University of Utah Western Political Science Association

Duverger's Law, Fusion, and the Decline of American "Third" Parties Author(s): Howard A. Scarrow Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 634-647 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/448267 Accessed: 20-08-2014 14:01 UTC

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This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:01:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DUVERGER'S LAW, FUSION, AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN "THIRD" PARTIES

HOWARD A. SCARROW StateUniversity of New Yorkat StonyBrook

AMONG the various reasonscited by Americanpolitical scientists for the United States having a two-partysystem, the electoralsystem has been stronglyemphasized. It is argued that the statewide- pluralitymethod of electinga presidentand governors,plus the single- member-district-pluralitymethod of electingnational and statelegislators, have made "third" partygrowth unlikely. This assessmentof the consequence of the pluralityelection method has also been stressedby students of comparativepolitics. In that contextit has been referredto by Riker (1982) and othersas "Duverger's Law." There is, however,a way by whichthe obstaclespresented to a minor partyby a pluralityelection system can be minimized;that method is jointly sponsoredcandidacies. Today in Great Britain the two smallestparties, the Liberals and Social Democrats, divide the parliamentarydistricts be- tweenthem and advise the electoratethat a vote fora candidate of either partyis a vote forthe "Alliance" (Curtice and Steed 1983). In France the Socialist and Communistparties agree not to contestthe run-offelection in any districtwhere the otherleftist party has polled more votes in the firstround of balloting; partiesof the rightfollow the same cooperative strategy(Penniman 1980). In an earlierperiod in Canada whenparty labels did not appear on the ballot, two partieswere able to nominatethe same candidatein a districtand advertisethis fact during the electioncampaign (Scarrow 1962: 6) In 19thcentury America jointly sponsored candidacies were commonplace, withcooperation between a minorparty and a major one being es- peciallyin evidence. Indeed, many of the electoralsuccesses recordedby minorparties during this period were in factthe productof these joint candidacies or, to use the termthen in vogue, the productof "fusion" candidacies.1 The historyand decline of the fusionpractice is the subject of thispaper. The paper will argue thatthe institutionalreforms enacted at the turn of the centuryhad the effectof eliminatingfusion candidacies, and with them the more complex partysystem they helped to sustain.

Received: July 25, 1985 Revision Received: Nov. 12, 1985 Accepted for publication: Nov. 14, 1985 NOTE: An earlier version of this paper was presentedat the 1985 Annual Meeting of the AmericanPolitical Science Association,where helpful comments were made by Edward Lazarus and Steven Rosenstone. The decline of thirdparty members in Congress is shown by Schlesinger(1984).

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FUSION CANDIDACIES

Frequency During the latterhalf of the 19thcentury fusion candidacies were fre- quent at all levels of government.At the presidentiallevel the firstexam- ple is foundin the electionof 1856, when the American(Know-Nothing) partyand the Whig partyboth backed the thirdparty candidacy of Mil- lard Fillmore(Petersen 1963; McKee 1906; Stanwood1928). The nextnota- ble example occurredin 1872 when the newlyformed Liberal Republican party nominated Horace Greeley as its presidential candidate; the Democraticconvention, not wanting to splitthe anti-Republicanvote, did likewise.The last conspicuousexample of a presidentialfusion candidacy was that of WilliamJennings Bryan, who was the candidate of both the Democratic partyand the Populistparty in 1896. A single fusionslate of electorswas presentedin 28 states,some of the electorsbeing Democrats and some Populists.Since thetwo partieshad not nominatedthe same vice presidentialcandidate, this allocation of electorswithin the slate was of poten- tial importance (Durden 1956; Stanwood 1928: Vol. I). Thanks to the data compiled by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research we are able to determine the frequency of fusion candidacies at selected other levels of government. At the gubernatorial level the earliest fusion candidacy appears to have been in New York in 1854, - when no less than eleven political parties including groups carrying such labels as "Strong Minded Women," "Anti Rent," and "Negro" - backed the Whig gubernatorial nominee.2 Altogether, before the century was out no less than fifty-onefusion gubernatorial candidacies, spread across twenty- four states, had appeared. At the congressional level fusion candidacies usually followedthe lead provided by presidential candidates, featuringsuch minor parties as American, Greenbacks, Populists, Prohibition, and La- bor, usually allied with one of the two major parties but occasionally allied among themselves. The total number of fusion candidacies involving mi- nor parties at the congressional, gubernatorial, and (beginning in 1913) senatorial level is shown in the accompanying graph.3

