UNITED NAT Distr. GENERAL SECURITY I S/6228 s COUNCIL 11 March 1965 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENEmL ON THE UNITXD NATIONS OPERATION IN

(For the period 13 December 1964 to 10 March 1965) TABLE OF CONTENTS Pane INTRODUCTION ...... 3 I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE A. Composition and deployment ...... ,4 B. Function and guiding principles ...... 6 C. Relations with the Government and with the cornunities ...... 7 D. Freedom of movement of the United Nations Force...... 8 II. ACTIVITIES TGWARDPREVENTING A RECURRENCEOF FIGHTING AND CON?!RIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AND MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER A. Military situation ...... 11 (i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP ...... 11 (a) Government armed forces ...... 11 (b) Turkish Cypriot armed elements ...... 13 (c) The Greek and Turkish national contingents ...... 14 (ii) Positions, fortified lines and territorial control of the Government and Turkish Cypriot forces ...... 15 B. General assessment of the situation with regard to preveni,ing a recurrence of fighting ...... 18 (i) Military conditions on the Island ...... 1.8 (ii) UNFICYP proposals for reducing areas of tension ...... 20 C. Specific developments and action taken by UNFICYP ...... 21 (i) The Famagusta new harbour situation ...... 21 (ii) The Roccas Bastion tunnel ...... 23 (iii) The Bellapais Road incident ...... 24 (iv) The road blocks incident ...... 25 (v) Observance of the cease-fire ...... 26 (vi) Methods used by the United Nations Force ...... 29 (vii) Activities of UNCIVPOL: the question of missing persons . . 3l 65-04489 / . . . s/6228 English Page 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page

III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDA RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS A. General assessment ...... 33 . B. Freedom of movement of the population ...... 35 C. Efforts to restore normal economic activities ...... 38 (3.) Economic restrictions ...... 38 (ii) Agriculture ...... 39 (iii) Local and export markets ...... 41 (iv) Industry ...... 42 0. Measures to assist refugees and other distressed persons .... 44 (i) Red Crescent relief .. T ...... 44 (ii) Relief and commercial shipment to ...... 47 E. Normalization of the public services ...... 48 (i) Public utilities ...... 4-8 (ii) Problems of public revenue ...... 49 (iii) Education ...... 52 (iv) Postal and telephone services ...... 52 (v) Land records ...... 53 F. The functioning of the L,aw Courts and the administration ofjustice ...... 54 (i) The functioning of the Courts ...... 54 (ii) Administration of justice ...... 58 IV. DESCRIPTION OF LOCAL SITUATIONS AS OF 7 MARCH 1965 ...... 60 v. FINANCIAL ASPECTS ... ., ...... 70 VI. MEDIATION EFFORT ...... 72 VII. OBSERVATIONS ...... 73

ANNEXI. AIDE-MZMOIm ANE REPLIES ON TH3 FAMAGUSTASITUATION ANNEX II. PLFEGES TO THE UNFICYP SPECIAL ACCOUNT AS OF 10 MARCH 1965

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INTROCUCTION t 1. I have the honour to submit to the Security Council my report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, covering developments from 13 December 1964 to 10 March 1965, and bringing up to date the record of United Nations activities under the mandate of the Security Council in its resolutions of 4 March, 13 March, 23 June, 9 August, 25 September and 1.8 December 1964.- U 2. Curing the fourth three-month period of the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, the peace has been kept, the cease-fire has by and large been observed, and, despite certain difficulties which are described in chapters I and II below, the military situation in general has remained quiet. The inabi:lity ,to find a basis for a final settlement, or indeed for a return to normal condi-tions, has caused a ]?enewed feeling of uneasiness among Cypriots which has made UNFICYP's task more difficult.

y Documents s/5575, s/5603, s/57@, s/5868, s/5987 and s/6121. s /6sa English Page 4

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE A. Composition and deployment

3. The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is composed of military contingents placed at the disposal of the United Nations by Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the . The Force also includes a civilian police element the personnel of which are provided by , Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden. 4. At the beginning of the period under review, the strength of the Force was 6,105 military personnel and :173 civilian police. On 0 March 1965, the numerical composition of the Force was as follows: Military Austria (medical unit) 45 Canada 1,120 Denmark 986 Finland 929 Ireland 1,061 Sweden 829 United Kingdom m Total 5,978 Civilian police Australia 39 Austria 34 Cenmark 40 New Zealand 20

Sweden -40 Total 2 Total UNFICYP: 6,151 5. The following changes took place during the intervening period: (a) Ireland: The Fourth Infantry Group (strength 425) relieved the Third Infantry Group (strength 415) during the period 26-28 January 1965. Transport was by commercial carrier. The Forty-first Infantry Group has remained virtually unchanged. S/6228 English mi% 5

(b) United Kingdom:-- 644 Signal Troop, Royal Signals, was rotated between 26 January and 7 February 1965. Detachment 230 Squadron Royal Air Force was replaced by 22 Squadron as an interim measure for one month on 11 January 1965. s on 11 February 1965, 18 Squadron RAF relieved 22 Squadron and at the same time Whirlwind helicopters were replaced by Wessex helicopters. 6 Flight, Army Afr a Corps, relieved 3 Flight, Army Air Corps, on 13 February 1965. Curing this period there has also been a considerable rotation of Headquarters staff at UNFICYP Headquarters. 6. Curing the period under review, the Force was deployed as follows (see attached map): Zone: HQ UNFICYP (International) HQ Nicosia Zone (Basic organization Canadian, with representative staff drawn from contingents under command). Austrian Field Hospital and Austrian Civilian Police Canadian Contingent Danish Contingent and Danish Civilian Police Finnish Contingent

---Famagusta Zone Swedish Contingent Swedish Civilian Police

Limassol-- District United Kingdom Contingent New Zealand Civilian Police Paphos District 3rd Infantry Group - replaced by 4th Infantry Group, Irish Contingent, between 26-28 February 1965. Australian Civilian Felice (one section)

Morphou-- District klst Infantry Group, Irish Contingent Australian Civilian Police (one section). 7. The Force remains under the ccmmand of General K.S. Thimayya, and Mr. C.A. Bernardes continues as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus. / . . . S/6228 English Page 6

B. Ftinction-- and guiding principles - a. The function of the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus remains unchanged; it was defined by the Security Council in its resolution of 4 March 1964 and reaffirmed in its resolutions of 13 March, 20 June, 9 August, 25 September and 18 Cecember 1964. The 4 March resolution sets forth the function of UNFICYP as follows: "in the interest of presierving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrent of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions". There is, in addition, the consensus expressed by the President to the Council's 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964, which was reaffirmed by the Council in its resolutions of 25 September and 1s CeccK:ber. 9. The guiding principles governing the operation of the Force remain as summarized in the report of 10 September 1964 (S/5950, para. 7). These refer to the exclusive control and command of the Force by the United Nations; the use of arms only for self-defence in discharge of the function of the Force including defence of UNFICYP posts and personnel subjected to armed attack; restraint and complete impartiality toward:; members of both communities, and close contact with the appropriate officials of the Cyprus Government and with the leaders of the communities. 10. The deployment of the Force is discussed in section A of this chapter; the methods used by it in carrying out its functions in the military field are detailed in chapter II. UNFICYP is assisted by a civil police unit which forms an integral part of the Force; its main duties remain as laid down in the report of 2 May 1964 (~15679, paragraph 4), and its work under that part of the mandate relating to the restoration and maintenance of law and order is referred to in chapter II, section C. 11. Curing the period covered by this report UNFICYP suffered I?O casualties as a result of intercommunal fighting; however, one UNCIFYP soldier was killed in a traffic accident when a scou-t car overturned. A second soldier was killed by the discharge of his own weapon, and two others died from natural causes.

I 12. One soldier was wounded while on duty by:the accidental discharge of a Turkish Cypriot fighter's gun, and one was stabbed while off duty in a fracas L involving National Guardsmen. Both soldiers have recovered. 13. Problems arising in connexion with the implementation of the mandate were regularly dealt with by the Political Liaison Committee, in which the UNFICYP Senior Political Adviser and Assistant Chief of Staff met separately with liaison officers representing the Government and the . Between 13 December IL964 and 10 March 1965 the Committee held forty-three meetings, twenty-two with the Government Political Liaison Officer and twenty-one with the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer.

C. -----Relations with the Government and with the communities---

14. The maintenance of friendly relations and harmonious co-operation with the Government of the Republic and with the members and leaders of both communities is an essential condition for carrying out UNFICYP's function under the mandate. 15. UNFICYP has therefore maintained close liaison with the Government of Cyprus. The Special Representative and the Force Comma~nder have engaged in continual :and detailed consultations with President Makarios and members of his Government on matters concerning the implementation of the mandate. Liaison was likewise maintained at all levels of the administration and of the military establishment. At the same time, the Special Representative and the Force Commander have had frequent consultations with the Vice President and with the leadership of the , Turkish Cypriot community. !$h ese arrangements have enabled UNFICYP to contribute to the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 by all a concerned, and to keep the objectives of that resolution constantly before the Government and the responsible leaders of the communities. 16. There have been, however, instances when this generally satisfactory state of affairs could not prevent difficulties from arising with regard to specific problems requiring UNFICYP intervention under the mandate. These difficulties tended, in certain cases, to becloud, if only temporarily, relations with the Cyprus military leadership. In seeking to fulfil their responsibility for defence of the island against external attack, the military authorities took several measures which were regarded as provocative by the Turkish Cypriot community, s/6228 English Page 8 giving rise to increased tension and even the danger of a recurrence of violence. The Cyprus military authorities also took certain measures, detailed in section D c of this chapter, which affected UNFICYP itself and its freedom of movement. In cases where disputed military situations arose, UNFICYP, which is not empowered . to force its views on either party, of necessity negotiated with both, since the consent of both was in fact required if peaceful solutions were to be found and violence averted. This gave rise, quite unjustifiably, to allegations from some quarters that UNFICYP treated the Turkish Cypriot community as a separate state. 17. Difficulties were also encountered by UNFICYP in its relations with the Turkish Cypriot military leaders - notably in connexion with the Roccas Bastion and Bellapais road episodes and in other cases of provocative building or digging of fortifications. The fundanlental problem, however, which has affected relations between UNFICYP and the Turkish Cypriot leadership relates to the meaning of the phrase "return to normal conditions" in paragraph 5 of the Security Council resolution of 4 March. It must be stated that the Turkish Cypriot leadership has co-operated only marginally in UNFICYP's efforts to promote a return to normality since it took the position that substantial progress in that direction depended on the prior restoration of the 1960 Constitution. In fact, the Turkish Cypriot policy of self-isolation has led the community in the opposite direction from normality. These points are discussed in chapter II1 below. 18. The satisfactory relationship established between members of the Force and the population of both major communities has remained in general unchanged, and f UNFICYP personnel continued as a rule to be welcomed in both. There were some exceptions, notably in areas of high tension, such as the Green Line and Famagusta. * The friendly attitude of the Greek Cypriot population was sometimes adversely affected by press campaigns which were directed against UNFICYP. These campaigns were generally called off after short periods of time. Unfortunately, their effects in the popular mind could not be erased with equal ease.

D. Freedom- of movement-- of the United Nations~- Force

19. The agreement reached between the Force Commander and the Government of Cyprus in November 1964 (s/6102, para. 127) worked satisfactorily during Cecember 1964 and January 1965. In the early part of February 1965, however, there were a s/6228 English page 9

number of instances of obstruction of UNFICYF vehicles, ifi some cases, involving threats of hostile action. 20. On five occasions UNFICYF vehicles were prevented from entering areas alleged by the Cyprus Police or the National Guard to be restricted, but not shown as such in the agreement. On six other occasions, UIWICYP vehicles travel:Ling on public roads used by National Guard convoys, or passing through restricted areas, were stopped, threatened, forced off the road by National Guard vehicles, deliberately pushed or forced into collisions, or prevented from overtaking National Guard co*voys. 21. It had been ovserved on a number of occasions that machine guns were apparently being trained on UNFICYP aircraft, and oe 9 February General Grivas warned that he had given orders to the National Guard to fire at United Nations planes flying - over restricted areas. On 16 February, an UNFICYP light aircraft in reconnaissance duty over such an area was actually fired at from the ground. The shots missed. A strong protest was lodged with the Government in connexion with this incident, since it was UNFICYP's understanding that the agreement on restricted areas applied to vehicles and personnel on the ground only. 22. There have been five incidents in which LlNFICYP personnel have been detained and searched by the Cyprus Police or National Guard, sometimes at gunpoint. 23. On sixteen occasions it was necessary to protest to the Government about obstructions of UNFICYP freedom of movement. Five of these protests were answered. 24. On three occasions Turkish Cypriot armed elements stopped UNFICYP patrols entering what they regarded as sensitive areas. UNFICYP protested on each occasion; no answers have been received from the Turkish Cypriot leadership. , 25. In a letter to the Government on 5 February, the Force Commander expressed his concern about the impeding or denial of freedom of movement to UNFICYP reconnaissance vehicles. He pointed out that the aim of reconnaissance by UNFICYP was to keep him properly informed, so as to enable him to assess likely future military developments, and so position the Force correctly for its task of keeping the peace. 26. At the same time, the Force Corrmander ordered a review of UNFICYP reconnaissance procedures, with a view to reducing to a minimum practices which might conceivably give rise to friction or resentment, however unjustified. The revised procedures do not diminish the ability of UNFICYP to keep the Commander properly informed bf developments in the Island. S/6228 English Page 10

27. On 25 February, the Minister of the Interior wrote to General Thimayya that, if the revised procedures were followed, there would be no intention on the part of the Cyprus security forces to interfere with United Fations operations on the Island, but the security forces expected UNFICYP not to interfere with their cwn functions. United Kations observation activities, he said, had been carried out in a provocative manner. The Government of Cyprus was facing a threat from outside, and considered that UNFICYP had no valid interest in activities designed to meet that threat. These were some of the reasons why the security forces resisted attempts from any quarter to observe in restricted areas. If the Force Commander's instructions were complied with, the Cyprus security forces would reciprocate fully. 28. The Force Commander's rep:ly, dated 8 March 1965, refuted suggestions that members of UNFICYP had acted irregularly in carrying out their observation duties. There was no possibility of UJXFICYP effectively carrying out its task without information about the armed fo:rces operating on the Island. The Force Commander emphasised the need for full co-operation between UNFICYF and the Government and expressed confidence that such co-operation would be forthcoming. s/622(3 English Page ll

II. ACTIVITIES TOWARDPREVE.NTlXG A RECURRENCEOF FIGHTING AND CONTRIBUTING TO THE RESTORATION AliE MAINTENANCE OF LAWAND ORDER

A. Military situation

29. The basic feature of the military situation in Cyprus within which UNFICYP carries out its peace-keeping function has been and continues to be the hostile confrontation between the armed forces, including militia and police, of the Government of the Republic, and the armed elements under Turkish Cypriot leadership. There are also the two national contingents, maintained on the Island by the Governments of Greece and I'urkejr under the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance of 16 August 1960. The effective strength of the Government forces is further enhanced by the presence of a substantial number of military personnel from Greece not forming part of the Greek National Contingent. Moreover, it is a factor in the situation that the Turkish Cypriots naturally continue tp look to the nearby mainland of for military assistance in a new crisis.

(i) Armed forces in Cyprus other than UNFICYP (a) Government armed forces

30. As a result of the decision taken by the Council of Ministers on 10 December 1964, to extend from six to twelve months the military service of conscripts called up &ring 1964 (~161.02, para. l32), there has been a marked development in the effectiveness and operational ability of the Cyprus National Guard, which has become more and more professional. In addition to the four age groups conscripted last year beginning in June, the 1946 age group was called up on 4 January 1965, thereby raising the total number of the conscrip,t element of the National Guard to approximately 14,000. 31. Instru&ion and training, which to a very large extent is the responsibility of Greek officers, has included field exercises,with live ammunition for light as well as for heavy weapons of conventional types. For specialized training in various fields, some recruits are, in addition, being sent outside Cyprus for short periods. In spite of the hardships of the winter, season, the discipline and morale of the troops do not appear to have suffered.

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32. As a supplement to the operational units formed by conscripted elements, there is still, in,rural areas, the militia. This is principally made up of members of the former volunteer force, organized in special units (Home Guard), available for ,, service in an em@rgency. As for the police, its estimated strength of 5,CC0 is considered to have remained unchanged during the past three months. c 33. No precise information is available with regard to the number of military personnel believed to have comd to Cyprus from Greece (excluding the Greek National Contingent) and who s-till remain on the Island. The Turkish Cypriot side has provided estimates of the order pf 10,OCO men. UNFICYP's estimate (s/6102, paragraph 134) remains unchanged. 34. No significant changes in the higher cor?xnand posts of the Cyprus defence forces have taken place during the period under review. 35. It was indicated in the December 1364 report (s/6102, para. 165) that the influx of arms and equipment for the Government forces, which had been a cause for concern during the summeT of 1964, had continued on a much reduced scale from September to November of that year. In the opinion of UNFICYP, the bulk of imported material was ammunition and maintenance stores fpr existing equipment, as well as possibly such items as, anti-aircraft artillery. This trend appears to have been reversed in December. There has been an increased influx of various types of light and heavy military equipment. This activity has enhanced the Government's ability to meet a threat of foreign invasion; at the same time, it has tended to increase tension. F 36. Much of the material has been introduced through the ports of Famagusta and Limassol, where UNFICYP has, on several occasions, in accordance with the agreement of 10 September 1964, (S/6102, para. l29), been notified of the arrival hs of shipments by the local police authorities and has also been invited to be present at the unloading procedure in the docks. When this has occurred, the shipments in question have generally consisted of ammunitiOn. 37. A great deal of additional material, however, much of it of strategic importance, has been introduced through the new port of Boghaz, some sixteen miles north of Famagusta. Unloading here and inland transport has taken place without informing UNFICYP as required by the 10 September 1964 agreement. S/6228 English Page 13

30. The Government armed forces have been actively strengthening coastal 'defences \ and cpnstructing new fortifications in other areas, including fortifications in depth. The network of roads in many of these sensitive areas has been further developed. 39. On 13 January 1965 and again on 5 February, the Force Commander sent written inquiries to the Minister of Interior, Mr. Georghadjis, about the reports of ILarge- scale importing of arms. General Thimayya drew the Government's attention to the relevant portions of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 and to the Secretary-General's views on this subject (see S/5950, para. 38). 40. By letters dated 20 January and 19 February, the Minister of Interior referred to the Government's legitimate right to defend the country against attack from the outside and assured the Force Commander that there was no intention of using any imported equipment in the inter-conmwnal conflict or to attack the Ilurkish Cypriot community.

