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TV/Series
13 | 2018 Diziler : les séries télévisées turques Diziler: Turkish TV Series
Béatrice Garapon et Barbara Villez (dir.)
Édition électronique URL : http://journals.openedition.org/tvseries/2303 DOI : 10.4000/tvseries.2303 ISSN : 2266-0909
Éditeur GRIC - Groupe de recherche Identités et Cultures
Référence électronique Béatrice Garapon et Barbara Villez (dir.), TV/Series, 13 | 2018, « Diziler : les séries télévisées turques » [En ligne], mis en ligne le 03 juillet 2018, consulté le 01 octobre 2020. URL : http:// journals.openedition.org/tvseries/2303 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/tvseries.2303
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 1 octobre 2020.
TV/Series est mis à disposition selon les termes de la licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d'Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modifcation 4.0 International. 1
Ce numéro traite des questions de production, des représentations et de la réception des séries télévisées turques. Plusieurs études de cas donnent un aperçu des goûts et des tabous à l’œuvre au sein de la société turque, ainsi que des rapports entre l’industrie, le public et le gouvernement turc. The present issue offers a view of Turkish television series in terms of production, representations and reception. Several series are studied in depth, shedding light on preferences, taboos and relations between the television industry, the public and the Turkish government.
TV/Series, 13 | 2018 2
SOMMAIRE
Diziler : les séries télévisées turques Béatrice Garapon et Barbara Villez
La liste des chaînes de télévision en Turquie et les acronymes utilisés dans ce recueil
“Turkish Content”: The Historical Rise of the Dizi Genre Arzu Öztürkmen
Genre strikes back: conspiracy theory, post-truth politics, and the Turkish crime drama Valley of the Wolves Josh Carney
Deep State. Visual Socio-Political Communication in the Television Series and Serials of the Turkish Television Channel Samanyolu Petra de Bruijn
Au-delà du monde enchanté des séries turques : littérature populaire et réalisme social dans « Kayıp Şehir » [La Ville perdue] Béatrice Garapon
The Political Potential of Popular Culture in Turkey: The Reading of Three TV Series: Leyla ile Mecnun, Ben de Özledim and Beş Kardeş Demet Lüküslü
Diplomatie culturelle et mépris de la culture populaire. La réception critique de Muhteșem Yüzyıl en Roumanie Jonathan Larcher
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Diziler : les séries télévisées turques
Béatrice Garapon et Barbara Villez
1 Lorsque nous avons organisé le colloque sur les séries turques qui est à l’origine de ce numéro, en 2014, les séries turques étaient un véritable phénomène. On ne comptait pas les articles de presse et mémoires d’étudiants qui se posaient la question d’un soft power à la turque, de la promotion du « modèle turc » par le biais de l’exportation de séries. Quelques années plus tard, en 2018, la Turquie exporte toujours autant de séries, mais il n’est plus question de « modèle démocratique » turc. Revenons d’abord brièvement sur la structuration de l’audiovisuel en Turquie, pour aborder le succès des séries.
L’audiovisuel en Turquie : quelques faits sur l’âge d’or des séries turques
2 Longtemps gardée sous le contrôle étroit de l’État, le secteur audiovisuel en Turquie a commencé à être libéralisé dans les années 1990. En 2001, une grave crise financière a nécessité un assainissement des finances publiques et plusieurs rachats de chaînes publiques par de grandes holdings. Cette situation a fait naître, en peu de temps, un grand nombre de chaînes concurrentes, et la nécessité de produire massivement du contenu, pour remplir les grilles de programmation de ces nouvelles chaînes1. Alors que, jusqu’alors, les chaînes turques se contentaient d’acheter des fictions étrangères, de programmer des jeux ou d’autres émissions de ce type, elles ont commencé à produire elles-mêmes des séries destinées à un public domestique. Ces séries (en turc dizi, au pluriel diziler), souvent très longues (rarement moins de 90 min), ressemblent plus aux telenovelas sud-américaines qu’aux séries américaines. Souvent faites de romances et de drames, elles sont plutôt adressées à un public féminin2. Depuis le début des années 2000, le secteur audiovisuel a bénéficié d’une croissance rapide, ce qui a permis d’augmenter la qualité des séries turques (qualité de l’image, acteurs, costumes, décors, sons, post-production). La télévision reste un média très populaire en Turquie, malgré la concurrence d’internet : en 2011, un adulte passait en moyenne 3h48 par jour devant la télévision3.
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3 L’économie de l’audiovisuel en Turquie fonctionne essentiellement sur un marché de l’audience : l’État n’offre qu’un faible soutien à la production audiovisuelle, qui se finance grâce à la publicité. Ainsi, l’audiovisuel et le secteur de la publicité sont liés par une dépendance mutuelle : les publicitaires ont besoin de contenus à fort taux d’audience pour diffuser des publicités regardées par plusieurs milliers de téléspectateurs, et les chaînes ont besoin du secteur publicitaire pour se financer4. Des séries « rentables » comme Gümüş [Noor]5 marquaient ainsi le début en 2008-2009 d’un véritable âge d’or de la télévision turque.
4 À partir de 2008, avec le succès dans le monde arabe de la série Gümüş [Argent – en arabe Noor], ces séries se sont révélées être des produits facilement exportables. Les pays des Balkans (notamment la Grèce, la Roumanie, la Bulgarie, la Macédoine, le Monténégro, ou encore la Bosnie), le Caucase et l’Asie centrale (dont le Turkménistan, l’Azerbaïdjan, la Géorgie, le Kazakhstan ou l’Ouzbékistan), ainsi que la péninsule arabique (Qatar, Arabie saoudite) et l’Afrique du Nord (le Maroc, l’Algérie, l’Égypte), sont les principales zones d’exportation. Les raisons de ce succès sont multiples et on a beaucoup glosé sur le « modèle turc », la diffusion de valeurs musulmanes – comme les pays d’exportation sont, pour beaucoup, des pays musulmans. En réalité, il ne faut pas perdre de vue les avantages commerciaux que présentent les séries turques par rapport aux séries américaines. Moins chères, elles sont aussi beaucoup plus longues (90 minutes par épisode en moyenne pour environ trente épisodes par saison) et ont l’avantage de fournir deux à quatre fois plus de contenu6.
5 Pour un pays comme la Grèce, l’offre turque présentait d’énormes avantages. À cause de sa propre situation économique, la télévision grecque produisait extrêmement peu de programmes locaux. Il était donc moins cher pour elle d’importer des séries étrangères que d’en produire, et les séries turques étaient bien plus économiques que celles émanant des États-Unis, d’un format de seulement 52 minutes. Ainsi est-elle devenue un des premiers importateurs des séries turques dans la région. Mais l’exportation des séries turques vers les Grèce a produit plusieurs effets étonnants : l’animosité envers la Turquie, installée depuis fort longtemps du fait de conflits historiques, a commencé à s’adoucir, le tourisme vers la Turquie augmente et la turcophonie gagne du terrain7. Certains personnages masculins des séries turques feraient même rêver les téléspectatrices en Grèce.
6 Néanmoins cette importante vente de séries envers la région méditerranéenne n’a pas été reçue avec autant d’enthousiasme de la part des instances politiques et religieuses d’autres pays des Balkans, de Caucase ou dans les pays arabes. Les Balkans et le Caucase et les pays de l’ancienne Union soviétique, qui craignaient une sorte d’impérialisme culturel turque et cherchaient à corriger le traitement de certains faits historiques, ont réagi par le passage de lois pour remplacer des séries turques par des programmes locaux8. L’Égypte, qui pouvait se féliciter d’une production importante des séries locales, importait néanmoins bon nombre de séries turques jusqu’au jour où un conflit politique surgit en 2013 entre Erdoğan et le gouvernement égyptien, qui a répliqué en retirant de la programmation les émissions en provenance de la Turquie. Si certains pays arabes critiquaient fortement les séries turques pour la façon dont elles représentaient des traditions religieuses, en Arabie Saoudite des leaders religieux sont allés jusqu’à demander l’interdiction de ces séries, voir menacer les propriétaires des chaînes qui les diffusaient9. Plus récemment, dans la crise entre l’Arabie saoudite et le Qatar, le gouvernement saoudien a interdit la diffusion de séries turques, afin de punir
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la Turquie pour son soutien au Qatar10. De tels conflits et interdictions continuent aujourd’hui pour des raisons religieuses, politiques et commerciales11 et montrent bien combien les séries télévisées sont devenues des enjeux à la fois commerciaux et géopolitiques majeurs pour la Turquie12.
L’image de la Turquie : un soft power ?
7 Si, entre 2009 et 2012, les séries turques ont connu un âge d’or en termes de qualité c’est en partie aussi parce que la plupart des séries iconoclastes, qui sortaient du schéma classique de la romance ou du drame, ont été produites entre ces deux dates. Après, le gouvernement turc a cherché de plus en plus activement à contrôler l’image du pays donnée par les séries et aujourd’hui, en 2018, la situation des productions est très différente.
8 Arrivé au pouvoir en 2001, issu d’une scission de la jeune garde du parti islamiste, l’AKP, Parti de la justice et du développement, mettait en avant un islam modéré. Ce parti était en nette rupture avec le kémalisme – du nom du fondateur de la République turque, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, qui avait promu des réformes laïques et un modèle occidental pour la Turquie. Alors que tous les partis politiques arrivés au pouvoir en Turquie jusqu’à l’AKP se réclamaient de cette idéologie, le nouveau parti et son jeune leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, faisaient figure d’outsider. Durant les années 2000, l’AKP, qui était confronté au pouvoir de l’armée dans les institutions turques, s’était donné une image de rempart de la démocratie, et, sous l’influence des négociations d’adhésion à l’Union européenne, avait engagé une série de réformes libérales. Cette libéralisation généralisée s’était ressentie dans le domaine de l’audiovisuel : plusieurs séries abordent des sujets sensibles, adoptent un ton plus libre sur le plan des mœurs, formulent une critique sociale. À partir de 2013, la censure, à travers son organe, le Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (RTÜK, Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu), se fait plus sévère. Finalement, c’est avec la tentative de coup d’État du 16 juillet 2016 que tout bascule : les autorités lancent de larges purges dans tous les secteurs de l’économie, et l’audiovisuel n’est pas épargné13. Aujourd’hui, les séries turques constituent peut-être encore un secteur très profitable pour l’économie turque, mais elles restent cantonnées dans le drame et le registre comique très éloigné d’une critique de la société ou – encore moins – du pouvoir.
Le cycle global television : comment comprendre et interpréter le succès des séries turques ?
9 La découverte de la circulation des séries turques dans la région méditerranéenne et au-delà a inspiré la création un cycle de conférences à Paris : Global Television Series14. En effet, d’après une étude d’Eurodata, la Turquie occupait la deuxième place, juste après les États-Unis, comme exportateur des séries télévisées dans le monde, suivie elle- même par la Corée du Sud15. Au vu de cette importance, le premier colloque a été consacré à la télévision turque : l’industrie et les politiques des chaînes, la censure, les particularités des diziler, leur réception par les cultures étrangères, leur façon de représenter l’amour, la famille, le succès, la pauvreté, la criminalité, les institutions politiques. Les importations, les ventes de format, les festivals où les acheteurs peuvent sélectionner des séries à diffuser sur leur chaîne afin d’attirer de plus grandes
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audiences élargissait le champs d’analyse de ces fictions à des domaines divers pour étudier les récits et les images, bien sûr mais également l’industrie télévisuelle et l’économie des marchés, la réception d’audience et les représentations sociologiques véhiculées.
10 Le colloque qui a eu lieu à Paris en 2014 a donc réuni des universitaires spécialisés dans l’étude des séries télévisées, ainsi que des spécialistes de la Turquie, et des professionnels de la télévision turque, qui venaient témoigner directement de leur travail. Le colloque s’est organisé autour de trois axes : production, représentations et réception. Le secteur audio-visuel turque est extrêmement productif, et fondé néanmoins sur des conditions de travail extrêmement difficiles. Les acteurs et les musiciens travaillent énormément et sont très peu payés16. Les longues journées de tournage imposées sur les acteurs réduisent le coût des productions en comparaison avec d’autres régions comme les États-Unis ou l’Europe. Les directeurs de deux chaînes, une privée (Kanal D - Pelin Distas) et l’autre public (TRT- Ibrahim Eren) ont accepté d’aborder l’épineuse question de la censure et les décisions et/ou sanctions imposées par la RTÜK (organe de censure pour l’audiovisuel).
11 Le deuxième axe permettait de découvrir la façon dont les diziler représentent la société turque : bon nombre en donnent une image idéalisée. Les contributions portaient sur les séries s’adressant à la jeunesse, aux téléspectateurs conservateurs ou encore d’autres de la gauche, ce qui permettait ainsi de constater le caractère très scindé du public turc et une importante présence des séries à contenu politique malgré les mesures de censure. Mais certains thèmes sensibles comme la question kurde sont traités de manière aseptisée, pour donner une image politiquement neutre17. Certaines séries « en costumes », notamment Le Siècle Magnifique (Muhteşem Yüzyıl) offraient des fresques de l’histoire de l’Empire Ottoman. De nombreuses autres séries tournent autour du groupe familial plutôt que d’un seul personnage principal ou bien du voisinage (« mahalle ») où tant d’histoires s’entremêlent. Parfois, le format de certaines séries américaines est acheté pour en produire une adaptation turque. C’est le cas de Desperate Housewives ; de 2011 à 2014, la version locale (Umutsuz Ev Kadınları) était diffusée un soir par semaine sur Fox TV, et la version américaine, sur une autre chaîne, un autre soir. Le téléspectateur pouvait ainsi constater les tabous de chaque société et les façons de les détourner sur le petit écran. Si par exemple le fils de Bree Van De Kamp était homosexuel, le fils de Berrin dans la version turque n’était qu’un petit malfrat, hétérosexuel mais souvent en prison. Il était trop osé, pour la série turque, d’avoir un personnage homosexuel.
12 Même si la majorité des séries étudiées ici sont des « dramas » on constate qu’il est impossible de généraliser sur les goûts et les politiques de diffusion en Turquie car beaucoup de diziler sont des comédies, traitent des questions familiales ou des romances, mais parfois les auteurs profitent de la censure, comme un outil qui stimule la créativité plutôt que d’aplatir les scénarios. Ainsi trouvent-ils des ruses pour évoquer des questions sensibles, des thèmes socio-politiques sans les nommer directement.
13 Les informations concernant le troisième axe du colloque, la réception des séries turques dans la région de la Méditerranée, étaient parmi les plus inattendues. Les réactions envers les séries turques des médias locaux des pays importateurs ont révélé les attitudes profondes envers la culture dite populaire. Par ailleurs les références, citations ou emprunts apparaissant sur les réseaux sociaux attestaient de l’impact de cette culture étrangère sur les jeunes, et les moins jeunes.
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14 Les articles qui composent ce numéro spécial sur les séries turques ont été choisis suite au colloque. Arzu Öztürkmen, professeure au département d’histoire de l’université du Bosphore (Bogaziçi üniversitesi) est spécialiste de la culture télévisuelle en Turquie. Dans son article, elle retrace l’histoire de l’industrie de la télévision en Turquie, pour dévoiler la construction du dizi comme genre depuis les années 1970. L’influence des fictions étrangères, mais aussi du fonds littéraire et théâtral turc, est fondamentale pour comprendre ce genre nouveau. Elle montre que le dizi, qui touche maintenant des audiences mondiales, est un genre différent, bien que proche, des telenovelas et soap. Souvent tournées en extérieur, avec des dialogues au temps réel, les diziler sont des séries au rythme naturellement lent, dont l’univers musical et visuel est plus riche et plus diversifié que celui des telenovelas et des soap.
15 Les lecteurs se rendront compte grâce à l’article de Josh Carney, maître de conférences en sociologie, anthropologie et études médias à l’université américaine de Beirut, qu’en dépit des idées reçues sur le contrôle exercé sur les séries par le gouvernement, la télévision turque a bien produit des fictions politiques notamment Kurtlar vadisi [La Vallée des loups]. Il s’agit en fait d’une franchise, de plusieurs séries (des spin-off) à saisons multiples et de films qui ont connu un grand succès au point de faire l’objet de discussions dans des magazines télévisuels et des talk-shows. Josh Carney étudie La Vallée des loups (et ses dérivés) et la lecture qu’en font les téléspectateurs en Turquie à partir des théories du complot, ce qui permet de rendre compte d’un imaginaire de l’existence de conspirations politiques menaçant le pays de l’intérieur comme de l’extérieur. Cet imaginaire est confirmé par l’étude de Petra de Bruijn, enseignante à Leiden University au Pays-Bas et spécialiste du théâtre, du cinéma et de la télévision turques. Petra de Bruijn centre son article sur la chaîne Samanyolu, la chaîne privée appartenant à Fethullah Gülen, un prédicateur musulman et nationaliste, fondateur d’un mouvement destiné à renouveler et répandre la foi musulmane. Les séries diffusées et produites par cette chaîne débordent d’intrigues politiques et de signes cachés qui selon les téléspectateurs, prouvent l’existence de complots et d’actions entreprises par un deep state.
16 Béatrice Garapon, docteure en science politique et spécialiste de la Turquie contemporaine, a fait la découverte en 2012 d’une série qui se démarquait nettement des autres. En effet la série Kayıp Şehir [La Ville perdue] était un ovni dans un paysage audiovisuel où la majorité des séries dépeignait une société moderne aux signes de richesse comme des vastes résidences, des voitures de sport et divers accessoires de luxe. Écrite par des journalistes et des écrivains, cette série novatrice modifiait considérablement l’imaginaire de la vie urbaine en Turquie. Influencée par les traditions littéraires, la culture et l’histoire moderne turques, les auteurs ont voulu donner une image réaliste, voire crue, de la société avec ses problèmes, sa violence, l’alcool, la saleté des immeubles d’un quartier pauvre, des mœurs légères de ceux qui luttent pour survivre. Rien dans Kayıp Şehir n’est négligé, ni camouflé comme dans les séries dont parle Demet Luküslü où la censure est plutôt traitée comme un défi, presque un atout pour pousser la créativité des scénaristes plus loin.
17 Demet Luküslü maîtresse de conférence en sociologie à l’Université Yeditepe à Istanbul se concentre sur un triptyque de séries - trois feuilletons réalisés par un même homme, qui se suivent et prolongent un dialogue mis en place avec le public. À l’annulation de Leyla Ile Mecnun [Leïla et le fou], la première, une suite a été produite pour continuer le discours qui critique les politiques de l’audiovisuel en Turquie aussi bien que la
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politique gouvernementale. L’article identifie également les sujets tabous, interdits à la télévision et les moyens que les auteurs ont trouvés pour contourner la censure. Ces séries ont ciblé directement un public de jeunes de la classe moyenne supérieure et urbaine, qui ont emprunté le jargon mis en place qu’ils insèrent dans leurs communications sur les réseaux sociaux. Demet Luküslü montre comment l’humour colorant ces séries a pu acquérir des significations politiques, notamment durant la mobilisation pour préserver le parc Gezi, qui a agité la Turquie en mai et juin 2013.
18 Jonathan Larcher clôt ce recueil d’articles avec une étude de cas sur la place de l’histoire dans la réception des séries turques sur les marchés des Balkans, notamment chez les Roumains et les Roms. L’auteur explore les contraintes locales du marché en Roumanie, où il existe une forte demande pour de grands peplums historiques. La télévision turque par l’exportation de la série Muhtesem Yüzyil [Le Siècle magnifique] comble cette demande ce qui renforce le grand succès de ce dizi. Jonathan Larcher souligne le rôle non négligeable des clips et de la musique des génériques de séries, (soit les thèmes, soit les sujets d’une chanson) qui signalent le degré de popularité d’une émission, méritant leur place comme mesure dans les études de réception.
19 Les chercheurs qui poursuivent les recherches sur la circulation des séries turques dévoileront certainement d’autres enjeux économiques et géopolitiques de ce commerce. Et comme le note Julien Paris, il ne faut pas négliger ces pays où les séries s’exportent car il se peut que l’un d’eux réussira un jour peut-être à modifier l’imaginaire créé par les diziler et « à imposer son récit et ses valeurs18. » D’ici là, une connaissance plus approfondie de l’audiovisuel turc et son incroyable succès ces dernières années permettra d’en tirer des leçons pour les autres pays des régions de la Méditerranée.
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_____ « Turquie : purge dans l’enseignement et l’audiovisuel », Libération, 19 juillet 2016, http:// www.liberation.fr/planete/2016/07/19/turquie-purge-dans-l-enseignement-et-l- audiovisuel_1467165 consulté mai 2018.
NOTES
1. Julien Paris, « Une production télévisuelle turque sous contraintes multiples : l’histoire, l’audience, le marché, le politique », 2 décembre 2013, https://dipnot.hypotheses.org/608, consulté mai 2018. 2. « Femmes turques et séries télévisées : diversité des lectures, richesse des usages », Genre en séries. Cinéma, télévision, médias, numéro 1, 2015, « Les Séries euro-méditerranéennes à l’épreuve du genre », http://genreenseries.weebly.com/uploads/1/1/4/4/11440046/ ges_n%C2%B01_tanri%C3%B6ver.pdf , p.120-146. 3. Paris, ibid. 4. Paris, Ibid. 5. Reyhan Atay, « L’Âge d’or des séries turques dans le monde », Le Figaro, 08 février 2018, http:// tvmag.lefigaro.fr/programme-tv/l-age-d-or-des-series-turques-dans-le- monde_4213e868-0c13-11e8-81cb-edaa50d6a916/. Voir aussi Martine Delahaye, « Les Séries turques ambassadrices du pouvoir », Le Monde, 06 juin 2017, http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/ televisions-radio/article/2017/05/06/les-series-turques-ambassadrices-du- pouvoir_5123334_1655027.html. 6. Julien Paris « Succès et déboires des séries télévisées turques à l'international. Une influence remise en question. », Hérodote, vol. 148, no. 1, 2013, p. 156-170. 7. Paris, « Succès et déboires… », op. cit,, p. 162-3. 8. Ibid., 166-7 9. Ibid., 164.
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10. https://ahvalnews2.com/neo-ottomanism/arab-tv-ban-turkish-dramas-hurts-neo-ottoman- dream-aw, consulté 2 avril 2018 11. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/dubai-based-broadcaster-mbc-removes-turkish-shows- until-further-notice-128252, consulté 2 avril 2018 12. https://ahvalnews2.com/neo-ottomanism/arab-tv-ban-turkish-dramas-hurts-neo-ottoman- dream-aw 13. « Turquie : purge dans l’enseignement et l’audiovisuel », Libération, 19 juillet 2016 http:// www.liberation.fr/planete/2016/07/19/turquie-purge-dans-l-enseignement-et-l- audiovisuel_1467165 consulté mai 2018 ; « Turquie: l'autorité audiovisuelle autorisée à bloquer des contenus sur internet », Huffington Post, 22 mars 2018, https://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/ entry/turquie-lautorite-audiovisuelle-autorisee-a-bloquer-des-contenus-sur- internet_mg_5ab38e09e4b008c9e5f478e8, consultés mai 2018. 14. Les séries télévisées turques, ‘diziler’ : production, représentations, réception en Méditerranée, La Fémis, Paris, 17-18 octobre 2014 ; Les séries d’Amérique latine, La BPI Centre Pompidou, le 14 février, 2016 ; Cap du Nord, les séries nordiques, La BPI, Centre Pompidou, le 15 janvier 2018. 15. http://www.justfocus.fr/series/series-turques-plus-vues-series-us.html. 2017 (EURODATA: http://www.mediametrie.com/eurodatatv/), consulté mai 2018. 16. Erwan Desplanques, « Amour, gloire et Bosphore : Istanbullywood, l’usine à fictions », Télérama, 28 décembre 2014, http://www.telerama.fr/television/amour-gloire-et-bosphore- istanbullywood-l-usine-a-fictions,120648.php, consulté 5 mai 2018. 17. Comme par exemple la série Sultan diffusée de mai à octobre 2012. Voir Francesco Marilungo, « The City of Terrorism or a City for Breakfast. Diyarbakir’s Sense of Place in the TV Series Sultan », Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication, volume 9, issue 3, 2016, p. 275-293. 18. Paris, « Une production télévisuelle turque… », op. cit., p. 169.
RÉSUMÉS
Issu d’un colloque tenu à Paris en octobre 2014 sur les séries turques, ce numéro revient sur le succès de ces fictions télévisées, qui a connu un pic entre 2007 et 2014. Les contributeurs de ce numéro s’interrogent sur la juste façon de comprendre et d’interpréter ce succès. L’introduction présente le paysage de l’audiovisuel en Turquie, pour expliquer ce qui a favorisé un tel essor. Elle donne ainsi des éléments concrets qui permettent d’éclairer l’exportation de ces émissions dans de nombreuses régions avoisinantes. Enfin, les auteures discutent la diffusion d’un soft power à la turque via ces séries, et montrent comment chaque article permet d’apporter une réponse, chaque fois sous un angle différent, à ces questions.
Following a conference held in Paris in October 2014 on Turkish series, this collection of articles deals with the success of these televised fictions, especially during its peak between 2007 and 2014. The articles contained here analyse the reasons for this success and offer ways to understand these programmes. This introduction presents the Turkish audiovisual landscape, in order to explain what made this triumph possible as well as the effects of these exportations to neighbouring countries. The authors discuss the diffusion of a “soft power Turkish fashion” via the series and how each article in this collection, each from a different angle, responds to the questions raised.
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INDEX
Mots-clés : Turquie, audiovisuel, séries télévisées, dizi, exportation, importation, enjeux commerciaux, enjeux géopolitiques, soft power Keywords : Turkey, audiovisuel, TV series, dizi, export, import, commercial stakes, geopolitical stakes, soft power
AUTEURS
BÉATRICE GARAPON Béatrice Garapon est docteure en histoire et science politique, spécialiste de la Turquie contemporaine. Elle est l’auteur d’une thèse sur les processus de démocratisation en Turquie et en particulier sur le Parti démocrate turc (1946-1960). Ancienne élève de l’École normale supérieure et diplômée de Sciences Po Paris, Béatrice Garapon a vécu plusieurs années en Turquie, en Égypte et ailleurs au Moyen-Orient.
Beatrice Garapon has a PhD in history and political science. She is a specialist of contemporary Turkey, her thesis being on the process of democratisation in Turkey particularly the success of the Democratic Party (1946-1960). She graduated from the École normale supérieure (ENS - Paris) and the Institute of Political Science in Paris. Béatrice Garapon spent several years living in Turkey, Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East.
BARBARA VILLEZ Barbara Villez est professeur émerite à l’Université Paris 8. De 2009 à 2017 elle a été responsable d’un réseau de chercheurs travaillant sur les séries télévisées (au LCP-IRISSO). Elle a publié de nombreux articles sur les séries judiciaires télévisées mettant en exergue la comparaison des représentations de la justice française et américaine. Son livre Séries télé: visions de la justice (PUF, 2005), traduit en anglais et réactualisé en 2009 (Television and the Legal System, Routledge) retrace plus de soixante ans de fictions judiciaires dans ces deux pays. En 2014 elle a publié Law & Order, New York Police Judiciaire: la justice en prime time dans une collection sur les series télé aux Presses Universitaires de France.
Barbara Villez is emeritus professor at University of Paris 8. Between 2009 and 2017 she directed a network of scholars on television series at LCP-IRISSO (University Paris Dauphine and the National Research Center, CNRS). She has written numerous articles on television law series comparing televised representations of law in France and the United States. Her book Séries télé: visions de la justice (PUF, 2005), translated and updated in English (Television and the Legal System, Routledge 2009) retraces over sixty years of television courtroom dramas in these two countries. Her Law & Order, New York Police Judiciaire: la justice en prime time was published in 2014 by Presses Universitaires de France.
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La liste des chaînes de télévision en Turquie et les acronymes utilisés dans ce recueil
La liste des chaînes publiques et privées de la télévision turque
NB : nous ne mentionnons pas les chaînes qui ont disparu
Les chaînes publiques
TRT 1 TRT 3 TRT Avaz TRT Belgesel TRT Haber TRT Kurdî TRT Türk
Les chaînes privées et satellitaires
ATV (Turquie) BeIN Sports (Turquie) Cartoon Network (Turquie) CNN Türk Disney Channel (Turquie) Euro D EuroStar TV Fox (Turquie) – anciennement TGRT: Türkiye Gazetesi Radyo Televizyonu Fox Life Galatasaray TV Hayat TV
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Kanal D Kidz TV MTV (Turquie) NTV (Turquie) Powertürk TV Samanyolu TV ShortsTV Show TV Star TV (Turquie) TLC Türkiye
Acronymes utilisés dans ce recueil
AKP : Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Parti de la justice et du développement, au pouvoir depuis 2001 en Turquie DISCOP : équivalent du MIPCOM – marché de productions télévisuelles et cinématographiques - pour l’Afrique et le Moyen Orient. EBU : European Broadcasting Union LATAM : Latin American MENA : Middle-East and North Africa MIPCOM : Marché International des Programmes de Communication- réunion annuelle pour les professionnels de la télévision qui peuvent acheter des séries à diffuser sur leur chaîne. NATPE : National Association of Television Program Executives PKK : Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan), groupe armé kurde RTÜK : Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu, Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel. YPG : Kurdish People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel)
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“Turkish Content”: The Historical Rise of the Dizi Genre
Arzu Öztürkmen
1 Since 2011, I have been engaged in the ethnography of the dizi world, a booming industry in both domestic and foreign markets. As a folklore and performance studies scholar, my focus is on the emergence of genres and on how their contemporary artistic creativity is rooted in the traditional contexts in which they are produced. As part of the first generation of television viewers in Turkey, and growing up with TRT1, my own personal memory of television serials, foreign and Turkish alike, also guided me in structuring my research. In its contemporary version, dizis have come to offer a hybridity of different narrative forms including musical, spatial, cinematographic and visual as well as textual. This essay has therefore a historical-ethnographic approach to the dizi world, examining how the dizis we have been watching since the mid-1990s grew to become a different cultural genre from those we were watching in the 1970s and 80s.
2 My field research began in 2011 with visits on the sets and preliminary interviews with writers, directors, editors, musicians and location scouts, to better understand the artistic construction of the ethnographical context of the dizi. Dizis had been formerly analyzed by scholars in the field of sociology and media studies, who usually approached them as textual narratives, analyzed with an eye on gender, class or semiological representations. At the beginning of the research, I was interested in other narrative components, particularly in musical narratives as a new element of the overall construction of the dizi, but also the editing process which had an important influence on how the episode story would reach the audiences. Much later, I also had a chance to interview actors, producers and set workers in different contexts. Their accounts over the past years have helped me to better examine the intertextuality between these different narrative forms in constructing the contemporary dizi as a genre.
3 Obviously, the genre issue is much more complex. When one explores the literature on the emergence and development of other television serials around the world, like the “soap opera”, “primetime TV drama”, “telenovela” or “musalsal2,” they all point: (1) to a
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particular historical-political context which made these genres appear; (2) to a traditional artistic domain which precedes them (popular theatrical forms, radio shows, etc.). The soap, for instance, has been politically situated in an escapist mood within the developing economies of post depression America in the 1950s, while the telenovela boomed during the authoritarian military coup era during the 1970s and the 80s3. Both genres had initially started on the radio, the soap operas had literally been sponsored by the soap industry, since the 1930s, and the radio telenovelas since the 1950s. The soap narrative had been formulated by advertising executives, while the telenovela genre has been linked to traditional circus theater combined with the populism of the Brazilian theater.
4 The development of the Turkish dizi world has been historically tied to the international repertoire of television drama. International television series were the pioneering tele-narratives Turkish audiences encountered, determining their modes of “television watching”. They also established the desire for particular kinds of dizi production. One can easily state that the dizi has evolved in time since the mid 1990s to become a semi-structural form as of the 2000s. My research question starts therefore with a search for understanding the historical context in which the dizi established itself as the genre we know of and discuss today.
On the History of “Turkish Content” and its Agencies
5 Television entered Turkish social life during the 1970s, through TR,T which was established in 1969. Broadcasting was limited to three days a week and black and white only until 1984. To situate the dizi within its own historical-ethnographic context, it is important to understand how Turkish audiences developed a sense of “appealing content” through time. It is therefore useful to begin by looking at the traditional habits of Turkish audiences and their sense of entertainment.
6 Before television or even radio broadcasting, Turkish traditional entertainment historically combined food, music and dance together. The traditional Ortaoyunu and Karagöz shadow theater since the Ottoman times have followed an interactive and improvised humor based performance (very much like the Commedia dell’arte) centering on class conflicts, ethnic humor, gender quarrels and based in neighborhood settings.
7 These were performed in open air, in coffeehouses or domestic space where audiences could shout, interfere and make comments, while enjoying food and drink. It is during the Republican times that the Turkish public was trained in “indoor theater” by learning how to wait in line to buy tickets, not to eat nuts while watching, to keep silent during the performance and to wait for the end of a show to applaud. One can easily state that traditional theater had a sense of what we call the sitcom genre today4. A survey of the texts of Karagöz and Ortaoyunu will clearly reveal how traditional theater used situational comedy through punning, misunderstandings or absurd encounters5.
8 Storytelling in epic and romance forms was organized again in domestic and public spheres, which could include music, dramatic mimicry and gestures. There the content would be based more on Middle Eastern stories, be they heroic, religious or romantic. These stories would in fact circulate through illustrated printed booklets through the XIXth century. Later, during the nation-building period in Republican times, radio broadcasting became the major media. News and music programs were the popular
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forms; particularly radio theater serials emerged as an important genre in the 1950s, captivating audiences consisting mostly of housewives and students. The content of radio theater included western classics, adaptations from international bestsellers (like Mario Simmel’s novels in the 1970s) and original Turkish plays.
9 When television broadcasting began to spread in Turkey during the 1970s, the number of television sets was very limited, as they were all imported. The first generation of television viewers in Turkey had to rely mainly on German brands like Chaub Lorenz, Grundig, Nortmende, Blaupunkt, Telefunken until the early 1990s, where Turkey became a leading “oem”, original equipment manufacturer6. While television sets were precious home appliances, they were also a source of socialization, creating a semi- public sphere within the domestic space, as many people needed to share television through house visits. Uniting neighbors and enhancing family reunions, watching television brought back the old habits of watching “aloud” and “with food”.
