CAUSE NO. CC-17-06253-C

UNITED DEVELOPMENT § IN THE COUNTY COURT FUNDING, L.P., A DELAWARE § LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; UNITED § DEVELOPMENT FUNDING II, L.P., § A DELAWARE LIMITED § PARTNERSHIP; UNITED § DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, L.P., § A DELAWARE LIMITED § PARTNERSHIP; UNITED § DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, A § MARYLAND REAL ESTATE § INVESTMENT TRUST; UNITED § DEVELOPMENT FUNDING INCOME § FUND V, A MARYLAND REAL § ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST § UNITED MORTGAGE TRUST, A § MARYLAND REAL ESTATE § INVESTMENT TRUST; UNITED § EVELOPMENT FUNDING LAND § OPPORTUNITY FUND, L.P., A § DELAWARE LIMITED § PARTNERSHIP; UNITED § DEVELOPMENT FUNDING LAND § OPPORTUNITY FUND INVESTORS, § L.L.C., A DELAWARE LIMITED § LIABILITY COMPANY; § § Plaintiffs, § § v. § AT LAW NO. 3 § J. KYLE BASS; HAYMAN CAPITAL § MANAGEMENT, L.P.; HAYMAN § OFFSHORE MANAGEMENT, INC.; § HAYMAN CAPITAL MASTER FUND, § L.P.; HAYMAN CAPITAL PARTNERS, § L.P., HAYMAN CAPITAL OFFSHORE § PARTNERS, L.P.; HAYMAN § INVESTMENTS, LLC; § § Defendants. § COUNTY, TEXAS

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 1 OF 26 DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS ELLEN A. CIRANGLE AND KYLE A. WITHERS

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COME NOW, Defendants J. Kyle Bass, Hayman Capital Management, L.P.,

Hayman Offshore Management, Inc., Hayman Capital Master Fund, L.P., Hayman

Capital Partners, L.P., Hayman Capital Offshore Partners, L.P., and Hayman

Investments, LLC, (“Defendants”) and file this, their Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Admission Pro Hac Vice for Ian Edward Browning and Motion to Revoke the Pro Hac

Vice Admissions for all of the Lubin Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP Attorneys Ellen A.

Cirangle, Jonathan Sommer and Kyle A. Withers, to state their oppositions to admission pro hac vice of attorney Ian Edward Browning and move for the revocation of the Pro Hac

Vice Admission of the other Lubin Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP Attorneys in this case and, for cause, would respectfully show unto the Court as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants oppose Mr. Browning’s admission and move to revoke the pro hac vice admission of all of the other aforesaid attorneys from the firm of Lubin Olson &

Niewiadomski, LLP (sometimes referred to as “Lubin”). The attorneys associated with

Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP have failed to abide by their duties to this Court and the candor expected of an attorney appearing in the State of Texas and therefore, should be denied admission. Defendants ask the Court to revoke the pro hac vice admission of all of the Plaintiffs’ attorneys associated with Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 2 OF 26 Rule 19(a)(7) of the Texas Board of Law Examiners, titled “Requirements for

Participation in Texas Proceeding by a Non-Resident Attorney,” mandates that the non- resident attorney declare that he/she is familiar with the State Bar Act, the State Bar

Rules, and the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct governing the conduct of members of the Bar, and will at all times abide by and comply with the same so long as such Texas proceeding is pending. Rule 19(d) allows the court to deny a pro hac motion for good cause. Rule 19(e) further grants the Court the power to revoke the non-resident attorney’s permission to participate in the Texas proceedings if the attorney is found to have engaged in professional misconduct.

Plaintiffs filed this business disparagement lawsuit on November 28, 2017, alleging

that the Defendants committed grievous harm by reporting problems with the

Plaintiffs’ business practices to the investing public. As will be shown, many of these

public comments addressed issues arising from the work of the Plaintiffs’ auditor,

Whitley Penn, and the circumstances under which Whitley Penn resigned as the

auditor for the Plaintiffs. These same issues were also the subject of an SEC

investigation into the Plaintiffs’ business practices. The Defendants filed a Motion to

Dismiss Under the TCPA on January 26, 2018 (the “Anti-SLAPP Motion”), seeking to

dismiss this lawsuit on the basis that it was an effort to silence scrutiny and public

comment regarding dangerous financial practices by UDF, a derelict publicly-traded

business. The Plaintiffs’ opposition to the Anti-SLAPP Motion required the Plaintiffs

and their lawyers to conceal and misrepresent multiple government and regulatory

investigations into the same business practices that the Defendants identified and

disclosed to the public.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 3 OF 26 This Motion to Revoke the pro hac vice admissions is based upon the false and misleading statements made by Ellen Cirangle, lead counsel for the Plaintiffs, at the hearing for the Anti-SLAPP Motion on May 21, 2018. Cirangle’s misleading comments focused on two primary topics: (1) she misstated the true facts surrounding Whitley

Penn’s work for UDF and Whitely Penn’s decision to resign as the auditor for the

Plaintiffs; and, (2) she mislead the Court regarding a then-active (and in fact nearly concluded) SEC investigation into the Plaintiffs’ business practices in order to leave the

Court with a false impression. The crux of Cirangle’s false statements were an emphatic denial of the SEC’s independent investigation, among other events and circumstances that have since become evident, which generally supported and reinforced the substance of Hayman’s public statements that financial irregularities existed within UDF and that the findings of its research were of public interest.

Shortly after the Court’s ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion, the media reported

UDF’s settlement of the SEC fraud charges, and the SEC’s filings (and UDF’s consent thereto) were made public. Judge Montgomery called counsel for the parties to a meeting in her Chambers to address the obvious discrepancies between the newly available public documents and the facts represented by Cirangle at the hearing. It is now clear that the

Plaintiffs delayed settlement of the SEC’s fraud charges, and the inevitable scandal and publicity arising from same, until just after the Court ruled on the Motion to Dismiss and the Court’s plenary power expired. Cirangle’s comments at the hearing were designed to mislead the Court relating to the status of the SEC investigation, which was at that time not only active, but apparently had effectively been largely resolved, with UDF’s consent

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 4 OF 26 to significant SEC fraud charges and UDF’s principals paying millions of dollars in fines and penalties arising out of their misconduct.

In addition, on March 24, 2020, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

(“PCAOB”) issued an Order Instituting Disciplinary Proceedings, Making Findings and

Imposing Sanctions (the “PCAOB Order”) against Whitley Penn, which also demonstrates the falsity of Cirangle’s statements. (See Ex. “A”).

There is no limit to the lengths (and depths) to which UDF will go in order to further their disinformation campaign to deceive and defraud the public. Recently, UDF filed a Bivens action against the FBI agents and the U.S. Attorneys’ Office that are conducting an active criminal investigation of UDF, and attempted to have the Assistant

United States Attorney James Nicholas Bunch removed from that case. The recently filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to File Redacted Complaint, complaining about UDF’s tactics in connection with its disinformation strategy:

…disappointed by their failure to convince either the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas (“NDTX”) or the Deputy Attorney General to halt a complex criminal investigation of their conduct and have Assistant United States Attorney James Nicholas Bunch (hereinafter “AUSA Bunch”) removed from that case, Plaintiffs are using this “Bivens action” to yet again interfere with legitimate law enforcement activity. In furtherance of their efforts, Plaintiffs ask the Court to unseal a redacted complaint and publicize their version of the history of a very active ongoing criminal investigation in the NDTX including details of non-public aspects of the investigation.

(See Ex. “B” p. 2)

It is clear that the Lubin attorneys are nothing but a mouthpiece for their clients’ endless and dishonest efforts to deflect attention from UDF’s own (and now admitted) misconduct and blame third parties (including Defendants and the federal government) for UDF’s misconduct and resulting investor losses. The revocation requested in this

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 5 OF 26 Motion will send a clear message to UDF that its deceptive and misleading conduct, including that propagated by its current lawyers, will not be tolerated.

II. RESPONSE AND MOTION TO REVOKE

Attorneys in Texas are bound by the mandates of civility, candor, and professionalism. Texas attorneys are trained in accordance with Texas Lawyers’ Creed, which provides that “[t]he conduct of a lawyer should be characterized at all times by honesty, candor, and fairness. In fulfilling his or her primary duty to a client, a lawyer must be ever mindful of the profession’s broader duty to the legal system.” Order of the

Supreme Court of Texas and the Court of Criminal Appeals, (adopting and incorporating the Texas Lawyer’s Creed: A Mandate for Professionalism (Nov. 7, 1989)).

Lawyers admitted in Texas pro hac vice are held to the same standards as Texas attorneys and rarely does an out-of-state attorney fail to rise to the occasion. However, the lawyers from the firm of Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP have failed to conduct themselves with the professionalism expected of attorneys admitted pro hac vice and therefore, this Court should deny the pro hac vice admission of Ian Edward Browning and revoke the pro hac vice admissions of all the other Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski,

LLP’s attorneys.

III. THE HEARING ON THE ANTI-SLAPP MOTION

A. Timeline of the Anti-SLAPP Hearing and the Secret SEC Settlement

The hearing on the Anti-SLAPP Motion was held on May 21, 2018. Unbeknownst to everyone in the Courtroom except the Plaintiffs and their lawyers, namely Cirangle, the

Plaintiffs had been working on a settlement of part of the SEC investigation for weeks or months. The following timeline is compiled from documents, which were not available

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 6 OF 26 to or disclosed to the Defendants or the Court at the time of the Anti-SLAPP hearing.1

These facts, now judicially admitted by UDF in its filed pleadings, demonstrate that the

Plaintiffs were under several regulatory investigations and in talks with the SEC to settle claims identical to Hayman’s criticisms at least six months before the Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit against the Defendants, and a year before the hearing on the Anti-SLAPP Motion.

These undisputed facts make it abundantly clear that UDF and its lawyers orchestrated a delay in the filing of the SEC Complaint and unopposed motions for entry of judgment until shortly after the hearing and ruling on the Anti-SLAPP Motion:

5.22.17 A full year before the anti-SLAPP hearing, the SEC indicates it is prepared to recommend a resolution that would not charge UDF with a scienter-based violation, and UDF “thereupon indicated they would agree to settle without admitting or denying on this non-scienter basis”. (UDF’s Deregistration Brief, p. 13, ¶2).

7.5.17 UDF and SEC discuss non-scienter language and terms (UDF’s Deregistration Brief, p. 13, ¶6).

8.31.17 UDF executed four month tolling agreements through 12.26.17 (3 subsequent tolling agreements ran through 8.20.18) (UDF’s Deregistration Brief, p. 13, ¶6 – p.14, ¶1).

11.28.17 UDF sues Hayman.

12.20.17 SEC FW office says it will send settlement recommendation to Commission during this week. (UDF’s Deregistration Brief, p.14, ¶1).

5.21.18 ANTI-SLAPP HEARING – In response to the Court’s direct question about the SEC Investigation, Cirangle states: “we absolutely know there’s no claim against us…there’s no filing * * * there is no charges.”

1 This timeline is based on (1) a Motion and Supporting Brief filed by the Plaintiffs in a SEC deregistration proceeding commenced on September 24, 2018 (“UDF’s Deregistration Brief”); (2) a SEC Complaint and unopposed Motions for Entry of Judgment, filed days after the Anti-SLAPP hearing on July 3, 2018 (“SEC Complaint”); and, (3) the PCAOB Order and a PCAOB Inspection Report issued in November 2018.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 7 OF 26

6.1.18 Court informs parties it will deny the Anti-SLAPP Motion.

6.11.18 Court’s original Order denying motion.

6.13.18 Court’s Amended Order dated 6.11.

6.18.18 SEC approval of non-scienter settlement. (UDF’s Deregistration Brief, p.14, ¶2).

6.29.18 Defendant’s Notice of Appeal of ruling on the Anti-SLAPP Motion.

7.3.18 SEC Complaint filed, as well as unopposed motions for entry of judgment (SEC Complaint) (See Ex. “C”).

7.3.18 Dallas Morning News article regarding SEC charges and UDF fines.

7.5.18 Court requests counsel conference in chambers regarding SEC filing.

7.31.18 SEC Consent Judgment entered. (See Ex. “D”).

9.24.18 SEC deregistration proceeding commenced, last briefs filed May 2019 (UDF’s Deregistration Brief).

8.12.20 SEC deregisters UDF securities, citing a “high degree of culpability” by UDF. (See Ex. “E”).

The strategy of UDF’s attorneys at the May 21, 2018 hearing was to convince the

Court that there was no truth to the public statements made by the Defendants as set forth and explained in the Anti-SLAPP Motion, and very particularly (as strenuously and repeatedly emphasized by UDF counsel) no truth to the statement that the independent actions taken by the SEC, among other events or circumstances that have since become evident, generally supported and reinforced the substance of Hayman’s public statements that financial irregularities existed within UDF and that the findings of its research were

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 8 OF 26 of public interest. In order to do this, Cirangle repeatedly misrepresented facts to the

Court, and wholly concealed the imminent charges by and settlement with the SEC.

B. Statements Regarding the SEC Investigations:

The following is a listing of Cirangle’s false statements regarding the SEC investigation, followed by the contradicting proof that Cirangle and the other Lubin attorneys knew and kept quiet so those pending charges, fines and penalties would not be made public until after the hearing and the Court’s ruling:

42:16-23 Defense Counsel and Cirangle argue about the filings and record, and Cirangle says “your honor I agree the SEC began investigation. What he said was the same things that came out in Hayman’s post, which is a complete lie…that came out in defendant’s posts. There’s nothing whatsoever to suggest that’s what the SEC was investigating. That’s what’s false about what he said.

44:7-9 Cirangle says “Right. And that’s four and half years later and there’s not a charge. There’s not what a claim. There’s not a conviction. There’s nothing.” She then says “we are not aware that they were….” and then stops upon the Judge’s inquiry.

44-45 Defense Counsel shows the Judge the December 2015 UDF filing that admits that the SEC had been conducting an investigation into UDF since April 2014, long before Defendants’ public comments. Cirangle says “your honor look at the next sentence” (the next sentence says that the company has been informed by the SEC that the investigation is not an opinion that any violations of any laws have occurred, or that the SEC has a negative opinion about any person or entity.)

122 – To rebut Defendants’ argument that all these government agencies form their independent conclusions which are consistent with Hayman…”There is not one shred of evidence in the record or in existence to support this. No one, no government agency has ever accused UDF of being a Ponzi scheme.”

123 – Cirangle states that “they don’t know any of this, they’re making it up.”

123-124 -- Regarding Defense Counsel’s statements that UDF’s counsel should tell the Court why the FBI is investigating and why the SEC intends to file litigation via the Wells notice…”Four years later…we don’t know everything in the government’s mind, but we absolutely know there’s no claim

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 9 OF 26 against us…there’s no filing…if we were a ponzi scheme, don’t you think after they took all our books and records 2.5 years ago, they would have shut us down……we don’t even have a claim, we don’t have a case number.”2

125-- “The record here does not support that…it’s all a red herring…Government’s done nothing at this point, and that’s not before this court.”

126-127 -- Judge says “I have a question are the FBI and SEC still investigating?” Defense Counsel says yes, court says “but you know nothing about the investigation yet”? Cirangle says “there is no charges”.

1. SEC Settlement Documents are purposely Filed Shortly After the Appellate Deadline for the Ruling on the Anti-SLAPP Motion. On July 3, 2018, the SEC filed a Complaint against UDF. Unopposed motions for entry of judgment were also filed. All of the UDF Defendants signed Consent Decrees agreeing to pay substantial fines, to entry of the Final Judgment, and to the entry of an injunction against the same conduct in the future. (See, Defendants’ Notice of Filing of

S.E.C. Complaint and Related Documents, filed in this cause on July 12, 2018). In connection with its investigation of UDF’s failures to properly impair loans, the SEC detailed how UDF fabricated cash flow projections that it provided to its auditors. After the Buffington affiliated borrower provided a “Borrower Projection” that showed an ever- increasing loan balance, which the borrower could not repay, UDF created its own cash flow projection (the “UDF Projection”) that falsely included future projects that the borrower had not agreed to undertake and that showed the borrower repaying the loan in

2 UDF counsel also knew the FBI was actively investigating UDF. See Ex. “B,” Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to File Redacted Complaint filed by the United States in a UDF lawsuit against the FBI agents and U.S. Attorneys’ Office. In this pleading, the U.S.A. describes UDF’s abusive tactics, which included attempting to disqualify the U.S. Attorney and interfere with law enforcement: “In reality, disappointed by their failure to convince either the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas (“NDTX”) or the Deputy Attorney General to halt a complex criminal investigation of their conduct and have Assistant United States Attorney James Nicholas Bunch removed from that case, Plaintiffs are using this “Bivens action” to yet again interfere with legitimate law enforcement activity.”

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 10 OF 26 full. (SEC Complaint, Para. 38). Eventually, UDF was forced to forgive $122 Million of debt related to the Austin Borrower, [the Buffington affiliated borrower]. (SEC

Complaint, Para. 40).

UDF and its principals agreed to an injunction against further violations of the

securities laws, and agreed to pay substantial fines:

“It is further Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed that:

Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert are jointly and severally liable for disgorgement of $6,809,282, representing profits gained as a result of the conduct alleged in the Complaint, together with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $390,718.

Defendant Greenlaw is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant Wissink is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant Etter is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant Obert is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

See, Final Judgment as To Defendants Hollis M. Greenlaw, Benjamin L. Wissink,

Theodore F. Etter, And Cara D. Obert, in Cause No. 3:18-cv-01735-L; Securities and

Exchange Commission v. UDF III, LP et al., § VI (See Ex. “F”).

Cirangle’s statements at the hearing on the Anti-SLAPP Motion that no claims had been filed was deliberately misleading because she knew, and the other Lubin, Olson &

Niewiadomski, LLP attorneys knew and said nothing, that the SEC Complaint and the

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 11 OF 26 unopposed motions for entry of judgment would be filed after the Court ruled on the Anti-

SLAPP Motion.

In addition, the SEC Complaint shows that, contrary to Cirangle’s representations to the Court, the SEC was in fact investigating the exact same conduct that was the subject of Hayman’s public statements.3 A brief review of the “Summary of the Action” from the

SEC Complaint shows the similarity:

1. “From at least January 2011 through December 2015 (the “Relevant Period”), UDF used money from a newer fund to pay distributions to investors in an older fund, without adequately disclosing the use of funds and the nature and status of loans made to developers.” (SEC Complaint, Para. 1).

2. “By 2009, UDF III had made substantial loans to developers and was making monthly distributions to investors in amounts that at times exceeded developer interest payments during the same period. In 2011, UDF IV began loaning money to developers of UDF IV projects who had also borrowed money from UDF III. Unbeknownst to investors, however, UDF directed the developers to use the UDF IV money to pay down separate UDF III loans, instead of using the funds loaned from UDF IV to develop UDF IV projects. In most of these cases, the developers never actually received the borrowed funds at all, and UDF simply transferred the money from UDF IV to UDF III. UDF III then used the loan payments—which were comprised of funds from UDF IV—to, in part, make distributions to UDF III investors. Using these transactions, which were not adequately disclosed to investors, UDF was able to cause UDF III to pay its investors at least $67 million of distributions using funds from UDF IV.” (SEC Complaint, Para. 2).

3. “UDF IV also failed to adequately disclose the nature of multi-phase projects in its loan portfolio. UDF IV told investors that none of its loans were invested in unimproved real property. This gave the impression that all of the loans in UDF IV’s portfolio were funding real estate projects that were under construction. In truth, UDF IV had loaned money for acquisition of unimproved properties designated for multi-phase development. In some cases, the properties remained in the entitlement phase even after they had been in UDF IV’s portfolio for years.” (SEC Complaint, Para. 4).

4. “In addition, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) required UDF III to report if any of its significant outstanding loans

3 A fuller comparison of the UDF Exposed Website’s content with the allegations in the SEC Complaint is attached hereto as Ex. “C” and incorporated herein for all purposes as if set forth in full.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 12 OF 26 became “impaired”—meaning UDF III believed it was unlikely to fully collect on the loan. UDF III knew or should have known before it filed its 2013 Form 10-K that it was unlikely to fully collect on an approximately $80 million loan to its second largest borrower. Although UDF III’s financial statements reflected general reserves, UDF III took no specific impairment on the loan and told investors that full collectability was probable.” (SEC Complaint, Para. 5).

2. Comparison of Hayman’s Public Comments to SEC Complaint Paragraphs 1 and 2.

SEC Complaint, Para. 1 -- UDF used money from a newer fund to pay distributions to investors in an older fund.

SEC Complaint, Para. 2 -- In 2011, UDF IV began loaning money to developers of UDF IV projects who had also borrowed money from UDF III. Unbeknownst to investors, however, UDF directed the developers to use the UDF IV money to pay down separate UDF III loans, instead of using the funds loaned from UDF IV to develop UDF IV projects.

These complaints by the SEC are the crux of the Defendants’ statements that UDF is operating in a “Ponzi like manner.” Although the SEC does not use the term “Ponzi”, no doubt a result of negotiation with the Plaintiffs, the conduct complained of herein is the very definition of a Ponzi scheme as articulated by the SEC itself:

[A ] Ponzi scheme is an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Ponzi scheme organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters focus on attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier‐stage investors to create the false appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate business.4

The following is a summary of Hayman’s statements on UDFExposed discussing this conduct:

1) Hayman Overview Presentation: Hayman detailed four ways in which new investor capital was used to funnel capital to existing investors;

4 Fact Answers Ponzi‐Schemes, under “What is a Ponzi scheme” available at https://www.sec.gov/fast‐answers/answersponzihtm.html (visited Jan. 22, 2018).

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 13 OF 26 Hayman gave a descriptive example of each type of transaction (slides 4 and 5)(See Ex. “G”).

2) Hayman Williamsburg Case Study: Hayman detailed in a 23-page case study how i) UDF I defaulted on loans and then ii) used UDF IV capital to lend to a developer (Centurion) which then iii) used that capital to pay UDF I a profits interest payment of $8 million, all after the bank (Premier Bank) which had originally lent funds to UDF I failed during the financial crisis and took impairment charges on the UDF I loans in question (slides 7 and 8) (See Ex. “G”).

3) Hayman Shahan Prairie Case Study: Hayman detailed in a 20-page case study how i) UDF I lent money to Centurion on Shahan Prairie, then ii) UDF III lent money to Centurion on Shahan Prairie and the UDF I loan was repaid, and then UDF V lent money to Centurion on Shahan Prairie and UDF III was repaid; this occurred during a period from 2004 to 2015 all while the land was not developed (i.e. finished lots were never developed to completion such that developers could sell to home builders as supported by pictures taken of the undeveloped by Hayman and by a third-party lawsuit filed by Megatel Homes in 2018) – slides 10 and 11 (See Ex. “G”).

4) Hayman Preston Manor Case Study: Hayman detailed in 37-page case study how i) UDF I financed a real estate development that went bust, then ii) UDF III lent on the same project subsequently, then iii) the SEC inquired about the treatment of the loan and specifically asked how UDF determined whether all amounts due would be collected, then iv) the loan was repaid along a similar time line when UDF III was lending money to UDF I and when UDF IV was lending money on the same project subsequently – slides 13 and 14 (See Ex. “G”).

5) Hayman Northpointe Crossing Case Study: Hayman detailed in a 42- page case study how i) how UDF III financed a real estate development and then ii) UDF IV bought a participation interest in the loan and the balance owed to UDF III declined as the balance owed to UDF IV increased demonstrating that UDF IV capital was being used to repay UDF III investors. The SEC also inquired related to the treatment of this loan in 2011 – slides 16 and 17 (See Ex. “G”).

6) Hayman Initial Post: Hayman detailed how UDF I (private partnership) began defaulting on loans and then UMT (public shareholders) lent money to UDF I at times when it had defaulted on third-party debt and later UDF III (public limited partners) purchased a significant participation interest in the UMT loan (its affiliate) which demonstrated how UMT capital was used to repay UDF I investors (whether partners or creditors) and how UDF III capital was used to repay UMT investors (whether public shareholders or creditors) – slides 19 and 20 (See Ex. “G”).

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 14 OF 26

Despite Cirangle’s representations to the Court, the SEC had not only very much accused

UDF of engaging in Ponzi behavior, but UDF itself had consented to relief based on those very allegations, and agreed not to deny any of those allegations.

3. Comparison of Hayman’s Public Comments to SEC Complaint Paragraphs 4 and 5.

SEC Complaint, Para. 4 -- “UDF IV also failed to adequately disclose the nature of multi-phase projects in its loan portfolio. In some cases, the properties remained in the entitlement phase even after they had been in UDF IV’s portfolio for years.”

SEC Complaint, Para. 5 -- “Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) required UDF III to report if any of its significant outstanding loans became “impaired”—meaning UDF III believed it was unlikely to fully collect on the loan. UDF III knew or should have known before it filed its 2013 Form 10-K that it was unlikely to fully collect on an approximately $80 million loan to its second largest borrower.”

These SEC complaints regarding the ever-increasing loan balances and lack of development of properties over many years, were also a subject of much of the

UDFexposed website, particularly the slides dealing with “the Precarious Preston Manor

(aka the Preston Manor Case Study). (See slides 13 and 14 (See Ex. “G”) attached hereto.

In particular, Slide __ titled, “Relevant UDF III and UDF IV Loan Balances” deals directly with the loans with ever increasing balances being passed from one fund to the next:

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 15 OF 26

C. Cirangle’s Statements Regarding Whitley Penn.

At the Anti-SLAPP hearing, Cirangle was not candid with the Court. She deliberately downplayed any issues with Whitley Penn’s audit work and otherwise accused the Defendants of being the source of the friction between the Plaintiffs and their auditors. Cirangle and the other Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP attorneys knew, or should have known, that Whitley Penn’s audit work was already the subject of investigations by the SEC and the PCAOB, which later imposed civil penalties of

$250,000 against Whitley Penn and three of its accountants that worked on audits of

Plaintiffs, barred a Whitely Penn auditors from being associated with a registered public accounting firm for a minimum of two years, suspended another Whitley Penn auditor

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 16 OF 26 from being associated with a registered public accounting firm for one year, and limited another auditor’s activities in connection with an audit for two years – all based on their failures and complicity with regard to UDF’s misconduct. The following is list of misleading statements Cirangle made to the Court regarding Whitley Penn:

Page 83 – Cirangle says Whitley Penn “did not resign... They did something called declination that said they wanted to no longer work for us. We could sit here and talk about that all day, but Dale Kitchens tells you tells you there was a rule that said if there’s anything wrong, they have to disclose it. They didn’t. There’s no evidence of any wrongdoing.”

Page 118 – Cirangle says “they said UDF and its auditor were concealing disagreements and reportable events. We showed that was false.”

Page 129-- Auditors filed statements with SEC, said there were zero issues with our prior filings, no disagreements between auditors and UDF. If you uncover fraud, you can’t just resign and walk away…. We stand by what we did, we have no disagreements is actually evidence that it’s not a Ponzi scheme. That’s why they have to accuse WP of being part of this fraud, either being so negligent and such awful accountants or being part of the fraud b/c they know when auditor says there’s not a problem, that’s a problem for saying we’re a ponzi scheme.

Page 131 – Hayman efforts to push communications to all local accountants, LinkedIn and other means. “Trying to interfere with our auditors and quite frankly it’s worked… they are putting us through the wringer doing extra due diligence because of all these things.”

See Transcript attached hereto as Ex. “H.”

1. What Cirangle Clearly Knew at the Time of the Hearing

At a minimum, at the time of the Anti-Slapp hearing, Cirangle undoubtedly knew, and other Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP attorneys knew about the following events that were not public at the time and that contradict her statements to the Court:

1. On August 31, 2015, the SEC met with Whitley Penn, questioned whether UDF had misled WP about a “spreadsheet” related to a borrower, and prohibited Whitley Penn from asking UDF questions about the spreadsheet.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 17 OF 26 Whitley Penn added 6 additional procedures to its 3Q15 review but did not withdraw prior audit opinions (UDF’s Deregistration Brief, p. 4).

2. On October 29, 2015, the PCAOB issued a report on its 2014 inspection of Whitley Penn (“PCAOB Report on 2014 Inspection”), notes “significant deficiency” – firm had not obtained sufficient evidence to support its opinion that the financial statements were presented fairly, failed to satisfy fundamental obligation to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements were free of material misstatement. “A serious matter…it is a failure to accomplish the essential purpose of the audit, and it means that…the audit opinion should not have been issued”. The deficiency was “failure to perform sufficient procedures to test occurrence and valuation of revenue” for an issuer. (See page 3, last ¶ through page 4, PCAOB Report on 2014 Inspection).

2. After The Hearing, Additional Public Accounting Board Findings Are Disclosed Demonstrating The Falsity Of Cirangle’s Comments.

Cirangle and the Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP attorneys had a duty to correct or supplement their false representations to the Court and never did.

Cirangle knew and other Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP attorneys knew, or should have known, of further PCAOB investigations of Whitley Penn that became the subject of a November 2018 Inspection Report:

11.18 PCAOB inspection report detailing significant deficiencies in WP’s work with respect to “Issuer A” – “auditor issued opinion without satisfying its fundamental obligation to obtain reasonable assurance about whether financial statements are free of material misstatement…a serious matter… it is a failure to accomplish the essential purpose of the audit, and it means that, based on the audit work performed, the audit opinion should not have been issued.” The deficiency was “failure to perform sufficient procedures to test the allowance for loan losses”. (See Ex. “I”).

3. Cirangle and other Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP attorneys knew, or should have known, of further PCAOB investigations of Whitley Penn that eventually became the subject of the PCAOB Order:

(a.) Whitley Penn’s audit work in 2013-2014

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 18 OF 26 During the 2013-2014-time frame, three significant mishaps occurred in connection with Whitley Penn’s audit work, which became the subject of the SEC investigation and the PCAOB findings:

• In connection with the 2013 audit of UDF’s 2012 financial statements, UDF provided Whitley Penn with a fabricated “revised spreadsheet” showing collectability of the line of credit to Buffington (See page 8, ¶26 PCAOB Order);

• In connection with the 2013 audits, the Whitley Penn engagement teams knew of transfers from UDF IV directly to UDF III for distributions to investors, recorded as loans to 3rd party borrowers with no prior request or approval of borrower, and UDF did not select which borrower until after the transfer. Whitley Penn determines those fit into “limited circumstances” whereby UDF had right to make discretionary advances (See page 15, ¶48-50 PCAOB Order); and,

• By the time of 2014 audit, Powell was aware the SEC had commenced an investigation of the UDF entities that included questions about UDF III’s monitoring of the Buffington LOC, the valuation of LOC collateral, and management’s decision to renew the LOC in 2013 (See page 11, ¶36 PCAOB Order).

(b.) Whitley Penn’s 2015 Work

The PCAOB made the following findings in connection with Whitley Penn’s 3rd quarter 2015 Review:

• Before 3Q15 review, Whitley Penn auditor Susan Lunn Powell was interviewed by the SEC and shown documents that called into question the accuracy and veracity of UDF information regarding the LOC. At a minimum, this raised questions about whether UDF entities misstated cash flow projections for the LOC to conceal its impairment (See page 18, ¶56 PCAOB Order).

• 3Q15 review – Powell performed procedures to follow up on what she learned from the SEC – verifies that in March 2014 Buffington had provided cash flow projections showing it would be unable to repay substantial balance of the LOC. Powell also confirmed that UDF had modified the projections that were provided to Whitley Penn, showing “future projects” not belonging to Buffington (See page 18, ¶57 PCAOB Order).

• 3Q15 review – Whitley Penn “became aware of facts indicating material modifications may have been necessary to UDF III and UDF IV’s 3Q15 financial statements”. Whitley Penn analysis projected shortfall on the LOC of $73M. (See page 22, ¶70 PCAOB Order).

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 19 OF 26 • Powell relied on non-binding LOIs provided by UDF for new developers and collateral. Powell and Lawlis, knowing the SEC was investigating, tried to get information from Buffington but ultimately relied on management reps. (See page 19, ¶60-62 PCAOB Order).

In a lack of candor, Cirangle deliberately downplayed any issues with Whitley

Penn’s audit work and otherwise accused the Defendants of being the source of the friction between the Plaintiffs and their auditors, because this bolstered her statements to the Court that there was nothing of substance to the SEC investigations regarding

Whitley Penn’s work. To the contrary, the PCAOB later imposed civil penalties and bars against Whitley Penn and three of its accountants who worked directly on the UDF audits.

All of this demonstrated the truth of the Defendants’ public statements regarding these very same matters.

IV. UDF is Hiding the Ball: the SEC Revocation of all classes of the registered securities of UDF III, IV, and V for Failure to File Periodic Reports

The Lubin lawyers’ efforts to portray the Defendants as the cause of their troubles is undermined by UDF’s efforts to hide the truth. To date, all four publicly‐registered

Plaintiffs have not filed required periodic reports with the SEC since the filing period ending September 30, 2015. On August 14, 2020, the SEC issued an Opinion (See Ex.

E) revoking the registration of all classes of the registered securities of UDF III, IV, and

V for failing to file necessary reporting documents for over 5 years:

The “reporting requirements are the primary tools which Congress has fashioned for the protection of investors from negligent, careless, and deliberate misrepresentations in the sale of stock and securities.” Respondents engaged in serious and recurrent violations of these critically important requirements and did so with a high degree of culpability. Although Respondents have taken steps to return to compliance, including the hiring of a new auditor, those steps are insufficient to justify a sanction other than revocation. Respondents have not filed any of the reports identified in the OIP, and they have missed

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 20 OF 26 additional required filings since the OIP. The record further establishes substantial reason to doubt that they will return to compliance and avoid delinquencies in the future. As a result, we find that Respondents have not made any showing that would justify a sanction other than revocation. Nor have Respondents established a genuine dispute of material fact that would necessitate an in-person evidentiary hearing or that the Division is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore grant the Division’s motion for summary disposition, deny Respondents’ motion for summary disposition, and revoke the registration of all classes of the registered securities of Respondents as in the public interest and necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors. (Emphasis added).

(See Ex. E SEC Order, Page 13).

V. UDF Sets Up and Controls Strawman Borrowers in violation of IRS Regulations

On December 28, 2015, UDF IV was sued in Fort Bend County, Texas. The Lubin lawyers knew or should have known that Hayman’s postings about UDF skirting the IRS regulations and controlling its borrowers were true based upon the allegations filed by the

Plaintiffs in Fort Bend County. The lawsuit documents admissions by UDF principals that UDF creates and controls its borrowers, and were at all times in control of the negotiation, planning and development of this project. UDF principals admitted that the representatives of the spin off borrowers “don’t even know where the property is.” (See

Fort Bend Petition, Para 13 attached hereto as Ex. “J”). UDF is not a legitimate REIT.

There are more admissions of fact that contradict the Lubin lawyers’ representations to this Court. UDF IV’s largest borrower is a private real estate developer based in Farmers Branch, Texas which does business under the name of Centurion

American through a complex web of affiliated entities, which are controlled by Dallas businessman, Mehrdad Moayedi (“Moayedi”) (Moayedi, Centurion American entities and their affiliates are collectively referred to as “Centurion”). As of September 30, 2015,

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 21 OF 26 Moayedi owed UDF-related entities approximately $585 million. In a recent prospectus filing, it was disclosed by Moayedi that he owed UDF [$900 million].

Yet at a meeting of the Farmer’s Branch city council in February 2016, Moayedi claimed that he did not really owe significant debts to UDF, instead explaining that he managed non-performing real estate assets (REO) on behalf of UDF, both of which completely contradict public disclosures made by UDF. Moayedi’s statements amounted to admissions of being a “strawman borrower.” The Lubin lawyers cite this meeting in the Plaintiffs’ Original Petition in Paragraph 160. The Lubin lawyers knew or should have known of these facts when they drafted Paragraph 160.

VI. The incidents detailed in the Complaint filed by the SEC, the PCAOB Order, and the SEC Revocation are just the tip of the iceberg.

These same business practices filter through UDF and its web of affiliates and

companies. The Lubin lawyers have a duty to be truthful with this Court, and they have

breached this duty. The Lubin lawyers’ efforts to portray the Defendants as the cause

of their troubles is undermined by the following list of events, lawsuits and

investigations against UDF:

• UDF’s officers were raided by the FBI; • UDF’s documents and computers were confiscated by the Government; • UDF was sued by the SEC; • UDF settled with the SEC; • UDF paid substantial $8.5M penalty to the SEC, including disgorgement of ill-gotten gains; • UDF entered into Agreed Consent Decrees; • UDF entered into Agreed Judgments; • UDF’s Auditors resigned; • UDF’s Auditors/CPAs were sanctioned; • UDF’s Public Entities Delisted by the SEC; • UDF’s Public Entities Deregistered by the SEC; • UDF admitted a forgiveness of indebtedness to UDF of $122 million; • UDF has been sued in numerous investor lawsuits;

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 22 OF 26 • UDF settled one investor class action suit and paid an approximately eight figure settlement, and is actively attempting to settle other investor class action claims; • UDF has more investor suits pending, from Texas to Delaware; • UDF sued the FBI Agent investigating them, interfering with a very active criminal investigation; • UDF sued the DOJ/Assistant US Attorney Investigating them; • UDF stopped paying regular distributions to investors. That accrued amount of missed distributions is now in the hundreds of millions of dollars, not to mention additional hundreds of millions of investor money that has not been accounted for; • UDF is being sued by business partners, including racketeering allegations from Megatel; and, • UDF’s largest borrower has admitted in money-raising documents that he owes UDF at least $839 million dollars.

In the suit against the FBI agents and the U.S. Attorneys Office, the United States recently filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to File Redacted Complaint, in which it was highly critical of the Public Relations aspect of UDF’s actions:

This case is a Bivens action in name only. In reality, disappointed by their failure to convince either the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas (“NDTX”) or the Deputy Attorney General to halt a complex criminal investigation of their conduct and have Assistant United States Attorney James Nicholas Bunch (hereinafter “AUSA Bunch”) removed from that case, Plaintiffs are using this “Bivens action” to yet again interfere with legitimate law enforcement activity. In furtherance of their efforts, Plaintiffs ask the Court to unseal a redacted complaint and publicize their version of the history of a very active ongoing criminal investigation in the NDTX including details of non-public aspects of the investigation.

(See Ex. B, p. 2).

It is clear that the Lubin lawyers are nothing but an instrument for their clients’ endless propaganda and spin in an attempt to place the blame on the Defendants for UDF investor losses. From the outset, Cirangle and the Lubin lawyers have deceived the Court, violated the ethical rules they agreed to uphold, and should be banned from the Texas

Courts.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 23 OF 26 VII. Relief Requested

Despite certifying that she was familiar with Texas’s ethical rules, Ms. Cirangle was inattentive to her duty of candor to this Court and conveyed that neither her nor her have regard for the ethical duties of Texas attorneys. Now that the cat is out of the bag, her firm has had more than tw0 (2) years to correct these misrepresentations, and has utterly declined to do so. Mr. Browning now seeks admission with the same certification to this Court of his own familiarity with the Texas Rules of Professional

Conduct. However, their firm has shown that their attorneys have no obligation to take

Texas ethical mandates seriously.

“The question of reputability of a non-resident attorney is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” State Bar v. Belli, 382 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex. 1964). Ms.

Cirangle’s misrepresentations to this Court were indicative of her firm’s overall strategy, which clearly requires its attorneys to forego their ethical responsibilities. Lubin, Olson &

Niewiadomski, LLP’s track record in this Court and this case supports denying Ian

Browning’s admission and revoking the previous admissions of Cirangle and the other

Lubin lawyers. Thus, Defendants ask this Court to exercise its sound discretion and deny the pro hac vice admission of Ian Edward Browning and to revoke the Pro Hac Vice

Admissions of each of the attorneys associated with Lubin, Olson & Niewiadomski, LLP.

UDF already employs Texas counsel in this matter, so the requested revocation will not affect any of the deadlines in place for the case.

Defendants request discovery on an emergency basis in order to prepare for the hearing on this Motion.

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 24 OF 26 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendants ask this Court to deny

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice for Ian Edward Browning and to revoke the

Pro Hac Vice Admissions of each of the attorneys associated with Lubin, Olson &

Niewiadomski, LLP.

Respectfully submitted,

FRIEDMAN & FEIGER, LLP

By: __/s/ Lawrence J. Friedman______Lawrence J. Friedman State Bar No. 07469300 [email protected] James R. Krause State Bar No. 24049314 [email protected] Shauna A. Izadi State Bar No. 24041170 [email protected] Jason H. Friedman State Bar No. 24059784 [email protected]

5301 Spring Valley Road, Suite 200 Dallas, Texas 75254 (972) 788-1400 (Telephone) ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS J. KYLE BASS AND HAYMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P.

-and-

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP

Cole B. Ramey State Bar No. 16494980 [email protected] Karly Stoehr Rodine State Bar No. 24046920 [email protected] Patrick J. Carew State Bar No. 24031919 [email protected]

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 25 OF 26 Raymond T. Fischer State Bar 24038446 [email protected]

2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 4400 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 922-7100 Facsimile: (214) 922-7101

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing document has been electronically served upon all counsel of record on this the 7th day of October 2020.

__/s/ Lawrence J. Friedman______Lawrence J. Friedman

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE FOR IAN EDWARD BROWNING and MOTION TO REVOKE THE PRO HAC VICE ADMISSIONS FOR ALL OF THE LUBIN, OLSON & NIEWIADOMSKI, LLP ATTORNEYS PAGE 26 OF 26 1666 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 Office: (202) 207-9100 Fax: (202) 862-8430 www.pcaobus.org

) ) ORDER INSTITUTING DISCIPLINARY ) PROCEEDINGS, MAKING FINDINGS, ) AND IMPOSING SANCTIONS ) PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 ) In the Matter of Whitley Penn LLP, Susan ) March 24, 2020 Lunn Powell, CPA, Jeffry Shannon ) Lawlis, CPA, and John Griffin Babb, CPA, ) ) Respondents. )

)

By this Order, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("Board" or "PCAOB") is imposing sanctions upon Whitley Penn LLP ("WP" or the "Firm"), Susan Lunn Powell, CPA ("Powell"), Jeffry Shannon Lawlis, CPA ("Lawlis") and John Griffin Babb, CPA ("Babb") (collectively, "Respondents"). The Board is:

(1) requiring WP to undertake certain remedial actions, as described in Section IV of this Order, and imposing a $200,000 civil money penalty on WP;

(2) barring Powell from being associated with a registered public accounting firm,1 limiting Powell's activities in connection with any "audit," as that term is defined in Section 110(1) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended (the "Act"), for an additional period of one year following the termination of the bar, requiring that Powell complete forty additional hours of continuing professional education ("CPE"), and imposing a $25,000 civil money penalty on Powell;

(3) suspending Lawlis from being associated with a registered public accounting firm for a period of one year, limiting Lawlis's activities in connection with any "audit," as that term is defined in Section 110(1) of the Act for an additional period of one year following his suspension, requiring that Lawlis complete twenty additional hours of CPE, and imposing a $15,000 civil money penalty on Lawlis; and

1 Powell may file a petition for Board consent to associate with a registered public accounting firm after two years from the date of this Order. PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 2

(4) limiting Babb's activities in connection with any "audit," as that term is defined in Section 110(1) of the Act for a period of two years, requiring that Babb complete ten additional hours of CPE, and imposing a $10,000 civil money penalty on Babb.

The Board is imposing these sanctions based on its findings that: (1) Powell and Babb violated PCAOB rules and standards2 in connection with the audits of the 2012- 2014 financial statements of United Development Funding III, L.P., and the review of that issuer's Q3 2015 interim financial statements; (2) Lawlis violated PCAOB rules and standards in connection with the audits of the 2013-2014 financial statements of United Development Funding IV and the review of that issuer's Q3 2015 interim financial statements; and (3) WP violated PCAOB rules and standards by failing to design, implement, and maintain appropriate quality control policies and procedures.

I.

The Board deems it necessary and appropriate, for the protection of investors and to further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports, that disciplinary proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 105(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended (the "Act") and PCAOB Rule 5200(a)(1) against Respondents.

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, and pursuant to PCAOB Rule 5205, Respondents have submitted Offers of Settlement ("Offers") that the Board has determined to accept. Solely for purposes of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the Board, or to which the Board is a party, and without admitting or denying the findings herein, except as to the Board's jurisdiction over Respondents and the subject matter of these proceedings, which is admitted,

2 All references to PCAOB rules and standards in this Order are to the versions of those rules and standards, and to their organization and numbering, in effect at the time of audits discussed herein. As of December 31, 2016, the PCAOB reorganized its auditing standards using a topical structure and a single, integrated numbering system. See Reorganization of PCAOB Auditing Standards and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards and Rules, PCAOB Release No. 2015-002 (Mar. 31, 2015).

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 3

Respondents consent to the entry of this Order Instituting Disciplinary Proceedings, Making Findings, and Imposing Sanctions ("Order"), as set forth below.3

III.

On the basis of Respondents' Offers, the Board finds that:4

A. Respondents

1. Whitley Penn LLP is a limited liability partnership organized under the laws of the State of Texas and headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas. The Firm is licensed by the State Boards of Accountancy in Texas (License No. P05377), California (License No. OFR659), New Jersey (License No. 20CZ00034600), Oklahoma (License No. 13919), and Minnesota (License No. F2269). The Firm is, and at all relevant times was, registered with the Board pursuant to Section 102 of the Act and PCAOB rules.

2. Susan Lunn Powell, CPA, is a certified public accountant licensed by the Texas State Board of Accountancy (License No. 078380). At all relevant times, Powell was an associated person of a registered public accounting firm as that term is defined in Section 2(a)(9) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(i).

3. Jeffry Shannon Lawlis, CPA, is a certified public accountant licensed by the Texas State Board of Accountancy (License No. 058485). At all relevant times, Lawlis was an associated person of a registered public accounting firm as that term is defined in Section 2(a)(9) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(i).

4. John Griffin Babb, CPA, is a certified public accountant licensed by the Texas State Board of Accountancy (License No. 081948). Babb is an associated person of a registered public accounting firm as that term is defined in Section 2(a)(9) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(i).

3 The findings herein are made pursuant to the Offers and are not binding on any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.

4 The Board finds that Respondents' conduct described in this Order meets the conditions set out in Section 105(c)(5) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(5), which provides that certain sanctions may be imposed in the event of: (1) intentional or knowing conduct, including reckless conduct, that results in a violation of the applicable statutory, regulatory, or professional standard; or (2) repeated instances of negligent conduct, each resulting in a violation of the applicable statutory, regulatory, or professional standard.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 4

B. Issuers

5. United Development Funding III, L.P. ("UDF III"), was an issuer as that term is defined by Section 2(a)(7) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(i)(iii). UDF III's public filings disclosed that it originated, acquired, serviced, and managed mortgage loans secured by real property or equity interests that held real property already subject to other mortgages.

6. United Development Funding IV ("UDF IV") was, at all relevant times, a Maryland real estate investment trust, and an issuer as that term is defined by Section 2(a)(7) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(i)(iii). UDF IV's public filings disclosed that it originated, purchased, participated in, and held for investment secured loans to persons and entities relating to real estate development.

7. UDF III and UDF IV were affiliates of one another and were under common management, along with several other affiliates (collectively, the "UDF Entities").

C. Summary

8. WP was the UDF Entities' external auditor, including for the year ended December 31, 2012 and continuing through the third quarter of 2015. Powell was the engagement partner for the audits and reviews of UDF III's 2012 through Q3 2015 financial statements. Babb was the engagement quality review ("EQR") partner for those same UDF III audits and reviews. Lawlis was the engagement partner for the audits and reviews of UDF IV's 2013 through Q3 2015 financial statements.

9. This matter concerns, among other things, (a) Powell's, Lawlis's, and Babb's failures to exercise due professional care, including professional skepticism, in connection with procedures they performed concerning loans made by UDF III and UDF IV to a key borrower, which accounted for a significant portion of each issuer's assets; (b) Powell's and Lawlis's failures to appropriately respond to evidence of possible undisclosed related party transactions between UDF III and UDF IV during the 2013 and 2014 audits; and (c) Whitley Penn's failure to maintain an adequate system of quality control ("QC system") both during and after those audit failures.

10. Specifically, Powell repeatedly failed to gather sufficient appropriate evidence to determine whether a significant loan was properly valued, and failed to adequately consider evidence indicating UDF III needed to record a substantial reserve for that loan. By Q3 2015, that loan accounted for $104 million (26%) of UDF III's assets. Evidence gathered by Powell indicated that it could be impaired by as much as $73 million at Q3 2015, which was approximately three times UDF III's total allowance for loan losses. Powell also failed to adequately respond to (a) evidence from confirmation procedures of a possible dispute between UDF III and the borrower for that loan and (b) the fact that UDF IV was repeatedly transferring cash to UDF III without either fund disclosing the transfers as related party transactions.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 5

11. Lawlis failed to adequately respond to evidence from confirmation procedures of a possible dispute between UDF IV and that same key borrower, whose loans accounted for approximately 10% of UDF IV's assets. Lawlis also failed to adequately respond to the transfers from UDF IV to UDF III that were not disclosed as related party transactions.

12. Babb, in connection with his EQRs for the UDF III audits, repeatedly failed to properly evaluate, with due professional care, the significant judgments that Powell made concerning the UDF III loan to the key borrower described above.

13. The above violations resulted, at least in part, from WP's insufficient QC system. During the period of the violations, WP's QC system failed to provide reasonable assurance that WP and its personnel performed audit work in accordance with professional standards or appropriately consulted with persons outside of the engagement team when necessary.

D. Background

Notes Receivable and Key Customer

14. The vast majority of UDF III's and UDF IV's assets were comprised of the notes receivable and accrued interest receivable balances from the loans they made. WP understood that the loans funded long-term development projects, with typical interest of 15% and above for UDF III, and 13% and above for UDF IV. WP also understood that UDF III and UDF IV typically set maturity dates on the loans for dates that were prior to the expected completion dates for the development projects. WP expected that UDF III and UDF IV would renew loans for ongoing projects if UDF III and UDF IV believed that the loan was adequately performing and collectable.

15. UDF III and UDF IV each reported their notes receivable both on a gross basis and net of an allowance for loan losses ("ALL"). The ALL was comprised of two components: (1) provisions for expected losses on loans individually evaluated for impairment ("specific reserves"), and (2) an accrual for losses on non-impaired loans.

16. UDF III and UDF IV recognized interest income from their loans on an accrual basis. Both funds disclosed that they suspend recognition of interest income on a loan when full recovery of principal and income was no longer probable. Accordingly, a loan that was impaired and not fully recoverable would also generally require suspension of interest revenue recognition.

17. One of the key borrowers for both UDF III and UDF IV was a group of related land development entities based in Austin, Texas (the "Austin Developer"). At all relevant times, UDF IV had several outstanding loans to the Austin Developer, which accounted for approximately 10% of UDF IV's assets and revenues. UDF III had just one outstanding loan to the Austin Developer, a line of credit (the "LOC"), which accounted for more than

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 6

20% of UDF III's assets and revenues. The LOC bore interest at 15%, and was subordinate to both the UDF IV loans and other senior debt.

18. In December 2016, the UDF Entities entered into a settlement with the Austin Developer, which resulted in UDF III forgiving more than $122 million of the Austin Developer's indebtedness to UDF III associated with the LOC.5 Although UDF III disclosed that the settlement may have a material adverse impact on its financial statements, UDF III has not publicly filed any financial statements after the Q3 2015 financial statements that WP reviewed. WP completed its Q3 2015 review for UDF III in November 2015, and then declined to stand for reappointment as the UDF Entities' auditors three days later.

Settlement with the Commission

19. On July 3, 2018, UDF III and UDF IV, along with several members of their management, entered into a settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission").6 The settlement stemmed from a Commission investigation that WP first learned about during the 2014 audits. The settlement concerned allegations by the Commission that UDF III had failed to recognize a specific impairment on the LOC and put the LOC on non-accrual status. It also concerned allegations that the UDF Entities did not disclose the true nature of the transactions involving cash transfers from UDF IV to UDF III for distribution to UDF III investors.

E. Powell Failed to Obtain Sufficient Appropriate Evidence Concerning the ALL During the 2012-2014 UDF III Audits

20. PCAOB rules require that registered public accounting firms and their associated persons comply with applicable auditing and related professional practice standards.7 An auditor may express an unqualified opinion on an issuer's financial statements only when the auditor has formed such an opinion on the basis of an audit

5 See Form 8-K filed by UDF III (Jan. 6, 2017). The impact of the settlement on UDF IV's financial statements has not been publicly reported.

6 See SEC Charges Real Estate Investment Funds and Executives for Misleading Investors, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 24185 (Jul. 3, 2018); Securities and Exchange Commission v. United Development Funding III, LP, et al., No. 3:18-cv-01735-L (N.D. Tex. filed July 3, 2018; final judgments entered Jul. 31, 2018).

7 See PCAOB Rule 3100, Compliance with Auditing and Related Professional Practice Standards; PCAOB Rule 3200T, Interim Auditing Standards.

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performed in accordance with PCAOB standards.8 PCAOB standards require, among other things, that an auditor plan and perform the audit with due professional care9 and to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the auditor's opinion.10

21. The auditor must design and implement audit responses that address the risks of material misstatement that are identified and assessed during the audit.11 In designing the audit procedures to be performed, the auditor should obtain more persuasive audit evidence the higher the auditor's assessment of risk.12 To be appropriate, audit evidence must be both relevant and reliable in providing support for the conclusions on which the auditor's opinion is based.13

22. Powell identified notes receivable as a significant account for each of the UDF III audits, and assessed that there were significant risks, including fraud risks, associated with that account. Powell designated the ALL as a "critical issue" and identified it as a significant estimate giving rise to high inherent risk for valuation of the net notes receivable balance. Powell also identified that management could perpetrate and conceal fraudulent financial reporting in connection with its notes receivable, including through understatement of the ALL.

23. Despite identifying those significant risks relating to UDF III's notes receivable, including the ALL, Powell failed to exercise due professional care, including professional skepticism when performing audit procedures over that account. In violation of PCAOB rules and standards, Powell failed to gather sufficient appropriate audit evidence about the value of the LOC, which was a significant loan. She also improperly relied on management estimates, data, and assumptions about that loan, without sufficiently evaluating their reasonableness.14

8 See AU § 508.07, Reports on Audited Financial Statements.

9 See AU § 230.01, Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work.

10 See AS 15, Audit Evidence, ¶ 4.

11 See AS 13, The Auditor's Responses to the Risks of Material Misstatement, ¶ 3.

12 See AS 13 ¶ 9.

13 See AS 15 ¶ 6.

14 See AU §§ 342.09-.10, Auditing Accounting Estimates.

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2012 Evaluation of the LOC

24. At year-end 2012, the LOC accounted for approximately 22% ($80 million) of UDF III's assets. UDF III's records indicated that the LOC collateral was also securing $49 million in additional debt at year-end 2012, including $26 million in senior debt. Powell knew that the LOC was past due as of year-end 2012 and UDF III management designated the LOC as impaired, but did not record any specific reserve for it in UDF III's ALL. During the audit, management asserted to Powell that it believed the loan was collectable. Management also provided Powell with documentation showing UDF III renewed the LOC in late March 2013.

25. In her initial analysis of the LOC for the 2012 audit, Powell noted that, if all of the land currently listed as collateral for the LOC was fully developed and sold, the lot sales would not generate sufficient proceeds to repay the LOC and other senior debt secured by the same collateral.

26. Nevertheless, Powell ultimately agreed with management that UDF III likely could collect the full amount of principal and interest, and that no specific reserve or suspension of revenue recognition was necessary. Powell based her conclusion on a revised projection that the Austin Developer's total future cash receipts from the development and sale of all lots would be approximately $152 million, exceeding the outstanding total debt and accrued interest by approximately $23 million. That calculation was based on management-provided data about the number of lots available for sale to repay the loan, the projected sale prices of those lots, and the amounts the Austin Developer would receive in development incentives.