2The party affiliationsare those presentedin the New YorkHerald. 3The graphis derivedfrom the ICPR data, supplementedby the CongressionalQuarterly's Guideto U.S. Elections(1975). Interpretationof the ICPR data is oftendifficult since theyare based on officialreports which are oftenmisleading in the case of fusioncandidacies. The figuresreported here, then, and shown in the graph, may be regarded as conservativeestimates of the numberof fusioncandidacies. Only fragmentarydata are available relatingto fusioncandidacies at thelocal level. Limitedevidence, nevertheless, suggeststhat such candidacieswere commonplace,usually involvinga locallybased partyand one of the two major national parties. Thus the Boston mayoral election of 1889, the firstunder the Australianballot, featureda candidate who appeared withthe labels "Citizen, Democratic" opposing a candidate labeled "Citizen, Independent, Democratic, Republican." The ballot is shownin Dana (1924-25). Seth Low won New York City's 1901 mayoralelection running as thenominee of the Republicans, Citizens' Union, and Greater New York Democracy. The 1905 mayoral race in San Francisco featureda Republican-Democraticfusion candidate opposing a Labor candidate.

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:01:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MINORPARTY FUSION CANDIDACIES: CONGRESSIONAL,GUBERNATORIAL, AND NUMBEROF V NUMBEROF STATES ; CANDIDACIES SENATORIALOFFICE,1850's-1960's 450 -r

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50 - o i 1900 1910 DECADE

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Methodof Balloting The advantagesof the fusionstrategy for the cooperatingparties were clear. For a major partyconfronted with strong opposition, a fusioncan- didacy was a way of increasingchances of victoryin a winner-take-allsys- tem. For the minorparty, fusion usually presentedthe only way forit to gain politicalinfluence. Its presencecould influencethe choice of nominee by the major party;its electoralsupport would entitleit to a claim on the loyaltyof a successfulfusion candidate; and sometimesit could insistthat one ofits own membersbecome thefusion nominee. Yet fora minorparty whoseprofessed reason forexistence was itsdistinctiveness from the major parties,a fusionstrategy was fraughtwith danger; accordingly,these parties were continuallydivided by the question of whetheror not to pursue that course.4 Helping to make fusioncandidacies an attractivealternative was the methodof balloting. Prior to theintroduction of the Australian ballot, each party,including any ad hoc group organizedto contesta particularelec- tion, was able to printits own "ticket" or seriesof ticketsfor the various national,state, and local offices,and distributethese on electionday. These ticketscould easilyinclude the name ofone or morecandidates whose names also appeared on one or moreother party tickets. Equally important,these ticketsallowed a partyto a fusionarrangement to maintain its own au- tonomousidentity during the balloting.If the votes were counted in such a way thateach party'scontribution to a candidate's totalcould be deter- mined,party autonomy was furtherenhanced. Thus one suggestionmade in 1896 forresolving the vice presidentialproblem which confrontedthe Democraticand Populistfusion effort was forthe successful electors in each stateto cast theirvice presidentialvote for the candidate of whichever party had attractedmore votes to the fusionslate of electors(Durden 1965: 46). Often, however,such dissectingof vote totals was not possible.5

INSTITUTIONAL REFORM The introductionof the Australianballot in the last decade of the cen- turysounded the initialdeath knellfor fusion candidacies. The introduc- tion of thisballot reformpresented minor parties with the obstacle of now

4 Haynes (1916: 4) arguesthat fusion candidacies were harmful to minorparties. Other writers, however, have stressedthat only with fusioncandidacies did minor party vote totals reach respectableproportions (e.g., Kleppner [1973]). The inter-partytensions which may accompany fusion candidacies are illustratedin Durden's account of Bryan's Democratic-Populistcandidacy. Tension withincontemporary coalition partners in Eu- rope are discussed in Bogdanor (1983). 5The calculationwould not have been possible in 1896 in stateswhere the office-blockAus- tralianballot had been introduced(see below). Even beforethe Autralian ballot, moreover, themethod of countingvotes appears not to have allowed forcalculating sub-totals. For example, Petersen(1963: viii) notes that in 1884 the Democrats and Greenbacks in Michigan presenteda common slate of twelvepresidential electors, but each party nominatedits own thirteenthelector so thatthe numberof votes receivedby thiselector would be taken as the number of votes which each partyhad attractedto the twelve fusioncandidates.