Discovering Colorful Lives in Black and White: TRT Broadcasting during the 1970s and 1980s
10 During the 1970s, the main formats of Turkish television consisted of news, music shows, and movies, mostly Hollywood black and white cinema. Stars of the 1950s and the 60s like Tyrone Power, Kim Novak, Ava Gardner, Katharine Hepburn, Cary Grant, Burt Lancaster became familiar faces for young Turkish audiences in the 1970s and the 80s. American prime time series The Persuaders starring Tony Curtis and Roger Moore, Star Trek, Mission Impossible, Petrocelli, Little House on the Prairie and Bonanza were broadcast in the early 1970s on TRT. But the “serial effect” was mostly created by shows like Dallas and The Fugitive. Along with Dr. Kimble, charismatic Colombo and Mc Millan and Wife also accompanied this trend. During the 1970s, TRT also showed BBC dramas adapted from classical novels like Anna Karenina and some French productions like Allô Police, Arsène Lupin and Jacques. TRT imported many unscripted formats from abroad as well. The first generation of Turkish television viewers were thus exposed to European formats, becoming fans of RAI studio shows, which starred phenomenal Italian singers like Raffaella Carra, Mina and Adriano Celentano. One other important format showing contests among different German villages had become the highlight of Sunday daytime broadcasting.
11 While showing foreign content, TRT was also interested in producing Turkish television films and mini-series. As the official national broadcasting network, their understanding of “Turkish production” consisted of adapting Turkish novels for television. In the early 1970s, TRT commissioned prominent movie directors like Halit Refiğ, Lütfi Akad and Metin Erksan to film a series of short stories. Although these stories were well-known stories of modern Turkish literature, they were not written for television. Exposed to fascinating foreign content, the majority of the Turkish audience found these pioneering television films depressing. They had a hard time interpreting the cinematographic symbolism of the movie directors who adapted these stories. Watching Turkish television content became in a way a “national duty” rather than a pleasant event, giving a sense of failure, when compared to western productions. What was captivating in Turkish content those days indeed came from the sitcom Kaynanalar ([The In-Laws], TRT, 1974-1997, 950 episodes) and the adaptation of the novel Aşk-ı Memnu ([Forbidden Love], TRT, 1975) by Halit Refiğ. In contrast to Erksan and Akad’s
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story adaptations, Aşk-ı Memnu became a real success as a mini-series 7. These two productions were very influential in giving the first feeling of producing high quality shows, of “western calibre”.
12 TRT’s early attempts to adapt stories and novels from Turkish literature gave way to another idea in the 1980s. TRT decided to commission acclaimed poet and novelist Atilla İlhan to write original scripts. İlhan wrote two dizis for TRT, Kartallar Yüksek Uçar ([Eagles Fly High], 1983, 14 episodes) and Yarın Artık Bugündür ([Tomorrow Now Means Today], TRT 1, 1987). Kartallar Yüksek Uçar was set in Izmir on the Aegean cost. It focused on competing families, generational clashes and romance, contextualized in the social- political landscape of Republican Turkish history. Yarın Artık Bugündür portrayed the rising awareness of a bourgeois girl, when she was exposed to the problems of eastern Turkey, leading to her estrangement from her former social circles. The focus of the content those years was therefore more of a “historiographic” nature. The essential desire was the analysis of Turkish society and history with a critical eye. And with his Marxist background and loyalty to traditional culture, Atilla İlhan was the perfect choice as an intellectual writer with a foot in Turkish cinema 8.
13 The 1980s were also the years when TRT developed an interest in historical drama ranging from adaptation of historical novels to historical plays based on political figures and events. Novel adaptations usually depicted the late Ottoman social life and political events in the 19th century period. Following the success of Aşk-ı Memnu (1975), three similar series aired in the 1980s. Üç İstanbul ([3 Istanbuls], TRT 1, 1983), Bugünün Saraylısı ([Today’s Aristocrat], TRT 1, 1985) and Çalıkuşu ([The Wren], TRT 1, 1986) were mini-series whose narrative evolved around class and romance set in the context of the XIXth century Ottoman social and political life. Loyal to the original novels, they were effective domestic productions, which appealed to Turkish audiences through the 1980s.
14 Produced by a state-run national network, historical dramas reflected very much the official approach to Ottoman history, depicting the “foundation” period or the lives of powerful sultans. This genre began with the phenomenal 4. Murat ([Murat the 4th], TRT 1, 1981), focusing on the lives of two powerful figures, the Sultan and his mother Kösem. Performed by prominent theater actors and actresses, this series adopted a strong theatrical frame. It continued with Kuruluş ([Foundation], TRT 1, 1988), this time a high-budget grand production depicting the foundation years of the Ottoman Empire, and filmed upon a plateau particularly built for that production.
15 The 1980s were the years where first soap operas and telenovelas also began being broadcasted on TRT. Following Köle Isaura ([Esclava Isaura], TRT 1, 1985), others came along like Santa Barbara (TRT 1, 1986), Cesur ve Güzel ([The Bold and the Beautiful], TRT 1, 1988), Zenginler de Ağlar ([Los Ricos También Lloran], TRT 1, 1989) and Hayat Ağacı ([Generations], TRT 1, 1989). For Turkish television viewers the content of soap operas and telenovelas matched very well the memory of Turkish cinema of the 1960s, which consisted heavily of melodrama. This was indeed the reason why TRT had also invested in family and neighborhood drama in the 1980s. The first sitcom Kaynanalar [The In- Laws], which had begun airing in 1974 was a great success and proved that Turkish familial humor, but also melodrama, could compete with imported drama. Hence came Perihan Abla ([Sister Perihan], TRT 1, 1986), Yaprak Dökümü ([The Fallen Leaves], TRT 1, 1987)9 and Bizimkiler ([Ours], TRT 1, 1988). Perihan Abla, in particular, which was set in
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Kuzguncuk, a neighborhood along the Bosphorus, was the harbinger of the many other neighborhood based dizi genres of the following years.
From Monopoly to Competition: The Shift from TRT to Private Network Broadcasting
16 As private television networks also began their national broadcasting, the Turkish content produced by TRT shifted towards a more diversified repertoire from 1990s onwards. These were the years where the national monopoly of TRT was broken, and new scripted and unscripted formats or imported foreign productions began airing on private channels. This was the beginning of a new era where productions were no longer subsidized but instead expected to be primarily “profitable”. A fierce competition began among private networks to transfer TRT’s hit soap operas and telenovelas, and import new ones like Yalan Rüzgarı ([The Young and the Restless], TRT 1, 1990), Marimar (ATV, 1994) or Fırtınalı Günler ([Days of Our Lives], Kanal D, 1995)10.
17 As for Turkish content, these shows took over the genre of family and neighborhood dramas. Some were also transferred from TRT like the phenomenal Ferhunde Hanımlar ([Ladies Around Ferhunde], TRT 1, 1993-1999) while new ones were being launched rapidly like Mahallenin Muhtarları ([Headmen of the Neighborhood], Kanal D, 1992)11 or Süper Baba ([Super Daddy], ATV, 1993).
18 The 1990s were also marked by the rise of another subgenre, the melodrama featuring national popular singers. These were the years when the popular music industry boomed with the rise of private radio broadcasting along with special music channels on television. These channels featured video clips, but casting a singer in a drama offered a more rewarding opportunity for drama producers. A series of melodramas emerged in the 1990s, featuring singers like Emrah in Gündüzün Karanlığı ([The Darkness of the Day], Show TV, 1993), Mahsun Kırmızıgül in Alem Buysa ([If Universe is as Such], Star TV, 1993), İbrahim Tatlıses in Fırat (Star TV, 1997), Alişan in Aynalı Tahir ([Tahir the Mirror], Star TV, 1998) or Seda Sayan in Evimiz Olacak mı? ([Will We Have a Home?], TGRT, 1999). These series served their producers and the private networks very well, displaying singers for a longer time than a video clip, and benefiting from their fans. This trend continued until the economic crisis hit the industry, which could not afford the high prices for the stars.
19 TRT took the challenge of competition during the 1990s by making choices on where to focus. Strict regulations falling upon them as a state network brought a certain limit to their genre and format choices. During these years, TRT focused on series depicting the family milieu, both as drama and comedy. They also produced documentaries and historical drama, taking the lead in domains where private networks could not yet invest or give priority. Depicting the Turkish Independence War, Kurtuluş ([The Saving], TRT 1, 1994) was for instance a project, which could only be produced through state sponsorship. The series was filmed over two years as a grand production like Kuruluş ([The Foundation], 1988). TRT could also produce its own documentaries, whereas private networks used mostly imported ones. These were the years where private networks were testing their strength in this new television landscape, which was indeed an industry-in-progress. Many of them hired producers from TRT, but TRT still had more power to cover more areas in the national territory and to access the
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relevant range of actors both from the cinema and theater worlds. Moreover compared to private production companies, TRT still offered a secure venue and more possibility to be widely broadcast. This balance changed over the years, when particularly the industry created its own “cast” both behind and in front of the camera, and gathered the capital to invest in high-quality productions, breaking TRT’s monopoly in this domain.
Industry-in-Progress: Towards a Balance Between State and Private Television
20 In the aftermath of a decade-long establishment of private broadcasting, the television industry moved in new directions during the 2000s. Trying to find a new balance between state and private television, a new epoch began where TRT lost its monopoly position and the rise in broadcasting time created more need for scripted and unscripted formats. Many networks tried to fill this time with foreign drama and shows, but imported substitution was not so easy when not subsidized. Although imported soaps and telenovelas like Bütün Çocuklarım ([All My Children], Kanal D, 2000) and Maria Mercedes (TRT 1, ATV, 2001) continued being broadcast, new and old local drama also aired on state and private channels. These years were an era of searching for new creative content, which would circulate from one network to another, once successful. The family comedy Çocuklar Duymasın ( [Don't Let the Kids Know], 2002 - nowadays) had attained such an exceptionally high rating that it became the topic of hour-long discussions in the most popular debate program Siyaset Meydanı ([Political Arena], 1994 - nowadays). The search for new content also expanded towards the depiction of issues like migration or ethnicity, in the socio-political context of Turkey struggling with identity politics. Seeking to captivate more audiences, historical focus emerged as a new domain of creative content for private broadcasters. Critical revision of recent history came forward with the phenomenal Çemberimde Gül Oya ([Rose Lace In My Scarf], Kanal D, 2004-2005), Hatırla Sevgili ([Remember Darling], ATV, 2006-2008) and Elveda Rumeli ( [Farewell Roumelia], ATV, 2007-2009), all of them being series which focused on factual historical data represented through the gaze of different family lives.
21 While neighborhood series continued to air, melodrama depicting love between the rich and the poor became a dominant genre of the 2000s. Bir İstanbul Masalı ([An Istanbul Tale], ATV, 2003-2005), Haziran Gecesi ([The June Night], Kanal D, 2004-2006), Gümüş ([Nour / Money], Kanal D, 2005-2007), Ihlamurlar Altında ([Under the Linden Trees], Kanal D, 2005-2006) and 1001 Gece ([1001 Nights], Kanal D, 2006-2009) can be cited among the most important of these romance series, where class and gender issues were dealt with. One other important subgenre was the so-called töre dizileri (tribal series). These series centered on social life in the southeast of Turkey, where traditional norms abound. Following the phenomenal success of Asmalı Konak ( [Vine Mansion], ATV, 2002-2003), others came along like Zerda (ATV, 2002-2004), Sıla (ATV, 2006-2008), Asi (Kanal D, 2003, 2007-2009), and Bir Bulut Olsam ([If I Were a Cloud], Kanal D, 2009) on different private networks. Their stories revolved around the household of a powerful landowner, love triangles and family solidarity. Another important subgenre, which was launched during this era was the political action genre focusing on intelligence services and conspiracy issues in the Middle East region. In the post-Gulf-war context,
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Kurtlar Vadisi ([Valley of Wolves], Show TV and Kanal D, 2003-2007) very rapidly drew a regional audience. Given all this diversity, one can easily state that the 2000s were in fact the constructive years of the dizi genre as we speak of today.
The Establishment of Dizi as a Genre
22 Today on international television markets like the MIPCOM, NATPE or DISCOP, the buyers usually refer to the Turkish dizi genre as Turkish soap, Turkish drama or Turkish telenovelas. This terminology may or may not change in time, but the genre of dizi stands apart from the soap or telenovela in different ways.
23 As we mentioned before, when one explores television serials around the world, be they soap opera, primetime drama, telenovela or musalsal, they are all rooted in a historical-political context and in a traditional, artistic domain, which precedes them. Historically speaking, the development of the Turkish dizi world has been tied to the international repertoire of television drama. International television series have had a great impact on Turkish audiences, determining their modes of television watching, establishing their perception of high quality content and creating the imaginaire towards the construction of the dizi genre.
24 One can easily state that the dizi evolved in time from the mid 1990s into a semi- structural form in the 2000s. As a genre, it has different features from the soap and telenovela. Many writers and directors believe that the style of telling the story makes a difference. Because dizis are shot in natural settings12 and because dialogues are performed almost in real time, dizis are “naturally slow”. The musical, textual and visual diversity is richer than the soap and the telenovela, which also have a slow narrative flow. Structurally speaking, dizis offer easily comprehensible narratives in their naturally communicated slowness in a wide variety of settings. The large range of locations raises curiosity as each place becomes a puzzle for the local audience, and for the foreign viewers, an eye on places where they do not have the opportunity to travel.
25 Dizis also offer an intertextuality between different narrative forms such as musical, visual and textual. The pace of the production process is unique to the Turkish television industry. Many networks are reluctant to commit themselves to a full-season broadcast without seeing the success of a show, thus the advertising revenues. This is why production begins with a few episodes in stock and scripts continue to be written on a weekly basis. Through the course of broadcasting, screen writers are exposed to a very rapid response from the audience, actors and producers, a process which has a direct impact on their writing. This is an almost face-to-face interaction where producers, writers, directors, art directors, directors of photography, editors, musicians, actors, agents and location scouts all have a creative input on the final product. It is therefore very important to explore the mechanisms of collective production, and to look at how the social actors of the dizi world influence and collaborate with one another through this creative process. Yet, this also makes the lifetime of the dizis very vulnerable, as no dizi can last as long as a soap opera.
26 One must also remember that there is a very interactive relationship between the press, fan sites, producers and writers. Gossiping is an extended oral genre, as much as fan site creative writing and clip production. Fans produce nowadays their alternative
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scripts, and share opinions once the casting process begins to match their star with their other most preferred stars.
27 From the perspective of audience perception, local attachments may have different reasons from those appealing to foreign audiences. Dizis rely heavily on Turkish lieux de mémoire and display a familiar ethnographic imagery, pouring scenes from Turkish ordinary life, which include family meals, true to life costumes and dialogues with traditional sayings13. Although dizis may be sold all over the world today, they are primarily produced for the local audiences.
Recent Trends: The Road to Global Acknowledgement
28 Turkish broadcasters and distributors have been following global television markets since the 1970s, primarily to buy new content and formats for national broadcasting. TRT has been part of the EBU, European Broadcasting Union, since its foundation in 1950. Although acquisition had been the primary reason for attending these global markets, Turkish productions like Aşk-ı Memnu and Çalıkuşu were sold abroad in the 1980s14.. The breakthrough however came in 2008 with Gümüş ([Nour/Money], the first dizi which boomed abroad. Gümüş was not the first series sold internationally, but it was the first to captivate a mass foreign audience at a size not experienced before15. The enthusiasm first began in the Middle East, moving west later towards the Balkans and the eastern European countries. The trend continued with the opening of the Latin American market in 2014 and leading towards Asian territories nowadays.
29 There are many different views regarding the boom of interest in Turkish dizi around the world. Some of these features, like the use of real locations and naturally slow narration, have been mentioned earlier in comparison to other genres. The technical quality of the productions and a rich profile of well performing actors should also be remembered. New faces with familiar Mediterranean looks were welcome in those territories where dizis were launched. Özlem Özsümbül, who directed the sales of Kanal D in the last decade, calls attention to the universal thematic commonalties as well: “Viewers from different regions find common ground in universal themes – love, desire, ambition and revenge16.” One can perhaps state that the strength of the dizis lies in their merger of these universal themes with a culturally familiar contextualization in these regions.
30 Here the impact of familiarity with the “Turkish cultural domain” should also be underlined. Turkey, as a “Nation of Empire17,” shares with the MENA and eastern European regions a similar aesthetic memory and social codes rooted in the Ottoman Empire. The LATAM and Asian countries also have cultural affinities with the Turkish world in different ways. Given their Mediterranean heritage, Latin American countries enjoy the family scenes with similar food or behavioral patterns. To Asian viewers, the Turkish cultural domain also offers a similar value system in terms of gender and class, but also a similar stance vis-a-vis the western world and modernization experiences. One should also note that the boom of Turkish sales on the Latin American markets began with old content (series such as 1001 Gece (Kanal D, 2006-2009), Ezel (ATV, 2009-2010), Fatmagül (Kanal D, 2010-2012). But at the same time, these dizis opened a gate for the new ones, featuring the same lead actors, who became international stars of social media, if not the mainstream magazine press.
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31 Since the mid 1990s, Turkey’s journey with rising Islamism began to affect broadcasting trends. This turned out to be more visible in the aftermath of the 2011 elections, where political critique in the Turkish media became an increasingly constrained and state- controlled issue. With growing authoritarianism, mainstream networks changed hands from liberal owners to more pro-government ones (Star in 2011, ATV 2013), obstructing a tradition of political debates and political humor on Turkish television. Political round table or discussion programs like Siyaset Meydanı [Political Arena], Teke Tek [One By One] or Ceviz Kabuğu [Nutshell] glued audiences to the screens during the 2000s, offering platforms for free discussion, a trend which has radically changed since then. Although some political programs continue to air, they are no longer a primetime event.
32 This phenomenon caused a visible shift in primetime broadcasting, away from news media and towards the dizi. Although political content made its way into dizi productions in the 2000s, rising authoritarianism, and industry dependence on ratings and advertising revenues, limited networks to romance and thriller genres18. Dizi writers often complain today of auto-censorship, particularly under the pressure of the censor, Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), which can easily penalize networks airing nonconformist material regarding government policies. In the last few years, Turkish producers have also been going through a challenging transition, as new international players like O3 and Endemol have entered the Turkish market.
33 Meanwhile the exportation of the dizis continues boosting other aspects of the Turkish economy. Dizis have sparked a tourism boom in two different ways. Firstly, by displaying Turkey’s different places and regions, dizis have raised a general interest in Istanbul, the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts, Cappadocia, and the ancient eastern cities like Antioch or Mardin. Second, they have shifted the tourist routes, from historical mosques and palaces towards the scenic locations like a particular neighborhood, mansion or restaurant showed in the dizis.
34 With its dynamic, young and hybrid demography, Turkey is a complex country with rising economic growth. Although benefiting from TRT’s legacy, the television industry today owes its leap mostly to the private sector. In the last few years, in the midst of radical political change, the industry has gone through many challenges and adaptations. As the country of honor at the MIPCOM 2015, Turkey’s television industry proved that it had developed its own agencies to produce new creative content. Coming a long way since the 1970s, the dizi genre, which was once inspired by foreign drama, has now established its own global impact, reaching out to distant territories and audiences.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AYDIN, Kemal Aydın & Tuncay GÜLOĞLU (2012), “Book Reading and Social Status in Turkey”, Economics and Management, 17 (2), p. 618-623.
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FORD, Sam, Abigail de Kosnik and C. Lee Harrington (eds) (2011), The survival of soap opera: transformations for a new media era, Jackson, Miss.,. University Press of Mississippi,
KUDRET, Cevdet (1994), Ortaoyunu, İstanbul, İnkılâp Kitabevi.
KUDRET, Cevdet (1992), Karagöz, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi.
MATELSKI, Marilyn J. (2012), The soap opera evolution: America's enduring romance with daytime dram, Jefferson, NC. McFarland.
MEEKER Michael (2002), A Nation of Empire:The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity. Oakland, University of California Press.
RIOS, Diana I. and Mari CASTAÑEDA (eds) (2011), Soap operas and telenovelas in the digital age: global industries and new. New York : Peter Lang.
TÜCCAR, Sevilay (2014), Sınırları Aşmak. TRT Documentary Production.
Webography https://monocle.com/magazine/issues/49/dream-export, (The final episode of Gümüş) accessed September 28, 2016. https://www.google.com.tr/search? safe=active&hl=tr&biw=992&bih=431&ei=O3HMWrCkJIWX6ATF-4sw&q=%C3%B6zs%C3%BCmb%C3%BCl+Viewers+from+different+regions+find+common+ground+ %E2%80%93+love%2C+desire%2C+ambition+and+revenge&oq=%C3%B6zs%C3%BCmb%C3%BCl+Viewers+from+different+regions+find+common+ground+in+univer %E2%80%93+love%2C+desire%2C+ambition+and+revenge&gs_l=psy-ab. 3...10894.15184.0.15536.11.11.0.0.0.0.0.0..0.0....0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..11.0.0....0.4xjkDF7NL5g, accessed March 2018
NOTES
1. Launched in 1969, Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) is the official national television network. 2. Musalsal (the arabic word for series) is the arabic version of soap opera. 3. See Sam Ford, Abigail de Kosnik & C. Lee Harrington (eds) The Survival of Soap Opera: Transformations for a New Media Era, Jackson, Miss., University Press of Mississippi, 2011; Diana I. Rios & Mari Castañeda (eds) Soap Operas and Telenovelas in the Digital Age: Global Industries and New, New York, Peter Lang, 2011; Marilyn J. Matelski, The Soap Opera Evolution: America's Enduring Romance with Daytime Drama, Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 2012. 4. The central theme of the Karagöz plays are the contrasting interaction between the two main characters, Karagöz and Hacivat. Karagöz represents the illiterate but straightforward public, whereas Hacivat belongs to the educated class, speaking Ottoman Turkish and using a poetical and literary language. Although Karagöz was definitely intended to be the more popular character with the Turkish peasantry, Hacivat is always the one with a level head. Though Karagöz always outdoes Hacivat’s superior education with his "native wit", he is also very impulsive and his never-ending deluge of get-rich-quick schemes always result in failure. 5. See Cevdet Kudret, Karagöz, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992; Cevdet Kudret, Ortaoyunu, İstanbul, İnkılâp Kitabevi, 1994. 6. Vestel company, in particular, gained a significant share in the European market of consumer electronics and home appliances, especially of TV sets. As of 2006, the company became the
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largest TV producer in Europe with more than 8 million units sold, accounting for a quarter of the European market, along with the BEKO company. 7. Aşk-ı Memnu also inspired a second series, broadcasted from 2008 to 2010 on Kanal D, that was extremely popular. 8. Atilla Ilhan’s sister Çolpan İlhan and her husband Sadri Alışık were well-known performers of Turkish cinema. 9. That also inspired a more recent series, broadcasted from 2012 to 2016 on Beyaz TV and TV2. 10. Magic Box-Star was the first network established in 1990 in Germany, broadcasting via sattelite. It was followed by Teleon and Mega in 1991; Kanal 6 (a TV channel that lived only a few months), HBB and Flash TV in 1992; TGRT, Kanal D, ATV in 1993. 11. Mahallenin Muhtarları which began in 1992 on Kanal 6 was then transferred in 1994 to ATV and airing later also on Kanal D and Star TV. 12. Initially neighborhood dramas took place in Istanbul’s old quarters, like Kuzguncuk, Çengelköy, Balat and Kumkapı. A group of other dizis were filmed in Cappadocia and in eastern towns like Antakya, Diyarbakır and Mardin. 13. In many other countries, this kind of artful association with self and society may take place through novels, stories, thus through the “reading domain”. For poor reading habits in Turkey see Kemal Aydın & Tuncay Güloğlu “Book Reading and Social Status in Turkey”, Economics and Management, 17 (2), 2012, p. 618-623. 14. See Sevilay Tüccar Sınırları Aşmak. TRT Documentary Production, 2014. 15. The final episode of Gümüş attracted 85 million viewers in 22 countries. See https:// monocle.com/magazine/issues/49/dream-export, accessed September 28, 2016. 16. https://www.google.com.tr/search? safe=active&hl=tr&biw=992&bih=431&ei=O3HMWrCkJIWX6ATF-4sw&q=%C3%B6zs%C3%BCmb%C3%BCl+Viewers+from+different+regions+find+common+ground+ %E2%80%93+love%2C+desire%2C+ambition+and+revenge&oq=%C3%B6zs%C3%BCmb%C3%BCl+Viewers+from+different+regions+find+common+ground+in+univer %E2%80%93+love%2C+desire%2C+ambition+and+revenge&gs_l=psy-ab. 3...10894.15184.0.15536.11.11.0.0.0.0.0.0..0.0....0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..11.0.0....0.4xjkDF7NL5g, consulted on 10.04.2018 17. See Michael Meeker A Nation of Empire:The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity. Oakland, University of California Press, 2002. 18. As rising socio-political tensions found new expressive and performative forms (particularly during the Gezi Park events in 2013), the genre of the dizi became a platform for political critique. Many screenwriters began using their scripts as an opportunity to drop a few lines about political responses to daily political events, posing a subtle critique against rising corruption, contestation against secularism, or concerning human rights violations, threats to freedom of expression and women’s status. This strategy differed from the earlier use of political drama to support state nationalism (as in the case of the blockbuster Valley of the Wolves).
ABSTRACTS
This article explores the making of the dizi genre. Coming a long way since the 1970s, the dizi genre, which was once inspired by foreign drama, has now established a global impact, reaching out to distant territories and audiences. As a genre, dizi has different features from the soap and telenovela. Because dizis are shot in natural settings and because dialogues are natural, dizis are
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slow. The musical, textual and visual diversity is richer than the soap and the telenovela which also have a slow narrative flow.
Cet article se penche sur la fabrique du dizi (série turque) comme genre. Le genre du dizi, dont l’élaboration remonte aux années 1970, a été inspiré par les fictions étrangères ; il a maintenant un impact mondial et touche des territoires et des audiences lointains. Comme genre, le dizi est différent du soap ou du telenovela. Comme les dizis sont tournées en extérieur et que le rythme des dialogues se déroulent naturellement, les dizis sont lentes. La diversité musicale, textuelle et visuelle est plus riche que le soap et le telenovela, qui ont aussi un rythme narratif lent.
INDEX
Mots-clés: dizi, séries turques, TRT, industrie audiovisuelle, attentes des téléspectateurs, töre dizileri Keywords: dizi, Turkish TV series, TRT, audiovisual industry, viewer expectations, töre dizileri, content
AUTHOR
ARZU ÖZTÜRKMEN
Dr. Arzu Öztürkmen is a Professor in the History Department of Boğaziçi University. She received her doctoral degree at the Department of Folklore and Folk life at the University of Pennsylvania in 1993 and has been teaching at Boğaziçi University since 1994. She specializes in performance studies (national celebrations, dance history, verbal art as performance, television drama), oral history and history of emotions (memory of conflict), folklore studies. She has published several books including Celebration, Entertainment and Theater in the Ottoman World (Seagull Publications, 2014) with Prof. Dr. Suraiya Faroqhi and Müzik, Dans, Gösterim: Tarihsel ve Kuramsal Tartışmalar (Boğaziçi University Publications, 2013).
Arzu Öztürkmen est professeure au département d’histoire de l’université du Bosphore (Boğaziçi universitesi). Elle a obtenu son doctorat au département de folklore de l’université de Pennsylvanie en 1993. Elle enseigne depuis 1994 à l’université du Bosphore. Ses intérêts de recherche comprennent l’histoire des arts vivants, l’histoire orale, et les études de folklore. Elle a publié plusieurs livres, Celebration, Entertainment and Theater in the Ottoman World (Seagull Publications, 2014) avec Suraiya Faroqhi et Müzik, Dans, Gösterim: Tarihsel ve Kuramsal Tartışmalar [Musique, danse, et représentation : débats historiques et institutionnels (Publications de l’université du Bosphore, 2013).
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Genre strikes back: conspiracy theory, post-truth politics, and the Turkish crime drama Valley of the Wolves
Josh Carney
EDITOR'S NOTE
I thank the organizing committee for the 2014 Paris conference on Turkish TV series for providing me an occasion to present an early version of this work, and Barbara Villez for her patience and guidance on this piece. This research was made possible by support from the Wenner Gren Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, and a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of South Florida.
1 In early October, 2016, Turkish production company Pana Film released a statement to television and the Internet in attempt to curtail a broiling scandal over a web site they had recently acquired. Pana had purchased the rights to the domain kurtlarvadisidarbe.com, which translates to “valley of the wolves coup,” in May, two months before a failed attempt by portions of the military to topple the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP). While this might pique interest in any circumstances, both fans and critics of the then thirteen-year-old Valley of the Wolves ([Kurtlar Vadisi], Show TV, 2003-20051) franchise were particularly intrigued because the show has a reputation for uncovering conspiracies and revealing truths about politics and power in Turkey ahead of the curve. Many fans assume the producers have inside knowledge about key events well in advance of the general public.
2 Speculation about why and how Pana Film had known to purchase the web site compounded the already rife rumors regarding who had plotted the coup. It was not long before TV talk show hosts Nihat Doğan and Ömür Varol began a campaign on their
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daily morning show Can’t Not Say It ([Söylemezsem Olmaz], Beyaz TV) to have Valley investigated for potential involvement in the coup. The campaign was outrageous on many fronts: it extrapolated from the web site purchase and posited wildly implausible conspiracies including secret messages transmitted through years-old programs and mind control based on the series’ soundtrack. It relied heavily on visual evidence that clearly negated the claims being made and was, furthermore, based on false information. It also appeared to be tied directly to corporate motivations, since the channel airing the accusations, Beyaz TV, had just lost the contract to broadcast Valley reruns. Beyond this, when the Pana Film team eventually did release a statement answering the accusations, Doğan and Varol merely shifted the target of their inquiry, transforming Valley plot points into new would-be conspiracies. As ridiculous as the claims were, they found audience in the fertile paranoia of the State of Emergency (Olağanüstü Hal - OHAL) in post-coup Turkey and, within a week, a prosecutor took up the hosts’ invitation to open an investigation.
3 This decision was not without irony, since Valley played a formative role in preparing the way for such paranoia and, in a greater sense, in fomenting a nexus of nationalism and post-truth politics that have been key to the AKP’s continued rule. This atmosphere relies heavily on the logics of conspiracy theory and, in the argument that follows, I trace these logics in Valley and among its publics by braiding three strands of evidence: the Valley text itself, media discourse about Valley, and observations from interviews and encounters with Valley viewers that arose amidst ethnographic fieldwork2. I turn first to the question of conspiracy theory as genre, and demonstrate how the genre norms that Valley had standardized were turned against the show by the Can’t Not Say It affair. Though the exploration of genre gives us a chance to examine some of the key logics of conspiracy theory, the function of such theory is also tied to its performative uses, and I next turn to the Foucauldian notion of enunciation to explore this. Finally, I touch on conspiracy theory as it circulates in the era of so-called post-truth politics, suggesting that the trust in simple truth to combat such theory may be misguided.
Conspiracy theory as genre in Valley
4 Valley premiered as a television serial on private channel Show TV in January of 2003. It relates the story of Polat Alemdar, a Turkish secret agent who infiltrates the Turkish mafia in order to destroy it in the first TV series, and then moves on to tackle other enemies of the Turkish nation, be they local or international. Polat works with a small team of men (and, later, women), sometimes with the cooperation of the state, and sometimes against corrupt elements of its bureaucracy. Valley has thus far spanned three TV series that garnered consistently high ratings on TV and online, and five feature films. Over the fifteen years since it first aired, Valley has established a host of norms in its patterns of communication with fans, a number of which were activated and reversed by Doğan and Varol in their autumn attack on Valley.
5 These norms are not unique to Valley but, rather, draw on and contribute to a larger body of conspiracy theory that has been subject to a great deal of study. Among the branches of this theorizing about conspiracy theory, I mark three broad trends: the typological, which aims to distinguish the norms of the conspiracy theory argument; the interpretive, which aims to consider the broader reasons for and meaning of
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conspiracy theory in the human condition (e.g. Comaroff and Comaroff, Fenster, Jameson, West and Sanders3); and the conspiracy-oriented, which focuses on the prevalence of actual conspiracy, and attempts to relate this to conspiracy theory (e.g. Marcus4). In what follows I focus primarily on the typological, referring in particular to the work of Richard Hofstadter5, who discusses the “paranoid style” of conspiracy theories, Earl Creps6, who examines their “rhetorical genre”, and Jovan Byford7, who describes the “anatomy” of such theories. Though I here make use of typologies, my interest in conspiracy theory is ultimately interpretive, and it is for this reason that I adopt Creps’ term “genre” when speaking of the norms of the conspiracy argument.
6 I employ genre not as a formal category but, rather, in line with Briggs and Bauman8, drawing on Hanks9, as “an orienting framework for the production and reception of discourse10.” Such a conception allows us to consider genre as a means for a multitude of discursive operations, bridging the gap between texts and those who use them. Indeed, Karin Barber calls genre “the pivot between the producer and receiver of a text11.” Though the argument to follow relies heavily on norms established within the Valley text itself, my ultimate interest is in the circulation and use of conspiracy theory among the publics who access and relate to Valley, and here I draw on Michael Warner’s conception of a public as a self-organized, text-based social space created by the reflexive and temporal circulation of discourse among strangers12. Though Valley evinces a host of genre norms in accord with the typological approaches highlighted above, for the sake of brevity, I lump these into three rough groups: shifts in loyalty; the rhetoric of asking questions, giving voice to others, and revealing truths; and, finally, the nature of the “truth” revealed by conspiracy theory logic.
7 Most obviously pertinent to the Can’t Not Say It debacle is the norm of radical shifts in loyalty. At the plot level, Valley normalized stark turns in the behavior of key characters, such that a friend one week might be an enemy the next, and vice versa. The transformation of a character known as Kara, who joined the third television series Valley of the Wolves: Ambush during season six (2011-2012), provides one case in point. Kara, who is loosely based on real-life MİT (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı - National Intelligence Corps) agent Mahmut Yıldırım (code name “Yeşil”), is initially portrayed as a villain. Shortly after being introduced to the plot (episode 129), he assassinates Alper, one of Polat’s associates in the intelligence service (episode 131), and then Hamit, a man that Polat is charged with protecting (episode 132). Over time, however, Polat and Kara come to realize they have both been betrayed by the same forces, and they become closest allies. Other key examples include the shifts in loyalty (and sympathetic portrayal of) Zaza Dayı a sometimes nemesis, sometimes ally; key members of the Council of Elders (İhtiyarlar Heyeti), who are supposed to direct Polat in the interests of the state, but sometimes betray him; and even Abdülhey, one of Polat’s most trusted men, who shifts loyalties while under the influence of mind control treatment.
