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International Citizens' Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion To International Citizens’ Tribunals Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights Arthur Jay Klinghoffer and Judith Apter Klinghoffer 15581_fm.i-iv.qrk 1/22/02 11:46 AM Page i International Citizens’ Tribunals This page intentionally left blank 15581_fm.i-iv.qrk 1/22/02 11:46 AM Page iii International Citizens’ Tribunals: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Advance Human Rights Arthur Jay Klinghoffer and Judith Apter Klinghoffer 15581_fm.i-iv.qrk 1/22/02 11:46 AM Page iv INTERNATIONAL CITIZENS’ TRIBUNALS Copyright © Arthur Jay Klinghoffer and Judith Apter Klinghoffer, 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any man- ner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2002 by PALGRAVETM 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVETM is the new global publishing imprint of St. Martin’s Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd. (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd.). ISBN 0-312-29387-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay, 1941- . International citizens’ tribunals: moblizing public opinion to advance human rights / by Arthur Jay Klinghoffer and Judith Apter Klinghoffer. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-312-293879 1. Commissions of inquiry, International—History—20th century. 2. Human rights. 3. Public opinion. I. Klinghoffer, Judith Apter. II. Title. KZ6060 .K59 2002 341.4’81—dc21 2001036551 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Westchester Book Composition First edition: March 2002 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America 15581_fm.v-viii.qrk 1/22/02 11:52 AM Page v To Abraham Zeev Apter and Sidney Klinghoffer This page intentionally left blank 15581_fm.v-viii.qrk 1/22/02 11:52 AM Page vii Contents Acknowledgments ix Abbreviation of Citations xi Chapter I: Citizens’ Power 1 THE REICHSTAG FIRE CASE Chapter II: The Berlin Cauldron 11 Chapter III: Rallying to the Defense 19 Chapter IV: Showdown in Leipzig 31 Chapter V: Aftermath 43 THE MOSCOW SHOW TRIALS CASE Chapter VI: Deep Freeze 51 Chapter VII: A Tribunal Crystallizes 63 Chapter VIII: South of the Border 79 Chapter IX: Deliberations and Recriminations 91 THE VIETNAM WAR CRIMES CASE Chapter X: The Activist Philosopher 103 Chapter XI: Plan of Action 111 15581_fm.v-viii.qrk 1/22/02 11:52 AM Page viii viii Contents Chapter XII: Behind the Scenes at Stockholm 123 Chapter XIII: The Swedish Context 139 Chapter XIV: Second Wind 149 CONTINUUM Chapter XV: Proliferation 163 Chapter XVI: Agenda for Reform 187 Notes 195 Index 243 15581_fm.ix-xii.qrk 1/22/02 11:49 AM Page ix Acknowledgments irst and foremost we would like to thank the Danish-American Ful- bright program and the Norwegian Nobel Institute for enabling us Fto spend a year in Scandinavia to research Trotsky’s exile in Norway and the Russell Tribunal sessions in Sweden and Denmark. Later, a grant from the Rutgers Research Council was instrumental in facilitating research at the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, and at the Morris Library of Southern Illinois Univer- sity and the Center for Dewey Studies, both in Carbondale, Illinois. Spe- cial thanks must certainly go to Anne Kjelling, chief librarian at the Nobel Institute, and to Sissel Wahlin and Anna Larsson, who provided excellent translations from Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian sources. Similarly, Petra Garnett and Benno Inslicht were instrumental in translating Dutch and German materials. At Rutgers University, Dung Nguyen and Keemya Richardson were most helpful in assisting with Internet searches. Several direct participants in the events covered in this study furnished accounts of their experiences via interviews, e-mail messages, and letters. Most noteworthy were the contributions of Dave Dellinger, Carl Oglesby, Ken Coates, Julius Lester, David Horowitz, Richard Falk, and Ebbe Reich. In terms of archival support, we benefited greatly from the efforts of John Wilson (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library), Carl Spadoni and Char- lotte Stewart (Bertrand Russell Archives), David Koch and Shelley Cox (Special Collections, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University), and Larry Hickman, Harriet Simon, Barbara Levine, and Diane Meierkort (Center for Dewey Studies). Nicholas Griffin, chief researcher at the Bertrand Russell Archives, was especially generous with his time and insightful comments as was Princeton University historian Anson Rabin- 15581_fm.ix-xii.qrk 1/22/02 11:49 AM Page x x Acknowledgments bach. At the Paul Robeson Library of Rutgers University, we tip our hats to the entire reference and circulation staffs that processed a huge number of requests for interlibrary loans with grace and alacrity. Also of great assis- tance were many helpful professionals at the Norwegian national library in Oslo; the university library in Aarhus, Denmark; and at our own local library in Cherry