDPs”, The Irra- 37. Phanida, “UNFC gives deadline to halt waddy, 26 March 2012; “UN chief calls for end military offensives”, Mizzima, 14 May 2012. to Kachin conflict”, Kachin News Group, 19 May 2012. 38. IRIN, “Myanmar: What if another Cyclone Nargis comes?”, 17 September 2009. 23. San Oo, “UN ready assist peace effort in Kachin: Ban”, Myanmar Times, 7-13 May 2012. 39. See e.g., Shwe Yee Saw Myint, “Govt relaxes NGO registration process”, Myanmar Times, 24. “Burmese President Will Lead Peace 16-22 April 2012. Committee”, The Irrawaddy, 8 May 2012. 40. Tom Kramer, Civil Society Gaining Ground: 25. New Light of Myanmar, 19 May 2012. The Opportunities for Change and Development in announcement was dated 3 May but no reason Burma (TNI-BCN, Amsterdam, 2011). was given for the delay. For Sai Mauk Kham, see also note 10. 41. See e.g., “HIV/AIDS and drug use in Burma/Myanmar”, TNI-BCN Drug Policy 26. “Ethnic leaders deny Minister’s claim it’s all Briefing Nr 17, May 2006, pp.10-13. about personal and business gains”, Karen News, 17 January 2012. 42. IRIN, “Myanmar: Donor aid begins to flow”, 4 January 2012. 27. The USDP won 883 of the 1,154 possible seats in the different legislatures. Only in the 43. See e.g., IRIN, “Myanmar: Anti-malarial Chin, Karen, Rakhine and Shan state assemblies drug resistance ‘hotspots’ identified”, 19 April did nationality parties win significant 2011; Medecins Sans Frontieres, “Lives in the

14 | Burma Policy Briefing Balance: the Need for Urgent HIV and TB Treatment in Myanmar”, 22 February 2012; Human Rights Watch, “Untold Miseries: Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin State”, 20 March 2012; Thailand Burma Border Consortium, “Programme Report 2011: July to December”. 44. See e.g., Seth Mydans, “Donors Asked to Withhold Aid Over Proposed Law in Cambodia”, New York Times, 7 April 2011. 45. Quoted from an interview with Welt am Sonntag, “Suu Kyi says Myanmar needs 'sustainable aid'”, AFP, 6 May 2012. 46. Reuters, “U.S. says ‘eyes wide open’ in response to Myanmar changes”, 11 May 2012. 47. Thant Myint-U, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia (Faber and Faber, London, 2011). 48. See e.g., Martin Smith, “Ethnic Challenges and Border Politics in Myanmar/Burma”, in, Xiaolin Guo (ed.), Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives (Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm, 2008), pp.37- 65. 49. See e.g., EarthRights International, “China in Burma”, September 2008, pp.10-11. 50. Reuters, “China says hopes US’ Myanmar moves not aimed at Beijing”, 25 April 2012. 51. See e.g., note 48. In the parliamentary and BSPP eras, for example, China supported the insurgent CPB, while the USA backed Kuomintang remnants from China. The USA also supported Thailand’s border “buffer” policy of tacitly accepting armed opposition groups from Burma that operated along its borders, a policy that, in Thailand’s case, still has vestiges today.

Burma Policy Briefing | 15 TNI-BCN Project on Ethnic Conflict in Burma Burma Policy Briefings

Burma has been afflicted by ethnic conflict and civil war since Burma in 2010: A Critical Year independence in 1948, exposing it to some of the longest in Ethnic Politics, Burma Policy running armed conflicts in the world. Ethnic nationality Briefing No.1, June 2010 peoples have long felt marginalised and discriminated Burma’s 2010 Elections: against. The situation worsened after the military coup in Challenges and Opportunities, 1962, when minority rights were further curtailed. The main Burma Policy Briefing No.2, grievances of ethnic nationality groups in Burma are the lack June 2010 of influence in the political decision-making processes; the absence of economic and social development in their areas; Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s and what they see as Burmanisation policies by governments Election Landscape, Burma since independence that have translated into repression of Policy Briefing No. 3, October their cultural rights and religious freedom. 2010 This joint TNI-BCN project aims to stimulate strategic think- A Changing Ethnic Landscape: ing on addressing ethnic conflict in Burma and to give a voice Analysis of Burma's 2010 Polls, to ethnic nationality groups who have until now been ignored Burma Policy Briefing No. 4, and isolated in the international debate on the country. In December 2010 order to respond to the challenges of political changes since Ethnic Politics in Burma: The 2010 and for the future, TNI and BCN believe it is crucial to Time for Solutions, Burma formulate practical and concrete policy options and define Policy Briefing No. 5, February concrete benchmarks on progress that national and interna- 2011 tional actors can support. The project will aim to achieve Burma's New Government: greater support for a different Burma policy, which is prag- Prospects for Governance and matic, engaged and grounded in reality. Peace in Ethnic States, Burma The Transnational Institute (TNI) was founded in 1974 as an Policy Briefing No. 6, May 2011 independent, international research and policy advocacy Conflict or Peace? Ethnic institute, with strong connections to transnational social Unrest Intensifies in Burma, movements, and intellectuals concerned to steer the world in Burma Policy Briefing No. 7, a democratic, equitable, environmentally sustainable and June 2011 peaceful direction. Its point of departure is a belief that solutions to global problems require global co-operation. Ending Burma’s Conflict Cycle? Prospects for Ethnic BCN was founded in 1993. It works towards democratization, Peace, Burma Policy Briefing respect for human rights and a solution to the ethnic crises in No. 8, February 2012 Burma. BCN does this through facilitating public and infor- mal debates on Burma, information dissemination, advocacy work, and the strengthening of the role of Burmese civil Other Briefings society and political actors in the new political system. Assessing Burma/Myanmar’s New Government: Challenges Transnational Institute Burma Centrum Netherlands and Opportunities for Euro- PO Box 14656 PO Box 14563 pean Policy Responses, Con- 1001 LD Amsterdam 1001 LB Amsterdam ference Report, Amsterdam, 22 The Netherlands The Netherlands & 23 February 2012 Tel: +31-20-6626608 Tel.: 31-20-671 6952 Fax: +31-20-6757176 Fax: 31-20-671 3513 Burma's Longest War: Anatomy of the , E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] by Ashley South, TNI, March www.tni.org/work-area/ burma- www.burmacentrum.nl project 2011

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