Poland and Ballistic Missile Defense
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PPrroolliiffeerraattiioonn PPaappeerrss 4488 ______________________________________________________________________ Poland and Ballistic Missile Defense The Limits of Atlanticism ______________________________________________________________________ Łukasz Kulesa . Security Studies Center The Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. In collaboration with the Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission ISBN: 978-2-36567-243-6 © Ifri – 2014 – All rights reserved Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27 rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE 1000 – Brussels – BELGIUM Tel : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Tel : 32 (0)2 238 51 10 Fax : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Fax : 32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email : [email protected] Email : [email protected] Website : http://www.ifri.org/ Proliferation Papers Though it has long been a concern for security experts, proliferation has truly become an important political issue with the last decade, marked simultaneously by the nuclearization of South Asia, the weakening of international regimes and the discovery of frauds and traffics, the number and gravity of which have surprised observers and analysts alike (Iraq in 1991, Libya until 2004, North Korean and Iranian programs or the A. Q. Khan networks today). To further the debate on complex issues that involve technical, regional, and strategic aspects, Ifri’s Security Studies Center organizes each year, in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), a series of closed seminars dealing with WMD proliferation, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Generally held in English, these seminars are structured around the presentation of an international expert. Proliferation Papers is a collection, in the original version, of selected texts from these presentations. An anonymous peer-review procedure ensures the high academic quality of the contributions. Download notifications are sent to an audience of several hundred international subscribers upon publication. Editorial board Editor: Corentin Brustlein Principal Scientific Adviser: Etienne de Durand and Jean Klein Layout Assistant: Jean-Baptiste Ollieric How to cite this publication Łukasz Kulesa, “Poland and Ballistic Missile Defense: The Limits of Atlanticism”, Proliferation Papers, No. 48, 2014. About the Author Łukasz Kulesa is the Head of the Non-proliferation and Arms Control Project at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). Since 2003 he has been working on the issues of international security at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, focusing on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation crises (North Korea, Iran), perspectives for nuclear disarmament, Russian security policy, nuclear and conventional deterrence, the role of missile defence, and the future of arms control systems. In 2010-2012 he was working as Deputy Director of the Strategic Analyses Department at the National Security Bureau, a body providing aid and support to the President of the Republic of Poland in executing security and defence tasks. Mr. Kulesa is a graduate of the Law Department of the Jagiellonian University (Cracow). He holds a Master of Arts degree in International Relations and European Studies from the Central European University (Budapest). Contents Introduction _____________________________________________ 7 Poland in the US and NATO BMD Systems ___________________ 11 Negotiations with the George W. Bush Administration ______ 11 Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach ________ 17 Cancellation of EPAA Phase IV (2013) and Prospects for the Future ________________________ 21 Air and Missile Defense Capabilities for the Polish Armed Forces _______________________________ 25 Rationale for Acquiring National AMD Capabilities ______ 25 Acquisition Challenges ____________________________ 27 BMD’s Strategic Challenges for Poland ______________________ 31 NATO Cohesion and the Russian Factor ______________ 31 Missile Defense and Deterrence _____________________ 34 Conclusion _____________________________________________ 37 Abstract Since Poland first expressed its willingness to host a critical part of the US Ballistic Missile Defense architecture, in 2002, the program has undergone several setbacks. Today, while Poland is still expected to host key elements of the US BMD capabilities, contributing to NATO’s territorial defense against ballistic missile threats, Warsaw does not enjoy the kind of special bilateral relationship that it was trying to secure with Washington. Domestic politics, changing threat assessments, the US ‘reset’ policy vis-à- vis Russia and the latter’s critics of BMD’s destabilizing character all contributed to this change, which, in turn, had strong consequences for Poland’s strategic posture. It sparked the recent Polish decision to acquire national air and missile defense capabilities, both as a strategic asset for the country’s own deterrence posture and as a national contribution to the NATO BMD system. It also influenced Poland’s attempt to reconcile its long-term national interests and threat perception with BMD’s greater role within the Alliance, both by emphasizing NATO’s collective defense mission and by ensuring that nuclear weapons would remain at the heart of NATO’s deterrence posture. * * * Depuis que la Pologne a manifesté son intention d’accueillir une composante essentielle de l’architecture de défense antimissile balistique (DAMB) américaine en 2002, le programme a connu plusieurs soubresauts. Aujourd’hui, même si le pays doit encore accueillir des éléments-clefs des capacités DAMB américaines, ceux-ci reflètent moins le renforcement du partenariat stratégique particulier bilatéral recherché par Varsovie qu'une contribution à la protection de l'OTAN face à la menace balistique. La politique intérieure, une réévaluation de la menace balistique, la stratégie américaine de reset vis-à-vis de la Russie et les critiques de cette dernière quant au caractère déstabilisateur de la DAMB ont contribué à façonner cette évolution, avec des conséquences significatives pour la posture stratégique de Varsovie. Tout d'abord, cette expérience tumultueuse a ainsi incité Varsovie à acquérir des capacités nationales de défense antiaérienne et antimissile. Par ailleurs, la Pologne a dû tenter d’accommoder ses intérêts nationaux et sa perception des menaces avec le rôle plus important dévolu à la DAMB au sein de l’Alliance, en insistant sur sa mission de défense collective des membres d’une part, et en s’assurant que les armes nucléaires demeureraient au cœur de la posture de dissuasion de l’OTAN d’autre part. Introduction ver the last decade, Poland’s willingness to host the United States O Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Europe has left it in the most precarious of positions. Not only did it generate an angry backlash from Russia, it also prompted negative reactions from a number of European partners. Negotiating with the United States, Poland started by conveying its interest in US “boots on the ground”, but later added a wide range of demands that were to strengthen its privileged position as a major European partner of Washington. Having agreed the terms of deployment of US Ground-Based Interceptors in Poland in 2008, Warsaw was disappointed to see the configuration of the BMD system changed during the following year by President Barack Obama. It decided to become a part of the new European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and host an SM-3 missiles base in the 2018 framework, but expectations for the impact of missile defense cooperation with the United States on the long-term security of Poland were scaled down significantly. The March 2013 US decision to cancel Phase IV of the EPAA (which was to give the base in Poland a direct role in protecting US territory) seemed to confirm the view that the importance of the future BMD installation in Poland would be greatly diminished as compared with the original plans. Partly as a result of the “rollercoaster ride” experience of dealing with the United States on Missile Defense, Poland decided that its own plans for the modernization of the armed forces should include a limited missile defense component. The projected Polish air and missile defense system would be developed in the next decade, operating in parallel with the US EPAA to provide protection against lower-tier threats. These capabilities could be used as a contribution to NATO operations or integrated into the national defense posture in case of a major deterioration of the regional security environment. Despite its early preferences for bilateral relations with the United States (as opposed to acting mainly through a NATO framework), Poland had to adjust to the change in US policy and the upgrade of NATO’s role in territorial ballistic missile protection. Since Warsaw