(b) --4Turkish Cypriot-- armed elements 41. According to information available to UNFICYP, the organizational structure of the Turkish Cypriot fighters has not changed during the period under review. Leadership seems to be exercised with great authority by the respective commanders. The influence of the extremist Turk Mudafaa Twdati or TMI (Turkish Defence Organization) remains as pronounced as before. Hard living conditions during the q winter season appear not to have lowered the Turkish Cypriot fighteus' fitness and morale. Qaj.ning, together with other military preparations, has been greatly stepped up. 42. Fortifications which have been damaged by the wet weather are being repa-ired and new fortifications within the Turkish Cypriot lines are also being constructed. The building of new fortifications invariably gives rise to retaliat.ory digging or construction activities by the other side. The,net result during this period has been a strengthening of fortified lines on both sides, thus contributing to the effective separation of Turkish Cypriot controlled areas from the rest of the country. 43. The total strength of the Turkish Cypriot fighters is estimated to remain at approximately 12,000. This figure may well be on the conservative side, and a

/ . . . s/6220 English Page 14 realistic appraisal should take into account the probability that, in the event of a new outbreak of hostilities, every able-bodied Turkish Cypriot is a potential fighter. 4.4. The Turkish Cypriots now seem to be concentrating members of their community (especially men of fighting age) in the major enclave under Turkish Cypriot' control. Thus there are indications that in the area which includes the Turkish Cypriot Sector of Nicosia, there has been during the period under review a fairly consistent excess of arrivals over departures of Turkish Cypriot men. Some of this population movement is known to be accounted for by the arrival of students and teachers, but its potential mj.litary significance cannot be overlooked. 45. Although occasionally new weapons of the small arms type have been seen, there is no evidence, to the knowledge of UNFICW, that the Turkish Cypriot fighting elements have received weapons or other categories of military equipment from outside the Island since last summer.

(c) The Greek and Turkish naiiional contingents

46. The two national contingents have remained in the locations which they occupied at the end of last year (s/6102, para. 138) and their strengths have been kept within the limits set by the Treaty of Alliance of 16 August 1.969, which was unilaterally denounced by the Government of Cyprus in April 1964. 47. Relief of about half of the Greek National Cpntingent took place on 18-19 December 1964 through the port of Famagusta. UNFICYF was informed in advance. 48. On 14 January 1965, the Turkish Charge d'nffaires in Nicosia informed the Government of Cyprus about Turkey's intention to rotate approximately half of the officers and other ranks of its contingent in February. He also approached UNFICYF requesting it to extend its good offices, as well as its assistance and facilities, in carrying out t&e operation, as in the case of the rotation of 26 October 1964 (s/6102, para. 140). On 4 February, the Government of Cyprus informed the Turkish Charge d'Affaires that it was unable to grant its consent for the replacement of personwl as proposed by the Turkish Government; a copy of this corrmunication was transmitted to UNFICW.

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49. UNFICYP has considered all along that the question of the rotation of the Turkish and G.reek Contingents should be dealt with by the Governments concerned. Its good offices have, nevertheless, been made available to the parties at their request and within the context of the provisions of paragraph 1 of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964. While the Turkish Government considers that it is entitled to relieve personnel of its national contingent in Cyprus without seeking the consent of the Government of the host country and the Government of Cyprus deems the presence of the Turkish Contingent in the Island illegal, UNFICYP's good offices can only be extended with a view to avoiding dangerous situations arising on this subject between the Governments of Cyprus and Turkey.

(ii) Positions, fortified lines and territorial control of the Government- and Turkish Cypriot forces

50. The Government forces and Turkish Cypriot armed elements referred to in the preceding section continue to,occupy military positions and fortified lines in .vari.ous parts of the Republic. As indicated in the last report (s/6102, para. 143), the Turkish Cypriots exercise complete military and administrative control over such places as the northern part of Nicosia City, its north-western suburbs and the region to the east and west of Kyrenia road up to the southern edge of the town of Kyrenia; the town of ; the Turkish quarters of Famagusta and Larnaca; an enclave comprising , another around Kalyvakia, and the two beach-heads at Kokkina and Limnitis. Access to these areas is ccmpletely interdicted to government troops, police and administrative agents and to in general, except for.travel on the Kyrenia road and across the Limnitis bridgehead under UNFICYP escort. All these enclaves are ringed by fortified positions manned by Turkish Cypriot fighters who enforce their exclusive control by force of arms against any attempted encroachment by the Government; facing them are similar government positions. UNFICYP is present or interposed in most places where this stat,e of,affairs prevails. Even though there is no shooting, the situation is essentially one of hostile military confrontation. 51. In this regard, conditions have remained unchanged for the past six months. There has been virtually no reduction in the scale of fortifications, and in fact in Kokkina, Nicosia and Famagusta a number of additional barricades, trenches and sandbagged fortifications have been dug or erected. Whenever such structures s/6228 English Page 16 are considered provocative, UNFICYF insists on their removal. A high proportion of the new works were in fact demolished after patient, negotiations by UNFICYP, but except in Limassol there has been no net reduction. 52. There are numerous Turkish Cypriot-inhabited areas in addition to the ones listed in para,graph 1 above where no such exclusive military control is exercised by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, but where the Government's writ runs only in part or not at all. Actually,, conditions vary from place to place; for example, the Government may have over-all military control of an area and may regularly run police patrols and even other traffic through a community, but in practice the local Turkish Cypriot leaders may continue to follow thr: directives of the Vice-President's office in Nicosia, and are usually, successful in inducing their compatriots to heed their authority unquestioningly. In the countryside,, a substantial area is cultivated by Turkish Cypriots. Trespass on the land of one village by shepherds or peasants from a village of the other community is a fruitful source of complaint which occasionally erupts into shooting; here again, no situation of military control may necessarily prevail, though tension continues. The Turkish Cypriot leadership contends that the aggregate total of Turkish Cypriot areas, including all .the village lands of Cyprus now actually cultivated by Turkish Cypriots, covers 25 per cent of the surface of the country, but much of.this in fact falls within ,the area of predominant government control. The question of the position of the Turkish Cypriot population is complex. ;55* The Government contends that ,the Turkish Cypriot leadership resorts to strong-arm tactics to enforce its domination and has made available to UNFICYP evidence about methods used to implement the self-segregation policy of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot leaders claim that their community nnx?t adopt defensive measures in the face of possible acts of Greek Cypriot violence; since they regard the Government as illegal, they also seek to avoid placing,Turkish Cypriots in situations where they have to acknowledge the authority of government agents. The fact is that this self-isolation policy is least successfW wherever the Government has most consistently sought to foster a return to normal conditions and to prevent victimization of Turkish Cypriots; in such areas the links with the Turkish Cypriot leadership in Nicosia may sometimes become tenuous, and the population may in part accept government administrative authority (See chapter IV). S/622? English Page 17

54. In present political conditions, moral suasion and the Turkish Cypriot's \ genuine fears for their safety are usually quite sufficient to enable the Turkish Cypriot leaders to assert their political authority and territorial and military .I control and to maintain the fighting spirit of the people at high pitch. The thousands who have to live as refugees in varying degrees of misery believe that a solution which will put an end to their plight will soon be forthcoming. Those who demur are few in number. 55. Accordingly, while the Turkish Cypriot fighters confront the government troops from fortified lines, the community leadership discourages the Turkish Cypriot population from engaging in personal, commercial or other contacts with their Greek Cypriot compatriots, from applying to government offices in administrative matters, or,from resettling in .their home villages if they are refugees. 56. The device of requiring exit permits for Turkish Cypriots desirous of leaving the Turkish Cypriot quarter and lawfully travelling about their business to other parts of the country is regularly used in Nicosia. While the Turkish Cypriot leaders contend that this formality is designed to check on possible abductions by Greek Cypriots, no verified reports of abductions have come to the attention of UNCIVPOL in many months; exit permits however may tend to discourage people from leaving the Turkish Cypriot quarter unless absolutely necessary. Directly related to this is the rigid denial to Greek Cypriots of passage rights through, or access to, Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas even while the l?urkish,Cypriot leaders \ demand freedom of movement for their people through government-contro:Ued areas. 57. The Government regards the military-political and territorial situation JT described in the above paragraphs as one of rebellion, and deems it essential to e:xtend its effective sovereignty and administrative control over the whole territory of the Republic. The Turkish Cypriot leaders assert that they will forgo their present military position only on the condition that the Turkish Cypriot community's rights under the 1960 Constitution are restored. Pending such a consummation, they will so far as may be within their power strive to achieve and enforce a condition akin to -I-de facto partition.

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B. Genersl asswsment of the situation-- with regard to -~~~~~a--1 recurrence of fighting -

(i) ---_IMilitary conditions on the-- Island 53. The Island has on the whole remained quiet during the period covered by this report. Tension generally remains high along the lines of direct armed confrontation. Moreover, there have been periods of local tension, notably during incidents involving the Famagusta New Harbour, the Roccas Bastion, the Bellapais Road positions, and the Limnitis bridgehead. These incidents were all marked by notice being served on UNFICYF by one side or sometimes by both, stating that unless the other side removed certain new positions by a given time the aggrieved party would open fire, attack, or seek to remove them by force. Patient negotiations by UWICW commanders at all levels invariably prevented dangerous situations from developing. In no case was there evidence of more than local preparations to carry out these threats. 590 On 9 February 1965, the Permanent Representative of Turkey addressed to the Secretary-General a letter (s/61X1.) stating that his Government had just received information from a reliable source "that the Greeks of Cyprus are now on the verge of unleashing a mass armed attack against Turkish Cypriots with the purpose of creating a fait acc;ompli". The representative declared that if the United Nations proved incapable of averting such aggression, Turkey would inevitably have to honour its humanitarian and treaty obligations. Similar representations were made on the same day to &he United Nations Force Commander by,the Charge d'iiffaires of Turkey in Nicosia. 60. On the night of 9-10 February, UNFICYP took adequate precautionary measures to, deal with any such contingency. The situation however remained quiet. 61. On 11 February, the Permanent Representative of Greece made representations to the Secretary-General concerning the reference to possible military intervention contained in the letter from the Turkish Permanent Representative; the representative of Greece in this connexion mentioned that his Government was committed to "respond automat:ically',to a Turkish attack against Cyprus, and had so informed the Government in Ankara. He also requested that the Force Commander should make a statement as to whether UNFICW had been able to detect any preparation for the alleged attack; a similar request was made by the Permanent Representative of Cyprus. S/6228 English Page 19

62. On 12 February, the Special Representative and the Force Corrmander visited \ the President of Cyprus and drew his attention to the allegations which had been made by the Turkish Government. Archbishop Makarios immediately sent a message m to the Secretary-General (s/6188) III which he sLated that those allegations were completely gl-oundless and expressed atiiety that they might be designed to provide an excuse for creating incidents and the resorting to "violence by Turkish Cy:priot elements or aggressive action by Turkey". The President added that his Government was doing its utmost to preserve and promote peace and normality in co-operation with UNFICYP, and had no intention whatsoever of resorting to any attack again& Turkish Cypriots. 63. Although UNFICYP has been impeded from time to time in its efforts, particularly by governmental forces with regard to essential freedom of movement, it has, by its deployment in likely trouble spots and by its continuous observation of military movement on ,the Island, endeavoured at all times to ensure that no large-scale preparations for an attack by one side or the other would escape its notice. 64. In spite of the growing strength, efficiency and secretiveness of the Na-tional Guard and the importation of appreciable quantities of heavy equipment during the period, there has been so far no specific evi$ence of preparations f:or a large- scale attack on the Turkish Cypriot community. As indicated in section A of -this chapter, there ,is likewise no evidence of a build-up or of preparations for J offensive action by the Turkish Cypriots. The situation therefore remains much the same as in the last report (s/6102, paras. 141-142). D 65. On the other hand, the build-up of the National Guard and of the Turkish armed element, the increased preparations for defence against external attack by the Government and preparation s for a possible resumption of inter-communal hostilities by the opposing sides will become more and more difficult to detect. It is therefore vital that UNFICYP's rights in respect of free movement and observations, both on the ground and from the air, shall continue to be recognized to enable the Security Council to be kept informed about the situation anfl to dispel unwarranted apprehensions. 66. It should be added at this point that, in accordance with its mandate, UJ!WCYP will do everything in its power, within the limits of its strength, to prevent a recurrence of fighting. S/6228 English Page 20

(ii) EICYP proposals for reducing areas of tension

67. While UNFICYF has been successful since last August in helping to prevent a recurrence of fighting, this has been achieved as a result of continuous effort; the accounts of specific incidents contained in section C of this chapter make it plain that these efforts have often been strenuous ones, and that officers and men serving in the United Nations peace-keeping force have often found both their mettle and their fortitude tried. There is no peace on the Island, but a tense and fragile truce. This situation moreover is likely to continue as long as there is a hostile confrontation within the Island and as long as the territory of the Republic is cut up by front lines and fortifications whose presence contributes to,maintaining tension at high pitch. 68. As stated in the last report (s/6102, paras. 167 to 172), the Force Cormnander, at the suggestion of the President of the Republic, prepared proposals, for the progressive defortifications of the key areas of tension on the Island. 69. The plans for the removal of all fortifications and armed posts in the Kyrenia Range and for the abolition pf the Green Line in Nicosia were submitted to the President on 2 December 1964. The plan for demilitarization of the positions of both sides around Kokkina brid@:ehead and the resettlement of refugees in the area was submitted on 7 December. 70. No official reply has been received, but there have been indications that in the opinion of the Cyprus military authorities, implementation of such plans at the present stage might give rise to a feeling of insecurity among the population. UNFICYF is prepared to ensure that none of the positions which might be left urmanced under the several demilitarization schemes would be taken over by the opposing side; in the unlikely case of a resumption of hostilities, troops from both sides could in any case reoccupy such positions in very short order. On the other hand, the elimination of armed confrontation, and of the tension, insecurity and constant fear of violence which such confrontation breeds among civilians of both sides, might at last bring a return to normal conditions within reach.

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C. Specific devehpments and ---action taken by LJNFICYP-

4 (i) The FamaEsta new harbour situation

7%. In Famagusta a difficult problem has been created by the building of a new 1 harbour, which has nearly doubled the capacity of the port. The new facility extends from the walled city, which is a Turkish Cypriot stronghold, to near the Turkish Cypriot village of Karaolos, north of Famagusta. What was a strip of waste ground is now a costly investment. In an agreement concluded by General Gyan1, the then UNFICYP Commander, with the President on 15 May 1964, it was decided that certain points in this area were not $0 be fortified and that all fortifications erected since 11 May would be removed. The terms of the agreement were also accepted by the Turkish Cypriot leader in Famagusta. While it has not been complied with in all particulars,,the agreement served to maintain a satisfactory calm in the area for eight months. UNFICYF was effectively interposed atop the city walls, which overlook the harbour, and in other places of potential tension. 72. During the intervening months, construction of the new harbour went forward, and towards the end of 1964 the Government began to construct fortifications for its defence (s/6102, pm. 160). It contended that it had the right and duty to protect and police the harbour area. The Turkish Cypriots maintained that fortifications ostensibly erected as coast defences could be turned against their community and that National Guard positions and patrols in the area could threaten a their free movement between Karaolos and the city. 73. The dispute assumed increasing gravi.ty,in January and February as construction of the harbour neared completion and new posts were taken over or constructed by P the National Guard. Each such move has been followed by protests and negotiation. The building of a machine-gun post at the Foor Hcuse, which commanded the new hartour area, the construction of a blockhouse on the mole, and thq occupation by the National Guard of hLts vacated by the workers of the Polish construction company which had built the harbour, were in each case followed by a sharp rise in -tension. 74. Upon visiting the scene on 15 Jixary, the Force Commander received assurances from the National Guard that their posts were for coastal defence and would not be manned except in an emergency, and from the Turkish Cypriot leader that he would take no precipitate action, such as having his men take up positions on the city

/ . . . s/6228 English Page 22 walls. On 5 February the Special Representative and the Force Commander discussed the situation with the President and it was understood that the huts being vacated by the construction firm would be occupied not by soldiers but by Cyprus police, who would perform the normal dockside security functions. An UNFICYP post would be maintained in one of these huts. 75, This arrangement was not implemented, and a stage was reached in mid-February when the Turkish Cypriots, faced with measures which they interpreted as posing a menace to their security, started building new barricades and improving trenches within the city and in the Turkish Cypriot suburbs. The National Guard in turn reacted by fortifying certain places which had been denied to them by the 15 May agreement. On 15 February, the President visited Famagusta; he asked the Force Commander and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to accompany him on a personal tour of the disputed positions. At a meeting on the following day the President proposed the removal of certain posts and joint manning of others with UNFICYP. These proposaJ.s were conveyed by UNFICYP to the Vice-President, who did not find them acceptable. In the meantime, UNFICW noticed a hardening of attitude on the part of the Turkish leaders in the area and at the same time a distinct reluctance on the part of the local National Guard commander to make himself available for discussion of current problems. This tended for a time to impede liaison. 76. However, after renewed consultations at a high level, UNFICYP obtained assurances from the authorities, and from the Turkish Cypriot leaders, that further building of fortifications would cease for the time being,, so as to avoid the possibility of escalation while negotiations were in progress. On. 27 February 1965 the Special Representative and the Force Commander submitted to the President an aide memoire containing UNFICYP's suggestions for a solution of the problem. The identical plan was transmitted to the Vice-President who on 8 March replied favourably. Dr. Kuchuk specified .that UNFICYP should take the necessary measures for the removal of all new National Guard posts and fortifications and to prevent the Government side fromputting up new positions or fortifications in area in the future. He added that further infiltration of military patrolling by the National Guard in the vicinity of Karaolos village

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should likewise be discontinued. A reply from the Government was received on 10 March. The _aide memoire and the two replies are attached as annex I.