27. Powell, however, failed to perform her analysis with due professional care and, as a result, failed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support her conclusions about the LOC.15 For example, in performing that analysis, Powell did not adequately:

 Test the accuracy and completeness of management-provided data that was critical to her calculation,16 including the number of lots that remained for sale, despite receiving a schedule from management indicating that some of the lots identified as collateral might have been sold already;

15 See AS 15 ¶ 4.

16 See AS 15 ¶ 10.

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 Evaluate the reasonableness of key factors and assumptions that were significant to the analysis, including the projected costs that would affect the collectability of the loan (e.g., future development costs being funded through senior debt);17 and

 Discount the future cash receipts to present value in her analysis, despite knowing that the interest rate on the LOC was 15% and the developments would take several more years to complete.18

28. Powell also considered that management had informed her that the Austin Developer had "pledged" additional collateral to support the repayment of the LOC, which it claimed would increase the number of lots available for sale. However, Powell did not take adequate steps during the 2012 audit to analyze that pledge and determine whether it, in fact, added valuable collateral to the LOC. Powell also did not consider whether that pledged collateral was, itself, subject to senior liens that affected the collateral's value.

29. As a result of these deficiencies, Powell failed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to determine whether UDF III's reported 2012 notes receivable was properly valued and whether revenue recognition should have been suspended for the LOC.

2013 Evaluation of the LOC

30. For the 2013 audit, Powell again failed to appropriately evaluate management's conclusions concerning the impairment and specific reserves of the LOC.

31. During the 2013 audit, Powell identified that available appraisals or other initial WP testing did not support the valuation of the LOC, which then accounted for approximately 23% ($84 million) of UDF III's assets. The engagement team asked management for additional support for the value of the LOC and, in response, received a cash flow analysis reflecting management's conclusions concerning the collectability and value of the LOC. Management's analysis for the LOC calculated that there would be $173 million of cash flows that could be used to satisfy that loan.

17 See AU § 342.09.

18 Cf. ASC 310-10-35-25 ("If a creditor bases its measure of loan impairment on a present value amount, the creditor shall calculate that present value amount based on an estimate of the expected future cash flows of the impaired loan, discounted at the loan's effective interest rate.").

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32. Powell, however, failed to adequately evaluate whether the information contained within the cash flow projection was sufficient and appropriate for purposes of the audit, as required by PCAOB standards.19 She failed to adequately test the accuracy and completeness of the information in the cash flow projections, or to test the controls over the accuracy and completeness of that information.20 She also failed to adequately evaluate whether the information was sufficiently precise and detailed for purposes of the audit.21

33. Specifically, while Powell performed testing procedures over certain data in the management cash-flow analysis, such as lot pricing data, she failed to plan or perform procedures to evaluate or test certain other critical data and assumptions. For example, she failed to test the accuracy, completeness and reasonableness of:

 Data in the cash flow model about the number of lots that would be developed and were available for sale in the future, including whether the underlying projects existed;

 Data and assumptions in the cash flow model relating to the amount of future development costs that would be incurred as senior debt; and

 Data and assumptions in the cash flow model about the timing of the estimated cash advances and repayments, which were important to the analysis because of the LOC's 15% interest rate.

34. As a result of these deficiencies with the LOC testing, Powell failed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to determine whether UDF III's reported 2013 notes receivable was properly valued and whether revenue recognition should have been suspended for the LOC.

2014 Evaluation of the LOC

35. For the 2014 audit, Powell again failed to appropriately evaluate management's conclusions concerning the impairment and specific reserves of the LOC. By that time, the LOC accounted for approximately 24% ($94 million) of UDF III's assets.

19 See AS 15 ¶ 10.

20 See id.

21 See id.

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Management's 2014 analysis for the LOC calculated that there would be $176 million of cash flows that could be used to satisfy the LOC.

36. By the time of the 2014 audit, Powell was aware that the Commission had commenced an investigation of the UDF Entities that included questions about UDF III's monitoring of the LOC, the valuation of the LOC's collateral, and management's decision to renew the LOC in 2013. This information should have caused her to exercise heightened professional skepticism when testing the value and impairment of the LOC, but she failed to do so.22

37. Powell also failed to adequately consider additional information which should have caused her to review the analyses with heightened professional skepticism. For example, during the 2014 audit, UDF III told Powell that the principal of the Austin Developer had informed the UDF Entities of his desire to retire, and was negotiating a settlement with the UDF Entities. Management indicated that the settlement negotiations were ongoing, and that management anticipated a settlement involving another developer taking over the projects reflected in the LOC cash flow analysis, which consisted of both existing projects and "future projects."

38. Powell also failed to adequately consider that:

 There had not been any cash payments of principal on the LOC during 2014, despite management's 2013 cash flow analysis projecting a substantial pay- down of the LOC in 2014;

 The cash flow analysis for the LOC included proceeds from "future projects," for which the WP engagement team had no evidence to support that they existed; and

 The ongoing settlement negotiations with the Austin Developer could indicate a dispute with the Austin Developer, and the Austin Developer did not respond to confirmation requests about its 2014 loan balance, despite responding to similar requests in prior audits.23

39. Powell again relied on management's cash flow analysis in testing the LOC for potential impairment, but she again failed to adequately test the accuracy and completeness of the information in the cash flow projections, despite all of the foregoing information. Powell reviewed a summary cash flow for the LOC, as well as a selection of five cash flow analyses for individual development projects that she understood were

22 See AU § 230.07.

23 See Section III.F, infra.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 12 generating repayments reflected in the summary cash flow. Powell also discussed the cash flow analysis with management, and reviewed management's support for the lot pricing management used in the cash flow model. Based on those steps, and inquiry to management about the LOC's status, Powell concluded that the LOC was fully collectable.

40. However, Powell again failed to adequately evaluate whether the information contained within the cash flow projection was sufficient and appropriate for purposes of the audit.24 While she performed testing procedures over certain data in the cash flow projection, she again failed to test the completeness and accuracy of other critical data and assumptions, including the number of lots that would repay the loans, the timing of estimated cash advances and repayments, or the projected amounts of future development costs.25 Powell also failed to take adequate steps during the 2014 audit to understand the nature of the "future projects" management included in its cash flow projection, and their qualitative and quantitative impact on the cash flow analysis. As a result, Powell failed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to determine whether UDF III's reported 2014 notes receivable was properly valued and whether revenue recognition should have been suspended for the LOC. 26

F. Powell and Lawlis Failed to Properly Evaluate the Results of the Confirmation Procedures Concerning the Austin Developer during the 2014 UDF III and UDF IV Audits

41. Both Powell and Lawlis violated PCAOB rules and standards in their respective UDF III and UDF IV 2014 audits by failing to follow-up on (a) loan confirmation requests to the Austin Developer and (b) information that management provided to explain the Austin Developer's failure to respond to a confirmation request.27

24 See AS 15 ¶ 10.

25 See AS 15 ¶ 10; AU § 342.09.

26 See AS 15 ¶¶ 4-6.

27 See AU § 330.30, The Confirmation Process ("When using confirmation requests other than the negative form, the auditor should generally follow up with a second and sometimes a third request to those parties from whom replies have not been received."); AU § 330.33 ("If the combined evidence provided by the confirmations, alternative procedures, and other procedures is not sufficient, the auditor should request

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42. At year-end 2014, the Austin Developer's debt to UDF III was comprised entirely of the LOC. The Austin Developer's debt to UDF IV was comprised of multiple loans, accounting for approximately 10% of UDF IV's assets. Roughly half of the Austin Developer's debt to UDF IV was overdue at the time of the audit and designated as impaired by management.

43. Both engagement teams considered it appropriate to send confirmation requests to the Austin Developer. After receiving confirmation requests from the engagement teams, the Austin Developer did not respond, despite having responded to such requests in the past, including for the 2013 audits. Management for the UDF Entities then informed both Powell and Lawlis that the Austin Developer would not respond to confirmation requests due to its principal's intent to retire and ongoing negotiations between the UDF Entities and the Austin Developer. The UDF Entities also informed Powell and Lawlis that it would not further extend the due dates on any of the Austin Developer's loans.28 Both Powell and Lawlis should have understood from those statements that there was a potential dispute between the Austin Developer and the UDF Entities, including UDF III and UDF IV. Nevertheless, they both failed to follow up with a second confirmation request.29

44. Having not received a response to their loan confirmation request, both engagement teams performed alternative procedures. The alternative procedures consisted of tying a selection of loan draws and paydowns to management provided documentation, including third party bank statements and draw requests signed by the borrowers, to roll forward the prior year's audited balance. However, the alternative procedures failed to provide sufficient evidence about the potential dispute concerning the Austin Developer and whether that dispute affected the loans' valuation. As a result, Powell and Lawlis failed to obtain sufficient audit evidence to determine whether the notes receivable were, among other things, properly valued for 2014.30

additional confirmations or extend other tests, such as tests of details or analytical procedures.").

28 Because management classified all overdue loans as impaired, Powell and Lawlis knew or should have known that such loans were likely to be classified as impaired by management as they came due, and therefore that they would need to be assessed for a potential specific reserve.

29 See AU § 330.30.

30 See AU § 330.33; AS 15 ¶¶ 4-6.

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G. Powell and Lawlis Failed To Perform Sufficient Related Parties Procedures During the 2013 and 2014 UDF III and UDF IV Audits

45. PCAOB standards recognize that, "[d]uring the course of the audit, the auditor may become aware of significant transactions that are outside the normal course of business for the entity, or that otherwise appear to be unusual given the auditor's understanding of the entity and its environment."31 The standards further provide that "[t]he auditor should gain an understanding of the business rationale for such transactions and whether that rationale (or the lack thereof) suggests that the transactions may have been entered into to engage in fraudulent financial reporting or conceal misappropriation of assets."32

46. PCAOB standards also provide that, when examining related party transactions, "the auditor should be aware that the substance of a particular transaction could be significantly different from its form and that financial statements should recognize the substance of particular transactions rather than merely their legal form."33 After identifying related party transactions, "the auditor should apply the procedures he considers necessary to obtain satisfaction concerning the purpose, nature, and extent of these transactions and their effect on the financial statements."34 For each material related party transaction (or aggregation of similar transactions), "the auditor should evaluate all the information available to him and satisfy himself that it is adequately disclosed in the financial statements."35

47. During their respective 2013 and 2014 UDF III and UDF IV audits, Powell and Lawlis designated related party transactions as a significant audit issue, but failed to

31 AU § 316.66, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.

32 Id.

33 AU § 334.02, Related Parties; see also AU § 411.06, The Meaning of Present Fairly in Conformity With Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("Generally accepted accounting principles recognize the importance of reporting transactions and events in accordance with their substance. The auditor should consider whether the substance of transactions or events differs materially from their form.").

34 AU § 334.09.

35 See AU § 334.11; see also Rule 4-08(k) of Regulation S-X, Related party transactions which affect the financial statements, codified as 17 C.F.R. 210.4-08(k).

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properly respond to evidence of unusual transfers from UDF IV to UDF III that were not disclosed as related party transactions.

Evaluation of Transfers During the 2013 Audits

48. During the 2013 audits, the WP engagement teams brought to the attention of both Powell and Lawlis certain unusual transfers from UDF IV to UDF III that management did not present or disclose as related party transactions. During the 2013 audits, the engagement teams learned that UDF IV transferred $1.2 million to UDF III in January 2014 so that UDF III, which otherwise lacked sufficient cash, could make distributions to its investors that same day. The engagement teams also understood that the transfer had been recorded as loans by UDF IV to third-party borrowers and pay- downs of loans by those same borrowers to UDF III, even though: (a) UDF IV and UDF III's joint management had initiated the transfer, without the prior request or approval of any third-party borrower; (b) the transfer flowed directly from UDF IV to UDF III without notice to any third-party borrower; and (c) UDF IV and UDF III's joint management had unilaterally selected which third-party borrower and loans it would use to record the transfer, and did not finalize that selection until after the transfer had already been completed. The engagement teams communicated that understanding to Powell and Lawlis, sent them supporting documentation, and also advised them that there might be additional similar transactions.

49. Both Powell and Lawlis initially agreed that the transaction flagged by the engagement team was "strange" and questioned why the initial transfer was not recorded as a payable/receivable between UDF III and UDF IV, which they knew were related parties. Powell and Lawlis also agreed that they should determine how many similar transactions took place in 2013. Nevertheless, Powell and Lawlis failed to perform sufficient procedures to obtain satisfaction concerning the extent of those transactions and their effect on the financial statements in 2013, including whether the transactions had been properly presented and disclosed.36

50. Instead, Powell and Lawlis improperly concluded that no further analysis of the accounting for the transfers was required after management pointed to language in its loan agreements that it claimed allowed UDF IV to make discretionary advances on a borrower's behalf, in certain limited circumstances, without advance consent from the borrower. Powell and Lawlis accepted management's assertion that the loan agreement provision allowed the UDF Entities to characterize the transfers as third-party loan activity, even though management had initiated the transfers on its own, without any borrower request, and for the express purpose of enabling cash distributions to UDF III's investors.

36 See AU §§ 334.02, .09, .11; see also Rule 4-08(k) of Regulation S-X.

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Although Powell and Lawlis read the loan provision that management identified, they did not determine whether the transfers fit into the limited circumstances described in the loan provision or obtain any other evidence to support management's interpretation. They also failed to consider whether the substance of the transaction, regardless of its form, required disclosure as a related party transaction.37

Evaluation of Transfers During the 2014 Audits

51. During the 2014 UDF IV audit and reviews, Lawlis became aware that UDF IV made additional transfers to UDF III similar to the January 2014 transfer, but he failed to adequately address them. Lawlis again knew that UDF IV recorded those transfers as third-party loan advances even though there was no evidence of the borrower's request or approval for the transfer. UDF IV also confirmed to Lawlis that it had initiated some transfers to its affiliates without the third-party borrowers' prior consent and obtained approval afterward. Nevertheless, Lawlis again failed to perform sufficient procedures to obtain satisfaction concerning the extent of the transactions and their effect on the financial statements, including whether the transactions had been properly presented and disclosed.38 For the additional transfers that came to the engagement team's attention, the team either verified that the relevant borrower eventually approved the transaction, or that the loan agreements included the provision for discretionary advances. However, Lawlis again failed to consider whether the substance of the transactions, regardless of their form, required disclosure as a related party transactions.39

52. For the 2014 UDF III audit, Powell failed to perform any procedures over the transfers to UDF III from UDF IV.

H. Powell and Lawlis Failed to Act with Due Professional Care During the Q3 2015 UDF III and UDF IV Reviews

53. In an interim review, an accountant may become aware of information that leads him or her to believe that the interim financial information under review may not be in conformity with GAAP in all material respects. In such circumstances, PCAOB standards provide that the accountant should make additional inquiries or perform other

37 See AU § 334.02.

38 See AU §§ 334.02, .09, .11; see also Rule 4-08(k) of Regulation S-X.

39 See AU § 334.02.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 17 procedures to provide a basis for communicating whether he or she is aware of any material modifications that should be made to the interim financial information.40

54. If the accountant becomes aware of information which relates to a prior audit report and is of such a nature and from such a source that he would have investigated it had it come to his attention during the course of his audit, PCAOB standards also require that he take certain steps concerning his prior report.41 First, he should determine whether the information is reliable and whether the facts existed at the date of his report.42 If those conditions are satisfied, the auditor should then consider if the nature and effect of the matter are such that (a) his report would have been affected if the information had been known to him at the date of his report and had not been reflected in the financial statements and (b) he believes there are persons currently relying or likely to rely on the financial statements who would attach importance to the information.43 The auditor is then required to consider whether to take action to prevent future reliance on his report.44

55. As discussed below, during their respective Q3 2015 reviews, Powell and Lawlis became aware of facts indicating material modifications may have been necessary in UDF III's and UDF IV's Q3 2015 financial statements, specifically to the notes receivable balances. That information also cast doubt on UDF III's previously audited annual financial statements. Although Powell and Lawlis performed procedures to respond to those facts for purposes of the Q3 2015 financial statements, they failed to perform those procedures with due professional care.45 Powell also failed to appropriately consider the possible implications for WP's previously issued audit reports on UDF III's financial statements.46

40 See AU § 722.22, Interim Financial Information.

41 See AU §§ 561.04-.06, Subsequent Discovery of Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditor's Report.

42 See AU § 561.04.

43 See AU § 561.05.

44 See AU § 561.06.

45 See AU § 722.22.

46 See AU §§ 561.04-.05.

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Powell Failed to Adequately Consider Indications of Potential Impairment for the LOC at 2013, 2014, and Q3 2015

56. Before the start of the Q3 2015 reviews, Powell was interviewed by the Commission staff, in connection with its investigation. During the interview, Powell was shown documents and asked questions by the Commission staff that called into question the veracity and accuracy of information that UDF III provided to the WP engagement team in connection with the FY 2013 and 2014 audits concerning the expected cash flows for the LOC. Specifically, Powell was shown documents that, at minimum, raised questions about whether the UDF Entities misstated their cash flow projections for the LOC to conceal its impairment by unilaterally including potential "future projects" in addition to current projects.

57. During the Q3 2015 review, Powell performed procedures to follow-up on the information she learned from the Commission staff, which included inquiries of management and reviewing additional documentation relating to the Commission's investigation and the LOC. Through these procedures, Powell verified that, in March 2014, the Austin Developer had provided its own cash flow projection to the UDF Entities, indicating that it would be unable to repay a substantial portion of its LOC balance. Powell also corroborated that UDF III had modified the version of the projection that it provided to WP for both 2013 and 2014, adding cash flows from "future projects" that the Austin Developer did not own and did not plan to develop.

58. During the review, Powell and the engagement team also quantified the amounts in management's LOC cash flow projections for 2013, 2014, and Q3 2015 that were attributable to existing projects, excluding the amounts attributable to future projects. That analysis showed that, in each of those periods, the cash flows from the existing projects were expected to leave a substantial portion of the LOC unpaid. By Q3 2015, the analysis projected a shortfall of approximately $73 million,47 suggesting that material modifications to the interim financial information might be necessary.

59. Despite this information, Powell did not adequately consider whether to withdraw WP's earlier audit reports.48 Powell also failed to propose that UDF III record any specific reserve for the LOC at Q3 2015 or suspend revenue recognition on the LOC. Instead, Powell concluded that UDF III could file Q3 2015 interim financial statements

47 At year-end 2013 and year-end 2014, the projected shortfall indicated by WP's calculation was $27 million and $60 million, respectively. The 2013 and 2014 financial statements did not include any specific reserve for the LOC.

48 See AU §§ 561.04-.05.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 19 that continued interest revenue recognition from the LOC, contained no specific reserve for the LOC, and included a total ALL for all loans of just $24.5 million.49 However, as discussed below, she failed to perform sufficient other procedures to provide a basis for that conclusion.50

Powell Inappropriately Relied on Non-Binding Letters of Intent at Q3 2015

60. Powell's conclusion that no specific reserve was required at Q3 2015 was based on three management-provided non-binding letters of intent. One of those letters, dated October 21, 2015, was between the Austin Developer and the UDF Entities and described that the Austin Developer would surrender its collateral in full satisfaction of its debts. The other letters, dated November 12, 2015, were between the UDF Entities and two new developers and described a proposal for new developers to take possession of the LOC collateral, pledge additional collateral, and assume the LOC debt as part of two larger transactions with UDF III.

61. Powell reviewed the letters and discussed them with management. From those discussions, Powell understood that management expected that the transactions described in the letters of intent would occur in late November or early December 2015.

62. After discussing the letters of intent with management, Powell concluded that she would rely upon them for the purpose of evaluating the LOC's impairment for the quarterly review. However, Powell failed to consider with due professional care whether they provided a basis to determine whether a material modification should be made to the interim financial statements to record an impairment for the LOC.51 For example, Powell did not adequately consider that:

 The letters did not reliably indicate whether the transactions described in the letters would occur, because the letters each stated they were "intended as a non-binding expression of intent" and "subject to the preparation, negotiation and full execution of the agreement"; and

49 UDF III management had initially calculated that its Q3 2015 ALL should be $23.9 million. During the review, Powell performed a calculation of the general reserve portion of UDF III's ALL with different reserve ratios for certain loans, which she based on her discussions with management. Powell's calculation resulted in a total ALL that was approximately $600,000 higher, and UDF III adjusted its total ALL accordingly.

50 See AU § 722.22.

51 See AU § 722.22.

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 The letters did not support that the LOC was properly valued, because they indicated that the UDF Entities would provide as yet unquantified fees and concessions to the new developers for them to take over the LOC and its related development projects.

Powell and Lawlis Failed to Appropriately Respond to New Evidence of a Dispute between the Austin Developer and the UDF Entities at Q3 2015

63. Based on documents they reviewed concerning the Commission's investigation, Powell and Lawlis both understood, among other things, that the Commission staff was examining whether UDF Entities, or persons associated with them, may have made false statements or material omissions about the credit quality of loan portfolios and the use of cash proceeds relating to certain loans.

64. As a result, Powell and Lawlis concluded that it was appropriate to send confirmation requests for all of the Austin Developer's loans as part of their respective Q3 2015 reviews for UDF III and UDF IV. In response to each request, the Austin Developer wrote that it could not confirm its loan balances or loan collateral because "the lender has failed to properly apply or adjust certain payments made on the loan or related loans. In addition, lender and its affiliates have, from time to time, transferred or collaterally assigned their rights with respect to the collateral under various loans to affiliates or third parties."

65. To follow up on the confirmation response, Lawlis emailed the Austin Developer, asking whether it could provide additional information. The response of the Austin Developer, however, provided no additional detail. Powell and Lawlis, in turn, relied on management inquiry to understand the nature of the potential dispute and once again rolled forward the prior year's audited balance by tying a selection of draws and payments to management-provided documents including third-party bank statements and draw requests signed by the borrowers. However, the alternative procedures failed to provide sufficient appropriate evidence about the potential dispute concerning the Austin Developer and whether that dispute affected the loans' valuation. As a result, Powell and Lawlis failed to adequately extend the review procedures to resolve the questions raised by the Austin Developer's confirmation response.52

52 See AU § 722.22.

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I. Babb Failed to Perform His Engagement Quality Reviews for the 2012-2014 UDF III Audits and Q3 2015 UDF III Review with Due Professional Care

66. The EQR partner is responsible for evaluating the significant judgments made by the engagement team and the related conclusions reached in forming the overall conclusion on the engagement and in preparing the engagement report, if a report is to be issued.53 In an audit, the EQR partner is responsible for evaluating the engagement team's responses to significant risks identified by the team and the EQR partner.54 In both audits and reviews, the EQR partner should evaluate whether the documentation that he or she reviewed supports the conclusions reached by the engagement team with respect to the matters reviewed.55 The EQR partner is also responsible for evaluating whether appropriate consultations took place on difficult or contentious matters during the audits and reviews.56 The EQR partner must perform his or her responsibilities with due professional care and skepticism.57

67. In each of the engagements discussed above, Babb reviewed the critical work papers relating to the UDF III engagement teams' response to the significant risks, including fraud risks, identified concerning notes receivable and ALL. However, Babb violated PCAOB rules and standards in those engagements by failing to properly evaluate, with due professional care, whether that documentation indicated that the engagement team responded appropriately to the significant risks and/or supported the conclusions reached by the engagement team.58

68. During the 2012 audit, Babb knew that the LOC was significant to the notes receivable balance and that UDF III management had classified the LOC as impaired without recording any specific reserve. Although Babb reviewed the documentation of the engagement team's testing of the LOC for impairment, there is no evidence he discussed it with the engagement team. Furthermore, he failed to evaluate with due professional care whether that testing adequately supported the conclusion that no specific reserves

53 See AS 7, Engagement Quality Review, ¶¶ 9, 14.

54 See AS 7 ¶ 10(b).

55 See AS 7 ¶¶ 11,16.

56 See AS 7 ¶¶ 10(h), 15(f).

57 See AS 7 ¶¶ 12, 17; AU §§ 230.07-.09.

58 See Rule 3100; AS 7 ¶¶ 10(b), 11, 16.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 22 were required for the LOC.59 For example, Babb did not consider whether the engagement team had tested the completeness and accuracy of the management- provided data used in that test. He also did not consider, among other things, that the engagement team had not discounted the future cash flows to present value for its impairment analysis.

69. During the 2013 and 2014 audits, Babb was aware that the engagement team changed its audit approach from 2012. Specifically, he knew that the engagement teams for those audits used management-provided cash flow projections to test the valuation of certain notes receivable and the adequacy of the ALL, including for the LOC. Babb reviewed the audit documentation describing the review of the cash flow analyses, but he failed to properly evaluate whether the engagement team's approach provided an appropriate response to the significant risks concerning the ALL.60 For example, Babb did not properly consider whether the engagement team had adequately tested whether the information contained within the cash flow projections was sufficient and appropriate for purposes of the audit. He also did not consider whether the engagement team had appropriately responded to the inclusion of "future projects" in the cash flow projections, in light of the fraud risk for ALL.

70. During the Q3 2015 review, Babb reviewed the engagement team's Summary Review Memorandum ("SRM") and he discussed with Powell the issues that had arisen concerning the LOC.61 Babb also reviewed each of the documents that were referenced in the SRM as pertaining to the analysis of the LOC's impairment. Those documents included the engagement team's analysis showing that the existing project cash flows would leave approximately $73 million of the LOC balance unpaid. They also included the non-binding letters of intent, which Babb understood Powell had relied on for her conclusions that the LOC did not need to be specifically reserved at Q3 2015 and that the prior audit reports did not need to be withdrawn. However, Babb failed to properly evaluate whether those letters of intent actually supported Powell's conclusion.62

59 See AS 7 ¶ 11.

60 See AS 7 ¶¶ 10(b),11.

61 The SRM served as the engagement team's engagement completion document for the Q3 2015 review, which Babb was required to review. See AS 3, Audit Documentation, ¶ 13; AS 7 ¶ 15(c).

62 See AS 7 ¶ 16.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 23

71. Babb also failed to properly evaluate whether appropriate consultations had taken place on the difficult and contentious issues that arose during the UDF III Q3 2015 review.63 Babb understood that WP's Partner-in-Charge of Technical Resolution ("Technical Partner") had been consulted during the review. However, Babb failed to determine whether the consultation, which was limited to reviewing the clarity of the documentation in two work papers, was appropriate in the circumstances.

72. As a result, Babb violated AS 7 by providing his concurring approval of issuance in each of those engagements without performing his EQR with due professional care.64

J. Whitley Penn Failed to Comply with PCAOB Quality Control Standards

73. PCAOB rules and standards require that registered firms establish and maintain an adequate system of quality control.65 "A firm's system of quality control encompasses the firm's organizational structure and the policies adopted and procedures established to provide the firm with reasonable assurance of complying with professional standards."66 "The nature, extent, and formality of a firm's quality control policies and procedures should be appropriately comprehensive and suitably designed in relation to the firm's size, the number of its offices, the degree of authority allowed its personnel and its offices, the knowledge and experience of its personnel, the nature and complexity of the firm's practice, and appropriate cost-benefit considerations."67

74. A firm's system of quality control should, among other things, include policies and procedures for engagement performance.68 A firm should establish policies and procedures to provide it with reasonable assurance that the work performed by engagement personnel meets applicable professional standards, regulatory

63 See AS 7 ¶ 15(f).

64 See AS 7 ¶¶ 12, 17; AU § 230.01.

65 See Rule 3400T, Interim Quality Control Standards; Quality Control Standard 20, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm's Accounting and Auditing Practice ("QC § 20").

66 QC § 20.04.

67 QC § 20.04.

68 See QC § 20.07.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 24 requirements, and the firm's standards of quality.69 It should also establish policies and procedures to provide it with reasonable assurance that personnel consult, on a timely basis, with individuals within or outside the firm, when appropriate (for example, when dealing with complex, unusual, or unfamiliar issues).70 A firm should also establish policies and procedures to provide the firm with reasonable assurance that its quality control policies and procedures are suitably designed and are being effectively applied.71

75. During the period of the violations described above, WP failed to design, implement and maintain appropriately comprehensive and suitably designed quality control policies and procedures in relation to the firm's size 72 and the complexity of its practice. In particular, WP did not have appropriately comprehensive policies and procedures concerning consultations with persons outside of the engagement team.73 Although WP designated one of its partners as the Technical Partner, it failed to implement specific policies or procedures concerning the Technical Partner's role. Among other things, there were no established procedures to provide reasonable assurance that the Technical Partner was qualified for the consultations he was asked to perform regarding the complex, unusual and unfamiliar issues that arose during the Q3 2015 UDF III review. 74

76. WP also failed to design, implement and maintain appropriately comprehensive policies and procedures to provide reasonable assurance that its personnel complied with professional standards and regulatory requirements.75 Many of the violations described above were repeated across multiple years and, in some cases, across multiple audit teams with different partners. Additionally, Powell's failure to

69 See QC § 20.17.

70 See QC § 20.19. Individuals consulted should have appropriate levels of knowledge, competence, judgment, and authority. See id.

71 See QC § 20.20; Quality Control Standard 30.02, Monitoring a CPA Firm's Accounting and Auditing Practice.

72 As indicated by the Board's inspection reports, WP grew from having 137 partners and professional staff in 2011 to 248 partners and professional staff by 2015.

73 See QC § 20.19.

74 See id.

75 See QC § 20.17.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 25 adequately consider whether to withdraw the 2013 and 2014 audit reports during the Q3 2015 review resulted, in part, from WP's failure to have sufficiently comprehensive policies and procedures relating to consideration of subsequently discovered information relating to previously issued audit reports. Multiple partners besides Powell and Babb, including partners in WP's leadership, were aware that WP had learned information during the Q3 2015 review that related to UDF III's 2013 and 2014 financial statements. However, WP's QC system failed to include policies or procedures to provide reasonable assurance that the information was actually evaluated with due professional care and in accordance with AU § 561.76

IV.

In view of the foregoing, and to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit reports, the Board determines it appropriate to impose the sanctions agreed to in Respondents' Offers. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

A. Pursuant to Section 105(c)(4)(B) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 5300(a)(2), Powell is barred from being an associated person of a registered public accounting firm, as that term is defined in Section 2(a)(9) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(p)(i).77

B. Pursuant to PCAOB Rule 5302(b), Powell may file a petition for Board consent to associate with a registered public accounting firm after two years from the date of this Order.

76 WP has represented to the Board that, since the events described in this Order, WP established and implemented the following changes to its quality control processes and procedures: (1) WP hired a full-time Director of Quality Control, (2) WP hired a full-time Learning and Development Coordinator, (3) WP assigned a Senior Manager to its quality control function on a half-time basis, and (4) WP amended its quality control policies and procedures relating to consultations and pre-issuance reviews.

77 As a consequence of the bar, the provisions of Section 105(c)(7)(B) of the Act will apply with respect to Susan Lunn Powell, CPA. Section 105(c)(7)(B) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person that is suspended or barred from being associated with a registered public accounting firm under this subsection willfully to become or remain associated with any issuer, broker, or dealer in an accountancy or a financial management capacity, and for any issuer, broker, or dealer that knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of such suspension or bar, to permit such an association, without the consent of the Board or the Commission."

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 26

C. Pursuant to Section 105(c)(4)(C) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 5300(a)(3), for one year following the termination of the bar ordered in paragraph B, Powell's role in any "audit," as that term is defined in Section 110(1) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(a)(v), shall be restricted as follows: Powell shall not (1) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, as an "engagement partner," as that term is used in the Board's AS 1201, Supervision of the Audit Engagement; (2) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, as an "engagement quality reviewer," as that term is used in the Board's AS 1220, Engagement Quality Review; (3) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, in any role that is equivalent to engagement partner or engagement quality reviewer, but differently denominated (such as "lead partner," "practitioner-in-charge," or "concurring partner"); (4) exercise authority, or supervise the work of another person exercising authority, either to sign a registered public accounting firm's name to an audit report, or to consent to the use of a previously issued audit report, for any issuer, broker, or dealer; or (5) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, as the "other auditor," or "another auditor," as those terms are used in the Board's AS 1205, Part of the Audit Performed by Other Independent Auditors;

D. Pursuant to Section 105(c)(4)(B) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 5300(a)(2), Lawlis is suspended, for one year from the date of this Order, from being an associated person of a registered public accounting firm, as that term is defined in Section 2(a)(9) of the Act;78

E. Pursuant to Section 105(c)(4)(C) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 5300(a)(3), for one year following the suspension ordered in paragraph E, Lawlis's role in any "audit," as that term is defined in Section 110(1) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(a)(v), shall be restricted as follows: Lawlis shall not (1) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, as an "engagement partner," as that term is used in the Board's AS 1201, Supervision of the Audit Engagement; (2) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, as an "engagement quality reviewer," as that term is used in the Board's AS 1220, Engagement Quality Review; (3) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, in any role that is equivalent to engagement partner or engagement quality reviewer, but differently denominated (such as "lead partner," "practitioner-in-charge," or "concurring partner"); (4) exercise authority, or supervise the work of another person exercising

78 As a consequence of the suspension, the provisions of Section 105(c)(7)(B) of the Act, discussed supra, at n.77, will apply with respect to Jeffry Shannon Lawlis, CPA.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 27

authority, either to sign a registered public accounting firm's name to an audit report, or to consent to the use of a previously issued audit report, for any issuer, broker, or dealer; or (5) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, as the "other auditor," or "another auditor," as those terms are used in the Board's AS 1205, Part of the Audit Performed by Other Independent Auditors;

F. Pursuant to Section 105(c)(4)(C) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 5300(a)(3), for a period of two years from the date of this Order, Babb's role in any "audit," as that term is defined in Section 110(1) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 1001(a)(v), shall be restricted as follows: Babb shall not (1) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, as an "engagement partner," as that term is used in the Board's AS 1201, Supervision of the Audit Engagement; (2) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, as an "engagement quality reviewer," as that term is used in the Board's AS 1220, Engagement Quality Review; (3) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, in any role that is equivalent to engagement partner or engagement quality reviewer, but differently denominated (such as "lead partner," "practitioner-in-charge," or "concurring partner"); (4) exercise authority, or supervise the work of another person exercising authority, either to sign a registered public accounting firm's name to an audit report, or to consent to the use of a previously issued audit report, for any issuer, broker, or dealer; or (5) serve, or supervise the work of another person serving, as the "other auditor," or "another auditor," as those terms are used in the Board's AS 1205, Part of the Audit Performed by Other Independent Auditors;

G. Pursuant to Section 105(c)(4)(D) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 5300(a)(4), the Board imposes the following civil money penalties:

1. Whitley Penn LLP, $200,000;

2. Susan Lunn Powell, $25,000;

3. Jeffry Shannon Lawlis, $15,000; and,

4. John Griffin Babb, $10,000.

All funds collected by the Board as a result of the assessment of these civil money penalties will be used in accordance with Section 109(c)(2) of the Act. Respondents shall pay these civil money penalties within ten days of the issuance of this Order by (1) wire transfer in accordance with instructions furnished by Board staff; or (2) United States Postal Service money order, bank money order, certified check, or bank cashier's check (a) made payable to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 28

(b) delivered to the Controller, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 1666 K Street, N.W., Washington D.C. 20006, and (c) submitted under a cover letter, which identifies the entity or person as a respondent in these proceedings, sets forth the title and PCAOB release number of these proceedings, and states that payment is made pursuant to this Order, a copy of which cover letter and money order or check shall be sent to Office of the Secretary, Attention: Phoebe W. Brown, Secretary, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 1666 K Street, N.W., Washington D.C. 20006.

H. Pursuant to Section 105(c)(4)(F) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 5300(a)(6), Powell, Lawlis, and Babb, are required to complete continuing professional education ("CPE") in subjects that are related to the audits of issuer financial statements under PCAOB standards (such hours shall be in addition to, and shall not be counted in, the CPE they are required to obtain in connection with any professional license) as follows:

1. Powell shall complete forty additional hours of CPE before filing any petition for Board consent to associate with a registered public accounting firm, including CPE related to allowances for loan losses and the auditing of related party transactions under PCAOB standards;

2. Lawlis shall complete twenty additional hours of CPE within one year of this Order, including CPE related to allowances for loan losses and the auditing of related party transactions under PCAOB standards; and

3. Babb shall complete ten additional hours of CPE within one year from the date of this Order, including CPE related to allowances for loan losses and the performance of engagement quality reviews under PCAOB standards.

I. Pursuant to Sections 105(c)(4)(F) and (G) of the Act and PCAOB Rules 5300(a)(6) and (9), the Firm shall carry out the following Undertakings:

1. Within 30 days of the date of this Order, WP shall retain and pay the fees and reasonable expenses for an independent consultant acceptable to the PCAOB staff who has experience with, and is knowledgeable concerning, PCAOB auditing and quality control standards ("Independent Consultant") and promptly notify the PCAOB staff of the identity, qualifications, and proposed terms of retention of the Independent Consultant.

2. To ensure the independence of the Independent Consultant, WP: (i) shall not have the authority to terminate the Independent Consultant

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 29

or substitute another independent consultant for the initial Independent Consultant, without the prior written approval of the PCAOB staff; and (ii) shall compensate the Independent Consultant and persons engaged to assist the Independent Consultant for services rendered pursuant to this Order at their reasonable and customary rates.

3. WP shall cooperate fully with the Independent Consultant and shall provide reasonable access to its personnel, information, and records as the Independent Consultant may reasonably request for the Independent Consultant's evaluation and certification.

4. Within 90 days of this Order, WP will review, evaluate, and implement any necessary enhancements to, WP's quality control policies and procedures applicable to audits and reviews conducted pursuant to PCAOB standards as they relate to the following areas:

a. consideration of the subsequent discovery of facts existing at the date of the auditor's report;

b. consultations (including but not limited to determining and documenting the scope of consultations, and the evaluation of such consultations by an EQR partner); and

c. monitoring (including selection of audits for pre- issuance review, root cause analysis, post-issuance review, or other enhanced monitoring based on engagement risk).

5. Independent Consultant Certifications.

a. Within 90 days of the Independent Consultant being retained, WP will brief the Independent Consultant regarding: (i) WP's review, evaluation and implementation of enhancements to its system of quality control in the areas identified in Paragraph IV.I.4 above, and (ii) how those quality control policies and procedures, and any enhancements to them since the time of the conduct described in this Order, are reasonably designed to ensure that WP system of quality control is appropriately comprehensive and suitably designed in relation to the firm's size, the number of its offices, the degree of authority allowed its personnel and its offices, the knowledge and experience of its personnel, the nature and complexity of the firm's practice, and appropriate cost-benefit considerations.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 30

b. Within 120 days of the Independent Consultant being retained, WP shall require the Independent Consultant to evaluate WP's review, evaluation and implementation of enhancements its system of quality control in the areas identified in Paragraph IV.I.4, above. If, as a result of that evaluation, it appears to the Independent Consultant that any further enhancements to the system of quality control are necessary, it shall recommend such enhancements to WP.

c. Within 180 days of the Independent Consultant being retained, WP shall either, (1) implement any recommendations received from the Independent Consultant, pursuant to Paragraph IV.I.5.b, and have the Independent Consultant certify that WP complied with those recommendations, or (2) communicate to the Director of the Division of Enforcement and Investigations the recommendations of the Independent Consultant that it did not implement, and the reasons for doing so.

d. Pursuant to Section 105(c)(4)(C) of the Act, Whitley Penn shall within twelve months of the date of the Order cause the Independent Consultant to certify in writing to the Director of the Division of Enforcement and Investigations, PCAOB, 1666 K Street N.W., Washington DC 20006, the Firm's compliance with the above paragraphs. The certification shall identify the undertakings, provide written evidence of compliance in the form of a narrative, and be supported by exhibits sufficient to demonstrate compliance. The certification shall include a description of the specific enhancements implemented to WP's system of quality control in the areas identified in Paragraph IV.I.4, above, since the time of the conduct described in the Order. WP shall also submit such additional evidence of and information concerning compliance as the staff of the Division of Enforcement and Investigations may reasonably request.

e. For good cause shown, the PCAOB staff may extend any of the procedural dates relating to these undertakings. Deadlines for procedural dates shall be counted in calendar days, except that if the last day falls on a weekend or federal holiday, the next business day shall be considered to be the last day.

PCAOB Release No. 105-2020-002 March 24, 2020 ORDER Page 31

f. WP agrees that the Division of Enforcement and Investigations may petition the Board to reopen this matter to determine whether additional sanctions or findings are appropriate if it believes that WP has not satisfied these undertakings.

ISSUED BY THE BOARD.

/s/ Phoebe W. Brown ______Phoebe W. Brown Secretary

March 24, 2020

Case 4:20-cv-00311-SDJ Document 21 Filed 08/19/20 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 1071

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION

HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, TODD F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, UMT HOLDINGS, L.P., UDF HOLDINGS, L.P., UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING, L.P., UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, L.P., UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, L.P., UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING INCOME FUND, V, UNITED MORTGAGE TRUST, AND Case No. 4:20-cv-00311-SDJ UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING LAND OPPORTUNITY, FUND, L.P.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DAVID KLIMEK, JAMES NICHOLAS BUNCH, CHRISTINE L. EDSON, a/k/a CHRISTY EDSON, and DOES 1 – 10.

Defendants.

INTERESTED PARTY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO FILE REDACTED COMPLAINT1

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, interested party the United States of America (hereinafter

“United States”) respectfully submits this Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to File

Redacted Complaint (the “Motion”). Although the United States is not a party to this action, the

1 Plaintiffs served the Motion to File Redacted Complaint via email on August 4, 2020, at 5:29 p.m. CST. Therefore, pursuant to Local Rule 5(d), service is deemed to have taken place on August 5, 2020. Local Rule CV-5(d). Therefore, the United States’ and individual defendants’ responses to Plaintiffs’ Motion are due on or before August 19, 2020. Local Rule CV-5(d), 7(e).

1

Case 4:20-cv-00311-SDJ Document 21 Filed 08/19/20 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 1072

relief sought in the Motion implicates an ongoing federal criminal investigation, in which the

United States has an interest. The individual-capacity Defendants, AUSA Nick Bunch and FBI Special

Agents David Klimek and Christine Edson, through their undersigned counsel, join in the United States’

arguments.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is a Bivens action in name only. In reality, disappointed by their failure to

convince either the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Texas (“NDTX”)

or the Deputy Attorney General to halt a complex criminal investigation of their conduct and have

Assistant United States Attorney James Nicholas Bunch (hereinafter “AUSA Bunch”) removed

from that case, Plaintiffs are using this “Bivens action” to yet again interfere with legitimate law

enforcement activity. In furtherance of their efforts, Plaintiffs ask the Court to unseal a redacted

complaint and publicize their version of the history of a very active ongoing criminal investigation

in the NDTX including details of non-public aspects of the investigation.

Plaintiffs filed this case under seal in recognition of the potential threat to the NDTX’s

ongoing criminal investigation and of violating district court orders in NDTX. The threat exists

because the complaint is based, at least in part, on the NDTX’s sealed search warrant affidavit,

which the Plaintiffs obtained a limited right to review, but not copy. That search warrant affidavit

remains sealed to this day despite Plaintiffs’ efforts, including its unsuccessful filed motion to unseal, in NDTX. Although Plaintiffs have purported to redact references to the sealed search warrant affidavit in their proposed redacted complaint, those limited redactions they proposed fail to ensure that the remaining allegations are not tainted from information gleaned from the sealed affidavit. Additionally, the proposed redacted complaint contains references to and descriptions of non-public and sealed aspects of the NDTX’s criminal investigation, which Plaintiffs have not

2

Case 4:20-cv-00311-SDJ Document 21 Filed 08/19/20 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 1073

proposed to redact.2 In this case, the United States’ interest in preserving the integrity of this

ongoing pre-indictment investigation outweighs the public’s qualified right to review judicial

records. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ complaint should remain sealed until at least the NDTX’s

criminal investigation results in either (1) charges being filed, or (2) prosecution being declined.

II. ARGUMENT

The United States maintains a strong interest in the integrity of ongoing criminal

investigations. The Fifth Circuit recognizes the public shares a similar interest in law enforcement.

Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962). The common law right to inspect and copy judicial records that Plaintiffs rely on here clashes with the United States’ and public’s interest in effective investigations and law enforcement. And while the Fifth Circuit has recognized the public has a common law right to inspect and copy judicial records, it has recognized that the common law right of access is not absolute. Bradley on Behalf of AJW v. Ackal, 954 F.3d 216, 225

(5th Cir. 2020). The court has consistently held the public’s right to inspect and copy judicial records is a qualified right of access that must be balanced against countervailing factors supporting non-disclosure, such as the United States’ and the public’s interest in maintaining the integrity of law enforcement. See generally, Ackal, 954 F.3d at 225-33 (conducting a case-specific analysis balancing the public’s right of access against interests favoring non-disclosure). The balance of interests in here weighs in favor of keeping the complaint under seal for now.

In this case, Plaintiffs were correct to file the case under seal in the first instance. The

Complaint contained references to and discussions of NDTX’s sealed search warrant affidavit.

Although Plaintiffs’ proposed redacted complaint purportedly redacts these references, there is no

2 Although Plaintiffs’ counsel conferred with counsel for the individual-capacity Defendants and United States regarding potentially unsealing the complaint and search warrant affidavit, they did not confer regarding a potential redacted complaint and did not share any proposed redactions prior to filing their motion. 3

Case 4:20-cv-00311-SDJ Document 21 Filed 08/19/20 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 1074

indication that their access to a “transcription” of that affidavit does not color the remaining

unredacted allegations. Regardless, it is clear that the proposed redacted complaint still discusses

non-public aspects of NDTX’s ongoing, very active, pre-indictment investigation. See e.g.s.

Redacted Compl. ¶¶ 73- 75, 97, 100-01, 103. Publicizing this information could threaten NDTX’s

investigation, and therefore weighs against unsealing the proposed redacted complaint at this

time.3 Also, given these allegations discuss meetings between witnesses and investigators,

publicizing the nature and content of these meetings could have a chilling effect on these

witnesses’ willingness to cooperate with investigators for the duration of the investigation, on the

cooperation of new witnesses, and could potentially chill witness cooperation in future

investigations. See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Officials with

law enforcement responsibilities may be heavily reliant on the voluntary cooperation of persons

who may want or need confidentiality. If that confidentiality cannot be assured, cooperation will

not be forthcoming.”)

Ultimately, the NDTX investigation will result in the filing of charges or the determination

not to do so. At that time, the threat posed to NDTX’s criminal investigation through public

disclosure of the complaint’s allegations will be less signficant.4 For this reason, the United States

opposes Plaintiffs’ Motion at this time. Once the NDTX files charges or declines to do so, sealing

3 Plaintiff’s Motion to File Redacted Complaint is only 13 pages long. Yet, ten of those pages—not to mention the 35 pages and eighty-one (81) exhibits in the Declaration of Paul Pelletier—consist of a recitation of the allegations contained in the Plaintiffs’ Sealed Complaint. Plaintiffs’ decision to file the Motion unsealed and immediately publish the Motion and Pelletier Declaration, see http://www.udfonline.com/bivens-action (last visited Aug. 19, 2020), is yet another example of Plaintiffs’ attempt to impede the criminal investigation. The timing is questionable given that the Defendants’ responsive pleadings are not due until September 14, 2020, meaning there is no urgent need to publicize this matter, especially when Plaintiffs have not even survived a motion to dismiss.

4 In the event of an indictment, it is likely the Government and the individual-capacity Defendants will seek a limited stay of this civil suit except to resolve any motions to dismiss.

4

Case 4:20-cv-00311-SDJ Document 21 Filed 08/19/20 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 1075

the redacted complaint would no longer be necessary to protect the integrity of NDTX’s criminal

investigation. Given the United States is not requesting these documents remain sealed forever, the interest in protecting the integrity of the criminal investigation outweighs the qualified public

interest in inspecting judicial records. See In re Sealed Search Warrants Issued June 4 and 52008,

No. 08-M-208, 2008 WL 5667021, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 14, 2008) (“Where, as here, the

investigation will result in the filing of charges or the determination not to do so, the interest in the

integrity and security of that investigation outweighs the interest in immediate access to the

documents, particularly where future disclosure of the documents is likely.”). The fact the United

States does not seek to keep the seal in place indefinitely mitigates Plaintiff’s purported “need to

litigate this case publically.” Pls.’ Mot. 12, ECF No. 17. This is especially true at such an early

stage of the pleadings when the Plaintiffs’ claims have not even survived a motion to dismiss.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ attacks on NDTX’s investigation of their conduct are nothing new. However,

the Court should not allow Plaintiffs to use this purported Bivens action as a weapon to further

their crusade. To preserve the integrity of NDTX’s investigation, the Court should deny Plaintiffs’

Motion to unseal the proposed redacted complaint. Once NDTX’s investigation concludes,

resulting in charges or a declination, unsealing of the redacted complaint may be appropriate. But,

until that time, the Motion should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN J. COX United States Attorney

/s/ James Gillingham JAMES GILLINGHAM Assistant U.S. Attorney Eastern District of Texas 110 N. College Street; Suite 700

5

Case 4:20-cv-00311-SDJ Document 21 Filed 08/19/20 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 1076

Tyler, Texas 75702 E-mail: [email protected] (903) 590-1400 (903) 590-1436 Texas State Bar # 24065295

ATTORNEYS FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

/s/ Andrea Jae Friedman ANDREA JAE FRIEDMAN Trial Attorney Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice Ben Franklin Station, P.O. Box 7146 Washington, DC 20005 E-mail: [email protected] (202) 305-0336 California Bar # 291692

ATTORNEY FOR INDIVIDUAL- CAPACITY DEFENDANTS JAMES NICHOLAS BUNCH, CHRISTINE EDSON, AND DAVID KLIMEK

6

Case 4:20-cv-00311-SDJ Document 21 Filed 08/19/20 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 1077

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 19th day of August, 2020, a true copy of this motion with attachments was served on all counsel of record by way of the Court’s CM/ECF system.

/s/ James Gillingham JAMES GILLINGHAM

7

RESPONSE in Opposition re 17 MOTION to file redacted complaint filed by James Nicholas Bunch, Christine L. Edson, David

General Information

Court United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas; United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

Federal Nature of Suit Civil Rights - Other[440]

Docket Number 4:20-cv-00311

© 2020 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Services // PAGE 8

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 22 PageID 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ______v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) files this Complaint against Defendants United Development Funding III, LP (“UDF III”), United Development

Funding IV (“UDF IV”), Hollis M. Greenlaw (“Greenlaw”), Benjamin L. Wissink (“Wissink”),

Theodore F. Etter (“Etter”), Cara D. Obert (“Obert”), and David A. Hanson (“Hanson”)

(collectively, “Defendants”) and alleges as follows:

SUMMARY OF THE ACTION

1. The United Development Funding family of investment funds (“UDF”) deploys investor capital towards the financing of homebuilders and land developers through private and publicly-traded investment funds. From at least January 2011 through December 2015 (the

“Relevant Period”), UDF used money from a newer fund to pay distributions to investors in an

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older fund, without adequately disclosing the use of funds and the nature and status of loans

made to developers.

2. More specifically, UDF solicited investments in a series of investment funds

(UDF III, UDF IV) by stating its ability to generate 8% to 9.75% annualized returns and to pay

investors regular distributions from loans for property development. UDF III began offering

limited partnership interests in 2006 and raised approximately $350 million from private

investors. Building on its track record of paying regular distributions to UDF III investors, UDF

launched UDF IV in 2008 and raised over $610 million from investors through May 2013. UDF

IV listed on the NASDAQ in June 2014.

3. By 2009, UDF III had made substantial loans to developers and was making monthly distributions to investors in amounts that at times exceeded developer interest payments during the same period. In 2011, UDF IV began loaning money to developers of UDF IV projects who had also borrowed money from UDF III. Unbeknownst to investors, however,

UDF directed the developers to use the UDF IV money to pay down separate UDF III loans, instead of using the funds loaned from UDF IV to develop UDF IV projects. In most of these cases, the developers never actually received the borrowed funds at all, and UDF simply transferred the money from UDF IV to UDF III. UDF III then used the loan payments—which

were comprised of funds from UDF IV—to, in part, make distributions to UDF III investors.

Using these transactions, which were not adequately disclosed to investors, UDF was able to

cause UDF III to pay its investors at least $67 million of distributions using funds from UDF IV.

4. UDF IV also failed to adequately disclose the nature of multi-phase projects in its

loan portfolio. UDF IV told investors that none of its loans were invested in unimproved real

property. This gave the impression that all of the loans in UDF IV’s portfolio were funding real

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estate projects that were under construction. In truth, UDF IV had loaned money for acquisition of unimproved properties designated for multi-phase development. In some cases, the properties remained in the entitlement phase even after they had been in UDF IV’s portfolio for years.

5. In addition, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) required UDF

III to report if any of its significant outstanding loans became “impaired”—meaning UDF III believed it was unlikely to fully collect on the loan. UDF III knew or should have known before it filed its 2013 Form 10-K that it was unlikely to fully collect on an approximately $80 million loan to its second largest borrower. Although UDF III’s financial statements reflected general reserves, UDF III took no specific impairment on the loan and told investors that full collectability was probable.

6. This misconduct violated Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933

(the “Securities Act”) and Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, and 13a-14 thereunder. As a result, Defendants should be enjoined from violating the securities laws they violated as alleged herein, Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert should be required to disgorge all ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest, and Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter,

Obert, and Hanson should be ordered to pay appropriate civil penalties.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 20(b), 20(d), and

22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77t(d), and 77v(a)] and Sections 21(d), 21(e), and 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) [15

U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u(e), and 78aa]. Defendants directly or indirectly made use of means or

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instrumentalities of interstate commerce or the mails in connection with the transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business alleged herein.

8. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to Section 22(a) of the Securities Act [15

U.S.C. § 77v(a)] and Section 27(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a)]. Defendants reside or have their principal place of business in this district. In addition, certain of the transactions, acts, practices, and courses of business constituting alleged violations of the federal securities laws occurred within this district. Among other things, Defendants offered and sold the securities at issue in this district.

DEFENDANTS

9. Defendant United Development Funding III, LP (“UDF III”) is a Delaware limited partnership headquartered in Grapevine, Texas. UDF III limited partnership units are registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act and are not listed on any exchange. UDF III files periodic reports with the Commission pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and related rules thereunder. UDF III has not filed a Form 10-Q or 10-K for periods ended after September 30, 2015.

10. Defendant United Development Funding IV (“UDF IV”) is a Maryland real estate investment trust headquartered in Grapevine, Texas. UDF IV’s common shares are registered with the Commission pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act. UDF IV’s common shares traded on the NASDAQ Global Select Market under the symbol “UDF” beginning on June 4,

2014. NASDAQ halted trading in UDF IV on February 18, 2016, suspended trading on October

19, 2016 for failing to timely file audited financial statements, and filed a Form 25 with the

Commission to delist UDF IV on May 18, 2017. As of the date of the Complaint, UDF IV’s common shares were quoted on OTC Markets Inc. under the symbol “UDFI.” UDF IV files

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periodic reports with the Commission pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and related rules thereunder. UDF IV has not filed a Form 10-Q or 10-K for periods ended after September

30, 2015.

11. Defendant Hollis M. Greenlaw (“Greenlaw”) is a resident of Colleyville, Texas.

Greenlaw is the Chief Executive Officer of UMTH Land Development, L.P. (“UMTH LD”), which is the general partner of UDF III and asset manager of UDF IV. Greenlaw also serves as the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Trustees for UDF IV, and serves as one of three voting Investment Committee members for UMTH LD. Greenlaw is a licensed attorney and member of the Maine (inactive), District of Columbia, and Texas bars.

12. Benjamin L. Wissink (“Wissink”) is a resident of Dallas, Texas. Wissink is the

President of UMTH LD. He also serves as one of three voting Investment Committee members for UMTH LD.

