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Team Cognition and Complex Collaborative Problem Solving Cognitive Sciences Laboratory Dr. Stephen M. Fiore, Director * IST http://csl.ist.ucf.edu Professor, Cognitive Sciences * Department of Philosophy University of Central Florida * 3100 Technology Parkway, Suite 140 * Orlando, FL 32826 407-882-0298 * [email protected] Team Cognition and Complex Collaborative Problem Solving The Cognitive Science laboratory has pursued a form of scientific stewardship in the development of the field of team cognition, a melding of cognition with research on how humans interact socially and with technology. This includes the development of a number of edited volumes that have brought together researchers from different disciplines to present their perspectives on team cognition (Salas & Fiore, 2004), on complex collaborative problem solving (Letsky, Warner, Fiore, & Smith, 2008), and on interdisciplinary approaches for studying shared cognition (Salas, Fiore, & Letsky, 2012). We have also pursued the development of journal special issues in order to reach targeted audiences who may not be familiar with certain disciplinary perspectives on collaborative cognition (Fiore & Salas, 2006; Salas, Fiore, Letsky, & Warner, 2010). These efforts contributed to the overall field of team cognition by bringing together experts in varied fields to present their work in a unified volume or issue to new audiences. We have focused on the development of a theory of collaborative problem solving that unites concepts and methods from a variety of disciplines. This work broke new ground in that we critically analyzed and synthesized existing literature across multiple domains, ranging from the psychological and organizational sciences to computer science and human factors. From this we integrated—into a concise theory—our approach for examining complex forms of collaborative cognition in teams. Building off of earlier work on team problem solving (Fiore & Schooler, 2004), and based upon this synthesis, we published a major theoretical article that positioned our macrocognition in teams model (MITM) within the broader literature on shared cognition (Fiore, Rosen, Smith-Jentsch, Salas, Letsky, & Warner, 2010). This model integrates three theoretical elements. First, it is multi-level in that it encompasses individual and team level factors. Second, it addresses internalized and externalized cognitive functions. Finally, it incorporates temporal characteristics to examine phases of collaborative problem-solving and how these alter process and performance. We additionally published a detailed delineation of the measures and metrics associated with assessing the processes arising in macrocognition in teams (Fiore, Smith-Jentsch, Salas, Warner, & Letsky, 2010). In support of this, we articulated a means for conceptualizing the knowledge building process and how problem solvers transform data to information to knowledge (Fiore, Elias, Salas, Warner, & Letsky, 2010) as well as how teams communicate to manage uncertainty when solving complex problems (Fiore, Rosen, & Salas, 2010). Our research is now examining this in the context of emergent and dynamic processes arising from collaboration to study phase transitions in problem solving using the processes identified in the MITM (Wiltshire, Butner, & Fiore, 2017), Our theoriZing was used to study collaborative problem solving at NaSa’s Johnson Space Center. We worked with NaSa’s Mission Control Center (MCC), which is responsible for control of the International Space Station (ISS), and which responds to problems that obstruct the functioning of the ISS. We used the MITM to assess collaborative problem solving processes in the MCC and documented the interplay between team knowledge building processes and internalized and externalized team knowledge in this complex domain (Fiore, Wiltshire, Oglesby, Okeefe, & Salas, 2014). In collaboration with NaSA, we developed a method for eliciting the knowledge necessary to understand the team’s collaborative problem solving processes, documented these findings, and made recommendations for training based upon this (e.g., Wiltshire, Rosch, Fiorella, & Fiore, 2014). Last, this line of work also encompasses team cognition in the context of technology (Bocklman Morrow & Fiore, 2013; Fiore, 2012; Wiltshire & Fiore, 2014), and how to develop and test technologies that can augment cognition in complex operational environments. This includes improving cognition for teams more generally (Fiore & Wiltshire, 2016) as well as improving decision making when faced with uncertainty (Fiore et al., 2017; Newton, Fiore, & Laviola, 2017). Many of these ideas were integrated in comprehensive review papers in which we developed a theoretical framework for the design of technology to support cognition and collaboration in distributed teams (Fiore, McDaniel, & Jentsch, 