CHAPTER FIVE
THE CATEGORIES AS PREDICATES
In Categories 2 Aristotle presents a fourfold division of beings, known as the ontological square. There he distinguishes substance and accident, and the universal and the singular. The distinctions that he makes parallel dis tinctions that he makes elsewhere for types of predications: the essential versus the accidental, and, again, the singular versus the universal. Aris totle also uses these distinctions in his various discussions of the ten cate gories. In the next chapter I shall discuss the types of predication. Here I wish to investigate the relation between Aristotle's theory of the categories and his views on predication. After all, 'category' ('KCXUJyopicx') means 'predication', and Aristotle has said that the categories are the different ways in which being per se may be said. 1 He even calls the ten ultimate sorts of being, substance (ri ionv) quantity, relation, ... , "the figures of predication". [Metaph. 1017a23] Above I have claimed that whatever, S, has being per se is such that 'S is' is true, where 'is' means real presence, and can be specified further through certain additional predicates. The categories would then be the types, or figures, of such predicates. In this way, Aristotle's doctrines about being per se in the Metaphysics embody the aspect theory of predication, so I have claimed. Here I shall consider whether what Aristotle says about the various categories agrees with this interpretation. Now Aristotle says too that "being" is divided into the four divisions of the ontological square. So I shall also have to consider the re lationship between these two classifications, the one into four, the other into ten divisions.
1 'Predication' in the sense that "the kinds of predication define classes or kinds of predi cates, namely the classes of those predicates which occur in a statement of a given kind of predication,"[sc., of being per se], as Michael Frede, "Categories in Aristotle," p. 32, says. He also notes that Aristotle is using 'KaT17yopia' in a new way. L. M. De Rijk, "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics: 4. The Categories as Classes of Names," pp. 18- 9; 21, notes that 'KaT17yopia' here means 'predication', but originally 'accuse', or better 'reveal'. THECATEGORIES 133
The Ten Categories
How Aristotle introduces and describes the "categories" has produced a lot of confusion and controversy. This centers around what Aristotle means by 'category' and what he intends the categories to classify. In the Meta physics, when Aristotle speaks of the categories of being, he seems to take the categories to classify real things, i.e., objects and their attributes. Yet 'category' does mean 'predication', and Aristotle says that they divide up "things that are said'? Indeed, Aristotle does not even call the list of ten in Categories 4 "cate gories". Thus we may doubt that that list is a list of categories. Still Aris totle does give the same list at Topics 1.9 (with the exceptiun of 'ri ianv' for 'substance'). So I shall assume that Aristotle is discussing the "cate gories" in Categories 4. 3 I shall follow custom provisionally and call the items on both lists "categories". In his discussion of the categories, Aristotle does appear to switch back and forth, from speaking about words to speaking about real things-at any rate in the fragmentary texts that we have. Categories 2 begins with a dis tinction about "things said" (rei J..gyoflgvcx). Some things are said with combination, like 'man runs', and others are said without combination, like 'man' and 'runs'. Here the "things said" appear to be expressions: the simple ones names and verbs; the complex ones statements. Having made this distinction, Aristotle next presents the ontological square. He makes the fourfold distinction about "beings" where he seems to be concerned with real objects: beings may be in or not in a subject, and may be said ofor not said of a subject. Then, after making some remarks about features of predication in chapter 3, Aristotle speaks again of "things said without combination", and says that these signifY one of the categories, sc., a sub stance or quantity etc. 4 Once more the "things said" appear to be expres-
2 Michael Frede, "Categories in Aristotle," p. 35, claims that 'category' means 'predi cation' in the Topics; 'kinds of predication'; in the Categories, 'kinds of things' or 'ultimate genera'. So too Donald Morrison, "The Taxononical Interpretation of Aristotle's Catego ries," n. 3, distinguishes three senses of 'category': l) types of predication, as in Categories 4 2) kinds of predication as in Topics 1.9 3) kinds of predication of 'be' as in Metaphysics V.7. On the relation between 'KaT71Yop&Lv' and 'J..iyav', see David Miner, Aristotle's Theory of Predication, pp. 73-6 3 Michael Frede, "Categories in Aristotle," pp. 30-2. 4 Aristotle does not use the term 'categories' much in the Categories to describe this list often. Indeed, "Categories" was not even the original title of the book: "The Book before the Topics" probably was. See Michael Frede, "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories," pp. 17-8. However, Aristotle does so elsewhere. E.g., at Metaphysics l 017a23, he describes them as "the figures of predication", and at l028al3 as "those predicated in this way". So I shall use the term 'categories', although I do agree with John Anton, "On the