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:01:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 638 WesternPolitical Quarterly having to gain access to the ballot by means of petitionsignatures, a bur- den not placed on partieswhich could gain automaticballot access by vir- tue of having attracteda large numberof votes in a previouselection - that is, the two major parties. The decline of thirdparties in the United Stateshas thusoften been tracedin partto thisaspect of ballot reform (Maz- manian 1974: Smallwood 1983; Rosenstoneet al. 1984).6There was, however, anotherfeature of thenew ballotlaws whichhas receivedinsufficient attention,although scholars at thetime (Ludington 1909, 1911) recognized its importance:the new ballot laws presenteda way forstates to outlaw fusioncandidacies. Where theparty-column type of ballotwas authorized, the law could require that a candidate's name appear at only one place on theballot. Where the office-block ballot format was introduced,the legis- lation could specifythat a candidate could have only one partylabel at- tached to his name on the ballot. By 1895 six stateshad enacted one or the otherof theserestrictions. By 1900 the list had grownto thirteen;by 1910 to twenty.These anti-fusionenactments were not always successful, however.Michigan was one of the firststates to specifythat a candidate's name could appear onlyonce on the party-columnballot; yetthat restric- tion did not preventthe Democrat and Populist partiesin thatstate from presentingon the 1896 ballot a complete"Democrat-People's" column of national, state, and local candidates. Soon thereaftera more effectiveanti-fusion device became available. Althoughthe directprimary has oftenbeen blamed forweakening Ameri- can politicalparties, in factthis institutional reform may have aided more than it injuredthe major partiesby the two impedimentsit erectedto mi- nor partygrowth. One of thesewas the outletprimary elections provided to dissidentfactions within the major parties;forming a new partywas no longernecessary (Holcombe 1924: 316; Key 1956: chs. 4-6; Burnham1981: 189).7 The otherwas thenew opportunityprimary laws presentedfor outlawingfusion candidacies. The primarylaws accomplishedthis latter goal by requiringthat primary contestants be adherentsof the partywhose pri- marythey entered (e.g., be membersof, pledge loyaltyto, etc.), or by requiringthat a candidatecould contestonly one party'sprimary. Also often included, or added by later amendment,was a "sore loser" provision, preventinga defeatedprimary candidate from contesting the generalelec- tionas a candidateof another party or non-officialindependent group. This restrictionfurther limited the options open to minor parties.

6In some respects,however, the Australian ballot made lifemore difficultfor the major parties, and hence could be seen as helpingthe minor ones. Rusk (1970) has argued that split-ticketvoting became easier, and Nash (1950: 134) notesthat the Australianballot, because ofits secrecy, allowed persons to voteagainst a dominantpolitical machine without fearof retaliation.A good account of the AustralianBallot reformmovement is Fred- man (1968). An earlier work is Evans (1917). 7 By farthe best example of major partyinsurgents finding expression through the primary systemrather than by forminga thirdparty is providedby the experienceof the Non- Partisan League in NorthDakota. Other evidence is provided by Galderisi and Gins- berg (forthcoming).Key's work has also been cited forstressing the weakening effect of primaryelections on major partystrength. See Scarrow (1984).

