Introduction to Asian Studies: East Asia and the Middle East

VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Egdūnas Račius • Justina Razumaitė

DIDACTICAL GUIDELINES

Kaunas, 2013 Reviewed by Dr. Aurelijus Zykas

Approved by the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy at Vytautas Magnus University on 12 December 2012 (Protocol No. 7a)

Recommended for printing by the Council of the Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy of Vytautas Magnus University on 7 January 2013 (Protocol No. 54)

Edited and translated by UAB “Lingvobalt”

Publication of the didactical guidelines is supported by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Project title: “Renewal and Internationalization of Bachelor Degree Programmes in History, Ethnology, Philosophy and Political Science” (project No.: VP1-2.2-ŠMM-07-K-02-048)

Introduction ...... 5 1. Introduction To Asian/East Asian Studies ...... 7 1. 1. Asian/East Asian studies and research inEurope and Lithuania ...... 8 2. Political Development Of China ...... 12 2. 1. China–Taiwan Relations 24 2. 2. China–Taiwan Relations in 1995–2000 ...... 27 2. 4. Cross-Strait Relations in 2000–2008 32 2. 5. The Issue of Unification ...... 33 3. Political Development Of Japan ...... 45 4. Sino – Japan Relations ...... 60 4. 1. Historical Issues in Sino – Japan Relations 63 4. 1. 1. Yasukuni Shrine ...... 63 4. 1. 2. Textbooks ...... 65 4. 2. Japan – Taiwan Relations ...... 67 4. 3. Territorial Dispute: Diaoyu or Senkaku? 73 4. 4. The US and East Asian Security 78 5. Political Development of the South and North Koreas . . . . 89 5. 1. Martial law in North Korea ...... 93 5. 2. North Korea’s Nuclear Programme 94 6. Economic Development of East Asia ...... 98 6. 1. China ...... 102 6. 2. China and Taiwan’s economy ...... 103 6. 3. Japan 105 6. 4. South and North Korea’s economy 106 6. 5. Energy and environmental protection in East Asia . . 108 7. Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia 112 7. 1. China ...... 112 7. 2. Tibet ...... 123 7. 3. Japan. The Ainu ...... 129 7. 4. North Koreans in China 132

3 8. Where is the Middle East? ...... 134

9. Statehood and Nations in theMiddle East ...... 137

10. Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East . . 139 10. 1. Dimensions of Islam 139 10. 2. Mechanisms and tools of the re-Islamisation carried out by revivalists: da‘wa and jihad ...... 145 10. 2. 1. Governmental re-Islamisation policy: Example of Saudi Arabia ...... 148 10. 2. 2. Re-Islamisation efforts of non-governmental actors 153

11. Socio-Political Reforms and the Democratisation Process in the Middle East 157 11. 1. 1990–2000: The lost decade (the decade of imitation of reforms) 157 11. 2. 2000–2010: The decade of forcing (reforms imposed from outside) ...... 159 11. 3. From 2010: The decade of fulfilment of hopes (internally initiated reforms)? ...... 161 11. 3. 1. Egypt ...... 163 11. 3. 2. Libya 165 11. 3. 3. Syria ...... 167

12. Interests And Role Of External Actors – The Case Of The Us 169 12. 1. U.S. interests in the region (the concept of the Greater Middle East) 169 12. 2. Lithuania’s contribution to the implementation of the US interests in the Middle East ...... 173

Abbreviations 177

References to Literature Sources and Websites ...... 178

4 Introduction

The objective of these didactical guidelines is to expand the diversity of political science and regional studies at Vytautas Magnus Univer- sity and other higher education institutions of Lithuania. Although political science studies in Lithuania have been expanded for a couple of decades already, it is the first time to prepare separate didactical guidelines for analysing the politics of the regions of East Asia and the Middle East. The course of ‘Introduction to Asian Studies: East Asia and the Middle East’ has been taught at the Faculty of Political Sci- ence and Diplomacy of Vytautas Magnus University since spring 2010. These didactical guidelines are intended for students seeking bachelor’s degree and anyone else interested in the political, social, and economic development of the countries of East Asia and the Middle East. These didactical guidelines are divided into two main parts, where the most important information and tasks for active learning are provided. Since the countries of East Asia are quite different, the countries of this region – China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea – are discussed separately in Chapters 1–7, with a focus on the history, domestic and foreign policy, and analysis of economic and social processes of each of them. Although the countries of the Middle East are also quite different if assessed according to separate criteria, in introductory-level texts they are usually presented together because of their substantial commonalities and similarities. It is also the case for this methodical material. For this reason, by its volume, the part devoted to the Middle East (Chapters 8–12 deal with the processes of political, social, and religious development) is proportionally shorter. As to the transcription of Chinese words in Latin letters, in these didactical guidelines they are transcribed according to the following two systems: the pinyin system – in texts and tasks related to China, and the Wade-Giles system (it was used in Taiwan until 2008; thereafter, Taiwan switched to the pinyin system; however, in most cases, transcription is made according to the old system following the previous tradition) in texts and tasks related to Taiwan. Japanese words are transcribed according to the romaji system.

5 Introduction to Asian Studies

The romanisation of Arabic words also poses challenges, particularly because the Latin alphabet (as well as the Cyrillic alphabet) has no matches to some Arabic letters and sounds. For this reason, in different linguistic environments, Arabic words are transcribed quite differently, often with a view to approximating them with the sound linguistic environment. Thus, for example, words transcribed into French, German, English, and Russian may radically differ, both orthographically and phonologically, both from each other and from the original. When adopted by the Lithuanian language, such words often undergo secondary modification, following which they become unrecognisable in their phonetic form compared with the Arabic original. In this methodical material, words of Arabic origin are transcribed directly from the original; therefore, although they may differ from their conventional usage in the Lithuanian language, they are phonetically closer to the original. The main materials of the subject and its tasks are prepared in such a manner that it would be convenient to students to study independently. The authors hope that this methodical publication will help to better master basic knowledge on East Asia and the Middle East and will facilitate the learning process. 1. Introduction To Asian/ East Asian Studies

Asia (Fig. 1. 1.) is a continent that is highly diverse in natural, cultural, religious, economic, and social terms. Its area is 44.6 million sq. km; population is 3.88 billion, which accounts to approximately 60 % of the world’s population (2012); various languages and writing systems are used: Chinese, Hindi, Arabic, Korean, Japanese, Mongo- lian, Vietnamese, etc. The most common religions: Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, and Christianity. In Asia, there are 48 sovereign states (member states of the United Nations) as well as 6 non-UN member states recognised by at least one member state of the United Nations. Specific characteristics: a rich cultural and religious diversity; large gaps between the rich (Japan, Singapore) and poor (Nepal, Cambodia).

Fig. 1. 1. Asia

Found: http://www.freeworldmaps.net/asia/political.html; reviewed on 16 August 2012.

7 Introduction to Asian Studies

The countries and territories attributable to the region ofEast Asia (Fig. 1. 2.) are China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Mongo- lia (UN member states) as well as Taiwan. The area of the region is 12 million sq. km and its population is more than 1.5 billion (2012).

Fig. 1. 2. East Asia

Found: http://www.freeworldmaps.net/asia/eastasia/pdf.html; reviewed on 16 Au- gust 2012.

1. 1. Asian/East Asian studies and research in Europe and Lithuania Issues of the region of East Asia are researched from different per- spectives. Worldwide popular studies include East Asian Studies, Chinese Studies, Japanese Studies, Korean Studies, Mongolian Stud- ies, Okinawan Studies, Taiwan Studies, Tibetan Studies, etc.

Asian studies and research centres in Europe:

The University of Oxford, the Faculty of Oriental Studies (website: http://www.orinst.ox.ac.uk/) The University of Cambridge, the Faculty of Asian and Middle East- ern Studies (website: http://www.ames.cam.ac.uk/) The University of London, the School of Oriental and African Stud- ies (website: http://www.soas.ac.uk/)

8 Introduction To Asian/East Asian Studies

Leiden University Institute for Area Studies (http://www.hum.leiden. edu/lias/) Lund University, the Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies (http://www.ace.lu.se/)

In Lithuania, Asian studies and research are conducted by the following institutions:

Vilnius University, the Centre of Oriental Studies, established in 1993 (website: http://www.oc.vu.lt/) Vytautas Magnus University (VDU), Centre for Asian Studies. VDU Asian Studies Centre was established in 2000, and VDU Profes- sor Algimantas Prazauskas was appointed its head. The same year, the Japanese Studies Centre was set up, and Arvydas Ališauskas acted as its first head. In 2009, both Centres were merged into the united Centre for Asian Studies. (website: http://asc.vdu.lt) Klaipėda University, the Centre for Oriental Studies, established in 1996 (website: http://www.ku.lt/hmf/struktura/centrai/orientalis- tikos-centras)

Questions: 1. Try to define the term ‘region’. 2. What is the origin of the word ‘Asia’? 3. What is similar and what is different between the countries of East Asia? 4. Which Asian/East Asian studies and research institutions in Europe and Lithuania do you know? 5. Choose one Asian/East Asian centre and describe its activities and research. 6. Which international organisations acting in Asia do you know? 7. Decode the following abbreviations:

DPRK ASEAN ECFA PRC APEC SAARC ROC ADB ROK SCO 9 Introduction to Asian Studies

8. In which countries are the following objects located? Enter the name of the object. What is its importance?

Photographs by J. Razumaitė

10 Introduction To Asian/East Asian Studies

Recommended reading and websites: 1. Beeson, Mark, Regionalism & Globalization in East Asia: Poli- tics, Security and Economic Development. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 2. Holcombe, Charles, A History of East Asia: from the Origins of Civilization to the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2011. 3. The Association for Asian Studies: http://www.asian-studies. org/about/index.htm 4. East West Center: http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ 5. Chathamhouse: http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/asia 6. International Institute for Asian Studies: http://www.iias.nl/ 7. East Asia Forum: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/

Do you know that… • At the beginning of the 21st century, the top five of the biggest world economies included two East Asian states: China and Japan. • China tops the list of most-populated countries and is the third- or fourth-largest country by total area, depending on the definition of total area (following Russia and Can- ada and surpassing or following the USA). • The area of China is twice as big as that of the European Union (China: 9.6 million sq. km; EU: 4.3 million sq. km) 2. Political Development Of China

Analysis and studies of China are important for the following reasons: China is the country populated by one fifth of the world’s population, and this part may not be ignored; China is one of the fastest-developing countries in the Asia-Pa- cific region; China is the biggest Communist state in the world.

Questions asked by researchers: Is China a friendly or hostile state? Will China become a democratic country, or on the contrary, post-autoritarian system will prevail? Is China a country that provides many economic opportunities or a country that poses economic threat? For how long will China’s economic growth continue?

Task No. 1:

Analyse Maps 2.1 and 2.2 and list the countries at which China borders.

How many provinces, autonomous regions, special administrative regions, and municipalities are there in China?

12 Political Development Of China

Fig. 2. 1. Map of China

Found: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/map template_ch.html; reviewed on 16 August 2012.

Fig. 2. 2. Administrative division of China

Found: http://www.freeworldmaps.net/asia/china/political.html; reviewed on 16 August 2012.

13 Introduction to Asian Studies

Task No. 2:

Fill in the table about the People’s Republic of China

Geographic position

Capital city

Borders at the following countries Population

Ethnic groups

Languages

Religions

Administrative division

Monetary unit

Public holidays

Membership in international organisations

14 Political Development Of China

Task No. 3:

Briefly describe the most important periods of China’s history (What are the most important features of that period? What are the most important political events? Who are the most important historical figures?)

What is the importance Most important Period Personalities of that period for China’s events political development? The Republic of China 1912–1949

1949–… The Republic of China in Taiwan 1949–… The People’s Republic of China

Task No. 4:

Who are these personalities and what is their importance in Chi- na’s political life? Fill in the table by entering their surnames and names, key biographical facts and achievements.

(1866–1925) (1859–1916) (1887–1975) (1893–1976)

15 Introduction to Asian Studies

Task No. 5:

Describe the Three Principles of the People, the doctrine developed by Sun Yat-sen. What is their importance for the emergence of the modern China?

民族主義, Mínzú zhŭyì – nationalism

民權主義, Mínquán zhŭyì – democracy

民生主義, Mínshēng zhŭyì – the People’s welfare

Task No. 6:

Answer the following questions:

1. When and where was the Communist Party of China established?

2. What is the significance of the Long March, which took place in October 1934–October 1935, for the development of the Commu- nist Party of China?

16 Political Development Of China

Fig. 2. 3. Map of the Long March

3. Between which groups was the Chinese Civil War (1927–1950) fought? What was the outcome of the war?

4. When was the Chinese Nationalist Party, Kuomintang (Guomin- dang), formed?

5. When was the People’s Republic of China established?

6. When were Congresses of the Communist Party of China held? What is the significance of those Congresses?

7. When was the Constitution of the Communist Party of China promulgated? What is its structure?

8. When was the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China promulgated? What is its structure? When revisions were made?

17 Introduction to Asian Studies

Task No. 7:

Fill in the table. China political leaders since 1949

Leaders of the Ministers State Prime Communist of Foreign leaders Ministers Party of China Affairs Functions

Who and when held the post?

Task No. 8:

Analyse Fig. 2. 4. and answer the following questions:

1. Who has the supreme power in China?

2. How many members does the Central Committee of the Party have?

3. How performs the functions of the executive power in the Party and the Government?

4. Which functions does the Politburo perform? How many members does it include?

18 Fig. 2. 4. Political institutions of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party Introduction to Asian Studies

5. Describe the functions of the National People’s Congress. How many members does it have?

6. How often does the National People’s Congress gather?

Task No. 9:

Answer the following questions: What is this building? What is its significance?

Photograph by J. Razumaitė

Task No. 10:

Read the speech of Hu Jintao, the President of the People’s Repub- lic of China, delivered during his visit on 19 January 2011 in the White House, and mark out the major guidelines of the foreign policy. Which aspects of the relationships with the US are of the highest importance to China? Mr. President, Mrs. Obama, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, it gives me great pleasure to come to Washington and pay a state visit to the United States at the beginning of the new year, at the invitation of Presi- dent Obama. At this point in time, let me extend, on behalf of the 1.3 billion Chinese people, sincere greetings and best wishes to the people of the United States.

20 Political Development Of China

I have come to the United States to increase mutual trust, enhance friendship, deepen cooperation, and push forward the positive, cooperative, and comprehensive China-U.S. relationship for the 21st century.

Over the past 32 years, since the establishment of diplomatic ties, the China-U.S. relationship has grown into one with strategic significance and global influence. Since President Obama took office, with concerted efforts of the two sides, our cooperation in various fields has produced fruitful results and our relations have achieved new progress. This has brought real benefits to our two peoples, and contributed greatly to world peace and development.

As we enter the second decade of the 21st century, the people of both China and the United States want to see further progress in our relations and people around the globe want to see greater prosperity in the world. Under the new circumstances, and in the face of new challenges, China and the United States share broad common interests and important common responsibilities.

We should adopt a long-term perspective, seek common ground while resolving differences, and work together to achieve sustained, sound, and steady development of our relations. I hope that through this visit, our two countries will advance the positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship, and open a new chapter in our cooperation as partners.

Our cooperation as partners should be based on mutual respect. We live in an increasingly diverse and colorful world. China and the United States should respect each other’s choice of development path and each other’s core interests. We should deepen mutual understanding through communication, increase mutual trust through dialogue, and expand common ground through exchanges.

Our cooperation as partners should be based on mutual benefit. China’s future and destiny are increasingly tied to those of the world and China- U.S. relations have become closer. Our two countries should seek to learn from each other through exchanges and achieve win-win progress through cooperation. This is the right approach for us to develop our relations

Our cooperation as partners should be based on joint efforts to meet challenges. China and the United States should step up communication and co-

21 Introduction to Asian Studies

ordination in international affairs, work together to counter the global challenges, and make a greater contribution to world peace and development.

Our cooperation as partners should be based on the extensive involvement of the people. The Chinese and American people cherish deep friendship towards each other, and they fought side by side at defining moments in history when the future and the destiny of mankind were at stake. The two peoples should extend exchanges and enhance friendship. This will offer a inexhaustible driving force for the growth of our relations.

Ladies and gentlemen, our world today is undergoing major development, major changes and major adjustments. To pursue peace, development and cooperation is the irresistible trend of our time. Let us seize the opportunity to forge ahead, hand in hand, and work together to enhance cooperation as partners, and let us work with all other countries to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.

Thank you once again, Mr. President, for your warm welcome.

Found: http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/full-text-hu-jintao-s-speech- at-the-white-house-80416; reviewed on 16 August 2012.

Questions for discussion: 1. Will China become the strongest power in the world? Why? 2. Can China become a democracy? Why? 3. What is China’s role in ensuring the security of the East Asia region?

Recommended reading and websites: 1. Dillon, Michael, Contemporary China. London & New York: Routledge, 2009. 2. Dryer, June Teufel, China`s Political System: Modernization and Tradition, 7th Edition. Longman, 2009. 3. Kang, David, Rising China. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 4. Shambaugh, David, and Michael, Yahuda, International Rela- tions of Asia. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008. 5. Kissinger, Henry, On China. The Penguin Press, 2011.

22 Political Development Of China

6. Xinhua (the largest news agency in China) http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/. 7. People’s Daily (the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China) http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/. 8. China Daily (leading English-language Chinese newspaper) http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/.

Do you know that… The Chinese were the first to invent paper, to learn manufacturing mirrors, to invent the compass and celestial globe, to chart maps, to invent porcelain, matches, book printing technology, and gunpowder, and to start using silk.

Task No. 11:

Fill in the table about the Republic of China / Taiwan

Geographic position

Capital city

Borders at the following countries Population

Ethnic groups

Languages

Religions

Administrative division

Monetary unit

23 Introduction to Asian Studies

Public holidays

Membership in international organisations

Fig. 2. 5. The Republic of China / Taiwan

Found: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/map template_tw.html; reviewed on 20 August 2012.

2. 1. China–Taiwan Relations Taiwan or the Republic of China (ROC) has the strategic and geopolitical value for China (PRC), Japan, and the US. However, the little island carries ‘different meanings to different actors involved in different times.’1 In the post-Cold War era, especially after Hong Kong and Macao, in 1997 and 1999 respectively, were re-ceded to PRC ‘Taiwan becomes the last piece in the puzzle.’2 Therefore, Taiwan in China`s understanding is an issue of national principles and pride, and, thus, needs to be re-ceded to the Mainland. However, it is not easy for both sides

1. Daojiong Zha, ‘The Taiwan Problem in Japan-China Relations: An Irritant or Destroyer?,’ East Asia, Volume 19, Number 1–2 (March 2001): 207. 2. Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: the New Roles of the Mi- litary (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 267. 24 Political Development Of China across the strait to start the constructive dialogue. First of all, both sides cannot find compromising meanings to define their relations after Cold-war. In Mainland’s proposal for the unification, the formula of Deng Xiaoping of ‘one country, two systems’ dominates. The position of Taiwan about its status in the future is not very clear, because it, also, depends on those who are in power and their views and interests. For example, President Lee Teng-hui ‘had declared the ROC and the PRC were two separate but equal entities that must, at some time, unify. However, before any unification, China must democratize.’3 Important to notice, that at the institutional level both the PRC and Taiwan have laid under obligations. Chinese adopted the Anti- Secession Law in 2005, where China declares its wish for peaceful unification with Taiwan. As for Taiwan, the Guidelines of National Unification adopted in 1991 defines its position towards the unification issue: 1. Both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory. Helping to bring about national unification should be the common responsibility of all Chinese people. 2. The unification of China should be for the welfare of all its people and not be subject to partisan conflict. 3. China`s unification should aim at promoting Chinese culture, safeguarding human dignity, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, and practicing democracy and the rule of law. 4. The timing and manner of China’s unification should first respect the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area, and protect their security and welfare. It should be achieved in gradual phases under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity.4 Moreover, the voice of regional players such as Japan and the US is also very influential in cross-strait issue, therefore, Taiwan can not

3. Bruce J. Jacobs and I-hao Ben Liu, ‘Lee Teng-hui and the Idea of ‘Taiwan’,’ The China Quarterly, 190 (June 2007): 382. 4. ‘Guidelines for National Unification,’ adopted by the National Unification Council at its third meeting on February 23, 1991, and by the Executive Yuan Council at its 2223rd meeting on March 14, 1991, http://law.wustl.edu/Chinal- aw/twguide.html (accessed August 10, 2012). 25 Introduction to Asian Studies be very flexible in making its own decisions. For example, during Lee Teng-hui`s era, Taiwan demonstrated active efforts pushing towards independence, whereas, his successor Chen Shui-bian was already not that flexible on his considerations about Taiwan’s independence or other issues leading towards Taiwan’s internationalization. Retrospectively, the Nationalist Government took control over Taiwan after the Second World War. Mao Zedong took power in Mainland in 1949, and Chiang Kai-shek (or Jiang Jieshi) with 2 million of his supporters fled to Taiwan.5 Thus, they established the Republic of China on Taiwan and enabled the Constitution of 1946 drafted by the Nationalist Government. At the same year, the US decided that Taiwan is a strategic place and put the island under their security umbrella to provide the protection from the Communists.6 In half a century, Taiwan developed its market economy and became one of four Asian economic tigers. However, the political system was highly controlled by the National- ists. Only in 2000, for the first time in island’s history, the Demo- cratic Progressive Party (DPP) won democratic elections against the Guomindang. Thus, Taiwan’s democratization and political transformation presented new concerns for the PRC.7 In addition, in the Legislative Yuan (or Parliament) elections in 2008, the political balance was favorable for the Guomindang again. This party won 81 seat leaving only 27 seats for DPP.8 The situation was opposite from that in 1995 and 1996, when the PRC tried to intimidate Taiwan during its legislature and first ever democratic Presidential elections. Then China deployed about 150,000 troops in Fujian Province which is the nearest to Taiwan and conducted three military exercises including ‘missile tests close to Keelung and Gaoxiong, Taiwan’s two most important seaports; a live-ammunition military exercise, and

5. See J. A. G. Roberts, A History of China (New York: Macmillan Press LTD, 1999), 249–255. 6. P. Calvocoressi, Pasaulio politika 1945–2000 (ALK, Briedis, 2001), 116. (In En- glish: P. Calvocoressi, World Politics in 1945–2000). 7. See Parris H. Chang, ‘Northeast Asian Security and Taiwan,’ in Asian Security and China: 2000–2010, eds. Santhanam, K and Kondapalli Srikanth (New Del- hi: Shipra, 2004), 217. 8. ‘Election Profile: Taiwan,’ http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1157 (accessed August 22, 2012). 26 Political Development Of China a large-scale amphibious landing exercise.’9 Moreover, the US responded immediately and sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area close to Taiwan. The evolution of bilateral relations and unification process as well as move towards full independence on behalf of Taiwan and a reunification of China on behalf of the PRC depend on power shift in China and Taiwan.10

2. 2. China–Taiwan Relations in 1995–2000 During the Cold war, relations between China and Taiwan were frosty and of minimal contact. As Yuan I writes, ‘The Taiwan- mainland China reconciliation begun by the late President Chiang Ching-kuo and developed by his successor Lee Teng-hui has been one of the most important strategic breakthroughs in the Taiwan Strait since the 1949 civil war.’11 In post-Cold war period, the major institutions for political dialogue were established on both sides. In Taiwan those were the National Unification Council (NUC)12 established on 7 October, 1990, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) established in late January, 199113, and Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) in March, 1991.14 On Mainland`s side, the Association for Re- lations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) was established in De- cember, 1991.15 In 1992, ARATS and SEF actively discussed about the future dialogue of bilateral relations. It was agreed that ‘the one-China principle was unavoidable issue in the talks on func-

9. Qimao Chen, ‘The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions,’ Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 11. (November 1996): 1055. 10. See P. H. Kreisberg, ‘Asian Responses to Chinese Pressures on Taiwan,’ in If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait. The International Response, eds. P. H. Chang and M. L. Lasater (University Press of America, 1993), 80. 11. I Yuan, ‘Cooperation and Conflict: The Offense-Defense Balance in Cross- Strait Relations,’ Issues & Studies, 33:2 (February 1997): 1–20. 12. See Harish Kapur, Taiwan in a Changing World: Search for Security (Blooming- ton, Indiana: Author House, 2004), 184–185. 13. ‘Mainland Affairs Council. An Introduction,’ http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/ english/orafunc/ora01.pdf (accessed August 22, 2012). 14. ‘Introduction to the Straits Exchange Foundation. History,’ http://www.sef.org. tw/english/index.html (accessed August 22, 2012). 15. Ibid. 27 Introduction to Asian Studies tional affairs between the two sides.’16 Both sides reached the consensus, which consisted of four key ideas: ‘The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are agreed that there is only one China; Each side claims itself to be part of one China; Each ac- knowledges the existence of the other; Each is entitled to define one China differently from the other and state the definition orally.’17 Historical breakthrough in bilateral relations was reached during Wang-Koo meeting on April 27, 1993 in Singapore.18 However, as L. Sheng notices, China’s emphasis on historical momentum of renewed bilateral talks was overestimated. After Lee declared that Guo- mindang was regime which came to Taiwan from the outside (wailai zhengquan 外來政權 )19, China realized that it can not trust Lee on the reunification issue. Moreover, bilateral relations worsened after March 1994 Qiandao Lake (千島湖 ) Incident, when 24 Taiwanese tourists were killed in PRC. Beijing could not stay calm observing Lee’s international steps, such as ‘go south’ policy in December 1993 or ‘vacation’ diplomacy to the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand in February 1994. Under the title of ‘‘vacation’, ‘visit’, or ‘holiday’ diplomacy, Lee journeyed to numerous countries including the Philippines, Singa- pore, Indonesia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan.’20 Futhermore, not only Taiwanese first popular elections irritated China, but also the fact that Clinton’s administration issued visa for Lee Teng-hui to make a ‘private’ visit to the US where he made a speech in his former alma mater, Cornell University, on June 9, 1995, and, thus, shocked Beijing.21 As a response to Lee’s visit, China 16. Shiquan Xu, ‘The 1992 Consensus: A Review and Assessment of Consultations between the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation’ in Breaking the China–Taiwan Impasse, eds. Donald S. Za- goria and Chris Fugarino (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2003), 91. 17. Ramon H. Myers and Jialin Zhang, The Struggle across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China Problem (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2006), 27. 18. John F. Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China), Second Edition (Lanham, Maryland, and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2000), xxxii. 19. Jacobs and Liu, ‘Lee Teng-hui and the Idea of ‘Taiwan’,’ 383. 20. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 90. 21. Myers and Zhang, The Struggle across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China Problem, 34.

28 Political Development Of China launched the so-called ‘wengongwuhe’ (political criticism and military threat) policy against Taiwan. The PRC leaders described this trip as Lee Teng-hui`s attempt to present Taiwan as an independent state. Important to notice, that in January, 1995, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin issued ‘The 8 Points Preposition for China’s Reunification’ on January 30, 1995. He stated, that ‘Adherence to the principle of one China is the basis and premise for peaceful reunification. China’s sovereignty and territory must never be allowed to suffer split.’22 He confirmed about PRC`s firm position towards the unification issue.

