Serbia's Sandžak: Caught Between Two Islamic Communities

ȂȱċǱ Caught Between Two Islamic Communities

byȱȱȱ ȱ°

Abstract ȱǰȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱĜȱȱ particularly evident on the Serbian side of the ċ region – home to a majority of the Muslim population of Serbia where religious and political leaders instrumentalize religious divisions to garner political support. A great majority of the population, meanwhile, seeks economic progress in the neglected region.

Key words: ǰȱǰȱ £ǰȱċ

Political Borders and Shifting Borders the Creation of Regions ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗŞŝŞǰȱ ȱ he ċ is a region that stretches from ċ also came under the auspices of the Tsouthwestern Serbia into northeastern Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1908, Vienna re- Montenegro and a colloquially used term that turned ċ to the Sublime Porte, until Ser- symbolizes a common foundation among lo- bia and Montenegro recaptured and divided cal Bosniaks. The region is, in other words, not the ċȱȱȱȱȱȱŗşŗŘȦŗřǯȱ a legal entity, but rather a mind-map that re- Between 1918 and 1929, the Serbian, Croatian, Ěȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱ and Slovenian monarchy (KSHS) subsumed such, many locals identify as ċ even the ċ into the „province of Southern though Montenegro and Serbia split in 2006. ȃǯȱ ȱŗşŚŗǰȱȱ¡ȱ ȱĴȱ- ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱ goslavia and rewarded the southern region of characterizes the Islamic community in Serbia, ċ to the Kingdom of Albania – a satelli- the mind-map and non-legal entity known as te state of Italy. The ċ’s legal character ċ illustrates the political, religious, and was since on the backburner so long as SFRY, social consequences locals face as a result of and the subsequent Federation of Yugoslavia the recurring territorial re-, and division. The (FRY), existed. existence of two Islamic Communities in Ser- ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ bia must thus be understood from two per- ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ǯȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ- regional borders, but also dictated that local ders, and the way in which the subsequent ȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ the onset of the royal dictatorship in 1930, for local Muslim communities. The second, and instance, the Austro-Hungarian decree for reli- related factor is the question of trust regarding gious autonomy stipulated a reorganization of the legitimate representation of the Islamic ȱ ȱ¢ǯȱȱȱǰȱ community in Serbia. the KSHS leadership transferred the seat of the reis-ul-ulema1 from Sarajevo to Belgrade, while

1 Supreme religious leader.

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keeping both the 2 and ċ3 in Skopje Islamic community of Serbia (Islamska zajed- and Sarajevo. A new organizational structure nica Srbije, IZS) in view of territorial integri- was introduced following the formation of ty. Three constituent mešihats5 represent the the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia IZS, including the mešihat in Serbia, Preševo, ǻǼǰȱ ǰȱȱȱȱ¡ǰȱĚȱȱ and Novi Pazar. The mešihat of Novi Pazar is federal structure of the newly created state. ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ - The seat of the Islamic community was now polje (Bakije-hanume), and Novi Pazar (Sinan Ȭȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽǯȱ ȱŘŖŖŝǰȱȱ°ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ - the Serbian side of the ċ region, succee- zational structure of the Islamic community ȱ °ȱ ȱ ȬȬȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ disintegrated in tandem with the destruction °ǰȱ ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ of SFRY. Henceforth, Islamic Communities of being a fraud, and an alleged lackey of state represented the Muslim ummah4 according to ¢ȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱ- the newly established Yugoslav successor sta- ęȱȱŘŖŗŜǯȱȱ°ȱȱȱ£ȱ tes. The question of legitimate representation serves as the current Reis-ul-ulema of the IZS. in Serbia, however, was contentious from the ȱ ŗşşřǰȱ ȱ ȱ °ȱ ȱ outset. the mešihat in Novi Pazar with political ba- cking from Sulejman Ugljanin, leader of the Democratic Action Party, SDA. In 2006, the Two Competing Islamic Mešihat adopted a new constitution under its Communities in Serbia new name, the Islamic Community in Serbia (Islamska zajednica u Srbiji, IZuS) because of Muslims on the Serbian side of the ċ re- Belgrade’s adoption of a law that recognized gion identify as Bosniaks, and as constituent only “traditional” Islamic communities here- members of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). ǯȱ°ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ Founded in 1993, the mešihat of the Islamic ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ °ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ community in ċȱȱȱĴȱ the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovi- with its institutional orientation toward the na. The IZuS is subdivided into four muftia- rijaset in Sarajevo, the highest religious and tes, including Belgrade, Novi Sad, Preševo, administrative body of the Islamic communi- and Novi Pazar. The muftiate in Novi Pazar is ¢ȱȱ ǯȱ ȱŗşşŚǰȱȱ ȱ °ȱ further connected to the International Univer- of Belgrade founded a new Islamic commu- sity of Novi Pazar. nity to illustrate Serbia’s institutional split ȱ ȱ °ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ °ȱ - from Sarajevo. Belgrade thus supported the tinually faced various accusations, including his alleged protection of local vehabjie (waha- 2 Vakuf is a modified word from the Arabic word al- bites), corruption and self-aggrandizement. In waqf. The waqf (khairi) is a charitable trust that belongs ȱȱȱǰȱ°ȱ¢ȱȱ to Allah. As such, it cannot be sold or used in a different his religious tenure for political purposes, capacity, except for the development of the Muslim community. which led to widespread antipathy against his 3 Medžlis is a modified word from the Arabic word ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ °ȱ majlis. Within this context, the word medžlis stands for Ulema council. 4 Ummah is an Arabic word, and means community. 5 Territorial, organizational units.

