The Security of Open Vs. Closed
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Netflix Security Requirements for Android Platforms Version 1.0 December 6, 2010
Netflix Security Requirements for Android Platforms Version 1.0 December 6, 2010 Netflix Confidential Overall Security Philosophy • Netflix and Partners are working together to create a market for connected platforms and services • For long-term success, this requires a healthy and secure ecosystem – Based on best practices – Transparency between content, service, and platform partners – Proactive cooperation, rapid response • Our mutual success depends on it – Breaches hurt everyone Netflix Confidential Typical Studio Requirements • Platforms must meet agreed-upon robustness specifications (Netflix Robustness Rules, DRM providers’ robustness rules) • Platform partners must submit sample products and security documentation to Netflix for certification. – Netflix must review documentation and assess compliance with robustness specifications • If a platform is breached, Netflix or partner may be required to revoke individual or class of platforms. • In case of extended breach or platform non-compliance, studio has option to suspend availability of content to the Netflix service. – Such action would adversely affect all platforms and all Netflix subscribers. Netflix Confidential Android vs. Studio Requirements • Most Android platforms have been “rooted” – yields full control of system – history suggests this problem will not go away • Once rooting occurs, Linux security model is insufficient to protect content -related assets • Without modification, these platforms do not allow Netflix to meet contractual obligations to studios • We are aggressively working with partners to address this vulnerability Netflix Confidential High-Level Platform Security Concerns • Content Protection – DRM keys – Content keys – AV content • Application Security – Application keys – Access to Netflix APIs & functionality – Non-modifiability – Non-migrateability Netflix Confidential Content Protection: DRM Keys • Group key – typically provisioned in manufacturing – one key for entire class of devices (e.g. -
Structuring the Smartphone Industry: Is the Mobile Internet OS Platform the Key?
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Kenney, Martin; Pon, Bryan Working Paper Structuring the smartphone industry: Is the mobile internet OS platform the key? ETLA Discussion Papers, No. 1238 Provided in Cooperation with: The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), Helsinki Suggested Citation: Kenney, Martin; Pon, Bryan (2011) : Structuring the smartphone industry: Is the mobile internet OS platform the key?, ETLA Discussion Papers, No. 1238, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA), Helsinki This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44498 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen -
Internet of Nano-Things, Things and Everything: Future Growth Trends
future internet Review Internet of Nano-Things, Things and Everything: Future Growth Trends Mahdi H. Miraz 1 ID , Maaruf Ali 2, Peter S. Excell 3,* and Richard Picking 3 1 Centre for Financial Regulation and Economic Development (CFRED), The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sha Tin, Hong Kong, China; [email protected] 2 International Association of Educators and Researchers (IAER), Kemp House, 160 City Road, London EC1V 2NX, UK; [email protected] 3 Faculty of Art, Science and Technology, Wrexham Glyndwrˆ University, Wrexham LL11 2AW, UK; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +44-797-480-6644 Received: 22 June 2018; Accepted: 25 July 2018; Published: 28 July 2018 Abstract: The current statuses and future promises of the Internet of Things (IoT), Internet of Everything (IoE) and Internet of Nano-Things (IoNT) are extensively reviewed and a summarized survey is presented. The analysis clearly distinguishes between IoT and IoE, which are wrongly considered to be the same by many commentators. After evaluating the current trends of advancement in the fields of IoT, IoE and IoNT, this paper identifies the 21 most significant current and future challenges as well as scenarios for the possible future expansion of their applications. Despite possible negative aspects of these developments, there are grounds for general optimism about the coming technologies. Certainly, many tedious tasks can be taken over by IoT devices. However, the dangers of criminal and other nefarious activities, plus those of hardware and software errors, pose major challenges that are a priority for further research. Major specific priority issues for research are identified. -
Id, Conf 20Xx