2. 3. Military Intimidation While Taiwan was carrying on its democratic reforms, the PRC tried to intimidate Taiwanese by demonstrating and testing its military might. Chinese military leaders forced Jiang Zemin to start military actions and in 1995-1996 the strait crisis accelerated. On July 19, 1995, Beijing announced about conducting ‘a series of naval-and-air joint maneuvers and missile tests in the East Sea, the North of Taiwan. Starting from July 21, China blockaded the north of Taiwan and test- fired two missiles.’23 Taiwan was directly intimidated and warned for the first time after the Cold War. China halted all merchant shipping in one of the busiest sea lines for a week.24 On November 15, PLA (People`s Liberation Army) began ‘the largest and most complex amphibious maneuvers ever undertaken in the Taiwan Strait.’25 There were two hundred landing craft, one hundred vessels, and from sixteen to eighteen thousands military personnel mobilized for the military exercises.26

22. ‘The 8-Point Proposition Made by President Jiang Zemin on China’s Reunifi- cation’ (January 30, 1995), http://ch.china-embassy.org/eng/ztnr/twwt/t138791. htm (accessed August 15, 2012). 23. I-Hsin Chen, ‘The Decision-Making Process of the Clinton Administration in the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996,’ 30. 24. H.C.L. Liu, ‘China and the US. Part 2: The challenge of unilateralism,’ Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HG01Ad01.html (accessed Au- gust 15, 2012). 25. Bernice Lee, The Security Implications of the New Taiwan, Adelphi Paper 331 (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1999), 47. 26. Bernice Lee, The Security Implications of the New Taiwan, 47. 29 Introduction to Asian Studies

The events in Taiwan Strait were not left without international attention. First of all, it was a significant test for the US to prove how strong is the obligation to preserve peace and stability in East Asia. On 19 December, 1995, the US aircraft carrier Nimitz, on its road from Japan to Persian Gulf, ‘sailed through the Taiwan Strait, the first US carrier to do so for 17 years.’27 However, the US administration was quite passive at that time, and the appearance of Nimitz was mere symbolical.28 Japan was also concerned about the situation in the region. The Taiwan Strait crisis was ‘a wakeup call for Japan.’29 Japan did not expect that China will act in such an aggressive way to intimidate Taiwan not to seek for independence. Japanese thought, that ‘China had changed with economic reform and opening.’30 Furthermore, in February, 1996, PLA started preparations for the subsequent military maneuvers. The exercises were carried eighty kilometers closer than the exercises in 1995. Military simulations were planned by Central Military Commission (CMC) and continued for few days. The PRC tested M-9 missiles on 7 March, 1996. React- ing to China`s behavior, the US deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups, ‘the Independence battle group from Okinawa to the waters east of Taiwan and the Nimitz carrier group from the Persian Gulf to the Philippine Sea.’31 On March 12 and 13, China started the second round of military exercises. On March 15, it announced ‘that from March 18 to March 25 the PLA would implement joint air, ground, and naval exercises near Pingtan island, with ten nautical miles from Taiwan-controlled islands.’32

27. Ibid., 47. 28. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ‘Strategic Ambiguity Or Strategic Clarity?,’ in Dange- rous Strait: The US – Taiwan – China Crisis, ed. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 196. 29. Ming Wan, ‘Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Taiwan,’ in Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia, eds. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo and Joseph P. Fer- guson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 167. 30. Ibid., 167. 31. R. S. Ross, The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force. First published in International Security 25:2 (Fall 2000): 87–123. 32. Ibid. 30 Political Development Of China

On May 20, 1996, President Lee was inaugurated as the first president in Chinese history elected in popular elections. In his inaugural speech ‘he praised Taiwan’s democracy and its people and emphasized that the country was entering a new era and therefore must deepen democracy. … [He, also,] scolded Beijing’s leaders for conducting war games, but promised the dialogue with them and rejected the course of ‘Taiwan independence.’’33 President Lee alerted Taiwan to prepare for possible invasion from the Mainland, and ‘gave a series of extremely persuasive and galvanizing speeches that generated solidarity.’34 Furthermore, in August 1996, Lee introduced the new approach towards China – ‘no haste, be patient (jieji yongren).’35 China learned that it is capable to paralyze Taiwan’s military capabilities in short term. The US also expressed their position towards Taiwan, Bill Clinton’s administration pledged to ‘three no’s’ – no support of Taiwan independence, no support for two Chinas (or ‘one China, one Taiwan’), and no support for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that require statehood.’36 In 1998, ARATS chairman Wang Daohan informed Taiwanese that China is ready to resume talks on unification issue under the principle of ‘one China.’ The chairmen of SEF and ARATS met in Shanghai. Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan agreed to meet in Tai- wan the next year and continue negotiations ‘despite of high levels of distrust.’37 The short-lived détente was suspended by Lee Teng-hui’s ‘state- to-state’ concept. In July, 1999, President Lee ‘declared that cross- Strait relations were ‘special state-to-state’ relations.’38 On July 9, Lee

33. Myers and Zhang, The Struggle across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China Problem, 36. 34. Albert Chang, ‘Managing Peace across the Strait: The Impact of United Sta- tes and Chinese Actions on Contemporary Taiwanese Nationalism, 1995-2005,’ SAIS Review, vol. XXVII no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2007): 110. 35. Myers and Zhang, The Struggle across the Taiwan Strait: The Divided China Problem, 37. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., 40. 38. Richard Bush, ‘The US Policy of Dual Deterrence,’ in If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics, and Economics, ed. Steve Tsang (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 41. 31 Introduction to Asian Studies was interviewed by Deutsche Welle Radio and told that the future China – Taiwan relations would be conducted on special state-to- state basis.39 After that, China postponed Wang Daohan’s visit to Taiwan. Later Lee told to the American political scientist J. T. Dryer, that ‘he made such a demand to forestall Wang Daohan’s trip, where Wang, was going to proclaim that Taiwan accepted PRC’s One-Chi- na principle.’40

2. 4. Cross-Strait Relations in 2000–2008 Even though Beijing claims that any elections in Taiwan are only of local importance, China in fact is very interested in those who will rule the island and supports favorite candidates since 1996.41 After Lee expressed his ‘two states’ theory’, Beijing issued the White Paper named The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue in February 2000. The PRC reiterated that ‘One-China Principle is the foundation stone for the Chinese government’s policy on Taiwan’ and ‘Only by adhering to the One-China Principle can peaceful reunification be achieved.’42 China did not demonstrate a sign of flexibility regarding ‘One-China Principle’ and was not willing to make concessions regarding the unification issue. Before presidential elections in Taiwan in 2000, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji warned Taiwanese no to vote for Chen Shui- bian (DPP candidate). He was very straightforward noticing ‘that [China] cannot accept Taiwan`s independence.’43 Important to notice, that despite of verbal intimidation of Zhu Rongji, China did not conduct military exercises. China merely wanted ‘to avoid risk and

39. Shin-shan Henry Tsai, Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 211. 40. Ibid., 211. 41. Gang Lin, ‘Beijing’s Taiwan Policy after the 2004 Taiwanese Election,’ in Ret- hinking New International Order in East Asia: U. S., China and Taiwan, English Series No. 52, ed. Yuan I (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 2005), 315. 42. ‘The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue (2000),’ Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content_17613. htm (accessed August 25, 2012). 43. Dana R. Dillon, The China Challenge (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Pu- blishers, Inc., 2007), 148. 32 Political Development Of China cost of any military option of re-unifying Taiwan unless otherwise needed.’44 Consequently, on 18 March 2000, Chen Shui-bian, ‘rep- resenting the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, was elected president, ending the Nationalist Party’s more than fifty-year governance of Taiwan.’45 The other day, China’s Politburo meeting was held, and Jiang Zemin announced a ‘sixteen-character policy’ towards Taiwan – renzhen guancha (observe closely), naixin dengdai (wait with patience), buji buzao (guard against impetuously) and baochi gaoya (maintain high pressure).46 Later on, in March, he developed ‘thirty-two character policy’ – ‘tongyi sixiang [unify thinking], jianchi yuanze [uphold principle], lengjing guancha [observe calmly], fandu cutong [oppose independence and promote reunification], yizhan cuhe [adopt force to promote peace], buji buzao [guard against impetuously], baochi yali [maintain pressure], and liangbian tanpan [bilateral talks].’47

2. 5. The Issue of Unification President Chen was unknown to Chinese politicians; therefore, they used ‘wait-and-see’ strategy towards him. The Central Com- mittee of CCP reached the consensus, that ‘as long as Chen did not declare independence, and it was unlikely in the near future, there would be no need to take military action.’48 China believes that time is on its side and prefers status quo situation. For Tai- wan status quo means, that the island ‘is an independent society that has its own armed forces, its own currency and own political system, but lacks the de jure independence of a sovereign

44. Ding, ‘Challenges for Taiwan Security’, 148. 45. John F. Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China), Third Edi- tion (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2007), 37. 46. Xitang Pan, ‘Xuanhe Lian`an and Guangxi De Weiji Yu Zhuanji’ (Crises and Opportunities in Cross-Strait Relations after the Presidential Election),Lianhe Zaobao, 17 April 2000, p. 21., in Lijun Sheng, China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), 49. 47. ‘Zhongguo Guofang Bao’ (China Defense Daily), Beijing, 24 March 2000, p. 2., in Lijun Sheng, China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui- bian, 49. 48. Lijun Sheng, China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian, 71. 33 Introduction to Asian Studies nation.’49 In the PRC`s perception status quo refers to long term unification goal and the situation is tolerated ‘as long as Taiwan does not make any move toward formal independence and other nations do not indicate a willingness to acknowledge Taiwan’s independence.’50 Furthermore, the most important issues creating tensions in cross-strait were Chen`s policies regarding his concept of ‘one country on each side’, as well as his intentions to amend island’s Constitu- tion, initiate referendums on sensitive political issues, trial to abolish National Unification Guidelines. In addition, China put its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. Chen Shui-bian pledged to develop peace and prosperity in the region. He announced ‘5 No’s’ policy referring to ‘not declaring Tai- wan’s independence, not changing the national title, not pushing for the inclusion of ‘state-to-state’ in the Constitution, not promoting a referendum to change the status quo on independence or unification, and not abolishing the National Unification Council or the National Unification Guidelines.’51 He, also, was willing to continue negotiations and cooperation with China; therefore, he put forward three conditions to start cross-Strait dialogue. First condition was ‘to nego- tiate on the basis of equality between Beijing and Taipei’, the second, ‘to resolve disputes by peaceful means’, and the third ‘to establish no preset conditions on the future of cross-Strait relations.’52 His inaugural speech reflected that President Chen is not willing to accept the 1992 consensus and ‘One-China’ principle. Moreover, he ‘failed to ac- cede to the Chinese request to state that he is Chinese [zhonguo ren]. He used the word huaren instead.’53 The word huaren‘ - 華人’ means ‘ethnic Chinese’54, not necessarily living in Mainland China. 49. Linda Jakobson, ‘A ‘Greater Chinese Union’: Striving toward a solution of Taiwan`s unresolved future status,’ Original Paper, AEJ (2008) 6:43-55 (Helsin- ki: Springer-Verlag, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2007), 45. 50. Ibid., 45. 51. Ch. Hung, ‘Opposition parties react cautiously to address,’ Taipei Times, http:// www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/05/21/36932 (accessed Agust 25, 2012). 52. Ted Galen Carpenter, America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 82. 53. Lijun Sheng, China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian, 53. 54. 華人. Ethnic Chinese person or people. DimSum Chinese Tools. 34 Political Development Of China

In 2002, China softened its position towards one-China principle saying that ‘‘Taiwan and China are both a part of China,’ rather than declaring what it had always claimed up until that point, that Taiwan is a part of China.’55 Moreover, in the same year, ‘the PRC formally invited members of the Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan`s pro- independence party, to the Mainland as long as the members were not pro-independence advocates.’56 Chen`s words ‘more economics, less politics,’57demonstrated his understanding that economic ties with the PRC are the most importance for Taiwan. However, China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally triggered Chen`s anger. When in July 2002, Nauru switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China, Chen proclaimed, that Taiwan will ‘go its own way.’58 In August 2002, saying that Taiwan has always been a sovereign country and that ‘‘Each side is a country’ [yibian yiguo] called for the legislation for the referendum on Taiwan’s Independence.’59 Con- tinuously, in 2003, Taiwan lost one more ally – Liberia. It was obvious, that China is not willing to lose Taiwan at any cost. China was carefully watching Chen`s steps and was convinced that his actions do not coincide with his words, therefore, ‘Chinese leaders quickly adopted a policy of shunning Chen [and] invited Chen`s opponents to visit China.’60 China installed more missiles targeting Taiwan to intimidate Taiwanese. In addition, China’s new leader Hu Jintao understood that Taiwan is ‘one of the most burden- some issues facing him.’61 It was obvious, that Taiwan will not accept one-China principle as it is defined by the PRC, and it will be a long

55. Chang, ‘Managing Peace across the Strait: The Impact of United States and Chinese Actions on Contemporary Taiwanese Nationalism, 1995–2005,’ 115. 56. Ibid., 115. 57. ‘Trouble Continues under Chen Shui-bian: Analysis,’ People’s Daily, May 6, 2002. http://www.china.org.cn/english/DO-e/32089.htm (accessed August 25, 2012). 58. Chang, ‘Managing Peace across the Strait: The Impact of United States and Chinese Actions on Contemporary Taiwanese Nationalism, 1995-2005,’ 116. 59. Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China), Second Edition, xxxiii. 60. John F. Copper, ‘Taiwan’s Failed President,’ Asian Affairs: An American Review, Volume 34, Number 4, (Winter 2008): 188. 61. Yasuhiro Matsuda, ‘PRC-Taiwan Relations under Chen Shui-bian`s Govern- ment: Continuity and Change between the First and Second Terms,’ 5. 35 Introduction to Asian Studies term security issue not only in the region, but also at the international level. Beijing adopted ‘a strategy of reinforcing both hands, i. e., a hard hand will become harder and a soft hand will become softer.’62 As a sign of ‘softer hand’ one could see China’s decision in 2003 to accept that ‘one-China principle is no longer required for Taiwan to establish trade, shipping and postal links.’63 The last important issue in Chen`s first term was the referendum issue. In January 2004, President proposed the questions for referendum to be voted along with presidential elections in March 2004. He proposed to vote whether ‘Should Taiwan strengthen its missile defense system if China refuses to withdraw its missiles targeted on Taiwan? Should Taiwan set up a ‘peace interactive network’ to build consensus between people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait?’64 Seeing Chen`s actions and approaching elections in Taiwan, China was rather calm. Beijing only opposed the referendum questions. According to Zhang Mingqing, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, ‘the mainland respects the aspiration of the compatriots in Taiwan to be masters of their own community, but Taiwan authorities are deliberately using the ‘referendum’ as a cover-up to challenge the one-China principle in a bid to split the motherland.’65 Important to notice that ‘neither referendum proposal was passed, as voter turnout did not reach the required threshold.’66 Thus, one can find that China learned the lesson not to intimidate Taiwan by military means. Unexpectedly to many, President Chen managed to remain in presidential office for the second term. There was a scandal leading

62. Chen-yuan Tung, ‘Cross-Strait Relations after Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Election,’ in Rethinking New International Order in East Asia: U.S., China and Taiwan, English Series No. 52., ed. I Yuan (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 2005), 348. 63. Copper, Historical Dictionary of Taiwan (Republic of China), Second Edition, xxxviii. 64. Ibid., xxxix. 65. ‘Chinese Mainland Opposes Taiwan’s Separatism, Referendum,’ Xinhua News Agency, October 29, 2003. http://www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Oct/78735. htm (accessed August 15, 2012). 66. ‘National Referendums in Taiwan,’ Taiwan Government Information Office, Republic of China. http://www.gio.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=35776&ctNode=2462 (accessed August 15, 2012). 36 Political Development Of China the elections. Chen and vice-president candidate Annette Lu in a suspicious incident were shot, though, none of them was hurt. Op- position suspected that the ‘shot’ event was stage-managed.67 The PRC could not influence the choice of the voterate, and as Yasuhiro Matsuda writes, the ‘PRC had become a ‘paper tiger’ by not conducting any military intimidation and virtually allowed Chen Shui-bian to hold the referendum.’68 Besides the referendum issue, President Chen was, also, keen to amend the Constitution of the ROC and abolish the National Unification Council and its guidelines. Regarding the amendment of ROC Constitution, Chen promised that ‘This new Constitution will not touch upon national sovereignty or territory, nor on issues of unification or independence, but will take as its base the realization of good governance and reform of the government system.’69 In the interview for British Broadcasting Corporation Chen confirmed, that ‘This new constitution will have no bearing on the issue of unification or independence nor will it change the status quo.’70 Local leaders in Taiwan did not have a common opinion regarding Chen`s ‘constitutional’ venture. For instance, a Guomindang leader Ma Ying-jeou ‘urged the head of the state to ‘wake up’ from daydreaming to try to tackle economic problems facing Taiwan instead.’71 On the contrary, former President Lee Teng- hui supported the idea, ‘that Taiwan has to have a new Constitution.’72 The PRC, also, warned that any amendments ‘will result in tensions and danger in the Taiwan Straits.’73

67. John F. Copper, ‘Taiwan’s Failed President,’ 182. 68. Yasuhiro Matsuda, ‘PRC-Taiwan Relations under Chen Shui-bian`s Govern- ment: Continuity and Change between the First and Second Terms,’ 12. 69. ‘Chen says defend ‘new Constitution’,’ The China Post, http://www.chinapost. com.tw/taiwan/detail.asp?ID=49827 (accessed July 25, 2012). 70. ‘Interview: Chen Shui-bian,’ BBC News Online, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ asia-pacific/3582853.stm (accessed July 25, 2012). 71. ‘Ma urges Chen not to write new Constitution,’ The China Post, http://www. chinapost.com.tw/detail.asp?ID=74597&GRP=A (accessed July 25, 2012). 72. J.A. Hung, ‘A New Constitution,’ National Policy Foundation, http://old.npf.org. tw/PUBLICATION/NS/092/NS-C-092-314.htm, (accessed August 25, 2012). 73. ‘‘New constitution’ means timetable for Taiwan independence: official,’ Em- bassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the United States of America, http:// us.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t84690.htm (accessed July 25, 2012). 37 Introduction to Asian Studies

On 14 March 2005, at the Third Session of the Tenth National Peo- ple’s Congress, the Anti-Secession Law was adopted. Beijing once again stressed that if Taiwan declares independence, ‘the state [PRC] shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.’74 The law prompted thousands of Taiwanese to attend the rally against China. Taiwanese officials made it clear, that they are not intimidated by the law.75 In April 2005, after Anti-Secession Law was passed, the PRC ‘invited KMT [Kuomintang or Guomindang] opposition leaders James Soong and Lien Chan to the Mainland in an attempt to court Presi- dent Chen`s adversaries.’76 At the international level, Beijing continuously wooed the countries recognizing Taiwan’s sovereignty to its side in order to limit Taiwan’s international space. For example, in 2003, Liberia switched diplomatic relations to Beijing, Senegal in 2005, Chad in 2006, Costa Rica in 2007, and Malawi in 2008. As Chao Chien-min expressed, it ‘has added fuel to the alienation that Taiwan has felt towards China.’77

74. ‘Anti-Secession Law,’ adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on March 14, 2005. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/ eng20050314_176746.html (accessed August 25, 2012). 75. Ted Galen Carpenter, America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan Carpenter, 95. 76. Chang, ‘Managing Peace across the Strait: The Impact of United States and Chinese Actions on Contemporary Taiwanese Nationalism, 1995–2005,’ 117. 77. Chien-min Chao, ‘Reformation of a Nation: Taiwan’s Mainland China Policy after the 2004 Presidential Election,’ in Rethinking New International Order in East Asia: U.S., China and Taiwan, English Series No. 52., ed. I Yuan (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 2005), 308. 38 Political Development Of China

Task No. 12:

Give a brief description of the most periods of Taiwan history (What has the biggest importance in that period? What are the most important political events? Who are the most important historical personalities?)

What is the impor- Most important tance of that period Period Personalities events for Taiwan’s political development? 1895 The Republic of Formosa

1895–1945 Japanese occupation

1945–… The Republic of China

Task No. 13:

Read the publication from The Taipei Times. Which historical event is covered in this text? What is its significance for Taiwan? As a result of an economic downturn and a shortage of daily necessities, theft became prevalent. Even more painful to the people was the fact that the troops stationed in Taiwan were undisciplined and often bullied people. These soldiers were the troops from the ‘mother country’ who had been enthusiastically welcomed by the public only a year ago. In the second year after the Nationalist government took over Taiwan, the crime rate became a serious problem, climbing 28-fold. In 1946, confrontations

39 Introduction to Asian Studies between the general public and the military and the police became more frequent. These incidents all had the potential of escalating into massive riots. … Late in the afternoon of Feb. 27, 1947, six agents of the Monopoly Bu- reau’s Taipei branch, including Fu Hsueh-tung (傅學通), were investi- gating the sale of smuggled cigarettes on Tai-ping-tung, which is today’s Yenping North Road. They caught middle-aged widow Lin Chiang-mai (林江邁) illegally selling cigarettes in front of the Tien-ma Tea House (located near the in- tersection of today’s Yenping North Road and Nanking West Road). The agents tried to confiscate Lin’s cigarettes and money, but she refused and begged for mercy. The agents hit Lin on the head with their gun barrels, making her head bleed, and she passed out. Bystanders became enraged and protested to the agents. The agents ran away, firing upon the crowd as they did so. A spectator, Chen Wen- hsi (陳文溪), was hit (and died the next day from a gunshot wound). The public became even more irate, beseiging both the police and the military police headquarters, demanding that the culprits be turned over for pros- ecution, but their demand was not met.

Found: Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives /2004/02/28/2003100472; reviewed on 20 August 2012.

40 Political Development Of China

Task No. 14:

Fill in the table. The political leaders of the Republic of China / Taiwan

Party leaders Prime Ministers Nationalist Democratic State leaders Ministers of Foreign Party (Kuo- Progressive Affairs mintang / Party (DPP) Guomindang) Who and when held the post?

Functions

Task No. 15:

Who are these personalities and what is their importance in Tai- wan’s political life? Fill in the table by entering their surnames and names, key biographical facts and achievements.

(1910–1988) (1923–…) (1950–…) (1950–…)

41 Introduction to Asian Studies

Task No. 16:

Analyse Fig. 2. 6. What is the particular feature of the division of powers in the Republic of China?

Fig. 2. 6. The division of powers in the Republic of China

Task No. 17:

Name four political parties of Taiwan.

42 Political Development Of China

Choose one party and present a brief history of its establishment as well as current activity guidelines and programme provisions. Specify the role of this party in the political life of Taiwan.

Task No. 18:

Answer the following questions: What building is this? What is its importance?

Photograph by J. Razumaitė

Questions for discussion 1. In your opinion, is Taiwan a part of China or an independent state? 2. What is the importance of Taiwan investments for China economy?

43 Introduction to Asian Studies

3. Does the intensifying economic cooperation between Taiwan and China reconcile the two sides in political terms? 4. What is the position of President Ma Ying-jeou on the issue of the unification with China?

Recommended reading and websites 1. Copper, F. John, Taiwan: Nation State or Province? 5th Edition. Westview Press, 2005. 2. Roy, Denny, Taiwan: a Political History. Cornell University Press, 2003. 3. The China Post http://www.chinapost.com.tw/ 4. Taipei Times http://www.taipeitimes.com/ 3. Political Development Of Japan

In Japan’s political life, four groups of political actors are important: (1) Parliament Members (480 in the upper house and 247 in the lower house); (2) bureaucrats or officials (approximately 4.77 million); (3) groups of interest (there are many of them, and some are more influential than others); (4) voters, ordinary people (approximately 100 million). It is important to mention that the Japanese political institutions, which used to act slowly and inflexibly, are changing rapidly recently. The last decade of the 20th century is characterised by a turmoil in domestic politics, which was most of all influenced by a downturn in Japan’s economy. Unemployment rate increased, and share prices dropped. Thus, Japan’s Iron Triangle, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), bureaucrats, and representative of big business, lost stability and their traditional influence. Instability and uncertainty in Japan’s political life began in 1993. The LDP was left by many members and sponsors, and it was the first time when a candidate other than proposed by the LDP was appointed as the Prime Minister. The LDP and the Social Demo- cratic Party formed the ruling coalition, and Tomiichi Murayama, the leader of social democrats, became the Prime Minister. It was the end of the era of the LDP’s control, the end of the so-called ‘1955 System’. The main opposition parties: the LDP and the DPJ (the Demo- cratic Party of Japan). The LDP was founded in 1955, and the DPJ was founded in 1998. The most important bureaucrats in shaping Japan’s politics are presented by the Ministry of Finance because it has a dominant power and authority in the formation of the national budget. Other Japanese institutions and agencies must succeed in obtaining a certain budget from the Ministry of Finance in order to be able to perform their tasks. There are many groups of interests in Japan, and they are highly diverse: directors of post offices, construction workers, war veterans, doctors, railway workers, etc.

45 Introduction to Asian Studies

The fourth political actor – the Japanese people, voters. There are around 100 million of those who are entitled and have the civil right to participate in the execution of the state policy decisions and policy formation.

Task No. 1:

Fill in the table. General information on Japan

Geographic position

Capital city

Borders at the following countries

Population

Ethnic groups

Languages

Religions

Administrative division

Monetary unit

Public holidays

Membership in international organisations

46 Political Development Of Japan

Fig. 3. 1. Map of Japan

Found: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/map template_ja.html; reviewed on 20 August 2012.

Task No. 2:

Briefly describe the most important periods of Japan’s history (What are the most important features of that period? What are the most important political events? Who are the most important historical figures?)

Period Most important Personalities What is the impor- events tance of that period for Japan’s political development? 1868–1945 the Empire of Japan

1949–…

47 Introduction to Asian Studies

Task No. 3:

Who are these personalities and what is their importance in Ja- pan’s political life? Fill in the table by entering their names, surnames, key biographical facts and achievements.

(1852–1912) (1880–1964) (1933–…) (1942–…)

Task No. 4:

Describe the main actors of Japan’s political process:

Parliament Members:

Bureaucrats:

Voters:

Groups of interests:

Task No. 5:

Explain the term ‘Amakudari’:

48 Political Development Of Japan

Task No. 6:

Name the four political parties of Japan.

Choose one party and present the history of its emergence as well as guidelines and programme provisions of its current activities. Speci- fy the role played by the party in the political life of Japan.

Task No. 7:

When was the Constitution of Japan declared?

Read Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan and answer the following questions. What it the particular feature of this article?

What is its significance for Japan’s foreign and security policy?

ARTICLE 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Task No. 8:

Read the extracts from the speech of the Prime Minister of Japan and answer the following questions.

What challenges did Japan have to face in March 2011?

49 Introduction to Asian Studies

Which main principles and commitments of Japan’s foreign policy does he name?

What vision of Japan’s foreign policy does he see?

ADDRESS BY H.E. MR. YOSHIHIKO NODA PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AT THE SIXTY-SIXTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Friday, September 23, 2011 Mr. President, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

First, I would like to begin by congratulating His Excellency Mr. Al- Nasser on his assumption of duties as President of the 66th session of the United Nations General Assembly. I express my gratitude to His Excellency Dr. Deiss, the former President, for his devoted efforts during his tenure as President. I would also like to pay my deep respect to His Excellency Secretary-General Ban for his leadership.

This has been a year of extraordinary challenges for Japan. A little more than six months have passed since the Great East Japan Earth- quake struck Japan. Nearly 20,000 people were killed or remain missing, and nearly 40,000 who were forced to evacuate even now continue to endure inconvenience in their daily lives. I am truly proud to see the noble spirit of the Japanese people manifest itself even amid such despair and hardships. At the same time, I have been deeply moved by the strong feelings of compassion shown by people the world over toward Japan. There are many unforgettable stories…

Since the 11th of March, the sounds of recovery have been echoing throughout the Tohoku region of Japan. The Government of Japan has been exerting all efforts to restore and reconstruct the disaster-af-

50 Political Development Of Japan fected areas. The daily lives of those outside the affected areas, including the metropolitan area of Tokyo, have almost returned to normal. The infrastructure and economy of the coastal areas of Tohoku, which were washed away by the tsunami, are recovering. Damaged supply chains are close to full restoration. We have been sharply reminded of the role that Japanese companies, including small and medium-sized enterprises, play in sustaining the growth of the global economy.

We are making steady progress towards securing stable control of the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Stations of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Currently, we are focusing our efforts on moving up the existing target period to achieve cold shutdown status by the end of this year. A number of other challenges remain to be addressed, including removal of debris and rebuilding of the livelihoods of the Japanese people in the affected areas. We will continue to be fully engaged in the efforts for restoration and reconstruction, as our highest priority task, so that Japan’s renewal can be realized without delay.

Mr. President,

As the new leader of Japan, I am deeply honored to discuss and share Japan’s ambitions for the world’s future as well as Japan’s diplomatic vision with all those in attendance here today at the United Nations General Assembly. The world is now undergoing tremendous changes, including those now under way in the Middle East and North Af- rica. These changes have been brought about through the aggregate consciousness of all individuals who have awoken. In its experience of the massive earthquake in March, Japan became newly aware of the importance of bonds with the people of the world. We have come to realize fully how important the responsibility to be fulfilled by each individual is to a society. We have never felt more strongly the significance of promoting human security. I am resolved to implement Japanese diplomacy working hand in hand with the all of the world leaders here at the United Nations, with the determination to make a substantive contribution to overcoming the challenges the world is facing and to shaping a brighter future for humanity.

51 Introduction to Asian Studies

Mr. President,

Allow me to touch upon Japan’s efforts for the growth of the world economy.

Japan has a long history of assisting developing countries in building wealthy societies through nation-building efforts and human resources development. Japan understands very well from its own experience that the engine of economic growth is a strong middle class. To strengthen the middle class, it is necessary to construct a social foundation upon which all individuals can enhance their capacities and develop them to the fullest. From this perspective, Japan will continue to support developing countries through the active utilization of its ODA.

We must not let the current global economic uncertainty and financial unrest hamper the efforts of the international community toward growth. It is vital that all countries cooperate in order to create harmony out of the current chaos. I myself am also committed to do my best as the new leader of Japan.

Achieving economic growth in tandem with fiscal health is the most crucial challenge confronting the world at the present time. Japan will press ahead with its targets for restoration of fiscal sustainability. Meanwhile, as we recognize that revitalization of the Japanese economy is directly linked to the rebuilding of the world economy, we will work on the strengthening of industrial infrastructure, employment and energy conservation, toward achievement of a full-fledged recovery from the earthquake disaster. In the mid-to-long term, we intend to further reinforce partnership between Japanese and other global economies. It is also important that trade activities not be dis- turbed by the excessive currency volatility.

Moreover, to realize sustainable growth of the Japanese economy, we will promote the attainment of a low-carbon society and a transition to a green economy. The key to achieving these goals is technological innovation in the areas of renewable energies, energy saving and clean use of fossil fuels, movement referred to as ‘green innovation’.

52 Political Development Of Japan

By around summer of next year, the Government of Japan will create a new strategy and plan on Japan’s mid- to long-term energy compo- sition to pursue a bold energy shift.

Japan will further improve upon its excellent, safe, secure and environment-friendly technologies, as represented by energy-efficient houses, electric appliances and electric vehicles. Japan will make a useful contribution for the growth of the global economy and for a brighter future for all in the discussions toward Rio+20.

Mr. President,

Japan will seek a safe and brighter future with full force. The maxi- mum vertical height onshore above sea level, called the ‘run-up height’, of the tsunami that hit the Tohoku district reached as high as 40 meters, the highest such value ever observed in Japan’s recorded history. We have learned that we must be very well prepared. In that regard, there are contributions that Japan, with such experience behind it, is uniquely qualified to make.