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These variousrestrictions, in ballotlaws and primarylaws, seem clearly to have been aimed at the minorparties. Many of the ballot restrictions were enacted shortlyfollowing the 1896 election,and theywere especially noticeablein thosestates where the Democrat-Populistfusion candidacies in that election had presentedthe greatestthreat.8 The resultwas that whereasthere were thirty-one states which had featuredat least one fusion candidacyin thedecade of the 1890s, in the followingdecade thatnumber was more thanhalved (see graph). Additionalstates joined the anti-fusion movementfollowing Roosevelt's Progressive campaign of 1912 (e.g., Mis- souri in 1913), or when the Non-PartisanLeague became a thirdparty threat(e.g., Idaho in 1919). Whateverthe precipitatingfactor, by 1920 at least twenty-fivestates had anti-fusionlaws on the books.9 California was not included in the total because by this time the state had repealed itsanti-fusion law, therepeal having been supportedby progressiveRepub- licans who thenproceeded to formtheir own Progressiveparty in the be- liefthat they would benefitfrom the cross-filing system now made possible (see below). Fromtheir very inception, anti-fusion laws werechallenged in thecourts by aggrievedcandidates (Columbia Law Review1947). Almost invariably, however,state courtsrefused to supportthe argumentthat the laws vio- lated the respectivestate constitutions. Majority opinions, often expressed in termsof moral outrage,held that fusioncandidacies were designed to deceive the unsuspectingvoter; as such theywere fraudulent.Moreover, such candidacies frequentlywere the result of "deals" among party "bosses." Dissentingopinions, however, used equally righteouslanguage to defendthe fusionpractice. Fusion candidacies, it was argued, were often theonly way ofdefeating an entrenchedand corruptpolitical machine. They also provided a healthyantidote to narrow partisanship;and they increasedvoter interest. In onlyone state,New York, did theselatter opinions prevail. In 1911 thatstate's highestcourt struck down an anti-fusion statutewhich had been pushedthrough the legislature by Tammany forces stungby successfulfusion campaigns in New York City. In doing so the Court was followingthe lead ofreformist Governor Charles Evans Hughes, who had vetoed a similarlaw.

8The stateswere California,Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,Texas, and Wisconsin.(The laws were later repealed in California, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania,only to be re-enactedat later dates.) Rosenstone, Behr, and Lazarus (1984: 20) have observed that following the introductionof the Australianballot stateswith strongparty organizations saw no immediateneed to enact restrictionson ballotaccess. Anti-fusionlaws followedthe same pattern;the same eastern states with a traditionof strongmajor party organizations (Connecticut,Maryland, Massachusetts,Pennsylvania, Rhode Island) were among the last to enact these laws. 9The chronologyof ballot law restrictionsup through1910 is found in Ludington (1911). Subsequent restrictiveenactments reported here have been derived throughanalysis of individual state Legislativehistories. Not all laws were equally thorough:some leftthe door open forfusions which resultedfrom primary write-in candidates, some did not cover independentcandidacies or those of non-officialparties; some lacked the "sore loser" provision.

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CONSEQUENCE OF THE ANTI-FUSION LAWS One way to assess the consequenceof the earlyanti-fusion enactments is to note the differencebetween the campaign waged by the Populists in 1896 and thatwaged by thenext third-party to engage in presidentialpoli- tics, Roosevelt's Progressiveparty in 1912. Mowry (1973: 2551-52) has shown that Roosevelt's advisorsfaced a dilemma. On the one hand they knew that in order fora politicalparty to take root, it had to presenta fullslate of candidates for congressional and stateoffices. On theother hand, theyrecognized that their cause would sufferif a Progressivechallenge to progressive-mindedRepublicans resultedin the candidatesof both parties being defeated.A fusionstrategy would have provided an answer to the problem.Yet thevery states where this tactic would have been mostlikely, i.e., the midwesternand prairiestates, were the ones which had enacted the anti-fusionlaws. Thus in onlya fewstates did Republican-Progressive congressionaland gubernatorialcandidates appear on the ballot. Twelve years later, when LaFollete waged his Progressiveinsurgency, he did so onlyat thepresidential level. In morerecent years also, thirdparty presiden- tialcandidacies have usuallybeen thoseof individual insurgents (e.g., George Wallace, John Anderson) ratherthan of partyorganizations. The fateof the Non-PartisanLeague mightalso have been different had its leaders been able to make use of the fusionstrategy (Morlan 1955; Huntington1950). Outside of NorthDakota, wherethe League was able to gain powerby enteringits members in Republicanprimaries, the League was forcedto establishitself as a thirdparty. Yet of the ten stateswhere League membershipwas strongestand thuswhere League partieswere es- tablished,nine had enactedanti-fusion laws. For the League, fusionwould have been likelynot onlywith acceptable Democratic or Republican candidates,but also withcandidates of fledgling labor partieswhich were then to be foundin Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, and Montana. One can also speculateon the fateof Minnesota's Farmer-Laborparty had the two fac- tions of thishyphenated party not been forcedto co-existwithin a single organization. Despite the reductionin thenumber of stateswhere fusion candidacies were allowed, in stateswhere they were stillpossible the number of such candidaciesreached an all-timehigh during the decade 1910-1919,reflect- ing Progressivismand otherexpressions of politicalferment. For thisrea- son, too, it is reasonable to suggestthat fusioncandidacies mighthave become a more conspicuouspart of the Americanpolitical landscape had the institutionalbarriers not been raised against them. Perhaps thebest way to assess the consequencesof the anti-fusionlaws is to look more closelyat what happened in those stateswhere such laws wereabsent. This analysiscan also serveto identifythree methods by which a minorparty can exploitthe fusionpossibility - primaryraiding, coalition building,balance of power - and to illustratefurther how ballot and primarylaws can eitherundermine or enhance these strategies.