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ȱȱĜȱȱŘŖŗŚǰȱȱ ȱ- necessary tool to ensure regional continuity: ȱ¢ȱȱ°ǯȱ°ȱ¢ȱ- ȱ ȱĴȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ved as the dean of the International University ȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ£ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ°ǯ ȱȱȱȱ ǲȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ǯȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱǯȱ ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱ£ǰȱȱ ȱ Fusing Political and Spiritual ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ - Interests: On the Heels of the ǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱ Yugoslav Succession Wars ñ°ǰȱñ²ǰȱiñǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ In light of the prewar barrage of propagan- ȱ Ȯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ da and full-blown violence in BiH during the ¢ȱ ǯ8 At the time, Ugljanin 1990s, a group of political actors strove for po- was recognized as a strong leader for the political and territorial autonomy for the ċ litical movement of the Bosniak population in region. Though disparate in their views, they ċǯȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ united behind Sulejman Ugljanin within the ȱȱȱȱȱċȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǻǼȱ Ȯȱ ȱ ě- he also supported the creation of a separate ȱ ȱ ȱ £°Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǯȱ Islamic Community that recognized the rija- Among Ugljanin’s recurring rallying points set of Sarajevo as its spiritual center. Muamer was the creation of a special status for a com- °ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱ ȱ - mon ċȱ Ȯȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ - lamic Community in 1993. negrin and Serbian sides of the territory. In Locals understood the implications ŗşşŗǰȱȱę¢ȱȱȱȱ of the above move, though some considered for autonomy within the umbrella organizati- the establishment of the second Islamic Com- on of the Bosniak National Council of ċ munity as a political strategy. A young inter- (BNVS).6 A total of 70.2 percent of all 264,156 locutor considered Ugljanin’s support of the eligible voters turned out in support of auto- Islamic Community in Novi Pazar as a ploy. nomy, especially residents of Novi Pazar, Tu- ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ - tin and Sjenica.7 Belgrade meanwhile denied ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ the validity of the memorandum and charged ǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ Ugljanin with violating the constitutional or- ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ der of Serbia and terrorism. As a consequence, ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱǯȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ Turkey. ȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ An elder resident of Novi Pazar ap- believers. But the Muslims are not divided in their preciated Ugljanin’s political activism as a ǯȱȱȱ ȱȂȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǻǼǰȱ ȱȂȱȱ 6 The assembly was registered as the Bosniak National ȱǯȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ Council of Sandžak (BNVS). Since 2003, the council is known as the Bosniak National Council. ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱȱȂȱȱȱ 7 For more information on the council, see: “Bošnjačko ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ nacional vijeće Sandžaka 1991-2011”. Sandzak News.com, 24. 12. 2011. http://www.sandzaknews.com/kolumna/73- bosnjacko-nacionalno-vijece-sandzaka-1991-2011.html 8 Interview held in Sandžak in June 2012