8 One “lesson” from such twists in plot is that no one is to be trusted fully. Loyalties can shift on a moment’s notice due to circumstances of national or supranational importance that are far beyond the control of any single character. Indeed, though Valley reinforces this lesson textually on a regular basis, it has also done so extra- textually at times. Numerous long-time viewers of the show spoke to me about the changes in “message” and “stance” that the show took with its various shifts between channels over the years and, given the clientelist media model prominent in Turkey13, this is hardly surprising. At a more personal level, the proclivity for radical shifts in
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loyalty was reinforced with the high-profile feud that took place between Pana Film’s two key figures in 2013: producer Raci Şaşmaz and his older brother, Necati Şaşmaz, who plays Polat Alemdar on the show. In the wake of the feud, which saw Raci leave the Pana team, long-time writers and key actors also left, suggesting that bonds formed over years of working together could be as fragile and liable to shift as those portrayed in the show.
9 This same language of loyalty shifts is deftly employed by Doğan and Varol in the following exchange on their first discussion of the “controversy” over Valley: NIHAT DOĞAN. Some of our viewers are writing to say, look man, Valley of the Wolves is the state’s show—it’s on the side of the state. ÖNÜR VAROL. Which state? NIHAT DOĞAN. Statist? FETÖ was statist as well: the, in quotation marks, PİÇ, paralel ihanet çetesi [parallel treachery gang], the parallel state structure, that is, the state within a state14. Were not Ramazan Akyürek, Ali Fuat Yılmazer, soldiers, prosecutors, judges, and those who bombed the people the state? They were the state itself15.
10 To provide some basic context, “FETÖ” is the acronym for Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü (Fethullaist Terror Network)—the AKP government’s name for the organization linked to Islamic Scholar Fethullah Mthat presumed to be behind the coup attempt16. Doğan uses a slang acronym, “PİÇ,” to refer to this group because the Turkish word “piç” is the insult, “bastard.” Akyürek and Yılmazer are intelligence operatives working for the state who are alleged to be members of the Fethullaist network, and to have had a role in the assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007. Doğan’s point is clear: there is no way to tell who is on what side, so the Pana team could well be enemies of the state.
11 Valley’s plot had made direct and clear reference to Gülen and his network as enemies of the state, involved in attempts to “clone” the state structure from within, and to bring down the government, since 2014. Indeed episode 218, which aired early that year, references and reenacts the three key aspects of what the AKP had already started calling a “coup” in late 2013: the highly public opening of prosecution cases against a number of key AKP party members for corruption, the public leaking of wiretap tapes to demonstrate this corruption, and the “truck scandal,” in which Gülen loyalists in the military prevented Turkish intelligence operatives from taking arms to Syria, allegedly to support Turkmen opposition to the Asad regime. The series even created a character based on Gülen called Muhterem Bey. Given Valley’s explicit casting of the Gülen Movement as an enemy, completely in line with the AKP take on the so-called “parallel state,” it is hard to understand how Varol and Doğan could implicate the franchise in the coup, but the norm of shifting loyalty established by Valley may well have prepared the way. Indeed, the ability of the conspiracy argument to accommodate a shift between enemies is one of the hallmarks that Earl Creps has identified in the conspiracy theory genre17.
12 Doğan and Varol do not directly accuse Valley of participation in the coup attempt; instead, they frame their task in terms of asking questions (and demanding an answer from Pana Film), providing a platform for others to speak (especially their audience members), and revealing truths (particularly through visual evidence, including documents, scenes from Valley, and on-the-scene investigation of Valley filming locations). It is this same language that Valley and its creators often employ when defending their work. Speaking on the talk show Uncensored [Sansürsüz], airing on pro-
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AKP channel 24 in 2012, Valley writer Bahadır Özdener explained to host Yiğit Bulut (now a senior advisor to President Erdoğan) why Valley poses questions that no one else is willing to ask by using a parable: Yiğit Bey18, when we’re speaking about media there’s a basic rule. There’s a room with five monkeys and there’s one banana hung in it. The first monkey tries to get it and he’s sprayed with water. The second tries and he’s sprayed with water too. After that, the others don’t try, and even if others are added to the room the previous monkeys prevent them from trying. Even when the old monkeys are all switched out none of the monkeys (which weren’t victims of the water) is brave enough to get the banana. Our young friends who enter the media are not told what to do, They’re told what topics not to touch on. This isn’t a didactic lesson, it happens little-by-little with courtesy. You can’t write a real history of our press because it doesn’t have a real history. Unfortunately it’s beholden to the hegemony, and the state never supported a good press. The worst facet of this is the youth losing the ability to ask real questions19.
13 Both Valley’s producers and its viewers agree that the show asks the “necessary” questions that others in Turkey are ignoring and, indeed, the rhetoric of “just asking questions” is among the norms identified by Jovan Byford in the anatomy of conspiracy theory20.
14 Closely related to the issue of asking (and getting fans to ask) the tough questions, Valley’s producers often explain their role as taking the side of the oppressed. Speaking on news channel Habertürk during the promotional tour for the fourth Valley cinematic spinoff, Valley of the Wolves: Palestine, director Zübeyr Şaşmaz and his older brother Necati explained their goals from a photographic standpoint. Palestine finds Polat and his team heading to Israel/Palestine after the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid in 2010 to kill the Israeli commander responsible for the raid. Noting that the treatment of Palestinians depicted in the film is based on facts from the Goldstone report, Zübeyr said that the Pana Film team wanted to “take photographs” of reality and show them back to the people: ZÜBEYR. It’s like the difference between CNN and Al Jazeera: are you on the side that drops the bomb, or the side where it lands? A war photographer’s situation is similar: you don’t want a war, but you can only do your job when there’s a war. It’s the same situation for those making this kind of film: you’re obliged to take a picture and that’s what you do. NECATI. But, for the sake of security most people stay on the winning side. That’s true of the press and it is generally true of filmmakers as well. We’re doing something different. We’re one of the first large scale operations playing to a wide audience to take the weaker side. We show where the bomb landed21.
15 Necati expanded on this point in a later interview with journalist Can Dundar: “We are on the side of the oppressed in all situations, regardless of their religion or race. […] Our target audience is all people, to let them hear this sound, to tell this story. This is a good action to take22.” While presenting a Palestinian side to the Israel/Palestine issue could clearly be justified as taking the side of the oppressed, Necati’s claim that Valley does this “in all situations” would appear to display, at best, deep political naiveté. The show’s portrayal of the Kurdish rights struggle, for instance, is far from sympathetic: its ultranationalistic take was so controversial that the second Valley TV series, Valley of the Wolves: Terror, was removed from the air after just one episode. Similarly, despite Necati’s denial of religious interest, Valley makes a clear point of demeaning Jewish and Christian characters, often casting them as the worst sort of villains and, in the case of Jews, portraying a host of common racist stereotypes as well.
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16 But while Necati’s statement could be read as a cynical marketing line, it could also be taken as a literal description of the way the Pana team sees their project—that is, as part of a greater struggle in which they are, a priori, defined as the weaker side. This notion is certainly in line with the so-called Sèvres Syndrome that operates among many in Turkey, and also animates the narrative structure of the show23. The name of this “syndrome” refers to the infamous Treaty of Sèvres (1920), in which the remnants of the Ottoman Empire were to be divided amongst European powers at the conclusion of the First World War, leaving only a small fraction of the land for an emergent Turkey. Turkey’s “independence struggle” was fought against Greece to prevent this outcome, but the lasting cultural impact of this threat, reinforced through education and media, has been an entrenched belief that only Turks will stand up for Turks, and that other nations are constantly looking to divide and conquer the country. Such a belief would be in line with what Richard Hofstadter has identified as the “paranoid style” that characterizes conspiracy thinking. In particular, Hofstadter notes that conspiracy theorists tend to conceive of their enemies as much stronger, “forces of almost transcendent power24”.
17 Inherent in both the issue of posing “real questions” and “taking the side of the oppressed” is the assumption that Valley’s project is somehow related to truth. Indeed, the franchise’s reputation is based heavily on its presumed depiction of realities that others dare not show. A number of viewers told me that Valley was an outlet for news stories that cannot be printed, with one suggesting that sources would leak information to Valley writers rather than reporters, because the writers were more trusted (May, 2013). Another told me that “ninety percent of what you see on Valley is true” (October, 2014) and, while few viewers actually attempted to quantify the truth value of the show, the sentiment, if not the number, was largely reflected by others.
18 Though Valley has often steered clear of overt claims—indeed, each episode of the TV serial begins with a disclaimer directly rejecting such claims—they have at times capitalized on this reputation, as in the promotional trailer for the premier of Valley of the Wolves Ambush season eight, released in the fall of 2013 25. It begins with a brief encounter from the previous season between Polat and a character named Ronald. The latter is a member of the Templars, a powerful secret society who are fighting to bring about a new world order, and who constantly thwart Turkey’s progress: POLAT. Turkey is moving forward to become a world power, why don’t you understand this? RONALD. Your economic and military power is far too little for your goals.
19 This is followed by news footage of conflicts throughout the Middle East, including General Sisi taking power in Egypt, soldiers marching on mountain trails, and skirmishes between police and protestors during the Gezi Park Movement. Then the screen goes blank, only to be replaced by penguins. A voiceover intones: “well, if you don’t want to watch penguins, watch the facts on Valley of the Wolves.”
20 The penguins are a reference to the blackout of news regarding the Gezi Park protests on Turkish news channels during the summer of 2013—particularly to CNN Türk’s decision to broadcast a penguin documentary while CNN International carried news of the protests live26. The intermingling of Valley text and news footage, alongside a reference to the shortcomings of Turkish news reporting has a clear implication: Valley is the place to come for the facts that you will not get elsewhere about what is happening, and about Turkey’s role in the world.
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21 Though the “facts” are certainly important, my encounters with viewers lead me to believe that it is the narrative weft among which these facts are interspersed with rumor and speculation that is ultimately the most salient aspect of the show, providing a transcendent “truth” of sorts that offers order in a chaotic world. This order is the logic of conspiracy, and it is the underlying premise and structure of the Valley franchise. There is no shortage of examples. In the just-mentioned trailer, for instance, the framing of crisis moments by a scene with the Templars suggests, in keeping with the narrative line of the serial, that the Templars purposely quashed the Arab Spring, supported the PKK, and instigated the Gezi Park protests in order to frustrate the “return” of Turkish prominence to the world stage.
22 I have touched briefly above on some aspects of conspiracy genre that populate Valley and the discourses surrounding it, referring, alternatively to the work of Creps, Byford, and Hofstadter. Hofstadter was one of the first to tackle questions of conspiracy theory from an academic standpoint, and among the key tenets of style he identifies are the notion of a “vast and sinister conspiracy” operating via “subtle machinery27”, a pedantic concern on the part of the theorist with exhaustive demonstration of his or her points28, and leaps in imagination between supporting facts and conclusion29. Creps expands on Hofstadter’s work, adding a number of other key tenets, including the above-mentioned flexibility of the conspiracy argument to accommodate new enemies and/or subjects30. Byford also hearkens back to Hofstadter in his more recent typology of the norms of conspiracy theory, including among these that such theories reveal “a single, overarching plot which supposedly explains everything31” and acts as “a motive force in history32”; that the conspirators work via a system of “hidden messages in political speeches, newspapers, and on TV33”; and, crucially, the importance of foreknowledge about key events34. In each of these cases, the authors strive to characterize the norms of the conspiracy theory genre. All three also mention the high prevalence of anti-Semitic stereotypes and casting of Jews as chief conspirators in a global order.
23 Several of these genre norms are important in establishing the transcendent truth of conspiracy logic that ties together Valley and its diverse subplots. The assumed role of hidden messages, for instance, has been key to Valley’s logic from the outset. In the first series, Polat routinely looked in the newspaper for clues that would be posted there either as a message to him by, for example, Aslan Bey, his key contact in intelligence services, or as a message to others that he could intercept in order to foil a plot. Years later, the above-mentioned character Kara was introduced to Ambush in the same way, hunting through newspapers for clues and clipping them out (S06, E129). Likewise, the importance of foreknowledge about key political events is something many fans refer to in explaining Valley’s value. Though it was often difficult for fans to point to specific instances when I pressed for examples, multiple informants told me that the show “predicted” that the death of President Turgut Özal in 1993 may have been an assassination. Valley began treating Özal’s death as an assassination with the first episode of Ambush in 2007, and then proceeded to show the “details” of the crime in the film Gladio, which came out in 2009. Though there had long been rumors of an assassination, Valley was credited with “predicting” the “truth” when the government opened the death up for investigation again in 201435.
24 A number of the other hallmarks of conspiracy logic are displayed in the second episode of season 9 (E231), one highlight of which is Andy Garcia reprising his 2005 role
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as a character called Amon, to lecture Polat on the nature of the “new world order36”. Elsewhere in the episode, Polat sits in front of a chalkboard filled with key events from 2001-2014 and we hear a voiceover of his internal monolog as he ties together the World Trade Center attacks of 2001, the US detention of Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq in 2003, the bombing of a consulate, synagogues, and a bank in Istanbul later that year, and the formation of ŞEDİD, the Valley equivalent of the Islamic State. These events are shown to have a cohesive internal logic tied both to the long-term Valley plot (e.g. the assassination of key character Mehmet Karahanlı in 2003), and to the greater global power structure. Editing suggests that England’s “Prince Henry” is part of a dynasty that still runs the corporations that control various states, and that he is also the ultimate power behind the Islamic State.
25 Valley ultimately phased out the Henry character, displaying the flexibility in terms of enemy norm noted above by Creps, but there was no departure from the “vast and sinister conspiracy” united by a “single overarching plot” and acting as a “motive force in history,” which are all key aspects of the conspiracy argument. Furthermore, we can see very clearly the leaps in imagination from evidence to conclusion, which take place for Polat at the chalkboard.
26 Each of the genre traits identified above can also be seen in the Can’t Not Say It approach to Valley. The initial “evidence” cited by the show for Pana Film’s suspicious behavior was the fact that the company had purchased the rights to the web site kurtlarvadisidarbe.com (valleyofthewolvescoup.com) two months prior to the 15 July coup attempt. This was quickly bolstered with a claim that the appearance of the name “Erdoğan” on a gravestone in the background of a cemetery scene from a 2012 episode (S06, E159) should be read as a coded message about the downfall of the former Prime Minister, now President of the country, Tayyip Erdoğan37. Indeed, the following day the show sent a film crew to a cemetery to “expose” the fact that the gravestone in question had been changed38. Varol claims that staff at the cemetery attest to Valley’s filming there, but if one watches the talk show carefully, stark differences between the cemeteries in question are clear: a worn-out sidewalk fronts the gravestone in the Can’t Not Say It clip, while there is none in the Valley episode; the two scenes feature an entirely different backdrop, with a forest in the Valley scene and more cemetery in the Can’t Not Say It clip; even the gravestones in question are physically different, though Doğan and Varol explain this as the intentional alteration by Valley; finally, there is an obvious difference in the gravestones behind the grave, suggesting in line with all of the above that the show had found the wrong spot.
27 Pana Film released a statement the following day explaining that the web site had been purchased in line with the broader concept of a “coup” by the Gülen Movement, noting as well that the government had been using the term “coup” to refer to the Movement’s actions since 2013. Furthermore, they noted that the Can’t Not Say It crew had, indeed, gone to the wrong site, though cemetery staff had not been lying: Valley had filmed an episode at the site investigated by the show—as many episodes feature cemeteries—it had just been a different episode. They further explained that the gravestone in question could still be found very easily in another cemetery and that it does say “Erdoğan.”
28 These replies did little to dissuade the hosts of the talk show, who simply shifted their attacks, claiming two days later that Valley still must have highlighted the Erdoğan gravestone for a reason. They then moved to a different episode of Valley to reveal
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“clues” about the show’s ulterior motives. Claiming that the ezan (Islamic call to prayer) was read backwards in the trailer to season 10 (2015), they had three religious experts on to interpret the meaning of a reverse ezan, suggesting that it may have been both a sin and an attempt at casting a spell on viewers. It is first worth noting that Can’t Not Say It does not by any means establish that the ezan was actually read backwards. Nonetheless, Valley’s clear tendency to highlight hidden messages within its plot line works against the show here, as host Varol notes “we highlight these sorts of details because this is an ‘operational’ serial that has been giving these kinds of hints regularly for 13 to 14 years39.” Indeed, Valley had even made a plot point about altered ezan calls being used to encourage conversion to Christianity in the spring of 2014 (season 8, episode 22140).
29 Another such “detail” from the season 10 trailer allegedly relates to Israel. Polat discovers a dead priest when he goes to a church in Cyprus and, as he leans down to examine the body, an elongated pool of blood coming from the priest’s head is visible on screen. Doğan and Varol claim that this blood puddle is in the shape of Israel, and Doğan goes on to extrapolate that this must be a message about how the Gülen Movement is linked to Israel, Zionism, the division of the Middle East, and the coming of a new world order. That the blood puddle in question only resembles Israel insofar as both are somewhat elongated may by now go without question, but we see here both the pedantic concern for detail and the leaps of imagination highlighted by Hofstadter.
Enunciating cracks in the story
30 If the brief survey above has demonstrated that Valley was plagued by the genre norms it helped establish, it also hints at the weak nature of some of the claims related to the show. Indeed, a mildly alert observer could see clearly that the visible evidence presented in no way matched the claims it was meant to support. Though the conspiracy theory phenomenon at work in Valley and its greater public is complex, and has many avenues worthy of exploration, I focus here on this intriguing disconnect between claims and the evidence that supports them. For Doğan and Varol were far from the only members of Valley’s public to make outlandish claims.
31 I met one member of this public, whom I will call Aşkın, at a social event in October of 2014. This was a tense period in Turkey, as the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel - YPG) in Syria were fighting to defend the town of Kobane against the Islamic State, and President Erdoğan had done all in his power to prevent those in Turkey from assisting in the defense, either by sending goods or crossing the border to provide support. His rationale was that the YPG was affiliated with the PKK and, therefore, that any assistance to their cause was assistance to terrorists. While Erdoğan was far from alone in his take on the situation, many in Turkey felt that the Islamic State was a greater threat than the YPG or even the PKK, and some Kurds and their allies also felt inspired by the YPG and its project of a stateless autonomous rule in Rojava (Kurdish-controlled Northern Syria). Aşkın was not among the latter group.
32 I had been speaking to our mutual friend, whom I had known for years, about Kobane when Aşkın intervened in the conversation. The friend introduced us and, when Aşkın learned that I was an American studying, among other things Valley, he struck a tone that I can only call deliberately combative while proceeding to lecture on what was “really” going on in Kobane. Among his claims were that the PKK contained very few
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Kurds—that the force was, rather, composed almost entirely of French, Germans, and Italians—and that the Islamic State was a deliberate creation of the US and Israel. His account was exhaustive, but I was not expecting to interview at that event, and neither did I ask his permission to record, so many of the details are now lost. Ultimately, however, he claimed that the “battle” for Kobane was no battle at all, but rather an elaborate charade to steal oil and undermine Turkey’s integrity. “And so,” he concluded, “you see more than ninety percent of what they show on Valley of the Wolves is true.” I laughed at this, but he repeated the claim, adding, “I’m serious, it may sound a bit crazy but the show really gets it right41.”
33 One thing that I found striking about this encounter was Aşkın’s mode of engagement. Each statement seemed to me to be delivered as an angry but nervous challenge against what I can only assume Aşkın perceived as my default “American” point of view on the world. He leaned towards me, adopting a stern, lecturing tone of voice that gave no pause for dialog, and used his finger to point at me when referencing the US. His gaze alternated between a smoldering stare and what I perceived to be a search for confirmation—as if he wanted to gauge the effect of this performance on me.
34 This interaction took place just weeks after the broadcast of episode 231, which I highlight above in terms of conspiracy logic and truth. Valley’s presentation of the Islamic State (or, as the show calls it, ŞEDİD) might be interpreted as in line with what Aşkın says, as there is little doubt either in the show or the real world that US interests in the region have much to do with oil. (In Valley, the immediate force behind ŞEDİD seems to be a company in the UK tied to the British Royal Family, but it is not entirely clear how this links to more distant forces, and the US and Israel often feature as part of the ultimate enemy in Valley plots.) But while Valley presents a complicated picture of the PKK and its motives, the show’s portrayal does not mesh with Aşkın’s account of a force composed mainly of Europeans. That is, it is hard to see why Aşkın would share this theory about the PKK, which goes directly against well-publicized facts about the organization and against Valley’s representation of the organization, while claiming the show was mostly true. Placing Aşkın’s insistence on the “ninety percent” truth of the show next to his performative engagement, however, I think his aim may have been provocation rather than a claim to referential accuracy.
35 In a discussion of so-called “White nihilism” among “hooligans” participating in a controversial annual pigeon shoot in the US, ethnographer Hoon Song notes that the hooligans he met were also conspiracy theorists who embraced absolutist theories despite clear deficiencies in their claims. Part of the reason for this, he suggests, is to provoke: Conspiracy theorists are not essentialists despite themselves; they actively choose to be so. They are militantly disinterested in the ideas of “partial truths”, of the contingency of meaning, of the Foucauldian wisdom that their version might be merely one of many “regimes of truth”. Instead, stigmatization only breeds claims to even Bigger Truths. […] Much more than a referential claim, their “theory” is an apparatus that provokes42.
36 For Song, a key element of the conspiracy theory is that inevitable moment when a propositional claim loses referential validity. When the evidence cannot sustain the claim. Something “escapes capture” at this moment, and this escape is best characterized by the Foucauldian concept of enunciation, which “refers to the event of discourse, not to its ‘content’; to its taking place, not to the text of what is stated43”.
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37 Many thinkers on conspiracy theory working in what I have called the interpretive tradition highlight the apparent rise and spread of such theorizing as a reaction to the so-called postmodern condition: the conspiracy theory provides an overarching logic to account for the loss of master narratives and give the self a sense of place in an otherwise fragmentary world. But Song’s observation on enunciation in the circulation of conspiracy suggests something important about this would-be master narrative: conspiracy theory may not be so much a replacement as it is a new sort of narrative, one in which the cracks in the story are clear, and are alternately invitation or provocation.
Post-truth politics, factishes, and the stakes of conspiracy
38 In contemporary Turkey, these cracks may serve as invitation, for example, to the roughly half of the population who accepts Erdoğan’s repeated assertions that any difficulties in the economy stem from the manipulation of a “finance lobby” bent on quashing Turkey’s rise to prominence. There is no evidence for such a lobby and, indeed, much to the contrary to suggest that it is Erdoğan’s political and economic policies that have damaged the economy. Nonetheless, both Erdoğan and Valley attest to such a lobby, inviting and provoking others to speak of it, as if repetition will conjure its existence44.
39 And, in an era that is increasingly referred to as that of “post-truth” politics, this may be true, in a sense. Bruno Latour has introduced the notion of a “factish”—a curious hybrid between fact and fetish that hearkens back to the time before humans purported to be modern, when belief was not opposed to fact45. For Latour, who holds that we never really could be modern—that we could never shake the importance of belief and merely transferred that belief from religion to fields such as science, ignoring that they were just as constructed in many ways—the factish represents a possibility to heal the modern break between what is “real” and what is constructed: The solution of the factish is not to ignore the choice [between reality and construction], as so many postmoderns will do by saying: “Yes, of course, construction and reality are the same thing; we know that everything is illusion and make-believe.” The factish says something else: It is because it is constructed that is it so exactly real, so autonomous, so independent of our own hands. As long as we do not understand the synonymy between construction and autonomous reality, we misconstrue the factishes as another sort of social constructivism and not as what modified the theory of what it is to construct anything46.
40 I am suggesting that we consider Latour’s factish as the acknowledged construction at the heart of many a conspiracy theory. The enunciative (and, often, performative) gesture that aims beyond the content of discourse to something else is the factish. Taking the factish seriously means countenancing a politics beyond the binary of fact and fiction. If conspiracy theory plays a role in the surge of so-called post-truth politics in Turkey and beyond, the “remedy” for such politics cannot simply be a turn to facts.
41 Assuming that facts will demystify the conspiracy theory is to assume that facts are the desired object of the theorist, but this is almost certainly a projection steeped in misunderstanding. As Latour suggests at the end of a laundry list of revolutions in western philosophical thought: “Each time the misinterpretation is the same: the naive
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belief in the other’s naive belief47.” Turkish media and media criticism are rife with discussion of the “ignorant” (cahil) audience and its manipulation by shows like Valley. Indeed the Valley enthusiasts and the Valley detractors noted above are likely to be seen as “ignorant” by many of the educated elite in Turkey. But the factish suggests that these publics may be up to something else: that the conspiracy logic so key to both the show and some political movements is not about proof but invitation. That insistence on facts precludes not only belonging but also understanding.
42 This is a cautionary tale. As Latour notes, “the reason one should always beware with factishes is that the consequences are unseen, the moral order fragile, the social order unstable48.” The Pana Film team felt the unwelcome return of conspiracy logic in an investigation that hints at such consequences. In February of 2017 that investigation, which was likely inspired by the Can’t Not Say It accusations, and sought to determine whether the production firm had anything to do with the coup, was dismissed by the Terror and Organized Crime Investigation Bureau of the Republic Chief Prosecutor of Istanbul49. While this suggests that factishes may lose potency in court, their overtures are quite powerful in other fields, and their progress from Valley to beyond certainly warrants attention. Indeed, the “coup” that inspired Valley’s web site purchase might well be called a factish morphed to fact: an object of AKP fantasy and fascination that led to such antagonism of the Gülen Movement that it almost had to act. Turkey’s political history is rich with real conspiracies that certainly began as theories of a sort, and richer still with theories about conspiracies yet to be revealed. The factish demands that we treat the latter with due care, developing an approach beyond the simple fact/fiction binary if we aim for political progress.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BARBER, Karin (2007), The anthropology of texts, persons and publics: oral and written culture in Africa and beyond, New York, Cambridge University Press.
BRIGGS, Charles and Richard BAUMAN (1992), “Genre, intertextuality, and social power “, Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 2(2), p. 131-172.
BYFORD, Jovan (2011), Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan.
CARNEY, Josh and Valentina MARCELLA (2017), “Screens of satire and commons of resistance: the place and role of humor in the Gezi Park protests of Turkey”, Ridiculosa 24, p. 151-164.
CHRISTENSEN, Christian (2007), “ Concentration of ownership, the fall of unions and government legislation in Turkey”, Global Media and Communication 3(2), p. 179-199.
COMAROFF, Jean and John COMAROFF (2003), “Transparent fictions; or, the conspiracies of a liberal imagination: an afterword”, in: T. Sanders and H. G. West, eds., Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, p. 287-299.
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CREPS, Earl G. (1980), “The conspiracy argument as rhetorical genre”, Communication Studies, Northwestern University, p. 320.
FENSTER, Mark (2008 [1999]), Conspiracy theories: secrecy and power in American culture, Minneapolis, Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press.
FILKINS, Dexter (2016), “Turkey's thirty-year coup”, The New Yorker.
GUIDA, Michelangelo (2008), “The Sevres Syndrome and "komplo" theories in the Islamist and secular press”, Turkish Studies 9(1), p. 37-52.
HANKS, William, F (1987), “Discourse genres in a theory of practice”, American Ethnologist 14(4), p. 668-692.
HDN STAFF (2014), “Report casts doubt on ex-president's death”, Hürriyet Daily News.
HENDRICK, Joshua D (2013), Gülen: the ambiguous politics of market Islam in Turkey and the world, New York, New York University Press.
HOFSTADTER, Richard (1952), The paranoid style in American politics and other essays, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
JAMESON, Fredric (2005), Archaeologies of the future: the desire called utopia and other science fictions, New York, Verso.
JUNG, Dietrich (2003), “The Sevres Syndrome: Turkish foreign policy and its historical legacy”, American Diplomacy 8(July).
LATOUR, Bruno (1997), “A few steps toward an anthropology of the iconoclastic gesture”, Science in Context 10(01), p. 63-83.
MARCUS, George E (ed. (1999), Paranoia within reason: a casebook on conspiracy as explanation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
SONG, Hoon (2006), “Seeing Oneself Seeing Oneself: White Nihilism in Ethnography and Theory”, Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology 71(4), p. 470 - 488.
WARNER, Michael (2002), Publics and counterpublics, New York, Zone Books
WEST, Harry G and Todd SANDERS (eds.) (2003), Transparency and conspiracy: ethnographies of suspicion in the New World Order, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press.
YAZETE STAFF (2017), “Saçmalık son buldu... Kurtlar Vadisi Darbe için takipsizlik kararı verildi!” [Absurdity comes to an end... dismissal decision for Valley of the Wolves Coup], Yazete.
YAZETE STAFF (2017), “’Kurtlar Vadisi Darbe’ye hakaretten Nihat Doğan, Ömür Varol ve ekibine hapis istemi” [Prison motion against Nihat Doğan, Ömür Varol and team for defamation of Valley of the Wolves], Yazete.
NOTES
1. The TV serial Valley of the Wolves [Kurtlar Vadisi] premiered on Turkish private channel Show TV in January of 2003, and shifted to private channel Kanal D for its fourth and final season in the fall of 2005. It was followed by the blockbuster film Valley of the Wolves: Iraq [Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak, 2006] and then the short-lived serial Valley of the Wolves: Terror [Kurtlar Vadisi: Terör] in 2007. Next was serial Valley of the Wolves: Ambush [Kurtlar Vadisi: Pusu], which ran for 10 seasons, from 2007-2016, shifting among private channels Show TV, Star TV, TNT, ATV, and Kanal D. The franchise has thus far led to four more films: comedy spinoff Muro: Damn the Humanist Inside
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[Muro: Nalet Olsun İçimdeki İnsan Sevgisine, 2008], and dramas Valley of the Wolves: Gladio [Kurtlar Vadisi: Gladio, 2009], Valley of the Wolves: Palestine [Kurtlar Vadisi: Filistine, 2011], and Valley of the Wolves: Homeland [Kurtlar Vadisi: Vatan, 2017]. The latter film tackles the topic of the July 2016 coup attempt, though producers clearly decided against using the “coup” name that had aroused such controversy. As of March 2018, there are rumors that serial Valley of the Wolves: Chaos [Kurtlar Vadisi: Kaos] will start production in the summer of 2018 for a fall premier on an as-yet undesignated channel. Various elements of the Valley franchise have circulated outside of Turkey, with films and serials making their way to Germany, parts of the Balkans, the Turkic republics, and much of the Arab world. 2. I spent four years in Istanbul between 2011 and 2015 working on various projects related to Turkish media, including one focused on Valley and its viewers. 3. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, “Transparent Fictions; or, the Conspiracies of a Liberal Imagination: an Afterword”, in Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order, ed. Todd Sanders and Harry G. West, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 2003, p. 287-299. Mark Fenster, Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American culture (Revised and updated ed.), Minneapolis, Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Frederic Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: the Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions, New York, Verso, 2005. Harry G West and Todd Sanders, ed. Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 2003. 4. George E Marcus ed., Paranoia Within Reason: a Casebook on Conspiracy as Explanation. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999. These trends are by no means mutually exclusive, and thinkers such as Fenster and Byford engage in aspects of all three. 5. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1952. 6. Earl Creps, The Conspiracy Argument as Rhetorical Genre (PhD dissertation), Communication Studies, Northwestern University, 1980. 7. Jovan Byford, Conspiracy Theories: A Critical Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. 8. Charles Briggs and Richard Bauman, “Genre, Intertextuality, and Social Power”, Journal of Linguistic Anthropology, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1992, p. 131-172. 9. William F Hanks, “Discourse Genres in a Theory of Practice”, American Ethnologist, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1987, p. 668-692. 10. Briggs and Bauman, p. 142-143. 11. Karin Barber, The Anthropology of Texts, Persons and Publics: Oral and Written Culture in Africa and Beyond, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 44. 12. Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics, New York, Zone Books, 2002. 13. Christian Christensen, “Concentration of Ownership, the Fall of Unions and Government Legislation in Turkey”, Global Media and Communication, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, p. 179-199. 14. I provide a portion of the Turkish original here because the specific acronym is important to the message. 15. Önür Varol, and Nihat Doğan, Sölyemezsem Olmaz [Can't not say it], Beyaz TV, 2016, 6 October. 16. There is little doubt among observers of Turkey that core elements of this organization were instrumental in the coup. Given the group’s highly ambiguous structure and the broad nature of its outreach, however, it is inconceivable that the majority of those associated with the group through its various service, educational, media, commercial, and financial ventures were involved. This has not prevented the Turkish government from persecuting these associates and any other perceived opponents of the AKP during the post-coup State of Emergency. For more about the Gülen Movement and its ambiguous organizational logic, see Joshua D Hendrick, Gülen:
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the Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World, New York, New York University Press, 2013. For an overview of the Gülen Movement’s relationship with the Turkish bureaucracy, the AKP, and some early hypotheses on the nature of the coup, see Dexter Filkins, “Turkey's Thirty- Year Coup”, The New Yorker, 2016, 17 October. 17. Creps, p. 97. 18. “Bey” is a term of respect, somewhat close to the English “Mr.”, but used with the first name rather than the last. 19. Yiğit Bulut, Bahadır Özdener, and Cüneyt Aysan, Sansürsüz [Uncensored], 24, 2012, 30 October. 20. Byford, p. 90. 21. This is a rough translation, excising repetition and condensing the original. Bedia Güzelce, Necati Şaşmaz, Nur Aysan, Zübeyr Şaşmaz, and Kenan Çoban, Skala: 'Kurtlar Vadisi Filistin' ekibi Skala'da [The Valley of the Wolves team on Skala], Habertürk, 2011, 24 January. 22. Can Dündar and Necati Şaşmaz, Polat Alemdar NTV'de [Polat Alemdar on NTV], NTVMSNBC, 2011, 27 January 2011. 23. Though there are many cases of this throughout Valley, episode 115 provides a prominent example, when Polat warns the head of elders that Turkey faces an “even worse condition than Sèvres” if circumstances in the country don’t change. Both Dietrich Jung (“The Sevres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacy”, American Diplomacy, Vol. 8, 2003) and Michelangelo Guida (”The Sevres Syndrome and "Komplo" Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2008, p. 37-52) have written about the so-called “syndrome” and its circulation in contemporary Turkey. 24. Hofstadter, p. 29. 25. The disclaimer reads, “The people and institutions in our program’s account of events from this dark, clouded Turkish valley are entirely a work of fiction.” As of March 2018, the promotional trailer for Ambush season 8 was available at this link: https://tinyurl.com/hg535qf. The video says 11th season at the end because this was the 11th year of the franchise, but only the 8th season of the third TV serial, Ambush. Pana Film uses both sets of numbers to refer to the show at different times. 26. For more on Penguins and their role in the Gezi Park protests, see Josh Carney and Valentina Marcella, “Screens of Satire and Commons of Resistance: the Place and Role of Humor in the Gezi Park Protests of Turkey”, Ridiculosa, Vol. 24, 2017, p. 151-164. 27. Hofstadter, p. 29. 28. Hofstadter, p. 35. 29. Hofstadter, p. 37. 30. Creps, p. 97. 31. Byford, p. 33. 32. Byford, p. 34. 33. Byford, p. 81. 34. Byford, p. 86. 35. HDN Staff, “Report Casts Doubt on Ex-President's Death”, Hürriyet Daily News, 2014, 14 June. 36. I have assembled a brief, subtitled compilation of conspiracy-oriented clips from this episode and posted it at the following link: https://youtu.be/p3RDr7gD6lo. 37. Önür Varol, and Nihat Doğan, Sölyemezsem Olmaz [Can't not say it], Beyaz TV, 2016, 10 October. 38. Önür Varol, and Nihat Doğan, Sölyemezsem Olmaz [Can't not say it], Beyaz TV, 2016, 11 October. 39. Önür Varol, and Nihat Doğan, Sölyemezsem Olmaz [Can't not say it], Beyaz TV, 2016, 14 October. 40. One of the underlying motives for this theme was likely the YouTube ban in Turkey that took place at the time of the municipal elections on March 31st. The government had banned YouTube in an attempt to prevent further leaks revealing AKP corruption from the Gülen Movement. Valley E220 and E221, which broadcast at this period, suggest that mind control techniques were
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being used on the Turkish people through subliminal messages in social media and, therefore, that something drastic needed to be done to prevent this danger. 41. I recorded these lines and a brief sketch of our interaction on paper moments later, and then added this to my fieldnotes when I returned home that night. 42. Hoon Song, “Seeing Oneself Seeing Oneself: White Nihilism in Ethnography and Theory”, Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 71, No. 4, 2006, p. 482 [p. 470 – 488]. 43. Song, p. 482, italics in original. 44. Ambush specifically tackles the “lobby” in episode 212 (S08), where it is shown to be tied to both the Templars and the Gülen Movement. 45. Bruno Latour, “A Few Steps Toward an Anthropology of the Iconoclastic Gesture”, Science in Context, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1997, p. 63-83. 46. Latour, p. 69. 47. Latour, p. 81. 48. Latour, p. 80. 49. Yazete Staff, “Saçmalık Son Buldu... Kurtlar Vadisi Darbe için Takipsizlik Kararı Verildi! [Absurdity Comes to an End [...] Dismissal Decision for Valley of the Wolves Coup],” Yazete, 2017, 7 February. Weeks later, it was revealed that an indictment for defamation against the Can’t Not Say It presenters had been filed based on complaints by Pana Film: Yazete Staff, “‘Kurtlar Vadisi Darbe’ye Hakaretten Nihat Doğan, Ömür Varol ve Ekibine Hapis Istemi” [Prison Motion Against Nihat Doğan, Ömür Varol and Team for Defamation of ‘Valley of the Wolves’], Yazete, 2017, 27 February.
