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LZ Based Compression Benchmark on PE Files Introduction LZ Based
LZ based compression benchmark on PE files Zsombor Paróczi Abstract: The key element in runtime compression is the compression algorithm, that is used during processing. It has to be small in enough in decompression bytecode size to fit in the final executable, yet have to provide the best compression ratio. In our work we benchmark the top LZ based compression methods on Windows PE files (both exe and dll files), and present the results including the decompres- sion overhead and the compression rates. Keywords: lz based compression, compression benchmark, PE benchmark Introduction During runtime executable compression an already compiled executable is modified in ways, that it still retains the ability to execute, yet the transformation produces smaller file size. The transformations usually exists from multiple steps, changing the structure of the executable by removing unused bytes, adding a compression layer or modifying the code in itself. During the code modifications the actual bytecode can change, or remain the same depending on the modification itself. In the world of x86 (or even x86-64) PE compression there are only a few benchmarks, since the ever growing storage capacity makes this field less important. Yet in new fields, like IOT and wearable electronics every application uses some kind of compression, Android apk-s are always compressed by a simple gzip compression. There are two mayor benchmarks for PE compression available today, the Maximum Compression benchmark collection [1] includes two PE files, one DLL and one EXE, and the Pe Compression Test [2] has four exe files. We will use the exe files during our benchmark, referred as small corpus. -
Steganography and Vulnerabilities in Popular Archives Formats.| Nyxengine Nyx.Reversinglabs.Com
Hiding in the Familiar: Steganography and Vulnerabilities in Popular Archives Formats.| NyxEngine nyx.reversinglabs.com Contents Introduction to NyxEngine ............................................................................................................................ 3 Introduction to ZIP file format ...................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction to steganography in ZIP archives ............................................................................................. 5 Steganography and file malformation security impacts ............................................................................... 8 References and tools .................................................................................................................................... 9 2 Introduction to NyxEngine Steganography1 is the art and science of writing hidden messages in such a way that no one, apart from the sender and intended recipient, suspects the existence of the message, a form of security through obscurity. When it comes to digital steganography no stone should be left unturned in the search for viable hidden data. Although digital steganography is commonly used to hide data inside multimedia files, a similar approach can be used to hide data in archives as well. Steganography imposes the following data hiding rule: Data must be hidden in such a fashion that the user has no clue about the hidden message or file's existence. This can be achieved by -
Users Manual
Users Manual PKZIP® Server SecureZIP® Server SecureZIP Partner Copyright © 1997-2007 PKWARE, Inc. All Rights Reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or translated into any other language in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, whether it be electronic, mechanical, magnetic, optical, manual or otherwise, without prior written consent of PKWARE, Inc. PKWARE, INC., DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES AS TO THIS SOFTWARE, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, FUNCTIONALITY, DATA INTEGRITY, OR PROTECTION. PKWARE IS NOT LIABLE FOR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. Portions of this software include RSA BSAFE ® cryptographic or security protocol software from RSA Security Inc. This software includes portions that are copyright © The OpenLDAP Foundation, 1998- 2003 and are used under the OpenLDAP Public License. The text of this license is indented below: The OpenLDAP Public License Version 2.7, 7 September 2001 Redistribution and use of this software and associated documentation ("Software"), with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: 1. Redistributions of source code must retain copyright statements and notices, 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce applicable copyright statements and notices, this list of conditions, and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution, and 3. Redistributions must contain a verbatim copy of this document. The OpenLDAP Foundation may revise this license from time to time. Each revision is distinguished by a version number. You may use this Software under terms of this license revision or under the terms of any subsequent revision of the license. -
Malware Detection Using Semantic Features and Improved Chi-Square 879