(ii) The Roccas Bastion --Itunnel 77. During the night of 23-24 January, a large section of stone fncing on the Roccas Bastion, an integral part of the medieval walls of the old (city of Nicosia, collapsed into the moat after being loosened by heavy rains, and revealed a section of tunnel approximately 50 metres long. The tunnel had been constructed in great secrecy presumably during the summer of 1364 by the Turkish Cypriots, who thus obtained an excellent.firing position facing houses awoss the Green Line occupied by the National Guard. The Green Line agreement of December 1963 called for both sides to evacuate certain areas, which would then be demilitarized and occupied by.the peace-keeping Force. Among these was the Roccas Bastion. 78. Revelation of the tunnel faced UNFICYP with a difficult situation, fey passions and tensions had been high on both sides for some time. The Government and the Greek Cypriot poptiation were, not unnaturally, most perturbed; the Press dealt extensively with the danger of Turkish Cypriots burrowing in tunnels throughout the city; some newspapers even suggested that members of UNFICYP, which maintains, a post on top of the Bastion, must have been privy to the Turkish digging. The Government demanded assurances that vital government offices, especially the Telecommunication Authority building and the police station at Paphos Gate, 200 metres to the south, were not threatened by Turkish Cypriot underground operations, and asked that the tunnel should be completely destroyed and the Turkish Cypriots denied access to the area. 79. There followed a week of tense negotiations between UNFICYP and the Turkish Cypriots, whq had violated the Green Line agreement by digging into a position which was supposed to be demilitarized and under exclusive UNFICYP control; their explanation was that the houses bccupied by the YJational Guard across the mea-t should also have remained demilitarized. It was eventually understsxd that the tunnel should be sealed off at the point where it entered the bastion proper; UNFICYF would ensure that the position should be rendered unfit for military use by anyone and would employ boring (camouflet) equipment to verify that no other tunnels existed in the area which could have the effect of threatening the security s/G228 English Page 24 of the government-controlled part of the city; UNFICYP would also consider the question pf temporary repairs to prevent further deterioration of the ancient city wall. c 80. The Force Commander visited the tunnel on 30 January, and on 8 February UNFICXP announced that the whole bastion, including the tunnel within it, was under complete UNFICYP control. Discussions continue with the Government and the Turkish Cypriots concerning other measures which might be taken to improve the situation in the area, notably with regard to the question of periodic access to the bastion for unarmed Turkish Cypriots and related issues.

(iii) The Eellapais Road incident 81. The Turkish Cypriot positions astride the Kyrenia Pass are in the form of a horseshoe whose wings follow the line of the,mountain peaks on either side of the road, while the base lies on the pass itself. The area between is a neutral zone under the terms of the Cease-Fire Agreement of 29 April 1964, which provides that neither side will construct any fortification forward of those occupied at the time of the cease-fire. 52. In the morning of 24 January 1965, UIWICYP noticed that the Turkish Cypriots had, under cover of darkness, started to build. three positions several hundred yards forward of their previous defensive line, dominating the Bellapais Road and quite close to the headworks of the Kyrenia water supply. These new positions were most provocative and UNFICW asked the Turkish Cypriot Commander to fill in r‘ the position and withdraw his men by 1600 hours the next day. 83. On that day, 25 January, a Turkish Cypriot spokesman requested a postponement of the deadline so that negotiations could take place with the Commander of UNFICYF \* Nicosia Zone. This was granted. However, as a precaution against further provocative digging, UNFICYF stationed a detachment of one officer and eight men in the disputed positions whi.ch were occupied by about fifteen Turkish Cypriot fighters. There the UNFICYF detachment remained for the next week. 84. As negotiations dragged on and the offending trenches were not filled in, the patience of the National Guard personnel, who had been watching the proceedings from their positions on the heights to the east, wore thin. The situation became tense with the possibility that the Naticnal Guard might also move forward, leading

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to a dangerous confrontation, since positions would then be too near one another to allow for effective UNFICYP interposition. 85. On 2 February, negotiations for the dismantling of the new positions and the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot fighters were finally successful. The withdrawal was completed by midday on the 3rd. At about this time, however, the National Guard decided to move forward and establish a new position opposite the Turkish Cypriot trenches, which by now were empty. UNFICYP immediately intervened and persuaded the National Guard to withdraw to their normal lines, which was done later in the day.

(iv) The L'imnitis road blocks incident 86. Since September 1964, Greek Cypriot traffic hasbeen regularly crossing the Limnitis enclave under UNFICYP escort (sj6102, pm. 39). 87. During the early hours of 16 February, UNFICYP found the Turkish Cypriots. setting up road blocks at the eastern and western approaches to the bridgehead. The local Turkish leader declared that, with immediate effect, all IJnited Nations-. escorted convoys would be stopped and the identity cards of Greek Cypriots checked. There were four Turkish Cypriot armed men at each road block. When the Cyprus Police were informed, they said that Greek Cypriots would not submit to Turkish Cypriot checks and immediately cancelled the convoys, pending settlement of the issue. 88. The local commander of the National Guard alerted his battalion, deployed artillery and served notice that if the road blocks were not removed, he would launch an attack on the bridgehead. He said that the United,Nation:; would be responsible for the safety of women and children in the area. 89. During the evening of 17 February, after two days of continuous negotiations by UNFICYP's Paphos District headquarters, the Turkish Cypriots eventually agreed to remove the road blocks and to allow normal UNFICYP-escorted.movement on the road. The first convoy went through at 05CO hours on the 18th. What might have developed into a serious outbreak of fighting had been averted.

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(v) Observance of the cease-fire - 90. The situations discussed so far in this section raised tensions dangerously and, if not promptly dealt with by UNFICYP, might easily have jeopardized the maintenance of the cease-fire. There were a number of other incidents involving I actual breaches of the cease-fire; in each case UNFICYP succeeded in localizing the trouble and preventing escalation. 91. A large number of the shootings which occurred during the period,under review were alleged to be the result of accidental discharges. It is noteworthy that there was a sharp increase in this sort of odcurrence after a new National Guard unit, presumably with a lower standard of training, replaced a more experienced unit in the Kokkina area. 92. Of the thirty-nine shooting incidents which in the opinion of UNFICYF constituted breaches of the cease-fire, sixteen occurred in Nicosia Zone, four in Famagusta Zone, four in Paphos District and fifteen in District. Seventeen of these were attributed to National Guard troops or other Greek Cypriots, and twenty-two to Turkish Cypriots. 93. Shooting incidents during the period are sLurmarized below; comparative figures from the two previous reports are also given: 9 December 1964 9 September to 9 June to to 7 March 1.965 8 December 1964 8 September 1964

Nicosia Zone 97 124 191 Faznagusta Zone 44 16 10 Lirnassol District 7 6 5 4 Paphos District 7 [ 53 Morphou District 67 10 - - - Total 222 160 259 94. The following casualties were incurred by the parties; the figures in brackets are for the period covered by the report of 12 December 1964:

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Killed: Greek Cypriots Turkish Cypriots- --Total

(a) Deliberate - (1) 1 (2) 1 (3) (b) Cue to accidental discharges 1 (1) - - 1 (1) -- - - - Total 1 (2) 1 G 2 (4) Wounded: (a) DeLiberate - (3) 1 (11) 1 (14) (b) Cue to accidental discharges or explosions + (1) 2 (3) 3 (4) -- - Total + (4) 3 65 4 (Yii 95. Curing the past three months, UNFICYP on twelve occasions proter;ted to the Government about breaches of the cease-fire agreement. Only one answer has been received. During the same period, UNFICY? on seventeen occasions lodged protests .with the Turkish Cypriot leadership. None of these has been answered. 96. There have been no confirmed instances of Turkish aircraft over-flying Cyprus during the period of this report. There has been one case of an unidentified craft, which might have been a submarine approaching the Turkish Cypriot controlled a:rea of Limnitis during the night of 5-6 February 1965 and exchanging light signals. As far as could be seen nothing was landed or taken off by the craft. The incident was observed by an UNFICYF post.

2 97 * One serious incident happened on 19 February 1965, when the National Guard opened fire on a group of unarmed Turkish Cypriot fighters cutting down a tree on their own side of the cease-fire line at Kokkina. Four shots were fired from two positions. One shot killed one of the Turkish Cypriots and another nearly hit a second as he ran away. UNFICYP soldiers in one of its observation posts witnessed the incident and noted where the shots came from. The National Guard have denj.ed that they fired the shots. The Force Commander has protested to the Minister of the Interior against this breach of cease-fire, and has asked to be informed about t;he disciplinary measures taken against the culprits. 98. Another potentially dangerous incident happened earlier at Kouklia (Paphos District). On 9 January at about 1930 hours , shooting was heard in that mixed village. Ati UNFICYF patrol hastened to the spot, where it was found that the I S/6220 English hge 28

National Guard and Cyprus Police on the one hand and the Turkish Cypriot villagers on the other hand were manning their trenches in an ugly mood. Each side maintained that the other had fired hundreds of shots into their quarter of the village without any provocation. The 1Jnited Nations patrol remained throughout the night, and a resumption of the shooting was avoided. In the morning, the village was ,a examined and a certain amount of damage was found, mainly in the Turkish Cypriot quarter. 99. It was not immediately clear, from the villagers' contradictory accounts, how the incidents had started, although all agreed that,there had been an explosion and that the Turkish Cypriot coffee shop had been damaged. UNCIVPOI. were called in to investigate, while the soldiers devoted their efforts to reducing tension and getting the village back to normal. 100. Meanwhile, both sides reacted to the situation in characteristic fashion by starting to dig trenches all over the place; on the 12th the National Guard Battalion Commander threatened to surround the village if the Rmkish Cypriots did not stop digging. It took until 16 January before this pointless activity was stopped through UNFICYP persuasion and the extra trenches filled in. The UNFICYP District Headquarters at Paphos had conducted the negotiations with the local National Guard commander and with the Turkish Cypriot leaders in Ktima. Eventually both sides counselled moderation and the situation cooled off. Meanwhile the UNCIVPOL investigation revealed that the trouble had started with some Greek Cypriots having a brandy party about fifty yards from the Turkish Cypriot coffee shop. One of the revellers ha13 lighted a home-made bomb which had gone off. Both communities reacted to the exp:Losion by assuming that the other side had attacked them and fired back wildly. A United Nations patrol is still in the village. 101. A minor shooting incident in a remote area which might easily have snowballed occurred on 2 February between the Turkish Cypriot village of Ayios Khariton and the Greek Cypriot village of Trypilneni at the foot of the Kyrenia range. When a Swedish UNFICYP patrol went to the scene to investigate, it was fired at five times from a distance of about 200 yiards; the shots missed. The firing stopped immediately when the National Guard identified the approaching soldiers as UNFICYP, and the Cypriot officer in command apoligized.

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102. On returning to Ayios Khariton, the UNFICYP patrol met about twenty Turkish Cypriots in a fighting mood and armed with shot guns, rifles, sub-machine guns and grenades. They were surrounding a Turkish Cypriot shepherd, Kamel Yossef, who had been wounded earlier that morning by the National Guard when grazing his frock. The Turkish Cypriots maintained that it was an unprovoked attack by the National Guard against an unarmed shepherd. The National Guard Company Commander assured UNFICYP that his troops had no aggressive intentions. 103. To prevent complications, UNFICYP's Famagusta Zone sent to the scene a Swedish platoon together with a medical officer, as well as armoured cars and one ambulance. The doctor examined the wounded shepherd and had him evacuated, by UXFICYP ambulance, to the Turkish Cypriot hospital in Famagusta Old City. The situation at Ayios Khariton had quieted down by 1500 hours in the afternoon and the United Nations reinforcements returned to Famagusta. UNCIVPOL investigation confirmed that it was most unlikely that the shepherd was armed when shot by the National Guard. He was, however, carrying a long shepherd's crook which might have been mistaken for a shot gun by Cypriot soldiers.

(vi) Methods used by the United Nations Force 104.. The preceding account has offered a general survey of the operation of the 'United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in the context of major developments in Cyprus. Of necessity, it had to deal chiefly with problems and incidents which gave rise to tensions and the danger of clashes; indeed, since the United Nations Force must 'use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting", it has to concern itself chiefly with matters of this kind. It should be clear, however, that this is not the whole story, and that, during most of the time by far the greater part of the Republic has been quiet, with Greek and Turkish Cypriots going about their daily tasks. 105. In no small part peaceful conditions, which have been maintained since last .August, have been due to the presence of the United Nations Force. !Che following paragraphs endeavour to provide a summary of the methods employed by the Force in its day to day effort to achieve this result. 106. As indicated in chapter I, the United Nations Force is organized by zones and districts which correspond to the Cypriot Civil Districts, facilitating liaison

I . . . s/6228 English Page 30 with the civilian authorities. UNFICYP units are interposed OP are present along the lines of actual armed confrontation between Government forces and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, and in all other places where areas inhabited by Greek and Turkish Cypriots adjoin, including mixed towns and villages. Each UNFICYP zone or district maintains a significant portion of its strength in the principal town of the district and a number of companies and platoons in the field. Frequent patrols are run, and fixed posts maintained in sensitive localities. 107. Incidents are dealt with at three levels - by the troops on the ground, by Zone or District Headquarters and at Headquarters UNFICYP. It is the task of the troops on the ground to get to know their area intimately, to establish a liaison with the National Guard officers and Turkish Cypriot fighter leaders on each side, and by their presence at likely trouble spots and constant patrolling to be in a position to react immediately to any breach of the cease-fire. 108. When agreement cannot be reached at zone or district level, the case will be taken up by Headquarters UNFICYP and high-level negotiations will take place with a representative of the Government, the Headquarters of the National Guard or the Vice-President's Office. It frequently happens, however, that cases which could be settled at Zone or District level are referred to Headquarters UNFICYP by one side or the other. Investigations are then initiated by the troops on the ground or UNCIVPOL, and the findings ChannelledtoHeadquarters to assist in the negotiations. 109. In most cases, the mere presence of the Force is sufficient to prevent fighting, especially the kind of fighting which is'apt to break out when armed men face each other across barricades. When shooting incidents or other breaches of the cease-fire occur, they are immediately investigated, and UNFICYP officers endeavour to persuade local Ccmmanders to stop their men from fighting and prevent escalation. Close watch is kept on the building of fortified positions; where such structures are judged by UNFICYP to be provocative, negotiations are promptly initiated for their removal. 110. Many incidents which could easily escalate if not dealt with promptly can be sorted out by a junior officer on the spot. An armed man, for instance, crosses the cease-fire line and the opposite side threatens to shoot if he does not go back; a United Nations non-commissioned officer will escort the man to safety and explain

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to the other side that he did not know the exact position of the line. A shot is heard and one side starts manning its fire positions in anticipation of an attack; an UNFICYP officer investigates and finds that it was an accidental discharge, and what might have been a perilous situation has been brought unde:r control. 111. The last report (s/6102, chapter I) gave a full account of the negotiations leading to the reopening of the Kyrenia road under UNFICYP control. The use of the Kyrenia :road has continued to rise gradually during the period of this report. The maximum weekly traffic figure for the previous period was that for the week of 29 November to 5 December 1964 when there were 348 vehicles and l,O85 passengers. The maximum weekly traffic for the current period was during the week of 24 to 30 January 1965 when there were 460 vehicles and 1,343 passengers. From 31 January to 27 February 1965 inclusive, traffic on the road totalled 1,713 vehicles and 4,953 passengers. Operation of the road under LJNFICYP escort has proceeded smoothly, making it possible to reduce the number of check points from seven to three. Mobile patrols continue to ensure the secure passage of all convoys and compliance with relevant provisions of the agreement on reopening of the road.