ABSTRACTS
Shortly after the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, two talk show hosts suggested that the producers of the popular and long-lived Valley of the Wolves media franchise may have been involved with the coup. While these accusations received only minor traction in Turkish media, they are interesting both because they likely played a role in the franchise being investigated, and because they relied on a set of genre norms for conspiracy theory that had been popularized and codified in Turkey’s public sphere by the Valley franchise itself. This paper investigates the relationship between conspiracy theory, Valley, and the show’s public in a three-part argument. It begins by exploring the genre norms of conspiracy theory as they relate to Valley. Next, it turns to the performative function of conspiracy theory, suggesting that the Foucauldian approach to enunciation may explain an under examined role of such theorizing. Finally, it remarks on the ties between conspiracy theory, enunciation, and politics in the rise of what is often called the post-truth era.
Peu de temps après la tentative de coup d’État de juillet 2016 en Turquie, deux invités de talk- show ont émis l’idée que les producteurs de La Vallée des Loups, une franchise médiatique populaire en Turquie, auraient pu être impliqués dans le coup d’État. Si ces accusations n’ont connu qu’une faible couverture médiatique dans les médias turcs, elles sont intéressantes, parce qu’elles ont certainement joué un rôle dans l’ouverture d’une enquête sur cette franchise, et parce qu’elles reposaient sur un certain nombre de normes de genre de la théorie du complot, qui avaient été popularisées et codifiées par la série La Vallée des loups elle-même. Cet article se penche sur la relation entre la théorie du complot, La Vallée des loups, et le public de la série, en trois parties. Il commence par explorer les normes de genre de la théorie du complot, dans leur
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rapport à La Vallée des loups. Ensuite, il se tourne vers la fonction performative de la théorie du complot, en faisant l’hypothèse que l’approche foucaldienne de l’énonciation pourrait expliquer un rôle sous-étudié de ces théories. L’auteur conclut par une série de remarques sur les liens entre théorie du complot, énonciation et politique, dans le contexte de la montée en puissance de l’ère de la « post-vérité ».
INDEX
Mots-clés: complot, La Vallée des loups, post-vérité, tentative de coup d’État de 2016 en Turquie, Turquie, genre, télévision, culture populaire Keywords: conspiracy, Valley of the Wolves, post-truth, 2016 Turkish coup attempt, genre, television, media, Turkey, popular culture
AUTHOR
JOSH CARNEY Josh Carney is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Media Studies at the American University of Beirut. His work focuses on media from Turkey, with recent projects on popular television, cinematic censorship, and the role of media screens in public demonstrations. He received his PhD in Communication and Culture from Indiana University in 2015. His personal website (with links to some publications) is joshlcarney.com.
Josh Carney est maître de conférences au département de sociologie, anthropologie et journalisme à l’université américaine de Beyrouth. Ses travaux portent sur les médias en Turquie, et ses projets les plus récents concernent la télévision et la culture populaire, la censure cinématographique, et le rôle des médias d’écran dans les mobilisations politiques. Il a soutenu sa thèse de doctorat au département de communication et culture à l’université d’Indiana en 2015. Voici un lien vers son site personnel (avec des liens vers quelques publications) : joshlcarney.com
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Deep State. Visual Socio-Political Communication in the Television Series and Serials of the Turkish Television Channel Samanyolu
Petra de Bruijn
1 The 11th episode of the Turkish serial1 Ötesiz İnsanlar ([The People Beyond], 2013-2015)2, directed by Başak Soysal shows an officer in the Turkish army, around 1997, on his way to the classy engagement party of the daughter of a general and the son of a colonel. The officer is religious and his wife covers her hair. The army dress code in this era requires his wife to appear unveiled at the engagement party. The wife leaves home unveiled, however, on the road to the party the officer regrets that he made his wife unveil. He stops the car in Balat, a conservative quarter of Istanbul, in order to buy a scarf in one of the shops. However, the shops are closed and in despair he rings the bell at all the houses in the neighbourhood. He asks Allah to help him and suddenly scarfs fall from the windows like manna from heaven (Plate 1 below).
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Plate 1: Screenshot Ötesiz İnsanlar, episode 11, 44,05 min.
2 He returns to the car and promises his wife that he will never ask her again to unveil. The seculars have to respect them for what they are. The headscarf issue was important in Turkish politics for several decades, from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. Through images and content as mentioned above, the Turkish television channel Samanyolu (Milky Way) communicated a socio-political message. Samanyolu was an international religiously orientated television channel with its headquarters in Turkey; owned by the Gülen Movement3, related to the Islamic scholar and preacher Fethullah Gülen. The channel started broadcasting on 13 January 1993 and was closed directly after the failed military coup of 15 July 2016.
3 Samanyolu television drama involved social issues from the perspective of Islamic religiosity, such as being honest, law abiding, peace loving, pious and caring for your family and neighbours. In addition, the channel included political issues in their shows, such as the Kurdish question, the headscarf issue, the 1997 military intervention and the controversy, starting in 2013, between the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) and the Gülen Movement. By touching upon sensitive Turkish social and political issues, Samanyolu was one of the few television channels to defy the self-censorship many Turkish media have inflicted upon themselves, especially since 20074. This article aims to elaborate on how Samanyolu disseminated socio-political content through its television series and serials, asking questions especially about Turkish political reality and religiosity. The discussion will touch upon the politicization of Turkish television drama in general and the position of Samanyolu in Turkish television. The focus will then be narrowed down to Samanyolu television dramas, particularly those series and serials of this channel in which socio-political themes appear: Şubat Soğuğu ([February Cold], 2004-2006), Tek Türkiye ([One Turkey], 2007-2010), Şefkat Tepe ([Compassion Peak], 2010-2014) and Ötesiz İnsanlar ([The People Beyond], 2013-2015). Only a selection of the Samanyolu shows with socio-political content will be discussed here, although in many others, references to political and historical events in Turkey were made. The serials included in this analysis form a representative case study of the manner in which socio-political content was disseminated.
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Politicization of Turkish television
4 Television drama has been used as a vehicle for the dissemination of political content in Turkey since the early 2000s, as Kumru Berfin Emre Çetin argues. The use of television drama as a vehicle for social and political content is not a new phenomenon; it has occurred amongst others in Brazil, Egypt and China5. In this respect, television drama is nothing else but a recent cultural product with the potential of influencing public opinion; as theatre, literature and film did before.
5 According to Çetin, this politicization was provoked by a number of circumstances. On the one hand, the late 1990s saw a large privatization of Turkish television channels; this was followed by a period of about 15 years, until 2006 in which relative freedom existed for these channels to determine the content of their programmes6. Turkish private television grew rapidly and at the same time Turkish society became more politicized, with a strong polarization between the secular and the religious. The combination of the relative freedom to determine the content of television and the increasing gap between societal factions in Turkish society brought about a politicization of Turkish television series and serials. After 2006, the relative freedom for private broadcasters changed. New regulations were implemented and, especially after 2010 with the consolidation of the AKP government, restrictions on the freedom of expression imposed on the media by the increasingly authoritarian mode of government, multiplied drastically7. The Turkish mediascape became more and more politicized and polarized. Media supporting the government did propaganda for the ruling party; those who wanted to tell a different tale were submitted to censorship and applied self-censorship. Çetin discerns two trends in the politicization of Turkish television drama: the dissemination of political messages through television serials and the use of television drama as “a battleground for groups expressing a variety of political concerns8”.
Position of Samanyolu
6 Samanyolu, on which this research will concentrate, started broadcasting in 1993. It was one of the smaller national channels, with in 2010 a market share of 2%9. According to a study conducted in 2009 by the Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (Radio and Television Supreme Council, RTÜK) Samanyolu ranged fifth in the list of most popular television channels with around 10% of the votes10. Samanyolu was owned by Feza Gazetecilik A.Ş.11; a media conglomerate combining newspapers in several countries, a news agency, a publishing house and a television channel. Feza Publications was closely associated with the Gülen Movement. After the failed military intervention in July 2016 all media outlets of the Gülen Movement in Turkey were closed, including Samanyolu12. Samanyolu could be described as a generic channel aiming at an Islamic orientated audience.
7 Drama forms an important component of the television offer in Turkey; economically13 and in terms of their presence on the Turkish mainstream channels14. Turkish television series and serials have qualitatively and quantitatively improved during the last decades to a point that they became an important export product15; in 2014 Turkey reached the level of the second world wide exporter of television drama16. Samanyolu was comparable to the other mainstream channels: 61% of its broadcasting was
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dedicated to television series and serials17. In November 2015 Samanyolu was removed from the Turkish television broadcasting satellite Türksat18. By this removal the advertising revenues were cut off, and the channel could no longer afford the production and broadcasting of television series and serials. After the failed military coup in July 2016 Samanyolu was closed altogether.
8 In the 1990s and 2000s Samanyolu caused a hype with the concept of fantasy series and serials. Ahu Yiğit describes these shows as: These fantasy serials adopt magical plots such as time travel, angels disguised as ordinary people, and appearing or disappearing objects and people. Several serials are set in the afterlife, from which the main character looks back on his or her life on earth19.
9 The first serial with fantasy content was Sırlar Dünyası ([World of Mysteries], 1996-2007, [first called Sırlar Kapısı, The Gate of Mysteries]). Other channels copied the concept, which was very popular for some time, but after a few years these productions were cancelled20. Samanyolu continued to produce fantasy serials and to broadcast reruns. However, in 2015, other concepts, not based on fantasy, dominated the spectre.
10 Yiğit’s claim that Samanyolu broadcasted only fantasy serials was not correct21. From 2004 onwards Samanyolu broadened its repertoire with other concepts. Since that time, Samanyolu produced, besides fantasy, serials of different genres, for instance police serials such as: Kollama ([Being Watched], 2008-2011) and Ekip 1-Nizama Adanmış Ruhlar ([Squadron 1 – Souls Dedicated to Order], 2012-2015); serials about family life and moral dilemmas such as, İki Dünya Arasında ([Between Two Worlds], 2012-2015) and Küçük Gelin ([Young Bride], 2013); and action serials, such as Tek Türkiye (2007-2010), Şefkat Tepe (2010-2014) and its successor Sungurlar ([Falcon’s], 2014-2015).
11 Recurring themes in Samanyolu’s dramas are anti-Islam politics such as the 28 February 1997 military intervention and the head scarf issue, the importance of education, the advocacy of a modern, preferably pious, life style, international conspiracy theories related to Free Masonry and the corruption and terror conducted by state related underground organizations, the PKK and Syrian or Iraqi Kurdish organizations. Socio-political messages may be found in all of Samanyolu’s shows. However, the emphasis of these themes in the most prominent examples shifts and the degree to which and the manner in which socio-political content was included changed over time.
Şubat Soğuğu ([February Cold], 2004-2006)
12 The first serial with an openly political content that Samanyolu broadcasted was Şubat Soğuğu. It dealt with a corrupt criminal group that carried out operations for a “deep state” organization. Mehtap Söyler and Ryan Gingeras, amongst others, prove that Turkey has a history of various kinds of underground forces, called derin devlet (deep state). These organizations, have existed since the time of the Ottoman Empire and have served both Ottoman and Republican Turkish regimes to consolidate their power and in Republican Turkey’s case to establish authoritarian regimes. After 1945, in cooperation with the CIA, an Özel Harp Dairesi (Special Warfare Department) was established, later to be continued under other names, like specially in the Kurdish regions the Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti- terror Organization). Since the 70s and 80s these secret organizations have maintained
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strong ties with organized crime, mainly drug trafficking and the mafia and ultra- nationalist extreme right political parties with violent youth organisations such as the Bozkurtlar (Grey Wolves). These deep state organisations were responsible for most of the numerous unaccounted for killings during the politically tumultuous years between 1960 and 198022.
13 The existence of deep state organisations has inspired many producers of Turkish films and television drama; amongst others Kurlar Vadisi Pusu ([Valley of the Wolves, Ambush], 2007-2016) the television serial and the movie Kurtlar Vadisi Gladio ([Valley of the Wolves, Gladio], 2009) 23. All mainstream television channels in Turkey, including Samanyolu, have elaborated on this theme. A producer has numerous opportunities for many action scenes with this theme, which, in addition, appeals to the nationalistic feelings of many Turks. Moreover, as Göçek states, many people still believe that Turkish sovereignty is undermined by foreign powers in combination with deep state related criminal organisations24. Şubat Soğuğu was the first Samanyolu serial in which a deep state organisation was depicted. As will be shown below, this theme reoccurred in various ways and even more strongly in later serials.
14 The name of the serial, Şubat Soğuğu, refers to what is called the 28 February military intervention. In 1997 and 1998 the Turkish military intervened in politics by overthrowing the coalition government of the Islamic Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) of Necmettin Erbakan, by closing down the party and by banning Erbakan from politics. This intervention was accompanied by the dismissal of a great number of military personnel and measures were taken against manifestations of Islam in public life. The military and other secularist politicians were afraid of the increasing power of political Islam in Turkey25. These events had a deep impact on religious movements, not only on the Milli Görüş (National Vision) around Necmettin Erbakan and its successor the AKP of Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan; they affected the Gülen Movement as well. For the Gülen Movement, which tried to provide Islam with a modernist worldview, this intervention was a trauma, as its depiction in the serials shows.
15 One of the main characters in Şubat Soğuğu is Tahir Mutlu, a writer and history teacher. In the period following the 28 February intervention, he lived in exile out of fear of being persecuted for the Islamic content of his writings and teachings. In 2004, when the action of the show takes place, he returns to Turkey, because of a more liberal climate. At that time the AKP had won the elections (2002), gaining a majority in Parliament. With this new regime, came the end of persecution of Islamic conservatives in the army and the state apparatus, following the 28 February military intervention26.
16 The character of Tahir Mutlu in the serial is the proto-type of a righteous follower of Fethullah Gülen. Just as Mutlu, Gülen had been prosecuted many times by the secular regimes and the military for his preaching and his educational activities. He was accused of encouraging his followers to infiltrate the military and the judiciary in order to take over the state. After the 28 February intervention, in 1998, he retreated to the United States27. The way Mutlu is depicted as a peace-loving, humble, religious preacher reminds one very much of Fethullah Gülen. Although Mutlu is not Gülen, by linking him to the spiritual leader of the Gülen Movement, the content of the serial takes on a second - political - meaning showing the struggle of the Gülen Movement against the secular forces in the Turkish regime (mainly the army) and the deep state organisations supporting it.
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17 Şubat Soğuğu was inspired by the concept of the immensely popular serial Kurtlar Vadisi ([Valley of the Wolves], 2003-2005). This serial was one of the longest running and most popular on Turkish television for more than a decade. It was the first serial in which political content was introduced. It started in 2003 and from 2007 until 2016 it was broadcasted under the name Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu [Valley of the Wolves Ambush]. The serial concentrated on a secret police squadron that fights the mafia, a corrupt conglomerate of powerful businessmen and an international free masonic organization aiming at a new world order infiltrating Turkey (Tapınakçılar, Knights Templar.) From the start, the serial incorporated elements from reality in its episodes and its films. Scenes referred to political events, sometimes commented upon, sometimes acted out, sometimes real politicians participated in the serial. Themes that were dealt with were amongst others, the admission of Turkey to the European Union, the Cyprus question and the Kurdish question28. Just as in Kurtlar Vadisi, Samanyolu included politics in its television dramas in various ways: political events were referred to, commented upon and imitated.
Tek Türkiye ([One Turkey], 2007-2011)
18 Tek Türkiye combined the theme of deep state violence with that of the terror of the PKK and the importance of education. The serial was produced by Salih Akan, the directors were Nacı Çelik Berksoy and Gürsel Ateş and the screenplay was written by Ali Kara and Samim Utku. The serial related the story of Tarık, a medical doctor, who visits an old friend in a small village in Hakkâri, the southeastern Kurdish region of Turkey. His friend is involved in smuggling medicines to the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK). When Tarık arrives in the village his friend had already left. Tarık decides to stay in the village, which is poverty struck and suffers hard from the terror inflicted upon it by the PKK. It is located in a remote area, where the Turkish army and gendarmerie are absent. It is a Kurdish village of, in principle, peace loving, traditionally living farmers and landowners. The members of the community are heavily divided between pro- and contra- PKK members. The PKK expects that they provide food, money and that their children join the organisation. New partisans are recruited by indoctrination and by force when needed.
19 During the first two seasons, emphasis lay on the backward position of the village. There is no school, and when Zeynep, the daughter of the local landowner, trained as a teacher, makes it her life’s work to open up a school for the local children, she is met with resistance from, on the one hand, the villagers because they do not understand the importance of education. The PKK, on the other hand, obstructs the establishment of the school out of fear that the villagers will no longer cooperate when they are educated. In reality the PKK had launched a campaign against village schoolteachers; many were killed29. Tarık teaches them hygiene and the necessity of a good working public health system. In addition, Tarık, with help from the imam and Zeynep, fights the conservative customs of the local people, such as blood feuds, child marriages and emphasis on the protection of the honour of women30.
20 In the last two seasons the depiction of the struggle against the PKK is foregrounded. There is a time lapse of about ten years. Tarık has married the nurse from the village, their son is born and he has become kaymakam (governor of a provincial district). The size of the struggle against the PKK has magnified. Already in the first seasons it was suggested that the PKK is not the only force controlling terror. References to forces
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within the Turkish government and foreign powers become more and more important during the series. It is implied that there are national and international (English/ American and Russian) intelligence forces and organisations with special mandates involved in the Kurdish issue. It is in their interest that the struggle in the southeastern regions continues; they work for Armenian and Kurdish Communist lobbies who want to create an independent Armenian and Kurdish state.
21 These international forces want to restore the map drawn at the end of the First World War at the Treaty of Sèvres (1920). This treaty reduced the Ottoman Empire to a rump state consisting only of the northern half of Anatolia. The rest of Anatolia was divided into Greek, Italian, English and French zones of influence. An independent Armenian state was supposed to arise in the eastern provinces and Kurdistan was to be a part of the Empire with autonomy31. As history proves, these plans never materialized, but a distrust against foreign powers with respect to their support of Armenian and Kurdish claims, called the “Sèvres syndrome” by Göçek, has remained vivid in Turkey until today; Turkey’s national security is always at stake, threatened by internal (Armenians/Kurds and other minorities) and external western forces32. In the series Tarık finds the original documents of this partition, signed by all the parties. All enemy parties, the Kurds, the Armenians, the Russians and the US want to use these original documents of the Sèvres Treaty for their own benefit and that is one of the reasons why all the parties are after Tarık.
22 In addition this theme refers to the infiltration of Hizbullah in the southeast of Turkey in the 1980s. Hüseyin Velioğlu established this organisation, inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt. Hizbullah acted against the PKK and its Batman branch worked together with state security organisations against the PKK. From 1993 onwards, Turkish politics aimed at the dissolution of Hizbullah, but all efforts were frustrated by the state security organisations. In 2000, when Hizbullah was not needed anymore against the PKK, the organisation was dismantled33.
23 During the last seasons, Tarık had to deal mainly with the PKK and a deep state team of special forces that enact possibly even more violent and cruel crimes towards the population than the PKK. In Tek Türkiye the PKK is represented as an organisation with a strategy of remorseless cruelty against the civilian population and their own people who refuse to execute their extreme orders. However, in the end the lower level of PKK commanders all turn out to have their reasons for becoming so cruel. Some of them had been victims of PKK violence as well; or they were told that their families had been shot by the Turkish army, but it was the PKK who did it. Others were persuaded to join the PKK in their youth with false prospects and regret their choice by now. They, however, cannot return to their homes because, either, they fear being killed by the PKK or they face long periods of imprisonment when they surrender. One of the main characters Şivan, was the commander of the PKK unit that terrorised the village in the first two seasons. At the end of the second season he suddenly realises that the PKK is corrupt and that the PKK killed his son. This transforms him into a completely different personality. He regains his lost faith in Allah and after working for the local populace as atonement, he becomes a Robin Hood like character that rescues people from a hiding place in the mountains and in the last season he joins Tarık’s resistance group.
24 Tarık is not able to fight the PKK because of his official function as kaymakam. Deep state infiltrators obstruct all action taken to appease the region. In the end, they succeed in getting Tarık arrested. Tarık escapes to the mountains and forms his own
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resistance group, called Son Karakol (the Last Guard Post). This is a reference to a secret organisation founded by the unionist leaders at the end of World War I to protect members of the Turkish government against the revenge of the Allied Forces and Christian minorities and to smuggle people and arms to Anatolia. This organisation is considered to be the start of the resistance movement in Anatolia that led ultimately to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey (1923). It was an underground organisation related to the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, better known as the Young Turks) and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk34 who worked together with this organisation only for a short time. Later Atatürk established his own underground organisation35.
25 In Tek Türkiye, Tarık, the good guy, stands for the civilized Turkish nation, where justice is implied and where there is space for Turks as well as minorities to live peacefully together. The reference here to Karakol, the first resistance movement of the Turkish Republic, implies, on the one hand, that Tarık and his friends are rescuing Turkey from the PKK and foreign intervention, like the heroes of the “Struggle for Independence”. On the other hand, they represent “the other” resistance, distinct from the secular Kemalist state resistance.
26 The serial ends with the dismantling of the deep state organisation, and a reconciliation of all local parties. A school will be build and it is suggested that when the people in southeast Anatolia get educated, justice and peace will remain and the area will prosper. The concept of schooling is a very important element in the Gülen Movement. It runs schools, boarding houses, universities and pre-university courses, first only in Turkey, but later as the movement grew, in many countries ranging from Central Asia, Africa, the Balkans, the US, Europe to Australia36.
Şefkat Tepe ([Compassion Peak], 2010-2014)
27 Tek Türkiye’s successor, Şefkat Tepe was broadcasted for four seasons from 2010-2014. The serial was produced by Salih Akan, directed by Engin Koç and the screenplay was written by Samim Utku. During the first two seasons the serial Şefkat Tepe focused on a regular army unit near a border village Karapınar in the southeastern region of Turkey. It is not clear whether this is the Syrian or the Iraqi border. In the first episode it is indicated that the serial takes place in 1997. This was a moment in history when the Turkish army more or less broke the resistance of the PKK and with the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, in 1999 an armistice was established37.
28 In the serial a Kurdish PKK cell terrorizes the village. The message of this programme is strongly Turkish nationalistic, depicting the PKK as mean villains and terrorists and the army as the good guys. The villagers are depicted as, mostly innocent, victims. The events dominating the serial are attacks on the village and the kidnapping of people, mostly women and children for extortion or young girls and boys, who are recruited for the PKK. As Zürcher states, in the Turkish press of those days, voluntary recruitments were often presented as kidnappings38. In the serial however very few people voluntarily join the PKK and many characters at one point repent their terrorist actions and become loyal anti-PKK fighters. Ali Samim Noyan, the scenarist of the serial, relates in an interview with Radikal journalist Pınar Öğünç that the show does not want to depict enmity between Turks and Kurds. The serial focussed more on moral, righteous and human behaviour and wanted to stress the unity of Turkey39.
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29 From the third season onwards, a team of special forces, the Sungurlar ([Falcon’s], 2014-2015), is established and the main character Serdar Mert, commander of the army unit in the village during the first two seasons, now becomes the commander of this unit. This team did not so much fight the PKK anymore, but concentrated on Kurdish and Islamist terrorists in Syria, or sometimes infiltrated the Turkish border region. This change can be explained by the political reality in Turkey; from 2012 onwards the peace process that lasted until the summer of 2015, secretly started by the AKP government in 2009, became visible to the general public40.
30 Ali Samim Noyan, the scenarist of the serial, relates in the interview with Radikal journalist Pınar Öğünç, that the peace process was a central issue in the serial. As Öğünç comments, it is impossible to deny the fact that 60% of the Turkish population supports the peace process. “[D]ışardan bir uyarıyla değil” (without a warning form outside), but independently, the Samanyolu management and the production team decided to change the story line. Noyan explains that, although the serial was supposed to take place in the 1990s, they wanted to make the serial look real. Since there was no armed struggle in 2013 between the PKK and the army anymore, the serial concentrated on foreign agencies; which according to Noyan “are still around41”.
31 One of the organisations the Sungurlar fight against is Selam-Tevhid (Peace-Unification) or by another name Kudüs Ordusu (Jerusalem army)42. This is, in reality, an Iranian orientated Islamist terrorist group that fights against Israel and its allies. It has been active in Turkey since the 1980s and some believe they were involved in the killing of the famous left-wing journalist Uğur Mumcu in 199343. After 2014 Şefkat Tepe continued under the title Sungurlar. At the start of the serial, in a promotion trailer, commander Serdar is wearing an orange overall, about to be executed by the Islamic State. As indicated in the scene, the action takes place in the Rojava area, the independent Kurdish area in Northern Syria44.
AKP – Gülen Movement controversy
32 The Gülen Movement, with their emphasis on the importance of education - educating many managers, lawyers and economists - was associated with the AKP, during its formative years. Many Hizmet sympathisers found jobs in the judiciary, ministries and earned important positions in the private sector45. From 2012 onwards the relation between the AKP and the Gülen Movement became troubled. A public prosecutor wanted information from Hakan Fidan, chief of the Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence Agency) about the secret negotiations between a Turkish delegation and the PKK in Oslo. The AKP accused the Gülen Movement of disturbing the peace process. As a punishment the AKP started an initiative to close down the Dershane’s, private, extra-curricular institutions where high school children could prepare, for example, the career determining central entrance exam for university. In December 2013 a large corruption scandal, involving family members of cabinet ministers and even the son of Prime Minister Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan was disclosed. Erdoğan immediately blamed the Gülen Movement and foreign powers of being behind what he called an attempt at a coup against his government. Ever since, Erdoğan has taken all possible measures to destroy the Gülen Movement, which he now considers to be his worst foe46.
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Karar Kurulu ([Decision Board], 2013-2014)
33 The Gülen Movement could be best described as a religious community with a loose structure; it is not a political organisation. The movement does not have the power a government or political party has to implement judicial steps or any other form of measures against the AKP. Therefore, in case of controversy with the AKP, they used their television series to explain their side of the story. Between 28 September 2013 and 19 April 2014, a kind of mini serial (28 episodes) by the name of Karar Kurulu was broadcasted, included within several episodes of Şefkat Tepe (E119-E148). The episodes of Karar Kurulu were broadcasted as an integral part of the episodes of Şefkat Tepe; always at the start of the episode. As an independent serial Karar Kurulu existed only on the website of Küre TV, the on-demand Internet streaming channel of Samanyolu; currently it is not on display. Its content was not related to the plot of the main show, Şefkat Tepe. In the episodes of this mini serial, each lasting around 5-10 minutes, we see meetings of a secret board talking about creating chaos in Turkey. (See Plate 2 below) The board is determined to wipe out the power of the Gülen Movement, called Cami`a (community) in the series. The board discusses the measures they have taken in order to destroy the power of the Cami’a. For instance, they congratulate themselves on the closure, in fall 2013, of the Dershane’s (Cram Schools), one of the issues in the controversy between the AKP and the Gülen Movement.
Plate 2: screenshot Karar Kurulu [Decision Board], Şefkat Tepe 2,52 min.47
34 The concept of the Karar Kurulu originated in Tek Türkiye. In this show the Decision Board was called Karanlık Konsey (Dark Council). The Karanlık Konsey, first appeared in the second season, (E63), broadcasted on 6 April 2009. The last Karanlık Konsey scene was broadcasted (E91, as far as I have been able to trace) on 6 February 2010. The Karanlık Konsey consists of representatives from all kinds of deep state organisations
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and foreign powers. Just as the Tapınakçılar in Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu, it is suggested that the Karanlık Konsey in Tek Türkiye and later the Karar Kurulu in Şefkat Tepe have connections with the masonic Knights Templar. Several Knights Templar symbols are referred to in Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu as well as in Karar Kurulu and Karanlık Konsey. For instance: • The faces of the actors in both the Tapınakçılar and the Karar Kurulu are hidden. In Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu they wear masks most of the time, in Karar Kurulu their faces are blackened. • The actors in Karar Kurulu wear rings that resemble Knight Templar rings. On the rings and on one of the banners hanging on the wall a kind of Baphomet symbol is depicted. This symbol had been used in the serial Şubat Soğuğu as well; here (Plate 3 below) it appears on the ring worn by the leader of the deep state organisation.
Plate 3: screenshot ring with Bapomet symbol Karar Kurulu [Decision board], Şefkat Tepe 5,04 min.48
35 In Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu, just as in Tek Türkiye, the references to a masonic-like global, Christian, western secret organisation, which aims at toppling the world order using Turkey as a target that has to be won over, is connected to the “Sèvres syndrome” discussed above. In Tek Türkiye, the scenes of the Karanlık Konsey are related to the main storyline. Members of the council meet secretly with characters of the serial in southeast Anatolia. This free masonic organisation is a coalition of all kinds of secret organisations, foreign such as the CIA, Russian or local such as the deep state. In the story, they are involved in the struggle in southeast Anatolia. The message conveyed is that the Kurdish populace is manipulated by these foreign forces, which obstruct a peaceful cohabitation of Turks and Kurds. In Şefkat Tepe, the same scenes of the Karanlık Konsey in Tek Türkiye are used with a different voice-over. The scenes do not have any relation with the plot of the main serial. In contrast with Tek Türkiye, the characters in the main serial are not aware of the existence of the Karar Kurulu. The scenes of the Karar Kurulu in Şefkat Tepe are only used to comment on actual political events going on in Turkey at the time; the closure of the Dershane’s and later on, the 17 December 2013 corruption scandal.
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Mixture of fiction and reality
36 Samanyolu went even one step farther in mingling facts and fiction. On 9 February 2014 Samanyolu reported the discussion in the Karar Kurulu in their main news bulletin Ana Haber Bülteni ([Main News Bulletin], 17.30 -21.30 min.). The anchorman remarked that the episode of Şefkat Tepe, broadcasted on 8 February 2014, had provided the audience again with scenes full of action. Without referring explicitly to the fact that this was fiction, he announced that the Karar Kurulu met again. Then a fragment of the mini serial was shown, provided with Turkish subtitles. Samanyolu produced this mingling of reality and fiction on several occasions. On 12 March 2014 the station was admonished by the RTÜK (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu/Radio Television Supreme Council) for the same action49. This time a fragment of the 15 February 2014 Karar Kurulu episode was broadcasted the next day as a non-fiction item in the lunchtime weekday news program Güncel Durum [Current Situation]. Since spring 2014 scenes of the Karar Kurulu have no longer appeared in any of the Samanyolu shows.
37 The AKP government continued their destructive actions against the Gülen Movement. On 14th of December 2014, instigated by the AKP government, many employees of media concerns related to the Gülen Movement were arrested, amongst them Hidayet Karaca, general manager of the Samanyolu Broadcasting Group. At his arrest Karaca declared: “ Bir dizi filmden terör örgütü çıkıyor. Özgür Türkiye, özgür basın susmaz” (A terrorist organisation originates from a serial. Free Turkey, the free press does not remain silent)50, and later he said “Yeni Türkiye dizilerden korkuyor. Bir yayın grup başkanı eğer terörden suçlanıyorsa daha ne diyeyim” (The new Turkey is afraid of serials. What else can I say when the general manager of a media group is accused of terror) 51. The “New Turkey” refers to the new era in Turkish political history that Erdoğan claims he is building.