13. Theodore F. Etter (“Etter”) is a resident of Dallas, Texas. Etter is the Executive

Vice President of UMTH LD. He also serves as one of three voting Investment Committee members for UMTH LD.

14. Cara D. Obert (“Obert”) is a resident of Dallas, Texas. Obert is the Chief

Financial Officer of UMTH LD, UDF IV, and UDF V. From May 2008 through April 10, 2017, she served as UDF III’s principal financial officer and principal accounting officer. Obert is a licensed CPA in the state of Texas.

15. David A. Hanson (“Hanson”) is a resident of Coppell, Texas. Hanson is the Chief

Accounting Officer for UDF IV. From May 2008 until February 2014, Hanson also served as

UDF IV’s Chief Operating Officer. Hanson is a licensed CPA in the state of Texas.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. The UDF Funds

16. Greenlaw and Etter founded UDF in 2003 with the aim of starting one or more investment funds to loan money to developers of residential real estate, with rates above those offered by commercial lenders. Over time, UDF established a family of investment funds (i.e.,

UDF I, II, III, and IV) that each raised money from investors. UDF III and UDF IV each said that the fund would strive to make a 8% to 9.75% annualized return for investors based on the ability of the fund’s borrowers to successfully develop real estate and repay their loans.

17. During 2003 and 2004, UDF sold limited partnership interests in its first two funds, United Development Funding LP (“UDF I”) and United Development Funding II LP

(“UDF II”). UDF I and UDF II were private investment funds offered through a select number of broker-dealers and required a minimum investment of $25,000. The funds raised a total of approximately $33 million, and were formed to make equity investments and lend money to real estate developers, including first lien and subordinate loans secured by residential real estate designated for single-family lot development.

18. In August 2005, UDF filed a Form S-11 with the Commission to offer investments in a third fund, UDF III. UDF III was formed to originate and invest in loans for the acquisition of real property to be developed as single-family residential lots that would be sold to home builders. UDF III is a publicly-reporting, non-traded fund. The minimum investment for

UDF III, however, was only $3,000, and the fund was offered by a much broader network of broker-dealers than the prior funds. UDF III concluded its primary offering in April 2009, raising approximately $350 million, which was 10 times the amount raised in its two prior funds combined.

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19. UDF explained UDF III as being appropriate for investors seeking “current interest income.” In an era of low investment yields, UDF III was an attractive investment because it offered to pay distributions (a/k/a investment returns) at an 8% to 9.75% annualized rate.

20. UDF III explained that it expected to earn investment returns by originating and purchasing loans as well as charging fees for providing credit enhancements to developers (e.g., loan guarantees to third-party lenders). It would make short to medium-term loans to real estate developers at interest rates of 15% and above, which was higher than traditional bank financing.

The developers would pledge existing real estate projects as collateral, and agree to pledge future projects as additional collateral, when needed. UDF III generally structured its loans as notes with interest payments and reductions to principal or “balloon payments” tied to cash received by the developer from the sale of a lot or parcel of land, municipal reimbursements, and refinancings. From inception of the note until a revenue or sale event, interest on the notes would accrue and then be rolled into the principal owed by the developer on a monthly or annual basis with the accrued interest amount being recognized by UDF III as income.

21. However, if and when developers made principal repayments, UDF III disclosed that its intent was to redeploy those funds “to create or invest in new loans during the term of the partnership” and that “[a]ny capital not reinvested will be used first to return to [investors’] capital contributions and then to pay distributions to [investors].” Instead, if UDF III wanted to make an investor distribution, it could borrow funds, use net proceeds from the offering, or use

“cash available for distribution,” which UDF III defined to include funds received from operations but not principal repayments. In sum, this meant that: (1) UDF III planned to loan investor funds to real estate developers; (2) when those developers repaid principal on their

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loans, UDF III would reinvest those funds by creating or investing in new loans; and (3) UDF III was not obligated to make investor distributions, but if it did, that money would come from cash flow from operations, borrowings, or net proceeds of offerings, but not principal repayments.

22. The problem for investors under this scenario, given the nature of the limited partnership structure, is that they might find themselves responsible to pay taxes on “phantom income”—a situation where the partnership reports accrued interest as income to the IRS during a tax year, but no cash is received by the limited partners, because no distributions are paid out.

As a result, UDF III disclosed in its prospectus that from time to time it “may borrow funds or use net proceeds from this offering… if we do not have cash available for distribution sufficient to cover taxes on any ‘phantom income’ to our limited partners.” UDF III also disclosed that

“we may fund our distributions from borrowings and the amount of distributions paid at any time may not reflect current cash flow from our investments.” But nowhere did UDF III state that it could use funds from an affiliated fund (e.g., UDF I, UDF IV) to pay distributions to UDF III investors.

23. In August 2008, UDF filed a Form S-11 with the Commission to offer investments in a new fund, UDF IV, with a plan to raise up to $500 million. UDF IV’s initial registration statement, which went effective in 2009, offered common stock at $20 per share without listing on a public exchange. UDF IV concluded its primary offering in May 2013 after raising at least $610 million. In June 2014, UDF IV listed its stock on the NASDAQ under the symbol ”UDF,” becoming UDF’s first publicly-traded fund.

24. Once funded, UDF IV issued loans at rates of 13% and above, which was again higher than rates offered by commercial lending banks. UDF IV built on the story of UDF III, and the prospectus described UDF IV being involved with investments similar to UDF III. For

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example, UDF IV claimed that it would employ an “actively managed portfolio approach” to

“make, originate or acquire interest in secured loans . . . for the acquisition of land and development of single-family lots” and related construction. The UDF IV prospectus section exclusively discussing UDF III also stated, “UDF III has investment objectives similar to ours and concentrates on making development loans to single-family lot developers. . . . UDF III reinvests the proceeds from loan repayments . . . [and] [p]roceeds from the repayment of loans are reinvested in new loans.”

B. UDF III Pays Distributions Using Undisclosed Transfers

25. UDF III’s and IV’s offering model was predicated on an expectation that it would make regular distributions to investors. UDF III began making distributions to investors in

September 2006, before the offering had even closed. By 2009, the offering was complete and substantially all of its capital was deployed, because UDF III had made numerous loans to developers. At times, UDF III’s monthly distributions to investors exceeded the payments UDF

III received from its developer borrowers during the same period. As a result, UDF III borrowed

$15 million from a third-party lender so it could continue to fund investor distributions, which it previously disclosed to investors that it might do. UDF III also sold interests (a/k/a participations) in its loans to other UDF funds to raise cash, and disclosed these related-party transactions to its investors in its periodic reports.

26. By 2011, UDF III, at times, did not have sufficient monthly cash flow to cover its distributions. UDF III investors had come to expect regular monthly income from distributions and did not want to have to pay taxes on phantom income. Also, UDF had begun offering interests in its newest fund, UDF IV. Because UDF emphasized UDF III’s regular distributions in its prior performance disclosures to prospective investors in UDF IV, any suspension or

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stoppage in distributions could harm its ability to raise investor funds. UDF IV was raising money in its offering that it needed to put to work; not only to generate interest income to fund distributions to its investors, but also to generate origination and asset management fees for UDF operations—a portion of which were ultimately distributed to principals of the fund’s advisor— and were tied to when money was loaned out on projects.

27. At times, UDF funded UDF III distributions in part by having UDF IV make secured real estate loans to UDF IV developers who used the proceeds to pay down their previous loans from UDF III. Those developers did not use the new UDF IV money to advance the underlying UDF IV development projects, but instead—at UDF’s direction—used it to pay down interest and principal on the developers’ outstanding loans from UDF III. UDF III then used the funds it received from the borrowers to make distributions to UDF III investors.

28. The developers involved did not object because their total outstanding indebtedness to “UDF” remained the same, and in many instances their cost of borrowing went down, because UDF IV loaned funds at a lower rate than UDF III. In fact, many times the borrower never touched the money from UDF IV.

29. Furthermore, UDF’s reporting of these transfers created the appearance that UDF

III was receiving enough money from operations on a monthly basis to support its ongoing distributions, and that UDF IV had sufficient borrower demand for its money to justify continuing to raise more. Money advanced by UDF IV was reflected in UDF IV’s disclosures as an increase in a specific loan’s carrying balance, but at times was not used to advance the construction of the project. And the pay down of UDF III loans with UDF IV money reduced the carrying amount of UDF III’s loan portfolio. UDF III’s disclosures reflected the repayment of loans, recognized income, and the timely payment of distributions; while UDF IV’s

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disclosures showed developers borrowing increasing amounts related to specific real estate

projects.

30. The amounts involved were substantial. From at least January 2011 through

December 31, 2015, UDF III received at least $225 million in cash inflows from various sources,

including approximately $80 million from UDF IV. During this time period, UDF III paid its

investors at least $133 million in monthly distribution payments, of which at least $67 million

came from UDF IV.

31. Each of the UDF IV-to-UDF III transfers exhibited similar characteristics. Each month UDF received an email from an outside vendor detailing how much money was needed to make distributions to investors. UDF, which monitored daily cash flows and bank balances among all UDF entities, then determined the UDF III cash requirements to fund the investor distributions. When UDF III had insufficient cash on hand, UDF sent an internal email directing a transfer of funds available from UDF IV to UDF III. Once the transfer from UDF IV to UDF

III was complete, instructions were sent to the accounting department directing a distribution to

UDF III investors. Further, although UDF eventually obtained approval from the borrower for these transactions, and the transfer from UDF IV was permitted pursuant to certain transaction agreements, it was the lender (i.e., UDF) and not the borrower that initiated the transactions. As discussed above, in many instances, the borrower never even touched the money from UDF IV.

32. UDF did not disclose the true nature of the transactions giving rise to the distributions to its investors, either internally or externally. To the contrary, UDF III investors were led to believe that their distributions were being paid from the operations of their fund, while UDF IV investors were led to believe that their investments were being deployed towards active real estate projects. Relying in part on these UDF IV-to-UDF III transfers, UDF III made

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a monthly distribution payment to UDF III investors each month until February 2016.

Thereafter, all distributions stopped.

33. UDF III’s and UDF IV’s annual reports on Forms 10-K, for at least the periods ended December 31, 2011 through December 31, 2014, and quarterly filings on Forms 10-Q for

the periods ended December 31, 2011 through December 31, 2015, failed to adequately disclose

the source of funds for UDF III’s distributions to investors, and UDF III and UDF IV failed to

adequately disclose the use of UDF IV funds to pay down UDF III loans and to make

distributions to UDF III investors.

34. UDF IV investors would have considered this information important when

making an investment decision that a portion of their invested funds were being used, not for the

development of residential lots, but instead to pay down UDF III loans and to make distributions

to UDF III investors. Likewise, UDF III investors would have considered it important when

making an investment decision that the true source of a portion of their received distributions

were not actually coming from funds from operations as disclosed in UDF III’s filings with the

Commission, but instead were the result of transfers from UDF IV. Further, in early 2016, UDF

III and UDF IV ceased making dividend payments, causing investors’ income to dry up and

jeopardizing their investment returns. UDF IV shares plummeted from approximately $17 per

share on the NASDAQ in late 2015 to consistently less than $3.50 per share on the OTC market.

C. UDF III Fails to Impair Loans in Violation of GAAP

35. UDF III was required to file financial statements with the Commission that

complied with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”). Among other things, this

meant that UDF III had to disclose certain information about the loans it had made to developers

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and inform investors if any significant outstanding loans became “impaired”—i.e., UDF III believed it was unlikely to be able to collect on the loan.

37. In its 2012 Form 10-K, filed on March 31, 2013, UDF III identified several loans totaling $111,749,000 that had matured but had not been repaid or extended as of December 31,

2012 and impaired eight of those loans. The largest of these loans, which was not impaired as the note was amended during March 2013, was a 2008 loan to an Austin-based developer (the

“Austin Borrower”) that reflected an outstanding principal balance of $76,999,000. The 2013

10-K, filed on March 31, 2014 disclosed that the loan to the Austin Borrower was extended in

March 2013 to a new maturity date of March 31, 2014, and increased to a new commitment amount of approximately $85 million. The disclosures further stated that full collectability for this loan was considered probable. But, UDF knew or should have known that full collectability from the Austin Borrower was not probable and, at best, highly uncertain.

38. In early March 2014, UDF’s outside auditors met with UDF in connection with the 2013 audit to discuss any impairment issues related to UDF’s loans. The outside auditors requested cash flow (i.e., collectability) projections for selected loans, including the loan to the

Austin Borrower. UDF had previously requested the Austin Borrower to prepare a cash flow projection (the “Borrower Projection”) for its loan, which the Austin Borrower sent to UDF on

March 18, 2014. The Borrower Projection showed an ever-increasing loan balance and that

Austin Borrower would be unable to repay the loan with cash from current projects. UDF did not provide the Borrower Projection to its outside auditors. UDF created its own cash flow projection (the “UDF Projection”) that used different assumptions and included the addition of eleven new projects that were projected to provide the Austin Borrower additional cash flow to pay off the loan. But the Austin Borrower had not vetted or agreed to undertake these eleven

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new projects. The UDF Projection showed the Austin Borrower paying off the loan in full. The

UDF Projection also used undiscounted cash flows. GAAP requires a company like UDF to

measure impairment based on the present value of expected future cash flows discounted at the

loan’s effective interest rate. On March 25, 2014, UDF advised its auditors that it had completed

its cash flow analysis and sent them the UDF Projection without providing the Borrower

Projection or the nature of the assumptions UDF used.

39. UDF III violated GAAP because it recognized no specific impairment on its loan

to the Austin Borrower in UDF III’s 2013 Form 10-K filed on March 31, 2014, and in all

subsequent periodic reports. Had UDF III properly complied with applicable GAAP, it would

have recognized a specific loan loss allowance in addition to its general reserve balance and put

the loan on non-accrual status with suspended income recognition at least as early as UDF III’s

2013 Form 10-K. Impairment of the loan to the Austin Borrower was material to investors

because it affected the status of the loan for UDF III’s second-largest borrower.

40. Thereafter, UDF and the Austin Borrower engaged in protracted negotiations to

unwind the failing relationship. Ultimately, UDF was unable to consummate the transfer of the

Austin Borrower’s loan portfolio to another developer. On January 6, 2017, UDF III filed a

Form 8-K announcing certain agreements involving the Austin Borrower, including UDF III’s

forgiveness of more than $122 million of indebtedness.

D. UDF IV Does Not Adequately Disclose Status of Real Property

41. UDF IV disclosed to investors in its risk disclosures that “0%” of its loans were

invested in “unimproved real property” for the periods ended December 31, 2012 through

December 31, 2014. For example, UDF IV’s 2014 Form 10-K states:

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We may invest in loans to purchase unimproved real property. As of December 31, 2014, we have invested 0% of our assets in such loans. Unimproved real property is generally defined as real property which has the following three characteristics: (a) an equity interest in real property which was not acquired for the purpose of producing rental or other income; (b) has no development or construction in process on such land; and (c) no development or construction on such land is planned in good faith to commence within one year.

42. These disclosures were important, because it led investors to believe that all the loans in UDF IV’s portfolio, particularly those with large, multi-million dollar balances, were

funding real estate projects that were actually under construction. The disclosures, however, did

not adequately differentiate between loans under development versus actual construction.

Several significant UDF IV properties were in entitlement and planning, but not being

constructed. In some cases, there was no development at all on the properties, even after they

had been in UDF IV’s portfolio for years.

43. Nevertheless, UDF IV underwrote several loans that were disclosed in its 2014

Form 10-K that were for unimproved real property, including one where a UDF asset manager

specifically requested property that would not need development for a period of years.

45. In November 2015, UDF’s outside auditor declined to stand for reappointment

and, since then, no UDF fund has released audited financial statements or periodic reports.

Further, UDF III has now forgiven more than $100 million in debt on real estate in some of the

fastest appreciating markets in the United States, but the exact write-offs by UDF III and UDF

IV are unknown because no audited financials have been released.

E. The Roles of Greenlaw, Etter, Wissink, and Obert

46. Throughout the Relevant Period, Greenlaw, Etter, and Wissink were the only

three voting members of UDF’s Investment Committee, which made all of the investment, loan

underwriting and impairment decisions for UDF III and IV. Obert was a regular attendee of and

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participant in the Investment Committee meetings and knew the nature and status of these decisions. Greenlaw, Etter, Wissink, and Obert each knew, or should have known, about the transactions between UDF IV and UDF III giving rise to the distributions at issue, the payment of the distributions to UDF III investors using UDF IV funds, the collectability of UDF III’s loan to the Austin Borrower, and UDF IV’s loans to purchase unimproved real property.

47. Greenlaw and Obert signed every UDF III and UDF IV Forms 10-K and 10-Q filed with the Commission during the Relevant Period, and Etter signed every UDF III Form 10-

K filed with the Commission during the Relevant Period. Greenlaw and Obert also, as required under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, certified each of UDF III’s and UDF IV’s periodic filings during the Relevant Period. In addition, Greenlaw and Obert signed several UDF IV registration statements and amendments thereto filed with the Commission during the Relevant

Period and through which UDF IV offered and sold securities. Greenlaw, Obert, and Wissink signed management representation letters to UDF’s outside auditor during the Relevant Period.

48. As a result, Greenlaw, Obert, Wissink, and Etter knew, or should have known, that the disclosures and statements discussed above were false and misleading. UDF IV’s capital raising activities also provided a portion of the fees paid to the funds’ advisor. Greenlaw, Etter,

Obert, and Wissink collectively received millions of dollars in compensation from the advisor during the Relevant Period in the form of distributions, guaranteed payments, salary, dividends, and miscellaneous income.

F. The Role of Hanson

49. During the Relevant Period, Hanson did not hold a position at UDF III and did not serve on the UDF Investment Committee or participate in its investment, loan underwriting, and impairment decisions. Hanson was, however, the Chief Accounting Officer of UDF IV, and in

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that capacity signed every UDF IV Form 10-K, several UDF IV registration statements and amendments thereto through which UDF IV offered and sold securities, and numerous management representation letters to UDF IV’s outside auditor. Hanson placed undue reliance

on other UDF personnel and did not take sufficient actions to ensure the accuracy of or a

sufficient basis for many of the representations contained therein, including representations

related to loan losses, cash flows, disclosures, and internal controls.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violations of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act (against UDF III, UDF IV, Greenlaw, Etter, and Obert)

50. The Commission realleges and incorporates by reference each and every

allegation contained in the paragraphs above.

51. By engaging in the conduct described herein, UDF III, UDF IV, Greenlaw, Etter,

and Obert, directly or indirectly, singly or in concert with others, in the offer or sale of securities,

by use of the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or by use of the mails

obtained money or property by means of untrue statements of a material fact and omitted to state

a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances

under which they were made, not misleading.

52. By reason of the foregoing, UDF III, UDF IV, Greenlaw, Etter, and Obert have

violated and, unless enjoined, will continue to violate Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act [15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)].

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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Aiding and Abetting Violations of Sections 17(a)(2) (against Wissink and Hanson)

53. The Commission realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above.

54. By engaging in the conduct described herein, Wissink and Hanson knowingly or recklessly gave substantial assistance to UDF III, UDF IV, Greenlaw, Etter, and Obert in their violations of Sections 17(a)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)].

55. By reason of the foregoing, Wissink and Hanson aided and abetted UDF III’s,

UDF IV’s, Greenlaw’s, Etter’s, and Obert’s violations of Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act

[15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)], and unless enjoined, will continue to aid and abet violations thereof.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violations of Section 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act (against UDF III, UDF IV, Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, Obert, and Hanson)

56. The Commission realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above.

57. By engaging in the conduct described herein, UDF III, UDF IV, Greenlaw,

Wissink, Etter, Obert, and Hanson, directly or indirectly, singly or in concert with others, in the offer or sale of securities, by use of the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or by use of the mails have engaged in transactions, practices, and courses of business which operate or would operate as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers.

58. By reason of the foregoing, UDF III, UDF IV, Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, Obert, and Hanson have violated and, unless enjoined, will continue to violate Section 17(a)(3) of the

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3)].

SEC v. United Development Funding III, LP, et al. COMPLAINT Page 18

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 19 of 22 PageID 19

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 (against UDF III and UDF IV)

59. The Commission realleges and incorporates by reference each and every

allegation contained in the paragraphs above.

60. By engaging in the conduct described herein, UDF III and UDF IV, whose

securities are registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78]), failed to

file annual and quarterly reports (on Forms 10-K, 10-KSB, 10-Q, and 10-QSB) with the

Commission that were true and correct, and failed to include material information in its required

statements and reports as was necessary to make the statements made, in light of the

circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

61. By reason of the foregoing, UDF III and UDF IV violated, and unless enjoined,

will continue to violate, Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] and Exchange

Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13].

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act (against UDF III and UDF IV)

62. The Commission realleges and incorporates by reference each and every

allegation contained in the paragraphs above.

63. By engaging in the conduct described herein, UDF III and UDF IV, whose securities are registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78l]: (a) failed to make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly

reflected the transactions and dispositions of its assets; and (b) failed to devise and maintain a

system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that: (i) transactions were SEC v. United Development Funding III, LP, et al. COMPLAINT Page 19

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 20 of 22 PageID 20

recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with GAAP or

any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (ii) to maintain accountability of assets.

64. By reason of the foregoing, UDF III and UDF IV violated, and unless enjoined, will continue to violate, Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§

78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(2)(B)].

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Aiding and Abetting Violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 (against Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, Obert, and Hanson)

65. The Commission realleges and incorporates by reference each and every

allegation contained in the paragraphs above.

66. By engaging in the conduct described herein, Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, Obert,

and Hanson knowingly or recklessly gave substantial assistance to UDF III and UDF IV in their

violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§

78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(2)(B)] and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13

[17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13].

67. By reason of the foregoing, Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, Obert, and Hanson aided

and abetted UDF III’s and UDF IV’s violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of

the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(2)(B)] and Exchange Act

Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13], and

unless enjoined, will continue to aid and abet violations thereof.

SEC v. United Development Funding III, LP, et al. COMPLAINT Page 20

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 21 of 22 PageID 21

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

Violations of Exchange Act Rule 13a-14 (against Greenlaw and Obert)

68. The Commission realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above.

69. Rule 13a-14 of the Exchange Act [17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14] requires quarterly and annual reports on Forms 10-Q and 10-K to include certifications of the issuer's principal executive and principal financial officers in the form set forth under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-

Oxley Act [15 U.S.C. § 721].

70. Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [15 U.S.C. § 721], Greenlaw and Obert certified that, based upon their knowledge, UDF III’s and UDF IV’s quarterly and annual reports did not contain any material misstatements or omissions, disclosed all significant deficiencies in internal controls, and fairly presented in all material respects the issuer’s financial condition and results of operations. Greenlaw and Obert knew, or should have known, these certifications were false.

71. By reason of the foregoing, Greenlaw and Obert violated Exchange Act Rule 13a-

14 [17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14].

SEC v. United Development Funding III, LP, et al. COMPLAINT Page 21

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 22 of 22 PageID 22

RELIEF REQUESTED

The Commission respectfully requests that the Court enter a final judgment:

a. permanently enjoining all Defendants from, directly or indirectly, violating Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) and (3)] and Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(2)(B)] and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13];

b. permanently enjoining Defendants Greenlaw and Obert from, directly or indirectly, violating Exchange Act Rule 13a-14 [17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14];

c. ordering Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert to disgorge all ill- gotten gains, with prejudgment interest;

d. ordering Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, Obert, and Hanson to pay civil penalties under Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Sections 21(d)(3) and 21A of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3) and 78uA]; and

e. granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and appropriate.

Dated: July 3, 2018 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Keefe M. Bernstein Keefe M. Bernstein Lead Attorney Texas Bar No. 24006839 B. David Fraser Texas Bar No. 24012654 Securities and Exchange Commission 801 Cherry Street, Suite 1900 Fort Worth, TX 76102 (817) 900-2607 (phone) (817) 978-4927 (facsimile) [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SEC v. United Development Funding III, LP, et al. COMPLAINT Page 22

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 4 PageID 28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ______v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT DAVID A. HANSON

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) files this Unopposed Motion for

Entry of Final Judgment against Defendant David A. Hanson (“Defendant”), and respectfully shows the Court as follows:

1. On July 3, 2018, the SEC filed its Complaint alleging that Defendant violated the federal securities laws.

2. The SEC has reached a settlement with Defendant. Pursuant to the settlement,

Defendant executed the Consent attached hereto as Exhibit A and, without admitting or denying the allegations in the Complaint, agreed to entry of the proposed Final Judgment submitted herewith (the “Final Judgment”).

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 4 PageID 29

3. Pursuant to the Consent, Defendant also waived service of summons and the

Complaint and agreed that the SEC may present the proposed Final Judgment to the Court for signature and entry without further notice.

4. The SEC’s counsel conferred with counsel for Defendant, who indicated

Defendant does not oppose the relief sought herein.

5. The SEC respectfully moves the Court to enter the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: July 3, 2018 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Keefe M. Bernstein Keefe M. Bernstein Lead Attorney Texas Bar No. 24006839 B. David Fraser Texas Bar No. 24012654 Securities and Exchange Commission 801 Cherry Street, Suite 1900 Fort Worth, TX 76102 (817) 900-2607 (phone) (817) 978-4927 (facsimile) [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 4 PageID 30

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I affirm that on July 3, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to all CM/ECF participants. I further certify that on the same date, I caused the foregoing to be served by U.S. Mail and email to the following:

Barrett R. Howell Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP 1717 Main Street, Suite 3750 Dallas, TX 75201-7301 214-765-3681

Attorney for Defendants United Development Funding III, LP and United Development Funding IV

Michael P. Gibson Burleson, Pate & Gibson, LLP 900 Jackson Street, Suite 330 Dallas, Texas 75202 214-871-4900

Attorney for Defendant Hollis M. Greenlaw

Mike Uhl Law Offices of Michael J. Uhl, P.C. 500 North Akard, Suite 2150 Dallas, Texas 75201 214-237-0809

Attorney for Defendant Theodore F. Etter.

Jay Dewald Jackson Walker LLP 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 600 Dallas, TX 75201 214-953-6130 and

Matthew G. Nielson Stanton LLP 1717 Main Street, Suite 3800 Dallas, Texas 75201 214-996-0209

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Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 4 PageID 31

Attorneys for Defendant Benjamin L. Wissink

Weston C. Loegering Evan P. Singer Joan E. McKown Jones Day 2727 North Harwood Street Dallas, Texas 75201 214-969-5264

Attorneys for Defendant Cara D. Obert

Arnold A. Spencer Spencer & Associates 201 Main Street, Suite 1375 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 214-385-8500

Attorney for Defendant David A. Hanson

/s/ Keefe M. Bernstein Keefe M. Bernstein

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Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 7 PageID 32

Exhibit A

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 7 PageID 33

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ----- v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF DAVID A. HANSON

1. Defendant David A. Hanson ("Defendant") waives service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admits the Court's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)j and aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 7 PageID 34

"Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and

Rules 12b-20, 13a-l, and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20,

240.13a-l, and 240.13a~13]; and

(b) orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $75,000.00 under

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

2l(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. Defendant acknowledges that the civil penalty paid pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that he shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor

Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that he is entitled to, nor shall he further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendant agrees that he shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the

Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United

States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this action. For purposes of this paragraph, a "Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

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Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 7 PageID 35

4. Defendant agrees that he shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. Defendant further agrees that he shall not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or othe1wise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defendant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to ajury trial and to appeal from the entry of the Final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

9. Defendant will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground, if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby waives any objection based thereon.

10. Defendant waives service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 7 PageID 36

Judgment by the Comt and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendant of its terms and conditions. Defendant further agrees to provide counsel for the Commission, within thhty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F.R. 202.S(f), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding, including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this action, Defendant understands that he shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations of the complaint in this action.

12. Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F .R.

§ 202.S(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission's policy "not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 7 PageID 37

allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings," and "a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e ),

Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and (iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by

Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(l9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l9). If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a pmty.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to

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Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 7 PageID 38

seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney's fees or other fees, expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevailing party in this action since the parties have reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Comt for signature and entry without fu11her notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Coui1 shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

Dated: -:::Sune \S 1 'dol

On 3J..AY'\'('.l \ S , 2018, ~~\.)\c\ 'A- \·\.rnm, a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledg[ uting the foregoing Consent.

,... ._:;;~ DONHAR.LAWSON )Q&.Ct Nl'- '11 PUBLIC-STATE OF TEXAS 'tr ... i ~··'..lb,\ ~NOTARY r: LJ...lJvO'-V'- \'\~~.. ~~j COMM. EXP. 10-oJ-2019 Notary Public -.,::,::"'f..••' NOTARY 10 11211sso Commission expires:

Appro~/ as to formo .k­

Arn61d A. Spencer Spencer and Associates 201 Main Street, Suite 1375 F 011 Worth, Texas 7 6102

Attorney for Defendant

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 7 PageID 39

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ______v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT DAVID A. HANSON

The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) having filed a Complaint and Defendant David A. Hanson (“Defendant”) having entered a general appearance; consented to the Court’s jurisdiction over Defendant and the subject matter of this action; consented to entry of this Final Judgment without admitting or denying the allegations of the Complaint

(except as to jurisdiction and except as otherwise provided herein in paragraph VII); waived findings of fact and conclusions of law; and waived any right to appeal from this Final Judgment:

I.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant is permanently restrained and enjoined from violating Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the

Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) and (a)(3)] in the offer or sale of any security by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly: (i) to obtain money or

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 7 PageID 40 property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (ii) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendant’s officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant or with anyone described in (a).

II.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant is permanently restrained and enjoined from aiding and abetting any violation of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] by knowingly or recklessly providing substantial assistance to an issuer that files with the Commission any periodic report pursuant to Section

13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] that contains any untrue statement of material fact, or which omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or which fails to comply in any material respect with the requirements of Section 13(a) [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] or

Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, or 13a-13 promulgated thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendant’s

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 7 PageID 41 officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant or with anyone described in (a).

III.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant is permanently restrained and enjoined from aiding or abetting any violation of Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)] by knowingly or recklessly providing substantial assistance to an issuer that fails to make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendant’s officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant or with anyone described in (a).

IV.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant is permanently restrained and enjoined from aiding or abetting any violation of Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)] by knowingly or recklessly providing substantial assistance to an issuer that fails to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that: (a) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (b) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and to maintain

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Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 7 PageID 42 accountability for assets; (c) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and (d) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendant’s officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant or with anyone described in (a).

V.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $75,000 pursuant to Section 20(d) of the Securities

Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant shall satisfy this obligation by paying $75,000 to the Securities and Exchange

Commission within 180 days after entry of this Final Judgment.

Defendant may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request. Payment may also be made directly from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm. Defendant may also pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United States postal money order payable to the Securities and Exchange

Commission, which shall be delivered or mailed to

Enterprise Services Center Accounts Receivable Branch 6500 South MacArthur Boulevard

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Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 7 PageID 43

Oklahoma City, OK 73169

and shall be accompanied by a letter identifying the case title, civil action number, and name of

this Court; Defendant’s name; and specifying that payment is made pursuant to this Final

Judgment.

Defendant shall simultaneously transmit photocopies of evidence of payment and case

identifying information to the Commission’s counsel in this action. By making the payment,

Defendant relinquishes all legal and equitable right, title, and interest in such funds and no part

of the funds shall be returned to Defendant.

The Commission may enforce the Court’s judgment for disgorgement and prejudgment

interest by moving for civil contempt (and/or through other collection procedures authorized by

law) at any time after 180 days following entry of this Final Judgment. Defendant shall pay post

judgment interest on any delinquent amounts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The Commission

shall hold the funds, together with any interest and income earned thereon (collectively, the

“Fund”), pending further order of the Court.

The Commission may propose a plan to distribute the Fund subject to the Court’s

approval. Such a plan may provide that the Fund shall be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund

provisions of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Court shall retain

jurisdiction over the administration of any distribution of the Fund. If the Commission staff

determines that the Fund will not be distributed, the Commission shall send the funds paid

pursuant to this Final Judgment to the United States Treasury.

Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, amounts ordered to be

paid as civil penalties pursuant to this Final Judgment shall be treated as penalties paid to the

government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 7 PageID 44

civil penalty, Defendant shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor Action based on Defendant’s payment of disgorgement in this

action, argue that Defendant is entitled to, nor shall Defendant further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant’s payment of a civil penalty in this action (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Investor

Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendant shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs.

Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this Final Judgment. For purposes of this paragraph, a “Related Investor Action” means a private damages action brought against

Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

VI.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant’s Consent is incorporated herein with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein, and that

Defendant shall comply with all of the undertakings and agreements set forth therein.

VII.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, solely for purposes of

exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, the

allegations in the complaint are true and admitted by Defendant and further, any debt for

disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by Defendant under this

Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 7 PageID 45

entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by Defendant of the federal

securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section

523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(19).

VIII.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purposes of enforcing the terms of this Final Judgment.

IX.

There being no just reason for delay, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Clerk is ordered to enter this Final Judgment forthwith and without further notice.

So Ordered and signed, this ____ day of ______2018.

______UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 4 PageID 46

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ______v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP AND UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) files this Unopposed Motion for

Entry of Final Judgment against Defendants United Development Funding III, LP and United

Development Funding IV (collectively, “Defendants”), and respectfully shows the Court as follows:

1. On July 3, 2018, the SEC filed its Complaint alleging that Defendants violated the federal securities laws.

2. The SEC has reached a settlement with Defendants. Pursuant to the settlement,

Defendants executed the Consent attached hereto as Exhibit A and, without admitting or denying the allegations in the Complaint, agreed to entry of the proposed Final Judgment submitted herewith (the “Final Judgment”).

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 4 PageID 47

3. Pursuant to the Consent, Defendants also waived service of summons and the

Complaint and agreed that the SEC may present the proposed Final Judgment to the Court for signature and entry without further notice.

4. The SEC’s counsel conferred with counsel for Defendants, who indicated

Defendants do not oppose the relief sought herein.

5. The SEC respectfully moves the Court to enter the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: July 3, 2018 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Keefe M. Bernstein Keefe M. Bernstein Lead Attorney Texas Bar No. 24006839 B. David Fraser Texas Bar No. 24012654 Securities and Exchange Commission 801 Cherry Street, Suite 1900 Fort Worth, TX 76102 (817) 900-2607 (phone) (817) 978-4927 (facsimile) [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 4 PageID 48

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I affirm that on July 3, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to all CM/ECF participants. I further certify that on the same date, I caused the foregoing to be served by U.S. Mail and email to the following:

Barrett R. Howell Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP 1717 Main Street, Suite 3750 Dallas, TX 75201-7301 214-765-3681

Attorney for Defendants United Development Funding III, LP and United Development Funding IV

Michael P. Gibson Burleson, Pate & Gibson, LLP 900 Jackson Street, Suite 330 Dallas, Texas 75202 214-871-4900

Attorney for Defendant Hollis M. Greenlaw

Mike Uhl Law Offices of Michael J. Uhl, P.C. 500 North Akard, Suite 2150 Dallas, Texas 75201 214-237-0809

Attorney for Defendant Theodore F. Etter.

Jay Dewald Jackson Walker LLP 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 600 Dallas, TX 75201 214-953-6130 and

Matthew G. Nielson Stanton LLP 1717 Main Street, Suite 3800 Dallas, Texas 75201 214-996-0209

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 4 PageID 49

Attorneys for Defendant Benjamin L. Wissink

Weston C. Loegering Evan P. Singer Joan E. McKown Jones Day 2727 North Harwood Street Dallas, Texas 75201 214-969-5264

Attorneys for Defendant Cara D. Obert

Arnold A. Spencer Spencer & Associates 201 Main Street, Suite 1375 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 214-385-8500

Attorney for Defendant David A. Hanson

/s/ Keefe M. Bernstein Keefe M. Bernstein

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 6 PageID 50

EXHIBIT A

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 6 PageID 51

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ______v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP AND UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV

1. Defendants United Development Funding III, LP and United Development

Funding IV (“Defendants”) waive service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enter a

general appearance, and admit the Court’s jurisdiction over Defendants and over the subject

matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided

herein in paragraph 10 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendants hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form

attached hereto (the “Final Judgment”) and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendants from violation of Sections

17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) [15

1

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 6 PageID 52

U.S.C. § 77q(a)] and Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) [15 U.S.C. §§

78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and

13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13].

3. Defendants waive the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

4. Defendants waive the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of

the Final Judgment.

5. Defendants enter into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats,

offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any

member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendants to

enter into this Consent.

6. Defendants agree that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment

with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

7. Defendants will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground,

if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby waives any objection based thereon.

8. Defendants waive service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

Judgment by the Court and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendants

of its terms and conditions. Defendants further agree to provide counsel for the Commission, within thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit

or declaration stating that Defendants have received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

9. Consistent with 17 C.F.R. 202.5(f), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 6 PageID 53

against Defendants in this civil proceeding. Defendants acknowledges that no promise or

representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or

representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or

may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding,

including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendants further acknowledge

that the Court’s entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal

or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and

other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a

statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a

member of, a self-regulatory organization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that

are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any

disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this

action, Defendants understand that they shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations

of the complaint in this action.

10. Defendants understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F.R.

§ 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission’s policy “not to permit a defendant

or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the

allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings,” and “a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that it neither admits nor denies the allegations.” As part of Defendants’ agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e),

Defendants each: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement

denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 6 PageID 54

complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement

to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent

contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; and (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, each Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint. If either

Defendants breach this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final

Judgment and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects

Defendants’: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a party.

11. Defendants hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney’s fees or other fees, expenses, or costs expended by Defendants to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendants agrees that Defendants are not the prevailing party in this action since the parties

have reached a good faith settlement.

12. Defendants agree that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without further notice.

13. Defendants agrees that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the

purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 6 PageID 55

Dated: _ __,~/.~) _f_/_;8_ I I By: Name: Title:

On :::SUn~d-<6 , 2018, =teidd(~~t"' , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the foregoing Consent with full

authoritytodosoonbehalfof U.D'r\\\ r;}at~:::&~e-&:o~~~

•'''"""'''' DONNAR.LAWSON /ldd_r.....fl_._ ,,-.. ..~'t PlJfl. ,.., _ __ f ~·X·.~-o\NoTARYPusL1c-sTATE oF TEXAS Notary Public ~

~;.:..~.:;§coMM . EXP.10-03-2019 Commission expires: ( ,:..\.-,1 '.'.::v-l.C\ ~.,,.... ··~~ u o'~ ,,,,~~oi~,,,, NOTARY ID 11217550 ''''"'''

Dated:&,I ~

On 3Ur\-Q 6~·, 2018, \\o\\v;. ~.lJt'OQl'\\t).w , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the foregoin~S onsentwith full authority to do so on behalf of LlDF \ \] as its C}l\ot [)(~u..\,\),o0"-~'\fofT

111 111 ''\•""t--..'t P(I." ,,, OONNA R . LAWSON a L~j f f/:;£;/-o \NOTARY PUBLIC-STATEOF TEXAS lb: ~ ;;_:. . 'f~...:;§ COMM. EXP.10-03-2019 Notary Public .

----~~;?,~;t.,~·-"NOTARY 10 11217550 Commission expires: l t>l.3l'd0..9

Barrett R. How II Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

1717 Main Stre~t,Suite 3 750 Dallas, TX 75201-730 I

Attorney for Defendants

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 5 PageID 56

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ______v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANTS UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP AND UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV

The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) having filed a Complaint and Defendants United Development Funding III, LP (“UDF III”) and United Development

Funding IV (“UDF IV”) (collectively, “Defendants”) having each entered a general appearance;

consented to the Court’s jurisdiction over Defendants and the subject matter of this action;

consented to entry of this Final Judgment without admitting or denying the allegations of the

Complaint (except as to jurisdiction); waived findings of fact and conclusions of law; and waived

any right to appeal from this Final Judgment:

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 5 PageID 57

I.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants UDF III

and UDF IV are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating Sections 17(a)(2) and

17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) and (a)(3)] in the offer or sale of any security by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly: (i) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (ii) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

II.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants UDF III and UDF IV are permanently restrained and enjoined from filing with the Commission any periodic report pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] which contains any untrue statement of material fact, or which omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or which fails to comply in any material respect with the requirements of

Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] or Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, or 13a-13

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 5 PageID 58 promulgated thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

III.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants UDF III and UDF IV are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating, directly or indirectly,

Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)] by failing to make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

IV.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants UDF III and UDF IV are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating, directly or indirectly,

Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)] by failing to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that: (a) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 5 PageID 59 authorization; (b) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and to maintain accountability for assets; (c) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and (d) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

V.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants’

Consents are incorporated herein with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein, and that Defendants shall comply with all of the undertakings and agreements set forth therein.

VI.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purposes of enforcing the terms of this Final Judgment.

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 5 PageID 60

VII.

There being no just reason for delay, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Clerk is ordered to enter this Final Judgment forthwith and without further notice.

So Ordered and signed, this ____ day of ______2018.

______UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 4 PageID 61

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ______v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, AND CARA D. OBERT

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) files this Unopposed Motion for

Entry of Final Judgment against Defendants Hollis M. Greenlaw, Benjamin L. Wissink,

Theodore F. Etter, and Cara D. Obert (collectively, “Defendants”), and respectfully shows the

Court as follows:

1. On July 3, 2018, the SEC filed its Complaint alleging that Defendants violated the federal securities laws.

2. The SEC has reached a settlement with Defendants. Pursuant to the settlement,

Defendants executed the Consents attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, C, and D and, without admitting or denying the allegations in the Complaint, agreed to entry of the proposed Final

Judgment submitted herewith (the “Final Judgment”).

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 4 PageID 62

3. Pursuant to the Consents, Defendants also waived service of summons and the

Complaint and agreed that the SEC may present the proposed Final Judgment to the Court for signature and entry without further notice.

4. The SEC’s counsel conferred with counsel for Defendants, who indicated

Defendants do not oppose the relief sought herein.

5. The SEC respectfully moves the Court to enter the proposed Final Judgment.

Dated: July 3, 2018 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Keefe M. Bernstein Keefe M. Bernstein Lead Attorney Texas Bar No. 24006839 B. David Fraser Texas Bar No. 24012654 Securities and Exchange Commission 801 Cherry Street, Suite 1900 Fort Worth, TX 76102 (817) 900-2607 (phone) (817) 978-4927 (facsimile) [email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 4 PageID 63

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I affirm that on July 3, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic filing to all CM/ECF participants. I further certify that on the same date, I caused the foregoing to be served by U.S. Mail and email to the following:

Barrett R. Howell Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP 1717 Main Street, Suite 3750 Dallas, TX 75201-7301 214-765-3681

Attorney for Defendants United Development Funding III, LP and United Development Funding IV

Michael P. Gibson Burleson, Pate & Gibson, LLP 900 Jackson Street, Suite 330 Dallas, Texas 75202 214-871-4900

Attorney for Defendant Hollis M. Greenlaw

Mike Uhl Law Offices of Michael J. Uhl, P.C. 500 North Akard, Suite 2150 Dallas, Texas 75201 214-237-0809

Attorney for Defendant Theodore F. Etter.

Jay Dewald Jackson Walker LLP 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 600 Dallas, TX 75201 214-953-6130 and

Matthew G. Nielson Stanton LLP 1717 Main Street, Suite 3800 Dallas, Texas 75201 214-996-0209

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 4 PageID 64

Attorneys for Defendant Benjamin L. Wissink

Weston C. Loegering Evan P. Singer Joan E. McKown Jones Day 2727 North Harwood Street Dallas, Texas 75201 214-969-5264

Attorneys for Defendant Cara D. Obert

Arnold A. Spencer Spencer & Associates 201 Main Street, Suite 1375 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 214-385-8500

Attorney for Defendant David A. Hanson

/s/ Keefe M. Bernstein Keefe M. Bernstein

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID 65

EXHIBIT A

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 8 PageID 66

v.

DEVELOPMENT FUN DING IH, FUNDING HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID HANSON

Defendants.

M.GREENLAW

1. Detendant Hollis Greenlaw ("Defendant") •.vaives service of a summons and

the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admit~.theCourt's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

l 7(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [ 15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)], aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 8 PageID 67

[15

I,

14

(b) on a

in amount

$6,809,282, plus amount

$390,718; and

orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000.00

under Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

2l(d)(3) ofthc Exchange [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. that the civil penalty pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that he shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor

Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that he is entitled to, nor shall he further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related f nvestor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendant agrees that he shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the

Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 8 PageID 68

or as not

means a one or more

investors based on as ~... v,...,~~ this

not or

source, including not to made

pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. Defondant further agrees that he shall not assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defondant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Ruic 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of the final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 8 PageID 69

same as if set

9. on if it to hereby any objection based thereon.

that the

to Defendant of terms Defendant further to for the Commission,

thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F .R. 202.5(f), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liabiJity.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding, including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a

member of, a self~regulatoryorganization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 8 PageID 70

not to contest

to terms 17

§ provides in or to consent to a judgment or imposes a sanction

,, complaint or IS

to a denial, unless or respondent states he nor the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e),

Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or petmit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or pennit to be any public statement to the effect contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant docs not the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and (iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by

Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)( 19) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l 9). If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 8 PageID 71

and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i)

testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal

proceedings in which the Commission is not a party.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to

seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or

her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney's fees or other fees,

expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevailing party in this action since the parties have

reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without further notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment. .•

Dated: r;/z~tJI! Hollis

on Juv"e.. '2.8 , 2018, YJl,icsM.Gree11/o.w , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the foregoing Consent.

,,,,.,.,,,,, HILLARYA . HAGEN ,, .. ~"'f#lJ ,,, {l~-J.}~.,..\Notary Public. Stat e of Texas

;.;. :. ~ ..' .;~comm Expires 05-03-2020 .,_. ·. . +~:: 2158 -.,;:"·;,;''"'-"'' Notary ID 12491 '''""'''

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID 72

Attorney for Defendant

7

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID 73

EXHIBIT B

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 8 PageID 74

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A.No. ------v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DA YID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF BENJAMIN L. WISSINK

I. Defendant Benjamin L. Wissink ("Defendant") waives service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admits the Court's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)], aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b )(2)(A), and l 3(b )(2)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 8 PageID 75

"Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and

Rules 12b-20, 13a-l, and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20,

240.13a-l, and 240.13a-13];

(b) orders Defendant to pay disgorgement, on a joint and several basis with

Hollis M. Greenlaw, Theodore F. Etter, and Cara D. Obert, in the amount

of $6,809,282, plus prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of

$390,718; and

(c) orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000.00

under Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

2l(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. Defendant acknowledges that the civil penalty paid pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that he shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor

Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that he is entitled to, nor shall he further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendant agrees that he shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the

Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United

States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 8 PageID 76

deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this action. For purposes of this paragraph, a "Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

4. Defendant agrees that he shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. Defendant further agrees that he shall not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defendant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of the Final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 8 PageID 77

9. Defendant will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground, if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby waives any objection based thereon.

10. Defendant waives service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

Judgment by the Court and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendant of its terms and conditions. Defendant further agrees to provide counsel for the Commission, within thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F .R. 202.5(f), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding, including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this action, Defendant understands that he shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations of

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 8 PageID 78

the complaint in this action.

12. Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F.R.

§ 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission's policy "not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings," and "a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e),

Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and (iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that

any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by

Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or

settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set

forth in Section 523(a)(l9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l 9). If Defendant

breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment

and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i)

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 8 PageID 79

testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a party.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney's fees or other fees, expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevailing party in this action since the parties have reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without further notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

Dated: (Q - 1 -:::;- - l ~ ( ~ \JJ0 B enJa. mm. L . w1ssm· • k

On 6 - ~ / - , 2018, B-e.n LU t 5 5 "t f1~ , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the foregoing Consent.

Commission expires:

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID 80

}1;~ Jay De aid Jackson Walker LLP 2323 Ross A venue, Suite 600 Dallas, TX 75201

and

Matthew G. Nielson Stanton LLP Comerica Bank Tower 1717 Main Street, Suite 3800 Dallas, Texas 75201

Attorney for Defendant

7

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID 81

Exhibit C

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 8 PageID 82

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A.No. ----- v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF THEODORE F. ETTER

1. Defendant Theodore F. Etter ("Defendant") waives service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admits the Court's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

l 7(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)] and aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 8 PageID 83

"Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and

Rules 12b-20, 13a-l, and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20,

240.l 3a-l, and 240. l 3a-13];

(b) orders Defendant to pay disgorgement, on a joint and several basis with

Hollis M. Greenlaw, Benjamin L. Wissink, and Cara D. Obert, in the

amount of $6,809,282, plus prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of

$390,718; and

( c) orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000.00

under Section 20( d) of the Securities Act [ 15 U .S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

2l(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. Defendant acknowledges that the civil penalty paid pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that he shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor

Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that he is entitled to, nor shall he further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendant agrees that he shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the

Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United

States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 8 PageID 84

deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this action. For purposes of this paragraph, a "Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

4. Defendant agrees that he shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. Defendant further agrees that he shall not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defendant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of the Final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 8 PageID 85

9. Defendant will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground,

if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65( d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

hereby waives any objection based thereon.

10. Defendant waives service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

Judgment by the .Court and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendant

of its terms and conditions. Defendant further agrees to provide counsel for the Commission,

within thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit

or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F.R. 202.5(t), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted

against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or

representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or

representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or

may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding,

including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges

that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal

or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and

other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a

statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organizatio_n. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this action, Defendant understands that he shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations of

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 8 PageID 86

the complaint in this action.

12. Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F.R.

§ 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission's policy "not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings," and "a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e ),

Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and (iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by

Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a){l 9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l 9). If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i)

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 8 PageID 87

testimon ial obli gati ons; or (ii) ri ght to take legal or factua l positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a party.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regul atory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to seek from the United States, or any agency. or any official of the United States acting in hi s or her official capacity, directly or ind irectly. reimbursement of attorney's fees or other fees. expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevai li ng party in this action since the parties have reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without fu rther notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over th is matter for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

Dated :.-----'-6+--=') ~'-+-)--'--1-"'C.-& _ I I Th eod~t~

On J\).)AL S: ,20 1sJ1e..oc\o(e... Y ~~e._vJ ~a person known to me, personall y appeared before me and acknowledged executi ng thd foregoing Consent.

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID 88

Law Offices of Mich el J. Uhl , P.C. 500 North Akard. Su ite 2150 Dal las, Texas 7520 I

Attorney fo r Defendant

7

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID 89

Exhibit D

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 8 PageID 90

UNITED STA TES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ·~"'EXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A.No. ----- v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DA YID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF CARA D. OBERT

1. Defendant Cara D. Obert ("Defendant") waives service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admits the Court's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

l 7(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)], aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b)(2)(A), and 13(~1 )(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 8 PageID 91

"Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and

Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F .R. §§ 240.12b-20,

240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13], and violation of Rule 13a-14 of the Exchange

Act [17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14];

(b) orders Defendant to pay disgorgement, on a joint and several basis with

Hollis M. Greenlaw, Theodore F. Etter, and Benjamin L. Wissink, in the

amount of $6,809,282, plus prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of

$390,718; and

(d) orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000.00

under Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. Defendant acknowledges that the civil penalty paid pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that she shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related

Investor Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that she is entitled to, nor shall she further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action

("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset,

Defendant agrees that she shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty

Offset, notify the Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 8 PageID 92

to the United States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this action. For purposes of this paragraph, a "Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

4. Defendant agrees that she shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the ben~fit of investors. Defendant further agrees that she shall not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defendant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of the Final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the C~mmission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 8 PageID 93

with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

9. Defendant will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground, if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby waives any objection based thereon.

10. Defendant waives service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

Judgment by the Court and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendant of its terms and conditions. Defendant further agrees to provide counsel for the Commission, within thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F.R. 202.5(t), i.his Consent resolves only the claims asserted against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or representation has been made by the Commissio:~ or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission with regard to any ~r;:ninal liability that may have arisen or may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding, including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 8 PageID 94

action, Defendant understands that she shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations of the complaint in this action.

12. Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F .R.

§ 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission's policy "not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings," and "a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that she neither admits nor denies the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section

202.5(e), Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and

(iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(l 9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l 9). If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 8 PageID 95

and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in wh ich the Commission is not a party.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney' s fees or other fees, expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevai ling party ir1 this action since the parties have reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without furiher notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Court shall retain jurisd iction over this matter fo r the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Fina l

Dated: 62 _, ·/ Y

On JI" ne s ,20 18, Co r~ Db-e I+ , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the fo regoing Consent.

1--L J\) NotaryM ru~Pub l c A Hu.g 1 11 , •"" "" 1, HlllARY A. HAGEN ,.... ~· ~"• ,, Commi ss i o~xpires: ff:·~··!-:% Notary Public. Stole of Texas ;~\~. .:.;og Comm. Exp11es 05-03 -2020 ,,~,e · · · · ~+ ,... '•,,,,,~ 1>•' Notary ID 124912158

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID 96

Joan McKown Weston Loegeri Evan Singer JONES DAY 2727 North Harwood Street Dallas, Texas 75201

Attorneys for Defendant

7

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 1 of 9 PageID 97

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ______v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANTS HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, AND CARA D. OBERT

The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) having filed a Complaint and Defendants Hollis M. Greenlaw (“Greenlaw”), Benjamin L. Wissink (“Wissink”), Theodore

F. Etter (“Etter”), and Cara D. Obert (“Obert”) (collectively, “Defendants”) having each entered

a general appearance; consented to the Court’s jurisdiction over Defendants and the subject matter of this action; consented to entry of this Final Judgment without admitting or denying the

allegations of the Complaint (except as to jurisdiction and except as otherwise provided herein in

paragraph VIII); waived findings of fact and conclusions of law; and waived any right to appeal from this Final Judgment:

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 9 PageID 98

I.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants Greenlaw,

Wissink, Etter, and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating Sections

17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) and (a)(3)] in the offer or sale of any security by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly: (i) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission of a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (ii) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

II.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants

Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from aiding and abetting any violation of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] by knowingly or recklessly providing substantial assistance to an issuer that files with the Commission any periodic report pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] that contains any untrue statement of material fact, or which omits to state a material fact necessary in order to

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 9 PageID 99

make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not

misleading, or which fails to comply in any material respect with the requirements of Section

13(a) [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] or Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, or 13a-13 promulgated thereunder [17 C.F.R.

§§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13].

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who

receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’

officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or

participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

III.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants

Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from aiding or

abetting any violation of Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)]

by knowingly or recklessly providing substantial assistance to an issuer that fails to make and

keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the

transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who

receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’

officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or

participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 9 PageID 100

IV.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants

Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from aiding or abetting any violation of Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)] by knowingly or recklessly providing substantial assistance to an issuer that fails to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that: (a) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (b) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and to maintain accountability for assets; (c) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; and (d) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

V.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants Greenlaw and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating Rule 13a-14 of the Exchange

Act [17 C.F.R. § 13a-14] by signing a certification of a Form 10-K or 10-Q filed with the

Commission falsely confirming that the Form 10-K or 10-Q does not contain any untrue

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 9 PageID 101

statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements

made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who

receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants

Greenlaw’s and Obert’s officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants Greenlaw or Obert or with anyone described in (a).

VI.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that:

Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert are jointly and severally liable for

disgorgement of $6,809,282, representing profits gained as a result of the conduct alleged in the

Complaint, together with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $390,718.

Defendant Greenlaw is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange

Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant Wissink is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange

Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant Etter is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to Section

20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15

U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant Obert is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 9 PageID 102

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange

Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)]..

Defendants shall satisfy these obligations by paying the amounts stated above to the

Securities and Exchange Commission within 180 days after entry of this Final Judgment.