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ȱȱ ȱǯȱǯȱȱ¢ȱ The Montenegro-Serbia Split: ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱ Another Border is Drawn ¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ- munity. Just one.9 Bosniaks in Montenegro were less suspicious In 1996, Ugljanin returned from Turkey of and looked toward Podgorica for poli- a compromised politician. Once seen as a vocal tical leadership. Besides breaking with the advocate, he now seemed subdued compared ñ°ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ŗşşŖǰȱ to his former self. He no longer supported au- ȱ /°ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱęȱ the political fold.10 In 2006, a substantial majo- with Bosnia. A number of locals considered rity of Bosniaks supported Podgorica’s move him suspicious, based on his alleged collusion for independence. Pro-independence senti- with Belgrade to split the local vote. Others, ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ċȱ ȱ however, still perceive him as their legitimate Plav, though less so in Bjelo Polje. Berane and ȱǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱ°ǰȱ- Pljevlja rejected Montenegrin independence ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱęȱȱ by a small margin. political void during Ugljanin’s absence. Dis- ȱ ȱ°ȱȱȱȱȱ agreeing with Ugljanin’s politics and course of referendum at the time, though neither of ǰȱ°ȱȱȱSocijaldemokratska them held substantial sway over the Monte- ȱȱǻǼǯȱ°ȱ¢ȱ- negrin Bosniak population. The dream of a ed a conciliatory course with Belgrade due to ęȱ ċ was now over, a reality that his conviction that cooperation would impro- sunk in quickly at the local level. I think the idea ve the standard of living in the ċ region. ȱȱȱċȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ°ǰȱ ȱȱǯȱċȱȱ¢ȱȱ others support his cooperation with Belgrade. ȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȂȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱȱ£ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱęǰȱ¢ȱ¡ȱǳ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ǯȱ ǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǳȱȱ£ȱ ȱċǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȮȱȱ as best as they could. Though their political and ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ spiritual platforms and positions transformed ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱǰȱȱǻǼȱȱ°ȱǻǼǰȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱǯŗŗ Many Bosniaks ȱȱȱǻ Ǽȱȱȱ°ȱ- share his point of view and look to a future in ȱȱęȱȱȱȱċ region. which Serbia becomes a member of the Euro- pean Union.

10 “Serbia’s Sandžak: Still Forgotten”. Europe Report No 162. International Crisis Group, April 8, 2005. 14. 9 Interview held in Sandžak in June 2012. 11 Interview held in Sandžak in June 2012.

