2014 Crime and Safety Report n

Product of the Research & Information Support Center (RISC)

The following is based on open-source reporting.

February 7, 2014

Overall Crime and Safety Situation

The Republic of Yemen government transitioned to a new government in February 2012. However, Yemen continues to face many challenges, including resistance to change by former regime officials; tribal disputes; anti-government groups -- including Houthi groups in the north -- and a southern secessionist movement. These challenges, coupled with poor economic conditions and a generally weak national security apparatus, have allowed lawlessness to flourish in many regions and have given space for extremist groups to operate.

Crime Threats

Yemen is rated a Medium to High threat environment for crime. Even with improving political conditions, crime levels remained steady throughout 2013 due principally to tough economic conditions and weak law enforcement. In the region, most serious criminal activity is concentrated on the outskirts of the city and occurs mainly at night. Crimes such as pick pocketing, petty theft, scams, assault, and sexual harassment do occur. Common petty or street crime exists throughout Sanaa, particularly when valuables and cash are left in plain view. Burglaries and home invasions are not common within the expatriate community, but violence, carjacking, and kidnappings of expatriates have remained constant due to continued political instability and inadequate policing coupled with poor economic conditions.

Overall Road Safety Situation

Road Safety and Road Conditions

Driving around Sanaa is extremely hazardous; standard driving and traffic rules are not enforced. It is common to see a person driving on the wrong side of the road, at high rates of speed, and in vehicles that would not meet Western safety standards. Many vehicles lack proper lighting or mirrors and are unlicensed. Many drivers are under the influence of qat, and it is not uncommon to see underage drivers. Motorcycles are commonly unlicensed and used as taxis. Pedestrians are a major concern, frequently darting in and around traffic without warning. Major intersections may be controlled by traffic police officers on an intermittent basis, and traffic lights, if they exist at all, often do not work.

Travel on roads between cities can be dangerous. Armed carjackings, especially of four-wheel- drive vehicles, occur in many parts of the country, including the capital.

Political, Economic, Religious, and Ethnic Violence

The contents of this unclassified presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and unclassified embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support. Yemen’s location adjacent to the Horn of Africa also creates major issues with refugees from throughout the region, and its close proximity to Somalia brings it within the influence of the piracy problem and terrorist groups, including al-Shabaab.

Local, Regional, and International Terrorism Threats/Concerns

Although crime activity is similar to many international cities of comparable size in the region, indigenous and international terrorism present the most serious security concerns.

Al-Qai’da in the Arabian Penninsula (AQAP) and AQAP-affiliated groups carried out hundreds of attacks -- including suicide bombings, car bombings, ambushes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations by gunmen riding motorcycles -- throughout Yemen. The following list is not exhaustive, and details only a small fraction of the incidents recorded in 2013: On January 10, unknown gunmen ambushed and killed Sheikh Ali Abdullah Abdul Salam in Mahfid, . Sheikh Abdul Salam served as an intermediary between the Yemeni government and AQAP. On January 16, two unidentified gunmen riding motorcycles shot and killed Deputy Security Chief of the Dhamar Governorate, Brigadier General Abdullah al-Mushki, just south of Sana’a. On January 28, a suicide bomber affiliated with AQAP drove a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) into a checkpoint on the outskirts of Rada’a, al-Bayda Governorate, killing 11 soldiers and wounding 17. On February 04, militants affiliated with Ansar al-Sharia ambushed Yemeni troops in the Walad Rabi’a district, al-Bayda Governorate, killing two soldiers and wounding three. On April 27, militants reportedly affiliated with AQAP attacked a checkpoint in Rada’a, al-Bayda Governorate, killing five soldiers. On June 27, armed tribesmen blew up the oil pipeline in Sirwah, Ma’rib Governorate, and remained at the site to prevent engineering teams from repairing the damage. On September 20, militants reportedly affiliated with AQAP detonated two car bombs at a military camp in al-Nashama, Shebwah Governorate, killing 21 soldiers. In a separate but related incident, armed gunmen attacked the police headquarters in Mayfa’a, killing eight police. The attackers reportedly kidnapped several soldiers during the attack and escaped using stolen vehicles. On Sept 9, an Air Force bus was bombed, and six Air Force personnel died in the attack. The bomb was apparently attached to the underside of the bus. On September 30, AQAP militants overran the Second Military Regional Command (2MRC) headquarters in Mukalla, Hadramaut Governorate, killing 10 soldiers. A suicide bomber detonated a VBIED outside of the 2MRC building at the onset of the attack. Armed gunmen, wearing military uniforms, exchanged fire with soldiers before storming the 2MRC headquarters and taking hostages. On October 6, a German diplomatic security officer was murdered in the Haddah area of Sana’a, reportedly in a botched kidnapping attempt. On October 11, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a market in Yafa’a, Lahj Governorate, wounding seven people. On November 26, unidentified gunmen shot two Belarusians working as private contractors in Sana’a, killing one. In a separate incident, unidentified gunmen shot and killed Colonel Ahmed Ismail al-Jahdary, director of training at the police academy in Sana’a. On December 05, militants affiliated with AQAP initiated a complex attack on t he Ministry of Defense headquarters in Sana’a. Suicide bombers detonated two VBIEDs: the first to gain entry into the complex, and the second in front of the hospital. Attackers wearing military uniforms

The contents of this unclassified presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and unclassified embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support. entered the hospital and gunned down medical staff, patients, and visitors indiscriminately. The Yemeni government reported 57 people killed and hundreds wounded. Qasim al-Raymi, an AQAP military commander, apologized for the attack on the hospital in a December 21 video statement after the extent of the murder of innocent civilians was publicized, stirring widespread public outrage. On December 15, a Japanese diplomat was attacked outside his hotel in the Haddah area of Sana’a. The attack occurred as he entered his vehicle. He was injured but survived what was reportedly a botched kidnapping.