The first lesson from Japan’s recent tragedy is the importance of -in ternational cooperation in disaster risk reduction. We have a long history of combating and overcoming natural disasters. In fact, we have provided active support in the efforts to respond to the disasters which have occurred in recent years in areas such as Sumatra, Sich- uan in China, Haiti and New Zealand. We are prepared to share with the world our accumulated knowledge and skills, as a country which has learned to coexist harmoniously with nature. As a first step, Japan will hold an international conference in the disaster-stricken Tohoku region next year to boost international cooperation on coping with natural disasters. To build on the outcome of the conference, Japan proposes to host the Third World Conference on Disaster Reduction in 2015. Japan will take a leading role in the international community in creating a disaster-resistant world society.

Next, Japan hopes to share its acquired knowledge and experience in the field of nuclear safety. I welcome the holding yesterday of the

53 Introduction to Asian Studies high-level meeting on this issue under the initiative of the Secretary- General. Following the nuclear accident, Japan has implemented emergency safety measures and has further strengthened its nuclear energy regulation regime. In yesterday’s meeting, I expressed my resolve to contribute positively to the reinforcement of global nuclear power safety, drawing on our experiences in the accident. Next year, Japan will co-host an international conference with the IAEA to share the results of the overall assessment of the accident in comprehensive detail, and to contribute to the various measures taken by the international community to raise the standards for nuclear safety. Although some countries, regrettably, are still imposing undue restrictions on imports from Japan, our government will continue to provide prompt and accurate information on this matter, with trans- parency. I would request that all countries make sound judgments based upon scientific evidence.

Mr. President,

Global threats continue to proliferate. It is essential to solve the root causes of these threats while taking steps to address them. Japan will continue to respond to both challenges in order to ensure a brighter and more peaceful future.

With regard to the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia, Japan will remain actively engaged in combating the problem through the continuous deployment to the area of two destroyers and two patrol aircraft.

Japan intends to make enhanced efforts toward the eradication of terrorism as well as its causes. Despite the passage of a decade since the 9.11 attacks, our collective sorrow is yet to be healed. And in that connection, I would like to express my sincere condolences on the demise of Mr. Rabbani, Chairman of the High Peace Council in Af- ghanistan. Japan reiterates its firm condemnation of these atrocious acts of terrorism. In order to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a breeding ground for terrorism, we will continue to con- front the problem with strong resolve. Japan has expressed its commitment to provide approximately five billion U.S. dollars of assis-

54 Political Development Of Japan tance over five years from 2009, focusing on security, reintegration of former insurgents into society and development, and will steadily implement this commitment.

UN peacekeeping missions are being dispatched to fragile and conflict-prone States. Japan will contribute to the efforts for peacebuild- ing by actively participating in those operations. We must further improve circumstances to this end.

At the same time, we will do our best to achieve the ideal of ‘a World without Nuclear Weapons’ through such efforts as the Non-Prolifer- ation and Disarmament Initiative or NPDI.

The DPRK’s nuclear and missile issues pose a threat to the entire international community, and Japan continues to urge the DPRK to take concrete actions toward their resolution. In particular, the abduction issue represents a violation of basic human rights. Thus, this is a universal issue and a matter of great concern for the entire international community. Japan is committed to continuing its utmost efforts to realize the return of all the victims at the earliest possible date, through strengthened coordination with other Member States. With regard to Japan-DPRK relations, Japan intends to maintain its efforts to compre- hensively resolve the outstanding issues of concern, settle the unfortu- nate past and normalize relations, in accordance with the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. Japan urges the DPRK to take positive steps in order that our countries may have a dialogue toward this goal.

Mr. President,

In recent years, the role of the United Nations has taken on greater significance than ever. In order for the United Nations to tackle these issues more effectively, Japan will continue to support increasing effectiveness and efficiency and reinforcing the functions of the United Nations.

Security Council Reform is absolutely necessary in this respect. We must accelerate the stagnated reform process. All Member States

55 Introduction to Asian Studies must proactively commit to the reform with a sense of urgency, that it would affect the credibility of the United Nations. Japan intends to launch a substantive negotiation toward the reform with like-minded members, to make tangible achievements during this session.

Mr. President,

As I promised moments ago, Japan will recover from the earthquake disaster, and seek a peaceful, safe and brighter future side by side with the leaders gathered here. For that purpose, Japan will maintain its contribution to the attainment of the Millennium De- velopment Goals, focusing on health and education. Moreover, Ja- pan will continue its contribution to the development of Africa by hosting the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African De- velopment or TICAD V in 2013. Regarding the support for the developing countries to address climate change, Japan will implement its commitments on the Fast-Start Finance up to next year. Japan will continue its support beyond 2012.

Mr. President,

Today I would like to announce Japan’s new commitments.

Firstly, I wish to congratulate the people of the Republic of South Su- dan on achieving their independence, and I assure that Japan will extend wherever possible support for the nation-building efforts in South Sudan as well as for the consolidation of peace in the region. Japan is eager to make contributions to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) in the fields in which Japan excels. From this point of view, we are preparing to dispatch Japanese Self-Defense Forces personnel to Mission Headquarters as staff officers. Japan is also interested in dispatching an engineering unit of our Self- Defense Forces, to which the UN expresses high expectations. Japan therefore will conduct the necessary field study as early as possible.

Secondly, Japan will remain actively involved in the international community’s efforts against humanitarian crises. One of the most

56 Political Development Of Japan pressing challenges at present is the drought in the Horn of Africa, which is directly affecting the children of the region. To mitigate this suffering as effectively as possible, Japan will provide further humanitarian aid in addition to the assistance worth approximately 100 million U.S. dollars which it has already implemented.

The last commitment I would like to announce concerns the Mid- dle East and North Africa. Japan will support reform and democratization efforts in this region, which is now undergoing a massive change often referred to as the ‘Arab Spring’. To improve the employment situation and support human resource development in the region, Japan is prepared to extend an additional yen loan worth approximately 1 billion U.S. dollars in total, for projects which are expected to contribute to infrastructure building and industrial development. Moreover, we will provide support to ensure fair elections in Tunisia and Egypt, where polls are scheduled to be held in autumn this year. For a new Libya, Japan will support the country’s nation-building efforts in cooperation with the international community, utilizing its expertise and technological capacity. At the same time, Japan will deepen economic relations with Middle Eastern and North African countries by further promoting trade and investment through such means as trade insurance and export loans. As Middle East peace represents the linchpin for the peace and stability of the region, Japan will make active efforts, such as extending assistance to the Palestinians, for the realization of the two-state solution.

To conclude my statement today, I will touch briefly upon what I have felt in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake. After the events of 11 March this year, I strongly felt the magnificence of a society in which each individual undertakes actions in an orderly manner, a society in which people help each other. In addition, all lines of the Tohoku shinkansen, bullet trains, including a train which was running at 270 kilometers per hour at the time of the earthquake, made emergency stops safely, without causing a single injury. I believe this demonstrated fact bears witness to Japan’s high level of technical advancement.

57 Introduction to Asian Studies

I thus believe in the strength of the Japanese people, which comes to the fore most prominently in times of crisis. I am certain that such resilience, both human and technological, which does not yield in the face of enormous difficulties, will be the very source of Japan’s future contribution to the international community.

Mr. President, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let us take on the challenges for the resolution of the issues confronting the world today, with strong determination to open the way to a brighter future for humanity. As the new leader of Japan, I am determined to make progress step by step towards a more peaceful, prosperous and positive future, hand in hand with the leaders assembled here today.

The people of Japan as well as the government are determined to overcome any and all difficulties. We will continue our contribution towards a brighter future for the people of the world.

I should like to close my statement by reiterating our firm determination.

Thank you for your attention.

Found: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201109/23enzetu_e.html; reviewed on 16 August 2012.

Questions for discussion 1. How would you describe the main political actors in Japan? 2. Which main parties are there in Japan? What is the difference between their programme provisions? 3. When did Japan become a Member State of the United Nations Organisation? What is the role of Japan in this organisation? 4. What are the principles of Japan security policy? 5. What is Japan’s role in ensuring security in the region of East Asia?

58 Political Development Of Japan

Recommended reading and websites 1. Beeson, Mark, Regionalism & Globalization in East Asia: Poli- tics, Security and Economic Development. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 2. Holcombe, Charles, A History of East Asia: from the Origins of Civilization to the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2011. 3. Kabashima Ikuo, Gill Steel, Changing politics in Japan. Cor- nell University Press, 2010. 4. Jansen, Marius, The Making of Modern Japan. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000. 5. Drifte, Reinhard,Japan’s quest for a permanent Security Coun- cil seat : a matter of pride or justice? St. Martin’s press, 2000. 6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. http://www.mofa.go.jp/. 7. Ministry of Defense of Japan. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/index. html. 8. Prime Minister of Japan. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/index-e.html. 9. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan. http:// www.meti.go.jp/english/ 10. The House of Councillors of Japan. http://www.sangiin.go.jp/ eng/index.htm 11. The House of Representatives of Japan. http://www.shugiin. go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_e.htm 12. The Japan Times. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/. 13. The Daily Yomiuri. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/. 14. Kyodo News. http://english.kyodonews.jp/. 15. The Asahi Simbun. http://www.asahi.com/english/.

Do you know that… Japan experiences around 1500 earthquakes each year. The world’s largest fish market is located in Japan, Tokyo. The word karaoke literally means ‘empty orchestra’.

59 4. Sino – Japan Relations

China and Japan are international communities and leaders in the Asia – Pacific region. The political stability, economic prosperity, and security of the Asia – Pacific region largely depend on the quality of their bilateral relations. Their bilateral relations are defined as ‘hot’ in economy and ‘cold’ in politics. China dominated the region of East Asia by the end of the 19th century; however, it lost the First Sino – Japanese War to Japan and thus the leading positions were taken over by Japan for the first time, while letting China lose its weight. In 1895, the countries signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, according to which Taiwan was taken over by Japan and remained its part until the end of World War II in 1945. In 1931, the so-called Mukden Incident (Manchurian Incident) occurred. It was a provocation specially designed by the Japanese as a pretext for invading Manchuria. Manchuria was rich in natural resources, and this is why the Japanese sought control over this territory. The puppet state of Manchukuo, actually controlled by the Japanese, was set up there. The post of the Head of State was given to Chinese Emperor Puyi; however, his powers were limited and everything was actually controlled by the Japanese administration. In 1937, the Second Sino – Japanese War began. The Japanese managed to occupy even more of China’s territory and reached the nationalist capital city of Nanjing. Depraved and undisciplined, the nationalist military had to flee. The Japanese committed atrocious war crimes, the consequences of which have a major impact not only on the Chinese nationalism, but also on Sino – Japanese relations in the 21st century. Having lost the World War II, Japan maintained relations with the Republic of China, led the Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-sheck. When the US severed relations with the Republic of China and established relations with the People’s Republic of China, Japan was also forced to change its position. In September 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka established official diplomatic relations with the PRC during his visit to Beijing. Japan admitted the position that Taiwan is a part of China. Nevertheless, at an informal

60 Sino – Japan Relations level, Japan has not terminated its ties with Taiwan and works inten- sively at both political and economic levels. In the 21st century, Japan and China are not friendly states; however, they approach their bilateral relations in a pragmatic manner and recognise that the failure of one of them would be detrimental to the other. In 1978, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Peace and Friend- ship. They have achieved peace, but friendship still might be negotiable. Contemporary Chinese and Japanese diplomats try to rely on friendship diplomacy. However, Sino – Japanese relations are balancing on a ‘razor’s edge between closer cooperation and dangerous rivalry.’78 Chinese and Japanese have built a network of informal relations in the past. For instance, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka (office years 1972–1974), Noboru Takeshita, the head of ruling LDP in 1987–1989, and other senior officials played an important role in fostering bilateral ties. However, current leaders are lacking their power and connections. China’s Japan policy has changed after Jiang Zemin`s visit to Ja- pan in 1998. During the visit, ‘Jiang spent most of [the time] chastis- ing the Japanese for being insufficiently repentant over their military past.’79 His goal was to receive a written apology from Japanese for the atrocities they made during the Second World War in China. To improve the worsening situation, Premier Zhu Rongji visited Japan in 2000, and he expressed the gratitude for Japanese economic aid, emphasized the importance of common interests and future cooperation in Sino – Japan relations. China’s current slogan towards relations with Japan is ‘taking history as a mirror while looking toward the future.’80 According to Chinese writers Shi Yinhong and Ma Licheng, ‘China should stop seeking further apologies from Ja- pan, take a more relaxed view of Tokyo’s gradual military expansion given Japan’s peaceful track record over the last half-century, and seek a stronger partnership with Japan to deepen economic integration and to counter American political dominance in East Asia.’81

78. Benjamin Self, ‘China and Japan: A Façade of Friendship,’ The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2002–2003): 77. 79. Denny Roy, ‘The Sources and Limits of Sino-Japanese Tensions,’ Survival vol. 47. No. 2 (Summer 2005): 195. 80. Ibid., 195. 81. Ibid., 196. 61 Introduction to Asian Studies

As China overpasses Japan in global economy as a second largest economy, ‘Beijing exhibits a more relaxed, confident posture in most of its foreign relations even as Japan is taking a larger, more active role as an international security player and moving closer to the status of a military ‘normal’ country.’82 Throughout the postwar period, Japan and China maintained a policy of constructive engagement. The strategy was established by Yoshida Shigeru, ‘who predicted that Japan and the West would eventually wean China away from Moscow by providing an alternative to dependence on the Soviet Union.’83 It was expected that prosperous China would inevitably become friendly to Japan and the US. Japan declares that in order to make Asia – Pacific region stable and safe it is important for China to become a more responsible member of international community. For that purpose, Japan particularly stresses two points in its relations with China: ‘(a) Support for Chi- na’s open and reform policy …, [and] (b) Promotion of bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperative relations (high-level exchanges, Japan-China security dialogue, ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, etc.).’84 In long term, the stability of China ‘is seen to be in Japan’s best interests.’85 Chinese political elite, also, stresses that cooperation, regional integration and social and cultural exchanges are vital for prospering good neighborhood. However, there are still many issues provoking tensions at bilateral level. For example, dueling national identities or societal antipathy (especially on Chinese side), Yasukuni Shrine, Japanese historical textbooks, Japan’s support for Taiwan, Senkaku islands, Japanese bid for a permanent seat in Security Council of the United Nations, Japa- nese intention to revise the constitution, the improvement of Self De- fense Forces` (SDF) capabilities, etc.. According to Denny Roy, those issues are limitations for fruitful dialogue. Among the named issues

82. Ibid., 192. 83. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 77. 84. ‘Japan’s Basic Policy Toward the People’s Republic of China,’ Ministry of For- eign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/index. html (accessed August 15, 2012). 85. Wolf Mendl, Japan’s Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests (Lon- don and New York: Routledge, 1995), 91. 62 Sino – Japan Relations history, Taiwan, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and Japanese – American security cooperation86 are the most problematic.

4. 1. Historical Issues in Sino – Japan Relations Anti-Japanese sentiments are deeply rooted in China. Chinese are opposing every Japanese action if it seems seeking to dominate over China and the rest of the region. Japan and China agree that history should be interpreted correctly; however, historical questions still influence bilateral talks. There are two sensitive historical issues differently interpreted by Chinese and Japanese such as Yasukuni Shrine and history textbooks.87

4. 1. 1. Yasukuni Shrine In August 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited the Yasukuni Shrine. It was the first time ‘a prime minister worshiped there since Yasuhiro Nakasone provoked a bitter controversy with his 1986 visit – heightening Chinese concerns about increasing Japa- nese self-assertiveness.’88 The former Prime Minister Koizumi, also, has visited the Yasukuni Shrine to worship Japan’s war dead. China views the visits as a Japan’s willingness to renounce military past, because among the ‘enshrined at Yasukuni are 14 Class A war crimi- nals from the Pacific War, including General Tojo Hideki.’89 Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine seems to be painful for Chinese. Accoriding to Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, ‘the fact that some leaders of Japan have been repeatedly visiting the Yasukuni Shrine’ is the source of ‘the main problems in Sino – Japan relations’ (by impli- cation more serious than expansion of Japan’s military or Japanese support for Taiwan).’90

86. ‘China – Japan Relations. VI. Some Sensitive Issues,’ Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs of People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/ gjlb/2721/2722/t15974.htm (accessed August 15, 2012). 87. See P. Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Democracy (Berke- ley: University of California Press, 2005), 90-98. 88. Benjamin Self, ‘China and Japan: A Façade of Friendship,’ 78. 89. Denny Roy, ‘The Sources and Limits of Sino-Japanese Tensions,’ 202. 90. Ibid., 202. 63 Introduction to Asian Studies

For many Japanese Yasukuni problem is merely an ‘internal af- fair … and not something that other countries should interfere.’91 The opposing group of Japanese does not agree with that position. They rather prompt their government to respect ‘the feelings of people in other countries and avoid actions that offend … neighbors and undermine good relations.’92 The official position of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizmi was that, ‘Visiting the Yasukuni Shrine is a personal issue of ‘spiritual matter’.’93 The official statement of the Government of Japan reassures, that Prime Minister ‘makes the visits as an individual citizen, not in an official capacity.’94 Prime Minister Koizumi stopped visiting the Shrine only in 2006. Until then, he followed his own decision and did not pay much attention towards Chinese complaints. As Ryosei Kokubun writes, ‘Japanese shifted to resistance against the habit of compromise with China in favor of taking a firm stand not only toward historical problems, but also to various matters such as national security and Taiwan.’95 Prime Minister Koizumi is a good example of such shift in Japanese policy towards China. On the other hand, Chinese were and are very dissatisfied with Japanese disrespect towards history and its misinterpretation. For Chinese the ‘insistence on paying homage at the shrine constitutes the major obstacle for improving and developing China – Japan ties and also harms political basis for bilateral ties.’96 According to former Chinese ambassador to Japan Wang Yi, ‘if Tokyo decides to

91. Sh. Takashina, ‘Japan’s War Dead and Yasukuni Shrine,’ Japan Echo. Vol. 33, No. 5 (October 2006) http://www.japanecho.co.jp/sum/2006/330503.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 92. Ibid. 93. ‘Yasukuni Shrine issue is a world issue,’ Peoples` Daily, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200605/23/eng20060523_267994.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 94. ‘Basic Position of the Government of Japan Regarding Prime Minister Koizumi`s Visits to Yasukuni Shrine, October, 2005,’ Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/yasukuni/position.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 95. Ryosei Kokubun, ‘Changing Japanese Strategic Thinking toward China,’ in Ja- panese Strategic Thought toward Asia Rozman, eds. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo and Joseph P. Ferguson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 143. 96. ‘Yasukuni Shrine issue cannot be bypassed: FM spokesman,’ Xinhua News On- line, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/25/content_4599657.htm (accessed May 15, 2012).

64 Sino – Japan Relations remove the political obstacles that have chilled the relationship between the two countries Beijing is sure to respond with good will.’97 As a matter of fact, other Japanese Prime Ministers as Shinzo Abe or Fukuda Yasuo were trying to avoid Yasukuni issue in order not to irritate China. But their position not to pay homage to war victims in Yasukuni Shrine does not mean that China ‘will … necessarily improve Japan’s bilateral relations with China anytime soon.’98

4. 1. 2. Textbooks Another question in Sino – Japanese relations is a question of history textbooks published by Japanese and highly criticized by Chinese and Koreans. The textbook issue has been raised in 1982 and for the first time emphasized different views towards history and war in each country.99 This issue remains unresolved and, thus, sensitive during 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century. During the 1990s, Japan`s education system was reformed in order to achieve more creativity and flexibility in teaching process. The teaching of history was also reviewed and teachers were encouraged ‘to develop in schoolchildren a greater pride in their country.’100 Especially, the ultra-patriotic education was promoted by right-wing LDP, which was ruling the country since 1955. However, during the period of 1993-1996, when for the first time left-wing party took power Prime Ministers Hosokawa and Murayama ‘had attempted to settle the past in a more conciliatory way than LDP and supporting groups would have liked.’101 In the eyes of Chinese, Koreans and other Asian nations ‘the textbook intentionally blurs the nature of Japanese militarist aggression. It fails to self-examine the sever disaster the aggression brought to people in Asian counties.’102 The books deal with the

97. ‘Abe wants strong China ties, avoids shrine issue,’ China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-08/03/content_656276.htm (accessed May 15, 2012). 98. ‘Yasukuni Shrine, Nationalism and Japan`s International Relations,’ Yomiuri Shimbun, Asahi Shimbun. The Asia – Pacific Forum: Japan Focus, http://japanfocus.org/-Yomiuri-Shimbun/1918 (accessed May 15, 2012). 99. Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the past, looking to the future? (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 50. 100. Ibid., 57. 101. Ibid., 60. 102. ‘Chinese Lawmakers Condemn Japan over Textbook Issue,’ People’s Daily, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200104/04/eng20010404_66842. html (accessed May 15, 2012). 65 Introduction to Asian Studies issues of Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731, comfort woman, etc. For example, the Nanjing Massacre of 1937-1938 when Japanese troops killed about 300,000 Chinese was renamed as an ‘incident’ and Japanese military actions during the Second World War were explained as ‘‘self-preservation’ and a desire to liberate Asia from Western control.’103 Right-wing Japanese conservatives believe that Chinese criticism over the textbooks is an outside-intervention into domestic affairs. They are afraid that ‘China’s claims could lead to harm the legitimacy of the imperial house, the Chrysanthemum Throne, the world’s longest continuous monarchy, which the majority of Japanese have supported for more than 1,000 years.’104 What regards the textbooks, The New History Textbook (Atarashii rekishi kyokasho in Japanese) for high schools was published and approved by the Ministry of Education of Japan in 2001, revised in 2005. Every time, books caused diplomatic storms and societal unrests in China and Korea. The books were depicted as ‘whitewashing’ or ‘unfit.’105 There are societal groups in Japan that do not allow history misreading and see its rewriting as a threat to education and political culture in Japan. For example, The Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21, the Committee for Truth and Freedom in Textbooks, the Advisory Committee for Discussing Social Studies Textbook Problems, or the Japanese Society for Democratic Education, they all are involved into the counter-offensive process of history misreading. The younger generation of LDP politicians such as Shinzo Abe have, also, taken a different view about the countries` history and think that ‘Japanese history textbooks fail to stress the positive advances and achievements that Japan has made.’106 Only small number of Japanese schools use those history text books. Ministry of Education in Japan can not force schools to use one textbook or another. The ministry can only revise textbooks every four years and make its recommendations. It was estimated that ‘only

103. Jamie Miyazaki, ‘Textbook stirs Japanese concern,’ BBC News Online, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4439923.stm (accessed May 15, 2012). 104. K. Takahashi, ‘Tortuous tangles over Japanese textbooks,’ Asia Times, http:// www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FJ26Dh01.html (accessed May 15, 2012). 105. ‘Japan textbook angers Chinese, Korean press,’ BBC News Online, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4416593.stm (accessed May 15, 2012). 106. Jamie Miyazaki, ‘Textbook stirs Japanese concern.’ 66 Sino – Japan Relations

0.13%, maybe a little more, of the total number of junior high schools have been using it, despite aggressive right-wing media campaigns.’107 Overall, it seems that different history interpretations will continue to influence future Sino – Japanese relations and it is not easy for both countries to find a general perception about their past. As He Yinan writes, ‘Both countries have yet to take any significant steps to promote a shared historical memory honestly that would help mitigate the problems of history.’108

4. 2. Japan – Taiwan Relations The ideal situation for Japan would be to have official relations with both China and Taiwan ‘to secure resources, markets, and diplomatic status wherever available.’109 It is not easy for Japan to trim between two Chinese entities, Communist China and democratic Taiwan. The Japanese Government ‘took the approach of separating politics from economy (seikei bunri, in Japanese, zhengjing fenli, in Chinese) to promote economic and cultural relations with China.’110 The adoption of the flexible approach allowed Japan to keep formal relations with Chi- na, and simultaneously not to ignore Taiwan. In 1972, Japan created the formula how to deal with the PRC and Taiwan. The formula ex- tended ‘diplomatic recognition to Beijing but keeps in tact all aspects of relations with Taipei except recognition of statehood. The Japanese formula soon became a model for the rest of the world to follow.’111 It is obvious that Japan – Taiwan relations are closely intertwined ‘by a shared history, common values, economic ties, strategic align- ment, and social networks between their political parties and business

107. K. Takahashi, ‘Tortuous tangles over Japanese textbooks.’ 108. Yinan He, ‘National mythmaking and the problems of history,’ in Japan’s Re- lations with China: Facing a Rising Power, ed. Lam Peng Er (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 82. 109. Ming Wan, ‘Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Taiwan,’ 161. 110. Seichiro Takagaki, ‘The Taiwan factor in Japan-China relations,’ in Japan’s Re- lations with China: Facing a Rising Power, ed. Lam Peng Er (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 109. 111. Daojiong Zha, ‘The Taiwan Problem in Japan-China Relations: an Irritant or Destroyer?,’ East Asia, Volume 19, Number 1–2 (March 2001): 206. 67 Introduction to Asian Studies elite.’112 According to the historical Treaty of Shimonoseki, Taiwan was ceded to Japan and remained under the colonial rule during the period of 1895-1945. Throughout the fifty years, Japanese economical, political, and cultural experiences were deeply rooted into Taiwanese society. Even tough Japanese were colonizers, Taiwanese society is sentimental about the period of colonization; and as M. Wakabayashi writes, per- ceives Japanese as ‘unforgettable others’ which were important for the development of a Taiwanese sense of self.113 For example, when the first lady Wu Shu-Chen took her first vacation after her husband Chen was inaugurated as a President, she went to Japan. Her explanation for the chosen destination was that ‘Our families` older generation is used to eating Japanese food and they speak Japanese because they all were educated during the colonial rule.’114 Taiwanese youth, also, admires Japa- nese culture, especially pop culture filled with ‘Hello Kitty’, Doraemons, karaoke, etc.115 There is so called ‘Ha Ri Zu’ group of Japanophile youngsters who regard Japan as their ‘cultural Mecca.’116 Interestingly, Tai- wanese pop culture became very popular in Japan. Taiwanese movies and music stars became very popular among Japanese youngsters or so called ‘Ha Tai Zu’ (Taiwanophile geeks).117 Moreover, people-to-people exchanges are actively developing in tourism sector, what brings Japan and Taiwan better understanding and closeness. From the international point of view, Taiwan rarely criticized Japan for its colonial past and never demanded apology from Japan unlike China and Koreas, thus, remained ‘the only soothing voice in Japan’s regional environment.’118 Overall, Japan – Taiwan relations are based on unofficial political ties, common security concerns, cultural admiration, and economic interdependence.