(vii) The work of UNCIVPOL: the question of missing persons

112. The work of the UNFICYF' civilian police falls within that part of the mandate under which the Force, as necessary, contributes to the maintenance of law and s order. UNCIVPOL detachments are deployed and operate in close liaison with the several military zones and districts of the Force (see chapter I, para. 4, above). Their functions, wherever possible, are carried out in co-operation with local * police personnel. New UNCIVPOL liaison posts have recently been established at the Paphos Gate Police Station, which is the headquarters of the of the Cyprus Police, and at the old Central Police Station, which is used as a headquarters by the Turkish Cypriot personnel of the Cyprus Police. The duties of UNCIVPOL are, generally speaking, those which experience has shown to be more suitably carried out by a civil policeman than by a soldier, and those in which the aspect of inter-communal strife may be of significance. 113. Thus, UNCIVPOL personnel are responsible for appropriate searches at certain checkpoints on the Kyrenia road in the exercise of UNFICYP's control over the road, s/6228 English page 32 which is open to traffic for unarmed civilians only. UNCIVPOL man two posts in sensitive areas, viz, the mixed villages of Ayios Theodoros in Iarnaca District /. and Kazaphani in Kyrenia District; they are stationed at certain Cyprus police roadblocks and in other places where their presence may serve to minimise friction L between the Cyprus authorities and members of the Turkish Cypriot Community. 114. During the period under review, UNCIVPOL, in co-operation with the appropriate authorities as necessary, carried out twenty-three major investigations, including seven cases of homicide or attempted homicide which appeared to have aspects relating to inter-communal strife, and thirteen bomb explosions. There were scores of other investigations involving complaints of armed robberies, damage and theft of property, detention aad illegal arrest, confiscations, illegal grazing, theft of or damage to abandoned properties, unlawful digging for antiquities, etc. 115. UNCIVPOL made inquiries, in co-operation as appropriate with the International Committee of the Red Cross, about fourteen persons who were reported missing, namely six Greek Cypriots and eight Turkish Cypriots. Of these all but one have been accounted for. The missing person is a National Guard soldier last seen in the company of Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot Sector of Nicosia. The Turkish Cypriot leadership deny that he is being held prisoner. In addition, a Greek Cypriot prison warden who disappeared on 15 October 1964 has not been located, and no further trace has been found of three United Kingdom nationals and one German national reported missing for some time. 116. The final investigations into the disappearance of Major Macey and driver 0 Platt of UXFICYP in June 1964 (see s/5764, para. 13) were inconclusive and there seems no further possibility atthe moment of gaining any additional information. 117. Figures supplied by the Turkish Cypriot Missing Persons Bureau as at 1 March 1965 show that 209 Turkish Cypriots are still missing. This figure is the same as that given in the last report (s/6102, para. 93-94). Efforts to trace these persons have been continued by ICRC and UNFICYP without result and there is little prospect of finding them alive. 118. As at 12 December 1964, thirty-eight Greek Cypriots were reported missing and three British nationals and one German national. Figures supplied by the Cyprus police as at 1 March 1965 show that forty-two Greek Cypriots are missing, the same three British nationals and the same German national. S/6226 English page 33

III. ACTIVITIES TOWARDSA RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS ? A. General assessment

:a 119. My last report to the Council (s/6102, chapter II and Annexes, II to VI) contained a detailed account of the new efforts which were made by UNFICYP in October and November 1964 with the Government and both communities to seek solutions of: unresolved issues affecting the return to normal conditions. As part of these efforts UNFICYP, in its aide-m&moire of 27 October 1964. to President Makarios, invited the Government to take measures for the restoration of freedom of movement bn all roads throughout the country; to lift all economic restrictions on non-military goods; to consider accepting IJNFICYP's assistance in the prompt return of displaced persons to their home localities; to reachan agreement on UNFICYP proposals concerning the restoration of full postal services; and to facilitate the provision &medical attention to Turkish Cypriots in outlying villages. 120. In its aide-m&ire of 23 November'1964 addressed to Vice-President Kuchuk, UNFICYP invited~the Turkish Cypriot leadership to take similar measures to ensure full freedom of,movement for Greek Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot controlled areas; to encourage the+smbers of its co&unity to move :freely throughout .the Island; to refrain from'&kstricting normal contacts between the two communi.ties; to allow Greek Cypriots to operate industrial establishments owned by them in Turkish Cypriot controlled areas;.to,return ,to the Go&rnment equipment and machiner:y belonging to J '.' ,.'a' ‘,, various Government,dep8rtments;._ i,' to facilitate the normal functioning of the law courts; land toassist in the prompt return of Turkish Cypriot. displaced persons to a their former honie.~ .:) ,,I * rF:~ 121. UNFICYP obtained a favourable response frcm the Government to some of its proposals:~' a substantial increase in freedom of movement for Turkish Cypriots in and out of Nicosia was put into effect; economic restrictions on a number of ' non-military items were lifted; a new Red Crescent shipment was allowed into the country without the originally intended restrictions and imposition of import duties. On the other hand, however, the Government considered that in view of .the military situation on the Island it could not adopt certain recommended measures .which, in its view, would endanger its position. The Government also stated i-ts

. . 3 / S/6228 English Page 34 own demands on the Turkish Cypriot community and underlined the lack of response and co-operation it had received from the latter in bringing about a return to normal conditions. Vice-President Kuchuk for his part considered that the position of the Turkish Cypriot community was such that it could offer little response to UNFICYP's proposals which, in the view of the Vice-President, might endanger the position of his community; that UNFICYP's proposals envisaged a return towards normality which was not, in his view, within the framework and spirit of the Cyprus Ccnstitution; and that acceptance of UNFICYP's proposals would bring about a political situation according to a procedure which was at variance with the recommendation of the Security Council calling for an agreed settlement. These positions of the Government an'3 of Vice-President Kuchuk, as expressed in their replies to UNFICYP's aide-m&noires are reproduced in full in the annexes to my last report to the Security Council. 122.:It was thus evident, as noted in my last report, that while UJWICYP could in addition to its military functions do much to overcome day-to-day administrative, economic, social or judicial difficulties arising from the division of the two communities, its assistance was reaching its limits and little further progress could,be expected on some of't:he unresolved issues until there was clear prospect of,a final over-all settlement Which both sides could agree upon. I further stated that "pending the forthcoming debate on the Cyprus problem in the General Assembly and the further efforts made b:y the Mediator to find a permanent solution it would seem that the two communities see at present little advantage in abandoning or modifying their fundamental positions and that the solution of many issues is made dependent on a final political settlement" (s/6102, para. 22). 123. This fundamental situation has remained unchanged during the period under review.. Littl~.progress could therefore be made by UNFICYP on most of the main unresolved issues despite its persistent efforts and repeated appeals. From the outset I have pointed out to the Council that "ultimate responsibility for a return to normal conditions in Cyprus must, obviously, rest primarily with the authorities and people of Cyprus themselves, since normality can come about only as a result of a determination by the two communities . . . to lay down their arms and seek to live again in peace" (s/5671, para. 2). This hope has still not been fulfilled. S/6228 IEnglish page 35

124. Some criticisms have been .voiced lately in Government circles, in 3 communications to UNNCYP, and in the Greek language Press to the effect that UNFICYP has not succeeded in obtaining a return to a normality whic:h is conceived by them as an orderly submission of the Turkish Cypriot community to the authority 3 and legislation of the Government. The answer to these criticisms is that UNFICYP can only, in the words of the Security Council resolution of 4 Marc:h 1964. (S/5575), "use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of :Law and order and a return to normal conditions". This it has done to the best of its ability and powers, sparing no effort in its search for appropriate solutions during the entire period of its presence in Cyprus. These efforts are duly recorded in my various reports to the Council. 125. While it is thus clear that little progress could be made in the development of policies and the adoption of substantive measures having the support of both communities, it must be noted that in large segments of life on the Island there has been improvement in the conditions of living, as can be seen from the account given in the present chapter as well as in chapter IV of this rep&t. In many instances this improvement was achieved in piusuance of the role which UNFICYP is called upon to play as an intermediary between the divided communities in a great variety of matters concerning daily iife: in the,Island,,,,and~'as. part of its efforts to find pragmatic solutions to the diffi&tieti-on which it is asked to , bring its good offices to bear.

B. Freedom of movement of the population 3 126. The freedom of movement of the Cypriot civilian population con~tinued to be subject to restrictions imposed by the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community. 127. In my previous report it will be recalled that my Special Representative, in his aide-&moire of 27 October 1964 to the-President, had asked for the Government's restridtions on freedom of mov&ent to be lifted. In his reply the President agreed with the Special Representatite'that police roadblocks should be reduced to a minimum with a view to their progressive elimination; and that

/ . . . s/6228 hbglish Page 36

Turkish Cypriots should be free to move in and out of Nicosia (s/6102, annex III, section 1 (a) and (b)). Following this reply UIWICYP wrote again to the President offering practical suggestions for the removal 6f roadblocks and listing separately the roadblocks which did not serve a purpose consistent with the President's letter of 12 November 1.964 and which s:hould be eliminated immediately (List A); and roadblocks which likewise did not serve that purpose and were situated in the vicinity of Turkish Cypriot roadblocks (List B). UNFICYP also suggested that as one of the first steps, and for the purpose of restoring confidence, serious consideration should be given t,o removing the roadblocks on the Kyrenia road and at the junction of the Temblos coast road (s/6102, Annex IV). 128. Of the thirty-one roadbloc:ks mentioned in List A,, eight have been removed, plus a'further two which have been remove&but are reinstated from time to time for spot checks. The Kyrenia road and Temblos roadblocks have remained in place. The twenty roadblocks in List B are still in position. Three Larnaca roadblocks in List A were remixed, but have s:ince been replaced by three others which instead of being situated on the approaches to the town, as the others were, are situated at the entrances to the Turkish Cypriot,quarter. It should be noted that Cyprus police have recently instituted a system of mobile patrols which undertake checking work, and this may eventually lead lx a reduction in the number of static checkpoints. In January 1965 UNFICYP was informed at ,the Political Liaison Committee that the Cyprus Police had received instructions that Turkish Cypriot men of military age should not be allowed to come 'f‘rom other parts of the Island to settle in Nicosia. Cases occurred in which men claiming to be students were refused entry to Nicosia because the police were not convinced of their bona fides. The Government's policy, which was not uniformly applied, was assertedly designed to prevent a build-up of fighters or potential fighters in Nicosia. 129. The Turkish Cypriots, besides taking exception generally to the roadblocks and other restrictions on their freedom of movement, objected to the manner in which they alleged that the searches of persons and vehicles at checkpoints were carried out (long delays, damaging of goods, confiscation of certain goods not on the list of strategic materials, etc.). Most of these complaints related to the Famagusta Gate checkpoint, which is the principal point of entry to the Turkish Cypriot part S/6228 IEnglish Page 37

of Nicosis walled city - an average of some 800 to 900 people a day move in and out through this checkpoint. UNFICYP maintains a civil police post there to observe ;P ,the proceedings, though not every incident which becomes the subject of complaint takes place under UNFICYP observation. In general, however,. it can be said that > delays a? this checkpoint were mainly,due to weather,and to a,shortage of Cyprus policemen in face of a sometities he&y traffic. The delays did not seem to be maliciously contrived. Instances of goods being danaged in search were relatively rare, though of cwwse perishable goods in flimsy packaging did suffer by being unloaded and reloaded. Articles not on the list of strategic materials ,(e.g. boot-leather) were seized because it was feared that &hey might be used for military purposes. 130. The Turkish Cypriots for their part continued to deny freedom of movement to Greek Cypriots in the Nicosia triangle (except on the Kyrenia road in UNFICYI? convoy), through all-Turkish Cypriot towns astride main roads (e.g. Ambelikou, Lefka and Knodhara), and in the Kokkina bridgehead; the nearby Limmitis bridgehead is regularly traversed by Greek Cypriots in UNFICYP convoys. Turkish Cypriots continued to maintain that Greek C'xpriots could travel from one Greek Cypriot; area to another through all-Turkish Cypriot towns if they would submit to checking by Turkish Cypriot policemen. Few Greek Cypriots attempted to avail themselves of this facility but in one instance, at Knodhara, a Greek Cypriot vehicle was refused passage on the ground that the safety of its occupants could not be guaranteed. 131. The Government alleged that the Turkish Cypriot leaders themselves restricted * the freedom of movement of members of their community by prohibiting or at least controlling exit. The Government Political Liaison Officer produced photostat copies of such certificates issued in Nicosia. The Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer stated that if such permits were issued it was mere:Ly as a protective measure in case Turkish Cypriots were seized as hostages on their journeys between Turkish Cypriot areas. IJNFICYP continued to provide escorts when necessary for Greek Cypriots on particular journeys (e.g. the Kyrenia road and the Limmitis bridgehead) and to Turkish Cypriots in exceptional circumstances. 132. As in previous months, UNFICYP received a n&nber of requests from individual Greek Cypriots wishing to visit the areas controlled by the other side, usually in order to inspect their property there. Both sides continued to co-operate s/6228 English Page 38 generally in such arrangements, though the Turkish Cypriots refused a request by the Director of the Department of Antiquities to visit the Museum in Larnaca (in the * Turkish Cypriot quarter) and inspect the collection there. The Government, on the other hand, when informed that the Turkish Cypriot Political Liaison Officer wished 4 to visit two villages near Nicosia to inspect damage, said that it could see no reason for the journey as the (damage had already been inspected and recorded. 133. Under an arrangement of long standing, UNFICYP has provided occasional helicopter transport for the Turkish Cypriot leaders in Paphos, Limassol and elsewhere to visit Nicosia in connexion with certain administrative functions. 134. The Turkish Cypriot leaders in Nicosia have continued to request UNFICYP escorts and transport in order to visit other parts of the Island, so they may perform administrative duties, mediate local inter-communal disputes and so on. A number of these requests (but by no means all) have been met, UNFICYP's policy being that transport is only provided in individual cases and when, in the opinion of UIVFICYP, to do so would further the objectives laid down by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964.

C. Efforts to restore normal economic activities

(i) Economic restrictions 135. In spite of UNFICYP's efforts, there was not much progress towards the relaxation of economic restrictions and the restoration of normal economic activities , during the period under review. On the whole a standstill has developed in this sector. The disruption of normal economic activities continued to hit.hardest the Turkish Q-priot population, but the repercussions of the political crisis were felt c also by the economy of the Island as a whole. 136. There was no easing of restrictions on the list of materials which were prohibited to the Turkish Cypriots (see s/6102, Annex II, p. 6). On 1 March, UNF'ICYP was informed by the Government that a number of items had been added to the list, naqely: woollen materials if capable of being used for military purposes, an item that the Government had accepted to de-restrict on 12 November 1964; leather jackets; mackintoshes, including plastic raincoats; gloves; socks, woollen and/or cotton (but not anklets); rubber soles and leather shoe-laces; thermos flasks; S/6228 English page 39 steel wool; fire fighting equipment; 'plastic pipes; imported coal. The Government reserved the right to add any other items at any time. As it is at present, the list of prohibited materials contains some forty items, some of which have a direct military application, while others have only indirect or little military significance. The new list of prohibited materials was conveyed 'by UNFICYYE'to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which expressed -the view that the prohibition on the movement of so many goods was restricting trade and was in direct contradiction with President Makarios' message to the Secretary-General of 15 September 1964 (S/5950/Add..2/Annex) announcing that the Cyprus Government had decided to remove any economic restrictions. 137. The understandings previously reached with the Government on the release of adequate quantities of gas oil, Lubricants, fuel oil and spare parts for essential agricultural and industrial activities of the Turkish Cypriot community (see s/6102, paras. 72 and 74) continued to be implemented. Some quantities of petrol were allowed to Turkish Cypriot controlled areas outside 6f the Nicosia/Kyrenia restricted area. Building materials (cement, iron rods, timber, gravel, crushed stone and sand) remained on the prohibited list; however some quantities of these materials were allowed to Turkish Cypriots living in those parts of the Island where more progress has been made toward a return to normality. 138. Except for Kokkina (see sectionD (ii)below), commercial supplies, which were not on the prohibited list, moved in and out of the Turkish Cypriot areas in increasing quantities. They were, however, still subject to frequent inspections at checkpoints. Nevertheless, the number of requests to UNFICYP 'to escort commercial supplies decreased considerably. For its part, UNFICYP took steps to move toward a progressive discontinuance of such escorts,

(ii) Agriculture 139. During the past three months the practical arrangements made earlier by UNFICYP to facilitate the sowing of arable land (see s/6102, para. 81.) continued to be implemented. The sowing of wheat and barley was complete and even in the sensitive areas (i.e. those areas where the fields of one communi-ty are located near or inside an area controlled by the other community) a large part of the land was properly tilled and sown. s/6228 English Page 40

140. The situation in areas Abandoned by Turkish Cypriots was substantially different. The Turkish Cypriot leaders requested from the Government specific assurances, in advance of tilling, that indiscriminate grazing and illegal harvesting of the crops would be prevented. This was no small problem, as the Turkish Cypriots have abandoned about ninety villages and the total area of the arable land left unattended amounts to tens of thousands of acres. The Turkish Cypriot leaders also suggested, as an alternative, that the Government should assist Turkish Cypriot farmers to lease their land to the farmers of the other community on an annual basis. No encouragement was given by the Government to these suggestions. The Government's position generally is that Turkish Cypriots can,return to their villages in safety and that they should do so. 141. The arrangements negotiated by UNFICYP with the Government for the release of adequate quantities of gas oil, lubricants and spare parts for agricultural machinery of Turkish Cypriot farmers (see s/6102, paras. 72, 74 and 81) worked well on the whole, and no serious shortages seem to have occurred. 142. Arrangements for the maintenance of the citrus orchards in Turkish Cypriot abandoned villages continued to be made by IJlVICYF as well as by FA0 experts. 143. UNFICYP continued also to provide assistance for the vaccination of livestock, a programme begun in the autumn of 1964 when, as a result of the abnormal conditions, enterotoxaemia broke out among the livestock owned'by Turkish Cypriot farmers. Since then, vaccinations of livestock owned by Turkish Cypriots have been carried out with the help of UJWICYP in every district'of the Island. UNFICYF maintained the necessary liaison between the competent Government authorities and the Turkish Cypriot veterinary officers, escorted the Turkish Cypriot vaccinators and inimany cases provided transport for them. By the end of 1964 a large part of ' that year's vaccination programme had been carried out, comprising more than 150,000 anthrax and close to 100,000 foot-and-mouth disease vaccinations of sheep and goats, and some 3,500 vaccinations of cattle. The programme is now being completed. 144. The Turkish Cypriots continued to seek compensation for the losses suffered early in 1.964 as a result of harvesting of their grain and other crops by farmers of the other community, consequent upon the disturbances during the winter of s/6228 English I?age 41

1963..1964 (SW s/5950, para. 158 ff.). In a very few cases the parties concerned managed, with the assistance of IJNFICYP, to reach a settlement. Th,ere was no * progress, however, towards a general settlement of claims, or to finding some form of assistance to farmers who have suffered losses as a result of the disturbances. I (iii) Local and export markets

145. Some progress was at last achieved in the protracted negotiations, held under UNFICYF',s good offices, between representatives of the Cyprus Grain Commission and of the Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Societies (see s/6102, para. 84) on the question of the balances due by a number of Co-operative Societies in respect of the 1963 grain crop. The two sides agreed that out of the total sum due to the Cyprus Grain Commission, the value of crops collected by Co-operative Societies of abandoned villages, as well as other contested sums, will remain outstanding for the time being. They further agreed that the resultant difference will be settled as soon as possible, and that Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Societies carrying stocks of grain of the 1964 crop will be allowed to deliver such stocks to the Cyprus Grain Commission in se.ttlement of and/or against amounts due to the Commission. Such delivery of grain will be effected through the Turkish Co-operative Central Bahk. As a result, indivudal statements of account have been furnished by the Grain Commission, through UNFICYP, to each Co-operative Society for verification. The next step will be the collection of remaining stocks o:f grain of the 1964 crop for delivery to the Grain Commission in settlement of -the t outstanding debt for 1963. x4.6. The Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Societies asked the \Grain Commission to b commit itself to buy the 1965 grain crop of Turkish Cypriot farmers in the normal manner ) as envisaged by the Grain Control Law, i.e. at subsidized prices and on the same terms and conditions as those granted to the Greek Cypriot Co-operative Societies. The Grain Commission stated that, subject to the agreements mentioned above being complied with, and provided the existing quiet situation continued, the Commission saw no reason why the 1965 grain concentration should not be dealt with as usual. The Turkish Cypriot Co-operative Socieities held that this statement did not convey a sufficiently clear indication of the Commission's intentions in regard to the 1965 crop. The Commission replied that it was not prepared to discuss the question any further, until the amount due in respect of the 1963 crop was fully paid. s/6228 English Page 42

147. Up to now the marketing

(iv) Industry 148. UNFICYF continued to use its good offices to remove, whenever possible, obstacles to a return to normal conditions in the industrial sector. Concerning Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot industries located in areas controlled by the other community, it was UNFICYP's policy to urge, as in the past, that the lawful owners should be enabled to reactivate their industries or should not be prevented from removing or otherwise disposing of their properties. 149. The negotiations conducted by UNFICYP with the competent Government authorities for an increase in the allocation of wheat to the Turkish Cypriot flour mill,in Nicosia, already mentioned in the report of 12 December 1964 (s/6102, para. al.), were concluded. As from January 1965 the weekly allocation of the mill was increased by the Government from 87.5 to 100 tons. This did not entirely meet the request of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, who maintained that 120 tons was,the minQnum requirement for the number of people at present supplied by the mill. 150. The Turkish Tobacco Company of Cyprus, in Nicosia, continued to operate regularly on the basis of provisional arrangements whereby the Company pays the customs and excise duties when it imports its tobacco. Agreement has also been reached by the parties concerned that when a shipment of tobacco is cleared by the Turkish Tobacco Company an equivalent quantity of tobacco is released from the premises of the British-American Tobacco Company located in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of Nicosia. As a result, the British-American Tobacco Company, which is not operating, there at present, is able to recover progressively its stocks of raw,materials. 151. The Government continued to release reasonable quantities of fuel pi1 for Turkish Cypriot industries operating in mrkish Cypriot-controlled area. The Turkish Lvpriot industries located in Greek Cypriot areas remained inactive.