Malware Detection Using Semantic Features and Improved Chi-square 879 Malware Detection Using Semantic Features and Improved Chi-square Seung-Tae Ha1, Sung-Sam Hong1, Myung-Mook Han1* 1 IT convergence engineering, Gachon University, South Korea [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Abstract to avoid their detection and to make the analysis difficult. Signature-based detection is commonly used As advances in information technology (IT) affect all for anti-virus software currently to identify malware. areas in the world, cyber-attacks also continue to increase. The signature-based detection registers unique binary Malware has been used for cyber attacks, and the number signatures of malware and then detects the malware by of new malware and variants tends to explode in these checking the signature existence. This method means years, depending on its trendy types. In this study, we that more malware attacks leads to more signatures. It introduce semantic feature generation and new feature becomes very time-consuming to generate and register selection methods for improving the accuracy of malware signatures for various types of malware. Therefore, detection based on API sequences to detect these new there is a need for a new malware detection method in malware and variants. Therefore, one of the existing order to respond efficiently and quickly to such new feature selection methods is chosen because it shows the malware and variants. best performance, and then it is improved to be suitable For this reason, there have been studies on malware for malware detection. In addition, the improved feature detection using behavior-based malware feature selection method is verified by using the Reuter dataset. -
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UNPACKING CODE PATTERN FROM PACKED BINARY EXECUTABLE USING EXECUTION UNIT PATTERN BASED SEQUENCE ALIGNMENT ANALYSIS Page 94 of 103 Bibliography “AV-TEST, The Independent IT-Security Institute.” , 2018, URL https://www. av-test.org/en/statistics/malware/. Al-Anezi, M. M. K., “Generic packing detection using several complexity analysis for accurate malware detection,” International journal of advanced computer science and applications, volume 5(1), 2015. Alimehr, L., “The performance of sequence alignment algorithms,” , 2013. Armadillo, “Armadillo, Overlays packer and obfuscator,” , 2017, URL http: //the-armadillo-software-protection-system.software.informer.com, (Date last accessed 1 March 2017). Banin, S., Shalaginov, A., and Franke, K., “Memory access patterns for malware detec- tion,” , 2016. Bazrafshan, Z., Hashemi, H., Fard, S. M. H., and Hamzeh, A., “A survey on heuris- tic malware detection techniques,” in “Information and Knowledge Technology (IKT), 2013 5th Conference on,” pp. 113–120, IEEE, 2013. Beek, C., Dinkar, D., Gund, Y., and Others, “McAfee Labs threats report,” McAfee Inc., Santa Clara, CA. Available: https://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp- quarterly-threats-dec-2017.pdf, 2017. Bellard, F., “Qemu: Open source processor emulator, 2008,” URL http://savannah. nongnu. org/projects/qemu, 2009. Benninger, C. A., Maitland: analysis of packed and encrypted malware via paravirtu- alization extensions, Ph.D. thesis, University of Victoria, 2012. Berdajs, J. and Bosnic,´ Z., “Extending applications using an advanced approach to DLL injection and API hooking,” Software: Practice and Experience, volume 40(7) pp. 567– 584, 2010. Andy Asmoro UNPACKING CODE PATTERN FROM PACKED BINARY EXECUTABLE USING EXECUTION UNIT PATTERN BASED SEQUENCE ALIGNMENT ANALYSIS Page 95 of 103 Bergroth, L., Hakonen, H., and Raita, T., “A survey of longest common subsequence algorithms,” in “String Processing and Information Retrieval, 2000. -
PKWARE Secures Marquee Investment Partners
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE PKWARE® Announces Latest Release of PKZIP® & SecureZIP® for IBM® z/OS® Milwaukee, WI (September 28, 2010) - PKWARE, Inc., a leading provider of data-centric security and compression software, today announced the latest version 12 release of PKZIP and SecureZIP for z/OS on System z. Users of the IBM z/OS mainframe looking to further enhance its ability to maximize data center efficiency will find that new versions of PKZIP and SecureZIP for z/OS provide a solution with unparalleled usability. “PKWARE is an IBM PartnerWorld Advanced Partner and is committed to serving the needs of the mainframe z/OS community,” said Joe Sturonas, Chief Technology Officer for PKWARE. “We [PKWARE] are committed, with each new release, to provide a product that allows our customers the maximum opportunity to not only leverage the z/OS capabilities IBM offers, but to improve their overall data center operations.” PKZIP for z/OS provides file management and data compression, resulting in more efficient data exchange through reduced transmission times and storage requirements. This improves overall data center operations and significantly reduces costs. The PKZIP family of products is interoperable so that data zipped and compressed on the mainframe can be unzipped and extracted on all major enterprise computing platforms. SecureZIP for z/OS is an optimal solution for providing durable data security to protect privacy, whether data resides on z/OS or is in motion to other platforms. SecureZIP for z/OS also leverages existing investments in hardware cryptography within the mainframe environment. Moreover, it includes the cost reduction capabilities of PKZIP and is also interoperable so that data encrypted on the mainframe can be decrypted and used on other operating systems, providing users comprehensive data protection across all major enterprise computing platforms. -