112. Lam Peng Er, ‘Japan-Taiwan Relations: Between Affinity and Reality,’ Asian Affairs: An American Review, (January 2004): 249. 113. Masahiro Wakabayashi, ‘Taiwanese nationalism and the ‘unforgettable others’,’ in China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace, ed. Edward Frie- dman (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 5. 114. Lam Peng Er, ‘Japan-Taiwan Relations: Between Affinity and Reality,’ 251. 115. S. Daimon, ‘Taiwanese Youths becoming Japan fans,’ Japan Times, http:// search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn19990913a9.html (accessed August 15, 2012). 116. Jing Sun, ‘Japan-Taiwan Relations: Unofficial in Name Only,’Asian Survey, Vol. 47, Issue 5 (September/October 2007): 798. 117. Ibid., 801. 118. Ibid., 793. 68 Sino – Japan Relations

Since 1972, political relations between Japan and Taiwan were cut, and, therefore, various institutions and communication channels evolved to manage the bilateral relations. The significant step was ‘The change of name of Taiwan’s ‘virtual’ embassy from Association of East Asian Relations to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep- resentative Office (TECRO) in 1991 marked a notable change in the profile of Taiwan’s presence in Japan.’119 Moreover, unofficial political relations were developing at the individual level of political leaders, organizations and social groups. Especially, Lee Teng-hui`s personality fostered good bilateral relations. Lee being graduated from Kyoto University and fluent in Japanese charmed Japan. Not without the reason China was so anxious about the Taiwanese ‘Leader’ and his every single step to the US or to Japan. China was critical about the fact that Japan issued visa for Lee for the purpose of seeking medical treatment in Japan in 2001. In 2005, Chinese were even more an- tagonistic towards issuing visa for Lee Teng-hui to visit Japan from late December to early January. The governmental delegation from Japan was planning to pay a visit to Beijing, but it was postponed at the last minute at the request of the Chinese, ‘which was suspected to be their protest against Lee Teng-hui`s visit.’120 Despite of political dissatisfaction from Chinese side, Lee continued to foster Japan and Taiwan relations even after his departure from big politics. President Chen was pushing Lee for unofficial visits to Japan in order to promote bilateral relations.121 Both countries ‘are consciously gathering younger parliamentarians into their friendship clubs to ensure the continuity of personal rapport.’122 Taiwan`s President Chen Shui-bian was, also, friendly with Ja- pan. DPP, even though it lacks strong ties with Japan’s LDP, was developing social connections with other parties in Japan.123 In 2003, ex-Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, a close friend of Taiwan, visited

119. Phil Deans, ‘The Taiwan question: Reconciling the irreconcilable,’ in Chinese- Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Complementarity and Conflict, ed. Marie Söderberg (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 94. 120. Seichiro Takagaki, ‘The Taiwan factor in Japan-China relations,’ 122. 121. Qingxin Ken Wang, ‘Taiwan in Japan’s Relations with China and the United States after the Cold War,’ Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73. No. 3 (Autumn 2000): 359. 122. Lam Peng Er, ‘Japan-Taiwan Relations: Between Affinity and Reality,’ 258. 123. Ibid., 249. 69 Introduction to Asian Studies

Taipei as a private citizen. He noticed Chen to be ‘careful’ about his referendum plans. He visited Taiwan in 2006. Moreover, at unofficial ‘embassy’ level Japan and Taiwan relations remain strong. The head of the Taipei Office of the Interchange Association Katsuhisa Uchida was one of the most pro-Taiwan Japanese envoys ever. He ‘even went so far as to hold the first local celebration of Japanese Emperor Aki- hito’s birthday since Japan severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1972.’124 Under the Chen administration, there was slow but steady upgrade of Japan-Taiwan relations. Chen`s goal was to upgrade the relations to a ‘quasi-alliance’ level similar to that of the US – Japan alliance, and encourage Japanese to pass law similar to the Taiwan Relations Act of the US.125 Nevertheless, Chen worried Japan with his ‘referendums’ ideas which could destabilize regional stability. Japan’s Government did not support this policy and ‘was critical of [the] intention to intro- duce the mechanism of a referendum which could be used in the future to decide on the issue of de jure independence for the island.’126 Because of Chen`s ‘separatist agenda’, Tokyo at that time ‘became cooler to the idea of an independent Taiwan and keener on maintaining the status quo.’127 New Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou (in office since May 20, 2008) before becoming a President was called by the Japanese ‘anti- Japanese and close to China (反日親中hannichi, Shinchuu).’128 His ‘troubles’ with Japan begun in 2006 during his visit to Japan, Tokyo and Yokohama cities. In 2006, he was elected a chairman of Guo- mindang, and, therefore, he was viewed as close to the PRC and pro- one-China, and, thus, not a very effective mediator between Tokyo and Taipei. Japan was, also, disappointed by Ma`s inaugural speech,

124. Jamie Miyazaki, ‘Japan: Don`t rock the cross-Strait boat,’ Asia Times, http:// www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FB20Dh01.html (accessed August 2, 2012). 125. Brian Bridges and Che-po Chan, ‘Looking North: Taiwan’s Relations with Ja- pan under Chen Shui-bian,’ Pacific Affairs, Volume 81, No. 4 (Winter 2008- 2009): 583. 126. Seichiro Takagaki, ‘The Taiwan factor in Japan-China relations,’ 121. 127. Jamie Miyazaki, ‘Japan: Don`t rock the cross-Strait boat’. 128. T.W. Lim, ‘Japan’s Views of Ma Ying Jeou`s Accession to Power: an End to an Illusion?,’ EAI Background Brief No. 391 (July 2008), http://www.eai.nus.edu. sg/BB391.pdf (accessed August 8, 2012). 70 Sino – Japan Relations where he failed to mention Japan, despite of the presence of seventy- one member in Japan’s delegation.129 According to the Taiwan’s Gov- ernment Information Office and the Japanese source news, delegation leader Takeo Hiranuma ‘who serves in Japan’s powerful House of Representatives and leads a pro-Taiwan caucus, politely rapped Ma after the speech.’130 However, Ma himself thinks, that closer cross-strait relations are better for Japan and East Asian security. He stated, that closer Sino- Taiwanese relations ‘is not just significant for Taiwan and China; it’s also significant for Japan because Japan and Taiwan can continue maintaining their friendship without having to make difficult decisions with the Taiwan Strait in mind.’131 Furthermore, there were other initiatives for handling bilateral relations. In 1999, under the lead of pro-Taiwanese Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro and Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou the sister-city relations between Tokyo and Taipei were established. In the following year, Yokohama and Gaoxiong established the same kind of relations. Also, the Japan’s Diet members established working groups to promote contacts with Taiwan. Here, the Guomintang and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party are very active to develop social networks. For instance, the Nikkakon (Ni-Ka Kankei Giin Kondankai or 日華懇談會) group founded in 1973 by twenty-seven right-wing LDP members such as Ishii Mitsuhiro and Funada Naka is still upholding friendly ties with Taiwanese counterparts.132 There are even more informal actors willing to broaden relations with Taiwan. Well known nationalist Ishihara Shintaro organized the Senrankai (Blue Storm Society) to support Taiwan. The society is a club for ‘conservative politicians and addressed a variety of domes-

129. ‘Taiwan’s Ma omits Japan in inaugural speech, despite presence of 71 in Japan delegation,’ http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/taiwans-ma-o mits-japan-in-inaugural-speech-despite-presence-of-71-in-delegation (accessed May 26, 2012). 130. M.S. Chang and Ch.H. Fan, ‘Disappointment in Tokyo over Ma`s inaugural speech,’ Taipei Times, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/05/26/2003412991 (accessed May 26, 2012). 131. ‘Taiwan’s China thaw good for Japan, Ma says,’ Japan Times, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080722a2.html (accessed August 8, 2012). 132. Phil Deans, ‘The Taiwan question: Reconciling the irreconcilable,’ 90. 71 Introduction to Asian Studies tic and foreign policy issues.’133 Strengthening relations with Taiwan is no longer the only goal for the organization. In general, young Jap- anese and Taiwanese leaders do not have personal experience with the period of colonization; therefore, they see bilateral relations from different angle and try to create new connections. Another significant group is a group of Taiwan-born pro-independence activists who spent their live in Japan as exiles. The most famous personalities include Jin Mei-ling, Huang Wen-hsiung, and Huang Chao-tang. They actively promoted Taiwan’s independence, published many pro-Japan and anti-China articles and books published by major conservative public houses such as Fusōsha and Kōdansha. For instance, Huang Wen-hsiung published articles with the titles like Minikui Chūgokujin (The ugly Chinaman), Taiwan ha nihonjin ga tsukutta (Taiwan was build by the Japanese), etc.134 Important to notice, that current political relations between Japan and Taiwan are implemented by new generation leadership ‘who is composed of a new postwar generation that has different outlook on relations … than that of the previous generation, which had direct experiences and linkages with the past colonial era.’135 The existing political sympathy is mostly based on individual relations rather than on institutionalized system, and, therefore, is fragile. But, so far, the ‘fragility’ does not endanger good intentions and stability in region. It even provides a good model of friendly neighboring interaction and hope for the peaceful future between Japanese and Chinese. In the post-1972 period, security was of minimal importance to the Taiwan issue in Japan-China relations. Responding the reali- ties after the Cold War, Japan ‘has gradually begun to look at the Taiwan question as a security issue.’136 Especially, military security ‘reemerged as a significant factor in 1995, [when] ‘securitization’ of the Straits has shifted significantly.’137 The event provided the background for the conclusion of ‘U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Secu-

133. Jing Sun, ‘Japan-Taiwan Relations: Unofficial in Name Only,’ 799–800. 134. Ibid., 800. 135. ‘Taiwan-Japan Ties Face Critical Era. Editorial,’ Taiwan News, 15 March, 2006, http://taiwansecurity.org/TN/2006/TN-150306-1.htm (accessed May 3, 2012). 136. Soeya Yoshihide, ‘Taiwan in Japan’s Security Considerations,’ The China Quar- terly, No. 165, Taiwan in the 20th Century (March 2001): 141. 137. Phil Deans, ‘The Taiwan question: Reconciling the irreconcilable,’ 96. 72 Sino – Japan Relations rity: Alliance for the 21st Century’ in April 1996, where the issues of Theatre Missile Defense system and Taiwan appeared. Taiwan’s defense situation is ‘still the most dangerous element in regional security – the one factor that could easily and quickly lead to a major power conflict.’ In case of conflict Japan would -al low ‘use of U.S. bases on Japanese land for Taiwan’s defense.’138 Thus, China is carefully monitoring Japanese strategic concerns in Taiwan. Officially, Japan follows pro-one-China policy based on 1972 Japan- China Joint Communique, however, Japan – Taiwan relations have been maintained as working relations on a non-governmental basis.139 Generally speaking, Taiwan is a special place for Japan, because they have common economic and political systems, support the US leadership in the region and global arena, a shared security threat from China. In turn, Chinese believe that Japan is seeking to dominate over South East Asia, and ‘that Taiwan separated from PRC but closely tied to Japan will help fulfill these goals.’140

4. 3. Territorial Dispute: Diaoyu or Senkaku? In addition to ‘historical’ tension, China and Japan dispute over Di- aoyu (in Chinese) or Senkaku (in Japanese) islands in the East China Sea. Countries disagree ‘over the demarcation line of the East China Sea between the Ryukyu Island chain and the Chinese coast.’141 Ja- pan and China claim to own them, and their diputes periodically causes a minor crisis in Sino – Japan relations.142 Interesting to notice, that even though territorial problem was known and discussed in one way or another during many decades, however, the PRC did not claim the islands until the United Nations (UN) report about possibly huge oil and gas resources found in Senkakus area was published in 1968 and confirmed by Japanese in 1969. Only in 1970 China claimed the islands for the first time, and since then, the dis-

138. Benjamin Self, ‘China and Japan: A Façade of Friendship,’ 85. 139. ‘Taiwan,’ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/taiwan/index.html (accessed May 22, 2012). 140. Denny Roy, ‘The Sources and Limits of Sino-Japanese Tensions,’ 202. 141. Denny Roy, ‘The Sources and Limits of Sino-Japanese Tensions,’ 198. 142. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 82–88. 73 Introduction to Asian Studies pute between the PRC and Japan became tense.143 The issue became ‘the forefront of East Asian diplomacy, interestingly, at the end of the Cold War.’144 As a matter of fact, Taiwan also claims the islands being a part its territory. The islands have a land area of only 6.3 square kilometers and located ‘approximately 120 nm northeast of Taiwan, 200 nm east of the Chinese mainland, and 200 nm southwest of Okinawa. … the largest island, Uotsuri/Diaoyu, which covers roughly 8 hectares and lies 170 km northeast of Taiwan and 410 km west of Okinawa.’145 In addition, eight small uninhabited islands are, also, important geopolitically, because they are close to important international sea routes. Talking about the legal basis, there are several important documents worth to be mentioned. First of all, the rules of the game are defined by the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (came into force in 1994).146 It says, that countries ‘should act according to the fair principle development negotiations, seek means which both sides can accept. When there is a disagreement on the demarcation of EEZs [Exclusive Economic Zone] between any countries, the law stipulates that the parties concerned should avoid anything that could undermine an eventual agreement.’147 (See Map 1) In 1996, there was an agreement reached by China, Japan and South Korea declaring an EEZ of 200 miles.148 As for China, it conducts its activities in the disputed area based on the ‘Law of the People`s Repub- lic of China on its Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas’ of 1992, which ‘included not only the South China Sea, but also explicitly

143. Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balan- cing to Bandwagoning? (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 49. 144. J. Ferguson, ‘The Diaoyutai-senkaku Islands Dispute Reawakening,’ The Ja- mestown Foundation. China Brief. Volume: 4, Issue: 3., http://www.jamestown. org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3623 (accessed August 18, 2012). 145. ‘Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands,’ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ war/senkaku.htm (accessed August 18, 2012). 146. ‘UN Convention of the Law of the Sea,’ http://www.un.org/Depts/los/con- vention_agreements/convention_agreements.htm (accessed April 20, 2012). 147. ‘Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands,’ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ war/senkaku.htm (accessed April 18, 2012). 148. Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balan- cing to Bandwagoning?, 55. 74 Sino – Japan Relations

Map 1. Senkaku Islands

Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/East_China_Sea/Full.html, (accessed May 18, 2012). the Senkaku Islands.’149 That same year, Japanese Prime Minister Mi- yazawa tried to discuss the Chinese Law, but China’s leadership was not willing to open this question and left it for the future. In September 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto finally reached the agreement in Beijing. Both countries agreed about ‘a 200-mile- wide ‘joint management zone’ that would allow fishing in the area by both nations and coordinated utilization of resources.’150 According to this agreement, the fishing zone was defined between 127 degrees 30 minutes east and 124 degrees 45 minutes east longitude, ‘where the boats from the two countries may catch fish without prior approval from their respective governments.’151 However, Chinese warships and research vessels increased their activities in the area ignoring the reached agreement. During the period of 1996-2000, Chinese vessels intruded Japanese EEZ about 92 times.152 This, of course, caused Japanese dissatisfaction and, thus, the high possibility for the future

149. Ibid., 50. 150. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, 87. 151. Reinhard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balan- cing to Bandwagoning?, 56. 152. Ibid., 57. 75 Introduction to Asian Studies tensions remained. In 2001, China and Japan agreed that ‘Chinese authorities must notify Japan before entering the country’s territorial sea, including the waters around the disputed islands.’153 Not only politicians, but also patriotic activists of each country are involved into the issue and play a role in bilateral tension. In July 1996, a group of Japanese established a lighthouse in the islands, and this caused a wave of anti-Japanese protests in Hong-Kong and Tai- wan. Taiwan is, also, a claimant of the islands, and what Beijing is happy about, because ‘It helps China make the point that the issue is truly about ‘Chinese nationalism’, not self-serving propaganda. [And] the Senkakus issue threatens to alienate Taiwan from Japan.’154 Pro- tests persisted throughout 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005.155 In September 2010, Japan seized a Chinese trawler near to the islands. It sparked a serious diplomatic tension. In September 2012, Japanese Government revealed its plans to purchase three islands out of eight to promote their peaceful development. However, Chinese President Hu Jintao reaffirmed that China opposes Japan`s claims and islands belong to China. Anti-Japan protests erupted in Beijing. Besides political tensions, China and Japan have economic interests in the area which include oil and gas production, fishing, and sea investigation. Chinese companies such as China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Sinopec Star Petroleum Corporation operate oil and gas fields in East China Sea. The major gas reserves lie in the Chunxiao (or Shirakaba in Japanese) fields which overlap the EEZ between two countries and create a tense situation. It is estimated that Chunxiao field will produce 70 billion cubic feet of gas annually, and by 2010 will reach 350 billion. This gas field will carry the gas to the Chinese coastal areas near Wenzhou.156 Other contest-

153. Linus Hagström, Japan`s China Policy: A relational power analysis, 150. 154. J. Tkacik, ‘Clear signal needed on disputed isles,’ Taipei Times, http://www. taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/06/27/2003415879 (accessed April 18, 2012). 155. ‘Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands,’ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ war/senkaku.htm (accessed April 18, 2012). 156. Harrison S. Selig, ‘Seabed Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Coop- eration?,’ (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, 2005), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/docs/Asia_petroleum.pdf (accessed April 18, 2012), 3. 76 Sino – Japan Relations

Table 1. Table 2. Estimated Gas Reserves Estimated Oil Reserves

Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/East_China_Sea/Full.html (accessed May 18, 2012). ed gas and oil fields are Canxue, Baoyunting, Duanqiao, Wuyunting, Tianwaitian. According to the estimations made by CNOOC in 2006, the total gas reserves are 363.5 bcf, and total oil reserves are 17.9 million barrels.157 (See Table 1, Table 2) At the political level, China and Japan were trying to find a solution how to explore gas and oil fields in a soft way. Since 2004 to 2007, there were official talks carried eleven times. Countries proposed to create a joint development zone, but neither side still agreed on the final verdict. It is obvious, that countries are wishful to improve conflicting situation, overcome pessimistic moods and to look for brighter future prospects. In 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited China. In 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid a visit to Japan and had fruitful dialogue with Prime Minster Shinzo Abe. It was first Prime Minister’s visit to Japan since 2000 when Premier Zhu Rongji came to Tokyo. In Tokyo both Prime Ministers signed a joint statement ‘mentioning their countries` deepening economic relations and a shared determination to tackle global warming once the Kyoto protocol ends in 2012.’158 Interesting to notice, that historical problems were left aside and neither politician wanted to discuss historical issues in depth. They only stated that ‘‘We resolve to face up to history open up good, forward looking relations to a beautiful future.’’159

157. ‘East China Sea,’ Energy Information Administration, Official Energy Statistics from the US Government, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/East_China_Sea/ Full.html (accessed April 20, 2012). 158. ‘Chinese PM`s visit to Japan signals thaw in relations,’ The Guardian, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/apr/11/japan.china (accessed April 10, 2012). 159. Ibid. 77 Introduction to Asian Studies

Furthermore, President Hu Jintao paid a visit to Tokyo in May, 2008. Then Chinese President and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fu- kuda began to speak about a ‘warm spring’ in bilateral relations. Hu Jintao even played ping-pong with a Japanese champion and offered Japan to lend two giant pandas.160 During that visit Hu Jintao ‘played down wartime grudges and played up pragmatic cooperation.’161

4. 4. The US and East Asian Security The US play a very important role trying to promote peace and stability and secure own interests in Asia – Pacific. After the Cold War, the US reorganized their military forces in the region. Essential changes were made in 1990–1992, at the same time EASI – East Asia Strategy Initiative was published. According to this initiative, the US marched off military forces from the Philippines. In addition, it was planned to march off military forces from South Korea, but due to North Korean nuclear policy the decision was delayed. Furthermore, Japan and the US signed the Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century to keep security and to support democratization processes in East Asia.162 The US understand that East Asian countries became singnificant players on international stage. Furthermore, important to notice, that the most significant US ally in East Asia is Japan. Both countries have security engagement since 1951 when bilateral security treaty was signed. According to this treaty, the US obtained the right to deploy their military forces in Japan, mostly in Okinawa Island.163 In 1958-1960, the treaty was revised. In 1989-1992, due to Tiananmen incident in China, FSX contra version (when Japan was required by the US to use only American airplanes, and not devise their own technologies) and Persian Gulf

160. ‘On Visit to Japan, China’s Hu Has No Time for Olds Grudges,’ The Washing- ton Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/09/ AR2008050902724.html (accessed April 10, 2012). 161. Ibid. 162. ‘Japan – U. S. Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century, 17 April 1996,’ http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html (accessed April 23, 2012). 163. P. Calvocoressi, Pasaulio politika 1945–2000, (ALK, Briedis, 2001), (In English: P. Calvocoressi, World Politics in 1945–2000), 116. 78 Sino – Japan Relations crisis, the US and Japan relations experienced transition.164 Persian Gulf crisis demonstrated that Japan is not ready to provide military assistance to the US. Americans asked for technological help, however, Japanese support was only financial. The US were disappointed by Japanese ‘check-book diplomacy.’ The situation demonstrated that both allies should rethink their obligations to each other in order to promote stability in the region. The US and Japan recognized new challenges in their relationship after the Cold War. Moreover, the US and Japan spend big part of their budgets for military and defense needs. This helps to lead the regional security and stability and coun- terbalance China`s modernization. As for Taiwan, under the Taiwan Relations Act issued in 1979, the island became a subject of the US domestic law, albeit the law is not binding. The purpose of the Act is: ‘To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pa- cific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by autho- rizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, and for other purposes.’ Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled.165 Furthermore, in 2005, for the first time Japan joined the Bush administration in identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a ‘common strategic objective.’166 Overall, there are pros and cons for the US and Japan security alliance in the region. Talking about the pros, the alliance has a de- fensive and deterrent role, and is simply the best available post-Cold War security arrangement, and there is no better alternative. And on the contrary, there is an opinion, that the alliance is driven by

164. Hiroshi Nakanishi, ‘Japanese Relations with the United States,’ in The Golden Age of the US–China–Japan Triangle 1972–1989, eds. Ezra F. Vogel, Ming Yuan, and Akihiko Tanaka (Harvard University Press, 2002), 183. 165. ‘Taiwan Relations Act,’ Public Law 96-8 96th Congress, U. S. Department of State, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html (accessed April 25, 2012). 166. Anthony Faiola, ‘Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan,’ The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33297-2005Feb17.html (accessed April 25, 2012). 79 Introduction to Asian Studies increasing economic imperialism and that ‘Japanese are reluctant to engage in wars in other parts of the region simply in the interests of the US.’167 However, the reality shows that Japan recently is demonstrating more will to act in the region independently, and ‘Evi- dence of activism can be found in Japanese willingness, for instance, to participate in a search for solutions to regional conflicts.’168 The country has reformed the Defense Agency into the Ministry of De- fense, also, there are some signs that Japan wants to change its ‘Peace Constitution’, especially, the Article 9. This article limits Japanese participation in military conflicts.

Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.169

Japan is willing to join various security activities; however, it has to deal with its controversial historical past and the sensitive neighbors, which are carefully observing Japan`s behavior in regional and global levels. In order to remain independent and form its own security agenda in East Asian region Japan ‘avoids having to choose between the United States and China.’170 The US factor is very significant for Sino – Japanese relations. The article of Paul Milford perfectly reflects the importance of the US- Japan alliance in the region, and, also, considers China’s perception of the US and Japan. The author is testing the hypothesis that China is balancing against perceived aggressiveness rather than balanc-

167. Ashok Kapur, Regional Security Structures in Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 155. 168. Javed S. Maswood, ‘Conclusion,’ in Japan and East Asian Regionalism, ed. Ja- ved S. Maswood (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 132. 169. ‘The Constitution of Japan,’ http://www.constitution.org/cons/japan.txt (accessed January 24, 2012). 170. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Japan and Asian-Pacific Security,’ in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, eds. J.J Suh, Pe- ter J. Katzenstein and Allen Carlson (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004), 117. 80 Sino – Japan Relations ing against power. In 1997, Japan and the US revised Defense Guide- lines, and China ‘reflected the concern that the revised Guidelines are transforming the alliance from a vehicle that contains Japanese militarization into a vehicle that promotes it.’171 In 1993, former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro claimed that ‘the existence of the Japan – US security pact means that the US has the capability of monitoring the Japanese military capability, and this generates a sense of security among our Asian neighbors.’172 Later Japanese Prime Ministers such as Murayama and Mori explained to other Asian states, that ‘a Japan aligned to the United States is better than a non-aligned Japan.’173 The revised 1997 US – Japan Defense Guidelines specify forms of military cooperation between two countries. Originally the Guide- lines were put into effect in 1978. According to the revised document, defense cooperation was expanded not only to repel a direct attack against Japan, but also for crisis ‘situations’ surrounding Japan.174 The concept of ‘situations surrounding areas’ are rather situational than geographical. The Guidelines, also, expanded the role of Self Defence Forses (SDF) to deal with regional conflicts, participate in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. But SDF involvement should not exceed the non-combat role. SDF can offer logistical support for sea transportation of personnel and materials to U.S. ships, for non- combat evacuation operations, cooperation in surveillance, minesweeping, search and rescue, etc. There is only one case, in which SDF can use force, it is if ships refuse to obey ‘Japanese inspection in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions.’175 China was alarmed by the revised Guidelines and began worry- ing about strengthening of American power and expanded military cooperation with Japan. China feared that revised Guidelines will weaken the containment function of the alliance and promote Japan’s strategic independence. In 1997, Jiang Zemin visited the US President

171. Paul Milford, ‘China Views the Revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines: Popping the Cork?,’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 4 (2004): 115. 172. Ibid., 121. 173. Ibid., 122. 174. Daojiong Zha, ‘The Taiwan Problem in Japan-China Relations: an Irritant or Destroyer?,’ 216. 175. Paul Milford, ‘China Views the Revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines: Pop- ping the Cork?,’ 125. 81 Introduction to Asian Studies

Bill Clinton who tried to reassure that the revised Guidelines were not directed towards China. Yet, Jiang said that ‘We still hear occa- sional echoes of Japanese militarism that are inconsistent with history, so we need to be alert against it.’176 Not only China’s president was concerned about revised Guidelines, but also China’s military, media such as People’s Daily, Chinese scholars, and all of them agree ‘that if the Japan-US alliance breaks up Japan would become a military great power, and this would have a significantly detrimental effect of China.’177 There were two goals important for China, first one, to prevent Japan’s military autonomy, the second, support the alliance as a containing means to Japan’s growing militarism. China was, also, critical about the strengthening of Japan’s SDF. Even though SDF participated in peacekeeping or minesweeping operations, China was still sensitive towards Japanese military overseas activities. The US decision to establish Theater Missile Defense program (TMD), also, concerns China. The PRC believes that ‘TMD will have a dangerously destabilizing effect on the arms race between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.’178

Task No. 1: Fill in the table. Bilateral visits and meetings in 1972–2011. Date Who were the Where did the meet- What was the goal participants of the ing take place? and outcome of the meeting? meeting? September 1972

August 1978

April 1989

176. Ibid., 128. 177. Ibid., 131. 178. Yuan I, ‘Cooperation and Conflict: The Offense-Defense Balance in Cross- Strait Relations,’ Issues & Studies, 33:2 (February 1997): 1–20. 82 Sino – Japan Relations

Date Who were the Where did the meet- What was the goal participants of the ing take place? and outcome of the meeting? meeting? April 1992

October 1992

September 1997

1998

2000

October 2006

April 2007

December 2007

May 2008

October 2008

September 2009

December 2011

83 Introduction to Asian Studies

Task No. 2:

This list sets out the issues that pose the biggest problems in relations between China and Japan. Describe all of them in brief and try to provide arguments as to how these problems could be resolved.

Possible solution Problem China’s position Japan’s position method Military expenditure

Communism

Human rights

Population growth in China

Interpretation of history

Yasukuni Shrine

Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands

Taiwan

Environmental situation

84 Sino – Japan Relations Task No. 3:

Read the text and answer the following questions.

What treaty is this? Which political leaders of the countries signed it?

Which basic principles of bilateral cooperation do they define?

August 12, 1978

Japan and the People’s Republic of China,

Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China issued a Joint Communique in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis.

Confirming that the above-mentioned Joint Communique constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the Joint Com- munique should be strictly observed.

Confirming that the principles of the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected.

Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world.

For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries.

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

85 Introduction to Asian Studies

Japan: Minister for Foreign Affairs Sunao Sonoda

People’s Republic of China: Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

[Article I] 1. The Contracting Parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. 2. The Contracting Parties confirm that, in conformity with the fore- going principles and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, they shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

[Article II] The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

[Article III] The Contracting parties shall, in the good-neighborly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, endeavor to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.

[Article IV] The present Treaty shall not affect the position of either Contracting Party regarding its relations with third countries.

86 Sino – Japan Relations

[Article V] 1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of tools of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present Treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2. 2. Either Contracting Party may, by giving one year’s written notice to the other Contracting Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978. For Japan For the People’s Republic of China

Found: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html; reviewed on 20 August 2012.

Questions for discussion 1. Which issues, in your opinion, cause the biggest tension in relations between China and Japan: Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands? Taiwan? Yasukuni Shrine? Human rights? China’s population growth? Provide substantiation. 2. What is the significance of the interpretation of history in Sino – Japanese relations? 3. What is the importance of the year 1937 in Sino – Japanese relations? What is the difference in the opinion of China and Japan on the events of that time? 4. What is the attitude of China towards the changing security policy of Japan? 5. What is the attitude of the US towards the security of East Asia? 6. What is the importance of the US for the security policy of Japan? 7. What is the position of China in respect of the security alliance between the US and Japan?

87 Introduction to Asian Studies

Recommended reading and websites 1. Bush, Richard, The perils of proximity : China – Japan security relations. Brookings Institution Press, 2010. 2. Kang, David, China rising : peace, power, and order in East Asia. Columbia University Press, 2010. 3. Nancy, Bernkopf Tucker, Dangerous strait : the US-Taiwan- China crisis. Columbia University Press. 2005. 4. Steven K. Vogel, U.S.-Japan relations in a changing world. Brookings Institution Press, 2002. 5. Taiwan Security Research. http://www.taiwansecurity.org/. 6. National Institute for Defense Studies. http://www.nids.go.jp/ english/index.html 7. China Institute of International Studies. http://www.ciis.org. cn/english/node_521155.htm. 8. Center for Strategic and International Studies. East Asia and the Pacific. http://csis.org/region/asia 5. Political Development of the South and North Koreas

The Korean Peninsula countries – South Korea and North Korea – are countries which are very close both geographically and historically. Maintenance of security, stability, and peace in the peninsula is highly important to the whole region of East Asian. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was proclaimed in 1948. In 1950, Repub- lic of Korea declared its independence. In 1987, Roh Tae-woo was elected President in democratic elections, thus terminating a 26-year long military dictatorship. Since then, elections are held according to democratic principles. North Korea is suffering from economic deprivation. Undertaken in 1987–1993, an attempt of economic reforms failed. North Koreans suffer from starvation. North Korea receives strong support from Russia and China. The country is dominated by a military dictatorship. Top-level dialogue with South Korea was resumed in Septem- ber 1990. The two parties signed such agreements as theNorth-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation and the Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearisation. Consultations between the parties were suspended in 1994 when it was suspected that North Korea developed nuclear weapons. Confrontation between the countries lasts since the Korean War, which took place in 1950–1953. Ten- sion increased when in 2005 North Korea officially announced that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defence.

Task No. 1:

Fill in the table about the Republic of Korea (South Korea)

Geographic position

Capital city

89 Introduction to Asian Studies

Borders at the following countries

Population

Ethnic groups

Languages

Religions

Administrative division

Monetary unit

Public holidays

Membership in international organisations

Fig. 5. 1. The Republic of Korea

Found: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/map template_ks.html; reviewed on 20 August 2012.

90 Political Development of the South and North Koreas

Fig. 5. 2. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Found: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptem- plate_kn.html; reviewed on 20 August 2012.

Task No. 2:

Fill in the table about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

Geographic position

Capital city

Borders at the following countries

Population

Ethnic groups

Languages

Religions

91 Introduction to Asian Studies

Administrative division

Monetary unit

Public holidays

Membership in international organisations

Task No. 3:

Briefly describe the most important periods of Korea’s history (What are the most important features of that period? What are the most important political events? Who are the most important historical figures?)