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United in Division A recurring argument in support of the former ȱȱȱȱĴȱ ȱ- Both Islamic communities claim to represent de. Why has the government created a situation in all Muslims of Serbia, and disagreements ȱ ȱȱȱȱȬȱ£ǵȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱŘŖŖŝȱ ȱ°ȱ- ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ°ȱȱȱȱ ǵŗś And yet, even those who agree with as mufti. Believers who showed up in support the former mufti’s objections in general disag- ȱȱ°ȱȱ°ǰȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱ ǯȱ in the air and threw rocks and bricks at each One interviewee explained thatȱ °ȱ ȱ other during the subsequent clashes. 12 Since ȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱ this incident, the Bosniak population has be- ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ come internally divided. And yet, local Bos- ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ£ȱ- niaks and/or Muslims abhorred these clashes ǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱĜǯȱ ȱ and considered the growing fusion of religion ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǳȱȱȱȱ and politics an obstacle to a constructive social, ȱȱǯ16 and political progress. Tȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ Religious and political opinion ma- ȱ ȱ ȱ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȮȱȱ°ǰȱ°ǰȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ – still assume that all Bosniaks, too, are practi- ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ cing Muslims, and vice versa. Former mufti to each other in a normal manner. The communi- °ǰȱȱǰȱȱȱĚ¢ȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ Ěȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ£ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱ being Muslims of Roma and Albanian back- ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱ ground in Southern Serbia. Yet it appears that than Bosniaks amongst one another.13 Bosniak appointees internalized and further ȱ ȱ °ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ - perpetuated the concept that Bosniaks appro- nin, as many supporters as opponents. Suppor- ve of all legislation if promoted by and for ters agree with the former Mufti’s arguments Bosniak-Muslims. This explains the overtly regarding a lack of prospects in the region, religious overtones in the political process of higher unemployment among Bosniaks when the ċ area and indicates that local poli- compared to unemployment numbers of Serbs, ticians and religious leaders emphasize the lo- the generally high unemployment in ċ, cal Muslim identity to garner votes. The above the violations of human rights, and Belgrade’s quote, however, illustrates that religious and failure to care for historic Islamic landmarks.14 political leaders cannot assume that Bosni- aks favor all proposals simply because they 12 “Sukob Ispred Džamije Altun-Alem”. B92. No- are couched in religious terms. Bosniaks of vember 16, 2012. http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/ index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=11&dd=16&nav_ ċ, in other words, look for more sophis- category=11&nav_id=272509 ticated, and long-term solutions to the very 13 Interview held in Novi Pazar June 2012. ęȱȱ£ȱǯ 14 “Zukorlić i vlast u Srbiji: Zidanjekrize”. Radio Slobod- na Evropa. February 17, 2013. http://www.slobodnaevro- When you ask average citizens here about pa.org/content/srbija_sandzak_zukorlic/2312758.html See also “Zukorlić: Autonomija Sandžaka nužna”. Ra- html?id=24522257 dio Slobodna Evropa. March 3, 2012. http://www.slo- 15 Interview held in Novi Pazar June 2012. bodnaevropa.org/archive/news/20120320/500/500. 16 Interview held in Novi Pazar June 2012.

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ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱǰȱexplai- ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱ ned one lady in her late sixties, you will conclu- ȱȱǯ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱę- encies, and only secondarily to their demands for minority rights. Her sentiments were echo- Conclusion ed by a middle-aged man who argued for a re-evaluation of the negative narrative that de- The existence of two Islamic Communities in ęȱ ȱ ċ since the Yugoslav Succes- Serbia must be understood from the perspec- ȱ ǯȱ The entire Serbian media announces ȱȱĚȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱ°ȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱěȱȱ- Ƿȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ nities. Questions of legitimacy and trust in ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ- the government are at the core of the divided ǰȱȱĜȬĜȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ Muslim community in Serbia. Both the IZS and ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ñ°ǯȱ IZuS purport to represent the entire Islamic ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ǲȱȱȱȱȱ community in Serbia and thus claim Islamic ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ properties. The political leadership in Belgra- ǯȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ de, in particular, supports the IZS with regard ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ to Serbia’s territorial integrity. The IZuS, by ȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ contrast, is oriented towards Sarajevo. ȱȱ ǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ At the local level, disputes that sur- ǻǼǯȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ round the representation of the Islamic com- ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ munity in Serbia serve as a prism through ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱ which we understand that locals do not sim- ȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱǲȱȱ ply endorse decrees because they are couched ȱ ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱ- in religious terms and/or in anti-Belgrade lems. This is a continuous message that is sent via rhetoric. To the contrary, locals oppose the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱ£ǯ Ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Here we see again that citizens distrust the European Union membership to escape the government in Belgrade. As such, the legiti- straightjacket of national boundaries and par- mate representation is very much tied to the tisan policy makers. governing body in Belgrade – a body that is yet viewed with great distrust among locals. A young man in his late twenties stressed his desire for political and religious About the Author leaders to create some sort of order. I want the ȱ Ȭ°ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ government to come down here to work on University of St. Gallen, and executive direc- the infrastructure. Iȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ tor for the Center for Governance and Culture ȱȱȱěȱǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ- at the University of St. Gallen. ¢ȱ ȱǯȱ ȱȱȱȱ ǳȱȱȱ E-mail: [email protected] ȱ¢ȱęǰȱȱȱǳ¢ȱȱ

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