Defendants may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request. Payment may also be made directly from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm. Defendants may also pay by certified check, bank

cashier’s check, or United States postal money order payable to the Securities and Exchange

Commission, which shall be delivered or mailed to

Enterprise Services Center Accounts Receivable Branch 6500 South MacArthur Boulevard Oklahoma City, OK 73169

and shall be accompanied by a letter identifying the case title, civil action number, and name of

this Court; the name of the Defendant making payment; and specifying that payment is made

pursuant to this Final Judgment.

Defendants shall simultaneously transmit photocopies of evidence of payment and case

identifying information to the Commission’s counsel in this action. By making the payment,

Defendants relinquish all legal and equitable right, title, and interest in such funds and no part of

the funds shall be returned to Defendants.

The Commission may enforce the Court’s judgment for disgorgement and prejudgment interest by moving for civil contempt (and/or through other collection procedures authorized by law) at any time after 180 days following entry of this Final Judgment. Defendants shall pay

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 9 PageID 103 post judgment interest on any delinquent amounts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The

Commission shall hold the funds, together with any interest and income earned thereon

(collectively, the “Fund”), pending further order of the Court.

The Commission may propose a plan to distribute the Fund subject to the Court’s approval. Such a plan may provide that the Fund shall be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over the administration of any distribution of the Fund. If the Commission staff determines that the Fund will not be distributed, the Commission shall send the funds paid pursuant to this Final Judgment to the United States Treasury.

Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, amounts ordered to be paid as civil penalties pursuant to this Final Judgment shall be treated as penalties paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendants shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor Action based on a Defendant’s payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that a Defendant is entitled to, nor shall a Defendant further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of a Defendant’s payment of a civil penalty in this action (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Investor

Action grants such a Penalty Offset, the Defendant receiving the benefit of the offset shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this

Final Judgment. For purposes of this paragraph, a “Related Investor Action” means a private

7

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 8 of 9 PageID 104

damages action brought against a Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on

substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

VII.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants’

Consents are incorporated herein with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein, and

that Defendants shall comply with all of the undertakings and agreements set forth therein.

VIII.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, solely for purposes of

exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, the

allegations in the complaint are true and admitted by Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and

Obert, and further, any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other

amounts due by Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, or Obert under this Final Judgment or any

other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with

this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by Defendants of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy

Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(19).

IX.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purposes of enforcing the terms of this Final Judgment.

8

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-5 Filed 07/03/18 Page 9 of 9 PageID 105

X.

There being no just reason for delay, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Clerk is ordered to enter this Final Judgment forthwith and without further notice.

So Ordered and signed, this ____ day of ______2018.

______UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9 United Development Funding III, LP, United Development Funding IV, Hollis M. Greenl... Page 1 of 2

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ABOUT DIVISIONS & OFFICES ENFORCEMENT REGULATION EDUCATION FILINGS NEWS

ENFORCEMENT SEC Charges Real Estate Investment Funds

Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and Executives for Misleading Investors

Administrative Litigation Release No. 24184/ July 3, 2018 Proceedings

ALJ Initial Decisions Securities and Exchange Commission v. United Development

ALJ Orders Funding III, LP, United Development Funding IV, Hollis M. Greenlaw, Benjamin L. Wissink, Theodore F. Etter, Cara D. Amicus / Friend of the Court Briefs Obert, and David A. Hanson, (N.D. Tex. filed July 3, 2018)

Fair Funds The Securities and Exchange Commiss on today announced charges against two real SEC Complaint estate investment funds and four executives in connection with their alleged roles in Information for Harmed misleading investors by failing to disclose that it could not pay ts distribut ons and was Investors using money from a newer fund to pay distributions to investors in the older fund. The SEC also charged a fifth executive for allegedly signing false SEC filings. Litigation Releases

Opinions and According to the SEC’s complaint, Texas-based United Development Funding (UDF) is a Adjudicatory Orders family of private and publicly-traded investment funds that deploys investor capital as loans to homebuilders and land developers. UDF allegedly solicited investors by Receiverships advertising annualized returns of up to 9.75 percent as well as regular distributions. According to the complaint, for almost five years, UDF did not tell investors that it lacked Stop Orders the monthly cashflow at times to cover investor distributions in one of its older funds, UDF III. Instead, to pay these distributions, the newer UDF IV fund loaned money to Trading Suspensions developers who had also borrowed money from UDF III. Rather than using those funds for development projects that were underwr tten by UDF IV, UDF directed the developers to use the loaned money to pay down their older loans from UDF III. In most of these cases, the developer never received the borrowed funds at all, and UDF simply transferred the money between funds so that UDF III could make the distributions to its investors. UDF III, UDF IV, and UDF executives Hollis Greenlaw, Benjamin Wissink, Theodore Etter, and Cara Obert knew or should have known that they had misled investors about the use of funds and the nature and status of loans made to developers.

The complaint also alleges that UDF III failed to appropriately impair loans in violation of GAAP, and that UDF IV did not adequately disclose the status of real property w thin ts portfolio. Finally, the complaint alleges that David Hanson signed false and misleading SEC filings and management representation letters w thout taking sufficient act ons to ensure the accuracy of or a sufficient basis for many of their representations.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert agreed to pay $8.2 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties. Hanson agreed to pay a $75,000 civil penalty. The defendants consented to the entry of final judgments that order them to be permanently enjoined from violating Sections 17 (a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933, and the disclosure, books and records and internal accounting control provisions of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Secur ties Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 thereunder. Greenlaw and Obert consented to also be enjoined from violating the certification provisions of Exchange Act Rule 13a-14.

The SEC’s investigation was conducted by David Whipple, David Hirsch, Keith Hunter, and Keefe Bernstein, and supervised by Eric Werner of the SEC’s Fort Worth Regional Off ce.

Modified: July 5, 2018

Site Map | Accessibility | Contracts | Privacy | Inspector General | Agency Financial Report | Budget & Performance | Careers | Contact

https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2018/lr24185.htm United Development Funding III, LP, United Development Funding IV, Hollis M. Greenl... Page 2 of 2

FOIA | No FEAR Act & EEO Data | Whistleblower Protection | Votes | Open Government | Plain Writing | Links | Investor.gov | USA.gov

https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2018/lr24185.htm Issues Raised by Hayman of a Ponzi-Like Real Estate Scheme In Evidence Hayman Statements Showing Ponzi-Like Scheme

1) Hayman Overview Presentation: Hayman detailed four ways in which new investor capital was used to funnel capital to existing investors; Hayman gave a descriptive example of each type of transaction (slides 4 and 5).

2) Hayman Williamsburg Case Study: Hayman detailed in a 23-page case study how i) UDF I defaulted on loans and then ii) used UDF IV capital to lend to a developer (Centurion) which then iii) used that capital to pay UDF I a profits interest payment of $8 million, all after the bank (Premier Bank) which had originally lent funds to UDF I failed during the financial crisis and took impairment charges on the UDF I loans in question (slides 7 and 8).

3) Hayman Shahan Prairie Case Study: Hayman detailed in a 20-page case study how i) UDF I lent money to Centurion on Shahan Prairie, then ii) UDF III lent money to Centurion on Shahan Prairie and the UDF I loan was repaid, and then UDF V lent money to Centurion on Shahan Prairie and UDF III was repaid; this occurred during a period from 2004 to 2015 all while the land was not developed (i.e. finished lots were never developed to completion such that developers could sell to home builders as supported by pictures taken of the undeveloped by Hayman and by a third-party lawsuit filed by Megatel Homes in 2018) – slides 10 and 11.

4) Hayman Preston Manor Case Study: Hayman detailed in 37-page case study how i) UDF I financed a real estate development that went bust, then ii) UDF III lent on the same project subsequently, then iii) the SEC inquired about the treatment of the loan and specifically asked how UDF determined whether all amounts due would be collected, then iv) the loan was repaid along a similar time line when UDF III was lending money to UDF I and when UDF IV was lending money on the same project subsequently – slides 13 and 14.

5) Hayman Northpointe Crossing Case Study: Hayman detailed in a 42-page case study how i) how UDF III financed a real estate development and then ii) UDF IV bought a participation interest in the loan and the balance owed to UDF III declined as the balance owed to UDF IV increased demonstrating that UDF IV capital was being used to repay UDF III investors. The SEC also inquired related to the treatment of this loan in 2011 – slides 16 and 17.

6) Hayman Initial Post: Hayman detailed how UDF I (private partnership) began defaulting on loans and then UMT (public shareholders) lent money to UDF I at times when it had defaulted on third-party debt and later UDF III (public limited partners) purchased a significant participation interest in the UMT loan (its affiliate) which demonstrated how UMT capital was used to repay UDF I investors (whether partners or creditors) and how UDF III capital was used to repay UMT investors (whether public shareholders or creditors) – slides 19 and 20. Hayman Overview Presentation

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide SEC Press Release

Source in evidence: Slide 4: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/UDF_Overview_Presentation_1_28_16.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide SEC Complaint

Source in evidence: Slide 7: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/UDF_Overview_Presentation_1_28_16.pdf Case Study on Where Public Shareholder Capital Went (aka the Williamsburg Case Study)

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 2 and 5: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Case_Study_Williamsburg_4_1_16_.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 14 and 15: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Case_Study_Williamsburg_4_1_16_.pdf Case Study on How the Scheme Works (aka the Shahan Prairie Case Study)

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 2 and 7: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Case_Study_on_How_the_Scheme_Works_Shahan_Prairie_1_28_16.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 9 and 11: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Case_Study_on_How_the_Scheme_Works_Shahan_Prairie_1_28_16.pdf The Precarious Preston Manor (aka the Preston Manor Case Study)

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 16 and 28: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_The_Precarious_Preston_Manor_FINAL.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 29 and 30: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_The_Precarious_Preston_Manor_FINAL.pdf The Northpointe Crossing Quandary (aka the Northpointe Crossing Case Study)

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 3 and 9: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_The_Northpointe_Crossing_Quandary_9.9.16_vF.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 17 and 18: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_The_Northpointe_Crossing_Quandary_9.9.16_vF.pdf Hayman’s Letter to the Auditor (aka the Initial Anonymous Post) Hayman Commentary in Post Attached to Auditor Letter

Source in evidence: Hayman initial post, December 10, 2015 Live link: https://www.hvst.com/posts/a-texas-sized-scheme-wVvf4Y2w Hayman Letter to Auditor (Whitley Penn)

Source in evidence: Page 4, Hayman Letter to Auditor: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Hayman_Letter_to_Auditor.pdf Other Non-Ponzi Issues that SEC Found Similar to Hayman Disclosure Issues Concerning: Unimproved Real Property Hayman Overview Presentation Slide SEC Complaint

Source in evidence: Slide 14, http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_Alpha_Ranch_10.5.16_vF.pdf Hayman Letter to Auditor (Whitley Penn)

Source in evidence: Pages 3 and 4, Hayman Letter to Auditor: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Hayman_Letter_to_Auditor.pdf Hayman Presentation on Alpha Ranch

Source in evidence: Slides 3 and 4, http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_Alpha_Ranch_10.5.16_vF.pdf Hayman Presentation on Alpha Ranch (continued)

Source in evidence: Slides 7 and 8, http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_Alpha_Ranch_10.5.16_vF.pdf Disclosure Issues Concerning: Impairment Charges Hayman Letter to Auditor SEC Complaint

Source in evidence: Page 2 & 3, Hayman Letter to Auditor: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Hayman_Letter_to_Auditor.pdf

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 7 PageID 33

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ----- v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF DAVID A. HANSON

1. Defendant David A. Hanson ("Defendant") waives service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admits the Court's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)j and aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 7 PageID 34

"Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and

Rules 12b-20, 13a-l, and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20,

240.13a-l, and 240.13a~13]; and

(b) orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $75,000.00 under

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

2l(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. Defendant acknowledges that the civil penalty paid pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that he shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor

Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that he is entitled to, nor shall he further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendant agrees that he shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the

Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United

States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this action. For purposes of this paragraph, a "Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 7 PageID 35

4. Defendant agrees that he shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. Defendant further agrees that he shall not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or othe1wise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defendant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to ajury trial and to appeal from the entry of the Final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

9. Defendant will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground, if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby waives any objection based thereon.

10. Defendant waives service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 7 PageID 36

Judgment by the Comt and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendant of its terms and conditions. Defendant further agrees to provide counsel for the Commission, within thhty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F.R. 202.S(f), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding, including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this action, Defendant understands that he shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations of the complaint in this action.

12. Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F .R.

§ 202.S(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission's policy "not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 7 PageID 37

allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings," and "a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e ),

Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and (iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by

Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(l9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l9). If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a pmty.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 4-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 7 PageID 38

seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney's fees or other fees, expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevailing party in this action since the parties have reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Comt for signature and entry without fu11her notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Coui1 shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

Dated: -:::Sune \S 1 'dol

On 3J..AY'\'('.l \ S , 2018, ~~\.)\c\ 'A- \·\.rnm, a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledg[ uting the foregoing Consent.

,... ._:;;~ DONHAR.LAWSON )Q&.Ct Nl'- '11 PUBLIC-STATE OF TEXAS 'tr ... i ~··'..lb,\ ~NOTARY r: LJ...lJvO'-V'- \'\~~.. ~~j COMM. EXP. 10-oJ-2019 Notary Public -.,::,::"'f..••' NOTARY 10 11211sso Commission expires:

Appro~/ as to formo .k­

Arn61d A. Spencer Spencer and Associates 201 Main Street, Suite 1375 F 011 Worth, Texas 7 6102

Attorney for Defendant

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 6 PageID 51

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A. No. ______v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP AND UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV

1. Defendants United Development Funding III, LP and United Development

Funding IV (“Defendants”) waive service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enter a

general appearance, and admit the Court’s jurisdiction over Defendants and over the subject

matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided

herein in paragraph 10 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendants hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form

attached hereto (the “Final Judgment”) and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendants from violation of Sections

17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) [15

1

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 6 PageID 52

U.S.C. § 77q(a)] and Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) [15 U.S.C. §§

78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and

13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13].

3. Defendants waive the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

4. Defendants waive the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of

the Final Judgment.

5. Defendants enter into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats,

offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any

member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendants to

enter into this Consent.

6. Defendants agree that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment

with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

7. Defendants will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground,

if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby waives any objection based thereon.

8. Defendants waive service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

Judgment by the Court and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendants

of its terms and conditions. Defendants further agree to provide counsel for the Commission, within thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit

or declaration stating that Defendants have received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

9. Consistent with 17 C.F.R. 202.5(f), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 6 PageID 53

against Defendants in this civil proceeding. Defendants acknowledges that no promise or

representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or

representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or

may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding,

including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendants further acknowledge

that the Court’s entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal

or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and

other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a

statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a

member of, a self-regulatory organization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that

are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any

disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this

action, Defendants understand that they shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations

of the complaint in this action.

10. Defendants understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F.R.

§ 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission’s policy “not to permit a defendant

or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the

allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings,” and “a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that it neither admits nor denies the allegations.” As part of Defendants’ agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e),

Defendants each: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement

denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 6 PageID 54

complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement

to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent

contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; and (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, each Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint. If either

Defendants breach this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final

Judgment and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects

Defendants’: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a party.

11. Defendants hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney’s fees or other fees, expenses, or costs expended by Defendants to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendants agrees that Defendants are not the prevailing party in this action since the parties

have reached a good faith settlement.

12. Defendants agree that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without further notice.

13. Defendants agrees that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the

purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 5-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 6 PageID 55

Dated: _ __,~/.~) _f_/_;8_ I I By: Name: Title:

On :::SUn~d-<6 , 2018, =teidd(~~t"' , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the foregoing Consent with full

authoritytodosoonbehalfof U.D'r\\\ r;}at~:::&~e-&:o~~~

•'''"""'''' DONNAR.LAWSON /ldd_r.....fl_._ ,,-.. ..~'t PlJfl. ,.., _ __ f ~·X·.~-o\NoTARYPusL1c-sTATE oF TEXAS Notary Public ~

~;.:..~.:;§coMM . EXP.10-03-2019 Commission expires: ( ,:..\.-,1 '.'.::v-l.C\ ~.,,.... ··~~ u o'~ ,,,,~~oi~,,,, NOTARY ID 11217550 ''''"'''

Dated:&,I ~

On 3Ur\-Q 6~·, 2018, \\o\\v;. ~.lJt'OQl'\\t).w , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the foregoin~S onsentwith full authority to do so on behalf of LlDF \ \] as its C}l\ot [)(~u..\,\),o0"-~'\fofT

111 111 ''\•""t--..'t P(I." ,,, OONNA R . LAWSON a L~j f f/:;£;/-o \NOTARY PUBLIC-STATEOF TEXAS lb: ~ ;;_:. . 'f~...:;§ COMM. EXP.10-03-2019 Notary Public .

----~~;?,~;t.,~·-"NOTARY 10 11217550 Commission expires: l t>l.3l'd0..9

Barrett R. How II Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP

1717 Main Stre~t,Suite 3 750 Dallas, TX 75201-730 I

Attorney for Defendants

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 8 PageID 66

v.

DEVELOPMENT FUN DING IH, FUNDING HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID HANSON

Defendants.

M.GREENLAW

1. Detendant Hollis Greenlaw ("Defendant") •.vaives service of a summons and

the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admit~.theCourt's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

l 7(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [ 15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)], aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 8 PageID 67

[15

I,

14

(b) on a

in amount

$6,809,282, plus amount

$390,718; and

orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000.00

under Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

2l(d)(3) ofthc Exchange [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. that the civil penalty pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that he shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor

Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that he is entitled to, nor shall he further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related f nvestor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendant agrees that he shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the

Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 8 PageID 68

or as not

means a one or more

investors based on as ~... v,...,~~ this

not or

source, including not to made

pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. Defondant further agrees that he shall not assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defondant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Ruic 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of the final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 8 PageID 69

same as if set

9. on if it to hereby any objection based thereon.

that the

to Defendant of terms Defendant further to for the Commission,

thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F .R. 202.5(f), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liabiJity.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding, including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a

member of, a self~regulatoryorganization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 8 PageID 70

not to contest

to terms 17

§ provides in or to consent to a judgment or imposes a sanction

,, complaint or IS

to a denial, unless or respondent states he nor the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e),

Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or petmit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or pennit to be any public statement to the effect contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant docs not the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and (iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by

Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)( 19) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l 9). If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 8 PageID 71

and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i)

testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal

proceedings in which the Commission is not a party.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to

seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or

her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney's fees or other fees,

expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevailing party in this action since the parties have

reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without further notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment. .•

Dated: r;/z~tJI! Hollis

on Juv"e.. '2.8 , 2018, YJl,icsM.Gree11/o.w , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the foregoing Consent.

,,,,.,.,,,,, HILLARYA . HAGEN ,, .. ~"'f#lJ ,,, {l~-J.}~.,..\Notary Public. Stat e of Texas

;.;. :. ~ ..' .;~comm Expires 05-03-2020 .,_. ·. . +~:: 2158 -.,;:"·;,;''"'-"'' Notary ID 12491 '''""'''

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-1 Filed 07/03/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID 72

Attorney for Defendant

7

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 8 PageID 74

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A.No. ------v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DA YID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF BENJAMIN L. WISSINK

I. Defendant Benjamin L. Wissink ("Defendant") waives service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admits the Court's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)], aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b )(2)(A), and l 3(b )(2)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 8 PageID 75

"Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and

Rules 12b-20, 13a-l, and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20,

240.13a-l, and 240.13a-13];

(b) orders Defendant to pay disgorgement, on a joint and several basis with

Hollis M. Greenlaw, Theodore F. Etter, and Cara D. Obert, in the amount

of $6,809,282, plus prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of

$390,718; and

(c) orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000.00

under Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

2l(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. Defendant acknowledges that the civil penalty paid pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that he shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor

Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that he is entitled to, nor shall he further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendant agrees that he shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the

Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United

States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 8 PageID 76

deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this action. For purposes of this paragraph, a "Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

4. Defendant agrees that he shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. Defendant further agrees that he shall not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defendant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of the Final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 8 PageID 77

9. Defendant will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground, if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby waives any objection based thereon.

10. Defendant waives service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

Judgment by the Court and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendant of its terms and conditions. Defendant further agrees to provide counsel for the Commission, within thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F .R. 202.5(f), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding, including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this action, Defendant understands that he shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations of

4

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the complaint in this action.

12. Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F.R.

§ 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission's policy "not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings," and "a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e),

Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and (iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that

any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by

Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or

settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set

forth in Section 523(a)(l9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l 9). If Defendant

breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment

and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i)

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 8 PageID 79

testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a party.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney's fees or other fees, expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevailing party in this action since the parties have reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without further notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

Dated: (Q - 1 -:::;- - l ~ ( ~ \JJ0 B enJa. mm. L . w1ssm· • k

On 6 - ~ / - , 2018, B-e.n LU t 5 5 "t f1~ , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the foregoing Consent.

Commission expires:

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-2 Filed 07/03/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID 80

}1;~ Jay De aid Jackson Walker LLP 2323 Ross A venue, Suite 600 Dallas, TX 75201

and

Matthew G. Nielson Stanton LLP Comerica Bank Tower 1717 Main Street, Suite 3800 Dallas, Texas 75201

Attorney for Defendant

7

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 8 PageID 82

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A.No. ----- v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DAVID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF THEODORE F. ETTER

1. Defendant Theodore F. Etter ("Defendant") waives service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admits the Court's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

l 7(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)] and aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 8 PageID 83

"Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and

Rules 12b-20, 13a-l, and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20,

240.l 3a-l, and 240. l 3a-13];

(b) orders Defendant to pay disgorgement, on a joint and several basis with

Hollis M. Greenlaw, Benjamin L. Wissink, and Cara D. Obert, in the

amount of $6,809,282, plus prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of

$390,718; and

( c) orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000.00

under Section 20( d) of the Securities Act [ 15 U .S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

2l(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. Defendant acknowledges that the civil penalty paid pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that he shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related Investor

Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that he is entitled to, nor shall he further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action ("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset, Defendant agrees that he shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the

Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United

States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 8 PageID 84

deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this action. For purposes of this paragraph, a "Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

4. Defendant agrees that he shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. Defendant further agrees that he shall not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defendant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of the Final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 8 PageID 85

9. Defendant will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground,

if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65( d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

hereby waives any objection based thereon.

10. Defendant waives service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

Judgment by the .Court and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendant

of its terms and conditions. Defendant further agrees to provide counsel for the Commission,

within thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit

or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F.R. 202.5(t), this Consent resolves only the claims asserted

against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or

representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or

representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or

may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding,

including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges

that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal

or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and

other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a

statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organizatio_n. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this action, Defendant understands that he shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations of

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 8 PageID 86

the complaint in this action.

12. Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F.R.

§ 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission's policy "not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings," and "a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e ),

Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and (iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by

Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a){l 9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l 9). If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i)

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 8 PageID 87

testimon ial obli gati ons; or (ii) ri ght to take legal or factua l positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a party.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regul atory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to seek from the United States, or any agency. or any official of the United States acting in hi s or her official capacity, directly or ind irectly. reimbursement of attorney's fees or other fees. expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevai li ng party in this action since the parties have reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without fu rther notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over th is matter for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Final Judgment.

Dated :.-----'-6+--=') ~'-+-)--'--1-"'C.-& _ I I Th eod~t~

On J\).)AL S: ,20 1sJ1e..oc\o(e... Y ~~e._vJ ~a person known to me, personall y appeared before me and acknowledged executi ng thd foregoing Consent.

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-3 Filed 07/03/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID 88

Law Offices of Mich el J. Uhl , P.C. 500 North Akard. Su ite 2150 Dal las, Texas 7520 I

Attorney fo r Defendant

7

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 2 of 8 PageID 90

UNITED STA TES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ·~"'EXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff, C.A.No. ----- v.

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, CARA D. OBERT, and DA YID A. HANSON

Defendants.

CONSENT OF CARA D. OBERT

1. Defendant Cara D. Obert ("Defendant") waives service of a summons and the complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admits the Court's jurisdiction over

Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.

2. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint (except as provided herein in paragraph 12 and except as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction, which

Defendant admits), Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the Final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things:

(a) permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violation of Sections

l 7(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15

U.S.C. § 77q(a)], aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a),

13(b)(2)(A), and 13(~1 )(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 3 of 8 PageID 91

"Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B)] and

Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F .R. §§ 240.12b-20,

240.13a-1, and 240.13a-13], and violation of Rule 13a-14 of the Exchange

Act [17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14];

(b) orders Defendant to pay disgorgement, on a joint and several basis with

Hollis M. Greenlaw, Theodore F. Etter, and Benjamin L. Wissink, in the

amount of $6,809,282, plus prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of

$390,718; and

(d) orders Defendant to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000.00

under Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section

21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

3. Defendant acknowledges that the civil penalty paid pursuant to the Final

Judgment may be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002. Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, the civil penalty shall be treated as a penalty paid to the government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the civil penalty, Defendant agrees that she shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages in any Related

Investor Action based on Defendant's payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that she is entitled to, nor shall she further benefit by, offset or reduction of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of Defendant's payment of a civil penalty in this action

("Penalty Offset"). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants such a Penalty Offset,

Defendant agrees that she shall, within 30 days after entry of a final order granting the Penalty

Offset, notify the Commission's counsel in this action and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset

2

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 4 of 8 PageID 92

to the United States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this action. For purposes of this paragraph, a "Related Investor Action" means a private damages action brought against Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged in the Complaint in this action.

4. Defendant agrees that she shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or indemnification from any source, including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with regard to any civil penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the ben~fit of investors. Defendant further agrees that she shall not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any federal, state, or local tax for any penalty amounts that Defendant pays pursuant to the Final

Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to a distribution fund or otherwise used for the benefit of investors.

5. Defendant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw pursuant to

Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of the Final Judgment.

7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the C~mmission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.

8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment

3

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 5 of 8 PageID 93

with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.

9. Defendant will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground, if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby waives any objection based thereon.

10. Defendant waives service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final

Judgment by the Court and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendant of its terms and conditions. Defendant further agrees to provide counsel for the Commission, within thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.

11. Consistent with 17 C.F.R. 202.5(t), i.his Consent resolves only the claims asserted against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or representation has been made by the Commissio:~ or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission with regard to any ~r;:ninal liability that may have arisen or may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability.

Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding, including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal or state law and the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this

4

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 6 of 8 PageID 94

action, Defendant understands that she shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations of the complaint in this action.

12. Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F .R.

§ 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission's policy "not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings," and "a refusal to admit the allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that she neither admits nor denies the allegations." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section

202.5(e), Defendant: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the complaint, or that this Consent contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the complaint; and

(iv) Defendant stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, that the allegations in the complaint are true, and further, that any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by

Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(l 9) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(l 9). If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment

5

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 7 of 8 PageID 95

and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in wh ich the Commission is not a party.

13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney' s fees or other fees, expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes,

Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevai ling party ir1 this action since the parties have reached a good faith settlement.

14. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the

Court for signature and entry without furiher notice.

15. Defendant agrees that this Court shall retain jurisd iction over this matter fo r the purpose of enforcing the terms of the Fina l

Dated: 62 _, ·/ Y

On JI" ne s ,20 18, Co r~ Db-e I+ , a person known to me, personally appeared before me and acknowledged executing the fo regoing Consent.

1--L J\) NotaryM ru~Pub l c A Hu.g 1 11 , •"" "" 1, HlllARY A. HAGEN ,.... ~· ~"• ,, Commi ss i o~xpires: ff:·~··!-:% Notary Public. Stole of Texas ;~\~. .:.;og Comm. Exp11es 05-03 -2020 ,,~,e · · · · ~+ ,... '•,,,,,~ 1>•' Notary ID 124912158

6

Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 6-4 Filed 07/03/18 Page 8 of 8 PageID 96

Joan McKown Weston Loegeri Evan Singer JONES DAY 2727 North Harwood Street Dallas, Texas 75201

Attorneys for Defendant

7 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C.

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Release No. 89535 / August 12, 2020

Admin. Proc. File No. 3-18832

In the Matter of

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, AND UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING INCOME FUND V

OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

SECTION 12(j) PROCEEDING

Grounds for Remedial Action

Failure to Comply with Periodic Filing Requirements

Issuers failed to file periodic reports in violation of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Exchange Act Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13. Held, it is in the public interest to revoke the registration of the issuers’ securities.

APPEARANCES:

William E. Donnelly and Stephen J. Crimmins, Murphy & McGonigle PC, Washington, DC, for United Development Funding III, LP, United Development Funding IV, and United Development Funding Income Fund V.

Keefe Bernstein, for the Division of Enforcement. 2

On September 24, 2018, we issued an order instituting proceedings (the “OIP”) against United Development Funding III, LP (“UDF III”), United Development Funding IV (“UDF IV”), and United Development Funding Income Fund V (“UDF V” and, collectively with the other two issuers, “Respondents”), pursuant to Section 12(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The OIP charged that Respondents “have repeatedly failed to meet their obligations to file timely periodic reports” and instituted proceedings to determine “whether it is necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors” to suspend or revoke the registrations of Respondents’ securities.1 On February 26, 2019, following a prehearing conference, an order was issued setting a briefing schedule for the parties to file motions for summary disposition.2

The Division of Enforcement filed a motion for summary disposition asserting that “Respondents have failed to file any periodic reports since the third quarter of 2015” and that revocation is the appropriate remedy for such “long-standing and continuing violations of the Exchange Act’s periodic reporting requirements.” Although Respondents did not dispute the Division’s assertion of delinquent filings, they opposed summary disposition on the ground that their delinquencies resulted from a “short-and-distort manipulation scheme [that] prevented Respondents from obtaining the audited financial statements and reviews they needed for periodic reporting.” Respondents argued that the matter should “be set for an evidentiary hearing in order to afford Respondents an opportunity to present testimony and exhibits to establish their defenses . . . .” Respondents also filed their own motion for summary disposition arguing that “a suspension or revocation of registration is not necessary or appropriate.” Accordingly, Respondents asserted that the “proceeding should be dismissed.”

Under Commission Rule of Practice 250(b), a motion for summary disposition may be granted if “there is no genuine issue with regard to any material fact” and the moving party is “entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law.”3 We view the facts “in the light most favorable to” the non-moving party,4 but that party must “produce documents, affidavits, or some other evidence to demonstrate that there [is] a genuine and material factual dispute” that necessitates an in-person evidentiary hearing.5 Having reviewed the parties’ submissions in the

1 United Dev. Funding III, LP, Exchange Act Release No. 84273, 2018 WL 4562835, at *1-2 (Sept. 24, 2018). 2 United Dev. Funding III, LP, Exchange Act Release No. 85197, 2019 WL 936699, at *3 (Feb. 26, 2019). 3 17 C.F.R. § 201.250(b). 4 Jay T. Comeaux, Advisers Act Release No. 3902, 2014 WL 4160054, at *2 (Aug. 21, 2014) (citing Robert L. Burns, Advisers Act Release No. 3260, 2011 WL 3407859, at *9 (Aug. 5, 2011)). 5 Jeffrey L. Gibson, Exchange Act Release No. 57266, 2008 WL 294717, at *6 (Feb. 4, 2008), petition denied, 561 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2009). 3 light most favorable to Respondents, we find that there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact and that the Division is entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law.6

I. Background

UDF III, a Delaware limited partnership, and UDF IV and UDF V, Maryland real estate investment trusts, are part of a family of companies that offer “a full suite of debt and equity capital solutions to leading developers and homebuilding companies.” On April 9, 2008, May 2, 2011, and April 22, 2016, respectively, UDF III, UDF IV, and UDF V filed Forms 8-A to register their securities pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(g),7 and each Respondent has continued to maintain its registration since filing its Form 8-A. UDF IV’s securities have traded publicly since June 4, 2014; the securities of UDF III and UDF V have not been publicly traded.

Exchange Act Section 13(a) requires issuers of registered securities, such as Respondents, to file periodic reports with the Commission “for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair dealing” in the companies’ securities.8 Respondents timely filed all of their required periodic reports through the filing of their quarterly reports for the period ended September 30, 2015.9 But Respondents stopped filing periodic reports after November 2015.

In late March 2016, UDF III and UDF V filed Notifications of Late Filing, on Exchange Act Form 12b-25, for their 2015 annual reports on Form 10-K.10 In those Forms 12b-25, Respondents stated that they were “unable to complete” their audited financial statements due to the resignation of Whitley Penn LLP, their auditor, and “the inability thus far to engage a new independent auditing firm.” Respondents represent that Whitley Penn’s resignation and their inability to hire a replacement was the result of the short-selling campaign, which lasted between December 2015 and October 2016. According to Respondents, the short-selling campaign included allegations that Respondents’ business “exhibit[ed] characteristics emblematic of a Ponzi-like scheme” in which new invested capital “is used to fund distributions to existing

6 See Citizens Capital Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 67313, 2012 WL 2499350, at *8 (June 29, 2012) (stating that “summary disposition is appropriate in proceedings like this one brought pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(j), where the issuer has not disputed the facts that constitute the violation”). 7 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g). 8 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a). 9 We take official notice of EDGAR filings, pursuant to Rule of Practice 323, 17 C.F.R. § 201.323, including those relating to the period subsequent to the OIP. A table summarizing Respondents’ delinquent filings is attached as Exhibit 1. 10 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-25(a) (setting forth filing requirement). 4 investors.” 11 Respondents add that the short-selling campaign led to an enforcement action against two of the Respondents and executives of all three Respondents.12

On May 26, 2016, Nasdaq’s listing qualification staff informed UDF IV, whose stock traded on the Nasdaq Global Select Market, that it was subject to delisting due to its failure to comply with Exchange Act reporting requirements. UDF IV responded to Nasdaq that it had hired a replacement auditor and “expect[ed] to be in a position to file the Delinquent Reports with the SEC” by “no later than” September 12, 2016. On August 29, 2016, however, UDF IV requested an extension, until October 17, 2016, to make its delinquent filings. Nasdaq granted this extension, but when UDF IV failed to meet that deadline, Nasdaq suspended trading in UDF IV’s stock. On May 18, 2017, with UDF IV still not having filed any of its delinquent reports, Nasdaq filed a Form 25 notification to delist UDF IV’s securities.13 Since being delisted, UDF IV’s stock has traded on the over-the-counter markets.14

Respondents have not filed any periodic reports since November 2015.

11 In early 2016, UDF IV retained outside counsel and forensic accountants to investigate the allegations. That investigation was completed in April 2016 and concluded that there was no evidence of fraud or other misconduct on the part of Respondents. 12 The Complaint in the civil proceeding alleged violations of the antifraud, reporting, books and records, and internal accounting control provisions of the federal securities laws. SEC v. United Dev. Funding III, No. 3:18-cv-01735-L (Compl., N.D. Tex. July 3, 2018). The parties ultimately settled, and the court entered Final Judgments by Consent on July 31, 2018. Pursuant to the settlement, the executives were ordered to pay $8.2 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties. All the defendants, including UDF III and UDF IV, were enjoined against future violations of the antifraud provisions of Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, as well as of the disclosure, books and records, and internal accounting control provisions of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act and Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13. 13 See Exchange Act Rule 12d2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-2 (authorizing the filing of an application on Form 25 “to strike a class of securities from listing on a national securities exchange” and discussing the procedures related thereto). 14 OTC Link, operated by OTC Markets Group Inc., currently displays UDF IV’s common stock (symbol “UDFI”) with a “Pink No Information” warning. See https://www.otcmarkets.com/stock/UDFI/overview (last visited June August 7, 2020). 5

II. Analysis

A. Respondents violated Exchange Act Section 13(a) and Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 and thus their securities are subject to revocation under Exchange Act Section 12(j).

Exchange Act Section 12(j) authorizes us, as “necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors,” to revoke the registration of all classes of an issuer’s securities if we find that the issuer has failed to comply with any provision of the Exchange Act or its rules.15 Exchange Act Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 set forth the requirements for the quarterly and annual reports mandated under Exchange Act Section 13(a).16 A violation of these provisions does not require scienter.17 The Division contends that Respondents violated Exchange Act Section 13(a) and Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 by failing to file timely quarterly and annual reports as charged in the OIP.

Respondents oppose the Division’s motion for summary disposition by stating that they need “a hearing in order to present the evidence supporting the facts and circumstances set forth in their Answer and affirmative defenses . . . .” But Respondents admit to not having filed required annual reports for the fiscal years ended December 31, 2015, and thereafter, and their quarterly reports for the fiscal quarters ended March 31, 2016, and thereafter. We therefore find that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Respondents violated Exchange Act Section 13(a) and Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder, and that the registration of the classes of their securities is thus subject to revocation under Exchange Act Section 12(j).18

B. Revocation under Exchange Act Section 12(j) is warranted.

In Gateway International Holdings, Inc., we established a multi-factor test to use in determining an appropriate sanction in the public interest when an issuer fails to make required filings:

[W]e will consider, among other things, the seriousness of the issuer’s violations, the isolated or recurrent nature of the violations, the degree of culpability involved, the extent of the issuer’s efforts to remedy its past violations and ensure

15 15 U.S.C. § 78l(j). 16 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 13a-13. 17 Citizens Capital, 2012 WL 2499350, at *5 & n.25 (citing Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722, 737 n.10 (9th Cir. 2003) and SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 740-41 (2d Cir. 1998)). 18 See Absolute Potential, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 71866, 2014 WL 1338256, at *5 (Apr. 4, 2014) (“To prevent summary disposition, the opposing party must present facts demonstrating a genuine issue of fact that is material to the charged violation.”). 6

future compliance, and the credibility of its assurances, if any, against further violations.19

Although Respondents describe the Gateway factors as “still relatively new” and a “fairly recent addition to the SEC’s enforcement program,” we have applied these factors in Section 12(j) proceedings since 2006. We have also long held that though these factors are nonexclusive, and no single factor is dispositive,20 “a respondent’s repeated failure to file its periodic reports on time is ‘so serious’ a violation of the Exchange Act that only a ‘strongly compelling showing’ regarding the other Gateway factors would justify a sanction less than revocation.”21

1. Respondents’ violations are serious, recurrent, and show a high degree of culpability.

We find Respondents violations to be serious. By failing to comply with its reporting obligations, Respondents “‘violate[d] a central provision of the Exchange Act.’”22 As a result, they have “deprived both existing and prospective holders of [their] registered stock of the ability to make informed investment decisions based on current and reliable information, including

19 Gateway Int’l Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No 53907, 2006 WL 1506286, at *4 & n.27 (May 31, 2006) (citing Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1979)). 20 -Biotics, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 70800, 2013 WL 5883342, at *12 (Nov. 4, 2013). 21 Calais Res., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 67312, 2012 WL 2499349, at *4 (June 29, 2012) (quoting Nature’s Sunshine Prods., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 59268, 2009 WL 137145, at *7 (Jan. 21, 2009)); accord Cobalis Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 64813, 2011 WL 2644158, at *5 (July 6, 2011); Am. Stellar Energy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 64897, 2011 WL 2783483, at *4 (July 18, 2011). Respondents assert that it is the Division’s position that “the missing filings themselves are all” that must be shown to justify revocation. This mischaracterizes the Division’s position. The Division argues that revocation is justified not merely by the seriousness of Respondents’ reporting violations but by a consideration of all of the Gateway factors, including that the assurances of future compliance are not credible. As discussed below, our consideration of all the Gateway factors leads us to conclude that revocation is the appropriate sanction in the public interest. 22 Cobalis Corp., 2011 WL 2644158, at *4. 7 audited financial statements, about [their] operations and financial condition.”23 Extensive Commission precedent has deemed missed filings of a duration and quantity similar to those at issue here to be serious.24 We further find that the violations, which at the time of the OIP involved 33 missed filings over two-and-a-half years, were recurrent.25 We also find, in light of Respondents’ undisputed awareness of their obligations to make the filings at issue, that Respondents’ violations were committed with a high degree of culpability.26

Respondents do not dispute that they failed to file the requisite reports as alleged, but nevertheless argue that “these three factors” do not warrant revocation. Specifically, Respondents argue that the situation presented in this case is distinguishable from other Section 12(j) proceedings in which revocation was ordered because “[r]ecurrent failures to file periodic reports typically involve issuers that are unable to devote the necessary time and expenditures needed to the reporting process.” Here, by contrast, Respondents assert that they were “tirelessly fighting a unitary and targeted campaign . . . designed to shut down [their] public reporting.” Respondents also assert that they “kept trying to engage auditors and pay their fees in full to get current in their periodic reporting.” Respondents further assert that “the ‘culpability’” was with the short-sellers, and “not with Respondents,” because the short-selling campaign “dr[o]ve away a series of auditors Respondents were trying to engage or actually did engage.”

Accepting Respondents’ assertions about the adverse impact of the short-selling campaign and their efforts to retain auditors and become current in their reporting obligations , as we must at the summary disposition stage, we do not believe they establish a genuine issue of material fact necessitating a hearing or justify a sanction less than revocation. It is undisputed that Respondents’ violations continued long after the short-selling campaign had ended.

23 Id. 24 See, e.g., Accredited Bus. Consolidators, Exchange Act Release No. 75840, 2015 WL 5172970, at *1 (two annual and five quarterly reports over two years); China-Biotics, 2013 WL 5883342, at *10 (failure to “file a single periodic report for more than a yea r and a half”); Impax Labs, Exchange Act Release No. 57864, 2008 WL 2167956, at *7 (May 23, 2008) (two annual and six quarterly delinquent filings over a period of more than three years); Gateway, 2006 WL 1506286, at *5 (“seven annual and quarterly reports” over the course of eighteen months). 25 See, e.g., Absolute Potential, 2014 WL 1338256, at *4 (finding violations to be recurrent on the basis of a two-year and then a subsequent five-year period of delinquency); China-Biotics, 2013 WL 5883342, at *10 (finding a year and a half of violations to be recurrent); Impax, 2008 WL 2167956, at *7 (finding two annual and six quarterly delinquent filings to be recurrent). 26 See Calais Res., 2012 WL 2499349, at *4 & n.26 (holding that “a long history of ignoring . . . reporting obligations under the Exchange Act evidences a high degree of culpability”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Am.’s Sports Voice, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 55511, 2007 WL 858747, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2007)); Gateway, 2006 WL 1506286, at *5 & n.28 (finding that it “evidenced a high degree of culpability” that respondent “knew of its reporting obligations, yet failed to file a total of seven annual and quarterly reports”). 8

Respondents’ violations continued even after the July 2018 settlement of the civil proceedings,27 when, according to Respondents, “for the first time since late 2015” it was “able to obtain the audit it had consistently sought . . . .” Indeed, Respondents’ violations have continued since the issuance of the OIP. Respondents have failed to return to compliance even after the asserted impediment to filing was removed, which means that investors still lack current and reliable information about Respondents and that revocation is necessary for the protection of investors.28

Respondents contend that the public interest would not be served by revocation because such action would “be extremely harmful to UDF’s shareholders.” But existing shareholders are harmed when an issuer is delinquent in its periodic reporting obligations.29 In this situation, “an existing shareholder could be forced to determine whether to sell his stock based on financial statements that give an inaccurate view of the issuer’s financial situation.”30 And, in any case,

27 See supra note 12. 28 See, e.g., Cobalis Corp., 2011 WL 2644158, at *4-6 (finding revocation warranted notwithstanding respondent’s argument that its filing deficiencies “were attributable to the actions of others and events beyond its control” because respondent did not “provide[] a credible basis to conclude that it” was capable of returning to compliance in order to “‘cure these deficiencies’”) (quoting Eagletech Communications, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 54095, 2006 WL 1835958, at *2 (July 5, 2006)); Eagletech, 2006 WL 1835958, at *4 (finding revocation warranted notwithstanding respondent’s argument that its filing deficiencies resulted from “two separate manipulations,” including a short-selling scheme that lasted for more than two years, because respondent remained “unable to remedy its past violations or ensure future compliance” and therefore investors were “harmed by the continuing lack of current, reliable, and audited financial information”); Gateway, 2006 WL 1506286, at *2 & 5 (finding revocation warranted notwithstanding respondent’s argument that its filing deficiencies resulted from a dispute with two subsidiaries that “prevented it from obtaining necessary financial information to perform the requisite audits for its annual reports” because “the problem remains that existing and potential investors still cannot evaluate the company’s profitability”); see also Talon Real Estate Holding Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 87614, 2019 WL 6324601, at *6 (Nov. 25, 2019) (granting summary disposition and finding that Gateway factors supported revocation despite respondent’s “personnel changes and retention of outside professionals,” filing of one of its delinquent reports, and expenditure of resources on the preparation of drafts of several of its other delinquent reports where respondent had “become delinquent on additional periodic filings despite these developments”); Absolute Potential, 2014 WL 1338256, at *3 & n.19 (revoking registration even though issuer had “made twenty-one [previously delinquent] periodic filings,” and its “accountants and auditors [had] expended approximately 285 hours, generating fees of approximately $62,000” because of the issuer’s protracted delinquencies, unpersuasive explanations for those delinquencies, and the absence of concrete remedial changes). 29 Gateway, 2006 WL 1506286, at *7. 30 Id. 9

“[i]n evaluating what is necessary or appropriate to protect investors, ‘regard must be had not only for existing shareholders of the issuer, but also for potential investors.’”31 As a result of Respondents’ violations, “[a]ll investors in the marketplace, both current and prospective [stockholders], were deprived of timely reports that accurately reflect the compan[ies’] financial situation . . . .”32 Revocation is warranted because both “existing and prospective shareholders alike are harmed where, as here, the required filings about the issuer are not available and, as a result, existing and prospective shareholders cannot make informed investment decisions.” 33

2. Respondents’ efforts to remedy past violations and ensure future compliance are insufficient to show that revocation is not appropriate.

Respondents assert that they are “working diligently to complete all necessary periodic reports” and cite the fact that they hired a new auditor and “an independent accounting consulting firm . . . to assist in the completion of Respondents’ audit workplan and become current in their filings.” But all of Respondents’ Forms 12b-25 filed since they hired the new auditor in June 2016 state that “there can be no assurance as to when [Respondents] will be able to file [the delinquent] periodic reports,” in each case ascribing the uncertainty to a “lack of financials for the [relevant period]” and Whitley Penn’s resignation in November 2015. We have held that revocation is appropriate despite a registrant’s “concerted efforts to avoid and correct its reporting failures” where the registrant “cannot credibly identify when it will become current on its reporting obligations.”34

3. Respondents’ assurances against future violations are not credible.

In “‘determining whether an issuer’s assurances against future violations are credible, one factor we consider is whether the issuer is able to adhere to reasonable schedules that the issuer has proposed for the fulfillment of delinquent filing obligations.’”35 In their Answer, Respondents stated that they “continue to work to bring UDF III into current compliance at their earliest opportunity” and estimated that UDF IV and UDF V would come into full compliance by June 30, 2019. But despite these representations Respondents have yet to file any of their delinquent reports, let alone return to full compliance. Although Respondents state that they

31 Id. at *7 & n.42 (quoting Great Grass Oils Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 5483, 1957 WL 52359, at *11 (Apr. 8, 1957)). 32 Absolute Potential, 2014 WL 1338256, at *6. 33 Nature’s Sunshine, 2009 WL 137145, at *8. 34 Impax, 2008 WL 2167956, at *11. 35 Calais Res., 2012 WL 2499349, at *7 (quoting Am. Stellar Energy, 2011 WL 2783483, at *5); see also Gateway, 2006 WL 1506286, at *6 & n.34 (revoking registration where respondent had “insisted that it intends to return to full compliance, yet its efforts repeatedly fall short”). 10 intend to comply with their reporting requirements in the future, their record of extensive non- compliance undermines the credibility of such assurances.36

C. Respondents have not been denied due process or equal protection.

Respondents challenge the proceeding on “due process” grounds. They assert that it is “simply not fair for proceedings with a substantive evidentiary record that must be weighed and reviewed against applicable decisional standards” to be decided by the Commission without first being referred to an administrative law judge. Respondents further claim that there is “an equal protection problem” because “other cases do have an actively engaged judge . . . .”

Although Respondents assert that they are entitled to an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge, the Supreme Court held in Lucia v. SEC that, “[b]y law, the Commission itself may preside over” any administrative proceeding that it institutes.37 And the D.C. Circuit held in Kornman v. SEC that interpreting the requirement that the Commission make findings “on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing,” which is what Section 12(j) requires, to “allow summary proceedings” is “a ‘permissible construction of the statute.’” 38 The court held further that a respondent is not denied the “opportunity for hearing” where “[t]he Commission informed him in writing of the allegations against him, and he filed a written response to the allegations,” and he “had the opportunity to challenge the arguments and evidence proffered by the Division in moving for summary disposition pursuant to Rule 250.”39

That is what happened here. The briefing order in this case stated that “[i]t is unclear at this stage in the proceeding whether an evidentiary hearing before a trier of fact is necessary,” and it directed the parties to “precisely specify the basis” for any opposition to summary disposition, “identify with particularity the material factual issues in dispute,” and “include, as attachments, relevant declarations, affidavits, and other supporting documentation.”40 Respondents do not claim that any evidence they sought to introduce was excluded. Had there

36 See Nature’s Sunshine, 2009 WL 137145 at *7 (finding it not “realistic to expect” a return to compliance “in the foreseeable future” since issuer needed “‘substantially more time than anticipated’ to remedy its many delinquencies”) (quoting Impax, 2008 WL 2167956, at *9). 37 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018). 38 592 F.3d 173, 181 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)); see also id. at 182 (noting that the Commission “modeled Rule 250 on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” that Rule 250 “reflects a well-established distinction between a hearing on the pleadings and an evidentiary hearing at which witnesses testify and are subject to cross-examination,” and that the court had previously found that a statute with similar language as in Section 12(j) did not “require an evidentiary hearing where there is ‘no genuine and substantial issue of fact that requires a hearing’” as Rule 250 provides) (citation omitted). 39 Id. at 183. 40 United Dev., 2019 WL 936699, at *2. 11 been a genuine dispute of a material fact, we would have denied summary disposition and either held an in-person evidentiary hearing ourselves or referred the matter to an administrative law judge to hold such a hearing. Because, as discussed above, there is no genuine dispute of material fact in this case, it is appropriate to decide the proceeding on the papers.41

We have stated previously that summary disposition is appropriate in Section 12(j) proceedings where the issuer does not dispute its failure to file periodic reports, and we have routinely imposed sanctions in Section 12(j) proceedings after an administrative law judge determined that there was no need for an in-person evidentiary hearing.42 And, as discussed above, the courts have upheld the use of summary disposition in our administrative proceedings so long as an in-person evidentiary hearing is not necessary to resolve a genuine dispute of material fact.43 Although Respondents claim that the “Commission is simply not equipped to sit as a court of first instance,” they do not explain why we are less able than an administrative law judge to determine whether “in the first instance” summary disposition should be granted.

Respondents do argue that, given their other official obligations, Commissioners in these proceedings “realistically” would either “just skim the [parties’] submissions” or “more likely . . . be forced to rely on one or more faceless staff lawyers—the real judges, who would remain anonymous—for how they should decide the matter.” But the courts have long held that the “use of assistants in the administrative process is indispensable to the orderly and efficient expedition of great volumes of work and the reconciliation of divergent responsibilities.”44

The courts have consistently approved an administrator’s utilization of a staff member he deemed qualified in the performance of his official functions. It is well settled that even in the adjudicatory process, an administrative officer may

41 Kornman, 592 F.3d at 183 (finding that “a summary proceeding was appropriate” because “Kornman does not suggest he was denied an opportunity to set forth all of his evidence, challenges, and defenses in his pleadings” and he failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact); see also, e.g., China-Biotics, 2013 WL 5883342, at *16 (revoking respondent’s registration after grant of motion for summary disposition and finding that a hearing was not necessary because evidence respondent presented did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact). 42 See, e.g., Advanced Life Scis. Holdings, 2017 WL 3214455, at *2; Citizens Capital, 2012 WL 2499350, at *8. 43 See, e.g., Gibson v. SEC, 561.F.3d 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because the investor declarations, like Gibson’s own declaration, do not create a material issue of fact, and because Gibson proffered no additional evidence that he hoped to prove at a hearing, we hold that the Commission did not err in granting the Division’s motion for summary disposition without requiring a full evidentiary hearing.”); Seghers v. SEC, 548 F.3d 129, 134-35 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding no error in grant of summary disposition because the evidence respondent introduced was undisputed and went to “the appropriateness of the sanction, not the necessity of a hearing”). 44 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 12

rely on subordinates to sift and analyze the record and prepare summaries and confidential recommendations, and the officer may base his decision on these reports without reading the full transcript. The only requirement is that the decision in the ultimate must be that of the administrative officer, for he ‘bears full legal and personal accountability for that which bears his name or concurrence.’45

There can be no question that in this matter the ultimate decision is the decision of the Commission, composed of the individual Commissioners, as the name of each Commissioner joining this opinion is listed at the conclusion of the opinion.

As to Respondents’ equal protection claim, “[a]n agency has broad discretion to determine when and how to hear and decide the matters that come before it.”46 “[A]n equal protection claim is not legally cognizable in the context of inherently discretionary governmental decisions.”47 And even if it were legally cognizable, Respondents would have to show “‘an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom they compare themselves.’”48 Respondents have not identified any respondent in a Section 12(j) proceeding since the Supreme Court issued Lucia that has had its proceeding initially referred to an administrative law judge. Because Respondents do not “‘identify and relate specific instances where persons situated similarly in all relevant aspects were treated differently’” from them, their equal protection claim fails for this reason as well.49

45 Id. (internal citations omitted). 46 Tenn. Valley Mun. Gas Ass’n v. FERC, 140 F.3d 1085, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 47 Myriad Interactive Media, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75791, 2015 WL 5081238, at *8 (Aug. 28, 2015) (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)). 48 Id. at *9 (quoting Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006)). 49 Id. (quoting Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 250-51 (1st Cir. 2007)). 13

III. Conclusion

The “reporting requirements are the primary tools which Congress has fashioned for the protection of investors from negligent, careless, and deliberate misrepresentations in the sale of stock and securities.”50 Respondents engaged in serious and recurrent violations of these critically important requirements and did so with a high degree of culpability. Although Respondents have taken steps to return to compliance, including the hiring of a new auditor, those steps are insufficient to justify a sanction other than revocation. Respondents have not filed any of the reports identified in the OIP, and they have missed additional required filings since the OIP. The record further establishes substantial reason to doubt that they will return to compliance and avoid delinquencies in the future. As a result, we find that Respondents have not made any showing that would justify a sanction other than revocation. Nor have Respondents established a genuine dispute of material fact that would necessitate an in-person evidentiary hearing or that the Division is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We therefore grant the Division’s motion for summary disposition, deny Respondents’ motion for summary disposition, and revoke the registration of all classes of the registered securities of Respondents as in the public interest and necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors.

An appropriate order will issue.51

By the Commission (Chairman CLAYTON and Commissioners PEIRCE, ROISMAN, and LEE).

