Phil. 173: Metaethics Feb. 21, 2018 Lecture 10: A New Kind of Nihilism: Moral Fictionalism I. A Quick and Dirty Introduction to Fictionalism in General Fictionalism is a fairly new way of being an error theorist about a given domain of discourse, while still allowing us to speak about that domain in much the same way as non-error theorists do. The basic idea: although the (positive, atomic) sentences in a given domain of discourse are literally false (or at least untrue), we treat them as a useful fiction. So instead of literally asserting a given claim in that domain, one fictively asserts it; and instead of literally believing a given claim in the domain, one fictively it. (Different versions of fictionalism give different accounts of what fictive assertion and fictive come to.) Two different ways of being a fictionalist about a given domain of discourse: • hermeneutic fictionalism (or descriptive fictionalism): We already do adopt a fictionalist stance toward that domain of discourse. • revolutionary fictionalism (or prescriptive fictionalism): Although we do not currently do so, we should adopt a fictionalist stance toward that domain of discourse. Areas of discourse in which fictionalism has been applied: talk about mathematical objects, unobservable entities, possible worlds, composite objects, colors, events, truth, and morality.

II. Joyce’s Moral Fictionalism Richard Joyce is a revolutionary fictionalist about morality. He endorses a force-modifier account of fictive assertion/belief, as opposed to a tacit story-operator account: • the tacit story-operator account: When one fictively asserts, “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street,” one literally asserts the proposition that according to the Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street. • the force-modifier account: When one fictively asserts, “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street,” one puts forward the proposition that Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street, but in a non- assertoric way. Joyce holds that the best test of whether one literally believes that p is whether one assents to its being the case that p in a critical context: a context in which one is at one’s most undistracted, reflective, and critical, in which one carefully considers all the for and against its being the case that p, and so on. So if one assents to its being the case that p in many ordinary contexts but not in more critical contexts, Joyce holds that one does not literally believe that p, although one might fictively believe that p.

Joyce’s master for revolutionary moral fictionalism: 1. Moral nihilism is true. [] 2. If moral nihilism is true, then the relevant options for what we should do are abolitionism, conservatism, propagandism, and fictionalism. [premise] 3. Conservatism and propagandism are bad options because of the disvalue of having untrue beliefs and not engaging in critical . [premise] 4. Fictionalism is a better option than abolitionism because the former provides a (partial) bulwark against weakness of will whereas the latter does not. [premise] 5. So, we should embrace fictionalism. [follows from 1, 2, 3, 4] III. Joyce on the Benefits of Literal Belief in Morality Joyce thinks that, in most cases, we have strong prudential to act in cooperative ways with our fellow humans (especially when we consider the benefits of having a good reputation). Hobbesian/Humean reply to the fool/sensible knave/free-rider who seeks to cheat her fellows when it seems like she can get away with it: • the cost of being caught is grave, especially compared to the value of what one stands to gain; • one misses out on the benefits of inward peace of mind; • since one is epistemically fallible, one might misjudge when one can get away with cheating; • since one constantly has cheating on one’s mind, one is “likely to be tempted to cheat in some situations where the chances of evading detection are less than certain” (p. 300). Fixing on the final of these considerations, Joyce believes that moral beliefs provide an additional benefit over purely prudential reasoning, namely as a bulwark against weakness of will: “Because short-term profit is tangible and present whereas long-term profit is distant and faint, the lure of the immediate may subvert the agent’s ability to deliberate properly so as to obtain a valuable delayed benefit, leading him to ‘rationalize’ a poor choice. . . . When a person believes that the valued action is morally required—that it must be performed whether he likes it or not—then the possibilities for rationalization diminish. . . . The distinctive value of categorical imperatives is that they silence calculation, which is a valuable thing when interfering forces can so easily hijack our prudential calculations. In this manner, moral beliefs function to bolster self-control against practical irrationality” (p. 301).

IV. Joyce on the Benefits of Fictive Belief in Morality Joyce insists that fictive belief in morality can also help combat weakness of will, although to a lesser degree. To motivate this claim, he appeals to the following example (p. 303): Suppose I am determined to get into shape, but often find myself too lazy to exercise. So I lay down the following authoritative rule for myself: I must do fifty sit-ups every day, no less. When I’m doing sit- ups, I think to myself, “Must . . . do . . . fifty!” but if, in a more critical context, you ask me whether I really must do fifty, I’d concede that often it’d be just as beneficial if I did forty-nine.

V. Some Objections A smattering of possible worries for Joyce’s brand of revolutionary moral fictionalism (and his master argument for it): • Does he get the cost–benefit analysis right? • Why are untrue beliefs (in Joyce’s particular sense of what belief involves) instrumentally costly, as opposed to untrue thoughts on specific occasions? • If we can compartmentalize the set of all moral sentences and adopt a different stance toward it, why can’t we compartmentalize that set when we engage in critical inquiry? • If morality is incoherent (as some but not all nihilists hold), how can we pretend that it is true? • Which of the many possible moral stories are we to adopt a fictionalist stance toward? (Danger of reducing to two-level egoism.) • Why is the classroom the most reliable indication of what one truly believes? • If I reject a given moral claim when at my most critical, can it really do the motivational work that Joyce imagines it doing?