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PrimaryRaids As already mentioned,in 1913 Californiaremoved its restrictionon joint candidaciesby eliminatingthe requirementthat primary contestants be partymembers (Findley 1959). Progressive-mindedRepublicans believed it now would be safe forthem to formtheir own Progressiveparty; they could stillcontest Republican primariesand, if successful,could appear on the generalelection ballot withtwo partylabels followingtheir name on the office-blockformat. For a while thistactic was successful.In 1914 theProgressive candidates captured Republican nominationsfor five of the statewideoffices, and in 1916 the ProgressiveU.S. senatorialnominee, Hyram Johnson,enjoyed similarsuccess. However, as the popularityof Progressivismwaned, the raidingtactic became of diminishedvalue; indeed, it came to be used againstthe Progressive party itself. The mostpro- foundimpact of the 1913 amendment,then, came to be the raids which Republicansand Democratswere able to makeupon each other'sprimaries. Between 1914 and the mid-1950sclose to half of all candidates forstate and national officesappeared on the generalelection ballot as candidates of boththe major parties(Pitchell 1959). It was to put an end to suchjoint candidacies that cross-filingwas finallyoutlawed in 1959.10 Coalitions A much less riskytactic for a minor partyis to become a partnerin a power-sharingcoalition, convincing a major one thatits support will help secure victory.LaGuardia's initialmayoral victory in New York City in 1933 providesa good illustrationof how a coalitionstrategy can work. As the nominee of the Republican party,LaGuardia receivedsome 446,000 votesin the Republican columnof the ballot; as the nomineeof the Fusion party,a reformparty created thatyear by petition,LaGuardia attracted 419,000 votes. The combinedtotal was sufficientfor victory; neither component by itselfwould have been." BallotFormat New York's 1933 ballot formatdemonstrated another important ad- vantagewhich can accrueto a minorparty which pursues a coalitionstrategy. When thecandidate's name appears under separateparty columns, voters are given the option of votingfor a candidate and votingfor a particular party;said differently,voters are allowed to vote fora candidate without

?In additionto California,Pennsylvania and Massachusettswere late in outlawingfusion candidacies. As in California,Pennsylvania's 1935 law had as its statedgoal preventing major parties from raiding each other's primaries (Republicans had been raiding Democratic primaries).Pennsylvania's 1935 law did not, however,prevent fusion between a major partyand a non-officialparty or independentgroup; thatloophole was closed in 1939. Massachusettsoutlawed fusion candidacies in 1941. The natureof anti- fusionlegislation today is included in the ElectionLaw Guidebookpublished in 1978 by the U.S. Senate Committeeon Rules and Administration.In a fewstates, e.g., Penn- sylvania and Maryland, fusioncandidacies forjudicial officeare still allowed. LaGuardia successfullyran again in 1937 as a fusioncandidate, as did Robert Wagner in 1957 and 1961,JohnLindsay in 1965, and Edward Koch in 1981. (Koch's candidacy was Democrat-Republican.)

