NO. 37 JUNE 2021 Introduction

Measuring the Maghreb What Do Rankings and Indexes Really Tell Us? Aljoscha Albrecht and Isabelle Werenfels

International rankings and indexes, such as the World pub- lished in mid-April 2021, are increasingly influential in the Maghreb. The region’s promote improvements in their own performance, protest where they score poorly, and celebrate outranking their rivals. Rankings also allow opposition groups and activists to spotlight grievances in their own country. External coopera- tion partners, above all the European Union (EU) and its member states, use them as a basis for decision making and policies towards , and . While rankings and indexes insinuate objectivity and comparability, their sources, validity and utilisation are frequently problematic. Only if they are embedded in qualitative research on the Maghreb and their downsides reflected can they make a meaningful contribution to identifying reform needs and addressing deficits.

When the latest World Press Freedom Index the Tunisian press celebrating the country’s (PFI) came out in April 2021, it made head- best positioning in a decade, the Moroccan lines in the Maghreb and was picked up by and Algerian media each pointing to the prominent critics. At the same other’s poor score. time, the Maghreb states’ press agencies Other, newer, indexes have also become cite rankings and indexes to highlight their touchstones. These include the Bertelsmann neighbours’ deficits: While the Moroccan Transformation Index (BTI), the state press agency points to the PFI to un- Index of Intelligence Unit derline the lack of press freedom in Algeria, (EIU) and the ’s Ease of Doing its Algerian counterpart prefers to publicise Business Index. They play a growing role Algeria’s own position in the United in foreign and security as well as economic Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) and development policy, including in sig- (HDI). nificant country analyses of the German The March 2021 Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Index (FWI) created similar waves, as did Development (BMZ), in status reports of the January 2021 Corruption Perceptions the European Commission on the European Index (CPI). The latter was eagerly awaited Neighbourhood Policy, for example and immediately politically exploited, with on Algeria, and in mandatory Sustainability

Impact Assessments, which the EU requires covers “political transformation”, “economic for new trade agreements, specifically transformation” and “governance”. Algeria with Morocco and Tunisia. and Morocco lag far behind. Tunisia comes What all these rankings and indexes fourth overall in the IIAG ranking of Afri- have in common is their claim to provide can states, behind only the island states of reliable objective assessments. Closer ex- , and the . amination of these instruments and their Its public sector also makes a relatively application in the Maghreb context reveals solid impression in the CPI. how unrealistic that is in practice. Nevertheless, the democracy assessments do also reveal deficits. The BTI classifies Tunisia as a “defective democracy” with a The Maghreb in Figures “limited” economic transformation and “moderate” governance performance. The The position of the three Maghreb states EIU’s confirms the first in the 35 rankings and indexes selected for - point, classifying the country as a “flawed this analysis largely mirrors their geograph- democracy”. All the same, Tunisia rates as ical location – between Europe and Sub- the only democracy in the Maghreb. Saharan Africa, and thus between the ex- The human and civil rights situation is tremes of the respective scales. In other similar. In the FWI, which rates “political words, the instruments reflect the inequality rights” and “”, Tunisia scores gradient between “the West”, the Maghreb 71/100; neither Morocco nor Algeria even states on its “threshold” and the “Global manage 40 (see Table 1). Tunisia is thus the South”. Almost half the rankings that com- only Maghreb state that pare internationally place all three Magh- judges “free” and in addition the only Arab reb states in the middle third. None have state and one of only five African states. all three in the bottom third, while only The FWI classes Morocco as “partly free” the Global Militarisation Index (GMI) by the (but without ), Algeria as Bonn International Center for Conversion “not free”. Tunisia is also well ahead of (BICC) and Arton Capital’s Passport Index Morocco and Algeria in the PFI – despite see all three in the top third. The Mo Ibra- having once occupied, with 164th place in him Foundation’s Ibrahim Index of African 2010, the lowest position of any Maghreb Governance (IIAG) indicates that the Magh- state since the PFI was first created in 2002. reb is ahead in the regional context, placing Tunisia also leads on visa-free travel and all three Maghreb states in the top third of academic freedom. According to Henley & its ranking of 54 African countries. Partners Tunisians can travel visa-free to A direct comparison between the Magh- 72 countries, and Tunisia is the best-placed reb states also reveals a clear pattern of Maghreb country in Arton Capital’s Pass- strengths and weaknesses: Tunisia does best port Index. It does especially well in the overall, Algeria worst, Morocco is in the Academic Freedom Index (AFi) by Berlin- middle. based Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) where it is the only Maghreb state in the Democratic Front Runner Tunisia best of the five categories. This is also re- flected in its top placing in the UNDP’s Tunisia comes out first of the three Magh- Global Knowledge Index (GKI). Tunisia also reb states in more than half the examined leads the Maghreb in the Digital Quality of rankings and indexes, scoring especially Life Index (DQL Index). well in the areas of statehood and human The same cannot be said of security and civil rights. It performs exceptionally and conflict potential. To its credit Tunisia well in indexes assessing political systems, comes last among Maghreb states in both freedoms and governance (see Table 1). the GMI and the (FSI) – This applies for example to the BTI, which meaning it is the least fragile and the least