What is the impor- Most important tance of that period Period Personalities events for Korea’s political development? Colonial Korea 1910–1945

Provisional Government

1919–1948 Divided Korea

1945–…

92 Political Development of the South and North Koreas

Task No. 4:

Answer the following questions: Who are these personalities and what is their importance in North Korea and South Korea’s political life? Fill in the table by entering their names, surnames, key biographical facts and achievements.

(1912–1994) (1942–2011) (1983 or 1984–…) (1941–…)

Task No. 5:

Name the four political parties of the Republic of Korea. Chose one party and present a brief history of its establishment as well as current activity guidelines and programme provisions. Specify the role of this party in the political life of the Republic of Korea.

5. 1. Martial law in North Korea Since 1962, North Korea has been strengthening its military forces on the four principles of its Military Guidelines: ‘…to arm the entire population; to fortify the entire country; to train the entire army as a

93 Introduction to Asian Studies

‘cadre army’; and to modernise weaponry, doctrine, and tactics under the principle of self-reliance in national defense.’ Following these principles, North Korea seeks to become a huge military system. Big funds are allocated for defence. Each year, they range from 20% to 25% of the GDP. Military staff amounts to approximately 5% of all citizens. North Korean People’s Army has active military personnel of 1.13 million manpower and 8.2 million reserve manpower fit for military service. Military service age is 17 years and above. Country continu- ally strives to modernise its armament. It deploys ballistic missiles and is a potential manufacturer of chemical and biological weapons. Two thirds of the military forces are based near the demilitarisation zone at the border with South Korea.

5. 2. North Korea’s Nuclear Programme In 1968, 85% of countries of the world joined the NPT – Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, committing not to develop and not distribute any nuclear weapons, and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. In 1994, North Korea and the US signed an agreement under which North Korea abandoned its nuclear weapons development programme in exchange for international aid in constructing two nuclear power generating reactors. In 1995, the KEDO (Korean Energy Development Organisation) founded. Its main goal is to carry out energy-related projects as well as to ensure nuclear disarmament of the Korean Peninsula. The organisation has 13 members: Japan, South Korea, the United States, the European Union, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, Poland, Czech Republic, and Uzbekistan. In spite of the agreement, in 1998 North Korea launched a ballistic missile (believed to be a two-stage Taepodong 1) into the Pacific Ocean eastward over Japan, thus demonstrating the vulnerability of Japan and also of the whole Pacific region. In 1999, former Secre- tary of Defence William Perry visited Pyongyang and proposed the disarmament deal. North Korea promised to freeze its ballistic missile tests. U.S. President Bill Clinton relieved the economic sanctions against the communist state and allocated USD 4.6 billion for the construction of a safe nuclear power plant. 94 Political Development of the South and North Koreas

In 2001, George Bush’s administration negotiated the re-normal- isation of relations; however, at the same time, the State Department reported that the Koreans were testing the Taepodong-1 missile. George Bush warned North Korea not to terrorise other countries. In 2002, he named the ‘Axis of Evil’ countries: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, arguing that they posed a serious threat to the international community. In October 2002, the leaders of the US, Japan, and South Korea met at the Pacific Congress in Mexico and agreed to attempt to resolve the problem of nuclear weapons in a peaceful manner. In De- cember, North Korea resumed tests in Yongbyon Nuclear Site. Then, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the nuclear watchdog of the United Nations, warned North Korea that it had to comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Despite of these warnings, North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003. US State Security Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that the US was prepared to deploy 24 bombers in the Pacific region. In Feb- ruary, North Korea again fired ballistic missiles between the Korean Peninsula and Japan. In August, Washington announced that China, Beijing would hold six-party talks between the US, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia. North Korea demanded that in the talks the United States should sign a non-aggression pact and should not carry out a hostile policy. In February 2005, North Korea officially announced that it had developed nuclear weapons. It continues nuclear and missile testing not only inside the country, but also close to Japan shores, thus causing insecurity and instability in the region.

Task No. 6:

Read the editorial from Japan Times and answer the following questions.

1. Which important problems are covered in the message? 2. How are they sought to be resolved? 3. What is Japan’s position? 4. What is North Korea’s position?

EDITORIAL / Wednesday, Sep. 5, 2012

95 Introduction to Asian Studies

A dialogue with North Korea Japan and North Korea on Aug. 31 ended three days of talks in Beijing and agreed to hold a new round of talks, which will be upgraded with the participation of bureau chiefs of each country’s foreign ministry. The Beijing talks were the first held by the two countries in four years and the first since Mr. Kim Jong Un became the leader of North Ko- rea in December 2011 following the death of his father, Kim Jong Il. It is hoped that both countries will establish a permanent chan- nel for official communications that can serve as a basis for solving bilateral problems ranging from the North’s nuclear weapons program to the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents. For the next round of talks, both sides agreed to take up topics that interest both sides. Apart from the North’s nuclear weapons program, the abduction of Japanese nationals is the most important issue for Japan. Tokyo could not get a clear promise from Pyongyang that the abduction issue would be taken up at the next talks. Tokyo should strive to persuade Pyongyang to discuss this issue. It is especially important to remind Pyongyang of the August 2008 agreement to establish a joint committee to investigate the abduction issue in exchange for a partial lifting of Japan’s economic sanctions against the North. Ten years ago, in September 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koi- zumi visited Pyongyang for the first time. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il apologized for the abduction and Mr. Koizumi came back to Japan with five Japanese nationals who had been abducted. But 12 other Japanese abductees, including Ms. Megumi Yokota, are still unaccounted for. Although the North insists that Ms. Yokota is dead, reports exist that she is still alive. In addition, there are about 470 missing Japanese nationals who may have also been abducted by North Korean agents. The Beijing talks followed Aug. 9-10 talks held in China’s capital between the North Korean Red Cross and the Japanese Red Cross Society on the repatriation of the remains of some 22,000 Japanese who died on the Korean Peninsula shortly before or after the end of World War II. Since North Korea has brought the humanitarian

96 Political Development of the South and North Koreas issue to the fore, Japan should utilize this opportunity to press for progress in the resolution of the abduction issue. North Korea may be trying to obtain economic aid from Japan in exchange for the return of the remains. The Noda administration should not push for quick results in the talks; instead it should maintain a resolute attitude toward the nuclear weapons program and abduction issues. At the same time, it must be wise enough to adopt a flexible approach when the right moment arrives.

Found: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/ed20120905a1.html; reviewed on 10 Sep- tember 2012.

Questions for discussion 1. What threat does North Korea’s Nuclear Programme pose to the region of East Asia? 2. What is the role of the US in ensuring security and stability in East Asia? 3. What scenario of the reunification of South and North Koreas might be?

Recommended reading and websites 1. Bleiker, Roland, Divided Korea. Minneapolis, London: Min- nesota University Press, 2005. 2. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization http://www.kedo.org/ 3. The Korea Times http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/index.asp 4. The Chosun Ilbo http://english.chosun.com/ 5. Rodong Sinmun (official newspaper of the Central Commit- tee of the Worker’s Party of Korea) http://www.rodong.rep.kp/ InterEn/ 6. Economic Development of East Asia

By economic indicators, the countries of the region of East Asian are among the strongest economies in the world. Two of them – China and Japan – are ranked among the top five. Since 2011, China is second, while Japan is the third economy in the world. Nevertheless, Japan belogs to the club of the developed countries, while China is still a developing country (developed countries are those with high gross domestic product per capita, highly developed service sector, knowledge-based economy, and high human development index). South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong belong to the list of developed countries, and North Korea to that of developing countries. South Korea became the first East Asian country with which the European Union signed a free trade agreement. 5 APEC (Asia – Pa- cific Economic Cooperation) member economies represent the East Asian region – China, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (under the name ‘Chinese Taipei’). First manufacturing investments between China and Taiwan were made in 1986 by small and medium sized companies.179 In 1987, 67% of Taiwan`s exports came from those companies. A decade later, this number has fallen to 49%.180 Taiwanese investment was often routed through third countries; therefore, it is not easy to make accurate assessments, but actually the number ranges from 55 billion USD to 100 billion USD.181 Initially, Taiwan’s investments were related with cheap labor-intensive goods manufactured for the export to developed countries, however, eventually, Taiwan began to transfer high-tech production.182 Therefore, the government of Taiwan put the limits on the amount of the investment to the Mainland. The

179. Kapur Harish, Taiwan in a Changing World: Search for Security (Bloomington, Indiana, USA: Anthor House, 2004), 193. 180. Chien-min Chao, ‘National Security vs. Economic Interests reassessing Taiwan’s mainland policy under Chen Shui-bian,’ Journal of Contemporary China, 13 (41), (November 2004): 696. 181. Philip C. Saunders, ‘Long-Term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implicati- ons for U.S. Taiwan Policy,’ Asian Survey, Vol. 45, Issue 6 (2005): 983. 182. Ibid., 983. 98 Economic Development of East Asia amount could not exceed 50 million dollars in high-tech and industrial sectors.183 The 1995–1996 cross-strait crisis temporarily slowed down Tais- hang (Taiwanese businessmen) investments into Mainland, but not bilateral trade.184 As Philip Yang writes, ‘When China is emerging to become a regional and global manufacturing center as well as the economic powerhouse, Taiwan’s prosperity clearly links to that of Mainland.’185 The numbers of investments and foreign trade clearly illustrate that Taiwan is becoming more dependent on China’s huge market; and current trade-and-investment relations are as much as advantage as a disadvantage. In 2003, China became Taiwan’s largest trading partner and China’s and Japan’s trade reached all-time high of 120 billion USD. Furthermore, China and Taiwan economic relations sometimes override political concerns. The case of ‘mini-three links’ demon- strates that trend. Governments in order to improve business conditions made a decision allowing direct trade, transportation, and postal links. For example, since 2008, the economic relations quickly increased by opening of direct flights between Mainland and Taiwan. Supposedly, the impact of direct flights could be as much as 0,82% of Taiwan’s total GDP.186 Japan’s economic role in cross-strait area is very significant, too. Chinese, Japanese and Taiwanese economies are highly interlinked. In 2006, Japan’s trade with China amounted 118,4 billion USD in exports, and 92.9 billion USD in imports. Japan invested in China 58,2 billion USD.187 In 2008, trade figures with Taiwan total 45,7 bil-

183. Kapur Harish, Taiwan in a Changing World: Search for Security, 194. 184. T.J. Cheng, ‘China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and Super- conductivity,’ in Dangerous Strait: The US–Taiwan–China Crisis, ed. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 103. 185. Philip Yang, ‘The Rise of China and the Cross-Strait Relations,’ Tamkang Jour- nal of International Affairs, Vol. IX, No. IV (April 2006), http://www2.tku.edu. tw/~ti/Journal/9-4/941.pdf (accessed January 14, 2012): 5. 186. Chu-chia Lin, ‘Direct Flight and the Economic Development of Taiwan,’ Con- ference Paper. The 35th Taiwan-American Conference on Contemporary China (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University; Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, 2008), 10. 187. ‘Japan-China Relations,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,http://www.mofa. go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/index.html (accessed May 17, 2012). 99 Introduction to Asian Studies lion USD in exports and 21.6 billion USD in imports. In 2007, Japa- nese investments in Taiwan total 1 billion USD.188 In general, Japan is a capital-providing country for China and technology-providing country for Taiwan. Furthermore, Japan was providing official development assistance (ODA) to China. In 2003, the revised ODA guidelines announced that financial assistance to China could be jeopardized if China will increase its military spending or will produce weapons of mass destruction. In any case, in 2005, Japan made a decision to suspend ODA in 2008.

Task No. 1:

Fill in the tables China / Japan

Economic indicators / Country China Japan GDP (Gross Domestic Product) GDP growth

GDP per capita

Labour force distribution by sectors (services, industry, and agriculture) Unemployment rate

Inflation rate

Exports / Export partners

Imports / Import partners

Government debt

188. ‘Taiwan. Economic Relations,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www. mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/taiwan/index.html (accessed May 17, 2012). 100 Economic Development of East Asia

South Korea / North Korea

Economic indicators / Country South Korea North Korea GDP (Gross Domestic Product) GDP growth

GDP per capita

Labour force distribution by sectors (services, industry, and agriculture) Unemployment rate

Inflation rate

Exports / Export partners

Imports / Import partners

Government debt

Taiwan / Hong Kong

Economic indicators / country Taiwan Hong Kong or location GDP (Gross Domestic Product) GDP growth

GDP per capita

Labour force distribution by sectors (services, industry, and agriculture) Unemployment rate

Inflation rate

101 Introduction to Asian Studies

Economic indicators / country Taiwan Hong Kong or location Exports / Export partners

Imports / Import partners

Government debt

6. 1. China

Task No. 2:

Answer the following questions:

1. Explain the principles of China’s Open Door Policy. 2. Describe China’s Four Modernisations. When did they start to be implemented? 3. Name China’s special economic zones.

102 Economic Development of East Asia

4. Who is this person? What are his merits to China’s economy?

6. 2. China and Taiwan’s economy

Task No. 3:

Read the message from The Taiwan News and answer the following questions.

Which agreement between China and Taiwan is covered in the text?

What is the significance of this agreement for China and Taiwan relations?

ECFA signing scheduled for June 29

The ‘early harvest’ list covers 539 Taiwanese products and 267 Chi- nese goods: officials

Taiwan and China will sign the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in the Chinese city of Chongqing next Tuesday, while the ‘early harvest’ list of tariff concessions will cover 539 Taiwanese products and 267 Chinese goods, officials said yesterday. The signing will occur despite fears that the accord will lead to the de- cline of Taiwan’s traditional economic sectors and harm its sovereignty by forming a first step toward unification with China. The tariffs would be cut or abolished in three stages over a period of two years, reports said, though 108 Taiwanese products would receive 103 Introduction to Asian Studies the zero tariff immediately, including 18 agricultural products ranging from fish to bananas. The advantage to Taiwan would amount to US$13.8 billion (NT$443 billion), reports said, while China would receive benefits estimated at US$2.8 billion (NT$90 billion). Premier Wu Den-yih said he could not say he was satisfied, but he could accept the result. He led senior members of his Cabinet to the Legislative Yuan yesterday afternoon for a report to its speaker, Wang Jin-pyng. ‘On the part of protecting our side, we protected it quite beautifully, but on the attack side, we didn’t get everything according to our wishes and aims, so more effort will be needed,’ Wu told reporters when arriving at the Legislative Yuan. Both sides are expected to hold negotiations months after the signing in the hope of expanding the list. The final details of the list and the timing and location for the signing of ECFA were worked out yesterday morning at a meeting in Taipei by delegations of the two semi-official bodies in charge of cross-straits negotiations, Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation and China’s Asso- ciation for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. The two top envoys, SEF Chairman P.K. Chiang and ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin, will arrive in Chongqing next Monday and sign ECFA as well as an expected agreement on the protection of intellectual property rights the following day. Chiang will also meet local Communist Party leader Bo Xilai, widely regarded as a reformist, before returning to Taiwan next Wednesday. After the Taipei preparatory meeting yesterday, Taiwan’s chief negotia- tor, SEF Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian, said Taiwan did not make any concessions. His Chinese counterpart, ARATS Vice Chairman Zheng Lizhong, said that China conceded everything that could be conceded, for example not demanding to export farm products or send workers to Taiwan. Democratic Progressive Party Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen said the Legislative Yuan should examine ECFA article by article and clause by clause. The opposition has accused the government of failing to provide sufficient details about the negotiating process. The agreement will also make Taiwan’s economy too dependent on China, the DPP said.

104 Economic Development of East Asia

The party released an opinion survey showing most respondents thought the gap between rich and poor would grow wider over the next year, while unemployment would also rise as a result of ECFA.

Found: http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1299089& lang=eng_news&cate_img=83.jpg&cate_rss=news_Politics_TAIWAN; reviewed on 15 September 2012.

Questions for discussion 1. What are the main causes of China’s economic growth? 2. What are differences and similarities of economic development in China and Taiwan? 3. What makes China’s economic model attractive to other countries? 4. How does China’s economic growth influence the security and stability of the region of East Asia?

6. 3. Japan

Task No. 4:

Since 2011, Japan is the third economy in the world. Referring to the text, name the main causes of the slowdown in Japan’s economy.

Which ways for promoting Japan’s economic growth would you offer? Japan: Economy slips to third in world By Kyung Lah, CNN February 14, 2011 Tokyo, Japan (CNN) – Japan has slipped to the world’s third largest economy, falling behind the blistering speed of China’s manufacturing growth, according to Japanese figures released Monday. Japan’s cabinet office released its nominal gross domestic product -fig ures for 2010. Japan’s economy was valued at US $5.4742 trillion dollars while China was at US $5.8786 trillion.

105 Introduction to Asian Studies

Japan’s economy did grow in 2010, but only 3.9%, according to the government. China’s is expected to grow more than 10%. At the speed China is growing, Japan’s government predicts China will overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy in less than 20 years. China has expanded domestic industries and infrastructure, driven by a surge in exports. Multinational corporations have expanded in China, taking advantage of low labor costs. Japan, meanwhile, has been stuck in stagnation and deflation for two decades. Decisive economic policy has been lost in the revolving door of the country’s top leader, with Japan seeing six prime ministers in just five years. Looking ahead, Japan is facing a demographic tsunami, with the world’s fastest aging population and one of the globe’s lowest birth rates. On the national debt issue, Japan’s parliament is struggling to cap its GDP-to-debt ratio, which is nearing 200% – the world’s highest among developed nations. The size of an economy does not tell the entire picture: Japan’s GDP per head is around $40,000 while China’s is $4,500. The standards of living remain remarkably different in the two countries. But the economic size of a country gives a snapshot of not just the financial influence of a nation, but its power in the world’s political sphere.

Found: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/02/13/japan.economy.third/index.html; reviewed on 15 September 2012.

6. 4. South and North Korea’s economy Task No. 5: Read the article from The Korea Times and answer the following questions. Compare the economic indicators and development principles of South and North Koreas. Referring to the information provided in the article, what is the attitude of South Korea towards North Korea? 01-05-2011 South Korean economy 37 times bigger than NK’s By Oh Young-jin

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Excluding its big guns and weapons of mass destruction, North Ko- rea is not a functioning country and has long lost its competition with South Korea, as a recent economic comparison released by Statistics Korea indicates. The comparison shows that South Korea’s per-capita gross national income (GNI) amounted to $17,175 at the end of 2009, about 18 times larger than the $960 tallied for the North. The South’s population is about twice as large as that of the North. The South’s nominal GNI totaled $837.2 billion, which is 37.4 times larger than the North’s $22.4 billion. GNI is often regarded as a truer indicator of a given country’s economic power. Asia’s fourth largest economy posted $686.6 billion in trade of 2009, compared with $3.4 billion for the North. South Korean companies exported $363.5 billion worth of products, while imports amounted to $323.1 billion. Exports and imports by the North stood at $1.1 billion and $2.4 billion, respectively. In 2009, the South produced 48.57 million tons of steel last year, compared with 1.26 million tons by the North. Cement production by the South reached 50.12 million tons while the North produced 6.13 million tons. In addition, the data showed that the combined length of roads in South Ko- rea was tallied at 104,983 kilometers, 4.1 times longer than 25,854km in the North. Power generation by the South was 18.5 times larger than the North. The North, however, led the South in the production of coal, its main kind of fuel, and total length of railroads, the primary means of transportation for long distance travels. The significance of the gap is made miniscule, considering the South relies on a much wider range of means of transportation including airplanes or buses and private cars and no longer uses coal as its primary energy source. Statistically speaking, the gap in terms of economy is so big that a comparison is meaningless. The North is trying to make up for the gap with its military might. It still enjoys a numerical advantage in terms of military hardware, al-

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though experts say that their tanks and airplanes are outdated and can’t compete with South Korean weapon systems. One thing that Pyongyang has plenty of is its adventurism that was il- lustrated by its artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in the West Sea and torpedo attack on a South Korean naval vessel. Pyongyang still insists on its military-first policy with much of its scarce resources being devoted to maintaining its armed forces. This, together with its rigid central planning, is attributed to losing its headstart over the South after the 1945 liberation from Japanese colonial rule that left more industrial infrastructure in the North than in the South. Found: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2011/01/123_79235.html; reviewed on 15 September 2012.

6. 5. Energy and environmental protection in East Asia

Task No. 6:

Fill in the table

Position towards Main domestic Imported energy alternative and Country energy sources sources renewable energy sources China

Japan

South Korea

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Position towards Main domestic Imported energy alternative and Country energy sources sources renewable energy sources North Korea

Taiwan

Hong Kong

Task No. 7:

Answer the following questions.

What structure is this? In which country and when was it built? What are the consequences of its construction for the nation?

Task No. 8:

Answer the following questions:

Which non-governmental environmental organisation is discussed in the text?

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Describe its activities. What is the significance of the activities of this NGO?

… was founded by a group of concerned Chinese intellectuals in Lin- glong Park, Beijing, on June 5th 1993, and officially registered at the State Ministry of Civil Affairs on March 31st 1994, as one of- Chi nese environmental NGO pioneers. Its founders include Prof. Liang Congjie, Prof. Yang Dongping, Ms. Liang Xiaoyan and Mr. Wang Lixiong.

More than 10,000 members have joined … so far, including some 3,000 active individuals and 30 organizations, and nine local member groups have been founded all over China. Many individual members enthusiastically carry out a variety of environmental protection activities, and have received numerous awards. So far, more than ten NGOs have been established by … In the past sixteen years, … has received more than twenty awards at home and abroad, including the Asian Environmental Award, the Global Award, the Great Panda Award, the Green Citizens Award, and the Ramon Magsaysay Award, as well as recently the One Foundation Philanthropy Grants.

Vision In a society that lives in harmony with nature, every individual shall have the right to enjoy nature, beauty and share safe and clean natural resources.

Mission … promotes citizens with environmental awareness and creates platforms for public participation in environmental decision-making. … commits to help its members proactively undertake their responsibilities and actions as green citizens and consumers.

Core Values Be friend with nature and respect the right to life of all creatures on mother Earth, with sincerity and enthusiasm. And the development and nurture of a civil society is a critical safeguard for environmental protection.

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Questions for discussion 1. What are similarities and differences of East Asian countries in terms of economic development? 2. What are the causes of Japan’s economic growth? 3. What are the causes of South Korea’s economic growth? 4. How do East Asian countries plan to secure supplies of energy resources? 5. What is the attitude of East Asian countries towards renewable energy sources?

Recommended reading and websites 1. Beeson, Mark, Regionalism & Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 2. Ministry of Commerse of the People`s Republic of China http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/ 3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/main/index.jsp 4. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan http:// www.meti.go.jp/english/ 5. The Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia http:// www.erina.or.jp/index.html.en 6. Asia – Pacific Economic Cooperation http://www.apec.org/ 7. Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia

East Asian countries, as well as all others, have to deal with various social and ethical issues. The problems faced include aging population, social security, migration, integration of ethnic minorities, unemployment, and many others, which are significantly impacted by the globalisation process. East Asia is home to many ethnic groups; in China alone, there are 56, for all of which their identities and preservation of languages are important; therefore, governments have to work hard in order to protect and secure the interests of ethnic groups.

7. 1. China

Task No. 1:

Read the document and answer the following questions. When was the one-child policy introduced in China? What is its significance for China’s social development? Name the main principles of the one-child policy. The Population and Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on December 29, 2001, is hereby promulgated and shall go into effect as of September 1, 2002.

Jiang Zemin President of the People's Republic of China December 29, 2001

Population and Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China

(Adopted at the 25th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on December 29, 2001)

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Contents Chapter I General Provisions Chapter II Formulation and Implementation of Plans for Popula- tion Development Chapter III Regulation of Reproduction Chapter IV Rewards and Social Security Chapter V Technical Services for Family Planning Chapter VI Legal Liability Chapter VII Supplementary Provisions Chapter I General Provisions Article 1 This Law is enacted, in accordance with the Constitu- tion, for the purpose of bringing about a coordinated development between population on the one side and the economy, society, resources and environment on the other, promoting family planning, protecting the legitimate rights and interests of citizens, enhancing happiness of families, and contributing to prosperity of the nation and progress of the society. Article 2 China being a populous country, family planning is a fundamental State policy. The State adopts a comprehensive measure to control the size and raise the general quality of the population. The State relies on publicity and education, advances in science and technology, multi-purpose services and the establishment and improvement of the reward and social security systems in carrying out the population and family planning programs. Article 3 The population and family planning programs shall be combined with the efforts to offer more opportunities for women to receive education and get employed, improve their health and el- evate their status. Article 4 When promoting family planning, the people’s governments at all levels and their staff members shall perform their administrative duties strictly in accordance with law, and enforce the law in a civil manner, and they may not infringe upon legitimate rights and interests of citizens.

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Lawful performance of the official duties by the administrative departments for family planning and their staff members shall be protected by law. Article 5 The State Council shall exercise leadership over the population and family planning programs throughout the country. Local people’s governments at all levels shall exercise leadership over the population and family planning programs within their own administrative regions. Article 6 The administrative department for family planning under the State Council shall be in charge of the family planning program and the population program related to family planning nationwide. Family planning administration departments of the local people's governments at or above the county level shall be in charge of the family planning program and the population program related to family planning within their own administrative regions. The other administrative departments of the local people's governments at or above the county level shall be in charge of the relevant aspects of the population and family planning programs within the limits of their duties. Article 7 Public organizations such as Trade Unions, Communist Youth Leagues, Women’s Federations, and Family Planning Asso- ciations, as well as enterprises, institutions, and individual citizens shall assist the people’s governments in carrying out the population and family planning programs. Article 8 The State gives rewards to organizations and individuals that have scored outstanding achievements in the population program and family planning.

Chapter II Formulation and Implementation of Population Development Plans Article 9 The State Council shall make plans for population development and incorporate them into the national economic and social development plans. Based on the plans for population development nationwide and such plans made by the people’s governments at the next higher level,

114 Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia people’s governments at or above the county level shall, in light of their local conditions, work out such plans for their own administrative regions and incorporate them into their economic and social development plans. Article 10 People’s governments at or above the county level shall, on the basis of the population development plans, formulate plans for implementation of the population and family planning programs and make arrangements for their implementation. The administrative departments for family planning of the people's governments at or above the county level shall be responsible for routine implementation of the population and family planning plans. People’s governments of townships, ethnic townships, and towns, and neighborhood offices in urban areas shall be in charge of the population and family planning programs in the areas under their jurisdiction and shall implement the population and family planning plans. Article 11 In the implementation plans for population and family planning programs shall be specified measures for keeping the size of the population under control, improving maternal and child healthcare services, and raising the general quality of the population. Article 12 Villagers’ committees and residents’ committees shall, in accordance with law, make a success of the family planning programs. Government departments, the armed forces, public organizations, enterprises and institutions shall make a success of the family planning programs in their own units. Article 13 Departments in charge of family planning, education, science and technology, culture, public health, civil affairs, the press and publication, and radio and television broadcasting shall make arrangements to conduct public education in the importance of the population program and family planning. The mass media are obligated to give publicity to the population program and family planning for the public good. Schools shall, in a manner suited to the characteristics of the re- ceivers and in a planned way, conduct among pupils education in physiology and health, puberty or sexual health.

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Article 14 Family planning among migrant people shall jointly be managed by the people’s governments of the place where their resi- dence is registered and of the place where they are currently staying, but chiefly by the latter. Article 15 The State, on the basis of the national economic and social development, gradually increases the overall amount of funding for the population and family planning programs. People’s governments at all levels shall guarantee the necessary funding for the said programs. People's governments at all levels shall give special support to the population and family planning programs in poverty-stricken areas and in areas inhabited by ethnic peoples. The State encourages public organizations, enterprises and institutions and individuals to offer financial assistance to the population and family planning programs. No unit or individual may withhold, reduce or misappropriate the funds earmarked for the population and family planning programs. Article 16 The State encourages scientific research and international exchange and cooperation in respect of the population and family planning programs.

Chapter III Regulation of Reproduction Article 17 Citizens have the right to reproduction as well as the obligation to practise family planning according to law. Both husband and wife bear equal responsibility for family planning. Article 18 The State maintains its current policy for reproduction, encouraging late marriage and childbearing and advocating one child per couple. Where the requirements specified by laws and regulations are met, plans for a second child, if requested, may be made. Specific measures in this regard shall be formulated by the people’s congress or its standing committee of a province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government. Family planning shall also be introduced to the ethnic peoples. Specific measures in this regard shall be formulated by the people's

116 Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia congress or its standing committee of a province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government. Article 19 Family planning shall be practised chiefly by means of contraception. The State creates conditions to ensure that individual citizens knowingly choose safe, effective, and appropriate contraceptive methods. Where birth control operations are performed, the recipi- ents' safety shall be ensured. Article 20 Couples of reproductive age shall conscientiously adopt contraceptive methods and accept technical services and guidance for family planning. Incidence of unwanted pregnancies shall be prevented and reduced. Article 21 Couples of reproductive age who practise family planning shall receive, free of charge, the basic items of technical services specified by the State. The funds needed for rendering the services specified in the preceding paragraph shall, in accordance with relevant State regulations, be listed in the budget or be guaranteed by social insurance plans. Article 22 Discrimination against and maltreatment of women who give birth to baby girls or who suffer from infertility are prohibited. Discrimination against, maltreatment, and abandonment of baby girls are prohibited.