Hill. Arthur and Judith Klinghoffer Cherry Hill, New Jersey 15581_fm.ix-xii.qrk 1/22/02 11:49 AM Page xi Abbreviation of Citations AGHP Arthur Garfield Hays Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manu- script Library, Princeton University, USA BRA Bertrand Russell Archives, Mills Memorial Library, McMaster University, Canada CDS Center for Dewey Studies, Carbondale, Illinois, USA FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service H-DC Hook-Dewey Correspondence, Special Collections, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, USA JDP John Dewey Papers, Special Collections, Morris Library, Southern Illinois University, USA LBJL Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, USA Archival sources are noted as box/file, such as 75/8. This page intentionally left blank 15581_01.qrk 1/22/02 12:10 PM Page 1 Chapter I CITIZENS’ POWER “‘We’ll be judge, We’ll be jury,’ said Bertrand with fury: And our verdict has just been released to the press.’”1 his sarcastic ode was sent to President Lyndon Johnson in January 1967 by his aide Joseph Califano. At the time, the British philoso- Tpher Bertrand Russell was busily preparing an international tri- bunal to charge the United States with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Vietnam. Such a venue had no legal standing, but the U.S. government was gravely concerned about its public relations impact. Power ostensibly was being put into the hands of concerned citi- zens, and even the United States could not but recognize a serious threat to its sovereignty and international status. State authority was being chal- lenged on the basis of human rights practices, and justice was being played out across national boundaries. Was such a process an instructive exercise in democratic assertion, a triumph of liberalism’s standards of objectivity, or was it—as implied in the above ditty—a new form of kangaroo court? Could the populist remedy constitute a greater travesty of justice than the state’s malfeasance? Evolution In the wake of World War I, there was a public reaction against Realpoli- tik and statesmen who were its practitioners. Law and ethics grew in impor- tance, with Woodrow Wilson calling for a world community embodied in the League of Nations, which could settle disputes on the basis of interna- tional law. Public opinion was to be fundamental to the new Wilsonian order, since the American president did not envision the League of Nations as a prospective world government, but rather as a universal moral force. 15581_01.qrk 1/22/02 12:10 PM Page 2 2 International Citizens’ Tribunals Walter Lippmann quickly established his credentials as the most influ- ential theorist on the role of public opinion. He was a Harvard-educated journalist and public intellectual who helped the Wilson administration prepare for the Versailles peace conference and disseminated his views widely via newspaper columns, books, and his role as associate editor of a leading liberal magazine, The New Republic. Lippmann realized that the intervention of world opinion was bound to be intermittent, and that those with expertise and “interested spectators” would inevitably take the lead. Still, an aroused international citizenry was an essential check on arbi- trary power. The aim was to impact “the course of affairs,” but, of course, the public could only back involved actors and not generate issues by itself. Lippmann explained: “Public opinion in its highest ideal will defend those who are prepared to act on their reason against the interrupting force of those who merely assert their will.”2 Public pressure, especially in Britain, contributed to the charging of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany with war crimes and Turkish leaders with crimes against humanity for atrocities committed during the expulsion of the Armenians.3 Diplomatic concerns and issues of domestic jurisdiction, however, quickly sidetracked the course of justice, and there were no meaningful prosecutions of the perpetrators. Human rights advocates thus developed international commissions of inquiry during the interwar period as the antidote to an ineffective legal order. These panels of intellectuals scrutinized the legal institutions of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union by organizing hearings on the Reichstag fire of 1933 and the Moscow show trial of 1936. Such commissions were attuned to Lippmann’s belief that those with special knowledge and educa- tion would be at the forefront of public opinion in areas of their particular competence. Uninformed sectors of the public would be of little value in influencing the affairs of state, as there was a need for “an independent, expert organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the decisions.”4 This elitist approach was exactly that adopted by the commissions. Their members were not average citizens, such as those who served on juries, but prominent personalities with legal skills and considerable social and political standing.
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