38 Karaca was accused of “heading a terrorist group” based on references made in a scene of the Karanlık Konsey in Tek Türkiye in 2009 about an alleged Islamist group the Tahşiyeciler (Annotators, E64)52. In the serial, the Karanlık Konsey indicates that it could use a group such as the Tahşiyeciler in order to provoke a reaction from the secularists53. It seems that Fethullah Gülen, had a theological dispute with the Tahşiyeciler, originally a branch of the Nurcu Movement from which the Gülen Movement originated as well54. In a television speech on 6 April 2009, where Fethullah Gülen answered questions of followers, he clarified the meaning of the word irtica (fundamentalism) by explaining where the term comes from and how it developed in the context of modern Turkish history. In this speech he referred to the Tahşiyeciler as an organisation, which could potentially radicalise55. The accusation is based only on a fragment of this speech taken out of context; the pro-government media outlet Sabah (Morning) placed this fragment on its website56. The leader of the Tahşiyeciler, Mehmet Doğan, was arrested and imprisoned for 10 months in 2010. He openly sympathised with Osama Bin Laden and violent struggle; this in opposition to Fethullah Gülen who sought dialogue57. In 2013 Karaca had an illegally wiretapped telephone conversation with Gülen about the Tahşiyeciler scene in the script of the serial in 2009. The judiciary suggested that Karaca and Gülen sent messages to police officers through the serial to make them take action on the Tahşiyeciler58. Although no further evidence has been brought in this case, and several courts have asked for the release of Karaca pending his trial59, in November 2017 he was convicted to 31 years of imprisonment60.
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Ötesiz İnsanlar ([The People Beyond], 2013-2015)
39 Meanwhile, Samanyolu continued to criticize the AKP government and especially its president Erdoğan. References to a deep state organisation appeared again in the serial Ötesiz İnsanlar. This serial was broadcasted for two seasons, 2013-2015. It was produced by Ömer Önder, the scenario was written by the Kız Kulesi Senaryo Grubu (Maiden tower scenario group). Until the 43rd episode, broadcasted on 24 November 2014, the serial was directed by Başak Soysal. The 44th episode does not have credits and from the 45th episode, broadcasted on 8 December 2014, onwards the serial was directed by NEB, the initials of Nursan Esenboğa. Ötesiz İnsanlar takes place against the background of the political situation of the 28 February 1997 postmodern coup. This show focuses on a religious village girl, Elif, who enters the medical faculty of Istanbul University. With the help of a young lieutenant Deniz, she had been able to escape being married off to the son of a landowner and arrives in Istanbul. The first season concentrates mainly on the love affair between Elif and Deniz, son of a secular colonel in the Turkish army. His parents do not agree with Deniz’ choice for a headscarf-wearing religious girl from a peasant family. They want Deniz to marry Sanem, the spoiled, unreligious daughter of general Kudret Karay.
40 The serial revolves around the headscarf issue and the strong anti-religious atmosphere in Turkey, especially the Turkish army. Elif and her friends encounter all kinds of difficulties when they want to enter university. In order to enrol, they have to remove their headscarves, later on they are not allowed to attend courses or take exams. Kudret Karay, one of the cruelest secular orientated generals in the army, tries to purify the army of all religious elements; religious officers are severely punished. He was so afraid of religion that he forced his own sister Rana to give up her religious lover İbrahim. When she gives birth to a girl Karay tells her that the baby died. In reality he gave the girl for adoption to a family in east Anatolia; this turns out to be Elif. Since Elif is one of the most prominent, strongminded amongst the headscarved students, she has a lot to do with Rana, who is vice director of Istanbul University. Only near the end of the serial, Rana, İbrahim and Elif are reunited.
41 In the second season, Kudret Karay is approached by a deep state organisation, which aims at further destabilising Turkey’s political system. Here again, the organisation is depicted as a free masonic like organisation. Kudret Karay becomes the leader of the organisation and the ceremony accompanying this event is full of free masonic symbols, such as, again, the ring with the Baphometh symbol. In order to be inaugurated as the new leader, Kudret Karay has to take a blood oath with the old leader. Kudret Karay’s first assignment is to create more chaos and disruption through the establishment of a popular religious political movement. The deep state organisation notices that the anti-religious intervention of 28 February 1997 did not stop the religious sentiments of large segments of the population, especially the conservative migrants from Anatolia. In order to gain control over these people, the deep state organisation bribes a simple religious man, heading a charity organisation, to become the leader of a political Islamic movement. The movement resembles the AKP in its initial phase and its leader is an Erdoğan look-alike (Plate 4 below). This character is depicted as faking religiosity; he is corrupt and only after money and power. In this way, Samanyolu again sought a means to ventilate their political opinion.
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Plate 4: Erdoğan look-alike: Ötesiz İnsanlar final episode 1.26,04 min.
Conclusion
42 This article has aimed at elaborating on how Samanyolu disseminated its socio-political content through its television series and serials; the relation of the themes of these series to Turkish political and religious reality, how these themes can be discerned, how they develop over time and how they comply with the religiosity Samanyolu wants to disseminate?
43 Samanyolu started, as part of a trend in Turkish television, to include socio-political content in its series and serials from 2004 onwards. Samanyolu focused on the Kurdish issue in three of the serials analysed in this article: Şubat Soğuğu, Tek Turkiye and Şefkat Tepe. Their line of approach has a strong nationalistic view of the PKK: the PKK are terrorists and in cooperation with foreign forces, a threat to the unity of Turkey. However, in line with the teachings of the Gülen Movement, with an emphasis on peace, dialogue and education, the Kurdish people living in the area suffer most from the violence. Education would help them to have a better future, to develop their society and the need to join the PKK would disappear.
44 Another recurrent theme is the 28 February 1997 military intervention; the subject of Şubat Soğuğu and Ötesiz İnsanlar. These programmes problematize the anti-Islamic measures taken after the military intervention. After 2013, the AKP focused on the destruction of the power of their former ally, the Gülen Movement. The Gülen Movement reacted through its television channel, not only in news programmes but in its series and serials as well. Probably, they realised that through their very popular shows they could reach a much wider audience.
45 Religion and piety occur in the serials discussed, but with the exception of Ötesiz İnsanlar, the action serials do not display religiosity very openly. Religiosity is referred to by the fact that the good guys are Muslims, the characters sometimes pray to Allah
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in difficult situations and sometimes a wise pious man helps the characters make difficult decisions. The main theme of Ötesiz İnsanlar is the military intervention and the headscarf issue. It is therefore, logical, that a display of religiosity and piety is more foregrounded. In line with the teachings of the Gülen Movement, emphasis is laid on tolerance of the differences in human beings, peace and the importance of education.
46 Samanyolu, as other Turkish television channels, integrated contemporary and historical references to reality. Especially, since the start of the controversy between the AKP and the Gülen Movement, they took advantage of their access to wide audiences to disseminate, in a highly politicized mediascape, their side of the story.
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SÖZERI, Ceren and Zeynep GÜNEY (2011), The Political Economy of the Media in Turkey: A Sectoral Analysis, Istanbul, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation). tesev.org.tr/wp/content/uploads/2015/11/ The_Political_Economy_Of_The_Media_A_Sectoral_Analysis.pdf. Consulted 14 July 2017.
« Sungurlar Ne Zaman Başlayacak? » (When Will the Sungurlar Start?) (2014), Kure TV/Dizi/ Sungurlar/Haberler, 2014, http://www.kure.tv/dizi/sungurlar/haberler/sungurlar-ne-zaman- baslayacak. Consulted 23 August 2015.
« Toplantı No: 2014/16, Toplantı Tarihi: 12.03.2014, Karar No: 54 »
(Meeting no. 2014/16, Meeting date 12.03.2014, decision no: 54), RTÜK (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu/Radio Television Supreme Council) (12 March 2014), www.rtuk.org.tr/#. Consulted 14 July 2017.
« Turkey World's Second Highest TV Series Exporter after US » (26 October 2014), Hürriyet Turkish Daily News. www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-worlds-second-highest-tv-series-exporter-after- us.aspx?pageID=238&nID=73478&NewsCatID=345. Consulted 14 July 2017.
UĞUR TANIÖVER, Hülya (2012), Turkish Television Broadcasting 2011, Istanbul, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, pt.scribd.com/document/128389437/Turkish-Television-Broadcasting-2011. Consulted 14 July 2017.
YAVUZ, M. Hakan (2013), Toward an Islamic Enlightenment. The Gülen movement, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press.
YIĞIT, Ahu Yiğit (2011), « Islamic Modernity and the Re-enchanting Power of Symbols in Islamic Fantasy Serials in Turkey » in Muslim Rap, Halal Soaps, and Revolutionary Theater. Artistic
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Developments in the Muslim World, Karin van Nieuwkerk ed., Austin, University of Texas Press, p. 207-229.
ZÜRCHER, Erik J. (2017), Turkey. A Modern History, London, New York, I.B. Tauris.
NOTES
1. In this article the terms television serial and television series are used as defined by Jeremy G. Butler, Television: Critical Methods and Applications, 4th ed., New York/London, Routledge 2012, p. 465. “Serial: A narrative form that presents daily/weekly episodes, with a multiple set of recurring characters and simultaneous storylines. Because each episode specifically links to the next, narrative closure is rare. Series: A narrative form that presents weekly episodes, usually self-contained, with a defined set of recurring characters. In addition the term television drama is used referring to both serials, series and other forms such as sit-coms and soap operas.” 2. Unfortunately links to episodes of television series and serial are unstable. This holds true especially for the broadcasts of Samanyolu TV. All links to the serials and series on Küre TV and other websites distributing Turkish television drama have been removed since mid-2016. Some of them are available on YouTube. 3. The Gülen Movement is called the Hizmet Movement by the followers themselves. Hizmet means “service” and refers to the societal relief organisations run by the movement, due to their belief that in order to attain true faith it is necessary to provide “service to humanity” and to fulfil altruistic societal duties to improve life standards. M. Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment. The Gülen Movement, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p.8, 10. 4. Susan Corke, Andrew Finkel, David J. Kramer, Carla Anne Robbins and Nate Schenkkan, Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey, Washington/New York, Freedom House, 2014, p. 4 freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%202-3-14.pdf. Consulted 14 July 2017. 5. Kumru Berfin Emre Çetin, “The ‘Politicization’ of Turkish Television Dramas.” International Journal Of Communication, vol. 8, Los Angeles, University of Southern California, Annenberg Press, 2014, p. 2462 [p. 2462–2483]. http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/2749. Consulted 18 July 2017. See for a study on Chinese television drama: Florian Schneider, Visual Political Communication in Popular Chinese Television Series. Leiden, Boston, Köln, Brill, 2012. 6. Çetin, p. 2464. 7. Çetin, p. 2465. 8. Çetin, p. 2463. 9. Ceren Sözeri and Zeynep Güney, The Political Economy of the Media in Turkey: A Sectoral Analysis, Istanbul, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), 2011, p. 55. 10. Hülya Uğur Tanıöver, Turkish Television Broadcasting 2011, Istanbul, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, 2012, p. 21, pt.scribd.com/document/128389437/Turkish-Television- Broadcasting-2011. Consulted 14 July 2017. 11. “Feza Publications Inc.” Media Ownership Monitor: Turkey. turkey.mom-rsf.org/en/owners/ companies/detail/company/company/show/feza-publications-inc/. Consulted 18 July 2017. 12. “Feza Publications Inc.”. 13. Sözeri and Güney, p. 45. 14. Uğur Tanrıöver, p. 39-53. 15. Uğur Tanrıöver, p. 49-53. 16. “Turkey World's Second Highest TV Series Exporter after US.” Hürriyet Turkish Daily News, 26 October 2014.
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www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-worlds-second-highest-tv-series-exporter-after-us.aspx? pageID=238&nID=73478&NewsCatID=345. Consulted 14 July 2017. 17. Uğur Tanıöver, p. 45. The survey is based on research done between 30 April 2011 and 6 May 2011, Uğur Tanıöver, footnote 27, p. 40. 18. “Samanyolu group.” Media Ownership Monitor: Turkey. turkey.mom-rsf.org/en/owners/ companies/detail/company/company/show/samanyolu-group/. Consulted 18 July 2017. 19. Ahu Yiğit, “Islamic Modernity and the Re-enchanting Power of Symbols in Islamic Fantasy Serials in Turkey,” Muslim Rap, Halal Soaps, and Revolutionary Theater. Artistic Developments in the Muslim World, ed. Karin van Nieuwkerk, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2011, p. 209 [p. 207-229]. 20. Yiğit, p. 213. 21. Yiğit, p. 213. 22. For a detailed discussion of these issues see: Mehtap Söyler, The Turkish Deep State : State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy, Oxon, New York, Routledge, 2015 and Ryan Gingeras, Heroin, Organized Crime, and the Making of Modern Turkey, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. 23. Gingeras, p. 1. 24. Fatma Müge Göçek, Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era. Library of Modern Middle East Studies 103, London, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2011, p. 98-184. 25. Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey. A Modern History, London, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2017, p. 323-325. 26. Zürcher, p. 329-330. 27. Göçek, p. 157-158. 28. Çetin, p. 2467-2468. 29. Zürcher, p. 308. 30. Protecting the honour of women means in traditional Turkish/Kurdish circles that women have to behave modestly and that they have do their utmost best to avoid everything that could bring their reputation (and that of their whole family) in discredit. They have to marry as virgins, they don’t meet with men from outside the family without a chaperon, they don’t flirt or have extramarital relations. The very suspicion of not being “honourable” may cause a woman to be killed. Aysan Sev’er and Gökçeçiçek Yurdakul, “Culture of Honor, Culture of Change. A Feminist Analysis of Honor Killings in Rural Turkey,” Violence Against Women 7, no. 9, Thousand Oaks, California, SAGE Publication, 2001, p. 964-998. https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/ bitstream/1807/17543/1/cultureofhonour.pdf. Consulted 11-3-2018. 31. Zürcher, p. 147. 32. Göçek, p. 98-184. 33. Zürcher, p. 328. 34. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), founder and first president of the Turkish Republic (1923). 35. Zürcher, p. 135-136; Bilge Criss, Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923, Leiden/Boston/Köln, Brill, 1999, p. 94-114. 36. Carter Vaughn Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: a History, 1789-2007, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2010, p. 388-389; Bekim Agai, “The Gülen Movement’s Islamic Ethic of Education.” Turkish Islam and the Secular State. The Gülen Movement, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, Syracuse/New York, Syracuse University Press, 2003, p. 48-68; Thomas Michel, “Fethullah Gülen as Educator,” ibid., p. 69-84; M. Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment. The Gülen Movement, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 92-116. 37. Zürcher, p. 333-334. 38. Zürcher, p. 308.
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39. Pınar Öğünç, “Senaristi Der Ki: ‘Şefkat Tepe de Değişiyor’ (The Scenarist Says: ‘Şefkat Tepe Changes As Well’,” Radikal, 5 April 2013. 40. Zürcher, p. 359-362. 41. Öğünç, 42. Kudüs is the Islamic name for Jerusalem, being the most sacred city of Islam after Mecca and Medina. 43. “Kudüs Ordusu ve Türkiye - İran Çekişmesi” (The Jerusalem Army and the Turkey-Iran Bickering). Milliyet blog, 18 January 2012. http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/kudus-ordusu-ve-turkiye-- iran-cekismesi/Blog/?BlogNo=344263. Consulted 18 July 2017. 44. “ Sungurlar Ne Zaman Başlayacak?” (When Will the Sungurlar Start?). 2014 http:// www.kure.tv/dizi/sungurlar/haberler/sungurlar-ne-zaman-baslayacak. Consulted 23 August 2015. 45. Zürcher, p. 346-347. 46. Ergun Özbudun, “AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift.” South European Society and Politics, Vol. 19, No. 2, Milton Park, Abingdon on Thames, Oxfordshire, Taylor and Francis, 2015, p. 158-160; 163-164 [p. 155–167]. DOI 10.1080/13608746.2014.920571. 47. “Karar Kurul'un yeni kirli planı Ülkenin kılcallarını ele geçirmek!” (The new dirty plan of the Decision Board is to get hold of the capillaries of the Nation!) https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=_nmCGOi4qxQ, published 21 December 2013. Consulted 14 March 2018. 48. “Karar Kurul'un yeni kirli planı Ülkenin kılcallarını ele geçirmek!” see note 47. 49. “Toplantı No: 2014/16, Toplantı Tarihi: 12.03.2014, Karar No: 54 (Meeting no. 2014/16, Meeting date 12.03.2014, decision no: 54).” RTÜK (Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu/Radio Television Supreme Council) 12 March 2014, www.rtuk.org.tr/#. Consulted 14 July 2017. 50. “Hidayet Karaca: ‘Yeni Türkiye’ Dizilerden Korkuyor” (Hidayet Karaca: ‘the New Turkey’ is Afraid of Serials) Haberler.com, 18 December 2014, www.haberler.com/hidayet-karaca-yeni-turkiye- dizilerden-korkuyor-6784695-haberi/. Consulted 14 July 2017. 51. “Hidayet Karaca: ‘Yeni Türkiye’ Dizilerden Korkuyor” 52. Fragment of episode 64 of Tek Türkiye in which the Karanlık Konsey explains how they will create a new Islamist group that aims to take over the country. “Hidayet Karaca'nın tutuklanmasına sebep olan Tek Türkiye'nin 64. bölümü” (The 64th episode of Tek Türkiye which was the reason of Hidayet Karaca’s arrest) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nTEgXx48PNo, uploaded 19 December 2014. Consulted 14 March 2018. 53. Mustafa Akyol, “WikiLeaks Sheds Light on Turkey’s Mysterious ‘Annotators’.” Al-Monitor, Turkish Pulse, 22 December 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/turkey- wikileaks-mysterious-annotators-al-qeade.html. Consulted on 18 July 2017. 54. Bülent Korucu, “Questions and Answers in Tahşiye Group Debate.” Todayszaman, in Fethullah Gülen: Press Room, (Fethullah Gülen: from the Press), 18 December 2014, www.fethullahgulen.com/ en/press/1323-news/46876-todays-zaman-questions-and-answers-in-tahsiye-group-debate? hitcount=0. Consulted 14 July 2017. 55. Fethullah Gülen, “İrtica Paranoyası ve Duanın Esası” (The Paranoia of Fundamentalism and the Essence of Prayer), Bamteli, 6 April 2009, 24.50 -26.23 min., www.herkul.org/bamteli/irtica- paranoyasi-ve-duanin-esasi/. Consulted 14 July 2017. 56. “Fethullah Gülen’i İlk kez Açığa Düşüren o Vaaz” (This Preaching that Discomfited Fethullah Gülen for the First Time) Sabah (Morning), 14 December 2012. http://www.sabah.com.tr/webtv/ turkiye/fethullah-guleni-ilk-kez-aciga-dusuren-o-vaaz. Consulted 18 July 2017; Akyol, “Turkey’s Mysterious ‘Annotators’.” 57. Abdullah Bozkurt, “The Case of Jailed Journalist Hidayet Karaca.” Todayszaman, 23 December 2014, quoted from Fethullah Gülen: Press Room, www.fgulen.com/en/press/columns/46974-
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abdullah-bozkurt-todays-zaman-the-case-of-jailed-journalist-hidayet-karaca. Consulted 14 July 2017. 58. Ilıçak, Nazlı , “Hidayet Karaca Neden Cezaevinde”? (Why is Hidayet Karaca in Prison?), Büyük Tarih, in Fethullah Gülen: Press Room, (Fethullah Gülen: from the Press), 22 January 2015, http:// fgulen.com/tr/turk-basininda-fethullah-gulen/fethullah-gulen-hakkinda-kose-yazilari/2015- kose-yazilari/47301-nazli-ilicak-bugun-hidayet-karaca-neden-cezaevinde?hitcount=0. Consulted 14 July 2017. 59. Mürsel Genç, “Lawyers Appeal Karaca's Arrest.” The Free Library, SyndiGate Media, 22 December 2014, www.thefreelibrary.com/Lawyers+appeal+Karaca%27s+arrest.-a0395066182. Consulted 14 July 2017. 60. “Hidayet Karaca'ya 31 Yıl, Ali Fuat Yılmazer'e 16 Yıl Ceza” (To Hidayet Karaca 31 Years and to Ali Fuat Yılmazer 16 Years of Punishment), CNNTürk, 3 November 2017, https://www.cnnturk.com/ son-dakika-hidayet-karacaya-31-yil-ali-fuat-yilmazere-16-yil-ceza.
ABSTRACTS
From the early 2000s onwards Turkish television drama has been a vehicle for the dissemination of political content in Turkey. It occurred in shows of many Turkish television channels. This article focuses on Samanyolu (1993-2016) a generic channel aiming at an Islamic orientated audience, related to the Gülen Movement. The channel disseminated its socio-political content through its television series and serials. Samanyolu focused on the Kurdish issue in three of the serials analysed in this article: Şubat Soğuğu [February Cold], Tek Turkiye [One Turkey] and Şefkat Tepe [Compassion Peak]. Their line of approach has a strong nationalistic view of the PKK: the PKK are terrorists and in cooperation with foreign forces, a threat for the unity of Turkey. However, in line with the teachings of the Gülen Movement, with an emphasis on peace, dialogue and education, the Kurdish people living in the area suffer most from the violence. Education would help them to have a better future, to develop their society and the need to join the PKK would disappear. Another recurrent theme is the 28 February 1997 military intervention; the subject of Şubat Soğuğu and Ötesiz İnsanlar [The People Beyond]. These programmes problematize the anti- Islamic measures taken after the military intervention. After 2013, the AKP focused on the destruction of the power of their former ally, the Gülen Movement. The Gülen Movement reacted through its television channel, not only in news programmes but in its series and serials as well.
Depuis le début des années 2000, les fictions télévisuelles ont véhiculé des messages politiques, dans plusieurs chaînes de télévision. Cet article étudie la chaîne Samanyolu (1993-2016), une chaîne de télévision générique qui vise un public à sensibilité islamique, liée au mouvement Gülen. La chaîne a diffusé ses contenus socio-politiques à travers ses séries télévisées et ses feuilletons. Samanyolu a traité de la question kurde dans trois des feuilletons analysés dans cet article : Şubat Soğuğu [Le Froid de février], Tek Turkiye [Seule la Turquie] et Şefkat Tepe [La Colline de la compassion]. Leur approche donne une vision très nationaliste du PKK (le groupe armé kurde, ndlt) : ce sont des terroristes, en lien avec des puissances étrangères, qui forment une menace pour l’unité de la Turquie. Cependant, en accord avec les enseignements du mouvement Gülen, qui prône la paix, le dialogue et l’éducation, la population kurde est présentée comme la principale victime de la violence. L’éducation les aiderait à avoir un avenir meilleur, à se développer, ce qui tarirait le recrutement du PKK. Un autre thème récurrent est l’intervention
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militaire du 28 février 1997, ce qui est le sujet de Şubat Soğuğu, et de Ötesiz İnsanlar [Les Gens de l’au-delà]. Ces programmes traitent des réformes contre l’islam qui ont été prises après l’intervention militaire. Après 2013, l’AKP s’est donné pour objectif de détruire le pouvoir de son ancien allié, le mouvement Gülen. Le mouvement Gülen a réagi au moyen de ses chaînes de télévision, pas seulement via les nouvelles, mais aussi dans ses séries et feuilletons.
INDEX
Mots-clés: État profond, nationalisme, religion, propagande, Gülen Fethullah, communication visuelle, séries turques, Samanyolu Keywords: deep state, visual communication, Gülen Fethullah, propaganda, nationalism, religion, Turkish series, Samanyolu
AUTHOR
PETRA DE BRUIJN Petra de Bruijn obtained her PhD at Leiden University (1997) and works at the Leiden University Institute for Area Studies, department of Middle Eastern Studies. Her field of research combines modern Turkish prose literature and performing arts: Turkish theatre, Turkish film and television drama. Related to her current position as executive secretary of Leiden University Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (LUCIS) and director ad interim and executive secretary of the Netherlands Interuniversity Research School for Islamic Studies (NISIS) her scholarly interest focuses on the changing role of Islam in modern Turkish cultural life.
Petra de Bruijn est docteure de l’université de Leiden (1997) et travaille à l’Institut d’études aréales de l’Université de Leiden, au département d’études sur le Moyen-Orient. Son champ de recherche porte à la fois sur la littérature contemporaine turque et sur les arts vivants, le théâtre et le cinéma turcs ainsi que les fictions télévisuelles. Petra de Bruijn est secrétaire générale de Leiden University Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (LUCIS), ainsi que secrétaire générale et directrice par intérim du Netherlands Interuniversity Research School for Islamic Studies (NISIS). Ses intérêts de recherche concernent donc principalement le rôle de l’islam dans dans la vie culturelle turque à l’époque contemporaine.
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Au-delà du monde enchanté des séries turques : littérature populaire et réalisme social dans « Kayıp Şehir » [La Ville perdue]
Béatrice Garapon
1 Même si elle n’a duré que quelques mois, de septembre 2012 à février 2013, la série Kayıp Şehir [La Ville perdue] aura marqué le paysage des séries turques. Elle a été diffusée au moment où les séries connaissaient comme un âge d’or en Turquie, de 2010 à 2014. Plusieurs séries tentaient de s’emparer de sujets plus graves que la simple romance : l’Histoire (Öyle bir geçer zaman ki [Comme le temps passe vite] Kanal D, 2010-2013, Bu kalp seni unutur mu [Comment pourrais-je t’oublier], Show TV, 2009-2010, sur le thème de la militance d’extrême-gauche dans les années 1970), ou encore la police et, par ce biais, les tensions sociales ou politiques qui agitent la société turque (Behzat Ç., Bir Ankara polisyesi [Behzat Ç., un policier d’Ankara], Star TV, 2010-2013). Alors que certaines séries étaient des adaptations de romans ou d’œuvres littéraires célèbres, comme la célèbrissime série Aşk-ı memnu ([L'Amour interdit], Kanal D, 2008-2010), adaptation de l’œuvre de Halid Ziya Uşaklıgil, publié en 1900, à l’origine aussi sous forme de feuilleton ; d’autres donnaient dans la subversion et la réécriture comique des classiques (Leyla ile Mecnun [Leïla et le fou], TRT 1, 2011-2013) puisant ainsi dans le fonds littéraire du pays.
2 La grande originalité de la série réside dans son équipe de scénaristes, tous des écrivains, ou des journalistes plutôt marqués à gauche : Yıldırım Türker, Tuğrul Eryılmaz, Murat Uyurkulak, Leyla Olça et Hakan Bıçakçı – ces deux derniers ont quitté le projet avant la fin de la série, laissant la place à Yelda Eroğlu et Seray Şahiner. Tous sont des personnalités connues de la scène stambouliote. Murat Uyurkulak, Tuğrul Eryılmaz et Yıldırım Türker écrivaient fréquemment dans le journal Radikal, connu pour ses positions de gauche, avant sa fermeture en 2016. Murat Uyurkulak et Hakan Bıçakçı ont écrit plusieurs romans ; Yıldırım Türker a essentiellement traduit de la littérature anglo-saxonne. Il a aussi écrit une pièce de théâtre, et écrit des scénarios
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pour des films. C’est un fait rare dans les séries turques, qui sont globalement coupées du monde du cinéma et de la littérature, à la différence du modèle américain, où le genre de la série est pris au sérieux.
3 Diffusée entre septembre 2012 et mars 2013 sur la chaîne Kanal D1, qui produit en général des séries de bonne qualité, la série a reçu plutôt un bon accueil. Mais les fréquents changements d’horaires ont nui à l’audimat de la série. D’abord diffusée le vendredi à 22h30, elle passe au samedi 22h30, puis au lundi à la même heure. Le réalisateur de la série, Cevdet Mercan, se dispute avec la chaîne et quitte le projet au bout de quelques mois. En mars 2013, la chaîne Kanal D, décide de mettre fin à la série, au bout de la 1re saison, alors que les taux d’audience montraient plutôt un certain succès. Fait intéressant, Pelin Yaşaroğlu, la directrice de Kanal D, raconte que, lors de l’arrêt de la série, de nombreuses femmes portant un voile ont protesté sur les réseaux sociaux2. Cela montre bien que la série a su conquérir un public même dans les milieux conservateurs, au-delà des cercles bobos, de gauche et gay-friendly de la capitale. C’est un certain succès pour la série qui, et c’est un fait rare pour les séries turques, a eu pour ambition explicite de parler des tabous de la société. La dimension d’éducation du peuple, éducation à la tolérance, à l’ouverture d’esprit, est très présente tout au long de la série. Que trouve-t-on d’intéressant, et d’original, dans cette série à l’équipe scénaristique de haute qualité ?
Un réalisme social
4 Le thème général de la série, l’exode d’une famille de paysans à la ville, se prête facilement à la caricature, soit comique, soit moralisante. La ville comme lieu de perdition, qui corrompt, et finalement amène le brave paysan à sa perte, est un topos de la littérature, turque comme européenne (voire mondiale ! Le cinéma égyptien ou Bollywood est plein de films de ce genre). Or la série se caractérise par un très grand réalisme dans le ton, qui approche au plus juste le décalage, parfois léger, l’inadéquation du paysan dans la grande ville.
5 Le réalisme est d’abord celui de la langue. Le style des dialogues a une ambition presque naturaliste : argot et injures sont abondamment utilisés, et d’ailleurs pudiquement censurés par le RTUK, l’organe de censure de l’audiovisuel en Turquie. L’accent régional très fort du grand-père de la famille Topbaş ajoute à la « couleur locale ». Dans les costumes aussi : Aysel, la prostituée de la série, s’habille vraiment comme une prostituée et rien n’est euphémisé : elle porte des mini-jupes, des talons aiguilles et des robes dénudées (voir figure 1). Plusieurs scènes la montrent ivre, titubante, sans qu’y soit ajouté une leçon de morale implicite. Les bagarres, les baisers, ne sont pas seulement suggérés, mais vraiment montrés. Cela est un fait remarquable, qui contribue à différencier la série dans le paysage des séries turques de la période, très strictement censurées et plutôt pusillanimes : il est interdit, notamment, de montrer de l’alcool ou du sang dans les séries.
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Figure 1. Aysel, l’héroïne de la série, habillée d’un décolleté inhabituel pour les séries turques ; on remarque aussi qu’elle est lourdement fardée.
6 Le quartier de Tarlabaşı, dans lequel se passe l’action, est réellement l’un des plus pauvres de la ville, et surtout, il est situé en plein cœur de la ville, près de la place Taksim et du quartier de Beyoğlu3. Généralement peuplé de réfugiés kurdes arrivés après la guerre des années 1990, et de Gitans, le quartier sera bientôt détruit et reconstruit, dans le cadre de la politique de « transformation urbaine » du gouvernement4. En un sens, Kayıp Şehir s’inscrit dans le genre des séries de quartier, qui ont un grand succès en Turquie (ou ailleurs ! Comme le montre le succès de la série française Plus Belle la Vie, qui a pour cadre et pour thème le quartier du Panier à Marseille5), et ont été bien étudiées par Hülya Uğur Tanrıöver6. La série de quartier, en plus de décrire un quotidien, un microcosme qui fait partie de l’univers des spectateurs, ouvre de nombreuses possibilités narratives : tout le monde se connaît, les relations entre voisins peuvent être amicales ou conflictuelles. Les différents personnages de la série peuvent se rencontrer de façon naturelle, en se croisant en bas de l’immeuble, mais aussi surprendre des conversations ou épier par la fenêtre, ce qui permet de complexifier l’intrigue sans tomber dans le rocambolesque. Mais ici, il s’agit d’un quartier particulier, et la série entend bien tout montrer de la misère sociale. Les scènes de rue montrent des adolescents désœuvrés, voyous, des migrants africains qui tentent de se cacher, des transsexuels, des prostituées, jeunes et moins jeunes. L’effroi de la famille Topbaş lorsqu’elle arrive dans ce quartier est aussi celle du spectateur. 7 Kayıp Şehir, la ville perdue, reprend un motif du patrimoine culturel européen, puisqu’elle fait sien le cadre narratif de Rocco et ses frères de Visconti : une famille arrive de la région de la mer noire à Istanbul, alors que leur village a été inondé, et leurs terres, perdues. Le père de famille est mort, et c’est une mère célibataire qui élève ses six enfants, cinq garçons et une fille. La famille Topbaş – c’est leur nom – s’installe dans un quartier misérable de la ville, le quartier de Tarlabaşı, où vivent gitans, transsexuels, migrants, petits délinquants, enfants des rues et marginaux de tout poil. Un temps effarés par ce monde dont ils ne soupçonnaient pas l’existence, les membres de la famille se trouvent chacun leur voie dans cette nouvelle ville. Le deuxième fils de la famille, Irfan, rêve de devenir footballeur. Il tombe amoureux de la prostituée qui vit
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au-dessus de chez eux, Aysel. Le troisième fils, Kadir, est doux, calme et responsable. Il se rapproche un temps de la jeune fille timide qui vit en-dessous de chez eux, Zehra. Mais finalement, il tombe aussi amoureux de Aysel, alors même qu’elle est l’amante de son frère. Aysel et Kadir vivent ainsi un amour passionnel, interdit, qui prendra fin lorsque Kadir, contraint et forcé par ses responsabilités, finit par épouser Zehra. Ici, pas de bons sentiments. On est loin de l’univers rassurant des séries turques, où méchants et gentils sont facilement identifiables. Le sentiment amoureux est décrit comme une force destructrice, presque une malédiction, qui vient briser tous les liens sociaux et même familiaux.