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:01:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 642 WesternPolitical Quarterly having to supporta partythey may dislike. The foundersof New York's American Labor partyin 1936 createdtheir party that year in order that Roosevelt supporterswould be able to vote forhim as the ALP candidate, not as the candidate of Tammany Hall (some 275,000 chose thatoption). Under a circumstancesuch as this, the choice given to voters is similar to thatgiven to votersin a European multi-partysystem when prospective coalitionpartners are announced in advance of the balloting,as happens, forexample, in West Germanytoday: votersvote exclusivelyfor their own party'slist of candidates, even thoughsuch supportwill redound also to theadvantage of other parties in thecoalition (von Beyme 1983). Duverger (1963) reasonedthat two factors render the single-member-district-plurality systemof election detrimental to thirdparty growth: the mechanical effect- unless theyare concentrated,votes are wasted; and the psychologicalef- fect- not wantingto waste theirvote, voterswill shun thirdparty candidates. By pursuinga coalitionstrategy, a minorparty may be able not only to minimizethese barriers, but by being able to offeran alternativemethod of candidate supportit may in factbenefit from the system. Ballot formatis importantfor another reason. A problemfor a minor partyrelying on a coalitionstrategy is that it will always be in danger of being swallowedup by itsmajor coalitionpartner. Small European parties operatingunder parliamentarysystems often face this problem,e.g., the Irish Labor party(Farrell 1983). For Americanminor parties the problem has been magnifiedwhen the ballot formathas not permittedseparate ballot position.As alreadynoted, the pre-1890party tickets allowed such autonomy.However, when that system was replacedby the Australianballot only the partycolumn formatallowed a continuationof that advantage; the office-blockformat did not. In the lattercase, the ballot fora fusion candidacy featuredthe candidate's name, followedby the names of the respectivenominating parties and a single printedsquare forthe voter's "X." The importanceof the separateballot column to minorparty vital- ityis stronglysuggested by whathappened to New York State's multi-party systemonce thestate switched to theoffice-block format beginning in 1914. Immediatelythe number of minor parties, both those officially recognized and those generatedby petition,declined. The experienceof New York City is especiallyinstructive. The traditionof fusionmayoral candidates began in 1901 and continuedevery four years through 1913, when the second fusionmayor was elected (the victor's name appeared in six ballot columns).However, once theoffice-block ballot format was introducedsuch candidacies virtuallydisappeared; only one was attempted,in 1917, and that one was unsuccessful.Not until LaGuardia's 1933 election was the fusionpractice revived. By thistime, however, voting machines had been introduced(they were firstused in 1929), and the resultingparty column (or row) formatwas identicalto that of the pre-1914 paper ballots: each partycould again maintain its autonomyon the ballot.12

'2In Pennsylvaniaand (until 1912) Massachusetts,separate squares were printedafter the partynames, so thatvoters could expressa partyvote as well as a candidate vote. How- ever, voters could become confusedby this system,and the resultingsub-totals thus

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Balance of Power In addition to the advantages already described, separate ballot position allows a minor party to pursue a balance of power strategy. Since vote sub-totals for a fusion candidacy can be calculated, these totals may show that the minor party vote is all-important. Under these conditions a minor party will be able to bargain for concessions in return for it nominating the major party's candidate as its own. These concessions may take the formof policy, patronage, or candidate choice. The single-member-district- plurality system of election now becomes positively beneficial to a minor party; it is only because there is only one winner under this system that a major party may be willing to pay the price demanded. The Populist party once pursued a balance-of-power strategy in those states where it was strong enough to do so. Today the smaller parties in - European party systems bargain for concessions most notably portfo- - lios in return for their participation in a coalition government. Indeed, Sartori (1976: 123) uses as his criterion for defining the number of parties in these systems the number which have what he calls "blackmail poten- tial." In the United States, it is in New York State where a balance-of- power, blackmail party systemhas been most fullydeveloped (Scarrow 1983: ch. 3). The Liberal party (formed in the 1940s as the ALP lost support) first perfected the strategy and, seeing this party's success, disgruntled Republicans formed a Conservative party in the 1960s. Anti-abortion forces joined the balance-of-power game in the 1970s by formingtheir own Right to Life party. Thus evolved New York's five-partysystem, all made possible by the state's election law. That law is one of three in the country which still allows fusion nominations - the New York terminology is "cross en- dorsement" - and, as already explained, also allows separate ballot posi- tions for these candidates. In addition, the law allows "sore loser" candidacies, as became apparent in 1980 whenJacobJavits ran as the Liberal party senatorial candidate after having been defeated in the Republican primary.13 The most important feature of New York's election law, however, is a provision enacted in 1947. As an anti-raiding law (the ALP had been raiding Republican primaries), the Wilson-Pakula law required that primary election candidates be members of the party whose nomination they sought. The law, however, contained a crucial caveat: a party's leadership could, if it wished, authorize a non-member to enter its primary. Al-

did not accuratelyreflect the size of the respectiveparty supporters. (For New York's experiencewith this format during the period it used the office-blockformat, see Scar- row [1983]: ch. 3.) Nevertheless,it is perhaps significantthat of the threelarge states whichallowed fusioncandidacies untilat least the 1930s, only in Pennsylvania,whose ballot featuredmultiple squares as well as a straightparty vote option, were these candidacies betweena major partyand a minor one (e.g., Prohibition,Socialist, Labor). In Californiaand Massachusetts,in contrast,where the office-blockformat featured only the singleprinted square, fusioncandidacies were almost exclusivelythose betweenthe two major parties. '3As of 1984, twenty-sixstates prohibited sore loser candidacies. See AdvisoryCommission on IntergovernmentalRelations (1984).