I . . . s/6220 English Page 43

152. UNFICXP renewed its efforts to bring about the reopening of the two Greek Cypriot lime kilns, located in the Kyrenia ayea, referred to in the previous I report (see s/6102, para. 89). The Turkish Cypriot leaders were still unwilling to allow the reopening of these kilns on the ground that they were very close to b Turkish Cypriot military positions on the Yqrenia range. 153. UNCIFYP used its good offices to assist the Cypro-Steelwool Company, a Turkish Cypriot firm of Nicosia, to get clearance for the import of steel wire (an item on the governmental list of restricted materials) which is used by the Company for the production of steel wool for cleaning purposes. UNFICYP stated that it would co-operate with the Government authorities in ensuring that if the import of wire was authorized, it would be used only for the non-military purposes for which it was intended. The answer given was that the clearance of the steel wire would depend on concessions being made by the Turkish Cypriot side, such as -the reopening of one of the Greek Cypriot lime kilns mentioned above or of other establishments located in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled sector. On 1 March 1965, UNFTCY3 was informed by the Government that steel wool had been added to the list of strategic materials denied to the Turkish Cypriots.

I... s/6228 English Page 44

D. Measures to assist refugees and other distressed persons 154. The basic situation concerning displaced persons as described in the last 4 report to the Security Council has remained on the whole unchanged (See s/6102, paras. 45-62). The positions of the Government and of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, 1 as stated in their replies to UNFICYP's aide-m6moires of October and November 1964 remained fundamentally the same (s/6102, Annexes III and VI). Very few refugees returned to their homes during the period under review. The frequent rumours and reciprocal charges of impending attacks did not encourage progress in the solution of this important problem. 155. Given the positions of .the two communities, UNFICYP, although ready to assist in any resettlement plan, found room for assistance only in humanitarian relief activities, as described below, and in aiding, through escorting and protection, those refugees who in a few cases have returned to their villages for extended or short periods of time. It should be recalled that the problem of distressed persons is not limited to refugees. The large numbers of unemployed in certain areas, without work and monetary income, have remained unchanged. Red Crescent relief supplies are used for both groups of needy.

(i) Red Crescent relief 156. As indicated in the last report (s/6102, paras. 49-55), the eighth relief shipment of 655 tons of food and 245 tons of clothing, shoes, blankets, tents, soap, detergents and medicine:; sent by the Red Crescent Society of Turkey for the Turkish Cypriot refugees and distressed persons arrived at Famagusta on 3 December 1964. All items except 5,036 pairs of beets, 4,CGO pairs of xcollen socks, 1,5CO waistcoats and 8 l/2 tons of soap were cleared by the Customs authorities without delay and were allowed to enter Cyprus duty-free. According to the terms of the authorization for clearance given to the senior delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on 2 December, items for military use or'good s which might be used by military personnel would not be released and the impounded items were considered by Customs authorities to fall within that category. 157. With the agreement of the Cyprus Government, LJNFICYP supervised the unloading of the Red Crescent vessel, the bulk storage of the goods in Famagusta and in s/6228 English Page 45

district or zone warehouses, the transport or escort of the loads all over the Island and the distribution of the relief supplies based on a scheduled programme 1 and agreed scales of issue. 1.58. The food supplies were distributed among the Turkish Cypriots as follows: , 340.6 tons (52%) in Nicosia Zone, 78.6 tons (12%) in Paphos District, 58.95 tons (%) in the Limassol area, 58.95 tons (9%) in L arnaca District and 58.95 tons (s;$j in Fmagusta District. 159. On 14 January 1965 the Acting President of the Turkish Communal Chamber asked the good offices of the Special Representative in securing release of those Red Crescent items which were still at the Customs in Famagusta. He suggested that in order to expedite the release of the items and to reassure the Government that they would not be given to Turkish Cypriot fighters, UNFICYP or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should distribute them direct to Turkish Cypriot refugees. 160. After having inspected the commodities, UNFICYP was of the view that, although almost all kinds of men's clothing and footwear can be used for military purposes, the particular items in question could not be said to be of a specifically military pattern. UNFICYP therefore asked the Government, through the Government Political Liaison Officer, to reconsider the release of the commodities held at the Customs. UNFICYP undertook to arrange that the goods, if released, would not be distributed to Turkish Cypriot refugees in the sensitive Tylliria area and the :Nicosia triangle. No reply has yet been received from the Government. 161. On 10 February the Acting President of the Turkish Communal Chamber addressed a letter to the Secretary-General asking his personal intervention for the release of the items held, which were needed by the Turkish Cypriot refugees. 162. In addition to its efforts to facilitate the transport and proper distribution of the Red Crescent supplies, UNFICYP assistance was often requested by ICRC in Cyprus. On 15 December 1964, UNFICYP took over 4CO tents from ICRC, distributed them to refugees in various parts of the country and supervised their proper erection and use. Two hundred of the tents and 6 l/2 tons of tentage material were given to ICRC by the Government of the United Kingdom, and 200 were given by the Government of the United States. The latter Government also donated 1,100 mattfesses to the ICRC and these were distributed by UNFICYP .to distressed persons and refugees. 516228 English page 46

163. On 15 January the Acting President of the Turkish Communal Chamber informed the Special Representative that the Red Crescent Society of Turkey intended to send a new shipment of relief siupplies for the Turkish Cypriot refugees and needy. He asked the Special Representative to take the matter up with the Government. In his reply of 19 January the Special Representative indicated his understanding that the matter would be taken up by the Government of Turkey through regular diplomatic channels with the Government of Cyprus in accordance with normal procedure. The Force Commander was informed on 16 January by the Charge d'Affaires of Turkey in Cyprus that he had notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus of the desire of the Red Crescent Society to send a ninth shipment of approximately 1,000 tons of supplies for the Turkish Cypriot refugees. The Charge d'Affaires asked the Force Commander for UNFICYP's assistance in obtaining clearance for the shipment. 164. The Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General on r( February 1965 that the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia had received an answer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus to the effect that certain Red Crescent items would be allowed to be imported into Cyprus duty free; others would be subject to the payment of customs duty since they were produced in Cyprus in sufficient quantities; and certain goods would not be permitted at all. The Permanent Fiepresen~tative of Turkey requested the Secretary-General to intervene with the Government of Cyprus to ensure that the Red Crescent relief supplies could enter Cyprus without restrictions and free of duty. In his reply of l 22 February the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of Turkey that his letter had been transmitted to the Special Representative in Cyprus for such action as might be appropriate in the circumstances. 165. The senior delegate of the International Committee for the Red Cross in Cyprus informed the Special Representative on 4 March that he had endeavoured to ascertain whether a need existed for Red Crescent supplies among the Turkish Cypriot refugees. His findings agreed with those of UNFICYP, viz., that the last consignment of relief supplies, brought into Cyprus on 3 December 1764, had been distributed to the needy and that within a week's time there would, in general, be no supplies left. The Special Representative, although fully appreciating the reasons which had guided the Government of Cyprus in its decision on the matter, appealed on I . . s/6228 English I?age 47

7 March to President Makarios to reconsider the decision and to allow the shipment to enter into Cyprus without restrictions and without imposition of customs duties. I (ii) Relief and commercial shipments to Kokkina 3 166. Prior to New Year's eve 1964 Turkish Cypriot charitable organizations had arranged to send 293 gift parcels to refugees in Kokkina and UNFICYP had been requested by the Turkish Cypriot Comunal Chamber to secure Government clearance for these parcels. Clearance could not be obtained in time and the 'Turkish Communal Chamber accordingly decided to dispatch the parcels without it, but the lorry was refused exit at Farra&usta Gate by the Cyprus Police on 31:December 1964. The incident gave rise to protests by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and to requests for clarification as to the Government's position both on the principle and on the administrative and technical details of relief and commercial shipments to Kokkina. The stopping of these parcels was considered by the Turkish Cypriot leadership as contrary to the claim that there was freedom o-f movement in Cyprus for Turkish Cypriots and their commodities. 167. On 19 January, the Government Liaison Officer informed the Political Liaison Committee that non-strategic supplies needed for humanitarian purposes would be allowed to go to Kokkina but articles which could be regarded as comforts for Turkish Cypriot fighters were prohibited, as were articles required :for stockpiling rather than current consumption. Consequently the Government wished to know in , detail what was going into Kokkina, irrespective of whether the shipments were relief or commercial supplies, and consignments to Kokkina would accordingly continue to be subject to clearance procedures and would be checked and searched , by Cyprus Police if carried in Turkish Cypriot vehicles. The Kokkina bridgehead was a restricted area to which freedom of movement of persons and goods did not apply in full. This position of the Government on the Kokkina shipments was conveyed by UNFICYP to the Turkish Cypriot Liaison Officer, who expressed the view that it Irepresented a new departure in Government policy and signified new economic restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot community, beyond those implicit in the list of s-trategic materials. 168. There was also some difference of opinion between the Turkish Cypriots and the Government regarding the population figures for Kokkina. For the purpose of

/ . . . s/6228 English Page 48

ration-scaling the commoditjes which were going into Kokkina, a population figure of 900 civilians was finally accepted by the Government; the Turkish Cypriots claimed that the population was nearer 1,100. 169. During the period under review, food and the necessities of life were transported to Kokkina regularly every fortnight. Consignments consisted of Red Crescent supplies or products bought on the local market by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber. UNFICYP Economics Officers secured clearance for the consignments from the Government and arranged for their transport from Nicosia to Kokkina either in UNFICYP vehicles or in Turkish Cypriot trucks under UNFICYP escort. It has been UNFICYP's general policy throughout the island to encourage the transport of relief shipments in Turkish Cypriot vehicles; in the case of Kokkina, however, the Government expressed a preference for the use of UNFICYP vehicles. 170. As a result of difficulties which arose concerning the control and definition of certain relief materials, the Force Commander decided and informed the Minister of the Interior on 26 February 1965 that all relief cargo in UNFICYP vehicles could be searched by the Cyprus Police provided specific procedures were observed and without prejudice to the principle of freedom of movement and freedom from search of UNFICYP vehicles. For its part, on 4 March the Government accepted UNFICYP1s proposal to allow Turkish Cypriot drivers to come from within the restricted Kokkina area to take over at the Kokkina checkpoint transport of relief or commercial shipments carried in Tlrkish Cypriot vehicles. As a result, relief shipments to Kokkina will henceforth be transported in Turkish Cypriot vehicles instead of UNFICYP vehicles.

E. Normalisation of the public services (i) Public utilities 171. There was no significant change in the situation as described in the report of 12 December 1964 (s/61.02, paras. 90 and 91). Electricity and -crater continued to be supplied throughout the island to all quarters, Greek and Turkish Cypriot alike, in the towns as well as in the villages. UNFICYP helped to remove certain difficulties which arose at times as a result of the division of the two communities. Thus, when a serious power failure occurred in Nicosia in December 1964 - an electrical sub-station located in the Turkish Cypriot quarter

,,. _.,_ _ .~,., having broken down as a result of heavy rains and defective insulation - UNFICYP investigated the extensive damage and escorted the personnel of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus to .the Turkish sector in order to make repairs. The Authority provided materials, technicians and workers. There were also a few cases where the water supply of Greek and Turkish Cypriot villages was interrup.ted. UNFICYP investigated the causes and extent of the damage and used its good (offices to restore the service. 172. Governmental authorities continued to complain that water and electricity bills of the Turkish Cypriot consmers in Nicosia, and in a few other places, still remained unsettled and that their liabilities therefore continued to rise. In other centres Turkish Cypriot leaders made efforts to ensure that causes of complaint should be removed. In Xmassol, for instance, almost all bills have nov been settled. In Larnaca, where the administration of the water supply system, which is the property of the Turkish Cypriot EWAF, was taken over by the Government, the Turkish Cypriot community is claiming payment for the supply of water to Greek Cypriot quarters. l'73. During the period under review no further talks could be arranged between Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of the Electricity Authori-ty of Cyprus on matters pending since the outbreak of violence in Decanber 1967. This reflects growing scepticism of the two sides as to the possibility of settling matters such as the re-employment of the Turkish Cypriot personnel of EAC or the payment of salary arrears until a general settlement is a,rrived at.

(ii) Problems of public revenue 174. During December 1964, the Turkish Cypriot leaders brought to the attention of UIWICYF a number of claims among which were the following: (a) the annual grant of 2400,000 to the 'Turkish Communal Chamber, payable under article 88 of the Constitution, had been withheld by the Government in 1964.; (b) the Cyprus Inland Revenue Department had failed to pay to the Turkish Communal Chamber the income tax (exact amount unknown) which the Department had collected, by delegation and on behalf of the Chamber, from members of the Turkish community in respect of the years 1963 and 1964-i (c) the Turkish Cypriot community paid a large amount of indirect taxation (customs and excise duties, licensing fees, etc.) and the contribution in the form of excise duty on cigarettes consumed by the Turkish Cypriots was no less than 2400,000 a year. S/6228 English Page 50

175. UNFICYP took steps to ascertain the position of the Government in these matters. The reply of the Government mainly stated: (a) the grant of &OO,OCO due to the Turkish Communal Chamber in respect of 1963 had been paid in full during that year and in addition LlOO,071 had been advanced to the Chamber against future taxes; in view of the fact that since December, 1963 the Turkish community had contributed practically nothing to the Consolidated Fund (into which, in accordance with article 165 of the Constitition, all the revenue and monies raised or received by the Republic are paid), and that it had consistently refused to obey the tax laws of the Republic, the Government could not authorize the payment of the grant for 1964 out of the Consolidated Fund; (b) from the income tax collections made from Turkish Cypriots in the years 1.961 to 1964 there was a balance of E26,379 standing to the credit of the Turkish Communal Chamber; on the other hand, in addition to the above advance of ~00,871, the Turkish Communal Chamber owed the Government a sumof S67,OOO advanced to the Turkish Board of Education between 1959 and 1960 for the establishment of a secondary school in Nicosia, the liabilities of the Turkish Board of Education having been taken over by the Turkish Communal Chamber; (c) it was cbrrect that in past years the Turkish Cypriots had made a regular contribution to the revenue from the excise duty on tobacco but, as there were no separate records, it was not possible to say how large this contribution was as compared rrith the contribution of the rest of the population. 176. To this the Turkish Cypriot leaders further replied: (a) -the annual grant to the Turkish Communal Chamber vas a constitutional obligation which was not subject to any conditions, and therefore the amount of the payment involved could not be connected with the size of contributions of members of the Turkish Cypriot community to the Consolidated Fund, which was a fluctuating and uncertain sum; (b) the amount of f;LOO,871 advanced by the Government to the Turkish Communal Chamber in 1963 ws made against the 1964 grant and not against the future collection of taxes from the members of the Turkish Cypriot community; furthermore, the Turkish Communal Chamber main-tained that the sum of ~567,000 which had been advanced to the Turkish Board of Educa-tion between 1959'and 1960, prior to the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution, was a grant and not a loan; (c) considering that the contribution of the excise duty on tobacco to public funds was more than 22 million per annum, the share of the Turkish community in this respect could not be less thal the population ratio, i.e. &4OO,OCO. 177. UNFICYP undertook to convey these views to the Government. A reply had not yet been received at the time of completion of this report. I . . . s/6228 English Page 51

178. Meanwhile, on 20 December 1964, the Turkish Cypriot leadership informed UNFICYP that the Turkish Communal Chamber had made its own arrangements for the imposition and collection of income tax from members of the Turkish Cypriot community and had decided that the Cyprus Inland Revenue Department should be * notified not to act any longer as the Chamber's agent in that respect. The Turkish Cypriot leadership hoped that, through UNFICYP's good offices, the Cyprus Inland Revenue Department would be persuaded to pay over to the Chamber what it had so far collec.ted on its behalf and would cease forthwith to effect any further collection from Turkish Cypriots. 1'79. UNFICYPps positicn on this question, as communicated to the Turkish Cypriot leadership on 70 Cecember 1964, was that the exercise of good offices by UNFICYP might be deemed legitimate in regard to the payment to the Turkish Communal Chamber of income taxes which were said to have been collected from members of the Tuxkish Cypriot community in 1963 and 19614 by the Inland Revenue Department on the Chzunber's behalf. On the other hand, the matter of the Inland Revenue Department's ceasing to act as the Chamber's agent for the collection of income tax was not an appropriate one for the use of UNFICYP's good offices, because it represented a step away from rather than tcwards a return to normal conditions. 180. The Turkish Communal Chamber had meanwhile addressed communications to ,the Cyprus Mines Corporation, the Administration of the United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas, the Office of the British High Commissioner, and the Embassy of the

. United States of America asking that any income tax which they deducted under the pay-as-you-earn system from the emoluments of members of the Turkish Cypriot community should be remitted to the Turkish Communal Chamber and not to the Inland A Revenue Department. 181. On 18 February 1965 the Turkish Communal Chamber announced that the delegation of power it had previously made to the Inland Revenue Department to collect income tax payable to the Chamber by members of the Turkish Cypriot community had been withdrawn and that the Department, therefore, no longer had the authority to act as its agent. Tile tax payable by members of the Turkish Cypriot community under the Personal Taxes (Income Tax) Law would, until further notice, be assessed and collected by ,the Turkish Communal Chamber.