8 La description de l’inadéquation du paysan à la ville est, quant à elle, finement montrée, surtout dans le premier épisode de la série, qui décrit pendant une longue partie l’errance d’Irfan, le jeune héros de la série, dans la ville. Irfan doit rencontrer un ami de son frère aîné Ismail qui devrait pouvoir lui proposer un emploi. Ismail lui décrit rapidement le chemin. Irfan se perd aussitôt, croyant pouvoir marcher jusqu’à son but, alors que tout est beaucoup plus loin qu’il n’y songeait. La longue errance du jeune homme dans cette ville énorme qu’est Istanbul montre, par une suite de petits événements, l’inadaptation, et à plusieurs reprises, l’effarement du paysan dans la ville. Mais cette inadéquation n’est pas présentée comme comique : les acteurs montrent une réalité sociologique, mais jamais caricaturée ou folklorisée comme dans la plupart des séries turques. Ayant trouvé du pain par terre, Irfan l’embrasse trois fois et le pose en hauteur, un réflexe superstitieux qui montre que le jeune homme n’a rien perdu de ses habitudes. Au lieu de se promener avec un sac en toile, ou en cuir, comme un urbain, il porte à la main un sac plastique, joue avec un chapelet pour s’occuper les mains – ce qui agace Aysel, et a d’autres habitudes typiquement paysannes.
9 Mais c’est surtout par son ambition de tout montrer, de ne rien cacher, que se distingue la série. La violence des rapports de classe, ou des rapports de genre, ne sont jamais occultés. Récemment arrivée à la ville, la mère de la famille Topbaş, Meryem, fait la vaisselle dans un restaurant. Le travail est mal payé. Meryem emmène son fils cadet pour l’inscrire à l’école ; le directeur les reçoit dans son bureau, explique que les frais d’inscription sont de 150 livres (E03). Meryem demande s’il est possible de payer en plusieurs fois, ils n’ont pas l’argent pour payer le jour même. Passant brusquement au tutoiement, le directeur répond avec un regard plein de supériorité « Dans ce cas-là, tu viendras nettoyer les vitres en attendant de pouvoir payer ». Meryem serre la main de son fils et répond qu’elle reviendra le lendemain avec l’argent. N’ayant pas trouvé l’argent, Meryem vient faire les vitres de l’école ; c’est une source d’humiliation pour le petit garçon, qui casse une vitre de l’école. À un autre moment, le père de la famille qui habite en bas de l’immeuble, le père de Zehra, perd son travail de conducteur routier (E10). Il est obligé de se faire vendeur ambulant, l’un des métiers les plus bas de l’échelle sociale en Turquie. La honte l’empêche de le dire à sa famille, alors même qu’il reçoit des menaces de la part des autres vendeurs ambulants du quartier, qui ne veulent pas le laisser vendre ses produits sur « leur » territoire de vente.
Une vision non-idéalisée de la famille
10 La famille est un lieu facilement sacralisé par les séries turques. Les disputes entre frères et sœurs sont traitées, mais uniquement sur le mode comique, ou au contraire très dramatique, montrant une famille détruite et pleine de mauvais personnages : la
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moralisation n’est alors jamais très loin. Ici, l’enfermement que peut représenter la famille est montré sans détours. La famille qui habite en bas de chez les Topbaş a dû quitter son village, qui a été détruit durant la guerre civile à l’Est du pays dans les années 1990. Le grand-père, vieux et malade, ne cesse de supplier son fils, le père de Zehra et Murat, de l’emmener dans son village. « Notre village n’existe plus. Il a été brûlé. » réplique brusquement le fils (E14). Mais cela ne parvient pas à mettre fin à la supplique inlassable du vieillard : « Je t’en supplie, emmène-moi au village. Je t’en supplie… ». Les rapports entre frères et sœurs sont également montrés dans toute leur ambiguïté. Ces rapports sont chargés d’affection, mais aussi d’une certaine dose de rivalité, de jalousies, et cela alors même que la place au sein de la famille suit une hiérarchie assez stricte, selon l’âge et le genre. Plusieurs fois, Ismail, le fils aîné de la famille, se plaint qu’on ne l’écoute pas, alors qu’il est l’homme le plus âgé. Or, si Ismail a le privilège de l’âge, ce n’est pas le personnage le plus sympathique de la série. Il refuse que sa famille accueille Daniel, un jeune homme noir qui s’est pourtant battu pour défendre Sadik, son jeune frère.
11 Petits et grands frères de la série entendent bien régenter la vie de leurs sœurs. La fille de la famille Topbaş, Seher, s’entend dire par ses frères ce qu’elle doit faire et ne pas faire à longueur de journée. Plusieurs fois, elle est interpellée en pleine rue par l’un ou l’autre de ses frères, parce qu’elle a osé s’adresser dans la rue à un jeune homme noir, un migrant africain, avec qui elle aura plus tard une histoire. La jeune fille qui habite en bas de chez les Topbaş, Zehra, ne peut pas aller de son travail à chez elle sans être accompagnée de son jeune frère, qui veille jalousement sur son honneur. Une scène montre les deux jeunes filles, chacune accompagnée de son frère, qui sont sermonnées « fais attention à tes gestes, ne va pas seule chez l’épicier, ne te promène pas seule dans les rues ». Les quatre personnages se croisent dans la rue, et les deux jeunes filles sont prises d’un fou rire pressant (E04). Les relations entre frères sont empreintes de rivalité : la mère est toujours convoquée comme figure de référence. Ismail reproche à Irfan d’infliger des tourments à sa mère, parce qu’il refuse de travailler dans une usine ; Irfan lui rétorque que, pendant deux ans, Ismail était loin de la famille et qu’il n’était pas là pour s’occuper de sa mère : chacun veut être le premier dans le cœur de sa mère (E09). Cependant, la série fait aussi la part belle à la légèreté, et montre aussi la grâce de certaines scènes de famille, éclats de rire, qui montrent que dans toute famille, jalousies et disputes côtoient affection et tendresse.
12 La mère de la famille, Meryem Topbaş, est elle aussi un personnage positif, fort. Pourtant, c’est elle qui dénonce à la police le migrant africain, Daniel, avec qui sa fille entretient une relation amoureuse. L’interpellation se passe mal et Daniel meurt dans un affrontement avec les forces de police. Après la mort de Daniel, Seher fait une grave dépression nerveuse et tente de se suicider (E19). Bien qu’étant une mère aimante, Meryem ne pouvait pas accepter que sa fille ait une histoire avec un jeune homme noir et décide de le dénoncer pour mettre fin à l’histoire.
13 Le réalisme de la série réside donc surtout dans l’ambiguïté des personnages, qui, au lieu d’avoir un caractère clairement déterminé, sont tous à la fois bons et mauvais, pétris de contradictions. Irfan, par exemple, le héros de la série, est un personnage au grand cœur, attachant. Son amour tendre pour Aysel est l’un des thèmes de la série. Et pourtant, Irfan n’est pas vraiment un gentleman. Il invite Aysel dans un restaurant chic, mais s’énerve et l’insulte lorsqu’elle refuse de passer la nuit avec lui (E05). Dans les disputes avec Aysel, il lui arrive plusieurs fois d’être violent. Il refuse qu’elle travaille
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dans un restaurant où on sert de l’alcool, sous prétexte que c’est un endroit que fréquente « toutes sortes de gens » (E07). Tout amoureux qu’il est, il reste un homme ordinaire : macho, plein de préjugés, parfois violent.
14 Dans le même registre, la série s’ouvre sur un amour contrarié : Ismail, le fils aîné de la famille, veut épouser Zeynep, une jeune fille de son village, mais elle vient d’une famille riche, et les deux familles s’opposent à cette union. Finalement, le couple parvient à triompher des obstacles et se marie (E12). Mais, en fait, et contrairement au schéma classique, c’est là que commencent les problèmes. Le couple n’a pas beaucoup d’argent, ils habitent dans un appartement que Zeynep, qui vient d’un milieu aisé, ne trouve pas à la hauteur. Elle ne travaille pas, s’ennuie à la maison et attend toute la journée le retour de son mari, dont le travail est fatiguant et stressant. Très vite, la vie de couple se révèle oppressante, pour l’un comme pour l’autre. Ismail ne se sent pas à la hauteur, mais il en veut à son épouse de se plaindre de leur appartement. Il lui interdit de revoir ses parents, avec qui la jeune fille s’est fâchée pour l’épouser. De son côté, Zeynep est déçue de la vie de couple : elle ne voit que très peu son mari, qui rentre généralement d’humeur maussade. Elle s’ennuie, ne peut plus s’acheter de beaux vêtements, doit cacher à son mari qu’elle revoit sa famille. Assez rapidement, les disputes se multiplient et la situation devient explosive, au point qu’Ismail, au 20e épisode, manque de tromper sa femme, seulement quelques mois après leur mariage. Cette forme de situation, où personne n’est responsable, mais où malgré tout les choses tournent mal, est inhabituelle dans les séries turques. Ainsi, la série décline une critique plus subtile d’un système, où seuls les hommes travaillent et pas les femmes, et surtout subvertit les clichés du happy ending habituel, où le mariage est invariablement la clôture – heureuse – d’une suite d’événements contraires.
15 Aysel enfin, est la grande héroïne de la série. Mais elle tombe amoureuse du frère de celui avec qui elle entretient une liaison, Irfan. Ici l’amour, loin d’être un sentiment beau, agréable, est au contraire dépeint comme un sentiment dévastateur, qui s’apparente à une malédiction et vient semer malheur et confusion, là où les choses étaient clairement ordonnées dans un système social cohérent. Le spectateur est forcé d’assister au déroulement tragique de l’histoire d’amour interdite. On comprend l’amour d’Irfan pour Aysel. On comprend qu’elle puisse se laisser séduire par lui, sans vouloir pour autant l’épouser. Mais on comprend aussi qu’elle tombe amoureuse de Kadir, qui est aussi ordonné et raisonnable que son frère est aventurier et sanguin, faisant plonger l’histoire entière dans un torrent de rebondissements qui font souffrir tous les personnages principaux de la série. Personne n’est coupable de cet amour, et pourtant il enchaîne les personnages à leur destin, donnant à la série une dimension presque tragique.
L’éducation par le divertissement
16 Parfois, le message est plus explicite. C’est le cas pour le thème de la violence conjugale, qui est abordé dans les tout derniers épisodes de la série. Seher, qui a quitté la maison familiale pour vivre seule, commence à travailler dans une association pour les droits de l’homme, qui vise entre autres à protéger les femmes battues. Un jour, alors qu’elle est seule dans les locaux de l’association, Seher accueille une femme poursuivie par son mari, qui la bat et veut la tuer (E24). Au cours des épisodes suivants, le mari violent se fait de plus en plus menaçant, et même si la femme menacée se cache chez Aysel, à qui
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Seher a demandé de l’aide, son mari finit par la retrouver et l’abattre d’un coup de feu (E25). Lorsque ces épisodes ont été diffusés sur les écrans turcs, au début de l’année 2013, une banderole publicitaire contre les violences conjugales apparaissait en bas de l’écran lors de cette scène, disant « Ne restez pas silencieux ! Si vous êtes témoins de violences conjugales, appelez le [numéro spécial] ». Ici, l’éducation à la réaction face aux violences conjugales, qui est enserrée dans une structure narrative, et s’appuie sur les sentiments du spectateur au moment de la mort d’un personnage de la série, se double d’un message officiel de publicité du gouvernement.
17 Les thèmes très actuels sont abordés de façon pédagogique. En général, le dispositif narratif est le suivant : les personnages de la série sont d’abord eux-mêmes pleins de préjugés, puis amenés, dans le cours de l’histoire, à revenir eux-mêmes sur leurs préjugés, pour se rendre compte de leur erreur. C’est le cas, par exemple, du racisme envers les migrants d’origine africaine. Seher, la jeune sœur de la famille, étudie à l’université. Elle rencontre Daniel, un migrant africain qui attend à Istanbul de pouvoir passer en Europe. Ses frères voient d’un très mauvais œil l’intérêt de Seher pour ce jeune homme africain. Dénoncé par la mère de Seher, qui a découvert que sa fille avait une histoire avec lui, Daniel meurt d’une balle perdue lorsque la police veut l’arrêter. Bouleversée, Seher tente de se suicider. Aysel et l’un des frères de Seher, Kadir, trouvent Seher inanimée et l’emmènent à l’hôpital. Alors qu’ils attendent devant l’hôpital que Seher aille mieux pour la ramener à la maison, Kadir se reproche sa propre étroitesse d’esprit. Aysel lui répond en mots simples que Daniel et Seher, bien que l’une blanche et l’autre noir, sont les mêmes, faits du même bois, tous les deux prêts à tout pour vivre leur amour (E15). Le cliché de l’amour impossible, grand topos des séries turques, est ici utilisé pour montrer l’inanité des préjugés racistes
18 Kayıp Şehir est ainsi une série engagée, qui s’attaque à des tabous de la société turque. Ce n’est pas la seule série qui comprend une dimension d’éducation. Bien d’autres séries ont pour thématique la dureté d’un père, ou le conservatisme d’une famille qui s’oppose à une union. Les possibilités narratives ouvertes par le conservatisme des mœurs n’y sont pas pour rien. Il n’est pas rare que la famille forme un opposant rêvé à l’amour d’un couple. Mais généralement, les séries ne s’attaquent jamais à des sujets aussi délicats que l’homosexualité, l’histoire, le racisme ou la prostitution. Le but affiché de la série était le suivant7 : montrer l’Autre, l’étranger, le marginal, l’homosexuel, le pauvre, comme un semblable, dans une tentative d’éducation à la tolérance.
19 Pour le personnage de transsexuel, Duygu - qui devait au départ être un personnage homosexuel, mais cela a été jugé trop « osé » et trop exposé à la censure – la stratégie adoptée est un peu différente. Ici, la « leçon » de tolérance est moins apparente, moins explicite que pour le racisme, ou les violences conjugales. Pas d’épisode dramatique, si ce n’est que le premier épisode s’ouvre sur le transport de Duygu à l’hôpital, alors qu’elle a été agressée (E01). Le personnage n’est, la plupart du temps, pas montrée comme une victime, un personnage qui subit le rejet, voire la haine, de la société. Duygu est au contraire présentée le plus possible comme une femme comme une autre. C’est la meilleure amie d’Aysel, qui joue en toute occasion le rôle d’adjuvant, de confidente, de soutien pour Aysel (voir figure 2). L’idée ici est de la montrer comme un personnage attachant, proche, de montrer son côté humain plus que sa différence. C’est un personnage auquel on pourrait facilement s’identifier. Tout comme le spectateur, Irfan, qui tombe amoureux d’Aysel au début de la série, est forcé de l’accepter comme
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elle est. Dans le premier épisode de la série, une voiture jette le corps inanimé de Duygu sur la route. Alors qu’Aysel se précipite pour l’aider, Irfan les accompagne à l’hôpital. Au moment de payer pour que l’opération médicale pour soigner Duygu puisse avoir lieu, Aysel se rend compte qu’elle n’a pas l’argent de le faire, et Irfan donne tout ce qui lui reste comme argent - et tout ce qui reste comme argent à la famille – pour payer l’opération de Duygu. Quelques jours après, Irfan se rend dans un bar pour y noyer son chagrin dans l’alcool. Duygu l’y aperçoit, lui offre une assiette de fruits pour le remercier et interpelle la tenancière du bar à voix haute, pour lui dire qu’Irfan est son invité. Mais Irfan a honte d’être interpellé en public par un transsexuel. Il paie précipitamment son verre et part sans même saluer Duygu (E02). Peu à peu, mais sans bruit, Irfan perd ses préjugés envers Duygu, qu’il finit par considérer comme quelqu’un d’absolument semblable aux autres, et s’en fait une amie. Dans un autre épisode, alors qu’il appelle Duygu pour essayer de savoir où se trouve Aysel, Irfan lui lance, dans un accès d’enthousiasme : « merci, mon frère ! » pour se reprendre aussitôt : « euh… ma sœur » (E10). Le seul passage où le personnage évoque la difficulté d’être un transsexuel, c’est au moment de la mort de son père. Duygu doit se rendre à l’enterrement, et évoque avec une certaine amertume la relation avec son père : « Il n’a jamais été un père pour moi. Quand je m’habillais avec des vêtements de fille, il me frappait tellement fort qu’un jour il a failli me tuer… » (E22). Ici, c’est par l’identification avec le personnage d’Irfan que le spectateur en vient à surmonter ses préjugés vis-à-vis du transsexuel.
Figure 2. Duygu, le transsexuel ami d’Aysel, dans la position de confidente.
20 Un autre des thèmes abordés est l’Histoire récente de la Turquie. Lorsque la série Kayıp Şehir a commencé à sortir en 2012, plusieurs séries traitaient déjà de l’histoire contemporaine de la Turquie, certaines avec une approche assez critique. Oyle bir geçer zaman ki [Comme le temps passe], une série très populaire, sorte de saga familiale qui se déroule sur plusieurs périodes historiques, abordait certaines périodes douloureuses de l’histoire de la Turquie, dont la période des années 1970, et les trajectoires brisées de certains militants de gauche. La série Kayıp Şehir aborde, en filigrane, un épisode
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sombre de l’histoire turque, la nuit du 6 au 7 septembre 1955, au cours de laquelle les magasins grecs de la ville d’Istanbul (ainsi qu’Ankara et Izmir) avaient été pillés et mis à sac par la foule. Le grand-père de la famille Topbaş, Ismail, retrouve son amour de jeunesse, une femme grecque d’Istanbul, dont il était amoureux avant que la nuit du 6-7 septembre ne les sépare à jamais. Cette nuit-là, Ismail était parti à la recherche d’Eleni, sa fiancée, pour la protéger, mais, au cours de la nuit, cédant à la tentation, il s’était saisi d’un collier en or appartenant à un magasin grec vandalisé. Des années après, il retrouve Eleni à Istanbul, et décide de faire don du collier à l’église du quartier, en réparation de sa faute. « Ensuite, tout est allé mal dans ma vie » confie-t-il à Eleni avant de faire don du collier à l’église (E07). Alors qu’il est loin d’être le plus violent, ce douloureux événement de l’histoire turque a reçu une certaine couverture médiatique. Un film a été réalisé sur le sujet, Güz sancisi [ Les Douleurs d’automne], par Tomris Giritlioğlu, qui est aussi la conceptrice de projet de la série Kayıp Şehir. Ici, c’est le personnage lui-même, le grand-père Ismail, qui prend conscience de son erreur et tente de la réparer, à l’automne de sa vie. La démarche du vieillard est symbolique : il ne s’agit pas tant de réparer ses erreurs que d’en prendre conscience, d’en demander pardon. C’est un peu de la même façon que fonctionne la série elle-même. L’objectif n’est pas tant de délivrer un message en particulier sur les violences passées contre les minorités, mais de cesser de faire comme si ça n’avait pas existé, de soulever ces problèmes-là.
21 Les violences politiques plus actuelles sont également effleurées. La famille de Zehra, venue de Mardin, semble marquée par la violence de la guerre civile, même si le thème n’est pas clairement abordé. Leur village a été brûlé. Le grand frère de Zehra a péri dans des « affrontements », probablement entre les rebelles kurdes et la police ou l’armée. À la cérémonie de mariage d’Ismail et Zeynep, Zehra prétend qu’elle ne sait plus comment danser, car, dit-elle, elle n’a plus jamais dansé depuis la mort de son grand frère (E12).
Une série littéraire, influencée par la littérature underground
22 À part son projet d’engagement, Kayip Sehir est surtout une série littéraire, qui convoque toute une suite de références proches du courant littéraire des « bas-fonds ». On remarque facilement que le cadre de la série est celui de Rocco et ses frères. Quelques éléments, bien sûr, ont été adaptés : la boxe est remplacée par le football, la famille Topbaş est plus nombreuse, etc. Mais globalement, la série reste un remake, une ré- écriture, s’inscrivant dans un déjà-là littéraire et cinématographique ambitieux, exigeant.
23 La bande musicale est un accord avec les goûts littéraires affirmés des scénaristes : la figure de Sezen Aksu, cette chanteuse idole des années 1990, à l’histoire difficile, et à la carrière interrompue par la drogue, est présente à plusieurs reprises dans la série. D’abord, c’est elle qui en a composé la chanson-thème, qui revient à plusieurs reprises dans la série « Istanbul yokmuş bundan başka » [Il n’y a pas d’autre ville comme Istanbul]. D’autre part, le personnage d’Aysel, la prostituée au grand cœur, qui a souffert dans son enfance, est souvent présenté comme entrant en résonnance avec le personnage de Sezen Aksu. À l’épisode 8 de la série, Aysel manque d’argent. Elle doit rencontrer un client dans un hôtel chic de la ville, qui annule. Tentant de rentrer chez elle, elle
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découvre que le propriétaire, lassé des loyers impayés, a fait changer la serrure de la porte. Aysel revient dans l’hôtel chic ou a été réservée la chambre, commande du champagne, des fraises, et passe la soirée à se prélasser. Elle chante la chanson de Sezen Aksu « Kahpe kader » [Salaud de destin/ chienne de vie], qui comprend les paroles suivantes « si j’ai été heureuse trois jours, je pleure pour trois vies », ce qui correspond au personnage de la série comme à la célèbre chanteuse (E08). Lorsqu’elle retourne dans la maison de son enfance, où elle a été régulièrement abusée par son oncle, Aysel se couche sur le canapé, et on entend résonner une autre chanson de Sezen Aksu « Küçü ğum » [Je suis petite], chanson qui, à l’époque où elle était sortie, avait été interprétée comme un retour de la chanteuse sur son histoire difficile (E09). D’autres chansons de plusieurs autres icônes de la chanson turque engagée, de gauche, viennent former la bande-son de la série : « Gidiyorum » [Je m’en vais] de Kazim Koyuncu, « Yalan da olsa » [Même si c’est un mensonge] de Ahmet Kaya, grande star de la gauche turque – et kurde, puisque le chanteur est lui-même kurde.
24 Le thème de l’amour comme un sentiment porteur de destruction, mais surtout comme une sorte de malédiction, qui frappe aveuglément, est aussi le thème du diptyque cinématographique de Zeki Demirkubuz, Kader [Le destin]8, et Masumiyet [L’Innocence]9. Dans un quartier pauvre d’Istanbul, Bekir, un garçon d’une famille plutôt respectable, rencontre un jour Uğur dans le magasin dans lequel il travaille. Uğur est habillée curieusement et de façon plutôt indécente pour une jeune fille de son âge, et elle n’est pas vraiment belle – cette première scène évoque d’ailleurs celle de L’Amant de Marguerite Duras – mais Bekir tombe furieusement amoureux de Uğur. Uğur, de son côté, aime Zagor, un homme violent, qui a commis plusieurs meurtres et se trouve en prison. Toute sa vie, Uğur la passera à suivre Zagor, qui est transféré de prison en prison. Elle travaille dans des endroits louches, et en se prostituant pour vivre la plupart du temps. Bekir passera la sienne à suivre Uğur qui suit Zagor. Les parents de Bekir, qui font tout pour l’éloigner de Uğur, tentent de le marier, de lui trouver un travail… Mais Bekir finit toujours par fuguer, pour retrouver Uğur. Dans Kayıp Şehir, un personnage évoque clairement celui de Bekir dans le dyptique de Zeki Demirkubuz. Il s’agit du personnage de Ethem, le propriétaire du club de foot, dans lequel joue Irfan, et ex-amant d’Aysel. Ethem, lui aussi, aime Aysel d’un amour désespéré, sans retour. Malgré ses tentatives pour se ranger, son mariage avec une femme convenable, rien n’a jamais fait disparaître son amour pour Aysel. Ethem revient toujours à Aysel, et l’aime d’un amour incurable, même si, lassé d’être éconduit, il aime aussi la faire souffrir.
25 Le thème de l’amour pour une femme de mauvaise vie est d’ailleurs loin d’être étranger à la littérature et au cinéma turc. À l’épisode 24 de la série, alors que Kadir est en train de convoler en noces avec Zehra, la jeune fille respectable, Aysel regarde, chez elle, le film Vesikalı yarim [Ma prostituée bien-aimée] sorti en 1968, et interprété par, entre autres, Turkan Şoray, une actrice célèbrissime du cinéma turc des années 196010. Le film raconte l’histoire d’un homme simple, Halil, primeur dans un quartier d’Istanbul, qui tombe passionnément amoureux d’une chanteuse de cabaret, Sabiha. Halil s’offre le grand amour pendant quelques jours avec Sabiha, mais on comprend à la fin du film que Halil est marié, et il finit par retourner à sa femme et à ses enfants. L’amertume d’Aysel, qui regarde le film au moment où Kadir se marie, est un clin d’œil à un arrière- plan cinématographique. Le film est d’ailleurs tiré d’une nouvelle de Sait Faik Abbasıyanik11, une autre grande figure de la littérature « underground » turque.
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L’Istanbul que décrit l’écrivain est aussi un Istanbul cosmopolite, sale, peuplé d’ivrognes, de pauvres gens et de marginaux, homosexuels, clochards et bons à rien.
26 Enfin, le thème de l’amour interdit va même plonger dans un fonds encore plus ancien. Le titre de l’épisode 14, qui voit naître l’histoire d’amour entre Kadir et Aysel, est « Yusuf et Zuleyha12 » du nom du mythe de l’amour fou entre Youssef, fils de Jacob, et Zoulaikha, la femme de son maître. Tirée d’un verset coranique, l’histoire a été racontée un nombre incalculable de fois, avec plusieurs variantes, par des poètes persans et ourdous, surtout à l’époque médiévale. Kayıp Şehir n’est pas la seule série à convoquer des figures de la littérature médiévale ou mythique. Leyla ile Mecnun, [Leila et le fou], une série de la même époque, reprend un autre mythe, celui de Leila et Qaïs, l’équivalent islamique de Roméo et Juliette. Le mythe de Youssef et de Zoulaikha raconte la vie de Youssef, l’un des fils de Jacob, contre qui ses frères se rebellent parce qu’il est le fils préféré. Youssef est vendu par ses frères comme esclave, et travaille en Égypte dans la maison de Potiphar, un riche maître. La femme de Potiphar, Zoulaikha, aperçoit un jour Youssef et, fascinée par sa beauté, elle tente de le séduire. Zoulaikha est ainsi le symbole de la femme pécheresse, mais aussi la grande amante, l’incarnation de l’amour vrai. Youssef, lui, est la figure de la beauté innocente, envié de tous et surtout de ses frères. L’histoire de Youssef et de Zoulaikha est aussi le parangon de l’amour interdit. À l’épisode 14 de la série, Kadir, qui vient d’embrasser pour la première fois Aysel, passe la nuit dehors, à errer dans les rues. Il y rencontre un clochard, un ivrogne à qui il raconte son histoire avec Aysel. KADIR. Partout où elle pose le pied, il y a un tremblement de terre. Elle passe son temps à se bagarrer avec la vie. Dans ses yeux, des bêtes sauvages s’affrontent […] Moi-même, je me suis mis à ressembler à ces bêtes en me perdant dans le regard d’Aysel. Nous nous sommes embrassés comme des bêtes furieuses. […] J’ai cru que j’essayais de protéger mon frère. Alors que c’est moi qui étais le plus près du gouffre. LE CLOCHARD. Vous êtes devenus Yusuf et Zuleyha. (E14)
27 La forme même de l’échange, la figure du clochard rencontré au hasard des rues, rappelle ici le derviche, le fou de Dieu, qui vit pauvrement, mais de la bouche duquel sort la poésie et la vérité. La plainte de Kadir qui vient de recevoir le baiser d’Aysel, porte également le sceau de l’innocence perdue. « Moi, j’étais pauvre. J’étais ordinaire. Mais j’étais quelqu’un de bien » se lamente Kadir, « ce n’est plus le cas à présent. »
28 C’est peut-être, au-delà des messages de tolérance que porte la série, la force de ce récit : l’arrivée du paysan à la ville est plus qu’une question sociale. C’est aussi le thème littéraire du passage de la nature à la civilisation. Le paysan humble et naïf découvre avec douleur la force, mais aussi le tragique du sentiment amoureux. Alors qu’il se préparait à vivre une vie simple et honnête, épousant une jeune fille que tout lui destinait, sa condition sociale, sa famille, son caractère, il est frappé d’un puissant sortilège : l’amour pour Aysel. Cet amour ébranle et met à mal les règles les plus fondamentales de l’ordre social, la famille et la relation entre frères. C’est en donnant une ré-écriture originale de Rocco et ses frères, mais aussi en puisant abondamment dans la tradition proprement turque de la littérature des bas-fonds, que Kayıp Şehir marque le paysage des séries turques.
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BIBLIOGRAPHIE
ABBASIYANIK Sait Faik (2007), Un homme inutile, préface Rosie Pinhas-Delpuech ; traduction du turc et postface, Alain Mascarou, Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule, Bleu autour.
MARTIN Cilia (2013), « Quand les séries télévisées s’emparent de la transformation urbaine… Ville perdue ? », Dipnot, 4 avril, https://dipnot.hypotheses.org/184, consulté 30 mai 2018.
LE NAOUR Jean-Yves (2013), « 2 - Le Miracle de Plus belle la vie », Plus belle la vie. La boîte à histoires, Jean-Yves Le Naour (éd.), Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 31-50.
TANRIÖVER Hülya Uğur (2004), «La Famille, le quartier et la vie communautaire dans les feuilletons télévisés turcs », Anatolia Moderna/Yeni Anadolu, Türk televizyon dizilerinde, aile, mahalle ve topluluk yaşamı, Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, Adrien Maisonneuve, Paris, p. 225-233.
NOTES
1. Chaîne privée créée en 1993, la chaîne fut un temps la quatrième chaîne la plus regardée de Turquie et c’est encore une chaîne importante, malgré la montée en puissance des chaînes plus proches du pouvoir AKP. Elle appartient au grand groupe de média « Doğan holding », dont le fondateur est Aydin Doğan, un richissime homme d’affaires plutôt d’obédience kémaliste et nullement proche de l’AKP. En avril 2018, le groupe Doğan a été racheté par un groupe proche de l’AKP, Demirören. 2. Pelin Yaşaroğlu, allocution lors du colloque « Les séries télévisées turques (diziler) : production, représentations, réception en Méditerranée », colloque tenu à Paris, 17-18 octobre 2014. 3. L’ancien quartier européen d’Istanbul, qui a été dans les années 2000-2010 le cœur de la nightlife et l’un des endroits à la réputation la plus « moderne » de la ville. 4. Cilia Martin, « Quand les séries télévisées s’emparent de la transformation urbaine… Ville perdue ? », article de blog, 4 avril 2013, Dipnot, https://dipnot.hypotheses.org/184. 5. Jean-Yves LE NAOUR, « 2 - Le Miracle de Plus belle la vie », in Plus belle la vie. La boîte à histoires, éd. Jean-Yves Le Naour, Presses Universitaires de France, 2013, pp. 31-50. 6. Hülya Uğur Tanrıöver, « La Famille, le quartier et la vie communautaire dans les feuilletons télévisés turcs », (Türk televizyon dizilerinde, aile, mahalle ve topluluk yaşamı), Anatolia Moderna / Yeni Anadolu, Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, Adrien Maisonneuve, Paris, 2004, p. 225-233. 7. Entretien avec Hakan Biçakçi (scénariste), le 12/08/2013. 8. Film réalisé par Zeki Demirkubuz en 2006. 9. Film réalisé par Zeki Demirkubuz en 1997. 10. Film de Lütfi Akad, sorti à Istanbul en 1968. 11. Sait Faik Abbasıyanik, Un homme inutile, préface Rosie Pinhas-Delpuech ; traduction du turc et postface, Alain Mascarou, Saint-Pourçain-sur-Sioule, Bleu autour, 2007. 12. NB : nous employons ici la transcription turque de ces noms, et, plus loin, la transcription française, Youssef et Zoulaikha.
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RÉSUMÉS
Cet article analyse une série turque diffusée en 2012-2013 sur Kanal D, Kayıp Şehir [La Ville perdue], qui présente l’originalité d’aborder plusieurs sujets sociaux sur un ton très libre. La dureté des rapports de classe, la violence qui régit les relations entre frères et sœurs, l’homosexualité, la prostitution, le passé discriminatoire de la Turquie vis-à-vis de ses minorités sont traités avec réalisme dans cette série qui s’inspire très largement de thèmes propres à la littérature.
This article analyses, Kayıp Şehir [The Lost City], a TV series broadcasted between 2012 and 2013 in Turkey, on channel Kanal D. What makes this short-lived TV series outstanding is the way it dealt with several sensitive subjects in Turkish society, such as violence inside families, homosexuality, prostitution, and the discriminatory politics of the Turkish state towards its own minorities. These issues were handled with a realistic tone in the series, that is very much inspired by Turkish literary works.
INDEX
Keywords : Turkish series, Kayıp Şehir, literature, underground literature, Turkish television, teaching tolerance, taboos Mots-clés : séries turques, Kayıp Şehir, littérature, littérature underground, télévision turque, éducation à la tolérance, tabous, Turquie
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The Political Potential of Popular Culture in Turkey: The Reading of Three TV Series: Leyla ile Mecnun, Ben de Özledim and Beş Kardeş
Demet Lüküslü
1 In his influential works on popular culture, John Fiske underlines the “political potential” of popular culture. He argues that popular culture “is always, at its heart, political. It is produced and enjoyed under conditions of social subordination and is centrally implicated in the play of power in society1.” Inspired by Fiske’s argument, this paper focuses on the reading of three Turkish television series, Leyla ile Mecnun [Leyla and Mecnun], Ben de Özledim [I Missed You Too], and Beş Kardeş [Five Brothers], and discusses their political potential.
2 These three TV series, directed by the same director, Onur Ünlü2, and featuring the same main group of actors, can also be read as “one” TV series instead of three totally different ones. The journey started with the airing of Leyla ile Mecnun, an absurd comedy, in February 2011, on the public channel TRT1. The show soon became a cult series among the young and succeeded in creating its own jargon and was soon immersed into the youth culture. The series was supposed to continue for a fourth season but was unexpectedly ended right after the Gezi Park protests in 20133. I have argued elsewhere that “in fact, this immersion of the series into the youth culture that turned it into one of the important components of the Gezi Park protests in June 2013[…] brought about the decision of the public channel to not continue the series4.”
3 After the finale of Leyla ile Mecnun, the same team produced another TV series, Ben de Özledim, for Star TV (2013-2014), a private rather than public channel. The series started airing in October 2013 and chronicled the lives of the production crew (including producers, the director and the actors) after the cancellation of the series Leyla ile Mecnun. They all meet together and continue to live different adventures while missing the Leyla ile Mecnun days – hence the title, I Missed You Too. In light of its low
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ratings, the TV series was cancelled after 13 episodes (the last one being aired on 29 January 2014) and thus became a victim of the ratings system.