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2 Table 1

Democracy, freedom, corruption

Index Tunisia Morocco Algeria

Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 44th of 137 94th 83rd EIU Democracy Index 54th of 165 96th 115th Freedom in the World Index (FWI) 71/100 (“free”) 37/100 (“partly free”) 32/100 (“not free”) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 69th of 180 86th 104th World Press Freedom Index (PFI) 73rd of 180 136th 146th

Sources: Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2020; Freedom House, FWI 2021; Transparency International, CPI 2020; Reporters sans frontières, PFI

militarised. Less positively, it leads Algeria freedom and connectivity: In the Open and Morocco in the Budget Index (OBI) it holds 62nd place, 20 (GTI), which measures the “impacts of ter- ahead of Tunisia and 50 ahead of Algeria. rorism” in terms of incidents, fatalities, The gaps are even bigger in the Heritage injuries and property damage. Tunisia also Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom fares worse than Morocco on the Political and Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Terror Scale (PTS) and in the . Morocco is also best of the three in Index (GPI), which aggregates “domestic and ETH Zürich’s KOF Globalisation Index, international conflict”, “safety and security” in which the “economic globalisation” com- and “militarisation”. ponent accounts for one-third. Tunisia’s worst deficits are found in the Morocco leads on ecological sustainabil- economic sphere, where the free-market ity, taking seventh place of the 57 countries poster child Morocco sweeps the field. ranked in the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI). In reality that means fourth Economic Champion Morocco because its creator, the environmental NGO Germanwatch, demonstratively leaves the Morocco is close on Tunisia’s heels overall, first three places unfilled. In contrast Alge- placing first of the three Maghreb states ria’s extensive oil and gas industry leaves in 14 of the 35 rankings and indexes. The it at the bottom of the list (43rd). Morocco kingdom has a clear lead in the economic also does passably in Dual Citizen’s Global indexes, coming 53rd of 190 countries in Green Economy Index (GGEI), coming 59th the World Bank’s prominent Ease of Doing of 130. Business Index, thus outclassing Tunisia by In Yale University’s renowned Environ- 25 places and Algeria by 104. mental Performance Index (EPI) it scores The positive assessment of Morocco as a considerably less well. Here Morocco comes place to do business is attributable above all 100th of 180 countries, behind Tunisia (71st) to the indicators “dealing with construction and even Algeria (84th). The main reason permits” (16th), “paying taxes” (24th) und for this is that the index also includes the “getting electricity” (34th). Morocco’s com- development-related category “environmen- petitiveness is further underlined by the tal health”, in which Algeria is 61st overall World Economic Forum’s Global Competi- and best in the Maghreb. And although tiveness Index (GCI), where it lies 12 places Morocco leads the Maghreb in the economic ahead of Tunisia and 14 ahead of Algeria indexes, the BTI includes a pointer suggest- (see Table 2). Morocco also holds a clear ing that its lead is not unassailable: The Ber- lead on budgetary transparency, economic telsmann Stiftung regards Morocco’s “eco-