Chapter IV Rewards and Social Security Article 23 The State, in accordance with regulations, rewards couples who practise family planning. Article 24 To facilitate family planning, the State establishes and improves the social security system covering the basic old-age insurance, basic medical insurance, childbearing insurance, and welfare benefits. The State encourages insurance companies to offer insurance schemes that facilitate family planning. In rural areas where conditions permit, various types of old-age support schemes may be adopted in adherence to the principles of government guidance and willingness on the part of the rural people.

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Article 25 Citizens who marry late and delay childbearing may be entitled to longer nuptial and maternity leaves or other welfare benefits. Article 26 In accordance with relevant State regulations, women shall enjoy special occupational protection and be entitled to assistance and subsidies during the period of pregnancy, delivery, and breast-feeding. Citizens who undergo surgical operation for family planning shall enjoy leaves as specified by the State. Local people's governments may give them rewards. Article 27 The State shall issue to a couple who volunteer to have only one child in their lifetime a ‘Certificate of Honor for Single- Child Parents’. Couples who are issued the said certificate shall enjoy rewards in accordance with the relevant regulations of the State and of the province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government. Where measures in laws, rules or regulations specify that the rewards to couples who have only one child in their lifetime shall be given by the units where they work, such units shall execute the measures. Where the only child of a couple is disabled or killed in accidents, and the couple decides not to have or adopt another child, the local people's government shall provide the couple with necessary assistance. Article 28 Local people’s governments at all levels shall help rural households that practise family planning to develop economic undertakings by giving them support and preferential treatment in terms of funds, technology and training. Poverty-stricken households that practise family planning shall be given priority in terms of poverty-alleviation loans, relief through work and other poverty- alleviation projects, and social assistance. Article 29 Specific measures for conferring rewards specified in this Chapter may be formulated by the people’s congresses or their standing committees or the people’s governments of the provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central Gov- ernment or larger cities in accordance with the provisions of this

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Law and relevant laws and administrative regulations and in light of local conditions.

Chapter V Technical Services for Family Planning Article 30 The State establishes premarital health care and maternal health care systems to prevent or reduce the incidence of birth defects and improve the health of newborns. Article 31 People’s governments at all levels shall take measures to ensure citizens’ access to technical services for family planning in order to improve their reproductive health. Article 32 Local people’s governments at all levels shall rationally allocate and make multi-purpose use of health resources, establish and improve family planning technical service networks comprising family planning technical service institutions and medical and healthcare institutions providing such services and upgrade the facilities and improve the conditions for and raise the level of, such services. Article 33 Family planning technical service institutions and medical and healthcare institutions providing such services shall, within the scope of their respective responsibilities, conduct, among different reproductive age groups of people, publicity and education in the basic knowledge about the population program and family planning, provide pregnancy check-ups and follow-up for married women of reproductive age, offer advice and guidance and provide technical services in respect of family planning and reproductive health. Article 34 Persons providing family planning technical services shall give guidance to citizens who practise family planning in choosing the safe, effective and appropriate contraceptive methods. Couples who already have children are encouraged to choose long-acting contraceptive methods. The State encourages research in, employment and wide use of, new technologies and contraceptives for family planning. Article 35 Use of ultrasonography or other techniques to identify fetal sex for non-medical purposes is strictly prohibited. Sex- selective pregnancy termination for non-medical purposes is strictly prohibited.

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Chapter VI Legal Liability Article 36 Anyone who, in violation of the provisions of this Law, commits one of the following acts shall be instructed to make rectification and be given a disciplinary warning, and his unlawful gains shall be confiscated by the administrative department for family planning or public health; if the unlawful gains exceed RMB 10,000 yuan, he shall be fined not less than two times but not more than six times the amount of the unlawful gains; if there are no unlawful gains or the said gains are less than 10,000 yuan, he shall be fined not less than 10,000 yuan but not more than 30,000 yuan; if the circumstances are serious, his license shall be revoked by the authority that issued it; if a crime is constituted, he shall be investigated for criminal liability in accordance with law: (1) illegally performing an operation related to family planning on another person; (2) Using ultrasonography or other techniques to identify fetal gender for non-medical purposes or to bring about sex-selective pregnancy termination for non-medical purposes for another person; or (3) performing a fake birth-control operation, providing a false medical report, or issuing a counterfeit certificate of family planning. Article 37 If anyone forges, alters or trades in certificates of family planning, his unlawful gains shall be confiscated by the administrative department for family planning; if the said gains exceed 5,000 yuan, he shall be fined not less than two times but not more than ten times the amount of the said gains; if there are no such gains or the gains are less than 5,000 yuan, he shall be fined not less than 5,000 yuan but not more than 20,000 yuan. If the offence constitutes a crime, he shall be investigated for criminal liability in accordance with law. A certificate of family planning that is obtained by illegitimate means shall be revoked by the administrative department for family planning; if the fault lies with the unit that issues such a certificate, the persons who are directly in charge and the other persons who

120 Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia are directly responsible shall be given administrative sanctions in accordance with law. Article 38 Persons providing technical services for family planning who serve against rules and regulations or delay rescue measures, diagnosis or treatment, if the consequences are serious, shall, in accordance with relevant laws and administrative regulations, bear appropriate legal liability. Article 39 Any functionary of a State organ who commits one of the following acts in the work of family planning, if the act constitutes a crime, shall be investigated for criminal liability in accordance with law; if it does not constitute a crime, he shall be given an administrative sanction in accordance with law; his unlawful gains, if any, shall be confiscated: (1) infringing on a citizen's personal rights, property rights or other legitimate rights and interests; (2) abusing his power, neglecting his duty or engaging in malprac- tices for personal gain; (3) demanding or accepting bribes; (4) withholding, reducing, misappropriating or embezzling funds for family planning or social maintenance fees; or (5) making false or deceptive statistic data on population or family planning, or fabricating, tampering with, or refusing to provide such data. Article 40 Any unit that, in violation of the provisions of this Law, fails to perform its obligation of assisting in the administration of family planning shall be instructed to make rectification and be criticized in a circular by the local people’s government concerned; the persons who are directly in charge and the other persons who are directly responsible shall be given administrative sanctions in accordance with law. Article 41 Citizens who give birth to babies not in compliance with the provisions of Article 18 of this Law shall pay a social maintenance fee prescribed by law. Citizens who fails to pay the full amount of the said fees payable within the specified time limit shall have to pay an additional sur- charge each in accordance with relevant State regulations, counting from the date each fails to pay the fees; with regard to ones who still

121 Introduction to Asian Studies fail to make the payment, the administrative department for family planning that makes the decision on collection of the fees shall, in accordance with law, apply to the People's Court for enforcement. Article 42 Where the person who should pay the social maintenance fees in accordance with the provisions prescribed in Article 41 of this Law is a State functionary, he shall, in addition, be given an administrative sanction in accordance with law; with regard to a person other than the State functionary, a disciplinary measure shall, in addition, be taken against him by the unit or organization where he belongs. Article 43 Anyone who resists or hinders the administrative department for family planning or its staff members in their performance of their official duties in accordance with law shall be subject to criticism and be stopped by the administrative department for family planning. If his act constitutes a violation of the administrative regulations for public security, he shall, in accordance with law, be given a penalty for the violation; if it constitutes a crime, he shall be investigated for criminal liability. Article 44 Citizens, legal persons or other organizations that believe an administrative department infringes upon their legitimate rights and interests while administering the family planning program may, in accordance with law, appeal for administrative review or initiate administrative proceedings.

Chapter VII Supplementary provisions Article 45 Specific measures for family planning among migrant persons and for providing to them family planning technical services, and measures for collecting social maintenance fees shall be formulated by the State Council. Article 46 Specific measures for implementing this Law by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army shall be formulated by the Central Military Commission in accordance with this Law. Article 47 This Law shall go into effect as of September 1, 2002.

Found: Chinese Government`s Official Web Portal / http://www.gov.cn/english/ laws/2005-10/11/content_75954.htm; reviewed on 15 September 2012.

122 Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia 7. 2. Tibet

Task No. 2:

Answer the following questions. Who is the person shown on the photograph? What are his contributions in the areas of human rights and preservation of peace in the world?

Task No. 3:

Read extracts from a CNN interview the Dalai Lama and try to assess his approach to Sino – Tibetan relations. In which direction should they develop? Text of His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s interview on CNN April 27, 2012 9:49 am His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s interview on PIERS MORGAN TO- NIGHT, CNN … MORGAN: We’re here to discuss the World Peace Summit that you’ve been asked to speak at. Do you feel the world is a more peaceful place now than it was when you first became Dalai Lama? DALAI LAMA: Oh, yes. The fundamental level I think in today’s world much better. At least the disappearance of blood and war, and eventually big change happen. So at least the two blocs, both have their nuclear weapon ready to shoot each other. That kind of danger is now no longer.

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And some sort of violence, (INAUDIBLE), and some violence is very sad. But compare, during that previous danger, I think today I think comparatively, much better. Then I think important. I think, although the word peace is something almost become fashion. Peace, peace, peace. Even though some people who are really making every preparation for war. But they use the word of peace, peace, peace. MORGAN: When you see the Arab Spring uprisings through the Mid- dle East, and you see so many countries having young people who are better educated, who are no longer prepared to put up with virtual dic- tatorships, and they rise up, are you supportive of their actions? Do you think that is good for the world that they do this? DALAI LAMA: Yes, in principle, I support, of course. Obviously. I was always telling, expressing world belongs to humanity, humanity, not this leader, that leader, or the kings or queens or religious leaders. The world belongs to humanity. And then each country essentially belongs to their own people. So in America, I often express America belongs to Americans, and I think 200 million American people, not the Republican Party or Dem- ocratic Party. So – MORGAN: Do you think sometimes the politicians forget that? DALAI LAMA: I don’t think generally politicians come from democratic country. I think not that thinking. But sometimes a little bit short sighted. They’re mainly looking for the next vote. … MORGAN: Let’s talk China for a moment. China has become, in your lifetime, arguably now one of the two great super powers of the world. And may economically in the next 10 or 15 years become the number one super power in the world. What do you think of modern China and how it’s changed in the time that you’ve been Dalai Lama? DALAI LAMA: Big change. China, most populated nation. And also long history. I think really, China, Chinese, I think they really have a

124 Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia long history of civilization, rich culture. (INAUDIBLE) they argue, is the richness of their food. However, in modern China, a lot of ups and downs. But I have full faith Chinese people, they are hard working. So I think the last, I think 50 years, I think they already tested sort of the difference of experience. I think they, modern China, they got sort of really troubled experience during (INAUDIBLE) revolution. So after (INAUDIBLE) revolution it seems they opened their eyes. So things are changing. Things, I think, very realistic person. Somehow life-long communists, dedicated person, so they very much sort of keep the political power. Now that also is now changing. Now president – prime minister quite often, several occasion including one I think he’s meeting with CNN, he mentioned China need political reform. So he seems to – MORGAN: Are you pleased when you hear that? DALAI LAMA: Oh, yes. Now, as I mentioned earlier, my fundamental belief is China belongs to one (INAUDIBLE) the Chinese people, not the communist party or (INAUDIBLE) party. MORGAN: Is China’s power – DALAI LAMA: So things are changing. MORGAN: But is China’s new power good for Tibet, or is it dangerous for Tibet? Because the rest of the world may become so fearful of of- fending the Chinese, that they stop talking about Tibet. DALAI LAMA: Yes, in some ways, yes, that’s right. But somehow, it’s a Tibet issue. Yes? It’s very much just an issue. And also involves more issue. So number of Chinese also now showing that sort of the sense of solidarity with us. And the world. Many parts of the world. And those who know something about Tibet, about its current situation. I think very, very sort of sympathetic. Sort of they are concerned. And the political including some business company, sometimes a little bit cautious. MORGAN: How did you feel when President Obama delayed his meeting with you when he became president? Because the Chinese objected, and he met with them first. Did that offend you?

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DALAI LAMA: No. MORGAN: Did you understand why he did that? DALAI LAMA: Actually, he said once (INAUDIBLE), something (IN- AUDIBLE) something, aside for me, explained the reason. There’s certain reason. So better. First his meeting, I think without some point with Chinese complaining. So better. MORGAN: You understood that? DALAI LAMA: Yes. And then soon after he returned, he want to see me. MORGAN: And he gave you a 17-minute meeting. Which is the longest time, I believe, that any American president has ever spent with you in one meeting. What did he say to you, President Obama? Did he give you assurances that he is going to help you? DALAI LAMA: He inquired about Tibet. I obviously explain what is the current situation and our thinking. And he show sort of commitment to the Tibetan issue. MORGAN: Does he show – does he share your vision, which is for a Tibet that has shared power between Tibet and China? Does he share that vision? DALAI LAMA: Yes, sure. He (INAUDIBLE), what is our middle approach, not seeking separation, for all interest. I explain these things. Of course, he already knows. Then after our meeting, the White House formally some press sort of notice he made. Clearly he mentioned their support. That very, very good. Very good. MORGAN: Activists – DALAI LAMA: And then also my sort of meeting, the previous, Mr. Bush and Clinton, and eventually this senior or the father of – Mr. Bush’s father, that Bush, I met. He was very nice. Very nice. All very nice. MORGAN: Since the start of 2011, activists say that over 30 Tibetans have self-immolated, obviously a very serious escalation in a number of people taking their lives in this way. As their holy leader, what do you feel about this? What do you say to people who are thinking of doing the same thing and why are more people doing this now?

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DALAI LAMA: It’s – of course, it’s extremely sad, very sad. But this is not sort of the something new in China itself. I think in the cultural revolution, one important Chinese monastery’s abbot (ph) himself burned. And then Vietnam also you see it happen. And there are sort of cases there. These are one way they believe non-violence. And then if things are desperate, then in sort of having other they simply to sacrifice their own life. So very sad. So now important thing is not solution that’s expressed, we are very sad. But we must think what’s cause of this so desperate situation. MORGAN: And what do you think it is? DALAI LAMA: That’s obvious. (LAUGHTER) DALAI LAMA: There are – I often used to telling, including some Chi- nese sort of friend, now time come the Chinese government must think seriously and then they must follow the regarding sort of policies, regarding minority, they must follow the policy as things have been stated second to the (inaudible) fact. So their policy must be realistic. They must accept the reality. So then the things, once they know the reality and then process of policy according that reality, let’s release the policy. MORGAN: Many of the – many of the Tibetans who are taking their lives are doing so because they want a free Tibet. That implies that they want separation from China, but that’s not what you want. DALAI LAMA: No. MORGAN: You think that’s achievable and you think that it’s better to have a shared power. So what do you say to these young Tibetans who are desperate for a free Tibet, who are chasing separation? Do you think it’s time that they were told – DALAI LAMA: They’re not Tibetan. Some say, yes, they are sort of the – they have been sort of purpose, (INAUDIBLE). So some people say therefore that’s means independence. But many Tibetans feel, they say if they really want me, that they really trust me, then automatically they will sort of agree my view. (LAUGHTER) DALAI LAMA: So it is quite a contradiction. They want the Dalai Lama but they do not want the Lama’s idea. It is contradiction.

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MORGAN: But that is a big problem, isn’t it? DALAI LAMA: I don’t think, no, No. Well, of course, there is some people, they sit there, right from the beginning, they always say, oh, we want complete independence. But majority of the people not only here but also inside Tibet, last – few decades ,they say I had few occasion, collect their views, even recent Tibet. Of course, not (INAUDIBLE), we cannot do. But from pocket buckets (ph). So most of the – most of the people, particularly more – more educated, more realistic thinking, they all fully support – MORGAN: Do you believe – (CROSSTALK) MORGAN: Do you believe the new Chinese leadership are getting close to doing some kind of deal with Tibet or not? Do you believe that they are thinking the right way? DALAI LAMA: Now, firstly, you see, they are – they are sort of policies regarding their own people, now things, you see, there are indications, the seriousness, see, these are indications they more moderate, more realistic thinking. They seems upper hand, of getting upper hand, but still too early to say. So once the Chinese leaders, Communist leaders, they really thinking more realistically, then Tibet issue very easily can solve and also the issue of the whole people, sort of autonomy, and also in the Mongolia and rest of the China. I think they are sort of – I always expressing 1.2 billion Chinese people have every right to know the reality. Once people know the reality, the 1.3 billion Chinese people also have the ability to judge what’s right or what’s wrong. Therefore, the censorship is immoral. Chinese people should know the reality. So censorship is really very, very – (CROSSTALK) MORGAN: If the censorship – if the censorship goes and the reality comes out, there is more chance of a deal? DALAI LAMA: Certainly, 100 percent. … Found: http://tibet.net/2012/04/27/text-of-his-holiness-the-dalai-lamas-interview-on-cnn/; reviewed on 16 September 2012.

128 Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia 7. 3. Japan. The Ainu

Task No. 4:

Read extracts from the document and answer the following questions.

1. When was the document signed?

2. What is its significance for the Ainu of Japan?

3. What is its significance in the context of human rights protection in Japan?

4. What is the Ainu situation at the beginning of the 21st century? Does respect to their rights improve?

Summary of the Law for the Promotion of Ainu Culture and the Dissemination and Advocacy of Knowledge in respect of Ainu Traditions.

1 – Purpose To realize a society in which the ethnic pride of the Ainu people is respected and to contribute to the development of diverse cultures in our country, by the implementation of measures for the promotion of the Ainu traditions and culture from which Ainu individuals find their ethnic pride (hereafter referred to as ‘Ainu Traditions’), the spread of knowledge related to Ainu Traditions, and the education of the nation (hereafter referred to as ‘The Promotion of Ainu Culture’), in light of the situation Ainu Traditions are currently placed in.

129 Introduction to Asian Studies

2 – Summary of the law 1. Definition of Ainu culture ’Ainu Culture’ means the Ainu language and cultural properties such as music, dance, crafts, and other cultural properties which have been inherited by the Ainu people, and other cultural properties developed from these. 2. Responsibilities of the national and local governments (1) The national government must make efforts to implement measures for promotion of Ainu culture. (2) Local governments must make efforts to implement measures to promote Ainu culture in accordance with the social situations of their respective areas. 3. Respect to be taken into account in the implementation of this Act The national and local governments should respect the autonomous spirit and ethnic pride of the Ainu people in the implementation of the measures to promote Ainu culture. 4. Fundamental policy The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to establish the Fundamental Policy for measures to promote Ainu culture. 5. Fundamental program Local administrative bodies, appointed by national government ordinance, should establish the fundamental program for measures to promote Ainu culture, in accordance with the Fun- damental Policy. 6. Appointed corporation The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology will appoint only one corporation in the country, and recognize this corporation as proper to carry out the duties concerning the promotion of Ainu culture. 7. Supplementary Rules Provisions concerning the abolishment of the Hokkaido Ex-Ab- origines Protection Act and the Asahikawa Ex-Aborigines Protec- tion Land Disposition Act shall be established.

130 Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia

3 – Date of validity This law will be enforced from a date which shall be provided by government ordinance within 3 months from its promulgation. Further, the following supplementary resolution was adopted upon the enactment of this law, by the unanimous vote of the Cabinet Committees of both the House of Councilors and the House of Rep- resentatives. • Supplementary Resolution to the Legislative Bill for Law for the Pro- motion of Ainu Culture and the Dissemination and Advocacy of Knowledge in respect of Ainu Traditions. (Cabinet Committees of the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives)

Referring to the historical and social circumstances in which the Ainu have been placed, the Government should take appropriate measures toward the following matters, in order to further national understanding regarding the promotion of Ainu culture,

– Make efforts to sufficiently respect the autonomous spirit and reflect the will of the Ainu in measures for the realization of a society in which the ethnic pride of the Ainu is well respected

– Provide further support for the promotion of Ainu culture, respect for the ethnic pride of the Ainu and for the development of diverse cultures in our country

– Make efforts regarding the advocacy of Ainu human rights and raise awareness of these people, and to take the necessary measures, respect- ing the ratification of the ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’ and the spirit of the ‘U.N. Decade for Human Rights Education’ etc.

– Make efforts to disseminate knowledge about Ainu traditions including the indigenous nature of the Ainu, which is a historical fact.

– To continue to expand support for the existing Hokkaido Utari Wel- fare Measures Found: The Ainu Association of Hokkaido (http://www.ainu-assn.or.jp/english/eabout11.html); reviewed on 16 September 2012.

131 Introduction to Asian Studies 7. 4. North Koreans in China Task No. 5: Read the article and answer the following questions.

Which problem is dealt with in the text?

What is the attitude of China authorities towards the ethnic group mentioned in the article?

What are possible methods for resolving the problem?

25 May 2012

China targets illegal immigration at North Korea border

China has launched a drive against illegal immigration in a north-eastern region bordering North Korea. The campaign in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin province mainly focuses on North Koreans fleeing poverty and perse- cution at home. China is known to routinely repatriate North Koreans who often slip across the border undetected. Human rights groups say many face punishment when they return. ‘Foreigners who illegally enter, work and overstay are hidden troubles, and they might pose potential threats to social stability,’ Li Yongxue,

132 Social And Ethnic Processes in East Asia

a police official from Yanbian, was quoted by state-run China Daily newspaper as saying. The police say they want to stamp out criminal activities to maintain order. They add that those without proper documents will be sent back. Many of these illegal immigrants have relatives in China, some come to work, while others use China as a staging post before moving to other countries, according to the BBC’s Michael Bristow. A police officer from the province told the BBC that it was a sensitive year in China, with officials stressing the need for stability ahead of a leadership change this year.

Found: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-18208831; reviewed on 15 September 2012.

Questions for discussion 1. Which most pressing social problems in East Asian countries could you mention? What is the impact of these problems on the social and economic development of the countries? 2. Which ethnic groups live in East Asia? Take one ethnic group and describe its social and economic position. 3. How could you describe the position of ethnic groups from the human rights perspective?

Recommended reading 1. Zang, Xiaowei, Understanding Chinese society. Routledge, 2011. 2. Perry, Elizabeth J. and Mark Selden, Chinese society: change, conflict and resistance. Routledge, 2010. 3. Mackerras, Colin, China’s ethnic minorities and globalisation. RoutledgeCurzon, 2006. 4. Sjöberg, Katarina V., The return of the Ainu: cultural mobiliza- tion and the practice of ethnicity in Japan. Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997. 5. Ma, Rong, Population and Society in Contemporary Tibet. Hong Kong University Press, 2011. 6. Gardner, Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: strangers in their own land. Columbia University Press, 2010.

133 8. Where is the Middle East?

Source: Davison, Roderic H. (1960). ‘Where is the Middle East?’, Foreign Affairs 38: 665–675, https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/88070/original/Davison_Where% 2Bis%2Bthe%2BMiddle%2BEast%253F_Foreign%2BAffairs_1960.pdf

Tasks: a) Referring to Davison’s text as well as processes of the last few decades, show on the map the changes that occurred in the boundaries of the region of the Middle East over the centuries; b) Name the components of the Middle East; c) Identify the relationship between the Arab World and the Middle East; d) Find out to which regional and inter-regional organisations the countries of the Middle East belong; e) Identify the relationship between the Islamic World and the Middle East. For millennia, the region of the Middle East has been the cradle of civilisations, and also the area of their confrontations, often armed, and, therefore, devastating. In ancient times, the Middle East was home to the civilisations of Mesopotamia (Sumerian, Hittite, Akkadian), Per- sian, Jewish, and Armenians; this region was an area where Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans were very active. The Middle East was the place where all the three monotheistic religions emerged and formed; it is here where the Islamic Arab and, later on, the Turkish civilisations flourished. On the other hand, the Middle East experienced direct colonialism, when European empires, one after the other, colonised almost all lands of the region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the post-colonial era, the Middle East became a vibrant political melting pot with unresolved issues of boundaries, status of ethnic and religious minorities and a wide range of other domestic and foreign policy problems. Since the second half of the twentieth century, issues of the Middle East have always been on the agendas of both the world’s great powers and international organisations. And yet, the geography of the Middle East has not yet been defined. For the coverage of the region is viewed differently by separate Eu-

134 Where is the Middle East? ropean and North American countries (and sometimes even by different institutions in the same countries). For example, in the United States, Turkey is traditionally attributed to the Middle East, while Eu- rope until today has no consensus as to whether or not Turkey should be attributed to the European continent. Although Iran is usually included in the coverage of the Middle East, there are still some cases when Iran is attributed to Central Asia. A similar situation is observed in the cases of Pakistan in South Asia and Sudan in Africa. In the US academic circles, the Middle East is quite often separated from the Arabic countries of North Africa, the so-called Maghrib, granting it the status of an independent geopolitical unit. In addition, confusion is constantly caused by irresponsible use of the terms of ‘the Near East’ and ‘the Middle East’ both in the media and political rhetoric.

Found: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MENA; reviewed on 15 September 2012.

Although there is no consensus as to which states should be included in the coverage of the Middle East, the general trend is to agree that that the region of the Middle East, in broad sense, consists of 19 Member States of the League of Arab States from Morocco in the north-western corner of Africa to Oman in the south-eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula (excluding the remaining three, i. e., Comoros, Somalia, and Mauritania), non-Arab but Muslims Turkey and Iran as well as non-Arab and non-Muslims Israel. The region of the Mid- dle East may be conditionally divided into Maghrib, the Near East (Shām, Al-Mashriq) and the sub-region of the Arabian Peninsula.

135 Introduction to Asian Studies

Do you know that… The Middle East, depending on which states are included in the regional coverage, is populated by 400 to 500 million people (the most populated countries are Egypt, Turkey, and Iran with more than 75 million people in each). Although population of the region is not expected to grow in the near future as fast as before, it is estimated that it will double and in some countries (Saudi Arabia and Yemen) even triple by 2050. The population of each Egypt and Iran is to exceed 100 million in by 2050.189

189. Executive Summary: The Middle East, Population Resource Center, http://www. prcdc.org/files/MidEast.pdf. 136 9. Statehood and Nations in the Middle East

Source: Calvocoressi, Peter. World Politics, Chapters 9-14.

Task No. 1: (a) Set up periodisation of the history of the Middle East from the 19th century, providing at least 5 major events of each period; (b) Reveal the commonalities in the socio-political development of the states of the Middle East; (c) Group currently existing countries of the Middle East by various social, political and economic criteria.

Task No. 2: Fill in the table about a chosen state of the Middle East and allow your classmate to check their knowledge

Capital city

Neighbouring countries

Population

Ethnic groups and dominating languages Dominating religions

Political system

Administrative division

Monetary unit

Topography and climatic conditions Characteristic cultural feature / artefact

137 Introduction to Asian Studies

Task No. 3:

Prepare individual reports on one of the following issues:

1. Future of the Western Sahara. 2. Issue of Algeria’s Berber identity. 3. Prospects of Libya’s political system. 4. Darfur problem. 5. Prospects of Palestinian sovereignty. 6. Ethno-confessional friction in Lebanon. 7. Kurdish issue. 8. Prospects of the Saudi Arabian monarchy. 9. Phenomenon of the United Arab Emirates. 10. Yemen’s integrity issue. 10. Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East

10. 1. Dimensions of Islam

Task No. 1:

Find and present examples of expressions of different Dimensions of Islam in socio-political processes of today’s countries of the Middle East.

When speaking about Islam and Muslims, it is necessary to understand the distinction between what is called ‘Islamic’ and what is called ‘Muslim’ or, in other words, between the religion of Islam as a normative framework and cultures of Muslim societies and communities as practical value systems that are parallel to the normative (legalistic) Islam: religion and culture not necessarily coincide. In other words, what is required of a believer in scriptures and religious law is not necessarily followed in daily life. Quite often, an individual or group that nominally / formally belong to some religious tradition do not follow religious dogmas and requirements in daily life. Even more often, those dogmas and rules are re-interpreted so that what is actually followed is quite distant from ‘the original’. External cultural influences, natural and other circumstances put off the lifestyle from religious ideals even farther. Therefore, in the case of Islam (as well as virtually of any other religion), Muslim cultures must not be equated with the normative Islam proclaimed by Islam experts (ula- ma). Thus, specific (often very different among themselves) Muslim cultures, although they cannot be completely separated from Islam – there is a clear connection between everyday lifestyles of Muslims and Islamic norms, may not be perceived as representation of Islam. Unfortunately, for many Westerners who are not fully familiar with either, the truths of Islam or with the Muslim worldview and ways of life, this distinction was by no means and still is not obvious. Therefore, most non-Muslim Europeans practically view any action of

139 Introduction to Asian Studies

Table 10. 1. Distinction between ‘Islamic’ and ‘Muslim’

‘Islamic’ vs. ‘Muslim’

Islamic Muslim Ideal (how it should be) Reality (how it is) Law (legal traditions) Culture (s)

Muslims as determined (or even commanded) by religion and inseparable from it. Yet, it is a flaw characteristic not only of ignorant Euro- peans: often Muslims themselves are unable to understand the historically formed discrepancy between the reality and the ideal. However, some Muslims recognise this historical distinction in their own societies and communities and are deeply concerned about it. In scientific literature, such people are called ‘revivalists’ – advocates of the revival of Islam who form an alternative dimension to the classical-historical dimensions of Islam – legalistic, mystical, and folk Islam. The legalistic-normative and cultural-historical (folk) Islam are mutually contradictory or even mutually negating dimensions of Is- lam. The differences between these historical dimensions of Islam are convincingly demonstrated by Ernest Gellner in his book ‘Postmod- ernism, Reason and Religion’ (Gellner 1993: 23–39) who called those dimensions ‘High Islam’ and ‘Low Islam’. True, Gellner assigned to the folk Islam the mystical dimension of Islam, the so-called Sufism, which is interpreted as an independent dimension by many Islam researchers, and actually equated the legalistic Islam with fundamentalism. However, historically, the relationship between the legalistic and fundamentalist Islam was oftener marked by hostility and tension, rather than by consensus, let alone equality. Therefore, further to, and partly correcting, Gellner it should be added that today Islam can be seen as multi-dimensional, where besides the aforementioned historical (legalistic, fundamentalist, folk, and mystical) dimensions, there is also the dimension of the revivalist Islam (consisting of neo- fundamentalism and the politicised Islam, also called Islamism), and the interaction of all these dimensions in the second half of the 20th century resulted in the emergence of hybrid ones, such as the quasi- legalistic Islam, which is especially characteristic to converts.