Vanessa A. Countryman Secretary

50 Am.’s Sports Voice, 2007 WL 858747, at *4 & n.17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing SEC v. Beisinger Indus. Corp., 552 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1977)); see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 810 (1984) (“Corporate financial statements are one of the primary sources of information available to guide the decisions of the investing public.”). 51 We have considered all of the parties’ contentions. We have rejected or sustained them to the extent that they are inconsistent or in accord with the views expressed in this opinion. 14

EXHIBIT 1

United Development Funding III, United Development Funding IV, and United Development Funding Income Fund V Admin. Proc. File No. 3-18832

Summary of Respondents’ Delinquent Filings

No. Report Period Ending Due Date Delinquency Corrected For Filing Report52 Date How Late

01 10-K 12/31/2015 03/31/201653 Still delinquent

02 10-Q 03//31/2016 05/15/201654 Still delinquent

03 10-Q 06/30/2016 08/15/201655 Still delinquent

04 10-Q 09/30/2016 11/15/2016 Still delinquent

52 Pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 13a-1 and General Instruction A.2 to Form 10-K, non- accelerated filers such as Respondents are required to file annual reports with the Commission no later than ninety calendar days after the end of the period covered by the report. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 and 17 C.F.R. § 249.310. Pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 13a-13 and General Instruction A.1. to Form 10-Q, non-accelerated filers are required to file quarterly reports with the Commission no later than forty-five calendar days after the end of the period covered by the report. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 and 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a. 53 UDF III and UDF V, but not UDF IV, filed Forms 12b-25 for this report, which stated: “The registrant is unable to complete its audited financial statements due to the resignation on November 19, 2015 of Whitley Penn LLP, its independent auditing firm (previously reported in the Registrant’s Current Report on Form 8-K filed on November 24, 2015) and the inability thus far to engage a new independent auditing firm. Although the Registrant is in discussions for engagement of a new independent auditing firm, the Registrant cannot provide assurance when a new independent auditing firm will be engaged. Due to the lack of final audited financials for the year ended December 31, 2015, the Registrant is unable to file its Form 10-K within the prescribed time period. The Registrant intends to file such report as soon as practicable.” 54 All three Respondents filed Forms 12b-25 for this report, which were worded similarly to the Forms 12b-25 UDF III and UDF V filed with respect to their 2015 Forms 10-K. 55 All three Respondents filed Forms 12b-25 for this report. These Forms 12b-25 noted the June 2016 engagement of a new auditor as Respondents’ independent auditing firm and stated that “[t]he Registrant is working diligently to complete and file all necessary periodic reports as soon as practicable; however, there can be no assurance when the Registrant will be able to file such periodic reports.” Respondents have filed Forms 12b-25 for all of their subsequent delinquent filings, all of which have been worded similarly to these Forms 12b-25. 15

No. Report Period Ending Due Date Delinquency Corrected For Filing Report52 Date How Late

05 10-K 12/31/2016 03/31/2017 Still delinquent

06 10-Q 03/31/2017 05/15/2017 Still delinquent

07 10-Q 06/30/2017 08/15/2017 Still delinquent

08 10-Q 09/30/2017 11/15/2017 Still delinquent

09 10-K 12/31/2017 04/02/2018 Still delinquent

10 10-Q 03/31/2018 05/15/2018 Still delinquent

11 10-Q 06/30/2018 08/15/2018 Still delinquent

Summary of Delinquent Filings for Period after OIP

No. Report Period Ending Due Date Delinquency Corrected For Filing Report Date How Late

12 10-Q 09/30/3018 11/15/2018 Still delinquent

13 10-K 12/31/2018 04/01/2019 Still delinquent

14 10-Q 03/31/2019 05/15/2019 Still delinquent

15 10-Q 06/30/2019 08/15/2019 Still delinquent

16 10-Q 09/30/2019 11/15/2019 Still delinquent

17 10-K 12/31/2019 03/31/2020 Still delinquent

18 10-Q 03/31/2020 05/15/2020 Still delinquent

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA before the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 Release No. 89535 / August 12, 2020

Admin. Proc. File No. 3-18832

In the Matter of

UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, LP, UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, AND UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING INCOME FUND V

ORDER GRANTING AND DENYING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS

On the basis of the Commission’s opinion issued this day, it is

ORDERED that the motion for summary disposition filed by the Division of Enforcement is granted and the motion for summary disposition filed by United Development Funding III, LP, United Development Funding IV, and United Development Funding Income Fund V is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the registration of all classes of the registered securities of United Development Funding III, LP under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is hereby revoked pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(j); and it is further

ORDERED that the registration of all classes of the registered securities of United Development Funding IV under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is hereby revoked pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(j); and it is further

2

ORDERED that the registration of all classes of the registered securities of United Development Funding Income Fund V under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is hereby revoked pursuant to Exchange Act Section 12(j).

The revocations are effective as of August 13, 2020.

By the Commission.

Vanessa A. Countryman Secretary Case 3:18-cv-01735-L Document 15 Filed 07/31/18 Page 1 of 8 PageID 140

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE § COMMISSION, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § Civil Action No. 3:18-CV-1735-L § UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING § III, LP; UNITED DEVELOPMENT § FUNDING IV; HOLLIS M. § GREENLAW; BENJAMIN L. WISSINK; § THEODORE F. ETTER; CARA D. § OBERT; and DAVID A. HANSON, § § Defendants. §

FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANTS HOLLIS M. GREENLAW, BENJAMIN L. WISSINK, THEODORE F. ETTER, AND CARA D. OBERT

The court issues this Final Judgment pursuant to its Order, filed earlier today, and the parties’ settlement agreement, in favor of the Securities and Exchange Commission and against

Defendants Hollis M. Greenlaw, Benjamin L. Wissink, Theodore F. Etter, and Cara D. Obert

(collectively, “Defendants”) as follows:

I.

It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) and (a)(3)] in the offer or sale of any security by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly: (i) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission of a material fact necessary

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in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,

not misleading; or (ii) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates

or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

II.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from aiding and abetting any violation of

Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] by knowingly or recklessly providing substantial assistance to an issuer that files with the Commission any periodic report pursuant to

Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] that contains any untrue statement of material fact, or which omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or which fails to comply in any material respect with the requirements of Section 13(a) [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] or

Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, or 13a-13 promulgated thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 240.13a-1, and

240.13a-13].

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants,

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employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants

or with anyone described in (a).

III.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter,

and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from aiding or abetting any violation of Section

13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)] by knowingly or recklessly

providing substantial assistance to an issuer that fails to make and keep books, records, and

accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions

of the assets of the issuer.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

IV.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from aiding or abetting any violation of Section

13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)] by knowingly or recklessly providing substantial assistance to an issuer that fails to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that: (a) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (b) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and to maintain

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accountability for assets; (c) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s

general or specific authorization; and (d) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with

the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any

differences.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraphs also bind the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants or with anyone described in (a).

V.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that Defendants Greenlaw and Obert are permanently restrained and enjoined from violating Rule 13a-14 of the Exchange Act [17 C.F.R.

§ 13a-14] by signing a certification of a Form 10-K or 10-Q filed with the Commission falsely

confirming that the Form 10-K or 10-Q does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendants Greenlaw’s and Obert’s officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendants Greenlaw or Obert or with anyone described in (a).

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VI.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that:

Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert are jointly and severally liable for disgorgement of $6,809,282, representing profits gained as a result of the conduct alleged in the

Complaint, together with prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $390,718.

Defendant Greenlaw is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act

[15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant Wissink is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to

Section 20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act

[15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant Etter is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to Section

20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15

U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendant Obert is liable for a civil penalty in the amount of $250,000 pursuant to Section

20(d) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)] and Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act [15

U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)].

Defendants shall satisfy these obligations by paying the amounts stated above to the

Securities and Exchange Commission within 180 days after entry of this Final Judgment.

Defendants may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request. Payment may also be made directly from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm. Defendants may also pay by certified check, bank

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cashier’s check, or United States postal money order payable to the Securities and Exchange

Commission, which shall be delivered or mailed to

Enterprise Services Center Accounts Receivable Branch 6500 South MacArthur Boulevard Oklahoma City, OK 73169 and shall be accompanied by a letter identifying the case title, civil action number, and name of this court; the name of the Defendant making payment; and specifying that payment is made pursuant to this Final Judgment.

Defendants shall simultaneously transmit photocopies of evidence of payment and case identifying information to the Commission’s counsel in this action. By making the payment,

Defendants relinquish all legal and equitable right, title, and interest in such funds and no part of the funds shall be returned to Defendants.

The Commission may enforce the court’s judgment for disgorgement and prejudgment interest by moving for civil contempt (and/or through other collection procedures authorized by law) at any time after 180 days following entry of this Final Judgment. Defendants shall pay post judgment interest on any delinquent amounts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. The Commission shall hold the funds, together with any interest and income earned thereon (collectively, the “Fund”), pending further order of the court.

The Commission may propose a plan to distribute the Fund subject to the court’s approval.

Such a plan may provide that the Fund shall be distributed pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of

Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the administration of any distribution of the Fund. If the Commission staff determines that the Fund will not be distributed, the Commission shall send the funds paid pursuant to this Final Judgment to the United States Treasury.

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Regardless of whether any such Fair Fund distribution is made, amounts ordered to be paid

as civil penalties pursuant to this Final Judgment shall be treated as penalties paid to the

government for all purposes, including all tax purposes. To preserve the deterrent effect of the

civil penalty, Defendants shall not, after offset or reduction of any award of compensatory damages

in any Related Investor Action based on a Defendant’s payment of disgorgement in this action, argue that a Defendant is entitled to, nor shall a Defendant further benefit by, offset or reduction

of such compensatory damages award by the amount of any part of a Defendant’s payment of a

civil penalty in this action (“Penalty Offset”). If the court in any Related Investor Action grants

such a Penalty Offset, the Defendant receiving the benefit of the offset shall, within 30 days after

entry of a final order granting the Penalty Offset, notify the Commission’s counsel in this action

and pay the amount of the Penalty Offset to the United States Treasury or to a Fair Fund, as the

Commission directs. Such a payment shall not be deemed an additional civil penalty and shall not

be deemed to change the amount of the civil penalty imposed in this Final Judgment. For purposes

of this paragraph, a “Related Investor Action” means a private damages action brought against a

Defendant by or on behalf of one or more investors based on substantially the same facts as alleged

in the Complaint in this action.

VII.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that Defendants’ Consents are incorporated

herein with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein, and that Defendants shall comply

with all of the undertakings and agreements set forth therein.

VIII.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, solely for purposes of exceptions to

discharge set forth in Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523, the allegations in the

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complaint are true and admitted by Defendants Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, and Obert, and further, any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by Defendants

Greenlaw, Wissink, Etter, or Obert under this Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by Defendants of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(19).

IX.

It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that this court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purposes of enforcing the terms of this Final Judgment.

X.

There being no just reason for delay, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the court directs the clerk of court to enter this Final Judgment forthwith and without further notice.

Signed this 31st day of July, 2018.

______Sam A. Lindsay United States District Judge

Final Judgment (UDF Execs) – Page 8 Issues Raised by Hayman of a Ponzi-Like Real Estate Scheme In Evidence Hayman Statements Showing Ponzi-Like Scheme

1) Hayman Overview Presentation: Hayman detailed four ways in which new investor capital was used to funnel capital to existing investors; Hayman gave a descriptive example of each type of transaction (slides 4 and 5).

2) Hayman Williamsburg Case Study: Hayman detailed in a 23-page case study how i) UDF I defaulted on loans and then ii) used UDF IV capital to lend to a developer (Centurion) which then iii) used that capital to pay UDF I a profits interest payment of $8 million, all after the bank (Premier Bank) which had originally lent funds to UDF I failed during the financial crisis and took impairment charges on the UDF I loans in question (slides 7 and 8).

3) Hayman Shahan Prairie Case Study: Hayman detailed in a 20-page case study how i) UDF I lent money to Centurion on Shahan Prairie, then ii) UDF III lent money to Centurion on Shahan Prairie and the UDF I loan was repaid, and then UDF V lent money to Centurion on Shahan Prairie and UDF III was repaid; this occurred during a period from 2004 to 2015 all while the land was not developed (i.e. finished lots were never developed to completion such that developers could sell to home builders as supported by pictures taken of the undeveloped by Hayman and by a third-party lawsuit filed by Megatel Homes in 2018) – slides 10 and 11.

4) Hayman Preston Manor Case Study: Hayman detailed in 37-page case study how i) UDF I financed a real estate development that went bust, then ii) UDF III lent on the same project subsequently, then iii) the SEC inquired about the treatment of the loan and specifically asked how UDF determined whether all amounts due would be collected, then iv) the loan was repaid along a similar time line when UDF III was lending money to UDF I and when UDF IV was lending money on the same project subsequently – slides 13 and 14.

5) Hayman Northpointe Crossing Case Study: Hayman detailed in a 42-page case study how i) how UDF III financed a real estate development and then ii) UDF IV bought a participation interest in the loan and the balance owed to UDF III declined as the balance owed to UDF IV increased demonstrating that UDF IV capital was being used to repay UDF III investors. The SEC also inquired related to the treatment of this loan in 2011 – slides 16 and 17.

6) Hayman Initial Post: Hayman detailed how UDF I (private partnership) began defaulting on loans and then UMT (public shareholders) lent money to UDF I at times when it had defaulted on third-party debt and later UDF III (public limited partners) purchased a significant participation interest in the UMT loan (its affiliate) which demonstrated how UMT capital was used to repay UDF I investors (whether partners or creditors) and how UDF III capital was used to repay UMT investors (whether public shareholders or creditors) – slides 19 and 20. Hayman Overview Presentation

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide SEC Press Release

Source in evidence: Slide 4: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/UDF_Overview_Presentation_1_28_16.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide SEC Complaint

Source in evidence: Slide 7: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/UDF_Overview_Presentation_1_28_16.pdf Case Study on Where Public Shareholder Capital Went (aka the Williamsburg Case Study)

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 2 and 5: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Case_Study_Williamsburg_4_1_16_.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 14 and 15: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Case_Study_Williamsburg_4_1_16_.pdf Case Study on How the Scheme Works (aka the Shahan Prairie Case Study)

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 2 and 7: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Case_Study_on_How_the_Scheme_Works_Shahan_Prairie_1_28_16.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 9 and 11: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Case_Study_on_How_the_Scheme_Works_Shahan_Prairie_1_28_16.pdf The Precarious Preston Manor (aka the Preston Manor Case Study)

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 16 and 28: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_The_Precarious_Preston_Manor_FINAL.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 29 and 30: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_The_Precarious_Preston_Manor_FINAL.pdf The Northpointe Crossing Quandary (aka the Northpointe Crossing Case Study)

UDFexposed.com Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 3 and 9: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_The_Northpointe_Crossing_Quandary_9.9.16_vF.pdf Hayman Presentation Slide Hayman Presentation Slide

Source in evidence: Slides 17 and 18: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_The_Northpointe_Crossing_Quandary_9.9.16_vF.pdf Hayman’s Letter to the Auditor (aka the Initial Anonymous Post) Hayman Commentary in Post Attached to Auditor Letter

Source in evidence: Hayman initial post, December 10, 2015 Live link: https://www.hvst.com/posts/a-texas-sized-scheme-wVvf4Y2w Hayman Letter to Auditor (Whitley Penn)

Source in evidence: Page 4, Hayman Letter to Auditor: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Hayman_Letter_to_Auditor.pdf Other Non-Ponzi Issues that SEC Found Similar to Hayman Disclosure Issues Concerning: Unimproved Real Property Hayman Overview Presentation Slide SEC Complaint

Source in evidence: Slide 14, http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_Alpha_Ranch_10.5.16_vF.pdf Hayman Letter to Auditor (Whitley Penn)

Source in evidence: Pages 3 and 4, Hayman Letter to Auditor: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Hayman_Letter_to_Auditor.pdf Hayman Presentation on Alpha Ranch

Source in evidence: Slides 3 and 4, http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_Alpha_Ranch_10.5.16_vF.pdf Hayman Presentation on Alpha Ranch (continued)

Source in evidence: Slides 7 and 8, http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/News__Research_-_Alpha_Ranch_10.5.16_vF.pdf Disclosure Issues Concerning: Impairment Charges Hayman Letter to Auditor SEC Complaint

Source in evidence: Page 2 & 3, Hayman Letter to Auditor: http://udfexposed.com/assets/content/Hayman_Letter_to_Auditor.pdf Page: 1 of 175

1 REPORTER'S RECORD

2 VOLUME 1 OF 1

3 TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 17-06253-C

4 UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING,L.P. ( IN THE COUNTY COURT A DELAWARE LIMITED ( 5 PARTNERSHIP, et al, ( ( 6 Plaintiffs, ( ( 7 VS ( AT LAW NO. 3 ( 8 J. KYLE BASS, et al, ( ( 9 Defendants. ( DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

10

11 ------

12 HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

13 ------

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 On the 21st day of May, 2018, the following

22 proceedings came on to be heard in the above-entitled and

23 numbered cause before the Honorable Sally L. Montgomery,

24 Judge presiding, held in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas:

25 Proceedings reported by machine shorthand.

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1 A P P E A R A N C E S

2 JOSEPH M. COX SBOT NO. 04950200 3 ANDREA D. BROYLES SBOT NO. 24082744 4 Bracewell LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Ste. 3800 5 Dallas, Texas 75202 214/758-1077 6 ELLEN A. CIRANGLE 7 SBOC NO. 164188 JONATHAN E. SOMMER 8 SBOT NO. 24002974 Lubin Olson & Niewiadomski, L.P. 9 600 Montgomery Street, Ste. 1400 San Francisco, California 94111 10 415/981-0550

11 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF

12

13 MICHAEL K. HURST SBOT NO. 10316310 14 DAVID A. COALE SBOT 00787255 15 CHISARA EZIE-BONCOEUR SBOT NO. 24103714 16 Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst, LLP 2100 Ross Avenue, Suite 2700 17 Dallas, Texas 75201 214/981-3800 18

19 COLE B. RAMEY SBOT NO. 16494980 20 KARLY RODINE SBOT NO. 24046920 21 RAYMOND FISHER SBOT NO. 24038446 22 Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 4400 23 Dallas, Texas 75201 214/922-7100 24 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 25

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1 INDEX

2 May 21, 2018 PAGE

3 Announcements...... 4

4 Proceedings...... 4

5 Court Reporter's Certificate ...... 174

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7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 THE COURT: 17-6253-C, United Development

3 Funding, L.P., et al versus J. Kyle Bass, et al.

4 State your names for the record.

5 MR. COX: Judge, this is Joe Cox, Ellen

6 Cirangle, and John Sommer, here for the plaintiff, UDF.

7 THE COURT: Ellen -- spell it.

8 MS. CIRANGLE: Cirangle, C-i-r-a-n-g-l-e. Don't

9 worry if you mispronounce it. Everybody does.

10 MR. SOMMER: John Sommer, Your Honor.

11 THE COURT: I can do that.

12 MR. HURST: Michael Hurst and David Coale and

13 Chisara Ezie-Boncoeur from Lynn Pinker Cox & Hurst.

14 THE COURT: David Coale and who?

15 MR. HURST: Chisara, C-h-i-s-a-r-a. And here's

16 .

17 where it gets interesting. Her last name is

18 hyphenated. It's E-z-i-e, dash, B-o-n-c-o-e-u-r.

19 THE COURT: That's French.

20 MS. EZIE-BONCOEUR: Yes, Your Honor.

21 MR. RAMEY: Cole Ramey, Your Honor, along with

22 Karly Rodine and Ray Fischer, also for the Hayman

23 defendants. Shall I spell it?

24 THE COURT: No. Cole Ramey and --

25 MR. RAMEY: Karly Rodine, R-o-d-i-n-e, and Ray

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1 Fischer, with an s-c-h.

2 THE COURT: Okay. Number one, you were sent off

3 to a special master, and there was an objection filed.

4 So we need to deal with that first.

5 So one of you on each side can can remain

6 standing; the rest can sit down.

7 So, defense, nobody's going to stand up.

8 There's not going to be anybody for defense?

9 MR. COX: Judge, we would like --

10 THE COURT: He is not listening.

11 MR. COX: We would offer to take that up later.

12 We don't think that's germane for what we're trying to do

13 today. If we could take it up later.

14 THE COURT: I still want to talk about it.

15 MR. COX: Okay. Mr. Sommer and I may or may not

16 speak. We'll let Mr. Sommer stand.

17 THE COURT: Well, it gave me some concern. So

18 I'm sure y'all have seen it. And I don't want to delay

19 on this issue because I have to make a ruling within a

20 certain amount of time. So if this is be easily worked

21 out, that's what I want to do, and then we can go ahead

22 and proceed.

23 MR. HURST: I think, if I'm not mistaken, Your

24 Honor -- and y'all correct me if y'all think otherwise.

25 If you have the hearing today, we believe that you have

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1 30 days within which to make a ruling. I suspect you

2 could look over the discovery materials in that 30 day

3 window, is that right, on the objections?

4 MS. EZIE-BONCOEUR: Yes.

5 THE COURT: Okay. But talk about not efficient

6 is to have a special master look at it, and then he knows

7 what's contained therein, and then he doesn't explain it

8 or break it down.

9 So my question is, how about having me order him

10 to explain his reasons?

11 MR. COX: That would be fine, too, judge, and we

12 can split the cost like we did the last time, if that's

13 okay.

14 MR. HURST: That's okay with us, Your Honor.

15 THE COURT: Okay. Why doesn't somebody prepare

16 an order for me to send it back for his review to explain

17 his rulings.

18 MR. COX: Okay. We'll do it.

19 MR. HURST: Sure.

20 THE COURT: You see how efficient that is?

21 MR. COX: That's good. We'll get that to you

22 tomorrow. We'll run it by Mr. Hurst and get their

23 agreement.

24 MR. HURST: Thank you.

25 THE COURT: Now, I always like to finish what I

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1 start. Otherwise, I never get finished.

2 So, the in camera inspection -- see, here I go

3 again. I am tempted to give it to the other side, but

4 under a protective order. But I'm not totally convinced

5 I'm going to do that yet, but that's what I'm thinking.

6 Do y'all have a protective order in this case?

7 MR. HURST: We do not, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: Y'all need to maybe start thinking

9 about what that would look like, but nothing under seal

10 because that would require the Supreme Courts, and I

11 don't use that language in here. But that's kind of what

12 I'm contemplating, but I'm not sure yet.

13 MR. COX: Okay. Thanks.

14 MR. HURST: Thank you.

15 THE COURT: Now, who wants how long?

16 MR. HURST: Your Honor, we talked about it ahead

17 of time. I thought to be safe an hour and 15 per side.

18 MR. COX: We had offered 45 minutes per side.

19 MR. HURST: There's a lot there. I don't know

20 if you saw what they -- well, both sides, there's lot of

21 materials to go through. I think it takes some time to

22 explain some of the intricacies, if you will, of what's

23 going on in the relationship between the parties.

24 It may be that it could go faster, but I thought

25 in an abundance of caution an hour and 15 per side might

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1 be good, with the hope of giving time back.

2 THE COURT: That would get us to five o'clock if

3 we took no breaks. I'm not sure I need quite that much

4 time with y'all because I have done some reading.

5 I know that there were some objections filed.

6 And so before we start arguing this, I want to deal with

7 some of the objections. Because the way I view it is if

8 it could be easily remedied, I allow it versus pouring

9 somebody out on a technical deficiency.

10 Let me start there and once again mess y'all

11 up.

12 MR. COALE: Your Honor, David Coale. I can

13 speak to that from our side.

14 THE COURT: You are?

15 MR. COALE: David Coale, English.

16 THE COURT: Go ahead.

17 MR. HURST: Not to be confused with Cole Ramey.

18 MR. COALE: Mr. Ramey, his family spells it more

19 typically, but incorrectly, I'm afraid.

20 I was thinking about the same issue and how to

21 deal with the objections and our substantive issues

22 today. It seems to me that a lot of our objections are

23 material -- that material they have submitted is

24 immaterial, is unnecessary, is cumulative. If we

25 speak to the substantive issues --

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1 THE COURT: I don't want to go to that.

2 MR. COALE: I think we're going to end up

3 focusing on a handful of largely undisputed facts, and

4 what will be left at the end, the Court can easily make

5 some rulings on.

6 THE COURT: I want things like they forget to

7 notarize their affidavit.

8 MR. COALE: They've got one of those, I think,

9 but the majority are kind of house cleaning type. Let's

10 sweep this away and focus on the relevant things, which I

11 think the Court will get when we argue the merits. And

12 then whatever's left we can make a very short

13 presentation, I think.

14 THE COURT: If we have something like somebody

15 forgot to sign their affidavit, I'm going to let it be

16 signed, okay. And I doubt that the information contained

17 therein is going to be a surprise. And we'll talk about

18 the time frame. That should be able to be done pretty

19 quickly.

20 If in an affidavit, if there was some objections

21 based on they kept using my pet phrase, "based upon

22 information and belief," which generally makes an

23 affidavit not be able to be signed under penalty of

24 perjury, those need to be redone because I saw some of

25 that myself. I don't know if anybody made that

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1 objection, but it's like -- I always hate those.

2 So if an affidavit says "information and

3 belief," that needs to be changed to "my personal

4 knowledge," blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.

5 MR. COALE: In light of five minutes from the

6 Court just then, we can quickly review our objections and

7 remove some that I think are not going to be of interest

8 to Your Honor and focus the Court on some where I think

9 some of this may need to get cleaned up to have a cleaner

10 record.

11 THE COURT: Okay.

12 MR. COALE: During the proceeding we can tidy up

13 the objections and focus on that in light of what the

14 Court said.

15 THE COURT: Yeah, because that makes it

16 worthless. And one of them is a really important

17 affidavit.

18 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, we did obtain -- the

19 notary left the date of the year off it was notarized,

20 which is a technical issue. But we did have it

21 renotarized, and we have it here in the file. So that

22 was cleaned up already.

23 THE COURT: Okay. I just want to make sure we

24 don't have these kind of issues hanging versus

25 substantive.

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1 MR. COX: They just filed this recently, so we

2 filed our response this morning to their objections.

3 THE COURT: Okay. I can't see those. Well,

4 they don't come up until tomorrow.

5 MR. COX: I would just offer we hold this

6 until --

7 THE COURT: I know, but I still just want to hit

8 it just briefly.

9 MR. COX: Sure.

10 THE COURT: But I will tell you, for example,

11 affidavit of Parker Lewis is all information and belief.

12 That one I just saw myself, so I want it tidied up.

13 Okay. So are we going to do, like, a motion,

14 response, and a reply?

15 MR. HURST: The way we have set it up, Your

16 Honor, is we have divided the argument into thirds, if

17 you will, from our perfect. Myself, Mr. Ramey, and David

18 Coale will be splitting the argument, with Your Honor's

19 permission.

20 THE COURT: I don't have a problem with that.

21 You mean, in case I get tired of one of you, I get to

22 hear another.

23 MR. HURST: I suspect --

24 THE COURT: He didn't hear me.

25 MR. HURST: I'm sorry, Judge. What did you say?

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1 THE COURT: I said, if I get tired of one of

2 you, I can get somebody else?

3 MR. HURST: Right. You say next and move us

4 along.

5 THE COURT: That's fine, but that doesn't deal

6 with my issue, which is, you know -- and I realize these

7 Anti-SLAPPs have got three different parts. But you've

8 got a basic motion with the parts that pertain therein,

9 and then -- and it's your motion. And then they get to

10 respond, and then I would assume you may want to reply.

11 MR. HURST: Right.

12 THE COURT: Then I'm going to assume they're

13 going to do a surreply.

14 MR. HURST: And so and and so an.

15 THE COURT: Therefore, I have some basic facts

16 already, and maybe you could expedite going through some

17 of that so that you have time to do what I know is going

18 to occur: the reply, surreply, whatever.

19 In the meantime, what's the discovery that y'all

20 didn't get done? How is that going to affect this

21 hearing today? I mean, they're saying they have problems

22 with some of the rulings of Justice Wittington, so how is

23 that going to affect the response?

24 MR. COX: We filed our response, judge, with

25 what we had.

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1 THE COURT: I know.

2 MR. COX: We knew there would be some issues,

3 but we got what Justice Wittington did and did our best

4 with it and gave us the three or four documents he said

5 were not privileged, which if you look at them you would

6 see they weren't privileged to begin with, but neither

7 here nor there an argument now. But we'll do our best

8 with what we've got. And if Judge Wittington, if he does

9 give explanations, then you decide to overturn some of

10 that.

11 That's a nice song. That's catchy.

12 (Off the record)

13 THE COURT: Go ahead. That's fine then. I just

14 wanted to ask.

15 MR. COX: So what I'm saying is if some of the

16 rulings are overturned and we do get more documents, we

17 would then seek leave to file a supplemental response or

18 see if Mr. Hurst would agree that we could file a

19 supplemental response.

20 If that sounds like a plan --

21 THE COURT: It does.

22 MR. HURST: Same thing for the profit sharing

23 agreements that they have that we're trying to get from

24 Your Honor based on the in camera stuff.

25 (Off the record)

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1 THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed.

2 MR. HURST: May it please the Court, counsel.

3 Thank you very much, Your Honor.

4 I recognize and appreciate that Your Honor has

5 had lots of Anti-SLAPP or at least some Anti-SLAPP

6 experience in your court. I would submit to you, Your

7 Honor, that never has there been a more textbook

8 situation for Anti-SLAPP in this case where you have open

9 public comments and questions about UDF, which is a

10 public company which was raising hundreds of millions of

11 dollars from the investing public, including moms and

12 pops. And we posted something based upon hundreds and

13 hundreds of hours of research and publicly available

14 information, including most of UDF's filings, with

15 disclosure of our financial interest in the specifics,

16 first to the authorities and then much later to the

17 investing public.

18 So who is Hayman Capital? I think this is -- to

19 set the table, Your Honor, if I could, on these parties,

20 we will tell you who Hayman Capital is. Hayman Capitol

21 was founded by Kyle Bass in 2005.

22 Kyle, would you stand up?

23 Kyle's in the courtroom here. More on Kyle in a

24 minute because he individually is very important in this

25 regard as well.

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1 THE COURT: Is that why he's sitting in the back

2 row?

3 MR. HURST: It's because they took up all the

4 front row.

5 MS. CIRANGLE: No, our folks got here second.

6 MR. HURST: Hayman is registered with the SEC.

7 It's an investment advisor that focuses on global event

8 driven opportunities. It is a very recognized and very

9 publicly acclaimed company, but let me tell you what the

10 idea -- what shows to be the idea behind UDF's filings in

11 this case, their petition, their Anti-SLAPP materials

12 instead of recognizing who Hayman is, who Kyle Bass is.

13 They disparage him and deflect from exactly what their

14 liability is.

15 So in their petition, for instance, on page 25

16 they call Hayman Capital a collection of

17 entities in the business of short selling stocks. This

18 is just one of many examples of false statements that

19 they have made in both their petition and their affidavit

20 to try to deflect from their liability and to try to

21 impugn Hayman and Kyle Bass.

22 So in reality -- and this is based upon the

23 agreement and upon discovery we've given them. You have

24 to look at a specific date and time, but we're going the

25 use December 10, 2015, the date that Hayman first made

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1 public disclosures about UDF.

2 THE COURT: December 10?

3 MR. HURST: 2015. That's the date that Hayman

4 first went public about UDF and made the first public

5 comments.

6 Only 9.2 percent of Hayman's exposure was single

7 name short. That means companies like UDF for which they

8 had short interests in.

9 MR. COX: Judge, I hate to interrupt Mr. Hurst.

10 He's doing such a great job already at the beginning.

11 But we would object to this because it's outside the

12 record. There's no evidence of this in the record

13 whatsoever. So he's going to spew off a bunch of facts

14 that we never did contest because they're not in the

15 record. This stuff about 9.2 percent, it's not in their

16 papers.

17 MR. HURST: Your Honor, this is a verified

18 discovery materials that we tendered to them by virtue of

19 the agreement we had with the Court. Not only that, but

20 they can't just throw a bunch of things up against the

21 wall, which is what they've done by virtue of their

22 petition and their Anti-SLAPP and say, you know, I'm

23 sorry, you can't respond to it.

24 So, Your Honor --

25 THE COURT: No, wait. This hearing is on the

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1 record. So I can understand why they might have an

2 objection if there's been nothing filed relating to these

3 facts.

4 MR. HURST: We have filed our PowerPoint

5 presentation, Your Honor, which we have copies --

6 THE COURT: That's not evidence. You did file

7 it, then?

8 MR. HURST: Yes, we did, Your Honor.

9 THE COURT: When did you file it?

10 MR. HURST: We just filed it. We just finished

11 it this morning.

12 THE COURT: See, that means I won't get it until

13 tomorrow.

14 MR. COALE: I've got a copy here if Your Honor

15 would like.

16 MR. COX: We don't have the time, judge. We

17 would move to strike it because it's not evidence. They

18 have to have somebody to authenticate it. It's not a

19 demonstrative pursuant to 901 of the Texas Rules of

20 Evidence. So they don't get it in, and it can't be

21 filed. We move to strike it.

22 THE COURT: I agree.

23 MR. HURST: It is a demonstrative, Your Honor.

24 At the end of the day --

25 THE COURT: I would love to have a copy of the

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1 PowerPoint.

2 MR. HURST: May I approach, Your Honor?

3 THE COURT: Yes.

4 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, I would like some

5 guidance because he's said multiple facts already that

6 aren't in the record. So should we object individually?

7 I don't want to interrupt Mr. Hurst, but, for example, he

8 said that there was a full disclosure of financial

9 interests to the authorities, and there's nothing in the

10 record that supports that. He's already said three or

11 four things that aren't in the record.

12 THE COURT: Here's what we're going to do.

13 We're going to take 10 minutes and go over the

14 PowerPoint, his PowerPoint, and you're going to tell him

15 what you don't thing there's a fact about. Okay?

16 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay.

17 THE COURT: Do y'all have a PowerPoint.

18 MR. COX: Yes.

19 THE COURT: Same thing. So we're going to take

20 maybe 10 minutes for that as soon as y'all can get it

21 done.

22 I'll let you go to the jury room if you like.

23 (A break was held.)

24 THE COURT: Did we get some things worked out?

25 MR. HURST: I think we have some very

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1 fundamental disagreements, Your Honor, about evidence and

2 about how this was going to be presented.

3 I think the one thing I would say that I don't

4 see in the record that was -- and I thought was part of

5 our discovery responses, apparently wasn't all part of

6 our discovery responses, was the slide that you're

7 looking at right here. This was in our sworn

8 interrogatories. That was not. The 9.2 percent

9 apparently was not.

10 Your Honor, the statute nor the Rule 11

11 agreement nor anything else say that we're bound not to

12 introduce additional evidence at time of hearing. It

13 restricts us in that regard.

14 What they're trying to say, Your Honor, if I

15 may, is that their own public filings that the website

16 that they're using to sue upon, that all of those things,

17 anything that we've used from those things, are somehow

18 inadmissible in a court of law, including their SEC

19 filings.

20 We would submit to Your Honor a couple things.

21 First of all, the website is referenced in the affidavit

22 of Parker Lewis. It says -- the whole website is in

23 there, incorporated by reference, www.UDFExposed.com.

24 It's in there.

25 We attached over a thousand pages to the

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1 affidavit as far as that goes. But this is the very

2 website, the websites that they're suing upon. And they

3 take out selective clips from there and then say under

4 optional completeness, under relevance, under whatever

5 else, we can't make those arguments. They're trying to

6 essentially clip our wings in the PowerPoint presentation

7 itself by saying that we don't have evidence in the

8 record when they're never going to deny that they said

9 these things ever. These are their own filings.

10 THE COURT: Here's how it has to work. If it's

11 not in the record, then they are justified to object, and

12 I'm going to sustain the objection.

13 However, what we do at time of trial when we're

14 offering exhibits is I ask the side against whom certain

15 exhibits are being offered that if they can agree that

16 the predicate has been laid -- and this saved me days and

17 days of time -- then just go ahead and let it come in

18 without objection if you know that they can get in it.

19 That's what I do during trial.

20 So if you know that what he has in his

21 PowerPoint can be put into the record easily enough, we

22 can do it the easy way or we can do it the hard way. You

23 can object, and I'll sustain for the day. Then he will

24 be putting it in, and then we have to come back and do

25 the over again. It's kind of a waste of time.

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1 If you don't think he can get it into evidence,

2 object.

3 MR. HURST: So, Your Honor, the majority of

4 stuff --

5 THE COURT: But I have to leave it up to them.

6 MR. HURST: We would like, and we believe that

7 we're entitled to, to offer their own filings, their own

8 websites. To the extent that you don't believe they're

9 in the record, we're offering them into evidence today.

10 There's nothing that prevents us from doing that.

11 THE COURT: Well, it could be out of context. I

12 don't know. I'm going to let you all think about what I

13 just said for a minute, to decide what you're going to

14 let in and what you're not going to let in based on what

15 you think they can get in versus what they can't.

16 So five minutes. I'll let you think about it.

17 MR. HURST: I'm sorry?

18 THE COURT: I'm giving them five minutes to

19 think about it. It has to be in evidence for you to have

20 it in PowerPoint, but maybe we can work around it. So

21 give me a couple of minutes.

22 MR. HURST: Okay.

23 THE COURT: I've been doing this a while.

24 MR. COX: I understand. The fundamental issue,

25 judge, is whether or not -- I thought he said earlier is

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1 we would move to strike his PowerPoint from filing

2 because it's not a proper -- it's a demonstrative.

3 Doesn't meet Rule 901.

4 THE COURT: That's true.

5 MR. COX: If we get that order, then, we can

6 deal with this at this hearing as opposed to from the

7 filing itself. That's one thing we need to clear up.

8 THE COURT: Okay. What I'm suggesting just to

9 save time with you guys is if you know that on their

10 PowerPoint they have some fact that they should have

11 already put in evidence and forgot, let's go ahead.

12 Maybe you can think about foregoing your objection on

13 that, but if you don't think they can, then go ahead and

14 object. So look through it real quick and tell me what

15 you can live with and what you can't.

16 MR. COX: Be happy to, judge. We'll see what we

17 can come up with.

18 THE COURT: Y'all go, about three or four

19 minutes. Let them think now.

20 MR. HURST: I'm sorry, Your Honor. We're

21 talking about things that they could object to right

22 now --

23 THE COURT: He knows his assignment. You'll

24 find out in a minute.

25 MR. HURST: All right. Thank you.

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1 (A break was held.)

2 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, I think we have it

3 pretty narrowed. We can go through it and tell you our

4 view if that's helpful.

5 THE COURT: You don't need to tell me. Tell

6 him.

7 MR. COX: Judge, I think we just have a handful

8 maybe past that. Maybe he can just go, and when he's at

9 the slide we object to, we can tell him.

10 MR. HURST: Let's do them right now because I

11 think they're mistaken about what they think is not in

12 the record versus what is in the record. I prefer to go

13 through, but if they want to get it done, I would rather

14 get it done in the advance rather than them interrupting

15 my presentation.

16 THE COURT: No, I want you to go through it.

17 Tell them what you're okay with and what you're not.

18 Then we'll fight over what you're not. If you think it's

19 there, show them where it is. And let's get this squared

20 up. Save us a lot of time.

21 MS. CIRANGLE: I think we have agreement to the

22 extent they put in posts that they made that aren't in

23 the record that we agree they can come in for limited

24 purposes showing a posting made, but it's not evidence of

25 the truth of what's in there.

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1 And I think they agree with that, correct?

2 MR. HURST: I think so. I disagree that we

3 didn't -- we referenced it in Parker Lewis's affidavit.

4 THE COURT: It comes in for the fact that it was

5 in their post. When it's your turn, you say, We don't

6 agree with whatever it is they say. That's how that

7 works.

8 But if there's some things you don't think you

9 can say because there's no evidence whatsoever, that's

10 what y'all need to know right now because he's saying, I

11 think it's in, and you're saying, No, it's not. That's

12 what I want you to work out right now real quick.

13 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, I think we talked,

14 and there's a few things. On my reply I can just tell

15 you why they're false as opposed to having -- let them

16 say it, and I'll show you why it's false.

17 THE COURT: What?

18 MS. CIRANGLE: Well, you know, he started out

19 saying they made the post with full disclosure of the

20 financial interest in the subject matter --

21 MR. HURST: This is a demonstrative --

22 MS. CIRANGLE: Will you let me --

23 MR. HURST: This is not an exhibit. I get to

24 make my argument first regarding the website. It's not

25 the specific piece of evidence. They're trying to say,

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1 okay, the slide --

2 THE COURT: Yeah, that's overly broad.

3 MR. HURST: I get to talk through my slides and

4 explain my slides if they're not evidence.

5 THE COURT: The only thing I want to deal with

6 right this minute is what's up on the slide upon which

7 there's no evidence. Okay. Except where you kind of go,

8 yeah, they can get it in because I actually saw that on

9 the website. So I'm going to forego that problem right

10 now. Mr. Hurst can put that in later to formalize it.

11 But if you don't think that they can get it in,

12 tell them now, and we'll discuss that. And he's saying,

13 But I think it's all there. Then we'll deal with that

14 right now. This will take three minutes.

15 MR. HURST: All right.

16 THE COURT: Go talk to them about those specific

17 things.

18 MS. CIRANGLE: We did meet and confer and talk,

19 and I think there was just a of couple things, but we

20 can't reach agreement.

21 THE COURT: Let's talk about those couple of

22 things versus conclusory statements, which I realize, I

23 mean, are argument, which I don't see necessarily on this

24 slide.

25 MS. CIRANGLE: Right. Slide two was the one

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1 about full disclosure, and I'm happy to address that in

2 argument because I don't agree that the evidence is

3 there. But I think I hear you saying it's broad, so

4 you're not taking it as truth.

5 THE COURT: Let me see slide two.

6 Okay. I never got to read it because he moved

7 past it so fast.

8 MS. CIRANGLE: Last bullet point is where we

9 say --

10 THE COURT: First off, no demonstrative exhibit

11 is evidence. He didn't say it, and therefore it's not in

12 evidence. Let's move on.

13 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay. The next one is the slide

14 four and five where they were talking about, We never got

15 discovery on the underlying portfolio, just an

16 interrogatory about the UDF position.

17 THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait. I hadn't seen it.

18 This is slide five?

19 MS. CIRANGLE: Four and five. If you look at

20 four, you see where he's saying only 9.2 percent

21 Single-Name, Short Exposure.

22 THE COURT: Right.

23 MS. CIRANGLE: We have no discovery on this

24 portfolio, and that can be very misleading because --

25 THE COURT: If he has no evidence and y'all

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1 don't think it was on his website, then you can object to

2 it. That you have to object to at the time, and I'll

3 sustain.

4 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay.

5 MR. HURST: We'll withdraw the pie chart. We

6 will withdraw the second bullet point there which was not

7 part of the interrogatory -- I'm sorry. -- the first

8 bullet point which is not part of the interrogatory. The

9 second bullet point was part of the sworn interrogatory

10 that we gave to them.

11 MS. CIRANGLE: No, it's not. We just had -- the

12 only interrogatory sent was the dollar and value of the

13 UDF short.

14 THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait. Okay. I don't

15 know, but either it is or it isn't. So hold off.

16 MR. HURST: Okay.

17 THE COURT: So do that now or else don't say it.

18 She's challenging you on it.

19 MR. HURST: Okay. That's fine. We're going to

20 take out the pie chart.

21 THE COURT: The pie chart is slide five.

22 MR. HURST: Slide five. And we'll take out the

23 right side of slide four.

24 THE COURT: Okay. Then you can't say it,

25 either. I'm going to sustain the objection as to your

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1 statement -- put it back up, four.

2 I'm going to sustain the objection that right

3 now there's no evidence on this UDF short position, only

4 3.6 percent as of December 10, 2015. I'm going to

5 sustain, and I'm going to sustain the objection on only

6 9.2 percent Single-Name short exposure for now.

7 Okay.

8 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay. On slides 19 and --

9 THE COURT: Five hasn't been discussed. It

10 hasn't been put up formally.

11 MR. HURST: Five, we will withdraw the pie

12 chart.

13 THE COURT: Okay. Don't worry about it because

14 you can't withdraw a demonstrative exhibit because it's

15 not in evidence, anyway, to be considered. Just don't

16 talk about it. You hadn't discussed it, so it's not in

17 evidence.

18 So these are called agreements. You don't need

19 me for this. Y'all talk to him about it off the record.

20 (Off the record)

21 THE COURT: Do we have it all worked out?

22 MS. CIRANGLE: We're good.

23 THE COURT: I figured.

24 Go ahead.

25 MR. HURST: Thank you, Your Honor.

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1 Continuing on, I'm going to ask that you ignore

2 the right side here because one thing comes up.

3 THE COURT: It will be really easy to ignore it.

4 There's nothing on it.

5 MR. HURST: Well, there will be in a second.

6 So the whole point of this particular slide,

7 Your Honor, is UDF's petition. They make a statement

8 that's absolutely false about what Hayman is. They say

9 it's a short selling hedge fund entities. We say it's

10 false.

11 They say in paragraph 25, regardless, besides

12 the name calling and what they -- the attacks that they

13 make against us verbally and in pleadings and otherwise

14 about what Hayman is and what Hayman does. Like, for

15 instance, we hear counsel say terms like short and

16 distort and all these other things. A, that's not true.

17 We're not primarily a short seller.

18 The other thing is, Your Honor, short selling is

19 actually an important and integral part of our economy.

20 We cited numerous cites and quotes and things like that

21 from our reply brief. There's nothing in short

22 selling --

23 THE COURT: No, I know that.

24 MR. HURST: -- in itself that is evil. We even

25 got this from the head of the SEC, ironically one month

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1 before we made our first posting to the public saying,

2 Short selling is a good thing, not a bad thing, but they

3 try to saddle us, saying, Well, they're short sellers.

4 They've got to be bad people.

5 So I want to talk about who is Kyle Bass because

6 I think that's very important from this perspective. I

7 told you he's the founder and Chief Information Officer

8 from Hayman Capital. That's in his affidavit. But I

9 want to show you what they call him in the petition.

10 Again, to try to disparage him, to try to distract and

11 deflect from the real issues here.

12 Mr. Bass, over here they call him a desperate

13 gambler, a short seller, relied on rumors and scare

14 tactics, leftist economy minister, and a widowmaker

15 trader.

16 In realty, Your Honor, Kyle Bass is the longest

17 standing board member of the UT endowment: 44 billion

18 dollars, the largest public endowment in the entire

19 country. Not only is he the longest standing board

20 member, he oversees the Chairman of the Risk Committee,

21 which oversees all of the risks to UT's endowment

22 portfolio.

23 Your Honor, this is a mortgage fraud case. The

24 whole issue is mortgage fraud. There is no one that is

25 more of an expert than Kyle Bass is on mortgage fraud.

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1 How do we know this? Because in 2008 and 2009 during the

2 middle of the financial crisis, the heart of the

3 financial crisis, Kyle Bass was called by Congress to

4 testify in front of Congress regarding the very thing,

5 the mortgage fraud, as an expert witness. He's a

6 lecturer are at Columbia, Harvard, UVA, UT, Stanford, and

7 other places. University of Chicago.

8 And Kyle's practice and his focus has been on

9 global event-driven opportunities, in subprime credit,

10 pharmaceuticals, Asia, all over the board. The idea that

11 he is any of these things is objectively and verifiably,

12 absolutely false.

13 So let's talk about who UDF is, Your Honor, if

14 we could. UDF, by its own website, is a family of public

15 funds. They try to say in their petition, they try to

16 say in all their materials, that they're bunch of other

17 things. At their heart, though, and what they really do

18 is they're a lender. They loan money to home builders

19 and developers of residential properties, and they loan

20 money. That's what they do.

21 Then they go to moms and pops. They go to the

22 investing public. They say, We can get you these good

23 returns on your investment if you invest in our funds,

24 and we're going to loan that money to people like Mehrdad

25 Moayadi and Centurion, and they're going to pay back the

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1 loans with interest. When you get those loans and

2 interest back, we can pay you back your money with a nice

3 profit.

4 THE COURT: Question.

5 MR. HURST: Yes.

6 THE COURT: Okay. Residential lender. So are

7 we talking about apartment complexes?

8 MR. HURST: They're single family housing.

9 Like, housing developments and things like that.

10 THE COURT: Okay. So they lend to the

11 developer.

12 MR. HURST: Right, the developers and the home

13 builders.

14 THE COURT: And individual -- okay.

15 MR. HURST: That's what they're supposed to

16 do.

17 THE COURT: And then individual buyers, when

18 they buy it, that's given back against the debt for

19 developing it in the first place, right?

20 MR. HURST: That's a layer removed from what UDF

21 says that they do. UDF doesn't worry about the financing

22 for the individual home buyers. They only worry about

23 the specific loans that they make to the home builders

24 and developers on land that's going to be developed for

25 housing.

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1 THE COURT: Say someone built a house. Maybe

2 they got the land from the developer, and they are

3 allowed to buy a lot. They build a house. The house is

4 sold. When the house is sold, the builder gets his money

5 back. He then is supposed to pay the developer back or

6 he's already paid the developer back when he bought the

7 lot, right?

8 MR. HURST: We don't get involved, as I

9 understand it, in the details and what the individual

10 home builders do and whether or not somebody like Mehrdad

11 Moayedi and Centurion goes in, and they're supposed to

12 develop the houses and build the houses for somebody and

13 the people that are buying ready made stack houses.

14 THE COURT: I just wondered how the lender gets

15 the money back when the house is sold. When does that

16 occur?

17 MR. HURST: We don't know. We would have to ask

18 the home builders and the developers of the homes, like

19 the Mehrdad Moayedis and then the Buffingtons.

20 THE COURT: Another one question I had, and I'm

21 little ahead of you on this, but profit. So let's say

22 UDF -- this goes to both sides. UDF lends money at 13

23 percent interest to...

24 MR. HURST: Centurion.

25 THE COURT: Centurion, who I guess is going to

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1 be the developer. Yes?

2 MR. HURST: Supposedly.

3 THE COURT: Their profit, is that the 13 percent

4 interest coming back or is that if this home is developed

5 and then it's leased out, somehow some of that goes back

6 to -- how do you define profit?

7 MS. CIRANGLE: Do you want me to answer? I

8 don't want to interrupt his...

9 THE COURT: I know, but I interrupt people all

10 the time. That's what I do for a living.

11 MS. CIRANGLE: So UDF lends to developers like

12 Centurion, who are going to develop a large single family

13 community. Centurion takes that money, develops the

14 land, makes it into buildable lots.

15 THE COURT: That's like streets and lots. Okay.

16 MS. CIRANGLE: Right. And they sell those lots

17 to a home builder like D. R. Horton, and that money pays

18 back the loan that UDF gave them.

19 THE COURT: With 13 percent interest.

20 MS. CIRANGLE: Right. Exactly.

21 THE COURT: So the profit to UDF is the 13

22 percent interest?

23 MS. CIRANGLE: It's 13 percent interest if UDF

24 has used capital that it raised. Some part of UDF is

25 leveraged --

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1 THE COURT: Wait, wait. Say that again.

2 MS. CIRANGLE: So UDF gets money from investors

3 that it lends. So then that 13 percent all goes back to

4 UDF. And it has an overhead and some other expenses, but

5 it pays out to the investors roughly nine percent.

6 UDF also borrows money from banks -- Legacy

7 Bank's affidavit is here -- at a very good interest rate

8 because they have such good credit. They could borrow

9 at, say, four and a half, five percent and then lend to

10 Centurion. Now their profit is the 13 less what they're

11 paying the bank.

12 THE COURT: But the profit is strictly coming

13 from the 13 percent charge.

14 MS. CIRANGLE: Generally, yes.

15 THE COURT: It comes from that, and you have to

16 net it out.

17 MS. CIRANGLE: Generally, yes.

18 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

19 Go ahead.

20 MR. HURST: Thank you, Your Honor. And since

21 we've got to the 13 percent interest point, the whole

22 idea is that nothing, nothing that we could have said,

23 did say, would have said or anybody else could say would

24 affect whether or not the existing funds -- UDF I, II,

25 III, IV, V -- any of those funds could get their money

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1 back for their investors unless they have to get money

2 and raise money and new capital to pay those investors

3 back, which is exactly what happened.

4 In other words, if their lawsuit is about, Well,

5 we can't raise any more money now for our new funds

6 because there's this stuff out there that says we're

7 doing some bad things, we have some irregularities and

8 some Ponzi like qualities and whatever, that shouldn't

9 affect whether or not Centurion pays back their loans and

10 they pay back their investors.

11 Instead what happens is if they claim that

12 they're getting funding, if you will, and having to get

13 new money in order to pay things back, which is exactly

14 what was happening, then it starts to look like a Ponzi

15 scheme. Then these financial irregularities come

16 about.

17 So if you take new money, new money, and you

18 pay, for instance, UDF V, and you take that money and

19 you're paying back investors in UDF IV, even though

20 you've told the mom and pops that you've raised this

21 money through that you're going to be raising money to

22 loan out money to developers and home builders in UDF V.

23 Then that is what a textbook Ponzi scheme is, and then it

24 starts to implode upon itself. All Ponzi schemes implode

25 upon themselves.

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1 So that's the importance of the fact that they

2 are a lender. I think both sides stipulate that they're

3 a lender. Means that all the indicia of fraud comes from

4 them being lenders except for being lenders with

5 nondiversified loan portfolios, which we'll talk about in

6 a second, and then money is switching from bucket to

7 bucket to bucket. Publicly traded lenders or public

8 lenders don't behave in the way that UDF behaves. That's

9 where the red flags start to come up.

10 So this is one of the many diagrams that was

11 created two-and-a-half years ago, and this shows

12 graphically exactly what happened. So you've got UDF V

13 giving liquidity to UDF IV, giving liquidity to UDF III,

14 giving liquidity to UDF I.

15 What does that look like, Your Honor? That has

16 all indicia of being improper, potentially Ponzi scheme

17 like -- Ponzi scheme like this is. UDF V, they only have

18 eight loans. Six of those loans is to Mehrdad Moayedi

19 and Centurion. Of those loans, they don't get paid back.

20 So that is the problem.

21 So we have here -- and again, this is the other

22 slide. They've had this for two and a half years.

23 THE COURT: Is that statement on this slide?

24 MR. HURST: Yes. I'm sorry. Which one, the

25 Centurion one?

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1 THE COURT: About the number of loans.

2 MR. HURST: No, it's right here at the bottom of

3 this slide.

4 THE COURT: Okay.

5 All right.

6 MR. HURST: In other words, I think as time went

7 on, Moayedi and Centurion's percentage of the money

8 borrowed through the UDF entities grew and grew to UDF V,

9 where it's 80 percent. And six of the eight loans are to

10 Centurion and Mehrdad Moayedi.

11 And here is more detail on it in slide number 12

12 where UDF III loaned money. Years later UDF IV acquires

13 the loan. The result, UDF IV ends up repaying UDF III's

14 investors and giving them their returns.

15 Well, UDF IV didn't sign up for that. The moms

16 and pops investors didn't sign up for that. Same thing

17 happened for UDF IV using to repay UDF III investors.

18 Same thing for UDF V using it to repay UDF III

19 investors.

20 MS. CIRANGLE: Just to be clear. I just want to

21 make sure because none of that -- though the facts are in

22 the record he's saying, he's reading a slide of what they

23 said, but there's no actual fact cited. So I just wanted

24 to make sure we have that clear.

25 It's a slide from their website. So we were

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1 okay with it coming in for that, but it's not evidence of

2 actual facts on it.

3 THE COURT: Okay. So here's what needs to

4 occur. I appreciate you saying that at this point. I'll

5 wait for your presentation to show me that you disagree

6 with that as being a fact.

7 MR. HURST: And we would point out that Parker

8 Lewis's affidavit goes through the research and the time

9 and the hundreds of hours that went into determining all

10 this stuff.

11 THE COURT: Yeah, but it you didn't have some of

12 those specifics.

13 MR. HURST: Oh, it did. I believe.

14 Okay. I'm sorry. It doesn't have these

15 specifics, but it had the machinations of how this

16 transpired.

17 THE COURT: Yeah, it explained how he did his

18 research, but I don't know if it had those specifics.

19 MR. HURST: So what's ends up happening, judge,

20 after all of this is you've got relevant disclosures

21 omitted, funds paying off other funds, loan

22 concentrations, all perilously a mess. So you've got

23 capital that is raised that end up buying these

24 nonperforming funds -- UDF IV raising money to buy the

25 nonperforming funds for UDF III, and so on and so on.

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1 All the while the management team is extracting

2 tens of millions of dollars. The partners are taking

3 hundreds of millions of dollars in profits, and

4 eventually this scheme, if you will, was destined to

5 fail.

6 So the difference is no difference between Ponzi

7 himself, Madoff, maybe UDF. All of these situations

8 started off in a scheme very similar to the one created

9 by Mr. Ponzi using new money raised by new investors to

10 pay off old investors and just keep it going for as long

11 as it can go until it doesn't, until it implodes.