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3 Table 2

Economics and climate

Index Tunisia Morocco Algeria

Ease of Doing Business Index 78th 53rd of 190 157th Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) 87th 75rd of 141 89th Index of Economic Freedom 119th 81st of 178 162nd Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) n/a 7th of 57 43rd

Sources: World Bank, Ease of Doing Business Index 2020; World Economic Forum, GCI

2019; Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom 2021; Germanwatch, CCPI 2021.

nomic transformation” as “limited”, putting However, Algerian women appear to it 62nd, 17 places behind Tunisia. profit less than their male compatriots from the country’s development successes. Both Laggard Algeria UNDP gender indexes reveal significant deficits in Algerian gender parity. Algeria Overall Algeria lags far behind; in just three receives the worst possible rating in the of the 35 investigated rankings and indexes (GDI) and places does it come ahead of Tunisia and Morocco, 103rd of 162 in the Gender Inequality Index namely the GMI, the Index (GII). That said, neither Tunisia still less Mo- (HCI) and the HDI. Especially noteworthy rocco do especially well in this area either. are Algeria’s good showings in the HCI, Despite Algeria’s decent showing in introduced by the World Bank in 2018 to certain development-related areas, there is assess how well countries are harnessing no denying that it comes last of the three the economic potential of their citizens, Maghreb states in more than two-thirds of and in the UNDP’s HDI. Algeria’s perfor- the quantitative instruments overall. And mance in the HCI is not exactly spectacu- it has most catching up to do in the fields lar – 98th of 174 – but still ahead of the where Tunisia and Morocco do best: state- other two Maghreb states, particularly hood, human and civil rights, and econom- in the education components: on average ic and technological development. Algeria Algerians attend school for more than is the weakest of the Maghreb states in the a year longer than their Tunisian and DQL Index (and second-last of all the 85 Moroccan peers. included countries). The same also applies Where the Maghreb’s largest state really to the EF English Proficiency Index. stands out is the HDI (see Table 3), where it Finally, Algeria also gives cause for con- comes third in Africa (after Mauritius and cern in the sphere of security and conflict the Seychelles). Since 2010 the HDI com- potential. The FSI rates it as the most fragile prises “life expectancy at birth”, “expected” Maghreb state (and 71st of 178 overall), the and “mean years of schooling” and “gross GPI as the least peaceful (117th of 163) and national income (GNI) per capita”. Algeria the GMI as by far the most militarised scores better than the other two in three (see Table 3). indicators, but the one that stands out most is per capita GNI. This is especially signifi- cant because the Cost of Living Index attri- butes Algeria a lower cost of living than Morocco, which Numbeo calculates as hav- ing the highest in the Maghreb.

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4 Table 3

Development and militarisation

Index Tunisia Morocco Algeria

Human Development Index (HDI) 95th 121st 91st of 189 (HCI) 102nd 110th 98th of 174 Global Militarisation Index (GMI) 47th 23rd 15th of 151

Sources: UNDP, HDI 2020; World Bank, HCI 2020; Bonn International Center for Conver-

sion, GMI 2019.