/ . . . s/6228 English Page 52

(iii) Education

182. UNFICYP used its good offices to help remuie or alleviate the difficulties caused in the field of educa+.ion by the abnormal situation in the island. Shortages of classrooms in areas with a large number of displaced persons, restrictions on the , freedom of movement of teachers and students and, in some cases, shortage of' teaching aids were the main problems. 187. Since many villages have been abandoned by the Turkish Cypriots, the school- children of these villages had to join other primary schools and this caused a sharp increase in the school population of certain villages, and in some cases schcols had to be housed in temporary premises. At the request of the Turkish Cypriot leaders, UNFICYP during the past few months has escorted teachers to schools in various locali.ties of the iisland and as a result, practically no village is left without a teacher. UNi?ICYP al:30 helped to distribute a considerable amount of school supplies which were included in the December 1964 relief shipment by the Red Crescent Society of Turkey. 184. The position of .the Turkish Cypriot secondary schools is still unsatisfactory in Nicosia. It is estimal;ed that only some 50 per cent of the students from rural areas who normally attend 8 secondary school in Nicosia have been able to resume their studies .there. Restrictions on freedom of movement for young men 17 to 20 years of age and difficulties in finding suitable accommodation for the students were the main causes of the drop in attendance.

(iv) Postal and telephone services

185. The restoration of full postal and telecommunications services made little ? progress. The actual situation in the various zones and districts is described in chapter IV. Concerning the draft arrangements proposed by UNFICYP for the restoration of full postal services, the positions of the two sides came closer regarding the number of Turkish Cypriot postal employees to be re-employed. The Turkish Cypriot leaders, on the other hand, continued to insist that the arrangements, despite their transitional nature, should contain a provision reserving the rights and claims which the parties may have against each other. Such a provision is considered unacceptable by the Government. s/6228 English page 53

(v) Land records

. 1.66. Prior to December 1963, the Land Office for Nicosia Zone was established at Ataturk Square in the Turkish part of' Nicosia. When the inter-communal fighting broke out the Government requested that the land records, which were Government 1 property, be handed over to it; the Turkish Cypriots refused to hand them over and they still remain in Ataturk Square, where they are inaccessible to the bulk of the population of Nicosia Zone. 187. Curing 1964 the Government declared that the Land Office was no longer in Ataturk Square but was established henceforth at the former sub-office at Larnaca Road, on the Greek Cypriot side. Because Cyprus law provides that all land transactions must be registered with the Land Office, this had the automatic effect of voiding all future transactions registered at Ataturk Square; but the latter office is still the -de facto custodian of the records. 188. The fact that these records are not available continues to ca:use great inconvenience if not actual hardship, since land transactions of aL1 kinds, the granting of mortgages and similar activities have been brought practically ,to a standstill. Transactions are still registered at the Larnaca Road office but each transaction is subject to a proviso that it will become void if any impediment should be revealed when the records are available; nor is any certificate of registration issued for such transactions. 189. For 8 time UNFTCYP was able to arrange in individual cases fo:r the requisite . .boolrs to be brought across to the Greek Qpriot side where the Land Office staff could consult them and transactions could be recorded. The Turkish Cy@ots are A not willing to continue this arrangement, however, unless the Government will agree that the officers at the Ataturk Square office have authority to carry out such land transactions as the Director of Lands and Surveys wishes them to do, and that their work is recognized as legal. The Government is not willing to countenance any,such arrangement and the deadlock continues. 130. It should be noted that if a Greek Cypriot wishes to know whether or not a property is encumbered, he can, through the good offices of UNFICYF if necessary, obtain from the office in Ataturk Square a search certificate giving full particulars of all the entries in the land register relating to that property, including any mortgages 01 other charges. This certificate is of cowse invalid, I . . . s/6228 English Page 54 as far as the Government is cmcerned, but it may well provide a basis for certain financial transactions. The nlumber of such certificates issued has not been large but seems to be increasing. l-31. The District Land Offices in Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol, Paphos and Kyrenia continue to function more or lizss normally, and transactions are registered there by Greek and Turkish Qpriots

F. The funct.ioning of the Law Courts and the Gninistration of justice

(i) The functioning of the Courts- Nicosia 132. Although six months have :now elapsed since the District Courts in Nicosia began to function in a new building in the Greek Cypriot sector of the city, a, few hundred yards away from the "Green Line", no progress which can reasonably be described as appreciable has been made in so far as any return to norma~l conditions is concerned. As o'bserved in the last report (S/6102, para. 95) judges of both communities have 'been :regularly coming to the courts and the composition of the Courts exercising both civil and criminal jurisdiction has, in accordance with the provisions of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Lax, 1964, not been govern&d by the community tb which the parties to the proceedings belong. 193. The work~of the Courts, however, has been almo,st entirely confined to those cases where the parties involved are Greek Cypriots. Only Greek Cypriot litigants and Greek Cypriot counsel have attended the courts to transact business. Although the instructions issued by the Government to the police to ensure freedom of movement to, and freedom from arbitrary arrest of, Turkish Cypriot counsel, parties and witnesses going to the courts to attend proceedings still remain in force, no Turkish Cypriot litigants have taken advantage of this assurance. Nor has the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community n&e any request to UNFICYP for the protection of, or escort for, members of that community wishing to attend s/622!? English w?e 55

proceedings in the courts. On the contrary, UXFtCYP has been several times infcrmed by the Turkish @riot leadership that Turkish Cypriot litigants cannot . reasonably and fairly be expected to be satisfied with the assurances given by the Government, however genuine -they may be, in view of the fact that the new L;w * Courts building adjoins a military barracks of the Cyprus Armed Forces (the buildi.ng which was formerly the Tripartite Headquarters) and is immediately oppgsite a barracks of the Cyprus Police Force. 194. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot leadership contends that, in the present circumstances, the Turkish Cypriot community is in effect being denied free access to the Lay Courts by reason of their location, and we thereby being denied justice itself. A suggestion has been made both by the leadership of that commutiity and by the Turkish Cypriot lawyers that a practical method of making the services of the judges of the Republic available to the lWkish Cyprio-t community would be for the Minister of Justice to designate the old Law Courts building (within the Turkish Cypriot sector of the city) as an additional courthouse where pending civil cases involving only Turkish Cypriots could be taken up for hearing once a week or so, by the Turkish Cypriot judges of the Republic, who are functicning under the authority of the Supreme Court of the Republic. The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Ccmmeirce has endorsed this request. This cuggesticn has been brought to tl?e notice of the GoverrJnent by UEWICYP and the Goverrment's views are awaited. 195. The difficulties relating to the non-availability of the Court records and Land Registry documents (at present housed in the old Law Courts building in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia and still not transferred) continue to limit the * work of the Courts even in entirely Greek Qpriot cases. Ad hoc arrangementis have had to be made by the Courts in the great majority of these cases and, as a result of the lack of the original records and case files , judges have proceeded to hear such cases on the basis of affidavits filed by counsel affirming certain matters of fact, and certifying -the existence of various documents. Early in February the Minister of Justice handed to UNFICYP a list of records and files which had been asked for by counsel appearing in cases awaiting disposal by ,the Courts but which had so far not been transferred Prom the old Law Courts building. This list conta,ined a total of 148 files in civil actions, adoption applications, maintenance applications, Rent Assessment Board applications, bankruptcy i S/6228 English Page 56 applications, and probate applications and wills. In the great majority of these cases the parties are exclusively Greek Cypriots and all of them are cases which had been pending at the time the inter-communal hostilities broke out in Cecember 1963, some of them even darting back to 1961. The President of the Supreme Court has also been requested by the Government to use his good offices . to facilitate the transfer of these records to the Courts. Up to date there have been no tangible results from the negotiations on this matter which, however, are still proceeding. No doubt the desire of the Turkish Cypriot community to have practical facilities for the adjudication and disposal of exclusively Turkish Cypriot civil disputes on the lines indicated in the paragraph above appears to some extent to be linked with the question of the transference of the Court records in exclusi-rely Greek Cypriot c,ases. 196. The position regarding Turkish Cypriot members of the Court staff remains unchanged. The one staff member who has been reporting to work and performing his functions in the new Courts building continues to do so. The three others continue to function in the old Law Courts building in the Turkish Cypriot sector and have been receiving their salaries up to Ja;uary 1.965. 197. The functioning of the criminal Courts is also limited, in practice, to cases in which the accused are Greek Cypriots. Ten Turkish Cypriots are at present awaiting trial for alleged offences connected with the disturbances following the events of IXxamber 1963. They are being held in custody on judicial remand, their trials having been postponed to the next Assize Sessions (in May) on applications for, such postponement made by Turkish Cypriot counsel on their behalf. 198. The Supreme Court of Justice has continued to perform its appellate functiOns without interruption since it was first constituted in its present form under the Administration of Justice (Mi;scellaneous Provisions) Law, 1964 (s/6102, para. 101). The Court has been sitting reisularly in the building of the old Supreme Constitutional Court in the Greek Cypriot sector of the city, and the President of the Court and its other Turkish Cypriot member have been carrying on their work, both judicia~l and administrative, in complete harmony and co-operation with the three Greek Cypriot members of the Court.

I . . . S/6226 English Paw 57

The rest of the Island

199. The observations relating to the functioning of the Law Courts in Nicosia a.re, by and large, applicable to the Courts in the districts as well. Although judges of both communities continue to attend the courts and to work together, the bulk m of the cases disposed of are those exclusively involving Greek Cyp:riot litigants and Greek Cypriot accused. The attendance by Turkish Cypriots at courts si.tuated within the Greek Cypriot sectors of the main towns is comparatively negligible, despite the measures taken by the Government to ensure free movement for, and freedom from arbitrary arrest of, Turkish Cypriots coming to the courts for, the transaction of Court business. 200. None of the eighteen Turkish Cypriots attached to the Court staffs in Lima,ssol, Fama,gusta, Paphos, Larnaca and Kyrenia have yet returned to work in the courts . From reports reaching UNFICYP there is no reasonable ground for belief that there would be any change in this situation at present. The iabsence of these staff members continues to present administrative difficulties which indubitably impede the proper functioning of the Courts themselves.

General observations - 201. Judges of the Republic continue to travel throughout the Island without any interference, or attempted interference, by the police or by the a:rmed ~forces. The freedom of movement enjoyed by the Turkish Cypriot judges has continued during the period under review as it had during the earlier three-month period which was the subject of the last report to the Council. UJWICYF escorts as in the past b. have not been sought by, nor provided for, Turkish Cypriot judges. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has brought to the attention of UNFlCYP the difficulties being encountered by the Judge of the Sharia Court. This official, though not appointed by 6he Govercment of the Republic as a judge is appointed by the Tur];ish Ccna~r.al Chamber under the xlcvlnt provisicrs Of the Ccnstitution to adjudicate on disputes and applications arising from matrimonia:l and allied subjects based on the personal Muslim Yaw applicable to Turkish Cypiots. Since the outbreak of inter-communal violence in December 1963 he had not been travelling about the Island to preside over the Sharia Courts as had been the practice before. UNFICYP has been requested to use its good offices to persuade the Government to ensure that this official enjoys immunity from S/6228 English Page 58 restrictions and searches by the Police under the same practical arrangelnents as have been made for the judges of the Courts of the Republic. This request has been taken up with the appropriate authorities of the Government by LINFICYP and there is no reason, to believe that there would be any difficulty in meeting it. The 0 President of the Supreme Court is also using his good offices in this connexion. 202. In late January 1.965 UNFICYF was informed by the Minister of Justice that the arrangements made by the Government regarding the freedcm of movement of Turkish Cypriot counsel, parties and witnesses to proceedings before the Courts in Nicosia have now been extended to cover all districts of the Island. It will be recalled that under these arrangements the Government had issued instructions to the Police that Turkish Cypriot counsel, parties and witnesses to proceedings before the Courts "should not be arrested for any past offence, while proceeding to and from the Court to attend the proceedings in question or while in Court at&ending such proceedings, without a judicial warrant" (document s/6102, para. 95). Whether the extension of these arrangements to the entire Island would give the Turkish Qpriots concerned that degree of a sense of security as to produce any greater response than it has done in Nicosia itself remains to be seen.

(ii) @ninistration of justice

203. No changes worthy of comment have been noticed during the period Cecember 1964 to March 1965 regarding the administration of justice. As indicated in my last report (s/6102, para. 105) the practical difficulties the Courts are faced with from day to day naturally and necessarily interfere with the proper and normal administration of justice. One of the principal obstacles in the present circumstances is the inaccessibility of the areas inhabited entirely by Turkish Cypriots to the Government's law-enforcing authorities and officials. .The organs of the State are thus powerless in these areas to administer justice by protecting society from the criminal 'elements. This problem was referred to in my last report (pasa. 107). Nothing has happened in the intervening period to justify any satisfaction that there has been any return, or any trends indicating a return to normal conditions in so far as the working of the machinery of the law throughout the Island as a whole is concerned. On the contrary, there are reports that, in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas of some towns, there have been instances of ad hoc judicial proceedings outside the normal system of courts of the Republic. s/6228 English pws 59

204. As regards the administration of justice in disputes in civil matters such as debts, title to property, enforcements of contracts, etc., the position remains the same. Greek Cypriot litigants, although they have ready access to the Clourts, are hampered by the fact that the necessary evidence such as regis,trations of 1 title, documents relating to earlier land transactions, etc., are :not available to them since the Land Registry is in the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia and documents have not been, and are not being, transferred to the Courts. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot community claims that it is suffering from the disadvantage of not being in a position to have access to the Courts lvlith the same sense of personal security as have the Greek Cypriots. Personal hardship is also experienced by some members of the Turkish Cypriot community in view of the :fact that the Judge of the Sharia Court has not been functioning outside Nicosia since December 1963, thus holding up decisions on matters of great importance to their personal lives. 205. The Turkish Cypriot community has also been alleging discriminatory treatment by the Government, amounting to a denial of justice, in the manner in which public wo:rks are being executed. It is claimed that immovable property belonging to menlbers of that community have been taken over without notification to the owners, and in some cases destroyed without any justification or mitigation. The Government, on the other hand, has sought to explain its actions on the g,rounds that the taking over pf such property i s necessary for public purposes (e.g. road- widening schemes, etc.) forming part of the economic development of the Island as a whole and is authorized by existing releva~nt legislation. The Government has a~lso pointed out that it is not only property belonging to members, of the Turkish Cypriot community that has been compulsorily acquired for these development schemes but also property belonging to members of the Greek Cypriot cormuni-ty. UNFICYP, however, is using its good offices to explore the facts of each ca,se a,nd to ensure thst no injustice is done, or is thought to have been done, to members of one cormunity as against the other. S/6228 English page 60

IV. DESCRIFTION OF LOCAL SITUATIONS AS OF 7 MARCH 1965

Nicosia Zone 206. In Nicosia Zone no major change in the military deployment of either side has taken place. However, the National Guard has improved its position and strength within the Zone. In Nicosia City which has been the military focal point of the Zone during this period, especially during the Roccas Bastion negotiations, UNFICYP has been successful in negotiating the removal of many of the positions along the Green Line but the Line as a whole is more heavily fortified now than it was three months ago. 207. The relations and feelings between the two communities have further deteriorated during the period, although freedom of movement for Turkish Cypriots has generally improved. In many instances, Turkish Cypriots move freely to and from Nicosia but a large part of the Turkish Cypriot population is still reluctant to move. UNFICYP escorts are still provided, though on a much reduced scale. Greek Cypriots are not given freedom of movement by Turkish Cypriots, except in UNFICYP- escorted convoys on the Kyrenj.a road. 208. As described elsewhere in this report, the National Guard at the local level are insisting that several areas are restricted to UNFICYP and they have enforced this in certain places. A number of incidents have occurred. 209. As there has been no resettlement of refugees a great proportion of the Turkish Cypriots are without any regular income and for that reason are more or less dependent on relief supplies of food and clothing. A great number of Turkish Cypriots are living under conditions of considerable hardship. Some income is still made on agricultural products, but only on products grown in Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. Private businesses (shopkeepers,, restaurant and hotel owners for example) continue their business although on a very limited scale. Some Turkish Cypriots receive regular remittances from relatives abroad, mainly from Turkey and England. 210. Public servants are paid by the Turkish Communal Chamber and work in the administration of the Turkish Cypriot community. Some attempts have been made by the Government to arrange for the re-employment of former government employees of, for example, the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA); but the Turkish Cypriots do not want to go back to their jobs until normal conditions as they define them have been restored. s/6228 English page 61.