ID, CONF 20XX - Where is the policy enforced? -- When is the policy imposed? -- What is protected by the policy? (fine grained) -- What is protected by the policy? (coarse grained) -- Requirements of the person applying the sandbox -- Requirements of the application -- Security Policy Type -- Policy enforcements place in kill chain -- Policy Management -- Policy Construction -- Validation Claim -- Validation -- KCoFI, Oakland 2014 - Where is the policy enforced? -- System: “KCoFI protects commodity operating systems from classical control- flow hijack attacks, return-to-user attacks, and code segment modification attacks.” When is the policy imposed? -- Hybrid: “KCoFI has several unique requirements. First, it must instrument commodity OS kernel code; existing CFI enforcement mechanisms use either compiler or binary instrumentation [4], [10], [18]. Second, KCoFI must understand how and when OS kernel code interacts with the hardware. For example, it must understand when the OS is modifying hardware page tables in order to prevent errors like writeable and executable memory. Third, KCoFI must be able to control modification of interrupted program state in order to prevent ret2usr attacks.” What is protected by the policy? (fine grained) -- Code instructions: See Where is the policy enforced? What is protected by the policy? (coarse grained) -- System Level Component: See Where is the policy enforced? Requirements of the person applying the sandbox -- Install a tool: “The SVA-OS instructions described later in this section are implemented as a run-time library that is linked into the kernel.” Requirements of the application -- Use special compiler: “All software, including the operating system and/or hypervisor, is compiled to the virtual instruction set that SVA provides.” Requirements of the application -- Use sandbox as framework/library: “Because the operating system must interface with the hardware via the SVA-OS instructions, it must be ported to the SVA virtual instruction set. -
Jungledocs Documentation Release V1.0.1
jungledocs Documentation Release v1.0.1 Sarah Scott Jul 24, 2017 Table Of Contents 1 What Is Jungle Disk? 1 1.1 Backup Solutions.............................................1 2 Setting Up Jungle Disk 3 2.1 System Requirements..........................................3 2.2 Installation................................................4 2.3 Administrator Setup...........................................7 3 Introduction to the Jungle Disk Client 13 3.1 Agent................................................... 13 3.2 Activity Monitor............................................. 18 3.3 Application Settings........................................... 20 3.4 Settings File............................................... 28 4 Backup Solutions 31 4.1 Network Drive.............................................. 31 4.2 Backup Vault............................................... 32 5 The Network Drive 33 5.1 Network Drive.............................................. 35 5.2 Local Drive Mapping........................................... 37 5.3 Previous Versions............................................ 39 6 Simple Backup 43 6.1 Simple Backup.............................................. 44 6.2 Backup Job................................................ 45 7 The Backup Vault 51 7.1 Backup Vault............................................... 54 7.2 Backup Job................................................ 54 7.3 Previous Versions............................................ 59 8 How Does The Backup Process Work? 61 8.1 Data De-Duplication.......................................... -
August 2009 Volume 34 Number 4
AUGUST 2009 VOLUME 34 NUMBER 4 OPINION Musings 2 Rik Farrow FILE SYSTEMS Cumulus: Filesystem Backup to the Cloud 7 Michael VR able, SteFan SaVage, and geoffrey M. VoelkeR THE USENIX MAGAZINE PROGRAMMinG Rethinking Browser Performance 14 leo MeyeRoVich Programming Video Cards for Database Applications 21 tiM kaldewey SECURITY Malware to Crimeware: How Far Have They Gone, and How Do We Catch Up? 35 daVid dittRich HARDWARE A Home-Built NTP Appliance 45 Rudi Van dRunen CoLUMns Practical Perl Tools: Scratch the Webapp Itch with CGI::Application, Part 1 56 daVid n. blank-edelMan Pete’s All Things Sun: T Servers—Why, and Why Not 61 PeteR baeR galVin iVoyeur: Who Invited the Salesmen? 67 daVe JoSePhSen /dev/random 71 RobeRt g. Ferrell BooK REVIEWS Book Reviews 74 elizabeth zwicky et al. USEniX NOTES USENIX Lifetime Achievement Award 78 STUG Award 79 USENIX Association Financial Report for 2008 79 ellie young Writing for ;login: 83 ConfERENCES NSDI ’09 Reports 84 Report on the 8th International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS ’09) 97 Report on the First USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in Parallelism (HotPar ’09) 99 Report on the 12th Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS XII) 109 The Advanced Computing Systems Association aug09covers.indd 1 7.13.09 9:21:47 AM Upcoming Events 22n d ACM Sy M p o S i u M o n op e r A t i n g Sy S t e ms 7t H uSENIX Sy M p o S i u M o n ne t w o r k e d Sy S t e ms prinCipleS (SoSp ’09) de S i g n A n d iM p l e M e n t A t i o n (nSDI ’10) Sponsored by ACM SIGOPS in cooperation with USENIX Sponsored -