The Downsides: Plausibility four): As well as the two UNDP gender in- Problems of Rankings and Indexes dexes (excepting Morocco in the GII) this also applies to the At first glance these rankings and indexes (GHI), the GKI and the DQL Index. might appear to create a largely plausible Even greater contradictions appear among profile of the Maghreb states and their the rankings of political freedom and classi- relative international and regional status fications of political systems. The BTI clas- that tallies with qualitative observations. sifies Algeria as a “moderate autocracy”, Closer examination reveals the downsides: Morocco considerably less favourably as a These revolve around questions of con- “hard-line autocracy”. The EIU’s Democracy sistency between instruments and compati- Index on the other hand classes Morocco as bility with the findings of qualitative a “”, Algeria as an “authori- research, spanning the entire process from tarian regime”. The FWI also regards Morocco methodological issues to potential uses and (“partly free”) as much “freer” than Algeria general validity. (“not free”). One obvious explanation for such discrepancies would be different Methodological Question Marks underlying understandings of democracy. But in fact both the Bertelsmann Stiftung Comparison of different indexes and rank- and the EIU base their work on five broadly ings operating in the same or very similar congruent criteria. areas quickly raises multiple questions This would suggest that even minor concerning their design. Take for example deviations in individual criteria, their oper- the area of development: Algeria leads the ationalisation, standardisation and weight- Maghreb in the HDI on the basis of educa- ing, can cause wide divergences or even tion and a rentier state based on oil and gas contradictions in the classifications. In wealth. What the HDI fails to pick up is the effect, the instruments selected by Euro- development realities on the ground and pean and other external cooperation part- especially the opportunities associated – in ners ultimately decide how a state is judged. an age of global connectivity and digitalisa- With regard to cooperation projects – tion – more with English language skills whether economic or developmental in and access to high-speed internet than with nature – it certainly does make a differ- traditional schooling. Those are areas where ence whether a state is regarded as an Morocco and especially Tunisia do better. “authoritarian regime” or a “moderate Although Algeria leads in the HDI, Tunisia autocracy” (example Algeria). In Morocco’s does considerably better in five other devel- case the spectrum is especially broad, with opment-related indexes (and Morocco in partners able to choose between a “hybrid

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5 regime” and a “hard-line autocracy” as the actors primarily from the military, operat- basis for developing policies, making deci- ing behind the scenes via clientelistic sions and tailoring justifications. This illus- networks. trates the danger inherent to quantitative Both systems are equally problematic instruments: They insinuate comprehensive for political activists. The Algerian possibly objectivity and precise measurement. It more so, as restricted access for inter- tends to get forgotten that their subjectivity national organisations can begins with those who design them, and result in information deficits for example that judgements are already being made in on torture. So the question of which system the process of designing the instruments. deserves to be labelled as more “authoritar- And if the indicators are then applied ian” is debatable. Such judgements are selectively or instrumentalised, the result is potentially crucial for the Maghreb govern- frequently a simplistic and distorted image ments, because of their repercussions for of a considerably more complex reality – international agreements and cooperation. and in the worst case policies based on false The aforementioned analyses and reports assumptions. For example Morocco’s rela- on which the German government and the tively uncritical elevation to a “darling” of European Commission base their decisions international donors and investors over the fail to address this aspect. past decade, alongside Tunisia, is likely Ultimately, the comparability of such attributable in part to its improving rank- structurally very different economies is very ings. The danger here is that governments limited. How to meaningfully compare a may tend to design reforms to optimise rentier economy like Algeria with diversi- their rankings rather than enhancing their fied systems like Tunisia or Morocco? actual performance. Comparisons over time Morocco’s economy is strongly regulated – should also be treated with caution because one could say dominated – by the royal improvements in rankings do not necessarily family, and is more attractive to foreign indicate progress. They can result simply investors, especially from Europe. But from deterioration elsewhere, and vice the royal family’s economic monopoly, as versa of course. well as the corruption in public administra- Further problems include the difficulty tion, are detrimental to the domestic of data gathering in authoritarian states, private sector with less good connections to and outdated data or estimates underlying the royal court. In other words, the local certain indexes; these include the perspective on Morocco’s good showing in UNDP’s Multidimensional Poverty Index the Ease of Doing Business Index will be (MPI) and Gender Social Norms Index different and more sceptical. This is (GSNI). underlined by a comparison with other business indexes: Morocco lags far behind Flawed Comparisons and Tunisia in the BTI component “economic Blind Spots transformation”, which unlike the World Bank index includes criteria like “social A comparison with the qualitative litera- security and compensation”, “equality of ture introduces another set of problems. opportunity” and “sustainability”. For instance, political freedom indexes tend Concentrating exclusively on rankings to obscure the nature of the underlying sys- risks oversimplification, because many of tems. The examples of Morocco and Algeria the Maghreb states’ profound problems are illustrate the difficulties of placing coun- difficult or impossible to grasp quantitatively. tries with very different political systems For example, the individual indicators that on a single scale. One is ruled by a monarch form the instruments cannot comprehend with a firm hand and almost absolute con- phenomena such as informality and politi- stitutional power. The other is a highly cal parallel structures (the “deep state”). opaque system controlled by competing That is simply outside the scope of the