12 So the gist of Hayman's comments -- you'll hear

13 a lot about the gist of Hayman's comments that were made

14 to the public is that we were raising serious concerns

15 and questions about UDF's business based upon UDF

16 disclosures based upon Hayman's hundreds of hours of

17 research to warn the investing public.

18 So red flags all over the place. We take into

19 account those red flags, and we determined, based upon

20 the two years of investigation, all the things that we've

21 seen and put together that this was perilously dangerous

22 and built on a house of cards.

23 So by the time we made the comment in December

24 of 2015, the first time we made public comment, they

25 would have you believe that the -- that by that time if

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1 you would look at the sworn testimony of Mr. Hollis

2 Greenlaw, who is here in this courtroom, the founder of

3 UDF. He swears, Well, it's smooth sailing, everything

4 was going to be great. If they wouldn't have made this

5 comment on December 12, 2015, everything was going to be

6 fine. You shouldn't have exposed us.

7 In fact, here's paragraph 83 of his affidavit.

8 He said, This is what caused the panic December 10, 2015.

9 There were no other events or news that day that would

10 have caused this unprecedented drop in UDF IV's stock

11 price.

12 It's misleading, and it's false, Your Honor.

13 It's very important for us to note that.

14 So let's talk about the chronology and talk

15 about what happened. Unbeknownst to the investing

16 public, starting in April of 2014, the SEC was already

17 investigating these folks. The SEC had already been

18 investigating UDF for the very things that went public in

19 2015 by virtue of Hayman's posting.

20 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I have to

21 object to that. There's zero evidence in the record of

22 that.

23 MR. HURST: Your Honor, we'll go to -- again,

24 she can argue all she wants, but there's an SEC filing.

25 THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait, wait. That's not

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1 her argument. It's like, is there evidence? Show her

2 where the evidence is where you can say they were

3 beginning their investigation April 2014.

4 MR. HURST: I would be happy to, Your Honor. If

5 I could get through my presentation, I think it's going

6 to silence a lot of her objections. She's objecting to

7 evidence I haven't shown on the screen.

8 THE COURT: Time out. That's the problem. It

9 needed to have been filed before today.

10 MR. HURST: It is, Your Honor. It's filed

11 before today. She was mistaken that it wasn't filed.

12 THE COURT: This is what y'all were supposed to

13 be working out a little bit ago.

14 MR. HURST: We did work it out. I showed her

15 the filings, where it is.

16 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, I agree the SEC began

17 investigation. What he said was the same things that

18 came out in Hayman's post, which is a complete lie.

19 THE COURT: Say that again.

20 MS. CIRANGLE: That came out in defendant's

21 posts. There's nothing whatsoever to suggest that that's

22 what the SEC was investigating. That's what was false

23 about what he said.

24 MR. HURST: You say it's false or you say that

25 there's not evidence. If that's really false --

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1 THE COURT: I am confused.

2 MR. HURST: So the SEC -- I'm sorry. I'm

3 skipping ahead.

4 Okay. The SEC started investigating -- based

5 upon their own disclosure, investigating UDF in April

6 2014. What I understand Ellen to be saying right now is

7 that they weren't investigating into the mortgage fraud

8 issue. I find that hard to believe, but if she's got

9 evidence to show us that's not the case, we would love to

10 see it.

11 So if I could finish my presentation --

12 THE COURT: No, she gets to finish her

13 objection.

14 MR. HURST: Okay. Her objection is what?

15 MS. CIRANGLE: My objection is there's nothing

16 in the record nor nothing available to tell you what the

17 SEC was investigating such that you could suggest to this

18 judge that the SEC or any government investigator is

19 investigating whether we were a Ponzi scheme. That's

20 just false.

21 There is no evidence. You can't fix this. It's

22 just not true.

23 MR. HURST: Well, if she's saying that's not

24 true, I would like to see evidence of that.

25 (Simultaneous speakers)

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1 THE COURT: I have a question. What were they

2 investigating?

3 MR. HURST: Exactly. What were they

4 investigating?

5 THE COURT: Well, there's evidence that they

6 were investigating something, right?

7 MS. CIRANGLE: Right. And that's -- four and a

8 half years later there's not a charge. There's not what

9 a claim. There's not a conviction. There's nothing.

10 THE COURT: But that's not the point.

11 MS. CIRANGLE: We are not aware that they

12 were --

13 THE COURT: That's not the point.

14 What is the evidence that shows they were

15 investigating something back in April 2014?

16 MR. HURST: Slide 19, Your Honor. That's the

17 one right in front of you.

18 THE COURT: Oh, fact finding investigation.

19 Okay. So they were investigating something. So

20 you can't object to the fact they were being

21 investigated. You're just saying they can't say it was

22 for a Ponzi scheme. You don't know what they were

23 investigating specifically.

24 That was marked in yellow. Is there something

25 that's not marked in yellow to show what they were

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1 looking into?

2 MR. HURST: No. It just says they were on a

3 fact-finding mission during this same time period when

4 all this stuff is going on. All this stuff is coming to

5 light regarding UDF, and there's a fact-finding mission.

6 If they want to tell us the specifics about what was

7 being investigated, that that wasn't the case, as opposed

8 to saying it was false, I would like to see evidence of

9 that.

10 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, look at the next

11 sentence.

12 THE COURT: Wait, wait. I already finished

13 reading it. It would be speculation to know what they

14 were investigating at this point. So I'm going to

15 sustain relative to it being a Ponzi scheme.

16 MR. HURST: That's fine, Your Honor. The point

17 is this is April 2014, which I'm going to get to again if

18 I can get through this. But April 2014 is the date they

19 started being investigated by the SEC, interestingly in

20 the timing of which they wait until a year and a half

21 later to disclose that to the investing public. A year

22 and a half later, which happened to be on the same night

23 that Hayman made their first public posting, December 10,

24 2015. They waited until after Hayman made their posting,

25 and all of a sudden they came forward and made a

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1 disclosure that same night that, Oh, by the way, the SEC

2 has been investigating us for a year and a half. That

3 night, the same night.

4 So all this -- okay. So that took place the

5 same day, albeit the night, that SEC -- Ellen's going to

6 say that took place after the market closed. Fine. I

7 agree that that took place after the market closed. But

8 the SEC began its investigation of UDF a year and a half

9 before Hayman posted sentence one on a public website.

10 The auditor, Whitley Penn, fired or resigned from its

11 largest client before Hayman said anything about UDF and

12 resigning before they even had a replacement.

13 Before Hayman said one word about UDF publicly,

14 Mr. Kahane, William Kahane, who's the director, resigned

15 all of a sudden from UDF Board of Trustees. Mr. Kahane

16 was one of the founders of RCS Capital. RCS Capital, who

17 was their the exclusive wholesale dealer. They're the

18 ones that found investors, if you will, for UDF. They

19 had to settle their securities violation, and they got

20 out of the business. So Mr. Kahane founds RCS Capital.

21 He resigns. RCS has to settle their securities

22 violations --

23 THE COURT: What securities violation?

24 MR. HURST: I've got it on here somewhere.

25 MS. CIRANGLE: It's not one of the parties, Your

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1 Honor, just to be clear.

2 MR. HURST: Well, it was their exclusive

3 developer. It was their exclusive fund raiser, if you

4 will, at the time. They resigned before Hayman posted

5 sentence one on the website.

6 THE COURT: I just wondered what their violation

7 was.

8 MS. CIRANGLE: It was a proxy issue in

9 Massachusetts. They were sending too many proxies.

10 MR. HURST: And there's all sorts of Wall Street

11 Journal articles that accused them of fraud. They had to

12 get out of the business to settle their securities

13 violations. That prompted the SEC to start investigating

14 companies like RCS in the wholesale REIT business.

15 So then we talked about what happens in the

16 circle, not the red flags and the cards that in red, but

17 in the circle. We talked about this is when Hayman went

18 to its first public statement, and that's December 10,

19 2015.

20 December 10, 2015, that night after we make our

21 posting, UDF decides to come forward and disclose their

22 SEC investigation. And they do so in the document I

23 showed you a minute ago, and I'll come back to in one

24 SEC. That same day UDF III failed to timely pay its

25 debt, so once again they default. They don't come

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1 forward on their debt.

2 Then subsequent events, as you'll hear from

3 Mr. Ramey in a second, bear it out. February 18 the FBI

4 raids UDF's headquarters. Shortly thereafter another

5 director resigns from UDF V, and then the Wells notice

6 comes out to UDF III, UDF 4, and their affiliates which

7 says the SEC has serious concerns, and we're

8 investigating you. That's what the Wells notice is.

9 So the documents that support everything I just

10 said are April '14 nonpublic fact finding. This is when

11 UDF knew of the SEC investigation, but didn't disclose it

12 to the investing public.

13 I'm going to point out the second date at the

14 top there where they waited until December 10, 2015, to

15 mea culpa and tell the investing public what would the

16 investing public known if they would have known they were

17 being investigated by the SEC.

18 THE COURT: In reading the rest of that slide,

19 it said, okay, that there's a nonpublic fact-finding

20 investigation being conducted by the SEC and that the

21 SEC's informed the companies, which would be UDF

22 companies --

23 MR. HURST: Right.

24 THE COURT: -- that the investigation is not an

25 indication that any violations of law have occurred or

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1 that the SEC has any negative opinion of any person in

2 the security.

3 It goes on to say, "We believe they have perfect

4 policies and procedures in place, and that the matter

5 will not have a material adverse affect on the company's

6 consolidated results of operation, financial position, or

7 liquidity." So that doesn't sound very serious, even

8 though I wouldn't want the SEC investigating me. But at

9 the same time sometimes they have like stops on the road

10 to make sure you've got your driver's license and

11 insurance.

12 So I don't know what the procedures of the SEC

13 are. It's not my business. So I don't know if that's a

14 big deal or not.

15 MR. HURST: Well, it was a big deal to them.

16 They didn't disclose it to the investing public, which is

17 the point, and it gets worse, Your Honor.

18 THE COURT: But it doesn't say they're being

19 investigated for anything particularly that's serious.

20 So I don't know what the practice is of the SEC. Do they

21 sometimes just routinely look at these companies?

22 MR. HURST: We'll get through that because then

23 they get the Wells notices which says that there's

24 serious concerns with compliance issues, on and on.

25 But the point being is whether it is what they

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1 said it is, which investigation is still going on, or

2 they can -- the point being is they didn't disclose it to

3 the public. They didn't disclose it to the investors,

4 which is a big deal --

5 THE COURT: See I don't know if it is or not.

6 See, that's what I'm asking you about. I don't know if

7 it is or not because I have no familiarity. Is this,

8 like, routine?

9 MR. HURST: Well, if you're asking me, it is a

10 big deal. It is a big deal to not disclose an SEC

11 investigation when you're a publicly traded company and

12 to wait a year and a half to make that disclosure only

13 after Hayman goes forward with the public disclosures on

14 the website.

15 MS. CIRANGLE: I object again. There's nothing

16 in the evidence to show that because, in fact, isn't the

17 type of thing that has to be disclosed. It was done in

18 an abundance of caution after the Ponzi scheme

19 allegations came out.

20 There's no evidence that there was requirement

21 that we disclose this.

22 MR. SOMMER: In fact, Your Honor, there's a case

23 about Goldman Sachs which holds that even when there's a

24 Wells notice, which means that the SEC is considering

25 action, the company has no obligation to disclose it.

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1 That's a case from New York we can provide to Your

2 Honor.

3 But the law is clear. The company has no duty

4 to disclose an SEC investigation into some sort of matter

5 or routine which is what counsel's implying that we did

6 something wrong by not disclosing, but the law is clearly

7 to the contrary on that point.

8 MR. HURST: The point being is, Your Honor, how

9 is the market going to perceive when they withhold this

10 information for a year and a half, and the night of the

11 posting they decide, Oh, by the way, the SEC is

12 investigating us. And we'll get to that in a second, as

13 well.

14 The Whitley Penn resignation, November 19, 2005

15 (sic) before Hayman disclosed sentence one. November 24

16 Mr. Kahane resigns. RCS, the dealer/manager, charged

17 with fraud, and they were founded and built by

18 Mr. Kahane. They got out of the business as a result of

19 a settlement on their securities violations.

20 So I'm going to pass the baton over now to Cole,

21 let him take it from here.

22 MR. RAMEY: Your Honor, I'm going run through

23 this pretty quick --

24 MR. HURST: I'm sorry. One last thing.

25 Cole, sorry to interrupt you.

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1 We went past the slide, and before Ellen comes

2 up and says I was misrepresenting to Court about the

3 statements about disclosing the financial interests. We

4 said we disclosed the financial interest to -- I said in

5 open court we disclosed to the authorities, and we later

6 disclosed financial interest to the investing public.

7 It was not in the December disclosure. It was

8 in the February disclosure posting that we posted our

9 financial interests in the litigation -- in UDF, that we

10 said we do have a financial interest in UDF.

11 THE COURT: When did that begin, by the way,

12 that financial interest?

13 MR. HURST: We gave them that information --

14 MS. CIRANGLE: First quarter 2015.

15 MR. HURST: Yeah.

16 MS. CIRANGLE: We know by March we didn't get

17 any earlier trading data.

18 MR. HURST: Yeah. I just wanted to make sure

19 that I was clear it was February of 2015 when we had the

20 disclaimer on there showing that we had a financial

21 interest.

22 MS. CIRANGLE: 2016.

23 MR. HURST: 2016. Thank you.

24 THE COURT: December 15, 2015, was the first

25 posting.

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1 MR. HURST: December 10, 2015.

2 THE COURT: And the fact that UDF financial just

3 wasn't disclosed on your postings until a year later?

4 MR. HURST: No, until two months later.

5 February.

6 THE COURT: February. Okay. '16. Okay. Thank

7 you.

8 All right.

9 MR. RAMEY: I'm going the try to run through as

10 quick as I can, Your Honor, and I know you'll jump in.

11 THE COURT: You do?

12 MR. RAMEY: Well...

13 THE COURT: Probably, based on prior conduct.

14 MR. RAMEY: Let me just try to set the table

15 again. We're not here -- the point of all these

16 arguments is not that we're trying to prove the SEC case

17 or the AUSA's case. What we're trying to say is they

18 want to tell you, Look over here at this website. Look

19 at this short sell. Whatever you do, don't look at

20 police. Don't look at the FBI. Don't look at the SEC.

21 Don't look at our auditor. Don't look at our Nasdaq

22 delisting. Don't look at our own financials. Please,

23 please, look over here.

24 When we make our comments, and we put it up

25 there, a month after their auditor resigns. And we say,

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1 We don't think this thing is any good. We think it

2 stinks. That night they say, By the way, we don't have

3 to disclose it. The case law says I don't have to

4 disclose it, but I'm going to anyway. There is a

5 fact-finding investigation that I didn't do anything

6 wrong. The market reacts to that. All these things are

7 a chain of events that happens that we think is the real

8 cause of UDF's downfall.

9 That's what I want to talk to you about, three

10 things. What caused us to make public comment about

11 them, the public comment that we did make, and, in fact,

12 what was really happening in their own shop at the time

13 which I think will lead you to conclude clearly that

14 UDF's problems were of its own making, which is what I

15 said, and that our comments are wholly factual and

16 appropriate as part of our First Amendment speech rights.

17 Mr. Coale is going to sum up what that means under the

18 law.

19 So, first, how did Hayman come to learn about

20 UDF, and why did it this? Well, if you look at UDF's

21 breathless allegations, it calls Kyle Bass a desperate

22 loser and a gambler and a bad guy, unsavory connections,

23 and he has has hostility towards UDF. That's the

24 allegations. I'm talking allegations and proof.

25 What's the proof? You can see from Mr. Lewis's

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1 affidavit why they took an interest in this entity. They

2 found out about ARCP. They found out about its problems.

3 They found out about its affiliate, RCS, and that RCS was

4 raising capital for UDF V.

5 We knew the SEC and FINRA had already said these

6 kind of companies are the most problematic things we're

7 looking at right now. And he began to do his

8 investigation.

9 In November 2014, one full year before we ever

10 said a word about it -- and that's Mr. Lewis's

11 affidavit -- points out he found a lot of financial

12 irregularities from looking at public records. Loan

13 concentrations, high cost debt, deficiency notes, and the

14 use of their largest borrower, Centurion, as intermediary

15 moving funds between the UDF entities.

16 From that he had questions about solvency

17 concerns about both the borrowers insuring and the UDF

18 entities. And having raised those concerns -- we thought

19 about that for a year -- what did we decide? Hayman

20 decided it was a matter of public concern about public

21 figures, the government, the economy, and good service in

22 the marketplace.

23 And it was trading publicly. It was continuing

24 to raise money from the investors, and, in fact, he was

25 seeking to raise an additional billion dollars. That's

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1 the limits of the TCPA.

2 What do we do when we see a matter of concern?

3 We exercise our right of free speech, Your Honor, and we

4 make comment and ask questions and post red flags about

5 that. That's why we're here for this motion. That's

6 what the Anti-SLAPP procedure and the TCPA is.

7 And as Mr. Lewis's affidavit tells you, well,

8 after a year of this he decides to pen a letter to the

9 auditor who has resigned without an explanation at all

10 and later decided to distribute that letter and its

11 findings because of public interest and a fiduciary

12 responsibility.

13 So what? Well, like anybody does in the market,

14 put it out in the marketplace. People discuss and

15 consider and see what people think about it so it could

16 be evaluated by market participants. His research is two

17 years, and our website includes the production of

18 hundreds of pages of documents and a review of thousands

19 of pages of records.

20 As Your Honor just asked me to clarify, the

21 first post we made was anonymous, as was our absolute

22 right to do. And within 60 days we fully attribute it to

23 Hayman so that if Mr. Bass was, in fact, the desperate

24 gambler with unsavory connections that they're alleging

25 that he was, the people can take in the stock, who the

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1 speaker is, what he's saying, and what it's for.

2 Before you go into our website, we post a very

3 lengthy disclaimer you have to look at before you see

4 anything that says who we are. This is a Hayman site.

5 It says what our financial interest is. We've got a

6 short on this. We're going to make money if it goes

7 down.

8 THE COURT: When was the short obtained?

9 MR. RAMEY: The short, I believe, was billed

10 throughout 2015.

11 THE COURT: When did the first trade --

12 MS. CIRANGLE: First quarter of 2015. By March

13 of 2015 was our earliest date.

14 THE COURT: Yeah, I asked that before.

15 MR. RAMEY: No postings for months and months

16 after that while we were finishing our research, Your

17 Honor.

18 Our disclaimer says the materials were based on

19 public information. There might be information we don't

20 have. Site contains estimates, projections, and

21 opinions, and those might be inaccurate. And that

22 readers should conduct their own investigation, including

23 UDF investors. That's the essence of free speech, Your

24 Honor.

25 What's in the site? Well, a lot of things.

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1 It's got Forbes Magazine's predictions about UDF that

2 came out long before we ever commented in May of 2015.

3 It's got a letter from Kyle Bass that makes a lot of

4 general factual statements. For instance, we don't think

5 you should use cash from new investors to repay old

6 investors. We don't think that's sound. It has links to

7 third party news articles down there. Business Insider,

8 Forbes, and Dallas Morning News. And it's got a few

9 hundred pages of presentations and analysis, all based on

10 public record, attaching those public records, pointing

11 them out, and attaching some of UDF's only financial

12 documents.

13 For instance, I'm just going to give you a

14 couple page that were on that website. We show that we

15 think the UDF loan portfolio is dangerously

16 overconcentrated in one borrower whose affiliates have

17 more than 600 million dollars of the borrowings out

18 there. 57 percent according to that slide. And that

19 loans to this person are extended and sometimes not

20 repaid on maturity. think that's a problem. That's in

21 UDF's own financial records.

22 UDF doesn't deny that its concentration of loans

23 is in that individual's (inaudible). We give an example

24 where UDF V capital comes in and repays old UDF III

25 investors. Specifically, we're a loan from UDF V, so one

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1 of Moayedi's companies was used to pay off a previous

2 loan to Mr. Moayedi by UDF III from the old investors'

3 money. And then UDF investors -- UDF charged its

4 investors an origination fee on that based on the loan it

5 had already underwritten by the old entity. We think

6 that's stinks. So we point out that's what's happened

7 factually. And I don't think UDF denies that's what

8 happened.

9 We have an instance here with the Williamsburg

10 event where we've got UDF I borrowing money. It goes

11 immediately into foreclosure. UDF loans money -- UDF IV

12 does. Loans money to Centurion to buy it out of

13 foreclosure. And then they pay UDF a multimillion dollar

14 assistance fee with UDF IV money. That's UDF IV public

15 shareholder capital using to allow UDF I private

16 investors to partially regroup their past realized

17 losses.

18 THE COURT: Time out. Go back. So this whole

19 thing started before the financial crisis began in 2008,

20 UDF I.

21 MR. HURST: Yes.

22 THE COURT: All right. So UDF I gets the bank

23 loan. They loan it to, I guess, Williamsburg.

24 MR. RAMEY: In this instance, no, UDF I was

25 actually the one that got a loan from a bank and was

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1 going to go develop Williamsburg back when UDF was in the

2 development business.

3 THE COURT: Okay.

4 MR. RAMEY: It immediately goes into the tank

5 because of the housing crisis. UDF I defaults. RCS, you

6 just heard about. They raised capital for UDF IV. UDF

7 IV gives the money to Centurion, Mr. Moayedi. He buys

8 the UDF loan out of bankruptcy, relieves that. And they

9 paid UDF I millions of dollars. That's UDF IV investor

10 money going to pay UDF I.

11 Again, that's what we think is happening. We

12 think it stinks. We think we're entitled to comment on

13 it. They're entitled to dispute it or say, You don't get

14 it, which they do.

15 THE COURT: What did the FDIC do for UDF I when

16 it defaulted?

17 MR. RAMEY: What did they do? It says they were

18 appointed as receiver for Premier Bank to add the loan

19 that UDF I defaulted on from the Williamsburg

20 development.

21 THE COURT: Okay. I'm trying to remember. So

22 the FDIC ended up selling properties as receiver to apply

23 against the loans, right?

24 MR. RAMEY: I don't know if that was part of the

25 FDIC to take this loan. I don't think it happened. I

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1 think -- and I can check at a break. I think Centurion

2 bought it out of their receivership.

3 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, also again, none of

4 this is actually in the records.

5 MR. RAMEY: And again I'm not the prosecutor.

6 I'm telling the public what I think happens, what they're

7 doing. That's what we're seeing from their records.

8 THE COURT: All right.

9 MR. RAMEY: Another instance. We become aware

10 of the lawsuit in Fort Bend County, saying UDF IV used

11 shell entities to circumvent REIT limitations. UDF IV

12 has disclosed a loan to someone they called a nonrelated

13 party. And that is called 349 Memorial.

14 So Mr. Lewis looks up 349 Memorial, LLC, and

15 they've got a business address of 13809 Research

16 Boulevard in Austin. We go to Austin, and what does 349

17 Memorial say? It says United Development Funding outside

18 of his office. We think that stinks because they have

19 said that that loan is to nonrelated party. So we post

20 that and say, This is what we're finding. Thousands of

21 pages of this, based on their own records.

22 So the website, we put our comments in the

23 market, as we're entitled to do, and what happens? Well,

24 the market is going to process that information. UDF,

25 they're going to explain why we're wrong or an analyst is

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1 going to tell us why we're wrong. If we're wrong, the

2 market is going to reject our concerns, and we'll lose

3 our short on the trade. Our shorts on our short.

4 That's what people are doing on half the cable

5 news shows in the country. They're going on and talking

6 about who's going to make it, who's not, who you're going

7 to bet on, and who you're going to bet against. That's

8 what Hayman did. UDF wants to have you believe this

9 billion dollar company that was strong as a rock was

10 effectively ruined by a website from someone who they say

11 was a desperate gambler with unsavory connections. We

12 are asking questions, we are making comments, and we are

13 posting public records.

14 What UDF doesn't tell you in its paper is what

15 was also going on out there in the marketplace. Back to

16 what Mr. Hurst said a minute ago, the night after our

17 posting comes up, they file an SEC filing, and they put

18 on their own website, and they tell their investors on

19 the website, Hey, by the way we responded to that

20 Internet anonymous nonsense. That's what they say on

21 their website.

22 But when you look at the actual filing, they

23 said, Oh, by the way, since you said all this, we've been

24 cooperating with a nonpublic fact-finding investigation.

25 We don't think anything is wrong. We think we complied

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1 with the laws.

2 Okay. Reasonable to assume the market is going

3 to react a little bit skeptically, we think.

4 Then they issue what they call is this response

5 to our misleading anonymous posts. Do they give their

6 own presentation? Do they show, Here's the facts they

7 got wrong, the lies they told? Here's the information

8 they didn't have. I'm sorry. They missed it. The short

9 seller is going to lose everything.

10 No, they call us the short and distort scheme,

11 they're misleading, and they clearly demonstrate a lack

12 of understanding of kind of what we do, which everybody

13 who's gotten in trouble says that. said that. You

14 know, you just don't get us.

15 Investors who wish to understand our business,

16 we're not going to tell you in our postings kind of

17 what's wrong with Hayman, but just review our

18 registration statements and our periodic SEC filings, and

19 that'll be fine. They release a three or four page

20 document that talks about their loan concentration. Yes,

21 they're right. We've got things concentrated in a single

22 developer. They say things are fine.

23 It's not just us talking at the time, again,

24 Your Honor. It's not just Hayman. The Wall Street

25 Journal says, Another danger for UDF IV. Two-thirds of

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1 their loans were made to one person.

2 And then on February 13 is the thing that really

3 causes their problems. It's not a website. It's not

4 gossip. It's not an investor. It's not people buying

5 short or long. The FBI raids them on February 18. Not

6 based on our website; based on a search warrant issued by

7 the Northern District of Texas. And law enforcement

8 served their officers with Grand Jury subpoenas.

9 That's not just a nonpublic fact-finding

10 investigation. Who knows what the SEC might be asking?

11 That's the FBI going to the magistrate and saying, I've

12 got probable cause of a crime, please give me a search

13 warrant.

14 And they also say there, you know, the FBI was

15 here, people in blue jackets, but we don't think it's a

16 big deal. We didn't do anything wrong. They're entitled

17 to say that. The market is entitled to wonder what on

18 earth is going on there.

19 The news obviously explodes. Law enforcement

20 activities. The FBI issued subpoenas. They removed

21 materials. And even national magazines say, Now, UDF is

22 trying to blame Kyle Bass for all this, but they're

23 profiting. It's going to have a hard arguing that the

24 FBI raid was motivated by Kyle Bass.

25 It goes without saying, Your Honor, the FBI

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1 doesn't show up because they're surfing the web. They

2 show up with their side arms because they've gone and

3 gotten a search warrant based on showing some evidence of

4 a crime. I'm not here to prove that crime. I'm here to

5 say what we're commenting to the market about. These are

6 huge problems.

7 That's not the end of the problems coming out of

8 the UDF. In March of 2016 they disclosed to the world

9 that they're not in compliance with Nasdaq rules why?

10 Because they haven't issued any financial statements

11 since five months ago when their auditor resigned. And

12 Nasdaq gives them 60 days to get their act together.

13 They filed thereafter, saying, We're not able to complete

14 our financial statements. Why? Of course, it's because

15 of Kyle Bass and Hayman. No, it's because our auditor

16 resigned five months earlier, and we've just not been

17 able to engage one yet. We really don't know when we're

18 going to be able to do that. That's five months later.

19 This is not just Hayman. This is their investors in the

20 market.

21 Later in May they disclosed to everybody they

22 got a forebearance agreement with one of their lenders,

23 and we defaulted. And pursuant to our agreement, we're

24 going to suspend distributions to our shareholders, and

25 we're going to agree not to originate new mortgage loans

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1 and incur debt or substitute collateral without getting

2 the lender's consent. They came out again and said, The

3 Nasdaq has told us again that we have not yet filed our

4 records, and we denied UDF's requests for continued

5 listing on Nasdaq. Still no financial reports. Still no

6 auditor. Now seven months after Whitley Penn resigns for

7 that reason, then in June they report that they found an

8 auditor. June 2016.

9 And I'll just cut to the chase, Your Honor. Two

10 years later, not a single financial statement has been

11 filed. Two years.

12 THE COURT: Wait. Okay. The financial

13 statements quit being filed...

14 MR. RAMEY: On the 2015 before the Hayman

15 comment, the raid.

16 MS. CIRANGLE: That's not true. Last ones due

17 were September 30, 2015. They were filed. It was after

18 the Hayman post.

19 MR. RAMEY: Yeah, the last file was before the

20 Hayman post. No filings after the Hayman post. How

21 about that?

22 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay.

23 MR. RAMEY: September 2015 Q3 2015 was filed.

24 Then the auditor resigns. Then Hayman speaks. Then

25 Board of directors resign, and then the FBI raids, and

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1 not a peep from them since.

2 THE COURT: That's not my question.

3 MR. RAMEY: Okay.

4 THE COURT: My question is June 8, 2016, which

5 is, like, about six months after the last filing of the

6 Q10 --

7 MR. RAMEY: No, there was no 10K. The last 10Q

8 was September of 2015.

9 THE COURT: September when?

10 MR. RAMEY: Q3 I assume was filed early October,

11 late September of 2015 for Q3. November, someone's

12 whispering back there. Fine.

13 THE COURT: I thought Q10s were filed every

14 three months.

15 MR. RAMEY: They are for Qs 1, 2, and 3. So

16 March, June, and September. And counsel just said the

17 last one filed was the Q3 2015, and. The K is filed

18 annually.

19 THE COURT: The K. Okay. So I think I was

20 correct. Okay. There wasn't one filed in December 2015.

21 All right. This is June 8, 2016.

22 So my question is that means that a Q10 has not

23 been filed for nine months at this point, right?

24 MR. RAMEY: Yeah, nine months.

25 THE COURT: So Eisner Amper took the place of

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1 the other group.

2 MR. RAMEY: Whitley Penn. Remember, I showed

3 you the slide.

4 THE COURT: I know. Listen to my question.

5 They quit in November 2015, if I recall.

6 MR. RAMEY: Right.

7 THE COURT: So now you've got six months later

8 or seven months later Eisner Amper is on board. And are

9 you saying they -- are they still on board?

10 MR. RAMEY: I'm just telling you they have not

11 said that they resigned. They are on board.

12 THE COURT: And they haven't filed a Q10 yet.

13 MR. RAMEY: They haven't filed a 10K or a 10Q

14 since that time.

15 And I'll somehow you something they filed last

16 week saying Eisner Amper is working on it. We're getting

17 around to it. We've got no assurance when they're going

18 to file it, though.

19 THE COURT: That was my question.

20 MR. RAMEY: Yes. So all this time they're

21 blaming Hayman for all this. They're not filing any

22 financials. And all their documents say, the lenders,

23 We need your financials. Nasdaq says we need your

24 financials.

25 They tell us in the earlier statement, We can't

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1 file our financials because Whitley Penn is gone. Now

2 Eisner Amper is there, and two years later they're still

3 not doing it. And everybody in the marketplace is

4 saying, Huh. And they're trying to get you to believe

5 that one guy with a website is is the guy causing the

6 troubles. That's my point.

7 After they announce EisnerAmper is on board at

8 the end of the second quarter, second period, 10Q for

9 2016 --

10 THE COURT: I was calling it a Q10.

11 MR. RAMEY: I think the accountants call it a

12 10Q.

13 THE COURT: Whatever. It's got a Q and a 10.

14 MR. RAMEY: I couldn't pass the CPA. That's why

15 I became a lawyer.

16 They say they engaged EisnerAmper, and they're

17 going to work diligently to complete them and file them

18 as soon as possible, but there's no assurance when again.

19 Still hasn't happened yet.

20 And in August they disclosed that the Listing

21 Qualifications Department of Nasdaq says, Hey, Trust, you

22 didn't file it, and we're going to take that into

23 consideration when we decide to yank you off the

24 exchange, which they did. Trading in the trust

25 securities will remain halted, as they were after the FBI

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1 raid. Not because of what Kyle Bass said; because the

2 FBI raided them.

3 Now, I think I showed you earlier when UDF makes

4 a posting, and they tell their investors on their

5 website, Hey, we were funded to anonymous clowns on the

6 Internet, and that's it. Here they say, We received a

7 written notification from Nasdaq that they determined to

8 delist our shares. Why? Because of market gossip? No,

9 because we can't file our financials.

10 Look at what they don't say in that heading

11 what's attached in the press release --

12 THE COURT: Could I ask a dumb question?

13 MR. RAMEY: Sure.

14 THE COURT: So in December you file a 10K, but

15 do you also file another 10Q?

16 MR. RAMEY: I'm going to give you my guess.

17 There is no Q4, 10Q, that gets filed. Instead it's the

18 10K at the end of that year. So three quarterly reports

19 and a filing. Three Qs and a K.

20 So they talk about the delisting that was the

21 point of that post we just saw. What else did they

22 disclose. Oh, by the way, not just a nonpublic

23 fact-finding investigation. Hey, we also told Nasdaq --

24 THE COURT: Don't touch my screen.

25 MR. RAMEY: I'm not going to do it.

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1 Hold on. There it is.

2 In addition, the trust informed Nasdaq the trust

3 has received a Wells notice. It's not an investigation

4 notice. It's not a subpoena. It states, The staff at

5 the SEC has made a determination to recommend that the

6 SEC file an enforcement action against them. This goes

7 to everybody who's looking to invest, and every lender

8 sees this.

9 It's not a formal allegation or finding. It's

10 for the SEC and AUSA to worry about. But it's a

11 determination that's going to recommend that the SEC sue

12 them. They don't just file it on their website --

13 THE COURT: Go back.

14 MR. RAMEY: Sure. And they again say they don't

15 think they've done anything wrong, and they're entitled

16 to say that, just like we're entitled to say it doesn't

17 look right to us. We don't know how long it will last or

18 what the outcome will be or what action they may decide

19 to pursue.

20 They don't just file that. They send a press

21 release out saying that the SEC gave them a Wells notice,

22 and they're going to recommend that an enforcement action

23 be filed against them. That goes to the lenders. That

24 goes to the investing public, everybody. These are the

25 things they don't want you to look at. They want you to

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1 look at a website.

2 Finally, in January the Nasdaq review counsel

3 affirms the finding of the hearings panel to delist them.

4 Why? Because they still won't file their financials.

5 Now we are seven months after the EisnerAmper

6 engagements, and they say they're going to file a formal

7 notice of the delisting right here.

8 THE COURT: Okay. I got you.

9 MR. RAMEY: Okay. So, in fact, delisting

10 happens. They announce it in May of 2017. Again, the

11 market reacts. There's a press release saying why have

12 they been delisted? Not because of market gossip, not

13 because the share price went down. Because they still

14 will not file the 10K and the 10Q for the previous

15 quarters.

16 And Nasdaq makes sure everybody knows it. They

17 are delisted, and their stock has been suspended. This

18 adds to the cacophony of noise out there about UDF.

19 Obviously Hayman is part of it. It also includes the

20 FBI, SEC, Forbes Magazine, Wall Street Journal and a lot

21 of other people all saying, Something's up at UDF.

22 In addition their own filings provided all this

23 detail. The lawsuits roll in, both before and after our

24 posting.

25 MS. CIRANGLE: I'm going to object to that. The

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1 lawsuits were after the posting.

2 MR. RAMEY: Well, there were a lot of lawsuits

3 before, but we can --

4 THE COURT: Wait.

5 MR. RAMEY: I'll clarify, after your question.

6 THE COURT: That was going to be my question.

7 MR. RAMEY: There were lawsuits filed that gave

8 Mr. Lewis a lot of problems as he discusses on the

9 website about fraud and investor allegations, those kind

10 of things. After the raid and the delisting the

11 investor, the UDF investor --

12 THE COURT: You lost me on that.

13 MR. RAMEY: Okay.

14 THE COURT: Were there any lawsuits filed before

15 the posting?

16 MR. RAMEY: There were lawsuits filed involving

17 UDF that were the subject of our posting and are

18 mentioned in our website. Obviously the investors had no

19 reason yet to file their suits because the stock --

20 THE COURT: I know that, but that's not the

21 issue.

22 MR. RAMEY: Are there lawsuits? Sure.

23 MS. CIRANGLE: There were no lawsuits alleging

24 it was a Ponzi scheme or anything like that. He's

25 talking about minor lawsuits involving property that had

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1 nothing to do with their allegations in the posts.

2 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to go into this

3 right this minute because this is an important point.

4 What kind of minor lawsuits are we talking

5 about? And are any of them listed on this long list of

6 lawsuits against UDF and -- wait, wait.

7 Stand still. You're driving me crazy.

8 MR. RAMEY: Okay.

9 THE COURT: It's like you're pacing. See, it

10 comes up here on this screen, and the problem with this

11 set up is that, because it's not coming up here, you

12 can't point to it. And then you approach there, but when

13 you approach there my screen gets in the way. So I've

14 got some visual issues going on here.

15 This -- it says 64 in the bottom right, List of

16 Lawsuits. Were any of those lawsuits filed prior to the

17 posting? It looks like maybe --

18 MS. CIRANGLE: No.

19 THE COURT: What about the top two ones?

20 MS. CIRANGLE: No.

21 THE COURT: Wait a minute. The posting was

22 December 10.

23 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes.

24 THE COURT: The first two lawsuits were filed,

25 it looks like, in 2015.

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1 MR. SOMMER: It is later.

2 MS. CIRANGLE: A few days after the postings,

3 yes.

4 MS. CIRANGLE: The copy of the Ponzi and

5 everything, and they filed the lawsuit, like, three days

6 after the posts. Plaintiffs' lawyers reacted.

7 THE COURT: I'm trying to get it straight in my

8 head.

9 MR. RAMEY: The website, which is also in the

10 evidence, discloses the other lawsuits that we don't

11 believe are inconsequential, and we commented on.

12 THE COURT: I'm sorry. What? The way you said

13 that, I didn't hear you.

14 MR. RAMEY: Part of our website -- I think I

15 told you in that slide that talks about what's on the

16 website. There was one about this 349 memorial. We got

17 that information from a Fort Bend County lawsuit that

18 said that UDF was trying to violate REIT rules.

19 THE COURT: So you got that one. All right.

20 MR. RAMEY: And there are others that we comment

21 on, but they are not the investor lawsuits that I just

22 showed you. So when I said the lawsuits rolled in.

23 THE COURT: I'm just trying to keep it clear in

24 my head. This is a lot of information. It's like

25 drinking out a fire hose.

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1 MR. RAMEY: A fire hose of information we think

2 that was out there in the marketplace that caused their

3 decline. Not just one website.

4 I've just been handed a note --

5 THE COURT: But -- okay. Here's my problem. I

6 want specific information when, where, why versus broad

7 brush.

8 MR. RAMEY: Okay.

9 THE COURT: So I got curious what lawsuits were

10 filed before the posting that then the posting triggered

11 from. But sometimes you tend to, like, open up the door

12 again, and the floodgates come. And it's like no, just

13 stick to my specific questions so I can analyze it.

14 MR. RAMEY: Okay.

15 THE COURT: It's called being a very boring

16 former math major. And I hate math majors who are

17 attorneys in my courtroom because they drive me nuts, but

18 I'm going to drive you nuts.

19 MR. RAMEY: I can't site you the case style, but

20 I can provide it to you later. I believe there were at

21 least two: Fort Bend County and Travis County.

22 THE COURT: And they dealt with the fact they

23 didn't believe that these -- everything was structured

24 properly.

25 MS. CIRANGLE: Nothing.

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1 MR. RAMEY: We do think that there are

2 allegations in those lawsuits that cause concerns about

3 their lending practices and their business practices.

4 THE COURT: I want to know exactly what those

5 lawsuits were about because that's what's pertinent to

6 what we have today.

7 MR. RAMEY: I'll get you a copy of them, Your

8 Honor, and I can tell Your Honor a website.

9 THE COURT: Give me two or three sentences about

10 each, and that will do it.

11 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, they've gone an hour

12 and five minutes. I just want to make sure because we're

13 at 4:38.

14 THE COURT: They're going to turn off the

15 lights, you know.

16 MS. CIRANGLE: I know. I think in fairness we

17 should be able to go an hour and five minutes so that we

18 don't run out of time.

19 THE COURT: I'm fine with that, but we may have

20 to continue this another week. And I realize we've taken

21 some time getting geared up, but I believe that's

22 probably saved time and argument because these arguments

23 take time.

24 Anyway, I want to know about those two lawsuits.

25 Go ahead.

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1 MR. RAMEY: I'll let you know, Your Honor.

2 Thank you.

3 I'll wrap up quickly and turn it over to

4 Mr. Coale.

5 Again, no financial reports filed to the State.

6 That's the one that was filed 10 days ago, March 11.

7 Still Whitney Penn resigned. EisnerAmper is working on

8 it. They're working diligently, and there's no assurance

9 when it's going to happen. We think these are the

10 reasons why the stock did what it did, and the investors

11 had the problems that they had with it.

12 THE COURT: Due to the lack of final

13 financials.

14 MR. RAMEY: Due to what?

15 THE COURT: Let me read it.

16 (Pause)

17 THE COURT: Go ahead.

18 MR. RAMEY: I'm going to read really quickly

19 before I turn it over a point that Mr. Hurst made. What

20 UDF does is very, very simple. They get money. Either

21 they raise it, and they lent it out, and the spread is

22 their profit, as Your Honor recognized.

23 Nothing about what we say stops their loans from

24 getting paid off. Nothing about the stock price stops

25 them from paying their investors. That's out of cash

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1 flow and revenue. If the business model was solid -- we

2 don't think it was, and we commented on that. If it was

3 solid, they lend out those billions of dollars. They

4 come back in. They pay themselves, and they pay their

5 people. They couldn't for some reason.

6 Here's just an example of one of their own

7 letters after the financial stuff and after everything

8 got shut down. What do they tell their own investors,

9 limited partners, and UDF III? It's been really part of

10 the hedge fund. We've got EisnerAmper. This is a year

11 ago. And we still haven't gotten financials together.

12 The certainty and timing of the Fund's ability to access

13 capital will determine the rate at which we can fund new

14 loans and grow operating income. The amount and timing

15 of fund distributions will be determined after UDF III

16 files its financials.

17 They need new money to come in to make the

18 payments. That's the problem. When someone said, We

19 know what's that's called. You're going the hear a lot

20 of this Ponzi, Ponzi, Ponzi, Ponzi.

21 THE COURT: I know about the Ponzi scheme.

22 MR. RAMEY: Right. It doesn't mean you're the

23 devil. It doesn't mean there's nothing there. It just

24 means you're taking the money and paying old people off.

25 That's what the SEC defines it as. That's what we think

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1 they were doing. It looked like that.

2 And a couple times in the website we said that.

3 We're entitled to say that. The SEC says that's what it

4 means. They're entitled to comment.

5 One more thing. If you were a billion dollar

6 company that was legitimate, and if this reckless gambler

7 came out and said these things in thousands of pages,

8 presumably you would go to the market and say, That's

9 false. Let me show you these documents. We're going to

10 have this posting. Here, lender, here are these

11 things.

12 Nothing. Nothing. Crickets. They just say on

13 their website, We disagree. You don't get it. Look at

14 our registration statements.

15 There's not one document that they've produced

16 yet, speaking of evidence and documents, that show a

17 single e-mail, text, phone call, or letter to the guy

18 that owes them 600 million dollars. Not one.

19 THE COURT: To the guy that what?

20 MR. RAMEY: That owes them 600 million dollars.

21 Their biggest lender that we think is a problem. Biggest

22 borrower. Sorry.

23 Nothing. There's not one single document

24 produced that explains why their long standing

25 accountants --

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1 MR. SOMMER: They didn't ask for those documents

2 in that fashion. That's just misleading.

3 THE COURT: I'm sorry. What?

4 Time out. Let me explain my greatest asset.

5 I've deaf in one ear totally. So when there's an

6 interruption, I can't hear anybody. Court reporters love

7 me for this because only one person gets to talk at a

8 time. Right? And it does make for a little slower

9 delivery, but everybody gets to say their piece without

10 interruption. So hold that thought.

11 Say that again.

12 MR. RAMEY: He's about to say we didn't ask for

13 it right. I'll show you. It says, Documents sufficient

14 to show why Whitley Penn resigned. We were up here

15 arguing three weeks ago for six hours.

16 THE COURT: No, you weren't. I didn't let you.

17 I made you figure it out on your own. You argued with

18 him, not me.

19 MR. RAMEY: If this was a legitimate operation,

20 they would have had these things out there. They would

21 show these things. They would have them in text. They

22 wouldn't just call us bad people calling them names.

23 They would show why it's legitimate. They didn't. We

24 think the music has stopped on this.

25 THE COURT: Time out. I've been very curious

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1 why Whitley Penn resigned, as well.

2 MR. RAMEY: Me, too.

3 THE COURT: So you asked for discovery. But you

4 didn't argue in front of me because I threw you in a

5 room, and y'all figured it out, and you left.

6 MR. RAMEY: She stood up there and argued,

7 saying, We have documents sufficient to show, and then we

8 started haggling about --

9 THE COURT: You haggled. That was the end of

10 it. So whatever happened?

11 MR. RAMEY: We didn't get it.

12 MS. EZIE-BONCOUER: Your Honor, they represented

13 that they provided all responsive documents, and that

14 relates to Mr. Ramey's position right now that if they

15 provided all responsive documents related to Whitley

16 Penn, it's a bit odd that there's nothing in the record

17 and nothing that they produced that relates to why they

18 resigned. That's why we came and filed a motion to

19 compel.

20 THE COURT: But then you all I thought worked it

21 out.

22 MS. EZIE-BONCOUER: They represented there's

23 nothing, Your Honor. We had not worked out the profit

24 sharing agreement, Your Honor, and that's one of the

25 things we raised this afternoon.

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1 MS. CIRANGLE: We did produce the correspondence

2 from Whitley Penn. By the way, they did not resign.

3 They did something called declination that said they

4 wanted to no longer work for us. We could sit here and

5 talk about that all day, but Dale Kitchens tells you

6 there was a rule that said if there's anything wrong,

7 they have to disclose it. They didn't. There's no

8 evidence of any wrongdoing. But it seized on that, sent

9 a letter -- published a letter saying, Oh, my God, the

10 accountants are in on a fraudulent Ponzi scheme.

11 As soon as EisnerAmper gets hired, Well, wait

12 till I show the e-mails where part of their PR strategy

13 was to attack EisnerAmper. They do a linked in thing and

14 send their false statements to everybody. There was a

15 whole nother side to this. It's not summary judgment.

16 We really should get to the point of our evidence.

17 THE COURT: I know. I'm just saying whatever

18 happened to. And I think I got my answer.

19 MS. CIRANGLE: We produced the documents that we

20 had. They're looking for some memos, Oh, my God, they

21 resigned because of fraud. It doesn't exist. It's not

22 what happened. It was a business course. We gave them

23 everything we have. We didn't hide everything.

24 MR. RAMEY: We think there's nothing, but this

25 is a perfect example. She just got up and said, They

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1 didn't resign.

2 MS. CIRANGLE: They didn't.

3 MR. RAMEY: It's your own press release due to

4 the resignation of Whitley Penn, but now we just have to

5 call it something different because it sounds better.

6 There are four of these.

7 MS. CIRANGLE: Semantics.

8 MR. RAMEY: Semantics that matter to the market

9 because people are seeing, Oh, my gosh, there's no

10 explanation why your auditor resigned.

11 THE COURT: Okay.

12 MR. RAMEY: I'm going to let Mr. Coale take

13 over, Your Honor.

14 THE COURT: That's true. That's how it was

15 phrased.

16 MR. RAMEY: We're asking that you not let them

17 distract you from what really happened and what they

18 said. And don't let them blame Hayman for --

19 THE COURT: I sometimes get off on a detail. I

20 can't help myself.

21 MR. COALE: I will be brief because I have two

22 points I would like to cover. Conclude, the first being

23 very quick summary, the applicable legal standard. It is

24 overwhelming, amazingly, remarkably, in our favor and

25 forces constitutional. It's law that trumps all other

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1 laws. We talk about there's been a talk of profit

2 motive. You see it all through their briefing.

3 I found a website with all these cool political

4 cartoons on it. So the upshot of it was -- it was an

5 interesting take away to me. There's not a major federal

6 commercial law in this country that wasn't started by the

7 kind of dialogue that is in this courtroom today.

8 Sarbanes-Oxley comes out of the Enron catastrophe.

9 The Sherman Anti-Trust Act comes out of vicious

10 criticisms of John Rockefeller's business practices and

11 his defense of them. All of that -- and there's a

12 zillion other statutes -- it reflects the principle that

13 evil counsels are checked by good counsels. If I've got

14 something to say, I can say it, and you can talk back.

15 These statutes went back and forth. Enron had a

16 chance to defend itself. So did Rockefeller. Indeed,

17 Rockefeller companies are still in business today, just

18 different. The market worked. The kind of dialogue they

19 had worked. This kind of dialogue works. It works

20 because of this.

21 This is our state Supreme Court quoting New York

22 Times versus Sullivan. Actual malice is what is required

23 in a case such as this. Wanting to make money doesn't

24 get you there. Having been angry doesn't get you there.

25 You must be reckless, a term of art that means serious

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1 doubts as to truth. Of course, you must be a public

2 figure like Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Lay, and the other

3 fellow, Mr. Skilling.

4 There's been a lot of talk about that. Look at

5 their own damages argument. This is from their response.

6 They're trying to get a billion dollars in the market

7 from all these investors. Mom & pops, they call it.

8 Affidavits from priests they say lost their life savings.

9 You are a public figure when you're out there hustling

10 mom and pop for a billion dollars in new money. You are

11 making people talk about it. It is central to you.

12 You're not trivial or tangential, and it's germane to you

13 because you started it. You invited public discussion of

14 your business practices. You're asking people to throw

15 in money in their own their proof, their life savings

16 because of that. That is the kind of standard that

17 triggers this legal standard.

18 You've seen some examples -- the Court called it

19 a fire hose earlier. That's what the Supreme Court calls

20 a gist. You look at everything all together. These

21 objections you heard this morning or this afternoon are

22 exactly the opposite of that.

23 We object to subpart five on the list of 10

24 things about Mr. Bass. We object to the way slide four

25 was said in the introduction. That's the trees. The law

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1 is to look at the forest. The Supreme Court just a

2 couple week ago reminds us to look at the gist. You saw

3 what was on the screen. Everything up there was from our

4 website. Those big slides, logos on them. That's

5 serious work, serious study noting serious differences of

6 opinion with what UDF is telling the public. Of course

7 to get to it, you have to go through a disclaimer. That

8 is a solid wall of dozens of these issues all coming

9 together to point to the conclusion that there are

10 serious questions about this investment. Not is it a

11 Ponzi-like scheme on Thursday, not this, not that.

12 It goes to the issue of public concern. Is this

13 a place you ought to be putting your money? Is this

14 something like these people? Are we like the cartoonist

15 protected in that cartoon? We clearly are because of the

16 thoroughness of what we said and the bottom line of our

17 message, which is don't invest with these people.

18 Cool picture. I found a picture of a moon made

19 out of green cheese, and I wanted to put it in. But it's

20 to illustrate the point that we look at all the evidence

21 in a case where this standard is implicated. Just

22 because they say it doesn't make it so. The Court is not

23 obligated to blind itself to facts that are obvious, such

24 as things like there are 10Ks, 10Qs, the way the world

25 works.

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1 You don't get out of it by repleading. If I

2 say, hey, it's tortious interference. No. Dallas court

3 says that trick won't work because of the very first

4 slide I showed it's constitutional. It's in their

5 response. We have these other causes of action, but

6 they're all about what we said. If you could get out of

7 it by just saying, Well, we pleaded a different claim in

8 the constitutional protection.

9 That's the high level point. High level

10 constitutional protection, century of history, a legal

11 standard that is very, very favorable to us on every

12 cause of action in this case.

13 Damages. Now I'm going to go to the nitty

14 gritty. Their evidence of causation and damage, bluntly,

15 is a train wreck. They say they lost three things, none

16 of which are profit. They say revenue, which is not

17 profit. They lost credit which is only meaningful so

18 they can borrow something with it and make profit. They

19 lost investor capital, which is only meaningful so they

20 could invest and make profit.

21 Fire hose. Because they want to throw it all

22 out there and say the whole website is disparaging and

23 make a big show with a bunch of things, they say the

24 disparaging statements caused all these problems.

25 This is their response. It can't be the same

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1 disparaging statements. They're all different times,

2 doing different things. They've got a big glob of things

3 we said over a long period of time, excruciating detail,

4 that they say did all kinds of different things that they

5 could not possibly have done, acting collectively. Some

6 things happened in '10, some things happened later. It's

7 a big gob that lead to some lost stuff. That is not

8 causation proof under our Dallas Court of Appeals I'll

9 cover in just a second.

10 Slide 79 is a quick summary of the many things

11 Mr. Hurst and Mr. Ramey's presentation of the various

12 causes of their problems and the public admissions, UDF's

13 10Q where they talk about the resignation of Whitley Penn

14 and the fact the manager left and the effect it had on

15 them. That is too much of a causal chain --

16 THE COURT: Would you put that back to 79,

17 please? Thank you.

18 MR. COALE: Certainly. Fort Bend, by the way,

19 should be in the lower left.

20 THE COURT: Fort Bend what?

21 MR. COALE: Fort Bent should actually be Fort

22 Bend. Never have been there, but it seems like a nice

23 place.

24 THE COURT: You should go.

25 MR. COALE: I hear it's lovely in the spring.

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1 THE COURT: Go ahead.

2 MR. COALE: Hurlbut, the leading case on

3 business disparagement damages. The general point has to

4 be directly disparaging statements, not a whole bunch of

5 other stuff. This is a whole bunch of other stuff in '79

6 that boils down to these things that happened before.

7 They can't do that. They can't make that distinction in

8 an intelligent way with their evidence. We saw what it

9 was earlier. It's one line in Hollis Greenlaw's

10 affidavit. It's self-serving.

11 MS. CIRANGLE: I won't bother objecting. I'll

12 just tell you.

13 MR. COALE: You saw it on the screen. It's

14 self-serving, conclusory.

15 Damages caused by Hayman? This is Legacy Texas.

16 This is the big lender. They say, "We read all this

17 stuff on the Internet, and we would like some more

18 information. We would like to keep doing business with

19 you. We're attaching a proposed term sheet with new

20 terms to think about." That's not the disparaging

21 statements driving them out the door. That's encouraging

22 dialogue. That's the evil speech and good speech

23 interacting like you saw on the earlier slide. That's

24 not causation under the Dallas Court of Appeals

25 definition of that concept.

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1 Maybe it's truth and false. Does that make a

2 difference? No. They have a witness that says it

3 doesn't matter if it's true or false. It's just we say

4 it. That may be great evidence of damage, but it's

5 disastrous for causation. That can not be causation

6 evidence. Just say things and that creates liability.

7 We sure would like to make money. We had two

8 raises seeking over a billion dollars. That is not

9 evidence of lost profit. That is not causal. Our

10 Elliott case says the kind of detail that's expected of a

11 plaintiff in this context -- this is a DCPA case --

12 hoping to make a billion dollars is in the law of damages

13 in this district in Dallas is probative. I'm hoping I

14 win the Publisher's Clearinghouse. It's meaningless. It

15 was no evidence.

16 Finally, my last slide there is one last item,

17 that four elements of damage in their response. Three

18 are various lost things that are not lost profits and

19 were not caused by anything Hayman did.

20 The final item is alleged out of pocket

21 expenses, the disparaging statements again make an

22 appearance there, this time over a longer period of time.

23 It's fourth period of time. This is the evidence that

24 was rejected in MacFarland. That is the evidence they

25 offer in this case. They're obviously similar. It's

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1 obviously evidence of causation and damages.