211. In Nicosia Zone most foodstuffs can be purchased on the free market but lack of money remains a major impediment in many communities. 9 212. Under UNFICYP arrangements farmers have been sufficiently supplied with fuel and lubricants for agricultural machinery, and dairies and artisans are supplied e with fuel in reasonable quantities. 213. Spare parts for agricultural machinery have been supplied with a minimum of delay in almost all instances in which they have been requested. 214. As building materials are still restricted many houses and roads in Turkish Cypriot communities are in a very poor condition. 215. Electricity and water are supplied in sufficient quantities to the Turkish Cypriot communities. Postal services for the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia have not been re-established, since no agreement could be reached on the transitional arrangements proposed by UNFICYP. Mail collected in the Turkish Cypriot sector is handed over to UNFICYF which deli&s it in bulk to the Government postal administration, but no mail enters the Turkish Cypriot sector. A few Turkish Cypriots do collect their own mail from the Post Office in the Greek Cypriot sector. 216. Only a few telephones are connected. Fieconnexion is made conditional by CYTA on the settlement of monthly dues since the outbreak of the disturbances, a condition which few Turkish Cypriots are ready to fulfil. Attempts by UNF'ICYP to solve this problem, and to obtain clearance for restoration of the telephone :Line to Ephikho have failed. CYTA would consider restoring the line provided it could , do the repairs with its present staff who are all Greek Cypriots, bnt the Turkish Cypriots refuse to let any Greek Cypriots into the village and have suggested that 0 former Turkish Cypriot workers will repair the line if they are given the materials. This proposal was not accepted by CYTA. 217. The health situation in Nicosia Zone is considered to be satisfactory. Medical supplies are available in reasonable quantities although UWICYP has to render assistance in some instances. Turkish Cypriots in general still refuse to go to a Greek Cypriot hospital or to be attended by Greek Cypriot doctors. 210. The school situation for Turkish Cypriots is on the whole satisfactory; the educational system is working throughout the Zone but schools are sometimes overcrowded, especially the secondary schools in Nicosia City. s/6228 English Page 62

219. No apparent changes in the distribution of Turkish Cypriot refugees have occurred and the refugee problem seems to be fairly well under control. The International Red Cross has provided a reasonable number of tents. Food is the v most serious problem and with ,the unemployment position as it is, many still depend on the delivery of Red Crescent supplies. 1

Morphou District 220. There has been little ch,snge in the military situation since the last report. The western end of the Distric.t remains,the more sensitive, with the National Guard surrounding the Turkish Cypriot enclaves at Kokkina, Limnitis and Lefka. 221. In general the district may be described as quiet, though tension still exists; breaches of the cease-fire agreements, while fairly regular, have not on any occasion developed to a serious degree during the pericd under review. However, as the coastal defence preparations develop and defence in depth is sought, it is noticed that some tension is being caused in Turkish Cypriot villages which have not experienced it so far. The accidental or deliberate discharge of weapons by the opposing forces in Kokkira and Limnitis is an almost daily occurrence. This has now led to a Turkish Cypriot being killed. The Turkish Cypriots showed remarkable restraint on this occasion. 222. The general atmosphere in the District has not improved. Some additional tension has been caused by an increase in the number of roadchecks. It is virtually certain that two such mutually antagonistic sides, each of which possesses * considerable military strength,, could hardly have avoided an open clash had it not been for the presence of UNFICYP. ;- 223. While UNFICYP has maintained gocd relations with the leaders of both sides, there were indications of distrust of UNFICYP at the lower levels of contact. This was in part due to the campaign conducted against the Force by some sections of the Greek-language Press. 224. Concerning freedom of movement, the situation has remained in general the same as described in the last report. However, from time to time each community has stepped up its stop-and-search activities , apparently as a retaliatory measure. During the period, the Limnitis: Turkish Cypriots announced their intention of stopping and searching Greek Cypriot convoys which pass through their area under UNFICYP escort. This incident is described in chapter II, section C (iv). s/6228 English Page 63

225 * The economic situation varies greatly from place to place. Most individual owners who have left their properties still suffer , and most properties which have I escaped destruction have deteriorated for lack of care. However, the Turkish Cypriot communities can market their citrus crop under UNFICYP supervision, and L except in Kokkina the situation cannot be described as one of extreme poverty. In common with those in the rest of the Island, the Turkish Cypriot community in the District benefited by the easing of economic restrictions in October-November 1964 and agricultural activity has increased. 226. Generally speaking, there are no major problems concerning water and electricity supplies, though a few water disputes have been or are being settled by UNFICYP. There are no postal services in the Turkish Cypriot communities but some official post is arranged by URFICYP. Telephone communications are badly interrupted. Connexions between many Greek Cypriot communities are uncertain, the headquarters of the local system being in Lefka. The following Turkish Cypriot centres which formerly had telephonic communications no longer have them: Kokkina, Limnitis, . 227. There is little recognition by Turkish Cypriots of governmental authority and they generally do not comply with administrative regulations. A limited number of vehicles are licensed and insured, and these may move outside the,Turkish Cypriot enclaves. There are many more vehicles which are not licensed or insured, but these are now becoming unworkable for lack of spare parts. In individual cases . Turkish Cypriots will arrange, through UNFICYP, to comply with Government administrative regulations. 228. > Education remains a big problem in Turkish Cypriot communities of the District. The presence of refugees and the existence of travel restrictions have had the effect of overcrowding the institutions still open, and there is a dearth of text books, which can only be supplied from Turkish sources. 229. There is no major health'problem at the moment. Turkish Cypriot doctors and dentists may enter and leave all Turkish Cypriot communities except Kokkina. 230. The refugee problem has remained almost exactly the same as described in the previous report (s/6102, pare. 190). Turkish Cypriot leaders will not allow or encourage refugees to return to their villages, except to Kokkina. ll'he Government, on the other hand, encourages the return of the refugees to all villages with the exception of Kokkina. Red Crescent supplies and Red Cross activities have successfully alleviated many of the cases of extreme hardship. S/6228 English Page 64.

Famagustazone

(i) -Famaguste ~-~_ District 231. The military situation in the District has changed considerably during the period and presents one of the most sensitive problems on the Island. This is mainly due to the extension of Famagusta harbour, to the measures taken by the Government for the defence and policing of the harbour , and to the reactions of the Turkish Cypriot community. This has created very acute tension in Famagusta. Government troops have been reinforced and many new weapons brought in from outside seem to have been deployed in the District. This situation is described in detail in chapter II, C (i) above. 232. The general atmosphere in the District has deteriorated; the attitude of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to one another has become more hostile, while the attitude of the National Guard towards UNFICYP has at times been unto-operative. 233 - Turkish Cypriots move on the whole freely in the District, but must submit to frequent searches. Traffic statistics show that there has been a marked increase in movements of Turkish Cypriot vehicles during the last three months. Turkish Cypriots of fighting age are still reluctant to leave their villages as they are afraid of searches, interrogation and possible arrest. 254. The economic position of the District is satisfactory. Agricultural activities involve no problems. A substantial number of Turkish Cypriot workers are employed outside the walled city of Famagusta. There are 379 workers and 51 customs porters at the old port; 20 workers at the new port; 8 workers at the Public Works Department; 180 civilians and 120 auxiliary police in the British Sovereign Base Area. 235. The Turkish Cypriot part of the District continues to be administered generally by the former Turkish Cypriot ,District Officer. Famagusta walled city is administered directly by him and the remainder of the area has a rather loose system whereby local mukhtars handle immediate problems and consult the Turkish Cypriot leader in Fsmagusta on other more important ones. Efforts by UNFICYP to arrange for regular meetings between the Twkish Cypriot leader and the Government's District Officer have failed. There is wide compliance with administrative requirements; not all Turkish Cypriot vehicles are licensed and insured, however, and they therefore move only within Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas. s/6228 English Page 65

236. With the exception of res.tricted materials, especially building materials, there seem to be few supply problems for the Turkish Cypriot population. Fuel # supplies are ample. By far the most important problem for the Turkish Cypriot community in the District is that of unemployment and the consequent shortage of L money. The Red Crescent supplies for refugees have come'to an end. 237. Fublic utilities function normally. Mail is received from everywhere except Turkey, Nocosia and other Turkish Cypriot towns where postal services have not been re-established. Telephones are reconnected. 230. Primary education for Turkish Cypriots does not present any problems, since practically every village has its own school and teachers. Regarding higher education the problem is more complex as students in this category are of fighting age,. No problems were encountered as regards the health situation in the District. 239. A number of Turkish Cypriot villages have been abandoned. Most of the displaced persons (a total of between 800 and 900) live with friends or relatives in other Turkish Cypriot villages. The only ones who could be described as refugees are living in the walled city of Famagusta. At present there seems to be no hope that the displaced persons will resettle in their former villages.

(ii) Larnaca District

gi40. The military situation has remained quiet. No serious incidents have occurred, but an alertness to even slight changes is apparent on both sides. In I Larnaca town the National Guard positions along the municipal boundaries have been reduced in numbers. A number of Turkish Cypriot positions in Larnaca town have b been reinforced and are now permanently manned. In the rest of the District the positions have generally remained unchanged. 241. Relations at the top 1,evel:between the two communities, though still strained, are probably better than in most other Districts and Zones. The local District Officer and Turkish C!ypriot,leader continue to meet weekly. There is still a reluctance~on the 'part of the Turkish Cypriot community to mix freely with the Greek Cypriot community. On the'~ other hand, there is no freedom of movemen'c for Greek Cypriots through the two Turkish sectors of Larnaca and the princip&Turkish Cypriot villages of the District: Attitudes towards 'UNFICYP s&generally favourable and'cq-operation between IJNl?ICvP and~the iocal'authorities is excellent. S/6228 English Page 66

242. The supply situation is quite satisfactory and shortages exist only in the places where money is short on account of unemployment. 243. Essential public services and utilities are provided to the TWrkish Cypriots by the authorities even thcug:h, in the case of Larnaca torqn, the Turkish Cypriots do not pay the appropriate electricity rates. Greek Cypriots, in turn, do not pay water dues to the Srkish --Evkaf. More Turkish Cypriot telephones have been reconnected, after payment of outstanding bills to CYTA. Postal services do not function satisfactorily. 244. At the present moment there appears to be no hope for the resettlement of displaced persons in their former villages. On the contrary there is one case where '300 Turkish Cypriots want to move out of a village, in view of Government fortifications being constructed in the area.

Limassol 'District 245. The military situation continued to be quiet in the District. National Guard units are now billeted in Limassol, some of them in a camp adjoining that of the UNFICYP battalion. Apart from occupying a certain number of small posts in Limassol town and a detachment in the Vasilikos area, the units concentrate on military training. Fears expressed by the Turkish Cypriot leaders prior to the arrival of the National C;uard that their presence might cause friction in the town have proved groundless. 246. The good atmosphere in the District has been maintained owing in great measure to the efforts of the District Officer and the Turkish Cypriot leader who continue ' to meet regularly with the UNFICYP District Commander. Problems in all fields are raised at these meetings and a practical solution acceptable to all is almost invariably found. 247. A defortification connittee consisting of a local Government official, a Turkish Cypriot and an UNFICYP officer operates in the District with the task of arranging the dismantling of any new fortifications which may appear. It has been most successful in ensuring the almost complete absence of fortifications in the District. 248. Although there are three police checkpoints on the outskirts of Limassol town, they are not normally operated with severity and Turkish Cypriots have freedom of S/6228 English Page 67

movement within the District, including the town of Limassol where there is no Green Line nor barrier of any kind between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot parts of ., the town. It is considered tha-t the absence of any form of Green Line in the town is one of the most important factors in the maintenance of good relations between u the two communities. There are a number of mixed villages in the District. Although each community tends to live its own life, they do so in very reasonable harmony considering the problem on the Island. 249. The economic situation is good , continued improvements have been made in the Turkish sector of Lima6601 town and many families have returned to their former villages to tend their land, if not to remain there. Since the loss to their crops, if no work is done now,.is fully appreciated by the Turkish Cypriots, more have begun to return to work. UNEICYF has offered increased patrols but so far these have not been requested and normal patrolling of the District continues. 250. Economic restrictions have been reduced,to the minimum and special permission is readily given for the restrictions to be waived when it can be shown that the requirement for a particular item is justified. As distinct from other Districts (e.g. Nicosia), whenever prohibited goods are confiscated they are returned later when permission has been granted, or the purchase money is refinded and the items are returned to the dealer. 251. Licences, water and electricity services all function efficiently. Almost all bills have been paid by the Turkish Cypriots. Only in one or two cases have the services been discontinued and these cases have been dealt with at the liaison committee meetings or at specislly convened meetings. 252. Postal services function but no mail is delivered to and received from Nicosia. Some letters from Turkey have been received recently by liurkish Cypriots in Limassol; this represents a step forward in the return to normality. 253. The telephone service also operates properly except in a few villages.. However, these villages have now asked for the telephones to be repaired and this has recently been done in Mari village , after the absence of a telephone for over a year. 254. Although the two communities mix fully, the Pxkis& Cypriot community manage their own affairs, including the running of two schools - one elementary and one secondary - and also a medical clinic where operations are carried out. The s/6228 English Page 68 elementary school which caters at present for one thousand children is overcrowded by approximately two to three hundred, and the secondary school is working on a two-shift system. 255. Refugees are not a serious problem in the District. The bulk of them come from the Mallia District and are now living either in Limassol or in one of the Turkish Cypriot villages near the Sovereign Base Area. Some families live in tents but their conditions are not rea:lly bad. These refugees from Mallia have now begun to return in large numbers. Some have gone back to live in the village, while others return daily to work.

Paphos District 256. Although some Government forces are deployed in the area, it is considered that they are only there to provide a military presence. The Wrkish Cypriots have no large effective concentration of fighters and the District has been calm. There was one major incident in January, however, when, following an explosion in Kouklia village, shooting started between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot quarters (see chapter II, section C (vi)). Since this incident 7JXF'ICYP has been patrolling this village continuously. 257. The general atmosphere is quiet; this may be attributed to the fact that UNFICYP mans more posts and in somewhat greater strength than previously. The quiet atmosphere is however a somewhat uneasy one. It is worth noting that there are only four mixed villages and that in none of these has UNFICYF been able to get the leaders of the two sides to meet. A recent effort at Kouklia was frustrated at the last moment. 258. Reasonable freedom of movement has been established for TWkish Cypriots. Incidents occur somewhat regular:ly 'but they are generally of a minor nature and have usually been solved locally. Greek Cypriots are not allowed to pass through most Turkish Cypriot villages. 259., The economic position shou:ld improve considerably in the early months of this year. Fields have been prepared and crops sown, the rains have been the heaviest for a number of years and the resultant harvest should be considerable. It is hoped that the resultant profits will bring an easing of tension. The present position of the Turkish Cypriots is somewhat unhappy as the Red Crescent relief supplies which

I . . . ~16228 English %ge 69

were distributed seem to be running out. In some villages food is becoming scanty and clothes are in short supply. The position in Ktima is deteriorating and food 9 supplies will give rise to concern in the coming weeks. 260. The public services are functioning. Water and electricity operate normally J and a postal service is available, though i-t. is considered to be unsatisfactory by the Turkish Cypriot villagers and leaders. In Ktima, most Turkish Cypriots are ]?eluctant to avail themselves of the postal services open to them in the Greek Cypriot sector, partly because they do not wish to acknowledge the Government':; authority. 261. Many Turkish Cypriots visit the District Office and the police to solve administrative problems and to comply with procedures. In general however Turkish Cypriots seem to reject Government authority. 262. With a shortage of Turkish Cypriot doctors the public health situation is not satisfactory. Educa-tion is likewise affected by the shortage of teachers and by the reluctance of some teachers to come to the District. Three teachers did arrive in February and have begun to teach in the 'Turkish quarter of Ktima. 263. There has been no improvement in the refugee problem since the last report. Some alleviation of the distress has however been achieved. Red Crescent supplies, tentage and quil-ts have been received. s/6229 English Page 70

v. ?TNANCIAL ASPECTS

264. Thirty-five Governments, including four non-member States, have ma$e, pledges in cash or in kind totalling the equivalent of $20.6 million (U.S.) to finance the costs payable by the Organization for the, operation and maintenance of the Force in Cyprus through 26 March 1.965. A listing of the pledges received through 9 March 1965 to the UNJKKYP Special Account is . . . . . annexed to this report. 265. It is estimated that the amount already pledged, together with some additional pledges for the period ending 26 March 1965, which are still anticipated, will be sufficient to cover the costs payable by the Organization in respect of the Force through 26 March 1965, provided the Organization is not required to repatriate the entire Force at its expense at the end of this period. The total estimated costs to the Organization for the period through 26 March 1965, which include $0.5 million for cpntingencies but exclude the repatriation costs which might be as much as $0.9 million, total $20.7 million. 266. The above cost estimates do not include, of course, the costs which some Governments furnishing contingents to the Force have volunteered, up to the present time, to bear at their own expense. Such costs include the following: Australia has agreed to bear costs of pay, overseas allowances, equipment brought to Cyprus, arms, ammunition, travel costs outside of Cyprus and any compensation $n event of injury or death of the Australian policemen b provided to the Force, Canada has agreed to bear all costs of its contingent of approximately I 1,100 men furnished to IJNF!tCYP but will request reimbursement in respect of some costs relating to Canadian personnel and equipment provided to UNFICYF headquarters and the headquarters of the Nicosia Zone. The direct cost to the Canadian Government of its participation in the Force during the first nine months of UNETCYP operations has, according to its estitrate, been $3,340,000, and the pay znd allowances it has paid Canadian personnel serving in UNl?CCYP during the same period for which no reimbursement will be claimed from the United Nations is estimated at $3,090,000.

I . . . S/6228 English Page 71

Ireland has'sgreed to bear costs of pay, overseas allowances, supplies and equipment sent from Ireland, including uniforms and any other expenses arising d 1 in Ireland. New Zealand has agreed to bear costs of pay, equipment brought to Cyprus, . arms ) ammunition, travel costs outside of Cyprus and any compensation,in the event of injury or death of the New Zealand policemen provided to the Force. The Government of New Zealand will also not request reimbursement for overseas allowances paid during the first three-month period. United Kingd.om has agreed to bear all costs of its contingent and UNFTCYF headquarters personnel. In addition, the United States Government has provided initial air services to UNFICYP by transporting the Austrian, Irish, L'anish, Finnish and Swedish troops from their home countries to Cyprus and also the airlift relating to the rotation of the Finnish, Irish and Swedish contingents. So far,,the United States has, lifted about 8,500 troops without cost to the United Nations. 267. If it is decided to extend the mandate of the Force for a furt:her period of three months after 26 &rch 1965, with its existing nationality copposition, and on the expectation that existing arrangements will continue for the claims and reimbursemen-ts of extra costs to Governments providing contingents to UNFICYP, the costs to the Organization for the period from 27 March 1965 through 26 June 1965 are estimated at $6,425,000.