140 Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East

Legalistic Islam. The essence of the legalistic (normative) Islam dimension consists of Muslim legal theory (the so-called fiqh, jurisprudence) and practice. Muslim jurists have set themselves the objective to formulate specific rules and norms of legal conduct for Muslim societies, which could be followed by these societies in their daily social and private life. However, although agreeing on the grounds-sources of jurisprudence, at a level of positive law or branches of law, Muslim jurists, however, have gone separate ways – they gradually formed legal traditions that are different from one another. The differences between the legal positions manifested themselves already at the early stage of Muslim jurisprudence, when the most prominent jurists, on the basis of different and sometimes conflicting pronouncements of Quran, would make different decisions in almost identical situations. Disciples of those jurists followed the footsteps of the pioneers, thus increasing the gap until a dozen of legal traditions, the eponyms of which the early jurists became, gradually formed. True, only four Sunni legal traditions (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali) established themselves in Muslim societies and have survived to modern times. However, formally, representatives of all the four traditions held each other true (orthodox) Muslims, and not only did not consider the differences between them as a disadvantage, but even thought that those differences were an advantage. Among Shi’ites, who formed a minority, three independent legal traditions established themselves. However, despite a well-developed and sophisticated legal theory that was cultured in Muslim scientific and educational centres (numerous madrasa and university-level educational institutions), in fact, the practice of Muslim law was limited historically. Legal practitioners (quadi and mufti) had strongest influence in resolving family law matters, while leaving the other branches of law (commercial, administrative, international, often even criminal) to the discretion of land administrations and local informal power structures (tribes and clans) that practiced customary law (urf, adat). Mystical Islam. In parallel to the legalistic Islam, during the first several centuries of Islam history, a dimension diametrically opposite to the former formed: Taşawwuf – Muslim mysticism, which took roots under the name of Sufism in European languages. The

141 Introduction to Asian Studies first Muslim mystics were isolated solitaries, who denied worldly goods and temptations and focused on the contemplation of God (Dhikr). Before long, these mystics began to become centres of groups of followers, which later on (from about the 12th century) grew into fraternities (tariqa). Members of such fraternities traditionally lived together, often in isolation from people, in their own premises zawi( - ya, ribat) separately from mosques, religious schools (madrasa) and other religious buildings. Each fraternity was independent, had its own distinctive ideology, initiation, spiritual development, meditative practices (Dhikr, khalwa), rituals and ceremonies, and consisted of several hundreds or even thousands of initiated members. It was led by the Sheikh (also known as the Pir, Murshid) and was associated, by a continuous direct blessing chain (Silsila), with preceding leaders of the fraternity down to its founder (which was often claimed to be one of the accomplices of Muhammad). In Sufism, it is love, longing, desire to become closer to or even to merge with God yet in this life, is the fundamental category of relationship between the believer and God. Yearning for God and seeking to get closer to Him, Muslim mystics employ a wide range of aesthetic meditative practices (Dhikr), by performing which they hope to mingle with God and dissolve in Him (fana)190. Local residents, who were not initiated but were supportive of mystic fraternities, always flocked around them and were allowed to participate in weakly Dhikr rites. So, one way or another, most of Muslims were associated with Su- fism. However, due to their frequent non-orthodoxy both in belief and practice, mystics were not only often blamed for having walking off the straight path by stalwart jurists of the legalistic Islam and rulers of Muslim countries, but also persecuted. There were times when mystics were imprisoned, judged and condemned to death as apostates from Islam (Murtad). Folk Islam. Close to and often overlapping with Sufism, but nevertheless, not equated to it, is the folk (popular, cultural) dimension of Islam, which has pervaded the lifestyle of all Muslim communities and societies. Speaking objectively, historically most of Muslims

190. The book ‘Mystical Dimensions of Islam’ by Annemarie Schimmel (Schimmel 1975) gives probably the best presentation of Sufism. 142 Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East practiced one or another form of folk Islam. The folk Islam consists of a wide range of beliefs and practices that do not comply with the norms of the legalistic Islam (those that formed as a result of distort- ing them or were taken over from other religious traditions) as well as cultural traditions supported in communities (customs including customary law). Since the folk Islam has generally been practiced by lower, mostly semi-literate strata of society, the place of theology, jurisprudence and other sciences is taken their by superstitions, spells and incantations, the magic of words and numbers and astrology, which serve as the base for folk medicine. Syncretism is a characteristic feature of Islam: Muslims who practice its different varieties managed to combine different religious traditions, beliefs and rituals, in a peculiar way ‘Islamising’ non-Islamic religious practices. Also, the folk Islam became the place where the cult of saints in which living saints (marabouts) act near dead saints, strictly forbidden by the legalistic Islam, flourished especially actively. In some places (e.g. in Central Asia and the Malay Archipelago), the folk Islam even bal- anced at the edge of idolatry, when naturally occurring objects (trees, shrubs, and rocks) were enveloped in the halo of sanctity and magic powers. Because of its apparent deviation from the straight path (as- Sirat al-Mustaqim), the folk Islam, like Sufism, was scorned by most Muslim jurists, who recognised the legalistic Islam as the only true Islam, and was often persecuted by rulers. Revivalist Islam. Caused by imperialism, colonialism, the Indus- trial Revolution, and other socio-political processes of the modern age that were occurring in Muslim societies, reactionary revivalist movements rose in Muslim countries in the second half of the 19th century. Their representatives, or neo-fundamentalists, sometimes also called scripturalists or literalists, seeking to re-Islamise the Muslim community (Ummah) which, as they were confident, had de- viated from the straight Islam path, required to implement (restore) the religious law in Muslim societies. Neo-fundamentalist Muslims miss the observance of true religious norms in the Muslim societies of their times both in personal and social life and blame Muslims of having admitted, over centuries, a plenty of unwarranted inno- vations (bid’ah) such as mysticism (Taşawwuf ), folk beliefs, the cult of saints and so on to the matters of belief and practice. Seeking to

143 Table 10. 2. Spectrum of religious engagement

Neo- Traditionalists Islamists Jihadists Modernists fundamentalists Secularists (practitioners of (politically engaged, (destructive nihilists) (westernised (apolitical revivalists, (agnostics, atheists) historical-cultural progressive reformists) reactionary forms of Islam) revivalists) srcipturalists) do not give any although being absolutise religion significance to believers, they separate relation subordinate politics absolutised armed while ignoring religion or even subordinate religion from politics to religion struggle politics derogate it to politics

The liberal wing The radical wing Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East re-Islamise Muslim societies, Muslim neo-fundamentalists look to improving the religiousness of society by developing religious education (tarbia) and intra-community missionary activity (da‘wa) that are to lead to the establishment of the religious (Islamic) state ‘from the bottom’. Through these activities, neo-fundamentalists expect to convert those coreligionist who are, in their opinion, only nominal Muslims into the true Islam found by neo-fundamentalists in Quran and hadiths (sayings, actions and happenings attributed to Prophet Muhammad), whose pronouncements, as neo-fundamentalists believe, are to apply without interpretation, that is literally. Neo-fundamentalists, although they have similar goals (i. e., to re-Islamise Muslim societies), face polemics from a part of the neo- fundamentalist movement that formed in the first half of the 20th century and the Islamic movement that expanded over the whole world in the second part of the century. Islamists, unlike Muslim traditionalists (practitioners of the folk Islam), whom they accuse of disregard of religious obligations, religious negligence, or even apos- tasy from the true belief, as well as Muslim neo-fundamentalists who rebuke political inactivity are characterised by selective application of religious imperatives and political activism. Islamists believe that religion and politics are inseparable, and the latter is to be led by the former. In other words, Islamists seek to create a society and the state managed in a religious (Islamic) manner, and they anticipate achieving this goal by taking power – most often in a revolutionary way.

10. 2. Mechanisms and tools of the re-Islamisation carried out by revivalists: da‘wa and jihad

Task No. 3:

Referring to texts of Muslim law theorists and media reports, discuss and compare different concepts and manifestations of jihad.

Task No. 4:

Find examples of re-Islamisation in international and Muslim countries’ mass media.

145 Introduction to Asian Studies

Da‘wa, as a religious concept, is as old as Islam itself: it emerged together with the Quran. However, the Muslim holy book does not contain any exact meanings of this book, which would explain the place of da‘wa in the Islamic paradigm. There are no facts either that Muhammad interpreted it exactly – codes of hadiths (actions and pronouncements attributed to Muhammad) contain no definition of da‘wa at all. However, da‘wa does exist both as a word and meaning. Fundamental Islamic texts contain stories where God commands Muhammad to call people to Him. In fact, the whole Muhammad’s mission was nothing else but da‘wa – to call people to obey the only God. Muhammad did so as a practitioner rather than a theorist. In addition, it was his duty – to call people to God; after all, he was His messenger and prophet. In the eyes of Muslims, Muhammad was a missionary par excellence. After his death, the legacy of the mission of Muhammad was left to his followers, Muslims, who, over time, not only continued it further, but also developed it into the multifac- eted Muslim missionary tradition. The intra-communal activities of Muslims during approximately three last decades, or what they themselves claim to be da‘wa, should be considered in the light of political processes in the Muslim world. From the eighth decade of the twentieth century, the Islamic world (Dar al-Islam) entered a new phase of socio-religious development with a phenomenon, which, despite its recent appearance in the cultural context (at least in its current forms), has already gained a lot of definitions: Islamic revivalism, revitalisation, upsurge, reassertion, renewal, awakening; or Islamic fundamentalism and neo-fundamentalism; or the return of Islam, militant Islam, and political Islam (Dessouki, 1982: 4). All these definitions as well as several new ones, such as Islamism and politicisation of Islam, reflect various different forms and shapes of this phenomenon; however, at the same time, virtually all of them reveal the projects and efforts to ‘re-Islamise’ relevant Muslim societies. The general term ‘re-Islamisation’ defines the movements of religious groups and governmental authorities as well as reforms carried out by them that are aimed at restoring the public role of religion in a broader social environment; the role which, in the opinion of those groups / governments, was limited in socio-political, econom-

146 Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East ic, and cultural processes that have been influencing Muslim states since the beginning of the 20th century. To ‘re-Islamise’, in the eyes of Muslims concerned, in principle means to allow organising and regulating the society on the religious (Islamic) grounds to a greater extent than by means of non-religious social organisation systems. Such re-Islamisation is characterised by a clear prejudice against non-Islamic forms of social life organisation. Re-Islamisation is inevitably associated with, although not being identical to, the revival and promotion of Islam among Muslims; re-Islamisation is closer related to formal social structures and legal system imposed on the on society from above, while Islam belongs to an individual level of religious consciousness. Through the merger of da’wa with the concept of jihad (even its non-violence forms), subsequent generations of Muslim theorists have paved the way for the politicisation of da’wa. Since for some of them da’wa means jihad, and jihad sometimes leads to the use of force, da’wa, very similarly to jihad, became associated with the use of physical force. In this respect, revivalists split into two broad categories: pacifists (those who oppose the use of force inda‘wa ) and attacking activists (those who support the use of force in da‘wa). Muslim revivalists (Wahhabi, the Muslim Brotherhood and, in recent decades, some groups of neo-fundamentalists who increasingly often are called Salafi) interpret da‘wa as an essential part of the political game. In fact, for some, namely for ‘the Brotherhood’, da’wa itself became the policy (often identified as jihad), and has little, if any, with missionary activities. Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, when talking about the Brotherhood’s mission (which was always called by him da’wa), in fact has political objectives in mind, while God and theological concepts and problems serve in the ideology of the Brotherhood exclusively for political purposes. The Brotherhood and similar organisations pay little attention to extra-community da’wa, which is treated by them just as a little step in their vision of the Islamisation of the whole world. Other, less known, revivalist organisations and informal groups, especially those which are influenced by texts by al-Banna and other ideologies of the Brotherhood, follow the same path. It seems that modern revivalist movements, which have propensity to politicised

147 Introduction to Asian Studies intra-community da’wa, are concerned exclusively about Muslims who are close to them and whom they consider to have taken the wrong path and live in Jahiliyyah (the state of ignorance of the guidance from God) and do not consider non-Muslims as the object of their mission. Politicised by non-state actors, the modern da’wa is only side of the phenomenon called re-Islamisation. The other is the policy of the governments of Muslim countries in respective socio-cultural niches of their countries. Authorities of some Muslim states pursue this policy (particularly in the legal field, but also in the cultural field) already for nearly four decades (from the eighth decade of the twentieth century). Measures taken by the authorities, although they are not called so, to some degree fall within the sphere of intra-community da’wa.

10. 2. 1. Governmental re-Islamisation policy: Example of Saudi Arabia

Task No. 5:

Referring to official Saudi Arabian sources, local and international media, collect examples of efforts of the internal re-Islamisa- tion and external Islamisation of Saudi Arabia during the recent 50 years and present them to colleagues

Looking at re-Islamisation from the perspective of government actions, it started in the eighth decade of the twentieth century (and in some cases a little earlier), when the policy of the re-establishment of the public role of Islam was introduced. A plenty of new government institutions that had to take care of religious affairs were established in many Muslim countries, and already existing ones were restruc- tured. Especially the Arabian Peninsula, but also Libya, Pakistan, Iran and Sudan, saw introduction of new laws that highlighted the cultural orientation of the society on Islamic grounds; furthermore, it was the time when the image of their own, as a religious state and society, was started to be increasingly promoted. According to Halli- day, it was something which can be generally defined as ‘Islamisation’ imposed by the power from the top and by multitudinous Islamist 148 Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East movements from the bottom. Starting from the eighth decade, the trend was to change codes of laws and state practices so that they could better adapt to what they think to be ‘traditional’ or right Is- lamic practices (Halliday, 1995: 133). ‘Traditional’ is probably not an appropriate definition when speaking about of socio-cultural policies of the governments of Per- sian Gulf and several other Muslim states; however, ‘the right Islamic practice’ is just what Saudi Arabia and other Muslim governments envisioned to be created by them following the order of line 3:104 of ‘Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong.’ However, the unavailability of a clear, detailed and commonly accepted definition of what is the ‘right’ Islamic practice, despite many references and extensive reliance on fundamental Islamic texts and religions scholars, encouraged local governments to define it for themselves what they consider to be the ‘right’ Islamic social practice and in which areas of social life they should implement it further. Saudi Arabia’s government envisions re-Islamisation as a universal project: first of all, to re-Islamise the whole Ummah and then to start the Islamisation of the non-Muslim world. In his speech at the summit of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in Tehran in December 1996, Crown Prince Abdullah said: ‘If we are able to properly manage our own affairs and if we strictly keep to our glorious Sharia and its spirit of tolerance, we will be able, with God’s help, to direct our nation by the road of new revival, which will spread throughout the broad Muslim world. An objective look at our nation’s current situation, surrounded by existing circumstances and hit by events, will disclose to us the extent and depth of the awakening of Islam, which responds wherever God’s name is mentioned. It is a revival of religious belief, the purpose of which is to revitalise the Islamic values and strong principles stemming from the teaching of the Holy Quran and refined by the teaching of Sun- nah of the Prophet’ (Abdullah, Crown Prince, 1996). Saudi Arabia’s government sees the need for revival of Islamic values and, therefore, assigned itself the position as the supporter of the legitimacy of re-Islamisation and medium of the intra-community da’wa in the Muslim world. It seeks to dominate major pan-

149 Introduction to Asian Studies

Arab and pan-Islamic organisations and export its own version of re-Islamisation/Islam by all possible means. Its programme sounds simple but is clear and understandable to all Muslims: Sharia, based on Quran and Sunnah, must be the framework of the social life of Muslims. By reviving Sharia, Muslims will recover the regulating power of religion in the public space – it is what which is alleged to exist in Saudi Arabia itself. Those Muslim states which obey this programme are supported by Saudi Arabia and other member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council my means of low-interest loans and humanitarian, military, technological, and other assistance. At an international level, re-Islamisation has a certain type of product: Muslim countries receive economic aid from the Persian Gulf under the condition that they will implement the Saudi Arabian version of re-Islamisation in their societies.191 Inside their own countries, the re-Islamisation pursued by governments is carried out through legal measures, such as promulgation of criminal codes which rely heavily on classical Islamic jurisprudence with its hudud (fixed physical) punishments. Censorship stands out among the measures taken by the governments for promoting re-Islamisation. State censorship is not a new phenomenon in many Muslim states. Saudi Arabia, other states of the Persian Gulf, Iran, and several others, are well known for the strict restrictions imposed by them in order to prevent unwanted goods and access information from being imported to the relevant countries. Censorship is implicitly and sometimes explicitly related to the maxim ‘enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong’, which is constantly re- peated in da’wa books and other Muslim activists’ texts. The concept of this band of inviting people from Line 3:104 of Quran is actually being implemented by the Saudi Arabian and Iranian governments: they entrusted special quasi-police forces (let’s say, vigilantes) with guarding morality. In Saudi Arabia, ‘the government supports ‘enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong’ committees, whose members (known as mutaween in Arabian) impose in Saudi Arabia the officially sanctioned strict interpretation of Islamic social

191. Schulze emphasises the rise of Saudi Arabia to the hegemonic position as the ad- vocate of Islam, defender of Muslims, and propagator of Islamic values all over the world in the seventh and eighth decades (Schulze, 2000: 170–174, 187–189). 150 Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East customs’ (Gause, 1993: 16). The mutaween control residential places and are authorised to enter private spaces if they notice that some- body behaves immorally inside. They can arrest, impose a monetary fine, or punish otherwise. The mutaween diligence, however, seems to transcend the limits of re-Islamisation envisaged by the government. From the tenth decade of the twentieth century, Arabic news- papers started to right about strict measures of the Saudi Arabian government in respect of the mutaween applied because of their excessive harassment of the population (Kechichian, 1993: 45–48). The mutaween case is an example that reveals the tension between the commandments found in Lines 3:104 and 16:125 (‘Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction’) of the Quran. The morality police, as the mutaween are often referred to, has the power, which by definition is coercive; therefore, the existence of such ‘morality police’ complies with the spirit of only one commandment, while contradicting the other. The impact of censorship is especially felt in education. Taking into account the fact that most of educational institutions in most Muslim state are state-owned, the control of their curricula and faculties is an easy task. The state censors professors’ teaching programmes and works; therefore, they do not contain any criticism of government policy as well as of religions.192 In the countries of the Persian Gulf and several other Muslim countries, religious subjects are taught at all levels of education. Therefore, an overwhelming majority of young Arabs of the Persian Gulf are forced to study state-approved Islamic principles and the ‘right’ Islamic way of life (primary and secondary education in all the countries of the Persian Gulf is free of charge and compulsory).

In other words, authorities, by censoring education, regulates the form and content of intra-community da’wa. This caused contradiction from independent-minded Saudi Arabian revivalists. As Teitel- baum notes,

192. Gregory Starrett conducted a comprehensive study of religious education in Egyptian schools which highlights government interference with the educational sphere. See. Starrett, 1998. 151 Introduction to Asian Studies

‘To a great extent, its confrontation with opposition preachers has been over who determines what the correct for of Islam is, and who has the right to preach Islam in the country. At a June 1999 seminar on da’wa in the reign of the founder of the Kingdom, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa’aud, Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz addressed the preachers gathered. He stressed the importance of a unified message coming from preachers, and reminded them that ‘this is a state for da’wa and not a state that has been established merely for an earthly matter’. He expressed his hope that the preachers would act as security men to protect Islam, and concluded with an observation that the Internet, while containing much negative matter, could be a useful tool in informing the world about Islam in Saudi Arabia’ (Teitelbaum, 2002: 228).

The emphasis made by the Minister on the benefit of the Internet for the purposes of da’wa was not only simply reasoning of hopes because

‘The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da’wa and Guidance has arrogated to itself the most important domain name in Muslim Saudi Arabia: islam.org.sa. Among the many items to be found at the site was ‘A Work Plan for Qualifying Islamic Propagators’, presented to the 6th Conference of Ministers of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, held in Jakarta in November 1997. The Islamic Studies and Research Center of the Ministry, which could be accessed from the site, proclaimed its mission as ‘manifesting and defending the correct Islamic beliefs, and clarifying the Islamic point of view on the different contemporary intellectual issues. It further set for itself the goal of ‘keeping a vigil watch on whatever is published…regarding Islam and Muslims.’ The Ministry also operates the website of the Cooperative Office of Call and Guidanceal-Maktab ( al-Ta’awuni lil- Da’wa wal-Irshad) with offices in Jeddah. Its declared aim is to mis- sionize in the name of Islam. The obvious purpose of such websites is to present the Saudi version of Islam to the world’ (Teitelbaum, 2002: 228–229). These last observations and what was set out above clearly show that among Muslim governments, Saudi Arabian government has

152 Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East assumed a leading role in da’wa affairs (both in its intra- and extra- community forms). However, its position does not avoid criticism from single religious individuals and non-governmental organisations both in the Kingdom itself and abroad. It receives the biggest criticism (as a matter of fact, as well as all other governments pursu- ing similar re-Islamisation policy) because re-Islamisation carried out by the government with its intra-community da’wa is associated more with a formal attitude and it often fails to reach the depths of the individual Weltanschauung awakening the Islamity of citizens; so, it hardly satisfies the goals set for it. In addition, the current Mus- lim governments, even without distinguishing Saudi Arabia, are often blamed by Muslim revivalists of being non-Islamic, but rather hypocritical, if not non-Muslim at all, kafir. For this reason, their efforts of re-Islamisation are viewed by revivalists with suspicion, and they are not supported by some revivalist-dominated non-governmental Muslim organisations tend to pursue their own separate re-Islamisation/intra-community da’wa projects.

10. 2. 2. Re-Islamisation efforts of non-governmental actors

Source: Denoeux, Guilain. The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam (EBSCO)

Task No. 6:

In international media (The New York Times/ International Her- ald Tribune, The Guardian, Newsweek, TIME, BBC, al-Jazeera), find examples of re-Islamisation carried out by non-governmental actors.

In general, none of the Muslim governments has not managed so far to implement ‘the right’ version of Islamic practice for its country’s citizens. There have always been opposition groups even on purely religious grounds. Over time, (in Saudi Arabia, this process took longer and, therefore, was more versatile), to express it by the words of Kostiner, ‘the functions of Islam evolved into two forms: the state religion, which consists of government-controlled and practiced views and ‘savage’ opposition Islam, which opposes the interests of

153 Introduction to Asian Studies the state and resists state control’ (Kostiner, 1997: 75). Of course, this binary opposition is a great simplification of the current situation in most Muslim countries; however, in very general terms, it marks the trend of the bifurcation of religious understanding. Although it is hardly possible to speak of ‘salvage’ Islam, some opposition religious groups within and outside the Muslim world actually propagate a stricter version of the Islamic Weltanschauung. These groups believe that the governments failed to maintain the Islamity of their citizens and to strictly adhere to the ‘right and complete’ norms of Islam. Al-Quatan and Muhalhal, the ideologists of the Muslim Broth- erhood, contemporary radically-minded representatives of intra- community da’wa, present a premise which serves as the guidance for Muslim opposition movements. They divide mankind into two parts: the Party of God (Hezballah) and the parties of Devil (Ahzab ash-Shaytan) (Qutan & Muhalhal, 1992). This binary confrontation is found in the Quran: ‘Those who believe (jukatilūna) fight in the cause of Allah, and those who disbelieve (kafarū) fight in the cause of Taghut. So fight against the allies of Satan aulija( ). Indeed, the plot of Satan has ever been weak (4:79). The radicalism of imaginary confrontation serves several goals and reveals certain ways of thinking. First of all, it is assumed that there may be only one Truth; secondly, there is a certain group, namely the Party of God, who has it. Thirdly, the Truth has to fight against in justice and thus should be disseminated. Although this binary opposition, with the resulting theoretical consequences and practical implications, can also be applied to extra-community da’wa, it provides the basis for the rise of modern politically charged intra-community da’wa pursued by non-state actors. Thus, the fundamental feature of intra-community da’wa pursued by revivalists who are non-state actors is conscious belief of a group of Muslims in their imaginary righteousness vis-à- vis other Muslims, which leads to the implementation of the mission: to disseminate the imaginary Truth by any means whatsoever. Politi- cised intra-community da’wa implies competition and conflict. Usually, this conflict is vertical – between those who have power, particularly political, but also religious, and those who do not have it, or feel not to have it or feel to have lost it. Anyway, the latter can enjoy a certain degree of informal power. A lust for power (to retain or

154 Political and Social Role of Religion in the Middle East to gain it) can in many cases be considered to be the driving force of intra-community da’wa pursued by non-state actors. In this respect, modern intra-community da’wa does not differ much from earlier manifestations of da’wa of this type. Some Muslim opposition groups rushed into politics and even coercion, which called by them Jihad, so that actually there are no signs of what might be described as intra-community da’wa. Al- though those groups use the concept of da’wa and often refer to it as the fundamental idea for their actions, such groups are at the farther end of the spectrum of the activities called da’wa: their ideologies and their ensuing actions are antipodal to those Muslims who seek the peaceful extra-community da’wa. The common feature of such groups is their aggressive and reactionary polemic nature. Those are groups who embody their essence in the binary opposition mentioned above: there are only two colours in their world – black and white. They attribute to themselves everything they call ‘the white’, while viewing others and noticing in other only ‘the black’. Accord- ingly, the Truth is with those ‘the white’, that is with that group, while others are ignorant, if not hostile at all (to the imaginary Truth). Such groups, as a rule, use the concept of takfir which, as explained by Abdul Hakim Murad, means ‘declaring other Muslims to be beyond the pale, and hence worthy of death.’ (Murad). Murad questions, why such trend of using takfir spreads nowadays, and immediately replies himself:

‘Religious movements are the expression not just of doctrines and scriptures, but also of the hopes and fears of human collectivities. In times of confidence, theologies tend to be broad and eirenic. But when the community of believers feels itself threatened, exclusivism is the frequent result. And never has the Umma felt more threatened than today.

Even in the UK, the takfir phenomenon is growing steadily. There are factions in our inner cities which believe that they are the only ones going to Heaven. 99% of people who call themselves Muslims are, in this distasteful insult to Allah’s moral coherence, not Mus- lims at all’ (Murad).

155 Introduction to Asian Studies

Murad’s observation must be well understood, as it captures the key impetus behind the modern (especially politicised) intra-community da’wa carried out by revivalists: unconditional belief in their own ‘righteousness’, and ‘delusion’ of all others, which is embodied in the concept of takfir. Takfir is often consistent with the concept of Jahi- liyyah that serves for many radical Muslims groups as the basis for virtually all ensuing actions, which tend to be repressive. The violent Egyptian Takfir wal-Hijra is just one of many examples. Since politicised intra-community da’wa can arise from two categories of social actors – power/government and non-state agents (individual missionaries and Muslim organisations) which, as a rule, though not necessarily, are oppositional to the government – the relationship of intra-community da’wa with politics can be considered not only at the level of activities supported and carried out by the state, i. e., official re-Islamisation, but also from the perspective of non-governmental Muslim organisations engaged in da’wa. At the non-governmental level, oppositional religious groups form the axis for the analysis of intra-community da’wa. These groups, often prohibited by the power, are most eloquent in their rhetoric and actions, and passionately use the concept of da’wa. They claim themselves to be the media of re-Islamisation, arguing that their sole goal is to be the revivalists of Muslims’ Islamity. Therefore, the three concepts – da’wa, Islamity, and re- Islamisation – intertwine. Re-Islamisation carried out by governments is most evident in the Arabian Peninsula, while non-governmental intra-community da’wa and re-Islamisation efforts are not limited to one or several regions – they spread over the whole Muslim, and also non-Mus- lim world, where Muslim minorities are considerable. Furthermore, many of these efforts were generously supported (directly or through intermediaries) by foundations rooted in the Arabian Peninsula. 11. Socio-Political Reforms and the Democratisation Process in the Middle East

11. 1. 1990–2000: The lost decade (the decade of imitation of reforms)

Source: Documents of the Barcelona Process (Barcelona Declaration, http://www. eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf)

Task No. 1:

Referring to academic materials and reports of brain centres, evaluate the extent and efficiency of the socio-political reforms carried out in the Middle East

After the Kuwait war and the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 (and the end of the Cold War associated with it) – two unrelated events which, however, occurred one after the other within a short period of time, it seemed that favourable conditions formed for political and social reforms in Arabic (as well as in some other Muslim) countries. The Free World, as it had been called earlier by U.S. President Reagan, then triumphed – the angry evil forces (the USSR, and Hussein in Iraq), each in its own way, suffered a crushing defeat, which had to show the world that Western liberal democracies were not a random one-off winners, but that it was political systems based on liberal values who guaranteed their citizens progress, which was crowned with security, stability and prosperity. As a result, most of the regimes in the Middle East, which in the eighties were not democratic (except, of course, with reservations, for Israel and Turkey), in the early nineties, due to external and internal pressure, were forced or decided for certain political and social reforms. For example, the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula adopted constitutions, which had never exist there before, parliamentary work was resumed (Kuwait and Bahrain), or advisory councils were assembled for the first time (Saudi Ara-

157 Introduction to Asian Studies bia and Oman). Multiparty systems were introduced in other Arab countries (Yemen, Algeria, Tunisia, and later Jordan). In addition to these, the best-known reforms, the reforms of the legal base (for example, the Civil Code), education system, and social security, which had to comply with human rights requirements, were announced. In some countries, economies were liberalised significantly. Unfortu- nately, yet before the middle of the nineties, the reform movement not only did not result in the expected transformation, which would resemble the one that was taking place in Central and Eastern Eu- rope at the same time, but even was diminishing rapidly. The reason is that virtually in all Arab countries, the old ruling regimes (which themselves had always been viewing liberal reforms at least with suspicion, and even more often with hostility) again began to suppress democracy-oriented reform initiatives, both arising from the state machinery and, moreover, from the sector of non-governmental civil society organisations and groups. Reformists of Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, and Iran soon found themselves either in prison or outside their countries. Small groups of reformists, who transformed into secret extremists, declared their goal to be the overthrow of the existing regimes (especially in Egypt and Saudi Arabia), which would open the road to reforms. True, not necessarily for liberal and democratic; perhaps even the opposite – for Islamic reforms. In response to the deterioration of the situation in the Arab countries, with its often direct negative consequences for the European countries (illegal immigration, drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, and threat of terrorism), and in order to save the failing process of reforms, the European Union in 1995 launched a large- scale initiative, officially called the Euro-Mediterranean Partner- ship, unofficially also known as the Barcelona Process. The goal of this initiative was a comprehensive gradual and purposeful change of political and economic systems and social relations in the Arab countries so that they, to the extent possible, would become similar to those existing in the European countries. Unfortunately, the results yielded by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are viewed controversially both in Europe and the Arab world.