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6 quantitative approach. Even if the CPI does Added Value and represent an effort to address these issues, it Recommendations is still quantifying corruption as perceived by a section of the business elites rather The weaknesses illustrated by the example than the experience across society. Nor do of the Maghreb states demonstrate the the bare numbers reveal much about the ambivalence of rankings and indexes. Un- quality and structures of corruption. Con- reflected application can lead to problematic sequently, rankings and indexes supply assessments and decisions. But rankings little or no meaningful basis for determin- and indexes can contribute to identifying ing what kind of reforms would be needed. reform needs and rectifying deficits, from The same can be said about the GMI. It which both the Maghreb states themselves © Stiftung Wissenschaft measures a country’s militarisation but and their external cooperation partners und Politik, 2021 says nothing about actual or intended use stand to benefit. This makes it all the more All rights reserved of armed force, nor about the relationship important that the German government This Comment reflects between military and society. Is a country and the European Commission are aware the authors’ views. militarising because the monarch wishes it of the weaknesses of the instruments they to (Morocco), or has the military long been use. Otherwise the risk is that they will, as The online version of operating outside of (or even controlling) Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder put this publication contains politics (Algeria)? The indexes reveal little it, “dumb down global governance”. functioning links to other or nothing about the actors, whose quali- The following points should be observed: SWP texts and other relevant sources. tative nature largely precludes quantitative Generating a comprehensive understanding analysis. requires holistic and prudent consideration SWP Comments are subject No less problematic is the loss of local of different rankings and indexes and aware- to internal peer review, fact- detail. The blind spots include intra-national ness of their contradictions. Even then they checking and copy-editing. differences in poverty and unemployment – certainly cannot substitute the profound For further information on our quality control pro- for example in Morocco between the eco- knowledge of the local context that is a cedures, please visit the SWP nomic centres of Casablanca and Rabat and precondition for identifying omissions and website: https://www.swp- the marginalised Rif, or in Tunisia between distortions, avoiding misconceptions and berlin.org/en/about-swp/ the affluent Tunis suburb of La Marsa identifying the real causes of grievances. quality-management-for- and disadvantaged regions like Tataouine The extent to which it is useful or legiti- swp-publications/ and Jendouba. It is a real question whether mate to compare states with fundamentally SWP it would not be more productive to gather different priors is also an issue policy Stiftung Wissenschaft und detailed data on regions and actors – for makers should carefully scrutinise in each Politik example on the performance of political case. If we are to draw conclusions about German Institute for parties, ministries and political functions the validity of rankings and indexes we International and such as head of state – rather painting a must also factor in their origins and compo- Security Affairs whole country with the same broad brush. sition. These include the selected criteria, Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 Furthermore, in almost all cases (CPI their operationalisation and weighting, the 10719 Berlin apart) it remains unclear whether the coun- data sources and the collection methods. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 try’s citizens share the assessment. Accord- Not least, it is worth taking a look at the Fax +49 30 880 07-100 ing to surveys from 2020 the authoritarian funding, interests and worldviews of the in- www.swp-berlin.org regimes of Morocco and Algeria enjoy a stitutions producing them. [email protected] great deal more public confidence than ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 Tunisia’s democratically elected govern- ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 ment. doi: 10.18449/2021C37

Translation by Meredith Dale

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 40/2021) Aljoscha Albrecht is Research Assistant in the and Africa Division at SWP. Dr Isabelle Werenfels is Senior Fellow in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP.

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