2 The facts in this case are compelling. The

3 legal standard is overwhelmingly in our favor in granting

4 our motion.

5 THE COURT: We'll take a five minute break.

6 (A break was held.)

7 THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed.

8 MS. CIRANGLE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

9 THE COURT: Evening.

10 MS. CIRANGLE: Is it? Oh, my God. Okay.

11 Unfortunately you have to listen to my voice for the

12 whole time because I have to do this presentation myself,

13 but there you go.

14 So a summary of why this motion should be

15 denied. In our corner, UDF, we have a minimal burden.

16 This is a preliminary motion. We put in 11 detailed

17 affidavits by person with knowledge covering all elements

18 of UDF's claims.

19 THE COURT: So is that why they objected

20 cumulative?

21 MS. CIRANGLE: They have so much evidence. They

22 do. They object as cumulative, which is kind of crazy.

23 They say there's so much evidence that Centurion was a

24 real developer, we didn't need to keep putting Mehrdad

25 himself as CEO to say that. I thought that was funny.

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1 MR. HURST: Most of it was on relevance ground,

2 Your Honor.

3 MS. CIRANGLE: These are actual human beings

4 that went under oath to swear what happened and to swear

5 to details. Our CEO, a banker, other folks.

6 THE COURT: It's not based on information and

7 belief, and I'm not kidding about that.

8 MS. CIRANGLE: No, that was not a problem in our

9 affidavits. I will admit there's two or three things in

10 Hollis's that was on information and belief, but 98

11 percent of what we put in there is not information and

12 belief.

13 THE COURT: If it can be revised, it should

14 be.

15 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay. We put in over 200

16 documents, including 100 of defendant's own documents

17 that Your Honor, thank you, allowed us to have discovery

18 on. And those documents confirmed that what we said in

19 our petition that what defendants was doing was true and

20 even gave us some shocking evidence that we didn't know

21 anything about and there was never any public disclosure

22 about.

23 Defendants, they put in two self-serving

24 affidavits with conclusory and quite controverted claims

25 of good faith. As I'll show you when we got their

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1 internal discovery, we saw the 100 percent financial

2 motivation for what went on here. Obviously, nothing

3 about the public interest as they told Your Honor in

4 their affidavits.

5 They made not no serious counter argument in

6 their reply. We put in evidence of tons of material of

7 false statements, one after another. In their reply they

8 address one fact. They only disagree with us about one

9 fact relating to cash receipts that we'll cover later.

10 They don't even attempt to tell us we're wrong about the

11 falsity of their other statements.

12 They ignore virtually all our malice evidence.

13 In their reply they ignored all, but one piece of our

14 causation and damage evidence. They have some new

15 arguments here, but I did not address that in the reply,

16 and we'll get to that.

17 Now, the issue to be decided here is whether we

18 have, through pleadings and affidavits, shown a prima

19 facie case which means minimum quantum of evidence

20 necessary to support a rational inference that our

21 allegations of fact are true. And the sole question is

22 whether UDF can surmount this low threshold to proceed

23 past the pleading stage. This is not summary judgment or

24 trial. I just heard about an hour of great jury and

25 summary type arguments, but I did not hear anything from

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1 them defeating our strong evidence.

2 Now, the parties, I think you already know who

3 UDF is. We have -- what have we done for the world?

4 We've provided over a billion dollars in funding. We've

5 supported the development of thousands of award winning

6 single family homes in Texas for 13 years.

7 Defendants, they are a hedge fund and their

8 manager who make money by driving down the stock price of

9 companies by short selling.

10 Now, I agree to normal short shelling. It's not

11 illegal. It's a little odd some people say you're going

12 to make money if the company fails, but in this case it

13 was very different, as we'll show you. They also were

14 trying to tell you that's just a small part of their

15 business, but that's what Bass is famous for. It's much

16 easier to try to drive down a stock than to try to get a

17 stock to go up.

18 These are our four claims. You know what they

19 are. We don't have to dwell on that.

20 Again, our detailed affidavits meet the burden.

21 The legal burden is minimal. They are detailed. They

22 are not conclusory. I have read every Texas case on

23 Anti-SLAPP, and I have never seen affidavits as detailed

24 as ours and as non conclusory. We dotted our Is and

25 crossed our Ts. It's all there for Your Honor.

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1 We didn't just have our CEO do a 90 page

2 affidavit telling you why all these things were false and

3 how it affected his company. We had a banker who was

4 brave enough -- it's hard to get bankers to come forward

5 and tell their story. She was very upset by Bass and

6 what happened here, and she wanted to help us, and she

7 put in that affidavit just saying how wrong she thought

8 this was and how it causes harm.

9 We have Dale Kitchens who I know Your Honor is

10 already familiar with because you required us to show

11 some evidence of falsity before you gave us that nice

12 malice discovery. And I think you've already perhaps

13 read part of that. He's a national expert in the very

14 issues here. And he says that this is not a Ponzi

15 scheme, and the defendants were just wrong, and they knew

16 it was wrong.

17 Defendant's plan is well documented, their own

18 words, and revealed in more than 100 internal documents.

19 That collection of evidence far exceeds requirements for

20 establishing the minimum quantum of evidence to state our

21 prima facie case.

22 What does all this evidence show? Again, I keep

23 saying evidence because, unlike defendants who make a lot

24 of bold statements without citation, I have cited you

25 evidence for every single statement I'm going to make

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1 today. Maybe there's a minor one I get wrong, but that

2 was my intent. I urge you to read the evidence, read the

3 affidavit, see what they really say.

4 Here's what they show. Prior to defendant's

5 attack, UDF was doing just fine. UDF had steadily grown

6 over 13 years. We had funded over 2.7 billion in single

7 family developments and received over 1.3 billion in

8 repayments. We had a very healthy balance sheet: 1.4

9 billion in assets, less than 380 million in debt. We had

10 provided steady returns to our investors, and our stock

11 very closely traded its peers such as Starwood. No one,

12 not any lawsuit, any article, anyone had ever accused UDF

13 of being a Ponzi scheme. That was nowhere on the

14 horizon.

15 What else does this evidence show? Prior to

16 defendant's attack, defendants were struggling mightily.

17 Mr. Bass had made a series of poor investments over

18 several years after his first and only major success. His

19 returns were horrible, and his investors were fleeing.

20 Now, they take issue with what we call him. We

21 didn't call him that. Barron's Magazine and other folks

22 were telling. That's the media pressure. That's what

23 the media was saying about Mr. Bass. We didn't make up

24 those words.

25 In fact, in evidence we have Mr. Bass himself

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1 telling Barron's in August of 2015, "It's been a tough

2 year. It's nice to win all the time. When you're not

3 winning and everyone else is, it makes life difficult."

4 Those are his words, not ours.

5 We also have a document we got in discovery.

6 Again, I just want to say. They say, Oh, it's just a

7 website. Discovery revealed massive PR plans. They had

8 a fancy New York firm. They had communications memos,

9 ten point strategy, approach the government, approach the

10 media, do all these things. The website was a small

11 piece of it. So just when they say it was only a

12 website, that's just not true.

13 Part of that was they had this Q and A. So

14 Mr. Bass got questioned in the media, they were going to

15 train him. And they in that Q and A admit that they were

16 concerned that they would be portrayed as attacking UDF

17 in order to, quote, "shift attention from last year's

18 performance; i.e., our negative returns to investors in

19 2015." That is in the record, their words, in trying to

20 prepare Mr. Bass for media appearances.

21 Now, it was in that light that they came up with

22 this scheme. They were having problems, so they

23 concocted a plan to make over 100 million dollars by

24 destroying UDF's business. This plan had three parts.

25 We knew about one of them before they gave discovery,

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1 which is the 59 million dollar short position of UDF IV.

2 That means that if UDF IV went to zero, they made 59

3 million dollars. For every dollar -- well, let's just

4 say it that way. So as much as the stock was down, they

5 made that.

6 We didn't know they also internally were

7 shorting somewhere 30 to 50 million dollars of other

8 stocks, a basket of four related stocks that they believe

9 would trade in sympathy when our unsophisticated retail

10 investors would trade those stocks along with UDF IV.

11 This is the kicker, Your Honor. We did not know

12 this till we got discovery. We suspected it, but we

13 didn't know it. They were going to put together 100 plus

14 million dollar investment fund. And their plan was to

15 drive us into bankruptcy and purchase the assets out of

16 bankruptcy at a discount, the same assets they said were

17 the worthless assets of a Ponzi scheme.

18 I'm going to go through that. That's a very

19 important piece of evidence, and they never mention

20 that.

21 THE COURT: Time out. The second one, 30 plus

22 million short position in a basket of four related

23 stocks. What are you talking about?

24 MS. CIRANGLE: So UDF is a REIT, and they have

25 shorted UDF IV, the one public stock. They said, Well,

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1 gee, if we cause a UDF event, then there's some other

2 stocks that might go down around that event. So traders

3 thinking if this stock --

4 THE COURT: Not really related except they were

5 REIT stocks.

6 MS. CIRANGLE: REITs or REIT broker that they

7 thought in their analysis would trade. They call in it

8 sympathy.

9 THE COURT: But not connected with UDF.

10 MS. CIRANGLE: No, absolutely not. Just more

11 stocks they thought would go down --

12 THE COURT: You had a double negative issue

13 going there. Not related, correct?

14 MS. CIRANGLE: Correct.

15 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

16 MS. CIRANGLE: So I'm going to show you the

17 details of investment fund because it is very, very

18 important because it shows the falsity that they knew our

19 assets were valuable while they're telling the world it

20 was a Ponzi scheme. And it shows malice this was the

21 intent here to drive our company into bankruptcy, buy its

22 assets at a discount, and make another 100 million

23 dollars.

24 Just to illustrate what they're really doing

25 here is the plan, the two components, was if they made 59

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1 million from UDF IV going down, that's 59 million UDF

2 shareholders lose. I put 53 million here because that's

3 what ultimately happened. They didn't get to zero. They

4 made 53 million, not 59.

5 The other part, buying our assets, is to take

6 money from the banks, UDF, and Centurion and put it in

7 their pockets. That's how that would work. That's where

8 the money is going to come from in this scheme, moving

9 the value from our pockets and shareholders to theirs.

10 Now, in order to realize their intended

11 profits -- and these profits, I'm going to show you,

12 they're not back in the envelope. They're very well laid

13 out in internal memos what they expected to make.

14 Defendant's published their false and alarming posts.

15 Defendants first unsuccessfully tried to harm

16 UDF through the government. We put in the evidence that

17 they themselves said they were meeting with the

18 government, sending them e-mails. Part of their PR

19 communications campaign that they hired somebody for was

20 to continue their, what they call, third party

21 influencers, which is existing outreach to SEC, FBI, and

22 local state's attorneys. So they were very much active

23 in trying to do that.

24 But then they went to the media to try to get

25 them to publish their false story. I'll show you later

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1 rejected their story, saying, no,

2 it doesn't look like it's true. Frustrated by the lack

3 of profits and the huge carrying costs --

4 THE COURT: Of their own.

5 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes.

6 THE COURT: Not UDF.

7 MS. CIRANGLE: Correct. Defendant's profits.

8 They wanted the profit. It was year end. Their

9 investors were looking at losses. They needed to make

10 profit. This was costing them about $90,000 dollars a

11 day to carry a short position because when you short a

12 stock, you have to borrow it, and there's things that go

13 along with it. It's expensive to do.

14 THE COURT: You're going to have to slow that

15 down. And no pronouns. Say it again.

16 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay. When you short a stock,

17 like they did, and 59 million dollars worth, they have to

18 pay $86,000 a day to their broker, Goldman Sachs or JP

19 Morgan, in order to hold that fashion. So every day that

20 goes by they are paying out of pocket $86,000 to be

21 short.

22 THE COURT: How does it work?

23 MS. CIRANGLE: I could tell you if you want. I

24 do know all this.

25 THE COURT: Yeah.

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1 MS. CIRANGLE: When you short a stock, you have

2 to go out and call Goldman or JP Morgan and say, I need

3 to borrow that stock. They have to go out and find

4 someone willing to lend you that stock. And you have to

5 pay them to borrow that stock to hold it during the time

6 you short the position. I know it's really complicated.

7 And for purposes of this, the important thing is that

8 every day it's costing $86,000 to hold this position,

9 which is why they were in a rush to have some bad news

10 come out, which is the December 10 post.

11 THE COURT: So how long had they borrowed that

12 stock to short it?

13 MS. CIRANGLE: They started in at least March of

14 2015. That's the earliest Your Honor gave us discovery

15 on the trading.

16 THE COURT: And the publication was?

17 MS. CIRANGLE: December 10.

18 THE COURT: December. So they had that

19 situation going for about nine months.

20 MS. CIRANGLE: And Parker Lewis does an

21 analysis, and he says about a week before, We spent 10

22 million dollars to date.

23 THE COURT: Holding the stock.

24 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes. And Bass says in response,

25 This will happen in December. So they have tremendous

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1 financial pressure to get these posts out so the stock

2 will drop, and they can make their money because it's not

3 only are they not making a profit, but they're pay

4 $86,000 a day.

5 THE COURT: Is that articulated somewhere?

6 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes, it is. If you want me to

7 skip to that and then come back, I'm happy to do that.

8 Why don't we do that since it's clearly articulated in

9 their slides that we had it sort of towards the end. But

10 I can -- Kyle, it's slide 67 and 68.

11 So if we start with 68, Kyle, because that shows

12 the total.

13 This is Mr. Lewis, December 4. So this is six

14 days before the post, okay?

15 "My estimate for the borrow cost on UDF to date

16 is close to 10 million."

17 Okay. And the other point of the slide is

18 because they know they're going to publish this soon.

19 They have orders to short as much UDF every day as they

20 can find.

21 If we look at slide 67. Okay. I hope you can

22 read this, but Parker Lewis, the middle slide, November

23 24, again two weeks before the post. "Kyle, this is my

24 current estimate of the cost to carry the UDF position,

25 which is part of what is driving my view not to wait past

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1 Monday, December 14."

2 And at the bottom, I was wrong. It was $84,053

3 a day. That's what they're paying every day to carry

4 this position.

5 So Mr. Bass at the top of the e-mail on November

6 24, "This will happen in December one way or another.

7 That's their words explaining why they picked

8 December 10 to publish these posts.

9 Now back to slide 13.

10 Now, what do the posts say? The gists of these

11 posts were that "UDF's business was deceptive Ponzi

12 scheme predicated on purported fictitious returns such

13 that its business was essentially worthless."

14 On reply, defendants for the first time claim

15 their posts did not really say this, although today they

16 kind of have some Ponzi stuff. So it's kind of a little

17 confusing. But I think their main defense and reply when

18 they couldn't show that what they said was false was to

19 try to pretend they said something else and talk about

20 how, Well, we're just part of the honest opinion of

21 looking at your financials in the public, and we're just

22 pointing out a few things here.

23 But I think it's really important for you to

24 look at what these posts say because it explains why

25 these posts had such a huge impact on UDF, and it

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1 explains why we had a case here for falsity and malice

2 because none of these things are true. To this day

3 they're not defending them as true in the reply brief.

4 That didn't happen.

5 MR. RAMEY: I just want to object falsity is

6 their element in a disparagement claim, Your Honor. Much

7 of this is argument, like ours was, but she says we're

8 under serious pressure. She's not showing you documents.

9 She's just arguing.

10 So that's our objection, the same thing that

11 they were objecting to.

12 THE COURT: Okay.

13 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay. So let's look at...

14 These are the headline and some quotes from the

15 very first post, December 10, 2015. "Texas-Sized Scheme.

16 Exposing the Darkest Corner." "Ponzi Scheme." "One of

17 the most egregious cases." "Looks like a Ponzi scheme."

18 "Where did all the money go?" "It's sinister."

19 "Ponzi-like real estate scheme was set in motion."

20 In fact, I think one of them said, Well, we said

21 Ponzi a few times. They said it 69 times in their posts,

22 more than a few. These are all from the very first post.

23 The next slide shows more of these, which are

24 again from the December post. I call it Ponzi, Ponzi,

25 Ponzi because it's all over the place. This is the gist.

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1 "One Example of Many: How The Scheme Works."

2 "Enron, Madoff, Stanford." "Victims, Ponzi-like."

3 Down here Mr. Bass put a nice picture there.

4 "Today UDF faces significant bankruptcy risk, which would

5 leave its shares virtually worthless." That's what

6 they're saying about our company.

7 "Management has been misleading investors for

8 years."

9 In their presentation they focus on the website,

10 but that was two months after they put out all these

11 posts that started all this going and caused all this

12 harm. There was no disclaimer there. They hadn't really

13 addressed those posts at all.

14 Again, you know, Ponzi-like, hallmarks of a

15 Ponzi. Billion dollar problem. They have a house of

16 cards. What are they saying there? That it's worthless.

17 They use the word worthless. Scheme unraveling, et

18 cetera, et cetera.

19 Now, the reaction to the post by the media and

20 third parties confirms what they conveyed. And Moldovan

21 in the Dallas Court of Appeals tells us that readers'

22 conclusions and reactions can lend support for what was

23 the gist, what was being conveyed here.

24 These slides, they're all within hours of their

25 posts. This is the same day of their very first post.

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1 This is how the media saw it. Accuses them of Ponzi

2 scheme. Can go to zero. Hayman thinks it's a total

3 Ponzi scheme. Is trying to get the FBI, SEC, DOJ, et

4 cetera, to shut it down. There they're telling the world

5 this is Bass trying to get us shut down so that we all

6 cause panic with the investors.

7 Other third parties who read this -- our

8 bankers, Centurion, one of our brokers -- they read this

9 as the obvious. He was accusing us of being a worthless

10 Ponzi scheme. Defendants have objected to this as

11 irrelevant, but it's not. Under Moldovan, the reactions

12 of other folks tells you that what was being conveyed by

13 these. And that's important because that's what we have

14 to show is false, and that's what we have to show they

15 had malice for, and we have.

16 Now, this is another real kicker, and I want you

17 to pay close attention to this slide. This was Parker

18 Lewis, January 3, 2015 -- I'm sorry. '16. So this is in

19 between the first post and before the website. And this

20 is a discussion with that fancy New York PR firm,

21 Edelman, that they have hired to make sure they can have

22 a very widespread reach to their Ponzi scheme

23 allegations. And he's talking about key messages --

24 THE COURT: Now, who's Jeff Zilka?

25 MS. CIRANGLE: That is somebody from Edelman.

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1 Correct me if I'm wrong, but it's my understanding he's

2 with Edelman, a PR firm. The PR firm that defendant's

3 hired.

4 THE COURT: E-d-e-l?

5 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes. It's a New York firm that

6 they hired to create this communication campaign

7 summary.

8 So, Subject: Key Talking Points and Summary

9 Communications Plan. This is Parker Lewis. He's saying,

10 Okay, let's boil down the summary concepts. This is what

11 they're trying to convey, "the summary concepts of, A,

12 UDF's Ponzi-like real estate scheme; B, management

13 continually misleading investors, management's lack of

14 credibility; C, in insolvency of UDF's borrowers; and D,

15 ultimately insolvency and and likely bankruptcy of

16 UDF IV."

17 This is equally important. Why is he boiling

18 this down? Why are they doing these posts? Why is this

19 message so hard hitting? It is key to translate to the

20 impact of UDF's share price. That's why Parker Lewis

21 wants to make sure these posts are hard hitting. Those

22 are his words, Your Honor, not mine.

23 Next, again, all over the place they said that

24 the main issue here is that we are -- wait. I just want

25 to make one other point.

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1 Calling a company a Ponzi scheme is a big deal.

2 This is like dropping a nuclear bomb. This isn't a

3 subtle thing like, Hey, we're looking at your financials,

4 and we think maybe you shouldn't lend so much to one

5 lender or you've got some funds all invested in the same

6 thing.

7 No, you are saying this company is a complete

8 house of cards fraud. And the person saying it is a guy,

9 Kyle Bass, who is known for starting the rumor that

10 crashed . This is a guy with a lot of clout

11 in the short selling world. So for him to call a Ponzi

12 and drop this bomb, this is not one voice in the crowd.

13 This is not adding to some dialogue. No one had ever

14 accused UDF of this before.

15 THE COURT: Time out. Bear Stearns, what's

16 that.

17 MS. CIRANGLE: In the 2008 financial crisis,

18 Bear Stearns, you remember, went out of business.

19 THE COURT: No, I don't remember. I wasn't

20 doing any business with them.

21 MS. CIRANGLE: They did go out of business.

22 THE COURT: They went out of business.

23 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes, and it was all based on a

24 rumor that Goldman Sachs would not be a counter party to

25 Bear Stearns --

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1 THE COURT: Was not what?

2 MS. CIRANGLE: That Goldman Sachs would no

3 longer been a counter party with Bear Stearns.

4 THE COURT: What do you mean, counter party?

5 MS. CIRANGLE: If you TAKE the other side of

6 trades that Mr. Bass had. Essentially gold socks is

7 saying Bear Stearns is not creditworthy, which you can

8 imagine would be a big deal in that climate in 2008.

9 And the point of it is you don't have to

10 understand all that. It's just that Mr. Bass, when he's

11 telling the world we're a Ponzi scheme, people listen

12 because it's not just some yahoo internet guy that goes

13 on --

14 THE COURT: What did he have to do with Bear

15 Stearns and their going under?

16 MS. CIRANGLE: Well, he basically talked to a

17 reporter, David Fabor, and said that Goldman had refused

18 to take the counterside of one of his swaps. And when

19 that got out in the media, that became sort of the spiral

20 of the downfall.

21 MR. RAMEY: First, hearsay. To your specific

22 question, though, what did Mr. Bass have to do with that?

23 He's the one that saw that Bear Stearns was holding the

24 most enormous pile of toxic garbage ever in the form of

25 collateralized debt mortgage. And he bet against him,

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1 and it was he, Mr. Bass, that correctly predicted that

2 Bear Stearns would tank, which they did, not because he

3 called somebody at Goldman Sachs. That's what Mr. Bass

4 had to do with that scheme.

5 MS. CIRANGLE: And that's my point, that because

6 he had had this big success predicting that whole crash,

7 people listened when he said something. And even though

8 the posts were anonymous, and there was no --

9 THE COURT: It's just when y'all use examples

10 where you assume I know what you're talking about, don't

11 assume.

12 MS. CIRANGLE: Got it. Feel free to interrupt

13 me. I've been doing stock stuff for so long.

14 MR. RAMEY: Did you see Big Short, Your Honor?

15 THE COURT: No.

16 MR. RAMEY: It's kind of that.

17 THE COURT: I wanted to see it, and then I

18 forgot I wanted to see it.

19 MS. CIRANGLE: Did you watch Billions? Because

20 that's another good one. It's an HBO show with the

21 wonderful Damian Lewis.

22 THE COURT: No. The Big Short. Writing it

23 down.

24 MS. CIRANGLE: And Billions.

25 THE COURT: Billions. Okay.

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1 MR. COX: The big Short is not about Bass,

2 though, judge. It's about somebody else.

3 MR. HURST: Actually, Kyle's in the book The Big

4 Short, I'm sure.

5 THE COURT: Okay.

6 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay.

7 (Off the record)

8 THE COURT: Go ahead.

9 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay. So the point with this

10 slide is to show you that consistently up until they got

11 our evidence and all the affidavits showing that what

12 they said was false, they knew it was false, they

13 consistently said that their gist was it was a Ponzi

14 scheme. Mr. Hurst, March 5 of this year, saying that it

15 was a Ponzi-like, like Madoff, like Stanford, strawmen

16 borrowers, et cetera.

17 Again, at this stage, Your Honor, the question

18 is just is our reading of it reasonable. Obviously, it's

19 reasonable because the press, everybody read it that way

20 until they saw our evidence. So why are defendants

21 running from the gist of their posts, which is so

22 obvious, and Mr. Hurst admitted to you after seeing our

23 evidence and after being forced to produce their internal

24 documents.

25 Because UDF is not a worthless Ponzi scheme.

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1 Hollis Greenlaw, our highest executive, testified it's

2 not, and he gave you lots of details to back that up.

3 Dale Kitchens, a fraud and Ponzi scheme expert, testifies

4 it is not.

5 MR. HURST: I'm sorry. What did I admit? What

6 did you say I admitted?

7 MS. CIRANGLE: Slide up. The gist here was a

8 "Ponzi-like fashion, like Madoff, like Stanford."

9 Defendants own documents prove even though the

10 not believe UDF was a wordless Ponzi scheme. Need, they

11 believed we had well positioned assets that they wanted

12 to buy and make tens of millions of dollars in profits.

13 I'm sorry. Internal. And I'm going to go

14 through that.

15 By the way, when they tell you -- well, I had

16 such a reaction to their opening statement they fully

17 disclosed their financial interests. We know they didn't

18 disclose any financial interest in the December post.

19 February they had a disclaimer that said a short

20 position. They never told anyone in the public record

21 about this. Whether they told the government or not, we

22 don't know because that's not in evidence, and Mr. Bass

23 and Mr. Lewis certainly didn't swear that they did.

24 So the question is, Your Honor, if we're really

25 a Ponzi scheme, why would they want to buy our assets.

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1 Would someone buy 's stocks? No. The fact

2 they wanted to buy these assets show they know it was not

3 a worthless Ponzi scheme.

4 All right. So what happens? We're still in the

5 big picture here. They were partially successful. The

6 stock did crater. They made 53 million from their posts.

7 They can quibble, Oh, there are other things in the

8 market here and there. Well, the day of their first

9 post, within an hour or two the stock dropped 35 percent,

10 so that was pretty strong. They're saying, Oh, we

11 announced auditors, these other things. Stock went up

12 after that. Didn't go down. We'll show you that.

13 This had the effect, Your Honor, of taking 53

14 million individual investors, moving it into their

15 pockets. We don't know yet what they made on their

16 related basket because we don't have discovery. They

17 didn't actually drive us into bankruptcy, so they didn't

18 realize those profits, but they did cause UDF significant

19 harm.

20 In fact, you heard them say, Oh, well, if you

21 weren't a Ponzi scheme or weren't in trouble, you

22 wouldn't have trouble paying your loans. We paid all our

23 loans. Did they cause a liquidity crisis? Yes, because

24 some of our boilers were in the development stage. They

25 don't get that cash till they sell it to the home

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1 builders. So on a dime to have 200 million dollars of

2 credit taken away from us after these posts, yeah, we had

3 to scramble a bit, but we paid off all of that debt.

4 There's no evidence here that we fell apart when we

5 couldn't raise money. That's just false.

6 This is why we're here. We had a lot of damage.

7 This caused a lot of trouble to this company, and that is

8 why we're here.

9 Now I kind of gave you an overview, I want to go

10 through, apply the evidence to the actual elements of our

11 claim and highlight some of the most interesting.

12 Your Honor, I know we gave you a lot of paper,

13 but there is a lot of evidence here. I have never seen

14 such a well documented short selling scheme in all the

15 cases I've done, and there's a lot of stuff. I'm going

16 to try to highlight it here for you, but there's more in

17 our brief, and there's more in those affidavits.

18 So what are we here to show evidence on our

19 prima facie case? Our main claim is disparagement,

20 falsity with malice. There's no issue of privilege here.

21 No one's raised that, so we're not going to discuss that.

22 And special damage to us.

23 Now, falsity. We submitted a ton of evidence of

24 this. We showed you in detail in 13 pages that are up

25 how the very documents defendant swore they reviewed and

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1 relied on show the falsity of their posts. Mr. Greenlaw

2 cited you where he says there's falsity. Mr. Kitchens,

3 our banker. Centurion's CO, they said he was insolvent.

4 They said he was part of a Ponzi scheme. So all that was

5 a lie.

6 Mr. Straub, one of our developers who had to

7 walk from a deal right after the post because of the

8 chaos that the little website caused. And a few of our

9 brokers that talked about needing to halt selling the

10 stock on the very day of the December 10 post because of

11 the chaos that they caused.

12 This evidence showed two things. It showed the

13 falsity of defendant's overall gist that we were a

14 deceptive Ponzi scheme, that we had fictitious returns,

15 and our business was essentially worthless. We showed

16 that was false.

17 It also showed numerous, additional, very

18 material statements were also false. We showed it was

19 false for them to state because UDF's business was not

20 engaged in -- I'm sorry. They stated falsely that our

21 business was not engaged in genuine real estate

22 development. We showed that was false. They said Shahan

23 Prairie was not a real development. We showed that was

24 false.

25 They said our loans didn't generate cash. We

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1 showed that was false. There's cash receipts all over

2 our financials. They ignore it. They cherry-pick loans

3 that generate no cash and ignored the hundreds of

4 millions of dollars of cash receipts.

5 They said Centurion was insolvent. That's

6 false. They had no basis to say that. Centurion itself

7 tells you that. They said there were improperly accruing

8 interest on loans to Centurion. We showed there was

9 nothing improper about that, and they would have known

10 that.

11 They said our loans to Centurion were more than

12 double market rate and not arm's length. We showed that

13 was false.

14 They said UDF and its auditor were concealing

15 disagreements between them and reportable events. We

16 showed that was false.

17 Defendants, all this falsity. Again, they

18 reply. They call out one fact, one fact, they say we got

19 wrong, and that's it. Read their reply. Nothing else in

20 there, but one fact on cash receipts that I'll show you

21 in a minute.

22 THE COURT: Now, what?

23 MS. CIRANGLE: Cash receipts.

24 THE COURT: What about it?

25 MS. CIRANGLE: So of all these facts, they say

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1 we don't have cash receipts from loans. We show that, in

2 fact, if you look at our financials, there's all kinds of

3 cash receipts from loans.

4 Mr. Kitchens went through an example where they

5 cherry-pick we have a loan table in our financials. And

6 over half those loans show cash receipts and half don't

7 because those are the loans that are in the development

8 stage, and the home builder hadn't filed them yet. They

9 cherry-pick the loans that didn't generate cash and said,

10 Look, the loans to Centurion don't generate cash. That's

11 the only fact they came back to in their reply brief.

12 They said, Well, we disclosed that this was only 25 or 40

13 percent of the loan, but they don't tell you that that

14 same report repeatedly tells the reader these are

15 representative of the whole sample.

16 That's the only thing they address. All this

17 falsity evidence, that's all they address, and they

18 didn't even address that in any meaningful way.

19 So all this stuff they said is false, that's

20 unrebutted. They didn't put anything in or tell us we

21 were wrong.

22 How did they respond? They made an argument

23 here that they were "constitutionally protected

24 expression of opinion," citing to Bentley. But Bentley

25 provides, as has the U.S. Supreme Court for many decades,

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1 that there's "neither privilege for opinion nor any

2 artificial dichotomy between opinion and fact." You

3 don't look at that issue.

4 What you look at is, Is this statement

5 verifiable, and what is the context in which it was made?

6 So, for example, in Bentley the Texas Supreme Court found

7 that the defendant's statement that a judge was corrupt

8 was a verifiably false statement, not an opinion.

9 So the question is, under Bentley that they

10 cite, is it verifiable? Let's see how Kyle Bass told the

11 world in February of 2016 about whether it was

12 verifiable.

13 These are quotes from Mr. Bass that he has

14 admitted to making in our discovery, and he tells the

15 press, February 12, 2016, We're either going to be right

16 or we're going to be wrong. The good news is that bright

17 line is going to be drawn at a certain time in the

18 future. He invites us, "Show us where we are wrong. We

19 put the website out for the company to refute."

20 So he's telling you this is verifiable, what

21 he's put out there. That satisfies the test of Bentley.

22 Bentley also discusses the context in which

23 verifiable statements are made. And Bentley describes

24 the difference between what they call soapbox oratory,

25 which is somebody standing on a street corner spouting

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1 out what's on their mind. And research monographs, which

2 are actionable. That's what we have here.

3 In Bentley, the defendant claimed it made

4 lengthy investigations, and that's exactly what

5 defendants said here.

6 THE COURT: Research monograph.

7 MS. CIRANGLE: Yep.

8 THE COURT: You want to define that to me?

9 Research monograph.

10 MS. CIRANGLE: That means they've done a

11 research report. That the guy's taken the time and said,

12 Here is why I think X, Y, and Z. The question I see, I

13 could stand on a street corner and say, I think this

14 judge is corrupt, and I can yell at the top of my

15 lungs --

16 THE COURT: I've got it being modified by

17 detailing causes.

18 MS. CIRANGLE: Yeah. Again, in Bentley it was

19 important that the defendant claimed they made lengthy

20 investigation, and here obviously you heard them say over

21 and over how they researched this for two years.

22 And the last point on the slide is an important

23 one because even if you bought defendant's opinion and

24 you told Bass you didn't have to listen to what he said

25 at the time, it's still actionable under Texas law if the

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1 opinion is based on disclosed facts and if some of those

2 facts are either incorrect, incomplete, or defendant's

3 assessment of them is erroneous.

4 And we showed you that not only was there gists

5 that were a Ponzi scheme and worthless files, but there

6 were a whole lot of very important facts they also got

7 wrong.

8 They argue in their reply that we focus on

9 individual detail after individual detail trying to

10 identify minor inaccuracies in the overall story. But

11 the facts we prove are wrong are not minor in any way,

12 shape, or form. They are the core facts that support

13 defendants' false story.

14 Now, the other thing they try to do is say,

15 Okay, well, we're not going to address or say -- we're

16 not going to tell you that you've got anything wrong in

17 the facts. We're going to try to say all these

18 government agencies form their independent conclusions,

19 which are largely consistent with Hayman's public

20 statements and opinions.

21 There is not one shred of evidence in the record

22 or in existence to support this. No one, no government

23 agency, the Nasdaq, nobody, has ever accused UDF of being

24 a Ponzi scheme. Look at their reply. There is nothing

25 cited in there on page eight to support this statement.

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1 MR. HURST: Again, I'll object. I think you're

2 misciting our reply. We say the gist of it is the

3 irregularities associated with UDF, not specifically a

4 Ponzi scheme.

5 We believe the SEC and Nasdaq and the others

6 are, in fact, in accord with what it was that we posted

7 on the website. So it doesn't say specifically as to a

8 Ponzi scheme.

9 MS. CIRANGLE: They don't know any of this.

10 They're making it up. Clearly they said we were a Ponzi

11 scheme. They themselves aren't even saying anymore that

12 they can support that.

13 THE COURT: I'll look at it. It will take me a

14 while to read the volume of material that y'all

15 produced.

16 MR. HURST: The falsity issue is for them to

17 bring up, not for us to bring up. She keeps saying,

18 that's not true, that's a lie. Tell us what the SEC is

19 investigating them for. Tell us why the Nasdaq delisted.

20 Tell us why the FBI is investigating them. Tell us why

21 the Wells notice was issued that the SEC intends to file

22 litigation against UDF and why that stuff is still

23 pending as we sit here today.

24 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, four years later,

25 two-and-a-half years, we don't know everything in the

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1 government's mind, but we absolutely know there's no

2 claim against us. There's no filing. If we were a Ponzi

3 scheme, don't you think after they took all our books and

4 records two-and-a-half years ago, they would have shut us

5 down.

6 But to sit here and say -- my point is, you're

7 right. We have the burden of falsity. We met it. We

8 put in all these affidavits that actually show what they

9 said is false. Their response was to say, Well, gee,

10 we're not going to address the evidence. We're going to

11 try to get the judge to look over here and look at

12 this.

13 My colleagues want me to point out even if

14 there's a criminal conviction under the Texas evidence

15 rule, that's not always admissible in a civil case.

16 We're not under conviction here. We don't even have a

17 claim. We don't have a case number. So what they're

18 trying to do is somehow get you to look away from all

19 this evidence of what they said was falsity and look at

20 what happened here.

21 The other thing they're not doing, they're not

22 telling you about their PR strategy memory to influence

23 the government. They're not telling you that the day

24 after the raid, they sent around a congratulatory e-mail,

25 high fiving each other about it. We don't know what role

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1 they played, but we know they sure tried very hard to

2 influence that.

3 That's not what we're here to prove, Your Honor,

4 but they are being very disingenuous by not disclosing

5 their role in this. When they say independent, they were

6 in there showing the same slides. They were high fiving

7 each other the day after. They got congratulations on a

8 well executed strategy.

9 So let's just say the record here does not

10 support that, and it's all a red herring. Government's

11 done nothing at this point, and that's not before this

12 Court. It doesn't provide any evidence that what they

13 said was true or that there was any good faith to it.

14 Okay. The auditors. Okay. The auditors

15 resigned shortly before the posts. This is not evidence

16 of a Ponzi scheme. Yeah, I know, I just said resigned.

17 I'm not going to quibble. I think it's a declination.

18 You know what? It's not a word that matters in the

19 context of this.

20 The important thing is this is not evidence of a

21 Ponzi scheme. The auditors --

22 THE COURT: What's your objection?

23 MR. RAMEY: She was saying we're trying to be

24 disingenuous. That was her word. Mr. Bass's affidavit

25 says exactly what we did with the FBI and the SEC before

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1 we ever posted. They're acting like we didn't disclose

2 our communication with them, which we're entitled to do.

3 THE COURT: I'm sorry. Too money pronouns.

4 MR. RAMEY: The FBI and the SEC?

5 THE COURT: No. I understand that you went to

6 meetings with the FBI and the SEC.

7 MR. RAMEY: Right.

8 THE COURT: So what are you saying about that?

9 MR. RAMEY: I understood the argument to be that

10 we're being disingenuous by pretending we had nothing to

11 do with that. That's what she just said. We told them

12 exactly what we had to do with it in Mr. Bass's own

13 affidavit and in our Anti-SLAPP motion. That's my

14 objection.

15 MS. CIRANGLE: The affidavit left out most of

16 it. But, Your Honor, I'm not going to sit here and argue

17 about that. I don't think they told you that they all

18 high fived and congratulated themselves about the raid on

19 a well executed strategy. I don't think that's in

20 Mr. Bass's affidavit. So we'll just move on from that.

21 THE COURT: I have a question. Are the FBI and

22 SEC still investigating?

23 MR. HURST: Yes.

24 MR. RAMEY: Yes.

25 THE COURT: But you know nothing about the

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1 investigation yet.

2 MS. CIRANGLE: There is no charges.

3 MR. HURST: They issued a Wells notice which

4 indicates that they intend to prosecute UDF.

5 MS. CIRANGLE: That's not what it means.

6 MR. SOMMER: That's not what it means.

7 MR. HURST: That's what a Wells notice is.

8 MS. CIRANGLE: It is not.

9 MR. HURST: It has not been withdrawn. The SEC

10 is still investigating. The FBI is still investigating.

11 They could say it's not true. We're not being

12 investigated for a Ponzi scheme. We're not being

13 investigated for financial irregularities, but they won't

14 tell us what they're being investigated for.

15 MS. CIRANGLE: It's nonpublic.

16 MR. SOMMER: It's a nonpublic investigation.

17 It's the government says they're nonpublic. It's up to

18 the government to disclose.

19 THE COURT: Where is the definition again of a

20 Wells notice?

21 MR. SOMMER: It's a preliminary determination by

22 the local staff that they're going to make a

23 recommendation to the people in Washington to pursue an

24 enforcement action. However, those Wells notices do not

25 actually always result in action. Sometimes there's a

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1 Wells notice, and sometimes nothing happens and sometimes

2 something does happen. It's just a mixed bag, and you

3 don't know.

4 THE COURT: When were they issued?

5 MR. SOMMER: October 2016.

6 MS. CIRANGLE: Two years ago.

7 THE COURT: All right.

8 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, they brought this up.

9 That's why I'm addressing it. They are the ones who

10 said, All these people agree with us. That's not part of

11 our burden to say what the government does or doesn't.

12 We're addressing their defense. We met our burden. We

13 showed you in excruciating detail that this stuff is

14 false.

15 THE COURT: Was it excruciating?

16 MS. CIRANGLE: It actually was. I hope you

17 don't find it excruciating to read.

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 MS. CIRANGLE: All right. So now going back to

20 addressing their -- again, we put in all this evidence

21 that they said is false, and they're pointing to other

22 things to somehow defeat that without actually addressing

23 the evidence.

24 So talking about the auditors, okay? The fact

25 that the auditors declined to stand for reappointment is

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1 not evidence of a Ponzi scheme. Because the auditors

2 file the statement with the SEC, which they read, which

3 said there are zero issues with our prior filings, and

4 there are no disagreements between the auditors and the

5 UDF. That's because very strict financial accounting

6 laws require them. If you uncover fraud, you can't just

7 resign and walk away. And they know that because they

8 have accounting backgrounds.

9 So the fact that the auditors filed something

10 with the SEC saying, There's nothing wrong here. We're

11 declining to stand for reemployment, but we stand by what

12 we did, and we have no disagreements is actually evidence

13 it's not a Ponzi scheme. That's why they have to accuse

14 Whitley Penn of being part of this fraud, either being so

15 negligent and such awful accountants or being part of the

16 fraud because they know when the auditor says there's not

17 a problem, that's kind of a problem for saying we're a

18 Ponzi scheme. And Dale Kitchens tells you all this in

19 his affidavit that this is not a normal cause for

20 concern.

21 Also, you should look at the next line. This is

22 an internal e-mail where defendants are trying to push

23 what happened with the auditors out to the market. So on

24 the top, Mr. Bass, "Get it to REUTERS and Dow Jones,"

25 which is the news wire. "Get it to show on their news

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1 feed so the people that own it at Schwab will see it."

2 He's talking about Schwab. That's where our, as

3 they call them, mom and pop retail investors are going to

4 have their account. So Mr. Bass is going his best here

5 to make sure the investing public find out our auditors

6 resigned.

7 And five days later Mr. Lewis says, Well, gee,

8 UDF is up three percent on average volume. And they say,

9 The only seller we see out there is this one, and they're

10 the only ones who paid attention to this.

11 So far from driving the market and being some

12 big evidence of fraud, the stock was up, and no one

13 noticed this because they filed that thing with the SEC

14 that said there's nothing wrong.

15 Defendants also talk about how our new auditors

16 are taking time to come out with the audited financials.

17 And I think you have to look at the environment here.

18 They accuse us of being a Ponzi scheme, wrote a letter to

19 Whitley Penn basically saying, You're either so

20 incompetent or part of a fraud, you've got to look at all

21 this stuff.

22 Of course in that environment, do you think it

23 was easy to get new auditors? No, of course not. Then

24 what they don't tell you is part of what they hired

25 Edelman, the PR folks, was to continue to interrupt our

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1 new auditor. That was part of their plan. It's right in

2 their plan documents.

3 Here is an example of an e-mail from Parker

4 Lewis, and he's talking about how they want to send their

5 work to the EisnerAmper and inform their work. And then

6 you have another e-mail where defendants went so far as

7 to come up with a paid promotion strategy where, given

8 Hayman's desire to push the UDF presentation to a primary

9 audience of accounting auditing firm employees, they're

10 going to create a LinkedIn channel, and they are going to

11 build a target audience, which is going to be pretty much

12 every accountant in the Dallas/Fort Worth area. And then

13 we are going to have a paid campaign and launch promoted

14 dark posts -- I'm not even sure what that is, but it

15 means they're going the try to get their false statements

16 about UDF out through LinkedIn to every auditor,

17 including our current auditors. And so you can see this

18 is what they were doing there.

19 So they were being very active in trying to

20 interfere with our auditors, and, quite frankly, it's

21 worked. They are putting us through the wringer doing

22 extra due diligence because of all these things. It's

23 not an environment that's easy to be in.

24 Again, they say it's just a website, but they

25 accuse us of being a worthless Ponzi scheme house of

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1 cards. This is a nuclear bomb on our company.

2 So on falsity, then, in sum we put in all this

3 evidence to show the statements were false. Their

4 response was not to address any of that evidence except

5 that one little cash flow thing. Read their reply. They

6 don't address anything else. Instead, they try to change

7 what they said and back away from this nuclear bomb of

8 worthless Ponzi scheme.

9 They try to call the facts opinion, even though

10 Mr. Bass said in the press at the time they would be

11 either right or wrong. And they try to divert the Court

12 with references to the government events, and none of

13 those diversions show that what they said is true, which

14 is the issue in front of the Court. Have we shown

15 falsity? Yes. Again, it's not summary judgment trial,

16 either. We put in all these affidavits. We've shown

17 falsity.

18 Now I want to drill down on malice a little bit

19 here. Common law malice applies, but even if actual

20 malice applied, UDF is not a public figure. That's

21 researched and briefed in our opposition. If you read

22 those cases, you'll see that the public figure law does

23 not apply to them. That the actual -- what was said in

24 the post was not part of any public dialogue at the time,

25 and that is the law.

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1 THE COURT: Say that again.

2 MS. CIRANGLE: What they said in these posts,

3 the accusations they made, were we a Ponzi scheme, were

4 we a fraud. There was no evidence that anyone was having

5 discussion about that in the public record before

6 December 10.

7 THE COURT: I caught that. The public -- you're

8 saying that you're not a public figure.

9 MS. CIRANGLE: Under the Texas law -- they're

10 not arguing we're a public figure. They're arguing we're

11 a limited public figure, which means we are a public

12 figure only as it relates to what Hayman said.

13 So what Hayman said was we're a worthless Ponzi

14 scheme, and he started that dialogue on December 10. No

15 one else had that dialogue ongoing. So under the Texas

16 cases we cited, you can't be made a public figure by the

17 very thing the defendants did because that would be very

18 unfair to apply an actual malice standard in this

19 situation.

20 THE COURT: What about the fact that you're a

21 publicly traded company?

22 MS. CIRANGLE: That is not under Texas law.

23 They have to get you as a public figure, and they did not

24 even make that argument. And only one of our seven

25 plaintiffs is.

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1 THE COURT: Okay.

2 MS. CIRANGLE: It means that the (inaudible)

3 applies because it's an issue of public interest. But

4 that's a very different and separate legal question

5 whether actual malice or common law malice applies, which

6 turns on whether we're a limited public figure.

7 THE COURT: I'm thinking about another case here

8 for a second. Trying to disentangle the two.

9 I just finished a case. I had that stupid beta

10 fish case, okay? It was all over TV. And about this

11 fish and killing my official and blah, blah, blah. But

12 the it wasn't contracted, and somebody volunteered to do

13 it, yadda, yadda. So there had been a nondisparagement

14 clause, and they were being disparaged by the pet owners

15 who really only signed a contract for a dog, okay?

16 Long story short, I didn't get to rule on the

17 Anti-SLAPP first, another court did, so I got stuck with

18 their ruling. But it was considered a matter of public

19 interest that the public be warned about the fact this

20 beta fish was almost killed, purportedly. It's now an

21 octogenarian beta fish. Lived twice as long.

22 But public interest, all right. So in this case

23 how does this differ, be it public or not -- I mean...

24 MS. CIRANGLE: I can address that. So public

25 interest is the hurdle for Anti-SLAPP to apply. We don't

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1 even fight that. We're, like, fine, talking about

2 something in the public interest. Generally is it in the

3 public's interest to discuss these things. Public

4 figure -- limited public figure is a completely separate

5 legal tact that only applies when we get to what level of

6 malice does a plaintiff have to show. Completely

7 different cases, completely different tacts.

8 THE COURT: Okay. I'll try and sort that out.

9 Okay. I do realize Prestige Pets was not a

10 public figure.

11 MS. CIRANGLE: Quite frankly, Your Honor --

12 THE COURT: There is a beta fish sitting on some

13 appellate justice's desk, so I hear.

14 Go ahead.

15 MS. CIRANGLE: The only real difference is under

16 common law, their financial ill will, their desire to

17 make money from harming us.

18 Under actual malice it's not enough standing

19 alone, but it's absolutely a factor. If you have other

20 factors like we're going to show you, you can meet that

21 burden. So we have a ton of malice evidence here, so I

22 think we clearly meet either burden.

23 THE COURT: Okay.

24 MS. CIRANGLE: Financial move. We talked

25 briefly about the fact that they took out a $59 million

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1 short position. We cited the cases. Again, they keep

2 saying that financial motive is irrelevant to the malice,

3 but it's not. Their own case, Bellow, that they cite

4 says that the defendant had an injurious motive is

5 certainly a factor to be considered, citing Bentley who

6 says the same thing.

7 Defendants put up a quote from Mary Jo white,

8 the then SEC chair, about how great short selling is.

9 They left off the very next sentence which says, That's

10 very different, though, than if you manipulate by short

11 selling. Certainly if you're short selling and also

12 manipulating false statements, that's not legal.

13 THE COURT: Where is that?

14 MS. CIRANGLE: It's in -- I don't have a slide

15 for you. It's in the same article they quote of Mary Jo

16 White that they put up earlier. It's the very next

17 sentence in their evidence.

18 MR. HURST: I don't know it's in evidence, Your

19 Honor.

20 MS. CIRANGLE: You cited it in your brief and

21 relied on it.

22 THE COURT: Well, if it's not in evidence, we

23 have the same problem.

24 MR. HURST: Exactly.

25 MS. CIRANGLE: It was their cite that they put

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1 up, and I'm reading the next sentence from it. But I'm

2 happy to provide it to you if you want to see what she

3 really said.

4 THE COURT: Yeah, there's so much information,

5 it's going to slip.

6 MS. CIRANGLE: We already talked about this

7 basket of other stocks.

8 Now, this is a really significant event here.

9 Again, it wasn't just about short selling here. It was

10 much more than your basic short selling a case. They

11 also plan to try to push us into bankruptcy and pick up

12 our valuable assets at a discount. And this is very

13 clear and very specific evidence, both of falsity and of

14 malice. Their plan to buy our asset shows they knew it

15 wasn't a worthless Ponzi scheme.

16 So this is discovery they gave us that Your

17 Honor supervised. And this is a PowerPoint presentation

18 that Hayman did in September and October 2015. So right

19 before the December post, a couple of months. This was

20 drafted by Mr. Lewis with input from Mr. Bass. And this

21 draws out in detail a plan to buy both UDF and Centurion

22 assets in bankruptcy.

23 And this was put together in anticipation of

24 what defendants call this presentation, and I'll show you

25 a, quote, UDF event that would cause a lot of bad press

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1 and scare the banks and harm UDF. That event was the

2 publication a few months later of the posts.

3 So just going through they had an opportunity

4 overview. Texas real estate. They said -- next slide.

5 They're talking well positioned assets. Concentrated

6 portfolio. That same portfolio they criticize us for

7 being concentrated in their post, they saw as a positive

8 thing in these internal documents. Again, these are the

9 same assets that they're going to tell the world a few

10 months later are the assets of a worthless Ponzi scheme.

11 More slides. Well positioned assets. Looking

12 at a lot of these assets are in Dallas/Fort Worth,

13 looking at the good economy, the strong underlying

14 fundamentals. Supporting stable, steady growth.

15 Again, same assets they say are part of a

16 worthless scheme with a strawman borrower.

17 Here's another one. Real detail here.

18 MR. RAMEY: That's about the DFW economy, Your

19 Honor --

20 MR. HURST: This is a complete --

21 (Simultaneous speakers)

22 THE COURT: Okay. Remember my rule about one at

23 a time. I don't mind if one of you says something and

24 then the other one says something.

25 Janet, did you get all three of them at the same

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1 time?

2 THE REPORTER: No.

3 MS. CIRANGLE: I'll show you. I'll walk you

4 through. Let's go back to slide 41. Well Positioned

5 Assets. We're talking about the assets that they're

6 going to buy if they can drive us into bankruptcy.

7 MR. HURST: Where does it say that? I'm

8 sorry.

9 MS. CIRANGLE: I'll show you that. We're going

10 to get to that. Why don't you see the whole presentation

11 where I show you that.

12 The next slide, again, well positioned assets.

13 That's talking about our assets, and the reason they're

14 well positioned is because -- he's right -- the

15 Dallas/Fort Worth economy is very good.

16 MR. HURST: Where does it say y'all's assets?

17 MS. CIRANGLE: Well Positioned Assets is the

18 title of this presentation.

19 Next slide. Okay. Again, Well Positioned

20 Assets. This is a presentation we know was given at

21 least to Goldman Sachs. We don't know who else it was

22 given to.

23 Now, what they're talking about here is buying

24 an oversecured loan at a discount. Okay? These are UDF

25 loans, and they're saying they're oversecured.

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1 MR. HURST: I object, Your Honor. She just

2 showed you four slides in a row talking about the DFW

3 economy and doesn't mention once UDF. How can she

4 argue...

5 MS. CIRANGLE: I can show you -- you've had

6 this. Haven't you read it? I'm going to show you when

7 we get to the end.

8 THE COURT: Show him now.

9 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay.

10 THE COURT: This is slide 45.

11 MS. CIRANGLE: Slide 45. So this entire

12 presentation is centered around news of UDF --

13 THE COURT: Of UDF.

14 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes. And this entire thing is

15 talking about UDF's assets. I mean, the e-mails, I can

16 show. We put in evidence there's an e-mail Golden Sachs

17 had to sign an MBA. And they said, What company are you

18 talking about? And Bass says or Lewis, I forget who, It

19 says UDF. That's in evidence. So there's no question

20 they're talking about UDF.

21 So let's go back to slide 45. I'm sorry. 44.

22 So why do Parker and Lewis think that -- I'm

23 sorry. Parker and Lewis and Mr. Bass think a bank would

24 sell them an oversecured loan at a discount? Because the

25 "Regulated lending institution will not want to keep

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1 troubled loans on the books due to headline risk,

2 reputational risk, and associated risks of uncertainty."

3 So defendants, in addition to short selling our

4 stock, they also had this plan to essentially -- in a

5 nutshell you're going to steal the money from the banks

6 by using their posts to cause issues of headline risk,

7 reputational risks, and uncertainty so the banks would

8 sell these otherwise fully collectable loans -- they're

9 saying they're oversecured -- banks would otherwise

10 collect at a significant discount.

11 If we look at the next slide --

12 MR. HURST: They were talking of buying assets

13 from a bank. That's just a misstatement of what this

14 is.

15 MS. CIRANGLE: The assets are UDF loans. That's

16 in the record. It's in the evidence.

17 MR. HURST: It's false.

18 MS. CIRANGLE: I didn't want to show you 35

19 pages of a slide show, but I can certainly point you out

20 the evidence. It's all about UDF.

21 And how were defendants going to create the

22 headline risk, reputational risk, and uncertainty that

23 would drive the bank to sell the notes at a discount?

24 Because they were going to have breaking news and engage

25 those bank lenders within first two weeks of news about

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1 UDF breaking.

2 This means defendants would publish theirs

3 posts, wait a few weeks, and then approach the banks to

4 try to get them to sell these loans at a discount to

5 defendants. And again the banks are only going to sell

6 these oversecured loans at a discount because of headline

7 and reputational risk that defendants themselves would

8 create. This is why they published their posts

9 Another slide. Here's the Playbook for Success.

10 They've got a multiple year timeline of create the damage

11 and get the assets and sell them at a profit later on.

12 They've got the potential returns profile. They're going

13 to get default interest rates. The acquisition discount

14 to par, they're going to make the banks sell them -- not

15 make them, but after they create the risk and the

16 headline problems, they would cause the banks to do that.

17 They're going to take a management fee and upside the

18 profit.

19 They have -- again, this is written by Lewis and

20 Bass. I didn't make this up. They expect gross returns

21 from this project, this plan, of 50 to 90 million and

22 total management fees to Mr. Bass and Hayman of 15 to

23 25.

24 Again, these are the same assets that six weeks

25 later they're going to tell the world they're the assets

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1 of a worthless massive Ponzi scheme. And they produced

2 that only in the discovery Your Honor ordered. We didn't

3 know about it before. We highlighted in our opposition

4 brief. They didn't mention it in their presentation.

5 Here's another e-mail. If there's any question

6 if it's about UDF, you know, here's an e-mail right

7 around the time they did -- the day after they prepared

8 this presentation where Lewis is talking to Kyle about,

9 Let's get together a list of attractive deals that are

10 not in UDF IV and not in our initial target. So now

11 they're trying to get some in the other UDF entities, as

12 well as some Centurion assets.