PKZIP /Securezip™ for Iseries
PKZIP®/SecureZIP™ for iSeries User’s Guide SZIU-V8R2000 PKWARE Inc. PKWARE Inc. 648 N Plankinton Avenue, Suite 220 Milwaukee, WI 53203 Sales: 937-847-2374 Sales - Email: [email protected] Support: 937-847-2687 Support - http://www.pkware.com/business_and_developers/support Fax: 414-289-9789 Web Site: http://www.pkware.com 8.2 Edition (2005) SecureZIP™ for iSeries, PKZIP® for iSeries, PKZIP for MVS, SecureZIP for zSeries, PKZIP for zSeries, PKZIP for OS/400, PKZIP for UNIX, and PKZIP for Windows are just a few of the many members in the PKZIP® family. PKWARE, Inc. would like to thank all the individuals and companies -- including our customers, resellers, distributors, and technology partners -- who have helped make PKZIP the industry standard for trusted ZIP solutions. PKZIP enables our customers to efficiently and securely transmit and store information across systems of all sizes, ranging from desktops to mainframes. This edition applies to the following PKWARE, Inc. licensed programs: PKZIP for iSeries (Version 8, Release 2, 2005) SecureZIP for iSeries (Version 8, Release 2, 2005) SecureZIP for iSeries Reader (Version 8, Release 2, 2005) SecureZIP for iSeries SecureLink (Version 8, Release 2, 2005) PKZIP is a registered trademark of PKWARE Inc. SecureZIP is a trademark of PKWARE Inc. Other product names mentioned in this manual may be a trademark or registered trademarks of their respective companies and are hereby acknowledged. Any reference to licensed programs or other material, belonging to any company, is not intended to state or imply that such programs or material are available or may be used. The copyright in this work is owned by PKWARE, Inc., and the document is issued in confidence for the purpose only for which it is supplied. -
Fastdump Pro™
HBGary Responder™ User Guide 1 HBGary, Inc. 3604 Fair Oaks Blvd, Suite 250 Sacramento, CA 95864 http://www.hbgary.com/ Copyright © 2003 - 2010, HBGary, Inc. All rights reserved. HBGary Responder™ User Guide 2 Copyright © 2003 - 2010, HBGary, Inc. All rights reserved. HBGary Responder™ User Guide 3 HBGary Responder™ 2.0 User guide Copyright © 2003 - 2010, HBGary, Inc. All rights reserved. HBGary Responder™ User Guide 4 Copyright © 2003 - 2010, HBGary, Inc. All rights reserved. HBGary Responder™ User Guide 5 Contents Copyright and Trademark Information ....................................................................................................... 11 Privacy Information ..................................................................................................................................... 11 Notational Conventions .............................................................................................................................. 12 Contacting Technical Support ..................................................................................................................... 12 Responder™ Installation Prerequisites ....................................................................................................... 13 Minimum Hardware Requirements ........................................................................................................ 13 Prerequisite Software ............................................................................................................................. 13 REcon™ -
PKZIP Stream Cipher 1 PKZIP
PKZIP PKZIP Stream Cipher 1 PKZIP Phil Katz’s ZIP program Katz invented zip file format o ca 1989 Before that, Katz created PKARC utility o ARC compression was patented by SEA, Inc. o SEA successfully sued Katz Katz then invented zip o ZIP was much better than SEA’s ARC o He started his own company, PKWare Katz died of alcohol abuse at age 37 in 2000 PKZIP Stream Cipher 2 PKZIP PKZIP compresses files using zip Optionally, it encrypts compressed file o Uses a homemade stream cipher o PKZIP cipher due to Roger Schlafly o Schlafly has PhD in math (Berkeley, 1980) PKZIP cipher is susceptible to attack o Attack is nontrivial, has significant work factor, lots of memory required, etc. PKZIP Stream Cipher 3 PKZIP Cipher Generates 1 byte of keystream per step 96 bit internal state o State: 32-bit words, which we label X,Y,Z o Initial state derived from a password Of course, password guessing is possible o We do not consider password guessing here Cipher design seems somewhat ad hoc o No clear design principles o Uses shifts, arithmetic operations, CRC, etc. PKZIP Stream Cipher 4 PKZIP Encryption Given o Current state: X, Y, Z (32-bit words) o p = byte of plaintext to encrypt o Note: upper case for 32-bit words, lower case bytes Then the algorithm is… k = getKeystreamByte(Z) c = p ⊕ k update(X, Y, Z, p) Next, we define getKeystreamByte, update PKZIP Stream Cipher 5 PKZIP getKeystreamByte Let “∨” be binary OR Define 〈X〉i…j as bits i thru j (inclusive) of X o As usual, bits numbered left-to-right from 0 Shift X by n bits to right: -