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:01:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 644 WesternPolitical Quarterly thoughhailed at thetime as a law whichwould save New York's two-party system,this exception proviso turned out to have the veryopposite effect, since it guaranteedthat only witha minorparty leadership's permission could a major-minorparty fusion candidacy be arranged.In theblunt lan- guage of critics,the minorparty leaders could now sell theirnominations to thehighest bidder and guaranteeto thebuyer that any insurgentwithin the minor party's own rankswho triedto upset the arrangementwith a primarychallenge would be fought.Each pre-electionseason has thusbeen characterizedby bargainingsessions between leaders of the major parties and theirminor partycounterparts.14

CONCLUSION

This accountof fusioncandidacies has suggestedseveral generalizations concerningthe relationshipof electionlaws and a nation's partysystem. First,laws relatingto fusioncandidacies provide neithera necessary nor sufficientcondition for a particulartype of partysystem to emergeor to be maintained.A minorparty may thrivedespite an anti-fusionlaw (e.g., Minnesota's Farmer-Laborparty); and the absence of such a law, even when combinedwith a party-columntype ballot, does not necessarilyre- sult in minorparties taking root (e.g., Connecticutand Vermonttoday). Nevertheless,the history of fusioncandidacies in theUnited Statesdoes indicatethat Riker's two qualifications to Duverger's"law," statedby Riker in its deterministicform (p. 761), need to be supplementedwith an addi- tional condition:"Plurality election rules bringabout and maintain two- partycompetition except . . ." (3) wherefusion candidacies are legallypos- sible and otherconditions, especially a competitiveparty environment, en- courage theirformation.15 A second generalizationconfirmed by thehistory of anti-fusionlegisla- tionis thatelection laws - whatthey contain, what they omit - are themselves the productof partysystems. In the past, legislaturescontrolled by the major partiesoutlawed fusion candidacies; today, New York does not do so because governorsand manylegislators feel dependnet on the minor parties fortheir continued electoral success. Finally,the historyof anti-fusionlegislation demonstrates the effectof legal enactmentslong afterthe original inspiration for them has disappeared - thatis, demonstratehow institutionsthemselves, in contrastto theleaders who inspiredthem, have consequences. Enacted in the early part of the

4Although there is plentyof evidence that minor party support on electionday would dwin- dle ifa minorparty tried to launch a candidate of its own (Scarrow 1983: ch. 3), major partyleaders have been unwillingto take a chance of forfeitingthe additionalvotes which minorparty support provides. They continueto be impressedby claims that,for example, Richard Nixon would have been elected presidentin 1960 had it not been forthe Liberal votes which Kennedy attractedin New York, or that Ronald Reagan would not have carriedNew York in 1980 exceptfor the marginprovided by the Conservative line on the ballot. 5The two conditionsidentified by Riker are "(1) thirdparties nationallyare continually one oftwo parties locally, and (2) one partyamong severalis alwaysthe Condorcet winner in elections."

This content downloaded from 199.79.254.152 on Wed, 20 Aug 2014 14:01:44 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Decline of American "Third" Parties 645 century in response to largely rural-based discontent, the anti-fusion laws closed the door to fusion strategies which might have been pursued in later decades, such as the 1930s, when other protest movements emerged. In contrast, in New York the fusion practice became fully institutionalized, an historicallyaccepted component of the rules of the game which has proven resistant to legislative attempts to eliminate it and which the courts, citing the historical tradition, refuse to curtail. Looking at the flora and fauna of Australia, students of evolution observe how plant and animal life there evolved under a distinctiveenvironment, and inferthat similar formswould have evolved elsewhere on the planet under similar conditions. We may follow a similar line of reasoning, agreeing with Sartori (1966: 165-76) that contemporary party systems have been shaped by legislative actions taken at particular "strategic points" in a nation's development, and see New York's current multi-partysystem as an example of a party system which might have evolved in some other states had legislative actions there created a differentinstitutional environment.

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