I ..* s /6228 English Page 72

VI. MEDIATION EFFORT

268. In its resolution of 4. March 1964 the Security Council recommended that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the . Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a Mediator, who should use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the peoplqof Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. 269. Since the s&mission of the last report on the United Nations Gperation in Cyprus (~/61~>) the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus, Mr. Gala Plaza, has undertaken a third series of consultations with the parties to the Cyprus problem referred to in the Security Council resolution. During this series of consultations he was in Nicosia from 11 to l'i, from 20 to 23 and again from 25 to 27 February 1965; he visited Athens from ST to 19 and from 2'7 to 28 February, Ankara from 23 ,to 25 February and London from 28 February to 2 March. In Nicosia he had further talks with the President and the Vice President of the Republic of C&xws and a number of the Ministers of the Governmen-l;, and also with.other leaders, both official and unofficial, of the two cormunities in Cyprus. In Ankara he met with the Prime Minister, the Ceputy Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and other officials of the new Government of Turkey formed on 20 February; in Athens with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and other officials of the Government of Greece; and in London with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of State for,Cormnonwealth Relations and other officials of the Government of the United Kingdom. 270. In accordance with his terms of reference, the Mediator has continued from time to time to keep the Secretary-General informed about his activities. Upon his return to Headquarters on 2 March, the Mediator indicated his intention to submit toward the end of this month a comprehensive report on his efforts to date.

/ . . . s/6228 Egglish pwe 73

VII. OBSERVATIONS

Y 271. When I recommended, in my last report (S/6102) to the Security Council the extension of UNl?tXXF for a further period of three months, until 26 March 1965, * I had some hope that,this might be the last such recommendation that I would find it necessary to make. UNFICW has now been established for about a year, and, despite the effort of all concerned and the very creditable results achieved thus far, I now see no alternative but to recommend another extension of the Force for a further three months, that is, ,q.ntil 26 June 1.965. This, if approved, will be the, fourth extension of the Force. 272. In making ,this recommendation, I am aware that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain UNFTCYP because of the special burden on those providing contingents and also because of the growing difficulty of financini: UNFTCYP by voluntary contriburtions, particularly since these contributions have, so far, come only from a small number of States, a number of whom have contributed for each period. I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments of the contributing States, without whose generosity the Force could not have been maintained. 2'73. Consideration is being given to the possibility at some stage of reducing the size of UNJFICYP, but the Commander naturally sees great difficulties in any substantial reduction in strength, due not only to the continuing heavy I commitments which the Force has to meet with its present strength, but, also to recent indications of increasing tension and frustration in the Island. Alt:hough UNJXCYP has had remarkable success since August 1964, in keeping the peace in Cyprus, there can be little doubt, as I pointed @ut in my last report, that -the law of diminishing returns will almost inevitably apply in time to its effectiveness in keeping the peace. One indication of this probable trend which deserves brief mention is the attitude of some secti.ons of the local press, which has, on several occasions in the past three months, engaged in tendentious and fanciful csxpaigns against UNFTCYP. Such campaigns, though short-lived and unsubstantiated, cannot fail to have an adverse effect on the attitude of the population and the armed forces,toward UNF'ICYE and have led, in some cases, to incidents and misunderstandings. / . . . S/6228 English Page 74

274. Another indication of the present situation of LJNF'ICYP in Cyprus is the renewed vigour with which, in recent weeks, a number of questions have been raised 1 about its mandate. These questions, which have been advanced before, arise from ,,_. the inevitable fact that UNF'ICYP by its very nature cannot wholly satisfy the aspirations and aims of either community in Cyprus. On the one hand, it cannot act as an instrument of the Government in helping it to extend its authority by force over the Turkish Cypriot community in the areas now under its control. On the other hand, it cannot assume responsibility for restoring the constitutional position which existed prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1963 and early 1964, npr to contribute to the consolidation of the present stalemate in the Island. Both of these courses would basically affect a final settlement of the country's problems, a matter which is the province of the Mediator and not of UNFICYP. UNFITCYP's action is limited to doing its best to halt violence, to promote a reduction in tension and to restore normal conditions of life, thus creating an atmosphere more favourable to the efforts to achieve a long-term settlement. 275. The fact that the anticipated debate in the General Assembly on Cyprus did not take place has undoubtedly been one factor which has added to prevailing feelings of frustration and uncertainty in Cyprus. While the last months have been relatively peaceful, this should not blind anyone to the equally significant fact that both sides in Cyprus are now better prepared to fight, from a military point of view, than before, and consequently the results of any renewal of t fighting are likely to be more severe than heretofore. 276. In recommending the extension of UNl?K!YP for a further three months, I once again appeal to the parties concerned to make the most sincere and determined effort, by negotiations, both among themselves directly and through the Mediator, to find an agreed basis for long-term solutions of their inter-communal problems. Only this can afford real assurance agajnst a renewal of violence in Cyprus with all of its disastrous consequences. 277. In chapter III of this report, I have outlined the activities carried out by UNFICYF in its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions in Cyprus. These efforts seem to have reached their limits, in the face of the rigid positions taken by the Government, on the one hand, and by the leaders of the

/ . . . Turkish Cyprict community, on the other. If a break-through in this unsatisfactory and dangerous situation, which is little short of an uneasy truce with opposing armed elements facing each other in several points in the Island, is to be achieved, bold decisions are required from the Government and from the Turkish Cypriot leadership. I cannot emphasise too strongly how tenuous is the peace in the areas where Government forces and Turkish Cypriot fighters are poised against one another across a narrow no-man's land. In my judgement, there is a clear need for a gradual and progressive dismantling of fortifications with a view to achieving in the shortest possible time and under adequate protection and guarantees from UNP'ICYP, the removal of all fortifications and armed military,posts in the Island not essential for the defence of Cyprus against external attack. My Special Representative and the Commander of the Force have discussed this question with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders and will shortly submit to them concrete proposals to this end. I strongly urge the parties to give their support to these efforts.

/..,. s/6228 English Annex I be 1

ANNEX I

> UNFICYP AIDE-MEMOIRE AND REPLIES ON FAMAGUSTASITUATION

(a') UNFICYP aide-memoire of 27 February 1965 concerning the situation in the - d Famagusta area

1. On 15 May 1964, his Beatitude the President of the Republic and General Gyani, the then Commander of the United Nations Force, agreed on a number of measures to be taken at Famagusta with a view to reducing tension in the area. These measures were likewise accepted by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. While it cannot be said that the terms of this Agreement have been fully observed, the situation in Famagusta following its conclusion by and large remained calm until January 1965. 2. Curing this period, work has continued on the construction by the Government of a new extension of the Famagusta harbour, which at present is nearing completion. This has created a new situation, since the Government, in discharging its responsibility for the defence of the Island, has felt bound to institute a number of measures for the protection of the new harbour. These measures have of necessity tended to affect the inter-communal situation in the area; some of the new Government dispositions have been regarded by the Turkish,Cypriot community as posing a threat to its position, and fortifications have been built by the Turkish Cypriots to meet that threat. As a result, tension in Famagusta has risen > since 9 January 1965. \? _ 7. UNFICYP responsibility is directly involved in view of the function of the A Force, under its Mandate, "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting", and more specifically in view of its being a pai-ty to the arrangements of 15 May 1964. These arrangements, which were agreed upon prior to the construction of the new harbour, clearly require to be reviewed in the light of the new situation. The UNFICYP proposals in this regard are designed: (A) To facilitate the exercise by the Government of its right to make 'use of the new harbour extension, and the discharge of its obligation to defend it against attack; (B) To ensure that such steps as may be taken for this purpose do not' interfere with the existing position of the Turkish-Cypriot community in the area and are not likely to lead to a heightening of tension; s/6228 English Annex I Page 2

(C) To restore calm and contribute to the maintenance of law and order in the area. d 4. UNFICYP therefore recommends that arrangements along the following general lines should be agreed upon and put into effect: (A) All fortifications, positions, and other works dug or first rranned anywhere in the Famagusta area since 9 January 1965 by both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community, will be evacuated as stated below. - Exceptions - (B) The National Guard will continue its occupation of the armed post near the poor house jointly with members of UNFICYP; The fortification nearby will be kept unmanned, except in the event of an emergency, but the recently dug trenches in the area will be filled in. (C) The two posts on the mole guarding the entrance to the harbour when ready will be manned. The present post on the mole adjacent to the quay will be manned until such time as construction of the above two posts has been completed after which it will reaain unmanned. (D) The construction worker huts will be used to provide living acommodation for the garrison of the coast defence positions on the mole, not exceeding twelve to fifteen men, but no fortifications will be constructed in this area. UNFICYP will also maintain a post in one of the huts. (E) The post in the pilot house and any other post in the harbour will be occupied by UNFICYP. c ,“~ 5. The Government plainly has the right to police the new harbour extension, and j to rrake arrangements for local security there, along the same lines as have worked satisfactorily in the old harbour. UNFICYP suggests, that this is a role for policemen and not for soldiers of the National Guard; it is therefore proposed that any patrolling needed in the new harbour area should be carried out by the Cyprus police, but that no police station should be established in the extended portion of the harbour until such time as construction of warehouses has been completed and they are in use. 6. Demolition of the fortifications erected or constructed since 9 January 1965, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4 above, will be carried out within a period of ten days of entry into force of this Agreement. UNFICYP will be

L.. S/6228 Eng:Lish Annex I Paga 3 responsible for supervising such demolitions and ensuring that, in its opinion, they have been effectively carried out. 7. Implementation of these proposals, if agreed upon, shall be without prej.udice to the continued validity of Agreement of 15 &!ay 1964, and UJ!IFICYP considers that except in so far as as its terms may be modified by the arrangements outlined above, the Agreement of 15 May should now be fully observed by those concerned; it being understood, however, that UNFICYP will, within a reasonable interval after the entry into force of the arrangements outlined above, insti.tute, in co-operation with the parties, a review of the situation on the spot with a view to arriving at more satisfactory arrangements. a. In UNFICYP's considered view the adoption of these proposals would: (a) lead to a lessening of tension in the area as a whole; (b) permit the proper use o:f the harbour extension facilities; (c) allow the Government to carry out its legitimate responsibilities for defence and policing of the area; (d) adequately secure the position enjoyed by the minority comunity under the previous Agreement. It is therefore the hope of UNFICYP that the proposals will be found generally acceptable.

(b) Reply of the Vice-President of 8 i%rch to UNFICYP aide-memoire -of 27 February concerning' Famagusta 1. UNFICYP's aide-memoire dated 27 February 1.965, and the suggestions therein for demilitarizing the old harbour have been very carefully considered by the Turkish side. In their desire to show once again their goodwill and readiness to co-operate'with UNFICYP (despite highly objectionable expressions of opinion contained in the said aide-memoire) the Turkish leaders have succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the Turkish Police in the area to remove the sandbag barricades within the walled city and retain only the barbed wire barricades as was the case before and up to 9 January 1965, in addition to fulfilling the undertakings given in their letter of 23 February 1965. As a further gesture of goodwill, it has been agreed to restore to their previous condition the shallow trenches which had recently been cleaned by Turks in the Karaolos and Sakaria quarters, despite the fact that these were dug long before and were intended to be used by civilians for crawling to safety if their houses came under Greek fire from the s/%228 English Annex I Page 4 poor house, the bakery and the positions near the laundry. In giving this agreement it has been noted that UNFICYP will take the measures specified in Y UNFICYP's aide-memoire for the removal of all posts and fortifications created by the Greeks in the Famagusta area (in particular the poor house, the pilot tower ‘i and the customs tower) and wi:Ll prevent the Greeks from putting up in the future any new positions or fortifications in that area and from resorting to further inflitration or military acti.tiities such as setting up military patrols which, it is learned, they have started to carry out near the Karaolos quarter since the present proposals were submitted. 2. As regards the use of the word "fortifications" erected by the Turkish side, the Turkish side wishes to point out that the Turkish Police has not made and/or erected any fortifications wh;%tsoever except sandbag barricades (which were put up by the Turks after the breach of the 15 Nay agreement by the Greeks for the purpose of controlling traffic in the walled city, and which did not present any danger to the Greeks in that area) and except cleaning up certain trenches already in existence outside the walled city. 3. The Turkish sides wishes to take this ppportunity to welcome UNFICYP's stand as regards the validity of the 15 May agreement and UNFICYP's determination to see its full implementation. As UNFICYP is well aware the Turkish side in the area has carried out its undertakings of the agreement in full and did not take any unilateral action despite the fact that the Greek side as usual has not implemented their part of the agreement and furthermore aggravated the situation in the area 4 by taking unilateral and provocative action by creating new fortifications to which I reference is made in the letter of 23 February 1965. Iv 4. Regarding the revision of the I%y agreement the Turkish side wishes to point out that the need to revise any agreement can only arise after its implementation and before taking an~tinilattiral~step by force of arms and creating a fait accompli situation a~ has been the practice of the Greeks. No breach of any agreement can be justified under the pretext of revision after the event as it is proposed to be done in this particular case. Therefore it is the firm contention of the Turkish side that, before going into the revision of the 15 May agreement, the Greek fortifications and armed personnel in the Salamis road bakery and near the laundry which are directly threatening the lives of Turks in Karaolos and Sakarya quarters should be removed. s/6228 English Annex I page 5

5. The view of the Turkish side regarding the term "Government of Cyprus" is well known to the UNFICYP. It would not be amiss to repeat here again that the Government o:f this Republic has to be composed of two national and .juridical, communities, and governmental authority cannot vest solely in one community to the complete exclusion of the other as it is sought to be done by the Greek community after the passing of the Security Council resolution on 4 March 1.964. 6. Needless to say, the legitimate defence of this island is the task of both communities as specified under its Constitution and international obligations (the %rcat:~ of Allience), and any military activity purported to be taken by the Greek community under the pretext of legitimate defence of the island is nothing but an act of aggression directly aimed against the safety and security of the nxkish community. It is a fact that the Greeks have been continuously attacking the Turkish community since December 1963, despite all peace-keeping operations and efforts, and they have made it abundantly clear on many occasions both officially and unofficially that they intend to attack every single Turkish village in case of any attempt by Turkey as guarantor Power to save them. I:n conclusion, the Turkish side wishes to state that they take strong exception to the phrase "minority community" used in the last paragraph of UNFICYP's aide-memoire as well as to the line taken by UNFICW whereby it may appear that they favour the Greek argument that governmental authority in Cyprus as a whole can lawfully be exexised solely by the Greek community. Cyprus State being a bi-communal State composed of two juridical and national communities sharing its government and sovereignty, it is not correct to refer to one of the communities as a "minority community". In addition, such an action is also contrary to the Security Council resolution of 4 March.

(C) Reply Of President Makarios of 10 March, to UNFICYP aide-memoire concerning - the Famagusta situation

"Thank you for the aide-memoire concerning the situation in the Farragusta area. I wish to reaffirm that I fully appreciate all the efforts of UNFICYP for the prevention of incidents and the restoration of normality. I would therefore he in agreement with the suggestions contained in the aide-memoire for the lessening of tension in the area of Famagusta had I not considered that the procedure followed and the manner of facing the situation byUNFICYP are inconsistent wi.th the conception of a unitary state. The conferment of the responsibil.ity to I s/6228 English Annex I Page 6

UNFICYP in respect of the areas where the Turkish Cypriots allege that certain measures taken by the Government for controlling the area are causing to them feelings of fear or anxiety is not the correct manner of facing the situation. Such a policy encourages the 7Slrkish Cypriots to create incidents and cause tension within certain areas with the iaim of rendering subsequently necessary a demand for UNFICYP instead of the Government to undertake the control of the area. In this way, the imposition of law and order is seriously impeded. Nor do I consider it right for UNFICYP, in its efforts to lessen tension, to leave the impression that there are two states in Cyprus. The Government considers itself bound to take all necessary steps for the protection of the old and new harbour with a view to secure its safety and to maintain order therein and cannot neglect this simply because the measures taken may create a psychological anxiety in the mind of the Turkish Cypriots which, of course, is unjustifiable. In my letter to General Thimayya of 17 February 1965, in order to disperse the alleged fears of the Turks, I stated that the Government was ready to take the following steps: (A) to remove the armed posts in the hut to a distance of one hundred yards away from the road on the side of the seashore; (B) to keep unmanned the armed posts on the mole except those to be installed on the mouth of the harbour; (Th e already manned armed post on the mole will be evacuated within ten days.) (C) to allow UNFICYP to have observers in the post on the "pilot tower"; (D) to continue having the armed post near the poor house shared with the members of UNFICYP. The fortification nearby will be kept unmanned but the recently opened trenches will be filled up. My above statement to General Thimayya was intended to inform him of what the Government was prepared to do to relieve the alleged psychological fear of the Turkish Cypriots. The Government, however, is not prepared to enter into negotiations or In any way to agree to the principle that measures which are necessary for the defence of the Republic can form the subject of negotiation or can be made conditional upon the Turks or any other section of the population agreeing or disagreeing with them for psychological or other reasons." s/6228 English Annex II Page 1

ANNEX II

PLEDGESTO THE UNFICYP SPECIAL ACCOUNTAS OF 10 MARCH1965 (in US dollar equivalents) Government Amount --3- Australia 411,875 Austria 160,000 Belgium 341,669 Cambodia 600 Cyprus 260,000 Denmark 300,000 Finland 25,000 Germany (Federal Republic of) 2,000,000 Greece 2,050,000 Iran 10,000 Israel 10,000 Italy 249,547 Ivory Coast 10,000 Japan 300,000 Korea (Republic of) 15,000 Liberia 3,000 c Libya 1!5,000 1 " ? Luxembourg 20,000 klaysia 2,500 Malta 700 Morocco 10,000 Nepal 400 Netherlands 438,000 New Zealand 42,000 Nigeria 2,800 Norway 219,190 Pakistan 2.800

I . . . s/6228 English Annex II Page 2

Government Amount $ Sweden 460, oco Switzerland 235,000 Trinidad and Tobago 2,400 Turkey 200,000 United Kingdom 4,175,‘+52 United States of America 8,600,000 V~~~ZLEl~ 1,000 Vi&-&m 1,000 20,592,933