Adaptive Rule-Based Malware Detection Employing Learning Classifier Systems
Scholars' Mine Masters Theses Student Theses and Dissertations Fall 2011 Adaptive rule-based malware detection employing learning classifier systems Jonathan Joseph Blount Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/masters_theses Part of the Computer Sciences Commons Department: Recommended Citation Blount, Jonathan Joseph, "Adaptive rule-based malware detection employing learning classifier systems" (2011). Masters Theses. 5008. https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/masters_theses/5008 This thesis is brought to you by Scholars' Mine, a service of the Missouri S&T Library and Learning Resources. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ADAPTIVE RULE-BASED MALWARE DETECTION EMPLOYING LEARNING CLASSIFIER SYSTEMS by JONATHAN JOSEPH BLOUNT A THESIS Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of MISSOURI UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF SCIENCE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 2011 Approved by Daniel R. Tauritz, Advisor Bruce M. McMillin Samuel A. Mulder Copyright c 2011 Jonathan Joseph Blount All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Efficient and accurate malware detection is increasingly becoming a necessity for society to operate. Existing malware detection systems have excellent performance in identifying known malware for which signatures are available, but poor performance in anomaly detection for zero day exploits for which signatures have not yet been made available or targeted attacks against a specific entity. The primary goal of this thesis is to provide evidence for the potential of learning classifier systems to improve the accuracy of malware detection. -
Portable Executable
Portable Executable The Portable Executable (PE) format is a file format for executables, object code, Portable Executable DLLs and others used in 32-bit and 64-bit Filename .acm, .ax, .cpl, .dll, .drv, .efi, versions of Windows operating systems. extension .exe, .mui, .ocx, .scr, .sys, .tsp The PE format is a data structure that Internet application/vnd.microsoft.portable- encapsulates the information necessary for media type executable[1] the Windows OS loader to manage the Developed by Currently: Microsoft wrapped executable code. This includes dynamic library references for linking, API Type of format Binary, executable, object, shared libraries export and import tables, resource Extended from DOS MZ executable management data and thread-local storage COFF (TLS) data. On NT operating systems, the PE format is used for EXE, DLL, SYS (device driver), MUI and other file types. The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) specification states that PE is the standard executable format in EFI environments.[2] On Windows NT operating systems, PE currently supports the x86-32, x86-64 (AMD64/Intel 64), IA-64, ARM and ARM64 instruction set architectures (ISAs). Prior to Windows 2000, Windows NT (and thus PE) supported the MIPS, Alpha, and PowerPC ISAs. Because PE is used on Windows CE, it continues to support several variants of the MIPS, ARM (including Thumb), and SuperH ISAs. [3] Analogous formats to PE are ELF (used in Linux and most other versions of Unix) and Mach-O (used in macOS and iOS). Contents History Technical details Layout Import table Relocations .NET, metadata, and the PE format Use on other operating systems See also References External links History Microsoft migrated to the PE format from the 16-bit NE formats with the introduction of the Windows NT 3.1 operating system. -
Study on a Known-Plaintext Attack on ZIP Encryption
Study on a known-plaintext attack on ZIP encryption Dragos Barosan [email protected] February 8, 2015 Abstract The ZIP file format is one of the most popular compression format and it provides a stream cipher encryption for protecting data. A successful known plaintext attack has been developed since 1994, but there is no open source im- plementation for it. The research has focused on the feasibility of a successful, since the necessary plaintext is considered hard to obtain, and analyzed the al- gorithm. It has been found that, while difficult, plaintext can be found through varied resources. From an implementation point of view the algorithm contains sections that can be run in parallel, improving the execution speed. As future work, a full implementation of the algorithm is planned and it will be released as open source. Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Research questions 4 3 Related work 5 4 Approach 7 5 Feasibility of obtaining plaintex 8 5.1 ZIP Defaults . 8 5.2 ZIP Encryption . 9 5.3 Difficulty of obtaining plaintext . 9 5.4 Solution . 11 6 Attack Implementation 13 6.1 Overview . 13 6.2 Locate Data . 14 6.3 First stage of the attack . 16 6.4 Implementation . 17 6.5 Measurements . 18 7 Conclusions and Future Work 20 8 Appendices 23 2 Chapter 1 Introduction The ZIP archive file format was originally created in 1989 by Phil Katz to sup- port lossless data compression and replace the ARC archiving system. The first version has been has been released in the PKZIP package from the PKWARE software company[1].