4 The third TV series Beş Kardeş (Kanal D, 2015), again with the same director and nearly the same acting crew (with the exception of Ali Atay, who played the male lead, Mecnun, in Leyla ile Mecnun, and the inclusion of some important actors in the cast such as Tansu Biçer and Nadir Sarıbacak), started the journey on 16 February 2015 on a private channel, Kanal D. The series was interrupted after five episodes due to low ratings, with the promise of returning in the summer. The series resumed but was once again forced to end due to low ratings after the thirteenth episode on 4 August 2015.
5 Thus, it is possible to underline that Leyla ile Mecnun would probably have had the same short life if it had started its journey on a private channel, which generally gives higher priority to TV ratings, because the series, even though it would emerge as a cult series of the youth culture, never achieved popularity among a general audience. Leyla ile Mecnun was one of the TV series that was popular on the social media but less so according to the ratings. Ali Eyüboğlu, a TV commentator for the Milliyet newspaper, confessed after the ending of the first season, that he never made it through an entire episode, since he did not laugh at absurd comedies. However, he underlined that although the series did not have high ratings, it became a trendy topic after each episode on Twitter. Whenever an online survey was conducted on TV series, Leyla ile Mecnun always had good scores, whereas in the ratings, the series always situated in the middle or towards the bottom of the ratings list. For example, the final episode of the first season had a rating of 0.92 and was 78th overall, and 48th in the AB group (representing educated and high-income earners) with a rating of 1.385.
6 In this article, it will be argued that these three TV series, having indeed close links with each other, create a close contact with the viewers making it possible to observe the interrelationship between the text, the producer and the audience. Secondly, this article will discuss how these TV series resist the dominant systems (both the political system and that of the ratings of the TV world) and demonstrate the potential of TV series to become a force of opposition.
TV series “winking” at its viewers
7 There had been a tradition in the TV sector in Turkey to see the audience as “ignorant” and “passive”. Producers tended to believe that they knew what the audience wanted and it was important to keep the text as simple as possible. A similar debate also exists in television studies among scholars. On the one hand, there is the passive audience approach according to which “the text is seen as monolithic, containing a well-marked preferred meaning making it difficult for alternative meanings to emerge6.” According to the Marxist view of the role of television, “in watching television, people are persuaded to accept a view of society, and of their place in it, that confirms their subordination.” On the other hand, there is “an active audience” approach which “sees the text not as monolithic, with a strong preferred meaning, but rather as polysemic, containing a number of possible meanings and therefore allowing a range of audience interpretations7.” That is why the audience is not passive but active in discussing and analysing the text8.
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8 The three TV series that this article focuses on however claim to address themselves to an “intelligent” and active audience, viewers who are able to understand complicated jokes as well as the references made in the text. Onur Ünlü, the director, said in an interview in 2015 that when he directs movies, he has a fictitious audience in mind. It is an audience of viewers who are cleverer and more intellectual than Ünlü himself; a viewer who is not easy to please. Ünlü said that he produces films for this type of viewer9. It is possible to say he produces TV series with the same audience in mind. The texts of the TV series accordingly are difficult to grasp and full of references that aim to create a dialogue with the viewers.
9 The title Leyla ile Mecnun refers to an ancient Arabian love story, Layla and Mejnun. The series is in fact an absurd comedy and the script writer, Burak Aksak, explains in an interview10 that the question that led him to the idea of such a comedy was: What would it be like if a white-bearded old man (ak sakallı dede) as in fairy tales helped Mecnun in his love affair? In that sense, the series is Mecnun’s story and demonstrates male bonding between Mecnun, Mecnun’s father Iskender, Mecnun’s friend Yavuz, his brother Ismail and the neighborhood grocer, Erdal. The series in fact created a special jargon and expected that viewers learn and understand it. As I argued in a previous work11, since Leyla ile Mecnun was produced for the public channel, TRT1, the producers of the series had to face the censorship of the channel as well as that of the state agency responsible for monitoring, regulating, and sanctioning radio and TV broadcasts in Turkey, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK). Interestingly, the series invented some creative “tactics12” to overcome these difficulties and constraints and created a special jargon in the series in order to refer to banned material such as alcohol, cigarettes, or swearing and cursing.
10 For example, in Leyla ile Mecnun vocabulary: chewing gum represents cigarettes; grapes represent wine; to fall into grapes means to drink wine (to fall into wine); figs (incir) represent rakı13; fruit juice (canned fruit juice wrapped in paper) represents beer (beer wrapped in paper); plums represent tequila, etc. Similarly, since there is censorship on Turkish television as to the use of slang, the TV series chose to create new ways of swearing from the mouths of the characters to overcome this censorship. For instance, shower curtain, bathroom slippers, plastic bags, and holes in socks were all used as swear words. Duş perdesi (shower curtain) was used as a swear word and in the series, it was defined as “disgusting, since it sticks on your back while having a shower; you try to get rid of it and then it becomes even more tangled.” Tuvalet terliği (bathroom slippers) were defined as “yellow plastic low quality slippers, like ugly and dirty bathroom slippers”. Poşet (plastic bags) was also used as a swear word, as a “black, low- quality plastic bag, which is smelly and cancer producing.” Similarly, delik çorap (a hole in a sock) “the hole in your sock that you see after taking off your shoes (especially if you are in someone else’s house)” was used as a swear word. The jargon created by Leyla ile Mecnun thus became popular in the youth culture.
11 The two following series often referred to Leyla ile Mecnun, and both presumed that the viewers were familiar with it and that they would not miss these references. The departure point for Ben de Özledim was in fact the idea of what happened in the lives of the actors and the production team once Leyla ile Mecnun was over. It is also in Ben de Özledim that the viewers learned about how Leyla ile Mecnun would end. Burak Aksak, the script writer, announced in the series that in the final episode of Leyla ile Mecnun, if the series had continued, the spectators would have learned that everything was, in
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fact, in Mecnun’s imagination. Mecnun had an accident and was paralyzed, and the characters were all in his imagination. Once again, the producers of the series chose to transcend the constraints by not rejecting the rules, but by playing within the system and by “winking” at the audience: Leyla ile Mecnun had its final episode in another series.
12 Beş Kardeş in fact started as a separate and different story from Leyla ile Mecnun. It focused on the story of five brothers in their thirties, all single, living in one of the rare mansions (konak) in Istanbul. The first names of the five brothers are all the first names of five important writers in Turkey: Sait (as in Sait Faik Abasıyanık14), Turgut (as in Turgut Uyar15), Nazım (as in Nazım Hikmet16), Orhan as in (Orhan Veli17) and Aziz (as in Aziz Nesin18). Since the series took place in a mahalle (neighborhood), it was also possible to detect a reference to some other important programs in Turkish television history since the mahalle had been the place for other successful series such as Perihan Abla ([Sister Perihan], TRT, 1986-1988), Süper Baba ([Super Dad], TRT, 1993-1997), Bizimkiler [Ours, Our People], TRT1 1989-1994, Star TV 1994-1999, Show TV 1999-2002), etc 19. The last episode of the series ended tragically with the death of the five brothers in a car crash and the music played in this tragic scene was the music of Leyla ile Mecnun.
13 Concerning the political potential of these series, in all three, there were references to political events as well. In fact, departing from the existent tradition of seeing the audience as passive and less intelligent than the producers, the latter were confident that the viewers would catch these references and play an active role in interpreting them. Nicholas Abercrombie argues that “ any full analysis of the relationship of television and society must pay attention to three aspects of text, producer and audience20”, and invites scholars to look in detail at these three aspects in turn. The three series discussed in this article enable one to rethink TV studies literature, which tends to focus on the text, producers and the audience as distinct fields. These three TV series demonstrate how these three can be merged into one. As Abercrombie notes, “[m]ost of the larger questions concerning the social role of television can, in fact, only be satisfactorily tackled by considering the interrelationship of text, producer and audience21.”
14 My previous research showed that popular culture occupies an important place on websites and in comments on the social media by young people22. Intertextuality and the active use of humour are equally important. Moreover, TV series like Leyla ile Mecnun, Ben de Özledim and Beş Kardeş feed the youth culture. Hence, the series jargon is actively used in everyday conversations and references to the series can be found everywhere on the social media.
TV series with political potential
15 As already noted, in his studies on popular culture John Fiske argues the political potential of popular culture. He criticizes radical theorists for underestimating popular forces. According to Fiske, “we can learn at least as much, if not more, about resistances to the dominant ideology from studying popular everyday tactics as from theorizing and analyzing the strategic mechanisms of power23.” Similarly, there is an “underestimation of the amount of social change or progress that popular forces have achieved within and against the system that dominates their social experience24.” The three Turkish TV series in question illustrate well resistance to the dominant ideology
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and popular everyday tactics. It is important to note that the Turkish television sector since the 2000s has experienced an important turning point “in which new regulations, rapid market growth, and political pressures interact with and transform each other25.”
16 Even though Leyla ile Mecnun was aired on a public channel and was exposed to some censorship, the text did not refrain from making references to political debates and criticizing the political system. Interestingly, it was not punished by the state channel until the Gezi Park protests. For example, after the scandalous news about the Minister of the Interior, İdris Naim Şahin, who demanded that one of the citizens welcoming him on his visit to the town of Pasinler do a somersault as a sign of happiness at seeing him, there was a scene in Leyla ile Mecnun (S02, E57) criticizing that incident. Brother Ismail, who constantly searches for jobs but is unable to find one suitable for him, goes to a restaurant for a job interview. The restaurant owner asks questions of prospective workers and asks the man he decided to hire to demonstrate his happiness at finding a job. He said: “Do you want this job so much? How can I know that you want it so much? Stand up and start belly dancing or do a somersault so that I can understand that.” Brother Ismail is furious to hear this and responds: “What are you saying? A somersault! This man wants a job, he is not begging26!” However, it was especially with the support of the production team for the Gezi Park protests and also the utilization of the Leyla ile Mecnun jargon in the protests (demonstrating once again the links between the text, the producers and the audience) and the cancellation of the series that Leyla ile Mecnun had become a symbol of the Gezi Park protests and of political opposition27. In a similar manner, the existent nostalgia for Leyla ile Mecnun also demonstrates a criticism of the cancellation of the series. One also has to note that not only the public channel cancelled the show but also the other private channels were unwilling to air the series as well for rating reasons. In fact, ratings would be the reason for ending Ben de Özledim as well as Beş Kardeş. This also directs the opposition of the program against the rating- base decisions of the TV sector in Turkey.
17 Beş Kardeş is full of “critical” and “oppositional” references as well. To understand this oppositional potential of popular culture, it is important to cite - at least briefly - some examples. Interestingly, the following quotes from the series were turned into captions and shared on the social media, which again shows the interrelationship between the text, the producer and the audience. For instance, it is possible to recognize some references to the corruption charges against the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). These criticisms were especially evident in episode 8 of the series in which the five brothers try to identify the thief who stole their mother’s ring: NAZIM. No there is no excuse for theft. ORHAN. Brother, do you realize in which country we are living? NAZIM. You are right. In this country, one can always find an excuse for theft.
18 Here, the series was making an important reference and criticism of the excuses offered to justify political corruption. The following lines also provided a similar criticism about the situation in Turkey: ORHAN. Where do you think he is going? NAZIM. How do I know? If he stole the ring, he is going to the jewelry store. Look at us! What have they done to the country! We are even suspecting our brother of being a thief.
19 There were also criticisms in the last episode of the new presidential complex of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which has been called a “palace” by the opposition and criticized for
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its luxurious features. In the last episode, Orhan was saying that he bought one glass for 1000 liras, which is à la mode in palaces. Whereas the remark of the other brothers underlines the nonsense in talking about palaces in the 21st century: “We are living in the twenty-first century and you are still talking about palaces.”
20 Apart from these concrete references to the debates in the political culture of Turkey, it is also possible to detect criticisms about the “other” television series with high ratings (which can also be read as a criticism of the ratings-based TV system in Turkey). In an episode (Bes Kardes, E10) in which the five brothers suspect that they have a half- sister and start searching for her, the brothers start wondering whether that sister might be Canan, the fiancé of Sait, the older brother. Nazım’s answer is that this is not very probable, but if that were the case, their television series would have a better rating: SAIT. If […] our sister […] is Canan? NAZIM. Can such a thing happen? What is this? As if this were a television series. SAIT. She is not our sister, right? NAZIM. No brother, it is not possible. If it were the case, it would have been watched much more.
21 The examples from the TV series in fact demonstrate the pleasure in resisting power. John Fiske underlines the pleasure for the subordinate and that “the subordinate may be disempowered, but they are not powerless”: Pleasure for the subordinate is produced by the assertion of one’s social identity in resistance to, in independence of, or in negotiation with, the structure of domination. There is no pleasure in being a “cultural dope”: there is, however, real pleasure to be found in, for example, soap operas that assert the legitimacy of feminine meanings and identities within and against patriarchy. Pleasure results from the production of meanings of the world and of self that are felt to serve the interests of the reader rather than those of the dominant. The subordinate may be disempowered, but they are not powerless. There is a power in resisting power, there is a power in maintaining one’s social identity in opposition to that proposed by the dominant ideology, there is a power in asserting one’s own subcultural values against the dominant ones28.
Conclusion
22 The hashtag opened for the last episode of Beş Kardeş was #Güzelİnsanlar (#BeautifulPeople). This finale started happily with the older brother, Sait’s marriage ceremony to Canan, and their departure on their honeymoon. Once Sait departs, the story starts to turn “tragic” while the four brothers are gradually “tricked” and “robbed” subsequently losing their brother’s fish shop, his prized red delivery truck, and finally their house. Escaping a confrontation with the older brother, they flee to their father’s village. On his return from his honeymoon, Sait learns about what happened and goes to take back his red truck and then heads to the village to find his brothers. He finds them and they begin all to travel back to Istanbul. When Sait was just about to tell his brothers that he knows a way to recapture what they lost, the viewers begin to hear the melancholic music of Leyla ile Mecnun and see the vehicle fall off of a cliff and explode. There are many comments under the hashtag beautiful people all demonstrating shock over the ending of the series. The leading actor, Serkan Keskin, shares from his official twitter account the following phrase on 5 August 2015 (retweeted by 4.7K and declared favorite by 9K), the day of the last episode of the
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series: “Ohh yine kaybettik. Emeği geçen ve yanımızda olan herkese çok teşekkür ederim. (Ohh ([a sigh of relief] we lost again. I would like to thank all those who participated and were with us). These words resume the loss of all these “beautiful people” but also seem to refer to the cruelty of the existing system and the difficulty of “victory”. In other words, it is a relief not to be one of the “winners” of the system.
23 The television story, which started with Leyla ile Mecnun and ended tragically in the third TV series, Beş Kardeş, with the music played in this last scene also underlined the continuity between the series. After this tragic end (of the beautiful people), the question to be asked is: Does this tragic ending also symbolize the end of the journey of the television series that began with Leyla ile Mecnun? Does it also symbolize the impossibility of producing a TV series in this atmosphere of censorship and rating wars? The viewers will have to wait and see.
24 To be continued…
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABERCROMBIE, Nicholas (1996), Television and Society, Cambridge, Polity Press.
BAYTAR, Lora (2012), “Leyla ile Mecnun’un Macerası”, Agos, 17 June http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/ yazi/1699/leyla-ile-mecnunun-macerasi
DE CERTEAU, Michel (1988), The Practice of Everyday Life. Steven Rendall (Trans.), Berkeley, CA, London, University of California Press.
EMRE CETİN, Kumru Berfin (2014), “The ‘Politicization’ of Turkish Televisin Dramas”, International Journal of Communication, 8, p. 2462-2483.
EYÜBOĞLU, Ali (2012), “Leyla ile Mecnun ve Absürt bir Durum!”, Milliyet Cadde, 28 June, http:// cadde.milliyet.com.tr/2012/06/28/YazarDetay/1559736/leyla-ile-mecnun-ve-absurt-bir-durum-
FISKE, John (1997), Television Culture, London, New York, Routledge (first published in 1987 by Methuen & Co. Ltd.).
FISKE, John (1991), Understanding Popular Culture, Boston, Unwin Hyman.
KIRKLAR, Alper (2017), Onur Ünlü: Bir Sürü Endişe, İstanbul, Sel Yayıncılık.
LÜKÜSLÜ, Demet (2015), “Overcoming censorship with creative tactics: The TV series Leyla ile Mecnun as a cult series of the youth culture in Turkey”, French Journal for Media Research, 4.
LÜKÜSLÜ, Demet (2014), “Cyberspace in Turkey: A ‘Youthful’ Space for Expressing Powerful Discontent and Suffering” in Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East, edited by Linda HERRERA and Rehab SAKR, New York: Routledge, p. 76-88.
ÖZER, Eray (2015), “Onur Ünlü: Tembel Gösterip Aşırı Çalışkanlıktan Vuruyor”, Cumhuriyet Sokak, 21 June, p.14-15.
TANRIÖVER, Hülya Uğur (2002), “Türk Televizyon Dizilerinde Aile Mahalle ve Cemaat Yaşamı”, İstanbul Dergisi, 40, p. 93–96.
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TOPYILDIZ, Muhsin (2014), “Bizim imamımız da o çocukları içeri alırdı”, Radikal. 27 February.
“TRT, Bakan Şahin’e ‘takla’ göndermesine ses çıkarmadı”, T24, May 2012, http://t24.com.tr/ haber/trt-bakan-sahine-takla-gondermesi-yapan-ismail-abiye-ses-cikarmadi,203448
NOTES
1. John Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture, Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1991, p.159. 2. For a detailed interview with the director see Alper Kırklar, Onur Ünlü: Bir Sürü Endişe, İstanbul, Sel Yayıncılık, 2017. 3. It is important to note that Leyla ile Mecnun is not the only exception. Among others, special attention should be given to Behzat Ç, another Turkish TV series of political character. Behzat Ç. is a Turkish police series adopted for TV from Emrah Serbes’s books about police officer Behzat Ç. According to Hülya Uğur Tanrıöver’s classification (a classification given in “Turkish TV Series ‘ Diziler’: Production, Representations and Reception in the Mediterranean” Conference in Paris on 17-18 October 2014), the series is an example of a new genre in Turkish TV: series noirs. Emrah Serbes, the writer of the Behzat Ç. character, states in an interview on 18 June 2013 that if Behzat Ç. were a policeman in Taksim during the Gezi Park protests, he would give up his badge and gun and join the protestors. The actors of the series also showed their support for the Gezi Park protests (see “Behzat Ç. Rozetini bırakıp Gezi Parkı’na giderdi”, Tribun dergi, 18 June 2013, http:// www.tribundergi.com/haber/behzat-c-rozetini-birakip-gezi-parki-na-giderdi). The actors of the series showed their support for the Gezi Park protests as well (see “Behzat Ç’den ‘Gezi’ Açıklaması”, Cumhuriyet, 7 June 2013, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/diger/426370/ Behzat_C_den__Gezi__aciklamasi.html). 4. Demet Lüküslü, “Overcoming Censorship with Creative Tactics: The TV Series Leyla ile Mecnun as a Cult Series of the Youth Culture in Turkey”, French Journal for Media Research, no.4, 2015, p. 2. 5. Ali Eyüboğlu, “Leyla ile Mecnun ve Absürt bir Durum!”, Milliyet Cadde, 28 June 2012, http:// cadde.milliyet.com.tr/2012/06/28/YazarDetay/1559736/leyla-ile-mecnun-ve-absurt-bir-durum- 6. Nicholas Abercrombie, Television and Society, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 200. 7. ibid., p. 200-201. 8. According to Nicholas Abercrombie, this debate is quite artificial: “To a very great extent the debate over the active audience is rather artificial. No one will argue for the absolute autonomy of the audience from the text and no one will argue for the absolute power of the text over the audience. Rather the debate is properly about the balance of text, audience and social context, and that is entirely a matter of empirical investigation. Within this debate the essential question concerns the mechanisms by which members of the audience turn a television programme into something recognizable by them - and some of these have been described in this chapter.” Television and Society, Cambridge, Polity Press. 1996, p. 204. 9. Eray Özer, “Onur Ünlü: Tembel Gösterip Aşırı Çalışkanlıktan Vuruyor”, Cumhuriyet Sokak, 21 June 2015, p.15. 10. See Lora Baytar, “Leyla ile Mecnun’un Macerası”, Agos, 17 June 2012, http://www.agos.com.tr/ tr/yazi/1699/leyla-ile-mecnunun-macerasi 11. Lüküslü, 2015. 12. Michel de Certeau distinguishes between “tactic” and “strategy”. He defines tactic as the “art of the weak”, whereas strategy is the “art of the powerful”. According to de Certeau, tactics emerge in a space controlled by the enemy: “It [the tactic] does not, therefore, have the options of planning general strategy and viewing the adversary as a whole within a district, visible, and objectifiable space. It operates in isolated actions, blow by blow […] This nowhere gives a tactic mobility, to be sure, but a mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment, and
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seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment. It must vigilantly make use of the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers. It poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it is least expected. It is a guileful ruse”. See Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life. Steven Rendall (Trans.), Berkeley, CA, London, University of California Press, 1988, p. 37). 13. Rakı is a national alcoholic drink made up of twice-distilled grapes and aniseed, tasting very similar to Greek Ouzo. 14. Sait Faik Abasıyanık (1906-1954) is considered as one of the greatest writers of short stories and poetry in Turkish literature. An important theme in his works was the sea. 15. Turgut Uyar (1927-1985), an important poet in Turkish literature, is especially known for using imagery and complicted figures of speech in his poetry. He was part of an avant-garde movement of the 1950s known as İkinci Yeni (Second New) as an opposition to the simple use of language in the preceding movement of Birinci Yeni (First New). 16. Nazım Hikmet (1902-1963) is considered as one of the greatest literary figures of modern Turkish literature. He was a poet, playwright and novelist and also a Communist who spent considerable time in jail and died in exile. 17. Orhan Veli (1914-1950) was one of the founders (together with Oktay Rıfat and Melih Cevdet Anday) of the Garip Movement known also as the First New in Turkish poetry. The movement was a very important influence in the second half of the 1940s. 18. Aziz Nesin (1915-1995) is one of the most important figures of Turkish literature who published novels, short stories, poems and plays. 19. Hülya Uğur Tanrıöver, “Türk Televizyon Dizilerinde Aile Mahalle ve Cemaat Yaşamı”, İstanbul Dergisi, no. 40, 2002, p. 93–96. 20. Abercrombie, p.205. 21. ibid., p.205. 22. Demet Lüküslü, “Cyberspace in Turkey: A ‘Youthful’ Space for Expressing Powerful Discontent and Suffering” in Wired Citizenship: Youth Learning and Activism in the Middle East, ed. Linda Herrera and Rehab Sakr, New York, Routledge, 2014, p. 81-86 [p. 76-88]. 23. Fiske, p. 187. 24. ibid., p. 187. 25. Kumru Berfin Emre Çetin, “The ‘Politicization’ of Turkish Television Dramas”, International Journal of Communication, no. 8, 2014, p. 2463. 26. For details see, “TRT, Bakan Şahin’e ‘takla’ göndermesine ses çıkarmadı”, T24, May 2012, http:// t24.com.tr/haber/trt-bakan-sahine-takla-gondermesi-yapan-ismail-abiye-ses-cikarmadi,203448 27. It is in fact possible to see a certain continuity between these three television series and the movie directed by Onur Ünlü, İtirazım Var [the name of the movie was translated into English as Let’s Sin, but a word for word translation would be I have an objection]. Ünlü, in a talk during a special screening of the movie on 29 April 2014 in İstanbul, said that if the series had not ended suddenly, he would have waited for some years to make the movie. İtirazım Var was a movie about an « imam » who took on the role of a detective after the killing of a man in his mosque. The imam, who was played by Serkan Keskin, who portrayed the character İsmail Ağbi in L&M, was a critical imam and it was through him that the new Islamic bourgeoisie was being criticised. The reporters asked Onur Ünlü whether the source of inspiration for the movie was the imam who opened the doors of his mosque in Dolmabahçe during the Gezi Park protests to the victims of police brutality. Onur Ünlü answered that the idea of the movie had a long history dating back to before the Gezi Park protests; however, he was sure that “The imam in the movie too would open the doors of his mosque to these young people” (see Mushin Topyıldız, “Bizim imamımız da o çocukları içeri alırdı,” Radikal, 27 February 2014). 28. John Fiske, Television Culture, London, New York, Routledge, 1997 (first published in 1987 by Methuen & Co. Ltd), p. 19.
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ABSTRACTS
Inspired by Fiske’s argument about the political potential of popular culture, this article reads three Turkish television series Leyla ile Mecnun [Leyla and Mecnun], Ben de Özledim [I Missed You Too], and Beş Kardeş [Five Brothers] and discusses their political potential. These three TV series, directed by the same director and featuring the same main cast, can also be read as “one” TV series instead of three totally different ones. It is argued here that these three TV series have close links with each other and created a close contact with the viewers. This is a series that sends a “wink” to the viewers, making it possible to observe the interrelationship between the text, the producer and the audience. Secondly, this article discusses how these TV series resist the dominant systems (both the political system and that of the ratings of the TV world) and demonstrate the potential of TV series to become a force of opposition.
Cet article s’inspire du concept de potentiel politique de la culture populaire, qui a été développé par Fiske. Il discute le potentiel politique de trois séries télévisées, Leyla ile mecnun [Leïla et le fou], Ben de Özledim [Toi aussi tu me manques], et Beş Kardeş [Cinq Frères]. Ces trois séries du même réalisateur, qui ont le même casting pour les rôles principaux, peuvent aussi être lues comme trois versions totalement différentes d’une même série. Cet article montre que ces trois séries ont de nombreux liens entre elles et avec les téléspectateurs. Ce sont des séries qui jouent sur la complicité avec les téléspectateurs, ce qui nous permet d’observer les relations entre le texte, le producteur et l’audience. Plus largement, cet article se penche sur la question de savoir comment ces séries résistent au système dominant (à la fois le système politique et les ratings), et démontre le potentiel des séries pour devenir une force d’opposition.
INDEX
Keywords: TV series, popular culture, political opposition, Turkey, sociology of education, social movements, cultural studies, Internet studies, Ünlü Onur Mots-clés: séries télévisées, culture populaire, opposition politique, Turquie, sociologie de l’éducation, mouvements sociaux, culture studies, études internet, Ünlü Onur
AUTHOR
DEMET LÜKÜSLÜ Demet Lüküslü is an associate professor of Sociology at Yeditepe University, Istanbul, Turkey. She received her PhD in Sociology from École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris, France in 2005. She is the author of Türkiye’de ‘Gençlik Miti’: 1980 Sonrası Türkiye Gençliği [The ‘Myth of Youth’ in Turkey: The Post-1980 Youth in Turkey], İletişim Yayınları, 2009 and of Türkiye’nin 68’i: Bir Kuşağın Sosyolojik Analizi [Turkey’s 68: Sociological Analysis of a Generation], Dipnot Yayınları, 2015. Her areas of research include sociology of youth, sociology of everyday life, sociology of education, social movements, cultural studies and Internet studies.
Demet Lükülü est maître de conférence de sociologie associée à l’université de Yeditepe à Istanbul, en Turquie. Elle a soutenu sa thèse en sociologie de l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) de Paris en 2005. Elle est l’auteur de Türkiye’de ‘Gençlik Miti’: 1980 Sonrası
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Türkiye Gençliği [Le Mythe de la jeunesse en Turquie : le jeunesse turque après 1980], İletişim Yayınları, 2009, et Türkiye’nin 68’i: Bir Kuşağın Sosyolojik Analizi [1968 en Turquie : analyse sociologique d’une génération], Dipnot Yayınları, 2015. Ses thèmes de recherche concernent la sociologie de la jeunesse, la sociologie de la vie quotidienne, la sociologie de l’éducation, les mouvements sociaux, cultural studies et internet studies.
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Diplomatie culturelle et mépris de la culture populaire. La réception critique de Muhteșem Yüzyıl en Roumanie
Jonathan Larcher
1 À l’arrivée de Kanal Doğan, une chaîne turque, dans le paysage médiatique roumain en 2007, les émissions de contenu turc occupent rapidement les prime time de la chaîne, au premier rang desquelles se trouvent les séries télévisées. De septembre 2012 à décembre 2014, Suleyman Magnificul [Muhteșem Yüzyıl (Soliman le magnifique)]1 est très fréquemment leader d’audience à l’échelle nationale. Seulement l’enthousiasme pour la série qui raconte les amours et le long règne du Sultan Soliman 1er (de 1520 à 1566) ne s’étend pas aux autres contenus diffusés par la chaîne, ni nécessairement aux autres diziler (séries ou telenovelas) turques.
2 Au-delà de ces chiffres d’audience, cet article porte sur la réception et l’interprétation de ce succès par les institutions médiatiques roumaines, et en particulier la presse culturelle. Les discours élaborés par ces acteurs dès l’hiver 2012-2013 ont rapidement généré une véritable diplomatie culturelle à l’égard de cette série turque, tout en reproduisant une attitude de dédain qui persiste depuis plus de vingt ans dans les arènes médiatiques à l’égard de la culture populaire et des audiences des telenovelas. L’hypothèse de cette étude est que cette diplomatie culturelle s’explique par le rapport de la presse culturelle à la culture populaire et à une certaine télévision de divertissement, et par la place vacante laissée par les grands récits nationaux de l’époque communiste. Au fil de cette « lutte pour la signification2 » engagée autour du succès de la série, se dessinent la configuration des arènes médiatiques roumaines – leurs tensions, leurs rapports de force – ainsi que la hiérarchie culturelle défendue par les acteurs qui détiennent les positions hégémoniques et légitimes au sein de ces arènes.
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Des grilles de programme de type « latino- américaines »
3 En 2012, la série Suleyman Magnificul s’intègre rapidement à l’environnement télévisuel roumain. Introduite comme un « serial » ou une « telenovela » – le terme « dizi » n’existant pas en Roumanie – Suleyman Magnificaul est diffusé sur un créneau horaire de 20h00 à 22h30, à raison de 100 minutes par épisode.
4 Suite à la libéralisation du marché médiatique en 1992, celui-ci s’est rapidement structuré autour de grands conglomérats détenant des agences de presse, des journaux, des chaînes de radio et de télévision, et depuis le début des années 2000 des régies et des studios. Ce phénomène de concentration s’est accompagné d’une homogénéisation des programmes. Depuis 1997, les chaînes ont adopté des grilles de type « latino- américaine » où les séries TV – des telenovelas importées puis produites localement à partir de 2004 – occupent le prime time des principales chaînes3 . Cette programmation est adoptée par les trois principaux conglomérats de médias privés : Media Pro, Intact, ProSiebenSat.1, et, dans une moindre mesure, par la télévision nationale (Societatea Română de Televiziune). Comme l’indiquent les études annuelles d’Initiative Media, ces groupes concentrent 60 à 55% des audiences – une part qui est en recul depuis plusieurs années avec l’arrivée de chaînes de niches dans l’environnement médiatique roumain – et près de 90% des recettes publicitaires du marché télévisuel4. Pour les audiences, la diffusion de Suleyman Magnificul s’inscrivit donc dans la continuité de leur expérience télévisuelle, structurée en partie par ces grilles de programmation « latino- américaines ».
5 La série turque débarque sur le marché télévisuel roumain dans un contexte où la production des longs formats rencontre des difficultés, après les budgets et les audiences records de la fin de la décennie 2000. La production des telenovelas roumaines est au centre des stratégies de développement des émissions de contenus depuis 2004, dans un marché qui connaît une progression croissante des recettes publicitaires jusqu’en 2009, les annonceurs étant le principal – voir l’unique – source de revenus des groupes télévisuels. Cette même année, les deux principaux conglomérats, Media Pro et Intact, ont produit des telenovelas avec des budgets records. Le premier a produit la telenovela Regina ([La Reine], 2008, 2009), avec des dépenses estimées à 4 ou 5 millions d’euros, et le second a budgétisé une telenovela de 3,5 millions d’euros, pour Fetele marinarului ([ Les Filles du marin], 2009). Dans le contexte de la crise du marché publicitaire au début de l’année 2009 Intact a ainsi revu à la baisse les dépenses et les arcs narratifs de sa telenovela, la réduisant de 120 à 70 épisodes. Dès lors, ces conglomérats se concentrent sur des émissions aux formats beaucoup plus courts ; les sitcoms comme Spitalul de demenţă ([L’Hôpital de folie], 2012-2013, Media Pro) ou les séries au format classique de 45 minutes comme Las Fierbinţi ([ Au village de Las Fierbinţi], 2012-, Media Pro). Pour compléter les grilles de programme, les telenovelas sont alors majoritairement importées. Depuis 2014 et le succès d’audience rencontré par la série Suleyman, les conglomérats médiatiques roumains, ont importé plusieurs séries turques ; Karagül ([La Rose noire], septembre 2014, Pro TV), Sila ([Le Pouvoir du destin], janvier 2015, Pro TV), Adını Kalbime Yazdım ([La Loi du sol], avril 2015, Euforia TV), Asla Vazgeçmem ([ La Prisonnière de l’amour], juillet 2015, Antena 1). Une stratégie rarement payante puisque les diziler furent souvent déprogrammés des chaînes
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principales des conglomérats pour être diffusés sur les chaînes annexes (Acasă TV, Euforia TV).
6 Suleyman magnificul a donc assuré au trust turc Doğan Media Group, représenté en Roumanie par sa chaîne Kanal D, une place parmi les principaux conglomérats autochtones en terme d’audience et de recettes. Son succès est d’autant plus remarquable qu’il eut lieu dans une conjoncture où les régies des médias nationaux peinaient à produire des formats longs.
Engagement des audiences en ligne et réappropriations singulières
7 L’engagement des téléspectateurs sur les réseaux sociaux démontre une véritable maîtrise des conventions génériques et une connaissance des arcs narratifs de la série. De nombreuses conversations s’engagent sur les pages Facebook du serial. Par le partage des images que les acteurs éditent sur leur compte Facebook personnel ou la publication des images des épisodes diffusés ou à venir, les discussions organisées par les administrateurs des pages, les seuls autorisés à publier, sont construites autour des différents personnages. Les discussions et commentaires parmi les plus récurrents accordent une prévalence aux tensions entre les alliances et les filiations au sein de l’univers fictionnel, démontrant que les administrateurs des pages et les audiences assimilent le diziler au genre du mélodrame.