2009; Fiore, RodrigueZ, & Carstens, 2012), as well as training to accelerate the development of team cognitive readiness (Fiore, Ross, & Jentsch, 2012). REFERENCES - Team Cognition and Complex Collaborative Problem Solving * Indicates current or former student co-authors *Bockelman Morrow, P. & Fiore, S. M. (2013). Team Cognition: Coordination across Individuals and Machines. In J. D. Lee and a. Kirlik (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Engineering, Vol. 1: Foundations, Perspectives and Cognitive Issues (pp. 200-215). New York: Oxford University Press. Fiore, S. M., Elias, J., Salas, E., Warner, N. & Letsky, M. (2010). From Data, to Information, to Knowledge: Measuring Knowledge Building in the Context of Collaborative Cognition. In E. Patterson and C. Miller (Eds.), Macrocognition Metrics and Scenarios: Design and Evaluation for Real-World Teams (pp. 179-200). ashgate Publishing: United Kingdom. Fiore, S. M., McDaniel, R., & Jentsch, F. (2009). Narrative-Based Collaboration Systems for Distributed Teams: Nine Research Questions for Information Managers. Information Systems Management, 26, 1, 28–38. Fiore, S. M., Rosen, M. a., Smith-Jentsch, K. a., Salas, E., Letsky, M. & Warner, N. (2010). Toward an Understanding of Macrocognition in Teams: Predicting Processes in Complex Collaborative Contexts. Human Factors, 52, 2, 203-224. Fiore, S. M., Ross, K., & Jentsch, F. (2012). a Team Cognitive Readiness Framework for Small Unit Training. Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making, 6(3), 325-349. Fiore, S. M., Smith-Jentsch, K. a., Salas, E., Warner, N., & Letsky, M. (2010). Toward an Understanding of Macrocognition in Teams: Developing and Defining Complex Collaborative Processes and Products. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomic Science, 11, 4, 250-271. Fiore, S. M., Wiltshire, T. J., Oglesby, J. M., O’Keefe, W. S., & Salas, E. (2014). Complex Collaborative Problem Solving in Mission Control. Aviation, Space, & Environmental Medicine, 85(4), 456-461. Fiore, S.M. (2012). Cognition and Technology: Interdisciplinarity and the Impact of Cognitive Engineering Research on OrganiZational Productivity. In S. KoZlowski (Ed.). Oxford Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology (pp. 1306-1322). Oxford University Press. Fiore, S.M. & *Wiltshire, T.J. (2016). Technology as Teammate: Examining the Role of External Cognition in Support of Team Cognitive Processes. Frontiers in Psychology: Cognitive Science. 7:1531. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01531. Fiore, S.M. & Salas, E. (2006). Team Cognition and Expert Teams: Emerging Insights into Learning and Performance for Exceptional Teams. International Journal of Sports and Exercise Psychology, Volume 4. Fiore, S.M., *Warta, S., *Best, a., *Newton, O., & Laviola, J. (2017). Developing a Theoretical Framework of Task Complexity for Research on VisualiZation in Support of Decision Making Under Uncertainty. Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (pp. 1193-1197). Santa Monica, Ca: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. Fiore, S.M., RodrigueZ, W., & Carstens, (2012). uCollaborator: Framework for STEM Project Collaboration among Geographically- Dispersed Student/Faculty Teams. Journal of STEM Education, 13, 2, 84-92. Fiore, S. M., *Rosen, M. a., & Salas, E. (2010). Uncertainty Management and Macrocognition in Teams: a Multi-disciplinary Review and Integration. In K. Mosier & U. Fischer (Eds.). Informed by Knowledge: Expert Performance in Complex Situations (pp. 247-260). East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press, Taylor & Francis Group Ltd. Fiore, S. M. & Schooler, J. W. (2004). Process mapping and shared cognition: Teamwork and the development of shared problem models. In E. Salas & S.M. Fiore (Editors). Team Cognition: Understanding the factors that drive process and performance (pp. 133-152). Washington, DC: american Psychological association. Letsky, M. Warner, N., Fiore, S.M., & Smith, C. (Eds.). (2008). Macrocognition in Teams: Theories and Methodologies. London: Ashgate Publishers. *Newton, O., Fiore, S.M., & Laviola, J. (2017). an External Cognition Framework for VisualiZing Uncertainty in Support of Situation Awareness. Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (pp. 1198-1202). Santa Monica, Ca: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. Salas, E., & Fiore, S. M. (Eds.). (2004). Team Cognition: Understanding the factors that drive process and performance. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Salas, E., Fiore, S. M., & Letsky, M. (Eds.). (2012). Theories of Team Cognition: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives. New York & London: Routledge. Salas, E., Fiore, S. M., Letsky, M., & Warner, N. (2010). Shared Cognition in Complex Environments: Emerging Theoretical Issues
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