13 And low and behold, of course, look at one of

14 the assets that Mr. Lewis thinks is attractive: Shahan

15 Prairie. That's an example of an attractive asset. Your

16 Honor, Shahan Prairie is their poster child of proof of a

17 Ponzi scheme of a worthless asset where Centurion

18 misappropriated and stole all the loan money. In their

19 internal documents, they think it's an attractive deal

20 that they're plotting to buy if they can put us in

21 bankruptcy. This means both common law and actual

22 malice.

23 We have lots of other evidence and malice. On

24 slides 38 to 50 we lay out a lot of stuff. We show that

25 we knew what they said was false. We talked to Shahan

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1 Prairie. In addition to listing it as an attractive

2 deal, records defendants say they reviewed showed what

3 they said was false. It showed there was development.

4 It showed adjacent developer did it on the same

5 timeframe. It showed falsity of known address of a

6 single one of these.

7 Centurion, they call it straw borrower. They

8 say they're not real, but they actually competed with

9 Centurion in a bankruptcy court -- not they. A related

10 entity to Mr. Bass awarded Centurion a development

11 project over Mr. Bass's other entity after vetting all

12 proposals.

13 Defendants only source documents. This is one

14 they said was cumulative, Your Honor. There's so much

15 evidence that Centurion is a real and successful

16 developer that you shouldn't hear it all.

17 Also, let's look at another internal slide where

18 defendants are trashing a different developer in another

19 slide that I don't think saw the light of day. I'm not

20 sure. This is their own document. What search results

21 look like for an actual developer. They put in

22 Mr. Moayedi. They said, This is what searches suggest

23 each is in the business of developing land and building

24 homes. They talk about these hits that say he's very

25 successful developer.

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1 So while they're telling the world he's straw

2 man and misappropriating funds and all this stuff,

3 they're planning to buy his assets and they're internally

4 calling him an actual developer. Like we said, there's

5 accumulative evidence that they just knew that was false.

6 I think we covered this. They repeatedly say we

7 don't generate cash. That's completely wrong. Our cash

8 receipts are in our public filing for the world to see.

9 In fact, this is interesting. This is a

10 spreadsheet --

11 THE COURT: What is this?

12 MS. CIRANGLE: This is defendant's

13 spreadsheet.

14 THE COURT: This is slide 55?

15 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes.

16 THE COURT: But here's the thing. Y'all are

17 referring to the slide shows, both sides, without -- the

18 slide shows are not in evidence, and you're doing this --

19 no slide shows are in evidence.

20 MS. CIRANGLE: Correct.

21 THE COURT: And for the record purposes of

22 keeping a record, how is any appellate court going to

23 follow this conversation?

24 MR. COALE: That's stock in trade. I frequently

25 put them in the record as some kind of court's exhibit

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1 with the notation that they're not evidence, they're not

2 demonstrative. They simply are notes that were passed

3 around that people were looking at during the argument.

4 That way nobody is waiving an argument. Nobody is making

5 evidence up, but then the transcript becomes

6 comprehensible.

7 We can make the necessary statements on this end

8 to include it in the record and make it intelligible.

9 You don't have to mark it as an exhibit. We just have to

10 include it and say what it, in fact, is, which is what

11 everybody's looking at.

12 THE COURT: No, you're missing my point

13 entirely. Like, for example, she's saying this slide da

14 da da. Well, what is this slide? This slide is 55.

15 I don't even know that you filed your

16 demonstrative exhibit. I do know that defendant's filed

17 theirs, but I tried during that discussion to

18 occasionally refer to the slide numbers so that it's not

19 an impossible job trying to track what y'all are saying

20 compared with the slides that I supposed all the slides

21 are in evidence which we discussed before we got started

22 so if they weren't in evidence, we wouldn't talk about

23 it.

24 Anybody go to Baylor?

25 You know what I'm talking about.

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1 I'm sorry. I couldn't resist that.

2 MS. CIRANGLE: I'll find you some because we had

3 the Bates on virtually all of these in the slide show.

4 THE COURT: You what?

5 MS. CIRANGLE: The site for this one is Annex 5B

6 to Mr. Sommer's --

7 THE COURT: But if it said on that page of your

8 slide show that was the exhibit, that would be one thing.

9 If it doesn't show it, how is anybody going to track

10 this?

11 MS. CIRANGLE: Would you like us to type up a

12 list -- it's all in our brief. We say the same stuff

13 with cites.

14 THE COURT: If it's referenced in your brief.

15 MS. CIRANGLE: Yeah, it's all in there.

16 THE COURT: Page 55 of your slide show is

17 actually exhibit whatever. Is it?

18 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes. Everything we cite here, we

19 cite in our brief.

20 THE COURT: So both sides are saying to me that

21 your slide shows have been filed and that your briefs

22 refer to the pages of your slide show that would show the

23 exhibit. That's what y'all are telling me?

24 MR. COX: No.

25 THE COURT: I didn't think so. But that's

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1 what's needs to happen.

2 MR. COX: Judge, if you remember, we moved to

3 strike theirs since they filed it and strike the filing

4 which you agreed they couldn't file their PowerPoint

5 because it's not proper evidence. Not Rule 901.

6 THE COURT: Now, but the further discussion was

7 that if what they refer to is not in evidence, I didn't

8 want to listen to it.

9 Okay. So they altered a couple and made that

10 reference on the record, and I assume the rest of it is

11 in evidence.

12 MR. RAMEY: We assume so after Your Honor's

13 instructions.

14 THE COURT: I tried to head this off at the

15 beginning of -- gosh, about four hours ago exactly to

16 this minute because it's now 6:15. At least they haven't

17 turned the lights off.

18 MR. COX: They did outside.

19 THE COURT: Did they? I think that's because

20 they're sparked by people walking down the hall.

21 But I'm just saying how is anybody -- and as a

22 trial court I trial to protect my record which is try to

23 protect both sides of the record here. How is anybody

24 going to follow this discussion and know what y'all are

25 talking about?

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1 MS. CIRANGLE? I think we just agreed. We can

2 exchange letters tomorrow that have the citations and

3 file it. Just says, Here's the citations of what was in

4 the slide show.

5 MR. RAMEY: On this slide, sure. If you tell me

6 that's in your records, I'll take your word for it.

7 THE COURT: But that doesn't help you because if

8 this goes up on some ruling that I make, which Anti-SLAPP

9 motions can go up right then, one way or another, how is

10 the appellate court going to track where this evidence is

11 on those pages of your slide show? Because when you pull

12 stuff up here -- and this goes to both sides -- guys,

13 time out. I'll let you talk in half a second.

14 When you're talking, and I say page 55 of your

15 slide show, I'm doing that so the record has some idea of

16 where you are so that there's some piece of evidence on

17 55. I don't know what it is, where it is, but so that

18 there might be some hope maybe, if it's in your brief,

19 that you can find that exhibit for sake of your appellate

20 record.

21 MS. CIRANGLE: Your Honor, I am going to argue

22 to the Court of Appeals based on our brief, not on a

23 PowerPoint. The PowerPoint is here to assist us in

24 communicating to the Court what's already in our brief.

25 THE COURT: No, you've got to have evidence for

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1 the Court of Appeals, not a brief, but evidence for

2 the Court of Appeals to make their decision based on.

3 MS. CIRANGLE: It's all in the record.

4 Everything I'm going over is in the record.

5 THE COURT: How does the Court of Appeals know

6 where in the record it is? Because you all gave me nine

7 binders.

8 MS. CIRANGLE: Just like in our opposition

9 brief, in the Court of Appeals brief we cite you to the

10 exact place to find each of these things. It's in the

11 brief.

12 THE COURT: Okay. Oh, well. I'll just take it

13 on faith.

14 MS. CIRANGLE: The PowerPoint is not new

15 argument, new documents. It's just a way for us to try

16 to walk you through what's already in evidence in the

17 briefs. But we are fine, if the Courts wants, we can

18 submit one --

19 THE COURT: I see your point, but I know that it

20 wasn't necessarily true when we got started today that

21 everything in the PowerPoint was in evidence.

22 MS. CIRANGLE: On our side it was.

23 THE COURT: Okay. But I've heard Hayman arguing

24 it's not. So then you go, Yeah, it is. No, it's not.

25 Yeah, it is. So it's like okay, whatever.

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1 MS. CIRANGLE: If there is anything Hayman

2 thinks is not in the record and they want to put it out,

3 we're happy to do that.

4 MR. RAMEY: I'm arguing what she said. We said

5 it was false, and they didn't provided it. We can

6 disagree with her characterization of all that.

7 THE COURT: For example, a minute ago you were

8 talking about the upside of UDF's assets, and I'm hearing

9 an objection that that slide didn't relate to UDF. It

10 related to the economy of Dallas.

11 MR. RAMEY: I just think she's mischaracterizing

12 it. We can make that argument to you. On the Court of

13 Appeals we'll argue that --

14 THE COURT: I just want to make sure everybody

15 can track the evidence. That's my job.

16 MR. RAMEY: Thanks, judge.

17 THE COURT: Go ahead.

18 MS. CIRANGLE: So what we're on here -- if you

19 could go back one slide, Kyle.

20 THE COURT: To page 54.

21 MS. CIRANGLE: 54. That the loans appear to

22 prove larger and large balances for years without ever

23 generating cash receipts. That's deep in defendant's

24 posts. We talk about the fact that's just false to the

25 public filing. Show a bunch of cash receipts.

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1 Then this next document, this is their internal

2 plan we went over to buy assets in bankruptcy if they can

3 make UDF go bankrupt and maybe Centurion. This is

4 showing the assumption of that plan of cash receipts of

5 six percent per year.

6 MR. HURST: Your Honor, I don't know what we

7 want to do on this. They've gone now way past the hour

8 and 15 minutes, and we want to -- are we keeping to the

9 time restrictions that we were doing?

10 THE COURT: They've got an hour and 15 minutes,

11 that's true. I interrupted them a few times. Not way

12 past. It's just 20 after. Five minutes past. I

13 probably interrupted them at least 10 minutes worth.

14 Can can you wrap it up in five?

15 MS. CIRANGLE: If you tell me to, Your Honor, I

16 will.

17 THE COURT: Can you do it?

18 MS. CIRANGLE: Yes, I can.

19 THE COURT: So I can follow because I don't mind

20 giving a little wiggle room so that I can follow this

21 versus having to invent it in my own head.

22 MS. CIRANGLE: Yeah, I can do that.

23 THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

24 MS. CIRANGLE: The way I can do it is to tell

25 you the slides -- there's a bunch of slides here that go

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1 through malice, and these are all in our brief. And we

2 talked time and time again.

3 And, Kyle, if you just kind of...

4 We point out in our brief, They said this. Our

5 public filing reviews show it was false.

6 On slide 59, if you look at Mr. Kitchens, you

7 look at the same financial statements and said, Look,

8 these guys, that can not be true. They're making that up

9 because of the stuff they say. They say they're

10 accounting experts. They say they reviewed this stuff,

11 but the stuff they reviewed shows what they said is

12 false. Again, crickets. No response to any of this in

13 reply.

14 We've got evidence they purposely omitted facts.

15 We have evidence they purposely avoided the truth. We

16 have evidence of a predetermined result. All this

17 evidence is detailed in the brief. So time constraints,

18 I won't do go through it all.

19 (Off the record)

20 But I do want to show you slide 61. Before I

21 get to that, so all that stuff I talked about it's

22 relevant under Texas law. You look at the mix of things.

23 We have a lot of malice evidence. It's a ton. I could

24 talk two hours about the malice evidence, but obviously

25 that would be too much, but it's all meticulously

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1 detailed in our brief.

2 This here is something I do want to point out

3 because it is relevant.

4 So remember I told you they went to the

5 government, and then they went to the press? So they

6 were really hammering on the Wall Street Journal to do an

7 article saying it was Ponzi scheme, worthless, all these

8 things. They had their same theme, that Mehrdad's not a

9 real developer and he's stealing the money.

10 So they e-mail their results to the Boston

11 Journal. Those are the same ones that ended up on the

12 Internet a month later. After reviewing it,

13 Mr. Zuckerman wrote back and said, Well, look at this

14 article they found. If the money is going to Moayedi,

15 wouldn't it suggest he's actually using it to build?

16 Then again he's confused. Moayedi seems to be

17 an actual developer.

18 What happens with the Wall Street Journal is

19 Bass sends his, you know, what he wants them to write.

20 They say no. And ultimately they do publish an article

21 that has nothing to do with being a Ponzi scheme or

22 anything like that. It talks generally about the risk of

23 REITs.

24 The difference to that article and what Hayman

25 did here, they did their research. They actually called

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1 UDF. They asked their point of review. They reached out

2 to other people. When an independent journalist did it,

3 there's no way they could publish the story they

4 wanted.

5 Predetermined results. Obviously they wanted to

6 drive us into bankruptcy and make 59 million on the short

7 position. That's what the predetermined result is.

8 Under Texas law that's relevant to malice. There's just

9 no room for the truth here.

10 They have to ignore -- this is a point they made

11 earlier. Oh, gosh, we didn't really respond. That's not

12 true. We put out a detailed response on December 14 with

13 a lot of factual allegations, including things like the

14 fact Shahan Prairie was developed on the same timeline.

15 They immediately republish it, and then they publish

16 another post saying we're lying.

17 And they want more malice up here again. They

18 want to control the narrative. They don't want UDF to be

19 able to get a PR firm and refute it. They want to take

20 control. These are all things that show malice. They

21 didn't want to hear an even keeled thing here. They

22 wanted their story out there and nothing else. That's in

23 these Edelman memos.

24 There's no room for truth in any of this.

25 Bunch of other stuff. Okay. Causation damages.

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1 There is one important point before I get to slide 66.

2 These guys when they submitted their affidavits, they

3 told you -- these are from what they said in court.

4 Their decision to make public their statements that UDF

5 was principally guided by public interest, fiduciary

6 responsible. Mr. Bass had an obligation.

7 I showed you the e-mails where they said, It's

8 costing 84,000 a day to carry our short. We spent 10

9 million dollars on it. And Bass says, That's why we're

10 going to publish our posts.

11 Okay. Causation and damages. We put in a ton

12 of evidence here. We went in a lot of detail. We had

13 bankers tell you that the posts overnight changed the

14 relationship. We had Mr. Greenlaw submit multiple

15 paragraphs in detail. We had a ton of exhibits on this.

16 We had Centurion's CEO tell us he couldn't get

17 these projects done with UDF as the lender due to the

18 posts. We had Mr. Straub. He was about to sign this

19 large deal, and he backed away from it a week or two

20 after the posts because he understood when you drop a

21 bomb like this, when you say it's a Ponzi scheme, it's

22 going to screw the company up. It's going to cause a

23 problem. You're not going to be able to rely on them as

24 a lender. That's all detailed in this stuff. They're

25 just making jury arguments. Could have been something

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1 else. Could have been this or that. That's what these

2 people swore under oath to you was the cost. That's

3 enough for prima facie case.

4 Okay. Lost profits, we've got that. We've got

5 lost credit. We've got lost investor capital. We've got

6 out of pocket costs. Look at the cases. These are all

7 recoverable under Texas law.

8 The Lipsky case, you had a vice president that

9 did affidavit that was two sentences, and it said, Oh,

10 this caused us 3 million harm.

11 We've got boatloads and pages and pages of not

12 just our guide, but our developer saying it caused harm.

13 Our bankers saying it. This is the prima facie case of

14 us showing some evidence. We're more than met that.

15 They can make their causation argument at trial.

16 And Brown and Straub are very important. They

17 are third parties, and they don't have any skin in the

18 game here in terms of -- they came forward. They said,

19 We'll sign something under oath. They said, You're

20 right. Because of the extreme negative nature of these

21 posts, we knew it was going to be a problem for UDF.

22 Ms. Brown said the same thing.

23 Your Honor, since I'm out of time, and I think

24 you're tired of listening to me, is there anything else?

25 Oh, Alice Anne Brown. Paragraph six is really

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1 important. Ms. Brown knows our company. She was our

2 banker. She knows our folks. She read these posts, and

3 she said, You know my read of them? Bass took facts

4 about our business that was not unusual or improper and

5 distorted and misrepresented them to create the

6 impression our business was operating in a fraudulent

7 manner based on phony real estate developments that did

8 not generate legitimate returns.

9 That's exactly what happened here. She saw it.

10 She called it out. She was very adamant that that's what

11 happened here. And then it caused the entire bank

12 relationship to come crashing overnight.

13 This is all the December 10th posts and December

14 15, which they ignored in their opening brief, ignored in

15 their reply brief. Didn't have fancy disclaimers.

16 Didn't have a bunch of stuff. They crashed our world

17 because of the extreme nature.

18 Ultimately, Your Honor, despite of the volume of

19 the record, this is not a difficult motion to rule on.

20 Our burden is minimal. We presented so much evidence. I

21 have never seen this much evidence. I don't think

22 there's a single Texas case or certainly in California

23 that has this, either.

24 Defendants have failed to make any legal or

25 factual argument sufficient to defeat our evidence. They

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1 are making jury arguments for sure. A lot of it is

2 without evidence in the record. They haven't made an

3 argument to show we didn't show prima facie case.

4 Your Honor, if the evidence presented here is

5 not enough to get through this prelitigation hurdle, then

6 what is? We have put in so much, and the company

7 deserves to go forward into a normal litigation so we can

8 all have full discovery. And as Mr. Bass said, the truth

9 will come out.

10 THE COURT: Okay.

11 MR. HURST: Could we have few minutes to gather

12 thoughts for a short reply?

13 THE COURT: You may.

14 MR. HURST: Thank you.

15 (A break was held.)

16 THE COURT: How much time for the reply?

17 MR. COALE: 10 minutes or less.

18 MR. COX: Give them four. We'll go with two.

19 MR. HURST: They went 10 minutes over.

20 MR. COALE: Give me 10, Your Honor. I'll do any

21 darndest to come in under ten without speaking at the

22 speed of a gazelle.

23 THE COURT: That's what concerns me.

24 MR. COALE: Ten minutes, and I'll be leisurely

25 and pleasant, and it will work out fine.

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1 THE COURT: Promise?

2 MR. COALE: I'll do my best. That's one of

3 those -- what was that phrase? Soapbox oratory.

4 THE COURT: You've got the soapbox, so go

5 ahead.

6 MR. COALE: Several points of law. Factually,

7 this is in our briefing. There's no word on that

8 website, Your Honor, public statements that we back away

9 from.

10 There's this weird thing in the air here today.

11 If it's not said in the reply brief, it's been waived.

12 The statute didn't talk about the reply brief. Our

13 opening brief was written painstakingly.

14 THE COURT: Was it painful?

15 MR. COALE: It pains me. I had to sit in my

16 chair, and it pained me. I have carpal tunnel, and I had

17 pain. Hopefully you will not have pain reading it

18 because it will now be so easy to follow.

19 But when you read it, you'll see what we say we

20 said and why we said it. And we don't need to go back

21 and rehash all that reply brief. We didn't want to write

22 a 500 page reply brief after they wrote a 100 page

23 response to our 20 page motion. We officially said what

24 the point was, at pain admittedly, but we said it, and

25 we're done.

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1 So that business, we waived it and all that

2 stuff, wrong. There's statements they made that are just

3 flat wrong that were addressed in our opening brief, and

4 I'm not going to deal with that all that today. Just

5 note, if I don't talk about it -- they've got this waiver

6 thing going on. I'm not waiving. It's not magic. I'm

7 trying to focus on the highest priority items.

8 This one is easy. Causation. You saw the

9 affidavit. They blew it up. This is the big show.

10 We're going to hear what the causation argument is. It's

11 the negative nature of the posts. They had a negative

12 nature.

13 There's not a case in the world that uses the

14 phrase "negative nature" except for New York Times versus

15 Sullivan defining what is not evidence of actual malice.

16 I can have negative nature all day long. As long as it

17 is not actually malicious, it is protected. It is not

18 evidence of causation. It is not evidence that ties any

19 damage to any particular statement. And it is not

20 exclusion of alternate cause, which is the main thrust of

21 our causation argument.

22 Example of that. We heard about the Bentley

23 case that dealt with opinion. That involved the judge in

24 East Texas. He got in a tizzy with the local media

25 magnate, and they insulted each other. Went up and down.

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1 Went to the Supreme Court.

2 The fact she cites the objectively --

3 THE COURT: Are all these cases actually in

4 these nine binders y'all gave me?

5 MR. COALE: That one should be. Bentley should

6 be.

7 THE COURT: I need to know because I read the

8 cases.

9 MR. COALE: Well, I'll look into it. I don't

10 know the answer offhand.

11 THE COURT: Hopefully it is.

12 MR. COALE: Here's what you won't see if you

13 find it. You will find that there's evidence of

14 corruption at issue disputed. You couldn't see anti

15 corruption police showing up on the guy's doorstep. You

16 won't see him the same day as the first newspaper story

17 getting on the local TV and saying, The anti corruption

18 police are coming to investigate me. You won't see his

19 key staff members quitting because they just settled

20 fraud allegations with a regulator based on the

21 activities that were in that office.

22 In other words you won't see anything resembling

23 all the items on that long laundry list that we showed

24 the Court summarizing these of causation.

25 None of that is established. None of that

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1 negates -- that's inapplicable on the issue of opinion,

2 but what it really illustrates is causation. None of

3 that is explained away. All of it is negative nature.

4 It is both factual and fairly taken into account when we

5 form statements of opinion.

6 Early in our -- one other issue of law before I

7 go back to a couple of factual things I just can't leave

8 laying there. The issue of public figure. It is true

9 that they cite some cases. They say some things about

10 thrusting yourself into a conflict. One was fellow that

11 was the newspaper reporter when the Waco calamity

12 happened with the Branch Davidians a number of years ago.

13 Interesting question. Not one of them says

14 publicly traded status is irrelevant or somehow that's

15 not enough. It certainly doesn't say that when they

16 started the conversation. Drew a picture. It's rough,

17 but over here they say, You should buy our stock.

18 I don't know which entity actually said it, but

19 all of them collectively said a billion dollar deal was

20 lost because of it. They assume damages because of it.

21 They've got some gripe about it. You should buy our

22 stock and enrich us by a billion dollars. We said, No,

23 you should not. There are indicators of risk. They

24 started it by selling their stock and making statements

25 in the market about why you should buy our stock.

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1 We responded to that discussion by pointing

2 out -- and this was pointed out in the presentation

3 specifically -- well, it's in there. Here it is. This

4 chart. Robbing Peter to pay Paul. UDF V, UDF I. The

5 money is moving back around again. That looks

6 suspicious. I didn't hear anything about that. I heard

7 false 22 times before I quit keeping track.

8 But that's fishy. This is suspicious. This

9 slide is not crazy. This lays it out, points to money.

10 Look at the bottom of the screen. Loan concentration.

11 That's fishy. When one guy's got all the money, that's a

12 problem. The two of them together, coupled with some

13 shady disclosures on some other items, that's reason to

14 be concerned.

15 Not one of those things was rebutted. The whole

16 thing about whether Mr. Moayedi was a good guy or not, I

17 think they offered 106 affidavits about that. Great.

18 Power to him. But that has nothing to this issue in the

19 concentration of loans in the same context as robbing

20 Peter to pay Paul, in the same context as disclosure

21 problems.

22 That combination of things is what we described

23 in our opening brief. That's what the truth is. That's

24 what the gist is. And so far D 2 40102 is not the issue.

25 Let me find that one other slide. It's sort of

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1 a pejorative term. It doesn't do justice to the list.

2 It's a mountain. Where are the financial statements that

3 would explain it? They have this new owner on the job.

4 Okay. It's tough digging out from the hole. Why not

5 explain it? Where is the explanation the resignation of

6 the director? Where is the explanation of the other guy

7 after Mr. Kahane withdrew? Where is the explanation of

8 what they're doing with these agencies?

9 I recognize we don't know really know, but we do

10 know they're raiding their office, and we do know a Wells

11 notice has issued. Sure, that might not result in civil

12 litigation. People are sometimes not convicted after

13 indictments. It's a sign that they're taking it

14 seriously.

15 MS. CIRANGLE: There's no indictment.

16 MR. COALE: The fact that they disclosed it at

17 the moment we made our disclosure shows that somebody

18 thought there was a connection on their side of the

19 fence, and it certainly was not malicious for us to point

20 that out.

21 Where are the dividends? All this money

22 floating around, why haven't they found it and given it

23 to somebody? They can't have it both ways. Either they

24 said something at the time or they stood up and said,

25 This is wrong. We're not a Ponzi scheme, this, this,

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1 this, and this. They didn't do that.

2 They point to something else they say, well,

3 this is a thorough rebuttal. Nobody believes them. It

4 didn't work. They either didn't do it, in which case

5 they have only themselves to blame for their damages, or

6 they did it and didn't do it well. And the market place

7 of ideas checked them, and they lost. And they faced the

8 consequence of that in the market place of ideas and the

9 economic marketplace, not something that is regulated by

10 this Court.

11 At the end of the day -- by the way this profit

12 thing, the case New York Times versus Sullivan. New York

13 Times, Incorporated. They make money. The Washington

14 Post. All these media companies. Every defendant in

15 every one of these cases is motivated by profit in one

16 fashion or another.

17 Final note, this bankruptcy fraud thing. We're

18 going to do this, this, this. We're going to get these

19 lenders, and then we're going to do all this in a

20 bankruptcy court where you have to make full disclosure

21 of everything. And someone probably is going to pipe up

22 and say, Wait a minute, these allegations are false.

23 Hayman is telling a bunch of lies. It's the worst place

24 in the world to try to carry out some kind of big fraud.

25 We're looking for investment opportunities, not

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1 from UDF assets. That's a totally legitimate thing to

2 do. The notion that that shows malice? Try to rob

3 somebody in public with a thousand witnesses around. It

4 just can't be done. The market checks that as well.

5 At the end of the day, though, legally they

6 don't have any cognizable evidence of causation.

7 THE COURT: Any what?

8 MR. COALE: Cognizable. Big word, huh? Felt

9 really good saying it.

10 THE COURT: Spell cognizable.

11 MR. COALE: C-o-g-n-i-z-a-b-l-e.

12 THE COURT: Oh, I just pronounce it differently.

13 MR. COALE: It's North Texas as opposed to South

14 Texas perhaps. Whether it's cognizable, cognizable,

15 cognizable, or kahuna, it's not a prima facie case. It's

16 just not. You saw the cases. They offer only

17 speculation. Boom, that's that. Negative nature. Shows

18 our point about actual malice. This is an easy one.

19 THE COURT: Okay. He did it in nine minutes.

20 MR. HURST: There you go.

21 THE COURT: How long you want?

22 MS. CIRANGLE: I don't know. What do you want

23 from me? Four and a half, and then we're done after that

24 or do they get another or is this it?

25 MR. HURST: No.

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1 MS. CIRANGLE: Okay. Four and a half.

2 THE COURT: Okay. Go.

3 MS. CIRANGLE: I heard a bunch of things about

4 causation, negative nature, I didn't really follow, but

5 what I do know is he did the same thing his client did.

6 He cherry-picked a sentence from affidavits when earlier

7 in the affidavits, these people, the banker, she attaches

8 the December 10 post and says, I read these. They said

9 UDF was a Ponzi scheme. That's what was negative.

10 There's not just a stand alone statement of a

11 negative nature. So I don't really know what he's

12 talking about there, but it's cherry-picking. Read the

13 whole affidavits if you want to know the truth, but

14 that's the point on causation.

15 The other -- causation again. Read the

16 affidavits. We have developers. We have bankers. They

17 are swearing under oath, I read the posts. Because they

18 called this a Ponzi scheme, we knew that was going to

19 cause big problems for UDF, and that's why we stopped

20 doing business. That's what they say. That is more than

21 enough.

22 When do you have third parties? I went over a

23 single case where it's not just the CEO attesting to

24 damages. And even in that case they usually let it in if

25 it's detailed enough. We actually have our business

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1 counterpart saying, Here's the post. It's attached. I

2 have read it. It said they were a Ponzi scheme. That's

3 a horrible thing to deal with. It's going to cause

4 problems. We stopped doing business. In their reply

5 brief they didn't come up with any of this. It's

6 something they just came up.

7 Number two, they put up a slide with arrows and

8 circles and money and said we didn't reply. That's

9 totally wrong. Dale Kitchens, paragraph 24, multiple

10 places we rebutted.

11 I didn't have time to walk through Your Honor

12 all the evidence. I cited you an overview. We

13 absolutely rebutted it. There's no evidence of some

14 Ponzi scheme shuffle between funds, and they know it.

15 On the concentration of loans, that's

16 interesting. That wasn't really a bad thing when they

17 were behind our backs plotting to buy those loans and

18 knowing how that concentration was well positioned

19 assets.

20 I also have them showing they no longer are

21 saying that wasn't UDF, and they're still to this day

22 have no response to that PowerPoint.

23 And let's see. I heard some more jury arguments

24 again. You got to focus on what we're here for.

25 Preliminary motion. We barely had discovery, and we put

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1 all this evidence in front of you: falsity, malice,

2 causation, damages, it's all there. Again, if this isn't

3 enough to get us over a hurdle, then I don't know what

4 is.

5 On the public figure thing, again I would have

6 you actually look at the brief -- in our brief at page 59

7 through 62. It's not enough that we were out selling

8 stock in the market. There had to have been a

9 conversation about this specific issue here that we were

10 a fraud, that there were a problem. That's in the

11 Clemson case and Braden case. And those cases are very

12 clear on that point.

13 THE COURT: Okay. I'll ask you, as well. Are

14 the cases that are referenced and cited in your briefs --

15 this goes to both sides. Are they both -- are all those

16 cases in the documents you've given me?

17 MR. HURST: I don't think all of ours are. So

18 we will make sure that we get those to you.

19 THE COURT: Are yours?

20 MS. CIRANGLE: No, Your Honor.

21 THE COURT: All right. So here's what I want.

22 I want another binder. Both sides present the one

23 binder -- hopefully they will fit in one binder -- where

24 you've got indexes of plaintiff's cases, the defendant's

25 cases -- y'all listen up.

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1 What I want is for you to use one of these,

2 okay, if it's like defendant's case or plaintiff's case,

3 and underline it. And then the other side gets to

4 underline what they want in that same case in blue or

5 black ink so my eye goes to it and I understand the main

6 point. Because some of these cases are 50 pages long.

7 Though I do always try to figure out the gist of the

8 case, I don't want to read all 50 pages.

9 MR. RAMEY: One copy with different colors on

10 it?

11 THE COURT: One copy, different colors. If it's

12 defense case or plaintiff's case, you can pick the color

13 you want, be it yellow marker or the blue pen. It has to

14 be a blue pen. Let me explain why.

15 (Off the record)

16 THE COURT: Go ahead.

17 MS. CIRANGLE: I don't know. What do I have

18 left? A couple minutes here?

19 I do have to address their statement that --

20 again, I don't know why they keep saying financial motive

21 is irrelevant because the only case they cite, Bellow,

22 says, quote, Plaintiff's arguments that Bellow had an

23 injurious motive to ruin his representation are certainly

24 factors to be considered, end quote.

25 Citing Bentley, quote, An injurious motive is a

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1 factor to be considered in the termination of actual

2 malice, end quote.

3 You'll see that when you read the cases. It's

4 clearly relevant because if somebody had a 100 or 200

5 million dollar gain in motive to destroying a company, of

6 course they're not going to have any room for the truth.

7 There's no room in there for the truth. They have to

8 make it sensationalist. They have to say stuff that's

9 false. They have to overreach, and they have to ignore

10 every voice that could be the opposite to them. They

11 can't call the company. They can't talk to anyone. It's

12 going to rain on their parade. When the Wall Street

13 Journal tells them this doesn't look true, they have to

14 just ignore it and be mad at the Wall Street Journal.

15 I think that's it, Your Honor. You've heard

16 enough. You've got all these briefs. I'm going to stop

17 a minute short.

18 THE COURT: Need your cases.

19 MS. CIRANGLE: Thank you, Your Honor, for

20 staying late.

21 THE COURT: Sure. If you can get them to me

22 sometime tomorrow. I won't be reading them during the

23 day, so towards the end of the day is fine.

24 MR. HURST: Judge, real quick. One last thing.

25 This is probably not going to make you happy, but I would

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1 like to carry the water.

2 The postings on the website are on jump drives.

3 We reference them in the Parker Lewis affidavit. What we

4 would like to do for the record is to have those in the

5 record, the actual UDF Exposed in the case against UDF

6 into the record so that we -- so that the Court of

7 Appeals has those documents.

8 THE COURT: Okay. Time out. Here's the deal.

9 Yes, they need to be in the record, not on a UDF drive

10 where I can't see it. So y'all figure out how to get it

11 in the record. I think both sides want me to see them,

12 and that's fine. Not on UDF drive. I love paper.

13 MS. CIRANGLE: Most of them are already in the

14 record.

15 THE COURT: If they're in the record, great.

16 Figure out which ones are. If there are any others, put

17 them in. I assume that the dates are the ones in the

18 record that I could see the date of posting.

19 MR. HURST: Absolutely.

20 (End of proceedings)

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2 STATE OF TEXAS )

3 COUNTY OF DALLAS )

4 I, Janet E. Wright, Official Court Reporter in and

5 for the County Court of Dallas County, Texas, County

6 Court at Law Number Three, State of Texas, do hereby

7 certify that to the best of my ability the above and

8 foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of

9 all portions of evidence and proceedings requested in

10 writing to be included in the Reporter's Record, in the

11 above-styled and -numbered cause, all of which occurred

12 in open court or in chambers and were reported by me.

13 I further certify that this Reporter's Record of

14 the proceedings truly and correctly reflects the

15 exhibits, if any, admitted by the respective parties.

16 I further certify that the total cost for the

17 preparation of this Reporter's Record is $1,566.00 and

18 was paid by Mr. Hurst.

19 WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND this the 25th day of May,

20 +2018.

21

22 /s/ Janet E. Wright ______23 JANET E. WRIGHT, Texas CSR #1532 Expiration Date: 12-31-19 24 Official Court Reporter County Court-at-Law No. 3 25 600 Commerce Street, Suite 585 Dallas, Texas 75202

Janet E. Wright Official Court Reporter - County Court At Law No. 3 214/653-7831 Page: 175 of 175

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Janet E. Wright Official Court Reporter - County Court At Law No. 3 214/653-7831 1666 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20006 Telephone: (202) 207-9100 Facsimile: (202) 862-8433 www.pcaobus.org

Report on

2017 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP (Headquartered in Fort Worth, Texas)

Issued by the

Public Company Accounting Oversight Board

November 1, 2018

THIS IS A PUBLIC VERSION OF A PCAOB INSPECTION REPORT

PORTIONS OF THE COMPLETE REPORT ARE OMITTED FROM THIS DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH SECTIONS 104(g)(2) AND 105(b)(5)(A) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

PCAOB RELEASE NO. 104-2019-022 PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022

2017 INSPECTION OF WHITLEY PENN LLP

Preface

In 2017, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB" or "the Board") conducted an inspection of the registered public accounting firm Whitley Penn LLP ("the Firm") pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("the Act").

Inspections are designed and performed to provide a basis for assessing the degree of compliance by a firm with applicable requirements related to auditing issuers. For a description of the procedures the Board's inspectors may perform to fulfill this responsibility, see Part I.C of this report (which also contains additional information concerning PCAOB inspections generally). The inspection included reviews of portions of selected issuer audits. These reviews were intended to identify whether deficiencies existed in the reviewed audit work, and whether such deficiencies indicated defects or potential defects in the Firm's system of quality control over audits. In addition, the inspection included a review of policies and procedures related to certain quality control processes of the Firm that could be expected to affect audit quality.

The Board is issuing this report in accordance with the requirements of the Act. The Board is releasing to the public Part I of the report and portions of Part IV of the report. Part IV of the report consists of the Firm's comments, if any, on a draft of the report. If the nonpublic portions of the report discuss criticisms of or potential defects in the Firm's system of quality control, those discussions also could eventually be made public, but only to the extent the Firm fails to address the criticisms to the Board's satisfaction within 12 months of the issuance of the report. Appendix A presents the text of the paragraphs of the auditing standards that are referenced in Part I.A. in relation to the description of auditing deficiencies there.

Note on this report's citations to auditing standards: On March 31, 2015, the PCAOB adopted a reorganization of its auditing standards using a topical structure and a single, integrated numbering system. See Reorganization of PCAOB Auditing Standards and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards and Rules, PCAOB Release No. 2015-002 (Mar. 31, 2015). The reorganization became effective December 31, 2016. Citations in this report reference the reorganized PCAOB auditing standards.

PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 2

PROFILE OF THE FIRM1

Offices 5 (Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth, , and Texas City, Texas)

Ownership structure Limited liability partnership

Partners / professional staff2 47 / 310

Issuer audit clients 32

Lead partners on issuer audit work3 12

1 The information presented here is as understood by the inspection team, generally as of the outset of the inspection, based on the Firm's self-reporting and the inspection team's review of certain information. Additional information, including additional detail on audit reports issued by the Firm, is available in the Firm's filings with the Board, available at http://pcaobus.org/Registration/rasr/Pages/RASR_Search.aspx.

2 The number of partners and professional staff is provided here as an indication of the size of the Firm, and does not necessarily represent the number of the Firm's professionals who participate in audits of issuers. The number of partners cited above represents the number of individuals with an ownership interest in the Firm.

3 The number of lead partners on issuer audit work represents the total number of Firm personnel (not necessarily limited to personnel with an ownership interest) who had primary responsibility for an issuer audit (as defined in AS 1201, Supervision of the Audit Engagement) during the twelve-month period preceding the outset of the inspection. PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 3

PART I

INSPECTION PROCEDURES AND CERTAIN OBSERVATIONS

Members of the Board's inspection staff ("the inspection team") conducted primary procedures for the inspection from August 21, 2017 to August 28, 2017.4

A. Review of Audit Engagements

The inspection procedures included reviews of portions of four issuer audits performed by the Firm. The inspection team identified matters that it considered to be deficiencies in the performance of the work it reviewed.

The description of the deficiency in Part I.A of this report includes, at the end of the description of the deficiency, references to specific paragraphs of the auditing standards that relate to that deficiency. The text of those paragraphs is set forth in Appendix A to this report. The references in this sub-Part include only the standards that most directly relate to the deficiency and do not include all standards that apply to the deficiency. Further, certain broadly applicable aspects of the auditing standards that may be relevant to a deficiency, such as provisions requiring due professional care, including the exercise of professional skepticism; the accumulation of sufficient appropriate audit evidence; and the performance of procedures that address risks, are not included in any references to the auditing standards in this sub-Part, unless the lack of compliance with these standards is the primary reason for the deficiency. These broadly applicable provisions are described in Part I.B of this report.

One of the deficiencies identified was of such significance that it appeared to the inspection team that the Firm, at the time it issued its audit report, had not obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support its opinion that the financial statements were presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with the applicable financial reporting framework. In other words, in this audit, the auditor issued an opinion without satisfying its fundamental obligation to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements were free of material misstatement.

4 For this purpose, "primary procedures" include field work, other review of audit work papers, and the evaluation of the Firm's quality control policies and procedures through review of documentation and interviews of Firm personnel. Primary procedures do not include (1) inspection planning, which is performed prior to primary procedures, and (2) inspection follow-up procedures, wrap-up, analysis of results, and the preparation of the inspection report, which extend beyond the primary procedures. PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 4

The fact that one or more deficiencies in an audit reach this level of significance does not necessarily indicate that the financial statements are materially misstated. It is often not possible for the inspection team, based only on the information available from the auditor, to reach a conclusion on those points.

Whether or not associated with a disclosed financial reporting misstatement, an auditor's failure to obtain the reasonable assurance that the auditor is required to obtain is a serious matter. It is a failure to accomplish the essential purpose of the audit, and it means that, based on the audit work performed, the audit opinion should not have been issued.5

The audit deficiency that reached this level of significance is described below–

A.1. Issuer A

the failure to perform sufficient procedures to test the allowance for loan losses ("ALL") (AS 2301.16 and .18; AS 2501.11; AS 2605.10-.11).

B. Auditing Standards

The deficiency described above could relate to several applicable provisions of the standards that govern the conduct of audits. The paragraphs of the standards that are cited for the deficiency are those that most directly relate to the deficiency. The deficiency also relates, however, to other paragraphs of those standards and to other auditing standards, including those concerning due professional care, responses to risk assessments, and audit evidence.

5 Inclusion in an inspection report does not mean that the deficiency remained unaddressed after the inspection team brought it to the Firm's attention. Depending upon the circumstances, compliance with PCAOB standards may require the Firm to perform additional audit procedures, or to inform a client of the need for changes to its financial statements or reporting on internal control, or to take steps to prevent reliance on its previously expressed audit opinions. The Board expects that firms will comply with these standards, and an inspection may include a review of the adequacy of a firm's compliance with these requirements, either with respect to previously identified deficiencies or deficiencies identified during that inspection. Failure by a firm to take appropriate actions, or a firm's misrepresentations in responding to an inspection report, about whether it has taken such actions, could be a basis for Board disciplinary sanctions. PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 5

Many audit deficiencies involve a lack of due professional care. Paragraphs .02, .05, and .06 of AS 1015, Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work, require the independent auditor to plan and perform his or her work with due professional care and set forth aspects of that requirement. AS 1015.07-.09 and paragraph .07 of AS 2301, The Auditor's Responses to the Risks of Material Misstatement, specify that due professional care requires the exercise of professional skepticism. These standards state that professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of the appropriateness and sufficiency of audit evidence.

AS 2301.03, .05, and .08 require the auditor to design and implement audit responses that address the risks of material misstatement. Paragraph .04 of AS 1105, Audit Evidence, requires the auditor to plan and perform audit procedures to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the audit opinion. Sufficiency is the measure of the quantity of audit evidence, and the quantity needed is affected by the risk of material misstatement (in the audit of financial statements) or the risk associated with the control (in the audit of internal control over financial reporting ("ICFR")) and the quality of the audit evidence obtained. The appropriateness of evidence is measured by its quality; to be appropriate, evidence must be both relevant and reliable in providing support for the related conclusions.

The paragraphs of the standards that are described immediately above are not cited in Part I.A, unless those paragraphs are the most directly related to the relevant deficiency.

B.1. List of Specific Auditing Standards Referenced in Part I.A.

The table below lists the specific auditing standards that are referenced in Part I.A of this report, cross-referenced to the issuer audit for which each standard is cited.

PCAOB Auditing Standards Issuer AS 2301, The Auditor's Responses to the Risks of A Material Misstatement

AS 2501, Auditing Accounting Estimates A

AS 2605, Consideration of the Internal Audit A Function

PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 6

C. Information Concerning PCAOB Inspections that is Generally Applicable to Triennially Inspected Firms

A Board inspection includes a review of certain portions of selected audit work performed by the inspected firm and a review of certain aspects of the firm's quality control system. The inspections are designed to identify deficiencies in audit work and defects or potential defects in the firm's system of quality control related to the firm's audits. The focus on deficiencies, defects, and potential defects necessarily carries through to reports on inspections and, accordingly, Board inspection reports are not intended to serve as balanced report cards or overall rating tools. Further, the inclusion in an inspection report of certain deficiencies, defects, and potential defects should not be construed as an indication that the Board has made any determination about other aspects of the inspected firm's systems, policies, procedures, practices, or conduct not included within the report.

C.1. Reviews of Audit Work

Inspections include reviews of portions of selected audits of financial statements and, where applicable, audits of ICFR. For these audits, the inspection team selects certain portions of the audits for inspection, and it reviews the engagement team's work papers and interviews engagement personnel regarding those portions. If the inspection team identifies a potential issue that it is unable to resolve through discussion with the firm and any review of additional work papers or other documentation, the inspection team ordinarily provides the firm with a written comment form on the matter and the firm is allowed the opportunity to provide a written response to the comment form. If the response does not resolve the inspection team's concerns, the matter is considered a deficiency and is evaluated for inclusion in the inspection report.

The inspection team selects the audits, and the specific portions of those audits, that it will review, and the inspected firm is not allowed an opportunity to limit or influence the selections. Audit deficiencies that the inspection team may identify include a firm's failure to identify, or to address appropriately, financial statement misstatements, including failures to comply with disclosure requirements,6 as well as a

6 When it comes to the Board's attention that an issuer's financial statements appear not to present fairly, in a material respect, the financial position, results of operations, or cash flows of the issuer in conformity with the applicable financial reporting framework, the Board's practice is to report that information to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "the Commission"), which has jurisdiction to determine proper accounting in issuers' financial statements. Any description in this report of financial statement misstatements or failures to comply with PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 7 firm's failure to perform, or to perform sufficiently, certain necessary audit procedures. An inspection may not involve the review of all of the firm's audits, nor is it designed to identify every deficiency in the reviewed audits. Accordingly, a Board inspection report should not be understood to provide any assurance that a firm's audit work, or the relevant issuers' financial statements or reporting on ICFR, are free of any deficiencies not specifically described in an inspection report.

In some cases, the conclusion that a firm did not perform a procedure may be based on the absence of documentation and the absence of persuasive other evidence, even if the firm claimed to have performed the procedure. AS 1215, Audit Documentation, provides that, in various circumstances including PCAOB inspections, a firm that has not adequately documented that it performed a procedure, obtained evidence, or reached an appropriate conclusion must demonstrate with persuasive other evidence that it did so, and that oral assertions and explanations alone do not constitute persuasive other evidence. In reaching its conclusions, an inspection team considers whether audit documentation or other evidence that a firm might provide to the inspection team supports the firm's contention that it performed a procedure, obtained evidence, or reached an appropriate conclusion. In the case of every matter cited in the public portion of a final inspection report, the inspection team has carefully considered any contention by the firm that it did so but just did not document its work, and the inspection team has concluded that the available evidence does not support the contention that the firm sufficiently performed the necessary work.

Identified deficiencies in the audit work that exceed a significance threshold (which is described in Part I.A of the inspection report) are summarized in the public portion of the inspection report.7

The Board cautions against extrapolating from the results presented in the public portion of a report to broader conclusions about the frequency of deficiencies

SEC disclosure requirements should not be understood as an indication that the SEC has considered or made any determination regarding these issues unless otherwise expressly stated.

7 The discussion in this report of any deficiency observed in a particular audit reflects information reported to the Board by the inspection team and does not reflect any determination by the Board as to whether the Firm has engaged in any conduct for which it could be sanctioned through the Board's disciplinary process. In addition, any references in this report to violations or potential violations of law, rules, or professional standards are not a result of an adversarial adjudicative process and do not constitute conclusive findings for purposes of imposing legal liability. PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 8 throughout the firm's practice. Individual audits and areas of inspection focus are most often selected on a risk-weighted basis and not randomly. Areas of focus vary among selected audits, but often involve audit work on the most difficult or inherently uncertain areas of financial statements. Thus, the audit work is generally selected for inspection based on factors that, in the inspection team's view, heighten the possibility that auditing deficiencies are present, rather than through a process intended to identify a representative sample.

C.2. Review of a Firm's Quality Control System

QC 20, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm's Accounting and Auditing Practice, provides that an auditing firm has a responsibility to ensure that its personnel comply with the applicable professional standards. This standard specifies that a firm's system of quality control should encompass the following elements: (1) independence, integrity, and objectivity; (2) personnel management; (3) acceptance and continuance of issuer audit engagements; (4) engagement performance; and (5) monitoring.

The inspection team's assessment of a firm's quality control system is derived both from the results of its procedures specifically focused on the firm's quality control policies and procedures, and also from inferences that can be drawn from deficiencies in the performance of individual audits. Audit deficiencies, whether alone or when aggregated, may indicate areas where a firm's system has failed to provide reasonable assurance of quality in the performance of audits. Even deficiencies that do not result in an insufficiently supported audit opinion may indicate a defect or potential defect in a firm's quality control system.8 If identified deficiencies, when accumulated and evaluated, indicate defects or potential defects in the firm's system of quality control, the nonpublic portion of this report would include a discussion of those issues. When evaluating whether identified deficiencies in individual audits indicate a defect or potential defect in a firm's system of quality control, the inspection team considers the nature, significance, and frequency of deficiencies;9 related firm methodology, guidance, and practices; and possible root causes.

8 Not every audit deficiency suggests a defect or potential defect in a firm's quality control system, and this report may not discuss every audit deficiency the inspection team identified.

9 An evaluation of the frequency of a type of deficiency may include consideration of how often the inspection team reviewed audit work that presented the opportunity for similar deficiencies to occur. In some cases, even a type of deficiency that is observed infrequently in a particular inspection may, because of some combination of its nature, its significance, and the frequency with which it has been PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 9

Inspections also include a review of certain of the firm's practices, policies, and processes related to audit quality, which constitute a part of the firm's quality control system. This review addresses practices, policies, and procedures concerning audit performance, training, compliance with independence standards, client acceptance and retention, and the establishment of policies and procedures.

END OF PART I

observed in previous inspections of the firm, be cause for concern about a quality control defect or potential defect. PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 10

PARTS II AND III OF THIS REPORT ARE NONPUBLIC AND ARE OMITTED FROM THIS PUBLIC DOCUMENT

PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page 11

PART IV

RESPONSE OF THE FIRM TO DRAFT INSPECTION REPORT

Pursuant to section 104(f) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7214(f), and PCAOB Rule 4007(a), the Firm provided a written response to a draft of this report and that response has received careful consideration. Pursuant to section 104(f) of the Act and PCAOB Rule 4007(b), the Firm's response, minus any portion granted confidential treatment, is attached hereto and made part of this final inspection report.10

10 The Board does not make public any of a firm's comments that address a nonpublic portion of the report unless a firm specifically requests otherwise. In some cases, the result may be that none of a firm's response is made publicly available. In addition, pursuant to section 104(f) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7214(f), and PCAOB Rule 4007(b), if a firm requests, and the Board grants, confidential treatment for any of the firm's comments on a draft report, the Board does not include those comments in the final report at all. The Board routinely grants confidential treatment, if requested, for any portion of a firm's response that addresses any point in the draft that the Board omits from, or any inaccurate statement in the draft that the Board corrects in, the final report.

PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page A-1

APPENDIX A

AUDITING STANDARDS REFERENCED IN PART I

This appendix provides the text of the auditing standard paragraphs that are referenced in Part I.A of this report. Footnotes that are included in this appendix, and any other Notes, are from the original auditing standards that are referenced. While this appendix contains the specific portions of the relevant standards cited with respect to the deficiencies in Part I.A of this report, other portions of the standards (including those described in Part I.B of this report) may provide additional context, descriptions, related requirements, or explanations; the complete standards are available on the PCAOB's website at http://pcaobus.org/STANDARDS/Pages/default.aspx.11

AS 2301, The Auditor's Responses to the Risks of Material Misstatement TESTING CONTROLS Testing Controls in an Audit of Financial Statements AS 2301.16 Controls to be Tested. If the auditor plans to Issuer A assess control risk at less than the maximum by relying on controls,12 and the nature, timing, and extent of planned substantive procedures are based on that lower assessment, the auditor must obtain evidence that the controls selected for testing are designed effectively and operated effectively during the entire period of reliance.13 However, the auditor is not required to assess control risk at less than the maximum for all relevant assertions and, for a variety of reasons, the auditor may choose not to do so.

Footnotes to AS 2301.16

12 Reliance on controls that is supported by sufficient and appropriate audit evidence allows the auditor to assess control risk at less than the maximum, which results in a lower assessed risk of material misstatement. In turn, this allows the auditor to modify the nature, timing, and extent of planned substantive procedures.

13 Terms defined in Appendix A, Definitions, are set in boldface type the first time they appear.

11 The text presented in this appendix represents the standards as in effect during the applicable audit period. PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page A-2

AS 2301, The Auditor's Responses to the Risks of Material Misstatement AS 2301.18 Evidence about the Effectiveness of Controls in Issuer A the Audit of Financial Statements. In designing and performing tests of controls for the audit of financial statements, the evidence necessary to support the auditor's control risk assessment depends on the degree of reliance the auditor plans to place on the effectiveness of a control. The auditor should obtain more persuasive audit evidence from tests of controls the greater the reliance the auditor places on the effectiveness of a control. The auditor also should obtain more persuasive evidence about the effectiveness of controls for each relevant assertion for which the audit approach consists primarily of tests of controls, including situations in which substantive procedures alone cannot provide sufficient appropriate audit evidence.

AS 2501, Auditing Accounting Estimates EVALUATING ACCOUNTING ESTIMATES Evaluating Reasonableness AS 2501.11 Review and test management's process. In many Issuer A situations, the auditor assesses the reasonableness of an accounting estimate by performing procedures to test the process used by management to make the estimate. The following are procedures the auditor may consider performing when using this approach:

a. Identify whether there are controls over the preparation of accounting estimates and supporting data that may be useful in the evaluation. b. Identify the sources of data and factors that management used in forming the assumptions, and consider whether such data and factors are relevant, reliable, and sufficient for the purpose based on information gathered in other audit tests. c. Consider whether there are additional key factors or alternative assumptions about the factors. d. Evaluate whether the assumptions are consistent with each other, the supporting data, relevant historical data, and industry data. e. Analyze historical data used in developing the assumptions to assess whether the data is comparable and consistent with data of the period PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page A-3

AS 2501, Auditing Accounting Estimates under audit, and consider whether such data is sufficiently reliable for the purpose. f. Consider whether changes in the business or industry may cause other factors to become significant to the assumptions. g. Review available documentation of the assumptions used in developing the accounting estimates and inquire about any other plans, goals, and objectives of the entity, as well as consider their relationship to the assumptions. h. Consider using the work of a specialist regarding certain assumptions (AS 1210, Using the Work of a Specialist). i. Test the calculations used by management to translate the assumptions and key factors into the accounting estimate.

AS 2605, Consideration of the Internal Audit Function ASSESSING THE COMPETENCE AND OBJECTIVITY OF THE INTERNAL AUDITORS Objectivity of the Internal Auditors AS 2605.10 When assessing the internal auditors' objectivity, Issuer A the auditor should obtain or update information from prior years about such factors as— . The organizational status of the internal auditor responsible for the internal audit function, including— o Whether the internal auditor reports to an officer of sufficient status to ensure broad audit coverage and adequate consideration of, and action on, the findings and recommendations of the internal auditors. o Whether the internal auditor has direct access and reports regularly to the board of directors, the audit committee, or the owner- manager. o Whether the board of directors, the audit committee, or the owner-manager oversees employment decisions related to the internal auditor. PCAOB Release No. 104-2019-022 Inspection of Whitley Penn LLP November 1, 2018 Page A-4

AS 2605, Consideration of the Internal Audit Function . Policies to maintain internal auditors' objectivity about the areas audited, including— o Policies prohibiting internal auditors from auditing areas where relatives are employed in important or audit-sensitive positions. o Policies prohibiting internal auditors from auditing areas where they were recently assigned or are scheduled to be assigned on completion of responsibilities in the internal audit function.

Assessing Competence and Objectivity AS 2605.11 In assessing competence and objectivity, the Issuer A auditor usually considers information obtained from previous experience with the internal audit function, from discussions with management personnel, and from a recent external quality review, if performed, of the internal audit function's activities. The auditor may also use professional internal auditing standards4 as criteria in making the assessment. The auditor also considers the need to test the effectiveness of the factors described in paragraphs .09 and .10. The extent of such testing will vary in light of the intended effect of the internal auditors' work on the audit. If the auditor determines that the internal auditors are sufficiently competent and objective, the auditor should then consider how the internal auditors' work may affect the audit.

Footnotes to AS 2605.11

4 Standards have been developed for the professional practice of internal auditing by The Institute of Internal Auditors and the General Accounting Office. These standards are meant to (a) impart an understanding of the role and responsibilities of internal auditing to all levels of management, boards of directors, public bodies, external auditors, and related professional organizations; (b) permit measurement of internal auditing performance; and (c) improve the practice of internal auditing.