8 Les figures, les motifs et les univers narratifs de la série furent l’objet de plusieurs réappropriations au sein de la culture populaire. Devant le rapide succès du serial, des copies des bijoux portés par les personnages sont commercialisées, et plusieurs ouvrages de littérature populaire étrangère portant sur le couple formé par le sultan Suleyman et l’esclave/sultane Hurrem sont traduits au cours de l’année 20135. Dans la littérature prenant pour objet la culture populaire roumaine, la série est présentée comme une partie intégrante du paysage ; « pendant ma pause je suis sorti rapidement pour aller au Boieru, où je parlais avec Florică le serveur, ou bien on regardait ensemble Suleyman Magnificul, une telenovela turque sur Kanal D6. »
9 La série fait aussi l’objet d’un autre type de réappropriation, par des manelişti, chanteurs de manele, une musique populaire produite exclusivement (à de rares exceptions près) par des musiciens roms, et dont les auditeurs sont aussi bien roumains que roms. Jon Baiat Bun (Jon le bon garçon) compose ainsi le morceau Suleyman7 interprété ensuite par plusieurs chanteurs de la société Golden Boy Society (Alex Valea, Rashid et Ruby). Le clip vidéo présente la vision onirique d’un Suleyman dans un harem moderne, entre fantasmagorie orientale et imaginaire pittoresque du proxénète dealer de drogue8. Comme dans un certain nombre de vidéos de manele contemporaines, Jon Baiat Bun oppose cyniquement ces rêveries, à l’image d’un jeune qui s’est endormi derrière le comptoir d’une pâtisserie, tiré brutalement de sa torpeur par son patron. Cette image d’une domination quotidienne contraste avec l’ensemble du vidéoclip et avec les vers de la chanson qui figurent la puissance économique, sociale et sexuelle du personnage de Suleyman : « Que tu sois heureux man / Que tu n’aies ni chef ni programme / Et que ton prix au gramme fasse la loi / Qu’est-ce t’en dis sur Instagram? », le refrain entonné par une voix féminine (Ruby) reprend ; « Suleyman
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Suleyman / Tu es le grand sultan / Tu jettes de l’argent sur les femmes / Qu’est-ce que je donnerais pour te posséder.»
10 Fort du succès du vidéoclip sur internet, les manelişti sont invités à participer à des courts métrages et interviennent sur les plateaux télévisés d’émissions de divertissement9. Cette circulation transmédiatique s’inscrit dans l’histoire visuelle du genre musical manele, dont les musiciens et la forme des clips musicaux sont depuis 2010 repris dans des émissions de la télévision mainstream 10. Cette stratégie des principaux conglomérats à l’égard des contenus manele s’explique par un environnement médiatique qui depuis 2008 voit une partie importante des audiences se désintéresser des chaînes principales pour se tourner vers des programmes plus « spécialisés »11, notamment celles diffusant des vidéoclips de muzică populară (Favorit, Etno TV) et de manele (Taraf TV, Mynele TV), qui ont connu une augmentation importante de leur audience12. Cette réappropriation du manele par la télévision mainstream fait écho aux ré-emplois et remixs des musiques manele par les amateurs des années 2000 ; un phénomène qui participa à la formation d’une culture musicale, visuelle et numérique des internautes en Roumanie. Ces stratégies convergent par ailleurs avec celle des manelişti qui depuis 2013 remixent, avec l’ironie inhérente au genre13, les figures pittoresques et exotiques du moyen Orient (Dubaï, Égypte). La production de Golden Boy Society est à la fois le ré-emploi d’une figure populaire, mais aussi une réponse à d’autres manelişti qui ont introduit depuis l’automne 2013 ces altérités spéculaires dans les productions manele.
Histoire des « fictions patrimoniales » cinématographiques et télévisuelles en Roumanie
11 Face à ces formes de réappropriations et à la circulation des motifs de la série au sein de la culture populaire, les revues culturelles sortent de leur silence. Pour la première fois depuis l’adoption des grilles de programmation « latino-américaines », les revues culturelles et la presse spécialisée prennent pour objet les feuilletons télévisés. Elles se mobilisent pour traiter du succès de Suleyman Magnificul en comparant tout d’abord les productions turques et les telenovelas nationales. À cette fin, la question du genre télévisuel acquière une place centrale dans la discussion.
12 Or, quand la presse roumaine s’intéresse au « phénomène » Suleyman, elle mobilise des conventions génériques très différentes. Les publications en ligne des revues culturelles – Dilema Veche [Le Vieux dilemme], Historia (un mensuel de vulgarisation historique) – et des quotidiens – Adevărul [La Vérité], Gândul [La Pensée], Jurnalul Naţional [Le Journal national] – qui portent sur la série, donnent deux raisons au succès du diziler. L’importance des audiences, inédite depuis Inimă de ţigan ([Cœur de tsigane], Media Pro, 2007-2008), tranche avec celle des autres séries turques en raison des « conventions génériques » employées par Suleyman, et de la piètre qualité des productions roumaines qui n’élaborent plus de telles « fictions patrimoniales14 » : En regardant les autres faire leurs images, et gagner de l’argent avec ça, tu as envie de taper du poing sur le sol et crier: « Mais notre histoire qu’est-ce qu’elle a ? Pourquoi nous ne faisons pas pareil ? » […] Nous avons nous aussi notre lot d’intrigues et de luttes pour le pouvoir, nous avons des seigneurs courageux, des prétendants envieux, des commandants méritoires, des boyards perfides […]. Mais de tels sujets ne passionnent pas les producteurs. Ils fonctionnent selon le principe
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que c’est notre présent et non notre passé qui est glorieux. Alors, il ne faut pas s’étonner que nos telenovelas se nomment Inimă de ţigan 15. 13 Dans une émission web Dezbatere Historia, organisée en partenariat par le mensuel Historia et le quotidien Adevărul, les commentaires des utilisateurs se font l’écho des propos tenus par Ion M. Ioniţă, qui est ici le modérateur de l’émission : Nous ne savons pas utiliser Vlad Ţepeş [associé en Occident à Dracula]. Nous pourrions emprunter l’idée aux Turcs ! […] Nous avons nous aussi des histoires qui peuvent devenir virales en Occident, [ou encore] Nous devons exploiter ce que nous avons de beau et intéressant, autant dans la nature que dans l’histoire ! Malheureusement, nous regardons des films avec des Tsiganes parvenus, ce qui fait que les étrangers assimilent les Roumains à des Tsiganes. […] Nous avons besoin de films d’inspiration historique ou qui promeuvent les traditions ou les beautés naturelles de ‘notre’ pays16.
14 Pour comprendre ces propos il faut resituer les telenovelas dans une histoire longue des industries culturelles roumaines.
15 L’histoire du cinéma roumain est marquée par les conventions génériques des « fictions patrimoniales ». Ces dernières apparaissent dès le début du cinéma roumain. Independenţa României ([L’Indépendance de la Roumanie], Demetriade, 1912), premier film roumain, est une ode à la gloire du roi Carol Ier et un hymne aux soldat-paysans roumains qui ont combattu pour l’indépendance de la Roumanie en 1877 contre l’armée ottomane conduite par Osman Pacha. Suite à la nationalisation de l’industrie cinématographique en 1948, ces grands récits connaissent une fortune particulière avec l’ouverture des Studios d’État à Buftea en 1959. Après la relative « libéralisation culturelle » du champ cinématographique au début des années 1960, les acteurs politiques, les élites intellectuelles et les cinéastes exploitent le « concept « d’épopée nationale », vu comme un ample projet cinématographique de restitution de l’histoire roumaine17.» À ce propos Katherine Verdery notait que dans le courant de cette décennie « le parti a été ‘forcé’ de pénétrer sur le terrain des valeurs nationales sous la pression des intellectuels, qui ne pouvaient pas être mobilisés autrement, la Nation étant un symbole-clé de leur univers culturel18. » Lors de la décennie suivante, suite au durcissement des politiques culturelles, « le film historique devient une sorte de lieu de rencontre entre les directives formulées au niveau du parti et l’initiative ‘d’en bas’ des créateurs et des bureaucrates19.» Le cinéma roumain produit alors un très grand nombre de fictions patrimoniales qui couvrent une période du royaume des Daces (Ier siècle ap. J-C.) au début du XIXme. Indépendamment du genre, ces films ré-emploient de nombreux symboles historiques nationaux et partagent souvent un même arc narratif, la libération de la Nation Roumaine du joug des empires romains, russes, ottomans, et une glorification du peuple et de ses leaders charismatiques.
16 Toutes ces fictions patrimoniales disparaissent avec la chute du communisme. De 1990 à 2016, les films de patrimoine se limitent le plus souvent à la période du communisme – revisitée de manière critique par les cinéastes de la « nouvelle vague ». Cette « panne » des cinéastes est à situer également dans le contexte d’une précarité des moyens et des infrastructures de production et de diffusion cinématographique en Roumanie. Sur la période la plus récente (2009-2016), la production annuelle oscille entre onze et vingt-sept films (en comptant les co-productions). Les films roumains ne représentent ainsi que 9 à 13,6% des sorties nationales, dans un contexte marqué par la diffusion des productions américaines et un taux de fréquentation qui progresse légèrement de 0,4 à 0,7 entrées par habitant (en France il est de 3,2)20. Les grands récits
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nationaux cinématographiques rencontrent difficilement leur public en Roumanie. L’espoir pourrait être qu’ils soient devenus télévisuels. Seulement, les quelques « fictions patrimoniales » télévisuelles qui voient le jour se soldent par des échecs d’audience au regard des importantes sommes engagées, et leurs productions s’arrêtent au bout de la première saison. C’est le cas d’Aniela ([Aniela], 2009-2010) produite par le groupe Media Pro avec un budget record. De fait, comme nous l’avons déjà vu, les séries et les telenovelas à succès n’empruntent pas aux conventions génériques de la fiction patrimoniale. Elles relèvent davantage du mélodrame, Inimă de ţigan, du sitcom, Spitalul de demenţă, ou de la comédie, Las Fierbinţi.
Une réception symptomatique du rapport de l’élite culturelle et citadine à la culture populaire
17 Derrière cette comparaison avec les séries roumaines et l’insistance à rattacher la série turque à un genre transmédiatique différent de celui que les audiences ont identifié se cachent en réalité deux thèmes centraux du discours de la presse quotidienne et culturelle ; l’identité nationale roumaine, en panne de grands récits historiques, et la hiérarchie culturelle, ce qu’il est de bon goût de regarder.
18 Si dans l’ensemble la série Suleyman bénéficie d’une plus grande attention médiatique que les séries roumaines à succès des années précédentes, toutes les revues culturelles ne sortent pas pour autant de leur silence. Sur la période de diffusion de la série, de septembre 2012 à décembre 2014, la série est mentionnée dans seulement quelques articles de la revue hebdomadaire Cultura (dans les rubriques « culture anthropologique »), tandis que d’autres publications, comme Vatra, ignorent simplement le « phénomène ». En définitive, ce sont surtout les publications du conglomérat Adevărul Holding (le quotidien Adevărul, l’hebdomadaire Dilema Veche, et le mensuel Historia) qui se sont penchées sur le succès de la série.
19 Depuis le milieu des années 2000, les informations fournies par la presse quotidienne sur les telenovelas roumaines et étrangères à succès sont toujours classées dans la rubrique people, avec des nouvelles des acteurs et actrices, ou se contentent de relever l’audience des différentes émissions et séries. La telenovela Suleyman Magnificul fait également l’objet d’un tel traitement dans les médias d’information. Les publications du quotidien Gândul sont en ce sens relativement similaires à la manière dont les séries télévisées étaient jusqu’alors discutées par les médias. Les articles publiés sur le site internet mentionnant la série (42) sont classées dans la rubrique consacrée aux images de la série sur les réseaux sociaux et internet (7), dans la rubrique « Magazin », avec une focale portée sur les vedettes de Suleyman (24), et dans la rubrique « Ştiri » [News] pour les informations plus factuelles : audience, changement d’horaires, reprise des épisodes, ou plus étonnant la mention des déguisements inspirés de la série dans le carnaval de Mamaia, organisé par une personnalité politique fantasque (9). Deux mentions sont faites dans des articles portant sur des sujets de politiques internationales (turques). Sur la période de diffusion de la série, de septembre 2012 à décembre 2014, les proportions sont relativement identiques pour les publications de Jurnalul Naţional.
20 Dans Adevărul, la grille de lecture utilisée est différente. Les raisons du succès de la série sont interrogées et forment le sujet principal de plusieurs articles, une première pour
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la presse d’information. En effet, après la révolution de 1989, l’élite intellectuelle et les journalistes ont fondé leur vocation sur les modèles respectifs du « gardien des valeurs culturelles » et du « journaliste-sauveur21. » Si cette dernière figure s’est estompée au cours de la décennie 2000, le champ journalistique – en particulier les revues culturelles – a néanmoins conservé la première figure pour sa fonction auto- légitimatrice22. Tout au long de ces années, les séries et les émissions de divertissement furent considérées comme des formats populaires, et donc inconséquents. La seule télévision qui méritait d’être discutée était celle des journaux télévisés et des émissions politiques. Cet esprit corporatiste explique la mobilisation des historiens et chercheurs en sciences sociales, des experts du monde ottoman, et des analystes médias par la presse quotidienne pour éclairer les raisons du succès de Suleyman Magnificul.
21 Enfin, dernier changement notoire ; le storytelling autour de la série ne se limite pas aux publications du Doğan Media Group. Une pratique qui se démarque de l’attitude des conglomérats médiatiques qui, jusqu’en 2012, développent un storytelling autour des telenovelas à succès sur leurs plateformes (site internet, émission de divertissement, presse d’information) et autour des acteurs enrôlés pour leurs séries. Dans le cas d’ Inimă de ţigan, en valorisant les vedettes et acteurs qui ont émergé par les productions du groupe, Media Pro a ainsi développé la telenovela au sein des différentes émissions de contenu comme une même franchise, dans « le désir d’intensifier la loyauté des publics23. »
22 Jusque là, cette mobilisation exceptionnelle peut donner l’impression que Suleyman Magnificul a contribué à une plus grande légitimité des séries télévisées au sein des arènes médiatiques et culturelles. Toutefois, et de manière contrintuitive, les publications ne légitiment nullement le genre télévisuel. Les références à la série obéissent en réalité à de simples stratégies éditoriales.
23 Quelques articles utilisent le terme « Suleyman Magnificul » pour présenter des éléments de l’histoire et de la culture roumaines. Ainsi la découverte de ruines du XVIme siècle à Timişoara est intitulée : « Découverte surprenante sous la mosquée de Suleyman le Magnifique » [Moscheea lui Suleyman Magnificul, descoperită în centrul Timişoarei24]. La série est ici instrumentalisée comme un marqueur de la culture populaire permettant d’attirer du lectorat vers des contenus – art, histoire, culture – moins « attractifs » que les faits divers et les rubriques people.
24 Le titre de la série fait aussi l’objet d’instrumentalisations pour rendre visibles certains faits divers : « Armani, ‘Le prince des Ţigani’ a été baptisé revêtu d’or comme Suleyman Magnificul » [Armani, ‘Prinţul ţiganilor’, a fost botezat îmbrăcat în aur, ca Suleyman25]. De la même façon, un titre comme « Un pays de Solimans magnifiques » [O ţară de Suleymani Magnifici26] est utilisé pour parler de l’attitude ubuesque du maire de Constanţa, déguisé en sultan pour le carnaval qu’il organise dans sa municipalité. Les blogs du site Adevărul , ou les articles des journaux Gândul et Jurnalul Naţional ont fréquemment utilisé la série comme une simple référence culturelle pour présenter des faits divers relevant de la culture populaire (ou rurale). Les termes employés dans certaines dépêches illustrent parfaitement le dédain pour le « manque de culture » du monde rural : « Galerie photo : les habitants d’une commune de Caraş-Severin se sont déguisés comme des personnages de la série Suleyman Magnificul à l’occasion du Lăsata Secului (une fête qui marque le commencement du carême) “N’aurait-il pas plutôt fallu quelque chose de traditionnel ? C’est hideux !” » [Galerie foto – Locuitorii unei comune din Caraş-Severin s-au costumat de Lăsata Secului27].
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25 Au-delà de ces instrumentalisations, ce brusque intérêt pour la série a particulièrement porté sur l’authenticité de la reconstruction historique proposée par les producteurs de la série : les modes vestimentaires, la culture matérielle du XVIme siècle, etc. Le numéro d’Historia accorde une place importante à une étude critique de l’authenticité des représentations proposées par la telenovela. Experts et historiens sont donc mobilisés à l’occasion pour discuter de ce « que l’on n’a pas vu à l’écran » et présenter ainsi « le vrai visage de Roxelana et de l’influence du harem28 » [Dezbatere Historia : Suleyman Magnificul, ce nu aţi văzut în film. Adevărata faţă a Roxelanei şi influenţa haremului]. Le compte rendu que fait le journaliste des propos d’une historienne médiéviste, Paraschiva-Victoria Batariuc, est tout à fait révélateur de l’attitude des journalistes à l’égard des séries télévisés, ici assimilées à des telenovelas : D’un appartement d’un immeuble de Suceava, une ville assiégée et conquise en 1538 du sultan portraituré dans la telenovela turque, Mme Batariuc regarde Suleyman Magnificul avec les yeux d’une docteure en histoire médiévale. À plusieurs reprises, l’intrigue larmoyante emporte son attention, les dialogues, les images en couleurs, les jolis personnages l’amusent, mais immédiatement, la médiéviste se ressaisit, se révolte et sanctionne ce qu’elle considère comme de grosses bourdes, [de la part] des scénaristes de ce film historique29 .
26 Ailleurs, un journaliste décrit dans des mots relativement semblables l’attitude d’une téléspectatrice : « Bien qu’elle n’ait pas suivi la série depuis le début, Elena Paraschiv, une téléspectatrice de 68 ans a été ‘corrompu’ [coruptă] par les intrigues turques qui relisent une partie de l’hisoire du XVIme siècle30. » Ces deux descriptions discréditent une expérience télévisuelle commune, considérée sans intérêt pour comprendre l’engouement des audiences et relevant surtout la manipulation opérée par le « réalisme émotionnel » de la telenovela et le « système de relations psychologiques entre les personnages qui ferait écho aux relations effectivement vécues par [les téléspectateurs]31. » La seule raison légitime de suivre la série tient aux motifs et figures historiques présentés.
27 Ainsi, pour le champ journalistique, le succès de la série ne s’explique pas en fonction de la qualité des arcs narratifs ou du jeu des acteurs, même si la qualité des décors et des productions des studios turcs est parfois évoquée par des anthropologues et observateurs de la société turque. La fortune de la telenovela se comprend en raison des composantes de l’identité nationale roumaine. Pour reprendre les termes de Iulian Comănescu, un analyste des médias, cités dans le journal Adevărul : « Kanal D a exploité intelligemment un type d’ethos que l’on retrouve sur Etno TV et Taraf TV. Et cela fonctionne très bien, parce que nous avons un ego balkanique et une identité paysanne32 » ([De ce are succes Suleyman Magnificul], Adevărul, 28 mars 2013).
Conclusion
28 Les acteurs médiatiques ont produit trois types de discours en réponse au succès de la série turque. Après avoir constaté la panne des grands récits nationaux, ils ont utilisé les intérêts de la culture populaire pour mettre en valeur des éléments de la (haute) culture roumaine et ont produit une grille de lecture qui distingue le bruit du signal ; les bonnes choses à regarder des intrigues sirupeuses qui distraient l’attention. Ce contre-discours des médias d’information, opposé à la pratique des audiences et des producteurs de la telenovela constitue une véritable diplomatie culturelle. Elle est en somme le dernier avatar d’une longue tradition de déconnexion des « médias
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bourgeois » à l’égard des pratiques de la culture populaire, et dans ce cas, des usages des images.
29 Cette diplomatie culturelle – élaborée avec beaucoup de sérieux est également élaborée sur le mode de la satire dans des émissions télévisées de divertissement. L’équipe d’ Icomedy de Antena 1 a ainsi produit un court métrage opposant dans une « bataille de rimes » Soliman le Magnifique et Vlad Ţepeş (Vlad III l’Empaleur, duquel Bram Stoker s’est inspiré pour le personnage de Dracula). VLAD ȚEPEȘ. Je suis Vlad l’Empaleur né à Sighişoara / Et j’ai terrorisé tout le pays / Vlad Dracula était mon père / Ma mère me disait “va au diable” [Dracu’] quand elle m’envoyait le voir / Beaucoup m’appelait Dracula, y’a de quoi avoir peur / Tu sais que j’ai régné trois fois ? / Personne n’échappait à ma colère / Viens-là le Turc, je t’attends avec mon pal ! SULEYMAN. Salut Ţepes, ton ennemi te parle / Les hommes m’appellent “Sully” et les femmes “le Magnifique” / Tu étais le meilleur en Roumanie il y a de ça des siècles / Mais aujourd’hui, tu es périmé, le deal a changé / Lacrimi de iubire [une telenovela] ou Inimă de ţigan font moins d’audience que moi […] / J’ai autant de filles dans mon harem que toi d’années de règne / Je suis un sex-symbol, et je suis maintenant au pouvoir […] VLAD ȚEPEȘ.Tu crois Sully qu’un homme me fait peur / Toi qui viens d’un pays où tout le monde mange du loukoum / Moi, j’ai construit un pays qui est en Occident ! / Le tien était célèbre pour les jeans et les cigarettes / Toi tu as peut-être un film / Mais Bram Stoker a écrit un livre sur moi […] […] SULEYMAN. […] Toute la Roumanie se souvient à peine de toi / Mais moi, ils me suivent “non-stop” / Un Roumain sur trois est fan de moi / Ils crient comme dans Dallas quand passe Suleyman / Quand commence un épisode, tous sont rivés à l’écran […] / Tu es un vampire, mais Suleyman est une star / Je suis à la télé et toi dans les livres d’histoire !
30 Diffusée à la télévision et postée le même jour sur le compte Youtube de la chaine33, la courte vidéo reprend toutes les composantes de cette diplomatie culturelle élaborée par les acteurs médiatiques. Elle reproduit le constat ironique, et presque autocritique, de l’état des narrations patrimoniales roumaines, qui, quand elles ne sont pas en panne, sont toujours le fait d’étrangers (Bram Stoker et dans une certaine mesure, la telenovela turque). Cette remarque est l’occasion de revenir également sur l’inscription ambiguë de la Roumanie dans cette zone de l’Europe orientale ou balkanique. À l’image de ce contre-discours médiatique, la vidéo esquisse un rapport nationaliste à la culture populaire et plus généralement à la hiérarchie culturelle.
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Discographie
Jon Baiat Bun, Suleyman, Cat Music / Golden Boy Society, 5 août 2014.
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« De la Suleyman Magnificul la Inimă de ţigan », Historia.ro, 08 janvier 2014, http://www.historia.ro/ exclusiv_web/general/articol/suleyman-magnificul-inim-igan. Page consultée le 15 mai 2014.
« Dezbatere Historia : Suleyman Magnificul, ce nu aţi văzut în film. Adevărata faţă a Roxelanei şi influenţa haremului », Adevărul, émission enregistrée le 13 décembre 2013, http://adevarul.ro/ cultura/istorie/suleyman-magnificul-dezbatere-historia-8_52aac363c7b855ff56ac46c3/ index.html. Page consultée le 04 avril 2014.
« Galerie foto - Locuitorii unei comune din Caraş-Severin s-au costumat de Lăsata Secului în personajele din „Suleyman Magnificul”. „Nu ar fi trebuit să fie ceva tradiţional? E hidos! », Gândul, 25 mars 2013, http://www.gandul.info/magazin/locuitorii-unei-comune-din-caras- severin-s-au-costumat-de-lasata-secului-in-personajele-din-suleyman-magnificul-nu-ar-fi- trebuit-sa-fie-ceva-traditional-e-hidos-video-10687821. Page consultée le 18 août 2015.
« Moscheea lui Suleyman Magnificul, descoperită în centrul Timişoarei », Gândul, 20 décembre 2013, http://www.gandul.info/magazin/moscheea-lui-suleyman-magnificul-descoperita-in- centrul-timisoarei-11797356. Page consultée le 20 août 2014.
« O ţară de Suleymani Magnifici », blog Adevărul, 28 mars 2013, http://adevarul.ro/news/ eveniment/o-tara-suleymani-magnifici-1_5154722300f5182b855e0efd/index.html. Page consultée le 13 août 2015.
« Serialul Suleyman Magnificul, la testul istoricilor: “Cadanele nu purtauhaine de inspiratie veneţiana” », Adevărul, 18 janvier 2013, http://adevarul.ro/entertainment/tv/video-serialul- fenomen-suleyman-magnificul-testul-istoricilor-1_50f95cfa51543977a97675ad/index.html. Page consultée le 03 août 2014.
NOTES
1. Le titre turc, Muhteşem Yüzyıl [Le Siècle magnifique] fait allusion à Soliman le Magnifique. C’est ce qui explique que le titre roumain reprenne directement le nom de Soliman, avec Suleyman Magnificul. Mais il s’agit de la même série. 2. Stuart Hall, Identités et Cultures 2. Politiques des différences, traduit de l’anglais par Aurélien Blanchard et Florian Voros, (édition établie par Maxime Cervulle), Paris, Éditions d’Amsterdam, 2013, p. 249. 3. Ioan Drâgan et Valentina Marinescu , « La télévision roumaine en quête d’identité et d’équilibre », in Télérévolutions culturelles. Chine, Europe centrale, Russie, éd. Kristian Feigelson et Nicolas Pélissier, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1998, p. 229-247, [p. 232]. ; Voir aussi Georgiana Lucía Dragota, « Construcciones de la identidad étnica en la narrativa de ficción televisiva rumana », Revista Comunicación, n°10, vol.1, 2012, p. 464-478. 4. Les mesures d’audience et les performances publicitaires citées dans le présent article sont issues des différents numéros du Media Fact Book publiés par Initiative Media.
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5. Sur les cinq ouvrages, un seul est le fait d’un historien turc spécialiste de l’empire Ottoman ; Erhan Afyoncu, Suleyman Magnificul şi sultana Hurrem [Soliman le Magnifique et la sultane Hurrem], Bucureşti, Corint, 2013 (2011), traduit du turc par Leila Unal. Les autres sont des ouvrages de littérature populaire, la plupart publiés depuis plus d’une décennie en « occident » : Alain Paris, Ultimul vis al lui Suleyman [Le Dernier rêve de Soliman], Bucureşti, Editura Orizonturi, 2013 (1999), traduit en français par Diana Morăraşu ; Isaure de Saint Pierre, Suleyman Magnificul şi sultana Hürrem [Suleyman le Magnifique et la sultane Hurrem], Bucureşti, Editura Orizonturi, 2013 (2002), traduit en français par Mihnea Columbeanu, Corina Dragomir et Mariana Cabalorta ; Jean-Michel Thibaux, Rivala din harem (vol.1) [La Rivale du harem], Bucureşti, Editura Orizonturi, 2013 (2002) traduit en français par Nicolae Constantinescu ; Jean-Michel Thibaux, Suleyman, Hurrem şi printesa venetiana (vol.2) [Soliman, Hurrem et la princesse vénitienne], Bucureşti, Editura Orizonturi, 2013 (2003), traduit en français par Nicolae Constantinescu. 6. Adrian Schiop, Soldaţii. Poveste din Ferentari, Iaşi, Polirom. 2013, p.15 7. Cat Music / Golden Boy Society, 2014 8. Jon Baiat Bun, Suleyman, clip vidéo posté le 04 août 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=fS0Ao8FMRA8 [page consultée le 19 octobre 2014]. 9. Cronica Cârcotaşilor, 05 novembre 2014 10. Jonathan Larcher, « Partitions chromatiques et convergence des discours médiatiques : l’altérité imaginaire des figures tsiganes à la télévision roumaine », Émulations, numéro « Médias et identités », 2015, p. 101-110 11. L’enquête 2008 conduite par Initiative Media S.A. informait déjà que plus de « 48% du public arrivait à saturation » et se désintéressait des chaines “principales”, nombre d’entre elles dépassaient le seuil légal de minutes de publicité par heure ; Initiative Media S.A., Media Fact Book Romania 2008, Bucharest, 2008, p…. 12. Alexandra Urdea, « Folklore Music on Romanian TV. From State Socialist Television to Private Channels », Journal of European Television History and Culture, vol.3, n°5, 2014, p. 35-49 13. Victor A. Stoichiţă « The Boyar in the Helicopter : Power, Parody and Carnival in Manea Performances », in Manele in Romania: Cultural Expression and Social Meaning in Balkan Popular Music, éd Margaret Beissinger, Anca Giurchescu et Speranţa Rădulescu, Maryland, Scarecrow press, 2016, p. 163-184. 14. Pierre Beylot et Raphaelle Moine, (éd) Fictions patrimoniales sur grand et petit écran. Contours et enjeux d’un genre intermédiatique, Pessac, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, Collection Cinéma(s) 2009. 15. “De la Suleyman Magnificul la Inimă de ţigan”, Historia.ro, 08 janvier 2014 16. Commentaires de l’émission : « Dezbatere Historia : Suleyman Magnificul, ce nu aţi văzut în film Adevărata faţă a Roxelanei şi influenţa haremului », Adevărul, 13 décembre 2013. 17. Aurelia Vasile, Le Cinéma roumain dans la période communiste. Représentations de l’histoire nationale. Thèse de doctorat en histoire sous la direction de Serge Wolikow et Lucian Boia, Université de Bourgogne, Université de Bucarest. 2011, p. 573-574. 18. Vasile, p.36. À propos de Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism, Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania, University of California Press, 1991. 19. Vasile, p.576 20. Ces données sont produites par le Centrul Național al Cinematografiei et sont consultables en ligne : http://cncold.gov.ro/?page_id=442 21. Mihai Coman, « Les Nouveaux professionnels de la presse roumaine. Doutes et rêves de journalistes à la recherche de leur identité » in Télérévolutions culturelles : Chine, Europe centrale, Russie, éd. Kristian Feigelson et Nicolas Pélissier, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1998, p. 183-200, [p. 195-197].
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22. Mihai Coman, « Media Bourgeoisie and Media Proletariat in Post-Comunist Romania », Journalism Studies, vol.5, n°1, 2004, p. 45-58. 23. Henry Jenkins, « La Licorne origami contre-attaque. Réflexions plus poussées sur le transmédia storytelling », Terminal, Dossier « Le Transmedia Storytelling », Traduction de l’anglais par Mélanie Bourdaa, n°112, 2013, p. 11-28, [p. 13]. 24. Gândul, 20 décembre 2013 25. Gândul, 22 juin 2013 26. blog Adevărul, 28 mars 2013) 27. Gândul, 25 mars 2013 28. Adevărul, 13 décembre 2013 29. (« Serialul Suleyman Magnificul, la testul istoricilor: “Cadanele nu purtauhaine de inspiratie veneţiana” », Adevărul, 18 janvier 2013 30. « De ce are succes Suleyman Magnificul », Adevărul, 28 mars 2013 31. Jean-Pierre Esquenazi fait ici référence aux observations de Ien Ang sur son étude de la réception de la série Dallas et son concept de réalisme émotionnel dans Watching Dallas : Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination, Londres, Methuen & Co, 1985 [1982]. Jean-Pierre Esquenazi, « Séries télévisées et « réalités » : les imaginaires sériels à la poursuite du réel » in Décoder les séries télévisées, éd Sarah Sepulchre, Bruxelles, De Boeck, coll. Info Com, 2011, p.210. 32. « De ce are succes Suleyman Magnificul », Adevărul, 28 mars 201 33. Icomedy, « Bătălia în Rime! Suleyman Magnificul vs. Vlad Țepeș », vidéo postée le 20 décembre 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rM3ezmxGS3U [page consultée le 20 août 2014].
RÉSUMÉS
De 2005 à 2012, l’espace médiatique roumain est marqué par un grand contraste entre le succès d’audience des telenovelas nationales et le relatif silence qui entoure ce phénomène dans la presse quotidienne, la presse culturelle et les différents médias télévisés. C’est avec la diffusion de la série turque Suleyman magnificul [Muhteșem Yüzyıl (Soliman le magnifique)] sur les écrans roumains à l’automne 2012, que ces acteurs médiatiques nationaux vont se débarrasser de leur mutisme. Sans aucune concertation, ils opposent dès lors une véritable diplomatie culturelle contre les récits de la telenovela et l’engouement qu’elle suscite. Constatant la panne des grands récits nationaux et des fictions patrimoniales, critiques et journalistes révèlent par la même occasion le “nationalisme” latent et intrinsèque au rapport des élites à la culture populaire en Roumanie et l’inscription ambiguë de la Roumanie dans cette zone de l’Europe orientale ou balkanique.
From 2005 to 2012, a flagrant difference existed between the successful audience ratings of nationally produced telenovelas and the silence of the Romainian media (daily newspapers, cultural magazines or televised reports) to comment on this success. When broadcasts of the Turkish series Suleyman magnificul [the Turkish title, Muhtessem Yüzyil (The Magnificent Century)] began in 2012, the national media came out of its silence. Absent any concertation, they all immediately directed a sort of cultural diplomacy against the telenovela narratives as well as against TV viewer enthusiasm for the show. Journalists and critics, although admitting the absence of major homemade narratives and heritage fictions, revealed a latent intrinsic
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nationalism coming from the elites towards popular culture in Romania and the ambiguous inclusion of Romania into the zone of western Europe or the Balkans.
INDEX
Mots-clés : soft power, diplomatie culturelle, arènes médiatiques, telenovela, Roumanie, dizi, fictions patrimoniales Keywords : soft power, cultural diplomacy, media arenas, telenovela, Romania, dizi, heritage fictions
AUTEUR
JONATHAN LARCHER Cinéaste et anthropologue, Jonathan Larcher est doctorant à l’EHESS (CRAL) et diplômé en études cinématographiques (Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3). À partir d’une enquête et de films documentaires réalisés dans les rues tsiganes d’un village roumain, ses recherches et créations explorent les enjeux épistémologiques, politiques et méthodologiques soulevés par les arts et les archives filmiques en anthropologie. Il travaille également à l’élaboration d’une histoire visuelle et critique des imageries par lesquelles les familles roms/tsiganes ont été appréhendées.
Film director and anthropologist, Jonathan Larcher is a doctoral student at EHESS (CRAL) in Paris and a graduate in cinema studies of the Sorbonne (Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3). Based on fieldwork and documentaries of gypsy neighbourhoods in a Roumanian village, Larcher’s research and film creations examine the epistemological, political and methodological issues raised by the arts and anthropological film archives. He is also working on developing a visual and critical history of images representing Roms/Gypsy families.
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