158 Socio-Political Reforms and the Democratisation Process 11. 2. 2000-2010: The decade of forcing (reforms imposed from outside) Source: The speeches of G. W. Bush and other U.S. top officials (http://archive.org/details/george_bush_archive, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/documents/0,916659,00. html)

Task No. 2:

Using the statistics and information provided by the media and brain centres (International Crisis Group, www.crisisgroup.org), evaluate the efficiency of the measures of the Fight against Terror.

When the administration led by G. W. Bush, which favoured cardinal reforms in Arab countries, came to the White House, the situation started to change again. Since the autumn of 2001, and especially after Bush’s Annual Message toCongress in January 2002, the US administration concentrated its foreign policy exclusively on the Middle East (in fact, the US administration understands this term broader than its traditional definition and calls it the Greater Middle East) where most of the countries are Arab or Muslim. Gradually, the Bush Doctrine was formulated, where one of the pillars declared was the democratisation of this vast region that covers more than twenty countries. U.S. President repeatedly stated that the introduction of democracy in the Middle East was his ultimate goal, with which he closely associated the global anti-terrorist campaign pursued by the US In the rhetoric of President and other officials of his administration, democracy and terrorism were in inverse relationship – the more of one, the less of the other. It would mean that in order to reduce the threat of terrorism, which seemed to be unbridled at that time, it was necessary to fully support the spread of democracy in countries pervaded with terrorism. And it was how the Arab countries were perceived. After a relatively short preparation period, Iraq became the pioneer of this ambitious global restructuring programme. When raid- ing and occupying that country, the United States were assuring itself and the world that as soon as resolute (in other words, forced) implementation of democracy is started in one Arab country, others 159 Introduction to Asian Studies will also be forced to reform themselves under external and internal pressure. Thus democracy would spread over the whole region, becoming irreversible owing to the assistance of the US Unfortunately, the experience of the first decade after the overthrow of the Hussein regime has shown that democracy in this country, plagued by autocratic regimes and senseless wars, is yet a distant aspiration. And not just because the Americans were not sufficiently committed to its implementation, but rather because the imported democracy is not very popular among Iraqis (and other Arabs). And yet, the Iraqi crisis, although far from bringing immediate fruits of democracy, definitely stirred the Arab world – believing in the sincerity of the US administration when it speaks of the support of every kind to the democratisation processes in of the Arab countries, reformers raised their hands and renewed calls to their governments to democratise the political and social system. Scared local regimes began to make excuses and, using the carrot and stick approach, hus- tle to quench flaring-up democratic passions before they became uncontrollable. Moderate supporters of reforms were promised elections, expanded civil rights, while more radically-minded were continued to be cracked down, sometimes physically. True, often crackdown on political opponents is shown in such a light, where opponents are presented as extremists hostile to the stability of the country. Arab country governments rushed to set as the priority the establishment of security and stability in the country, without which any democratic reforms were claimed to be impossible. And since terrorism is the biggest threat, first of all, for the Arab regimes themselves, it is understandable that Arab governments, each in its own way, engaged in anti-terrorist campaign in the territories of their countries. So, although the use of democracy-related terms in the Arab countries increasingly entered the public discourse, the experience of both Iraqi and other Arab countries in admitting democracy to their political systems was symptomatic: governments spoke of Arab democracy, which is allegedly different from the ‘Western’ one. Westerners were said to know nothing about it and, by their interference (through various initiatives, such as the Barcelona Process or the Greater Middle East initiative, and military intervention), only to cloud the already ongoing process of reforms.

160 Socio-Political Reforms and the Democratisation Process 11. 3. From 2010: The decade of fulfilment of hopes (internally initiated reforms)? Source: Arab Spring Research Guide (http://libguides.law.harvard.edu/content. php?pid=270604&sid=2232531), „Arab Spring Archives’ (http://guides.library. georgetown.edu/content.php?pid=237796&sid=2048216).

Task No. 3:

Using materials available online, find out whether or not the political riots that occurred in some Arab countries in 2010–2012 are evaluated as revolutions? Substantiate your opinion with the help of the classical theories of revolutions (e.g. Stone, Lawrence. ‘Theories of Revolution’, World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jan., 1966), pp. 159–176, JSTOR).

Change of power usually occurs in one of the following two ways: either heads of states resign themselves (at the end of a term, as it is done in democratic countries, or due to deterioration of health while transferring the power of the heir, as sometimes happens in some countries ruled by non-democratic regimes) or are removed (in other words, overthrown). In the latter case, again, there are several possible ways of this action ranging from a military coup, which, as a rule, is carried out by a narrow circle of accomplice military officers, to a revolution, which involves if not the entire nation, then at least a significant part of it. Of course, other cases are also possible: for example, formation of armed opposition, which may lead the country into a possibly long-term internal conflict or even civil war resulting in the collapse of the ruling regime or, in some cases, even the state itself. The civil rebellion that broke out in a small, and non-significant in world politics, North African country Tunisia in December 2010, which just within a month was crowned with the getaway of the long-time head of the state Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, caused alert among the world’s politicians, academics, analysts and the media. They feverishly began exploring the roots of the rebellion, intentions and interests of the key players, and looking for the role of possible external forces concerned. In reality, there was no external force that 161 Introduction to Asian Studies not only would intervene in the course of the rebellion in Tunisia, but even would be able to follow the events so that to understand what was going on at that time. The rebellion of Egyptians, who shortly followed the Tunisian example, was faced by the world in the same embarrassed state: at the beginning, U.S. Secretary of State openly supported the Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak, while the President for a long time could not decide which side to support. The governments of other great powers of the world also did not venture to support the rebels until the overthrow of Mubarak. Even before the victory of rebels in Egypt, the wave of riots flooded a large part of the Arab world and was tagged ‘Arab Spring’ by the media, while the processes that started were named revolutions. However, the intensity of these so-called revolutions in different Arab countries was radically different: if in Morocco, Jordan, Oman, and Kuwait, protesting citizens even may not be called rebels because the participants of not numerous demonstrations did not seek the overthrow of power, but sought only social, economic, and political reforms, then in Bahrain, Yemen, and finally Syria, many-thousand crowds of rebels, who flooded city streets and squares, not only demanded the resignation of state leaders, but also constantly clashed with the armed forces loyal to the regimes. Shortly, Libya and Syria plunged into brutal internal armed conflicts. Looking from the perspective of the time two years after the beginning of the first protests, it can be said with confidence that the number of fully-fledged revolutions (meeting the definition) in the 22 Arab countries was… just one – in Tunisia. In Yemen, the change of rulers was also led by demonstrations; however, the assassination attempt on the country leader, which resulted in severe deterioration of his health and in- ability to lead the regime any longer, was a no less important factor. The revolution that was getting momentum in Egypt was preceded by the military, who were hurrying to remove the state leader who was not popular (any longer), while the revolution which endangered the survival of the Bahraini regime was brutally suppressed with the help of neighbouring fraternal regimes, in particular, by the hands of Saudi Arabian military units. In Libya, the power was replaced by a hail of bombs of third countries. In Syria, ‘spring-like’ spasms have taken the longest time and seem to be most brutal.

162 Socio-Political Reforms and the Democratisation Process

11. 3. 1. Egypt

Task No. 4: Using media reports and other available information, reveal the dynamics of the political forces of Egypt from the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2012. After the then Egyptian leader as-Sadat was killed in an attempt on his life in 1981, Vice-President Hosni Mubarak, who had tucked his military uniforms into civilian clothes, became his successor. During his reign, the precipice between the political-and-military elite and ordinary people, which had already existed before that time, became even deeper. Restriction of political and civil liberties and rights was actually made permanent by introducing the state of emergency, which continued until the beginning of 2011. Egypt turned into a stuffed animal and mere show of democracy: an overwhelming majority of votes in regular local, parliamentary, and presidential elections would be won by candidates of Mubarak’s party. To remain relevant at least to some extent, smaller legal parties adjoined to the regime almost naturally; others were co-opted. Thus, despite the front-side of a multiparty system, there was no real legal political opposition in Egypt during the whole three-decade period of Muba- rak’s reign. Egypt went to the hands of the top actors of the ruling party and military leadership.

The ousted Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak, Alexandria, mid-January 2011 (a week before the ‘revolution’). Photograph by E. Račius

163 Introduction to Asian Studies

The summer residency of the ousted Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak, Alexandria, mid-January 2011 (a week before the ‘revolution’). Photograph by E. Račius

In the absence of political opposition able to act publicly and freely, and under draconian laws restricting the freedom of speech, during all the decades of the Republic the citizenry had no possibility not only to control the government’s actions, but also to develop skills of critical thinking, which would enable them to take actions for improving their condition. In other words, it was a situation when the leadership naturally did not want to, and lower classes, also naturally, could not change the existing social pattern, which basically was suf- fused with a grandiose level of clientelism, nepotism, bureaucracy and corruption. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Egypt had transformed into a feud of ruling party bosses and military officers, where the never-changing political-and-military elite acted as in its own backyard, while ordinary citizens were actually turned into serfs of bureaucracy. Within a few decades, the Mubarak family alone accumulated assets worth at least USD 40 billion, while two- fifths (i. e., about 30 million) of the country’s population are forced to live on less than two dollars a day. Nowhere in the world can one see such pure and sleek forms of clientelism as in Egypt. Adding the symptomatic arbitrariness and brutality of law enforcement and ju- dicial structures to all the aforesaid onerous conditions makes the picture of the desperate situation of Egyptian citizens complete. Cer- tainly, the majority of Egypt’s population has managed to adapt to (although it is not to be held equal to reconciliation) to the current situation and, skilfully manoeuvring in it, create their tiny personal fortunes.

164 Socio-Political Reforms and the Democratisation Process

Back in the spring of 2008, a small group of young well-educated like-minded people gathered into the informal April 6 Youth Move- ment, which campaigned for protests and strikes against the regime. Within three years, owing to the use of modern technologies, the movement not only managed to organise several larger protests, but also to gain the skills of mobilising citizens in the cyberspace. Fi- nally, prompted by the Tunisian revolution, the movement leaders decided on one more action: to organise, on the occasion of the Na- tional Police Day, a protest against the brutality of the Egyptian police. There is no doubt that the protest organisers, judging from their previous experiences, could not hope for any great success – as a rule, such protests in Egypt used to attract just a few hundred participants, with whom the police did away immediately without any scruples. On 25 January 2011, protests already involved tens of thousands of people. With regard to the fact that the Coptic Church (about one tenth of the Egyptian population, i. e., approximately 8 million, are its adherents) officially banned its members to participate in protests, and the Muslim Brotherhood as well as several other larger political parties and movements did not formally joined them either, the numbers of protesters, by Egyptian standards, were impressive. With the number of participants in everyday protests rapidly increasing towards the end of the week, political groups, which stood behind until then, rushed to announce their joining the protests. As a result, on 11 February the top military, who had been carefully selected by the dictator himself and were supposed to be loyal to him, carried out a military coup and took power into their own hands. During the transition period, which lasted more than one year, power was gradually transferred to democratically elected parliament and president, thus formally placing Egypt on a democratisation track.

11. 3. 2. Libya

Task No. 5:

Using media reports and other available information, reveal the dynamics of the political forces of Libya from the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2012. 165 Introduction to Asian Studies

Nevertheless, the Libyan case is probably the most contrasting one on the common background: in this one of the least populated Ar- abic countries (its population is a little more than six million, including several hundreds of thousands of foreigners), the rebellion against the four-decade reign of the eccentric Muammar Gaddafi shortly not only divided the country into two hostile parts, but even involved the active intervention of external forces. During the four decades of his reign, Gaddafi made sure that no one else would ac- quire so much power as to be able to challenge him ever. According to the order devised by him personally, the ‘rule of masses’ (Arab Jamahiriya), formally, power was decentralised so that it would be entirely transferred to ‘the People’s Committees’). However, the real power was concentrated only in the hands of Gaddafi, who was in- tolerant to any criticism of his policies or personality. Therefore, no concentrated opposition remained in Libya under his control: those not satisfied with the existing power either emigrated or were brutally silenced. The uprising that broke out in eastern Libya in Feb- ruary 2011 reminded, by its nature, those that were taking place in Tunisia and Egypt – it was a spontaneous (unplanned, non-or- chestrated, and uncontrollable) breakthrough of massive civil dissatisfaction with the political, economic and social situation in the country. When the regime, as it was characteristic to it, responded obsessively, the peaceful rebellion turned into an armed one, and civilians were joined some military. However, the actions of the rebels had been coordinated by nobody for a long time – they acted according to the principle of ‘the People’s Committees’ known to them, in the form of independent armed squads. As soon as the rebels suc- ceeded in getting a foothold in Benghazi, the country’s second largest city, some former members of Gaddafi regime (a part of whom come from Benghazi and other areas in the rebel-controlled eastern Libya) started to claim leadership of the rebels and defected to the rebel side. Thus, having started as a rebellion of ordinary citizens against the regime, it turned into the arena of mutual struggle of the regime members, where high officials who had faithfully served the Colonel for many years declared having taken an oath to his enemies. With the help of NATO bombers, Gaddafi’s regime was overthrown within half a year.

166 Socio-Political Reforms and the Democratisation Process

The rush of civil riots that shook the Arab countries in 2001 was presented, with hopes, by some ideologically-driven (or at least influenced by idealism) external commenter as the fruit of the efforts of Arab reformers seeking to democratise the political system of their states. However, in the case of Libya, one must be cautious: although democratic elections have already been held and a new power has been formed there, the following question can be raised: Are those people who did not see any other political system during their life- times but a single-person Jamahiriya are sufficiently mature to trans- form the post-Gaddafi Libya into democracy?

11. 3. 3. Syria

Task No. 6:

Using media reports and other available information, reveal the dynamics of the political forces of Syria from the beginning of 2011 to the end of 2012.

When demonstrations started in Syria in the spring of 2011, although with a certain delay compared to other Arab countries, it was difficult to predict how events would develop. Already at that time, some observers argued that neither in Syria itself, nor among diaspora living abroad, there were not only no real organisations in opposition to the regime, but also charismatic personalities that could bring together and manage such organisations. It proved soon: although a nominal umbrella organisation was established for managing the opposition from Turkey – the Syrian National Council, during more than one and a half years of its existence it failed to offer leaders capable of mobilising Syrian citizens who were not satisfied with the existing regime. However, when the wave of protests reached Syria, it seemed that the regime was not prepared for possible public demonstration of disobedience either. This is why its initial reaction to the demonstration could appear to many people to be indecisive, and this could also to create the impression of the weakness of the regime. It would seem that ‘the Arab Spring’ overtook Syria (though certainly not only it alone) unprepared. However, the regime quickly 167 Introduction to Asian Studies regained its lost alertness and resorted to already well-tried repressive measures against unarmed civilians. These measures, in their turn, triggered consequences that probably even were not expected – the emergence of disobedience among the armed forces, without which the rebellion in Syria would most likely have been suppressed, and rebels would have faced even more brutal crackdown than in Bahrain. It was the desertion from the Syrian military which, to a great extent, caused the transformation of the revolution that emerged so peacefully into an armed conflict. And though more reliable data are not available, it is estimated that Syrian military forces that had had more than 300 000 of active service military personnel until the autumn of 2012 were left without authorisation by about 10 percent, most of whom became fighters that attribute themselves to the Free Syrian Army. Despite the fact that were some quite high-ranking officers among the deserters, the absolute majority of those who defected consisted of compulsory military service conscripts (in Ba’ath- ruled Syria, universal military service is generally compulsory for young people of 18 years of age). The lack of consensus within the opposition definitely weakens it and, at the same time, peculiarly strengthens the positions of the regime – it could (and did so constantly) accuse armed groups of carrying out a terror campaign and thus justify its response actions. Reports of international human rights defence and other non-governmental organisations about the conduct of armed oppositionists in respect of some civilians (for example, Homs Christians) only deepened concerns that the rebels not necessarily always followed the Geneva Conventions. 12. Interests And Role Of External Actors – The Case Of The Us

12. 1. U.S. interests in the region (the concept of the Greater Middle East)

Task No. 1:

On the basis of the materials accumulated during the course, evaluate the success of the US policy in the Middle East in the dimensions of security, political and economic cooperation, and image

In the intricate network of international relations, the dynamics of the Middle East countries, on the one side, and Europe and the US, on the other side, already for half a century gives food for both policy-makers and those political analysts who tangle the development of those relations. If the Europeans’ relations with Muslim states are characterised by relative consistency and moderation, in the case of the US they are more stormy – fluctuating from comprehensive support and cooperation to open hatred and hostility. This is also true in respect of many countries of the Middle East, with very few excep- tions (e.g. the cases of non-Arab Israel and Turkey). For example, the US – Iran relations have moved from amity and mutual commitments that formed after the coup organised by the CIA in the fifties, through the phase of elastic cooperation, to the stage of confrontation which became prevalent as a result of the 1978-9 revolution and which not only continues to this day, but even continuously worsens. In the case of Afghanistan, the US generously provided aid to mujahideens in their fight against the Soviet occupation in the eighties, but then turned away from them when they came to power. The Taliban regime that won over power from mujahideens became a violent enemy of the US administration, while the post-Taliban Afghanistan, being created by means of the military machine of the Americans and coalition partners, is again called a friendly state. The stories of Libya, Iraq, Somalia, Su-

169 Introduction to Asian Studies dan, even Egypt and Lebanon are similar and differ only in details, dates, names, and scopes. The quality of mutual relations often depends on the tone set by the stronger side – the side which has been kept undoubtedly by the US for more than six decades. However, the approach of the US administration to one or another regime in the countries of the Middle East can be and is adjusted by the ability of the regime to present itself as a partner and ally of the US For example, the former Iraqi dictator S. Hussein for almost a decade, in the eighties, used the status of a U.S. ally in the war initiated by him against the Islamic Republic of Iran. At that time, the US administration preferred to avoid talking about the threat arising from Iraq, although already then Hussein developed programmes of both biological and chemical, and eventually nuclear weapons, with the first two being used in practice yet during the war and shortly afterwards. Then Hussein’s regime was handy for the US, which saw it only as the enemy of the enemy (Iran) and, through this prism, – as its ally. Another state, but not the regime, which suffered due to its negligence or arrogance is Libya. In the ninetieths, its dictator Muam- mar Gaddafi gave offence to the world community. On behalf of its own and of ally Europeans, the US took military and other actions against the Libyan regime, which, although isolating Libya from the outside world quite effectively, failed to bring the desired result – did not compel to surrender and, even more so, did not overthrow Gaddafi regime. It was done by the US with NATO allies much later, in 2011. However, there are also different examples of relations between the countries of the regions and the US, which also, just from the other side, prove the previously proposed assumption that the approach of the US administration to relations with a particular regime are often determined not only by the reasons dictated by the US realpolitik, but also by the ability of the regime to persuade the US that it agrees with the policy pursued by the US in the Middle East (defined as ‘the democratic aspiration’) and even cherishes this policy. A good example of this is provided by the US – Egyptian relations, where the long-time, and now already deposed autocratic leader of the latter Hosni Mubarak constantly claimed to be a devo-

170 Interests And Role Of External Actors – The Case Of The Us tee of friendship and cooperation with the US and to support in principle its policy in the region. For this, every year the US supported the Egyptian government by huge amounts of funds and preferential military contracts. During the several last decades, the US foreign policy in the Middle East in general and the Israeli – Arab conflict in particular have been quite remarkable objects of discussions in al U.S. presidential election campaigns. And not necessarily because candidates would have diametrically opposite views of the US role in the conflict. In most cases, their views coincided on the principle matters, while differing only in the details. Therefore, even when the ruling party changes, the US policy on this issue remains quite consistent for nearly half a century: Israel is seen as a strategic partner whose interests are, as a rule, equated to the interests of the US itself. However, during the Clinton administration, the position of the US in respect of the Middle East region was ambivalent and often in- different, so the fact that the political and social reforms in the region were stuck was not actively responded by the US and this, of course, did not promote the development of reforms either. However, when the so-called neoconservatives (neo-cons) administration led by G. W. Bush, which favoured cardinal reforms in the Middle East, came to the White House, the situation began to change again. Since the autumn of 2001, and especially after Bush’s Annual Message to Congress in January 2002, the US administration focused its foreign policy exclusively on the Middle East (in fact, the then U.S. administration understood it broader than traditionally and named it the Greater Middle East). In November 2003, U.S. President bluntly stated that the Western nations for too long excused and accommodated autocratic regimes in the region that had pretended to be friendly, and that the practice would continue no longer because otherwise freedom and democracy would have no chance to take root in the region. 193 In addition to the frozen conflicts in Iraq and particularly in Af- ghanistan, in recent years the hotbed of extraordinary tensions re-

193. President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 2003-11-06, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html 171 Introduction to Asian Studies

U.S. military base, Ramstein, Germany, July. Photograph by E. Račius. 2006 sumed – Iranian government’s policy in the region and its relations with the United States. The dilemma of Iran’s nuclear ambitions has been plaguing the world for many years, after the nuclear programme carried out by country became known to the public. And although Iran has never confessed of developing nuclear weapons (on the contrary, Iranian representatives constantly assert that the programme is developed exclusively for the peaceful purposes of the diversifica- tion of energy sources and energy cost reduction), the peacefulness of the programme declared by the official Tehran, especially given the mood of the current government, is commonly called into question. The US took the initiative and immediately gathered a group of associates and started to curb this member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ through the UN Security Council and in other ways. Unfortunately, all previous negotiations did not produce any tangible results – Iran stubbornly requires the right to freely (of course, under the supervi- sion of the IAEA) develop a programme that is claimed to be vital to the nation where the population, and with it, demand for electricity and other energy sources grow rapidly all the time. With Iran not succumbing to pressure and dragging out negotiations, tension was gradually increasing until it reached the point where both parties started indirect threatening of using military measures – one by attacking, and the other by defending.

172 Interests And Role Of External Actors – The Case Of The Us 12. 2. Lithuania’s contribution to the implementation of the US interests in the Middle East Task No. 2:

Referring to the statements made by Lithuanian politicians, media reports, and academic articles, evaluate the authenticity and independence of Lithuania’s Middle East policy through the prism of Lithuania’s foreign policy.

In 2001, when the US administration announced a global anti-terrorist campaign while rhetorically dividing the world into a new binary opposition, which, of course, was only a distant echo of the one that existed in the Cold War, Lithuania joined it without delay. In his address on 7 October 2001, U. S. President Bush outlined this binary opposition in the following words: ‘Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril.’ 194 This basically meant that either a particular country is at the side of fighters against terrorism, or at the side of its sponsors. No third choice was envisaged by the Head of the US Administration. The same binary opposition was reaffirmed by- An tanas Valionis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithu- ania, in his report at the Conference ‘Terrorism as a Challenge to the Contemporary World’ held in Vilnius on 18 April 2002. He claimed that ‘In the fight against terrorism there can be no half allies, no half enemies and no half measures’195; it was also indirectly supported in his statements by Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus. Over the past ten years, top Lithuanian officials many times publicly declared support for the foreign policy pursued by the US administration in the Middle East, demonstrating that commitment in practice – back in the autumn of 2001, Lithuania sent its soldiers to take

194. Presidential Address to the Nation, The Treaty Room, 2001-10-07, http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011007-8.html 195. Valionis Antanas, International Response to Terrorist Threat: no Half Allies, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 2002, No. 1 (9), p. 18. 173 Introduction to Asian Studies part in the Afghan invasion. However, the real opportunity to show its loyalty to the US occurred on the eve of the invasion of Iraq, at the end of 2002–beginning of 2003, when the United States was gathering the invasion support team. Lithuania (as well as other nine post-communist countries of the Central and Eastern Europe) did not hesitate to support the invasion and offered its services for its execution. 196 Both invasions (of Afghanistan and Iraq) were justified by their organisers by the fight against international terrorism and by the ne- cessity to spread democracy. Lithuania’s self-identification with this rhetoric is evidenced by the comparison of the contemporary threat of terrorism to Europe with the threat of fascism before World War II expressed by the then Lithuanian Minister of Defence Linas Linkevičius in May 2004. 197 Linkevicius also warned that some European countries had not yet fully recognised the scope of the terrorist threat, making it clear that Lithuania had a deep perception of it and, therefore, unconditionally adjoined the US administration and its ‘anti-terrorist campaign’ and ‘spreading of democracy’ in the Middle East.

Lithuanian soldiers in Ghōr Province, Afghanistan, July 2006. Photograph by E. Račius

196. Letter of the Vilnius Ten Group, the Ambassy of the Republic of Lithuania in Finland, 11 February 2003, http://amb.urm.lt/suomija/showitem.php?TopMen uID=541&ItemID=916&SiteID=53&LangID=1. 197. Linkevičius Linas, ‘A Broader Concept of Security for the 21st Century’, a speech delivered at the 21st International Workshop on Global Security, 08 May 2004. 174 Interests And Role Of External Actors – The Case Of The Us

Unfortunately, as the scopes of terrorism (both local and international) during the first half-dozen years of the new millennium increased dramatically, and the seed of democracy in the Greater Middle East progresses rather slowly and with enormous obstacles, the US started to increase pressure on NATO partners so that they would focus their resources more on the countries that are becoming freezing conflicts – Afghanistan and Iraq. Lithuania, understanding the limitation of its resources, has been forced to choose between the two. Thus, the revision of Lithuania’s participation in international military operations started in 2005 and was crowned with Lithuania’s consent (under U.S. strong offering through NATO) to lead one of the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) that was set up just in June of the same year in Chaghcharan, the capital city of Afghanistan’s Ghōr Province. This mission is the first one when Lithuania not simply joined the team gathering for an international operation, but itself undertook to bring together and lead such operation. It was also definitely an expression of Lithu- ania’s loyalty to the US (and unconditional approval of its policies in the region). Officially, it was announced that ‘the PRT assists the Afghan Gov- ernment to maintain security in Kabul and beyond, facilitates the development of governmental structures, strengthens governmental control in the country, and supports reconstruction and humanitarian activities’. 198 The strengthening of the influence of the Afghan central government in the province and formation of appropriate conditions for the reconstruction of the province and the state were named as the main tasks of the PRT. Such tasks were formulated for all the more than two dozen of PRTs that acted in the country. However, within a more general framework of responsibility for the transfer of security to locals and withdrawal of occupying troops from Afghanistan, Lithuania, after eight years of the existence of the PRT, decided to disband it and to withdraw from the Ghōr Province completely at the end of 2013.

198. ‘Vyriausybė įsteigė atkūrimo grupę Afganistane’ (‘The Government sets a reconstruction team in Afghanistan’, BNS, 19 May 2005, http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6707701. 175 Introduction to Asian Studies

Lithuanian soldiers in Ghōr Province, Afghanistan, July 2006. Photograph by E. Račius

Following the events of the last decade, it is clear that the decisions of Lithuania’s power (especially during LSDP-dominated governments and presidential term of V. Adamkus) in respect of the Greater Middle East correlate with the policy of the US administration. Such Lithuania’s self-identification with the policy pursued by the US in the Middle East, as it has been declared publicly many times, is in accordance with the interests of Lithuania (closer cooperation within NATO and enhancement of bilateral strategic partnership with the US). However, in the region of the Middle East such position of Lithuania and actions accompanying it are often seen in a different light – Lithuania may begin to be perceived in the region (in fact, it began to be so since 2003) as an increasingly unpopular ally of the US executing the will of the latter, which, as evidenced by the moods of the Middle Eastern societies in recent years, is received unfavourably by a large part of the region’s population. Lithuania’s decision to vote against Palestinian membership in UNESCO was another example of its loyalty to the US – Israel axis.

176 Abbreviations

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation CIA – Central Intelligence Agency EU – European Union ISAF – International Security Assistance Force USA / US – United States of America / United States UK – United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland KAM – Ministry of Defence NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency URM – Ministry of Foreign Affairs USAID – United States Agency for International Development VRM – Ministry of the Interior References to Literature Sources and Websites

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