Civil Unrest

While 2013 witnessed a moderate level of political violence in Yemen in general, ongoing tribal and political schisms led to sporadic violence, demonstrations, and protests against government institutions. Most notable among these incidents was a militant attack on the Ministry of Defense in December 2013.

Civil unrest rose in 2013 compared to 2012. There were numerous marches and demonstrations, and protests throughout Yemen and in Sanaa in particular. Different groups protested the National Dialogue, the political crisis in Egypt, and the civil war in Syria. Protests have stemmed from a temporary ban on motorcycles, economic developments, and other domestic issues. In addition to protests, land disputes remain a source of conflict, as competing families/tribes lay claim to the parcels of land.

In September, 2012, a coordinated protest of approximately 500 persons at the U.S. Embassy turned violent, and several hundred persons pushed past Yemeni security forces and penetrated the Embassy compound, causing extensive damage to the property.

Religious or Ethnic Violence

The Zaydi-based gained momentum in 2012 with occasional Houthi marches and protests in Sanaa; this was extremely rare prior to 2012. Anti-U.S. Houthi propaganda and slogans are frequently seen throughout Sanaa, as the Houthi presence within Sanaa has grown. In 2013, Houthis and Salafists engagedin heavy fighting in and around Damaj and other regions in the northwest of the country.

Post-specific Concerns

Environmental Hazards

Roads are hazardous during rainy seasons because of a lack of adequate drainage. Flash floods pose a significant safety concern and may occur with little or no warning, even in Sanaa.

Industrial and Transportation Accidents

Traffic accidents are extremely common due to lack of obedience with basic traffic rules and poor vehicle maintenance. Drivers of all types of vehicles may drive while under the influence of qat, considered a schedule one narcotic in the U.S.

Regional Travel Concerns and Restricted Travel Areas/Zones

The contents of this unclassified presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and unclassified embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support.

There is an August 6, 2013, Travel Warning from the Bureau of Consular Affairs stating that “The U.S. Department of State warns U.S. citizens of the high security threat level in Yemen due to terrorist activities and civil unrest. The Department urges U.S. citizens to defer travel to Yemen and those U.S. citizens currently living in Yemen to depart immediately”.

Yemeni security officials also advise against travel to rural areas.

Kidnapping Threats

The threat of kidnapping is high. Kidnappings are often used as a political tool to demand government benefits and services or prisoner releases/exchanges. AQAP may also seek to benefit from negotiations involving kidnapping. The following cases are known by the RSO office.

1 Austrian in 2012 – released 2013 2 Finns in 2012 – released 2013 2 Dutch in 2013 –released 2013 2 South Africans in 2013 – one released in 2014 1 American in 2013 - still missing 1 from Sierra Leone – still missing 1 Iranian in 2013 – executed by his kidnappers on January 25, 2014 1 Saudi in 2013 – still missing 1 Ukrainian in 2013 – released 2013

Police Response

How to Handle Incidents of Police Detention or Harassment

Police and military check points are common and may appear with little advance notice. The police and military typically do not harass or detain foreigners unless the individual(s) acts suspiciously. Foreigners should immediately contact their respective Embassy if they are detained.

Travelers should avoid taking pictures of diplomatic or government buildings, possessing or carrying weapons, and should safeguard and carry their passport or official identification at all times.

Where to Turn to for Assistance if you Become a Victim of Crime

The published emergency telephone number for the police and ambulance service in Sanaa is 199; however, the service is unreliable. Knowing the location of emergency service providers is essential. Police stations are clearly identified with signs in English and . Police officers on foot and in static locations throughout Sanaa are also easy to find; however, most police officers do not speak English.

Various Police/Security Agencies

The contents of this unclassified presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and unclassified embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support. All police units fall under the Ministry of Interior). The police that most visitors will encounter include the Special Security Forces who principally man static checkpoints and the Emergency Police (Najda) who respond to reports of general criminal activity and support foreign embassies by providing security support.

Medical Emergencies

Due to the lack of reliable street addresses, emergency callers should provide directions based on prominent landmarks and be prepared to meet the ambulance upon arrival. Directions should be prepared and kept by the phone. If the patient can safely be transported to the hospital by private vehicle, a potentially long wait for an ambulance may be avoided. It is important to know the quickest and shortest route to the main emergency facilities throughout the city.

Contact Information for Recommended Local Hospitals and Clinics

There are various medical clinics and hospitals throughout Sanaa, but not all facilities offer full medical services, and emergency care is limited. Medical care outside Sanaa is even more limited. The published Sanaa phone number for ambulance/police service is 199, but the service is not reliable. The emergency fire service number is 191.

For non-life threatening emergencies or routine consultations, there are several private medical centers and medical providers available. It is strongly advised that all U.S. nationals identify and select a primary care physician and a pediatrician if required. The following medical service providers are frequented by foreigners residing or traveling in Sanaa:

UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HOSPITAL 60TH Street, Sanaa Tel. No. 471 122 -500 000

MODERN GERMAN HOSPITAL Street before Al-steen crossing; front of Al-Tadhamon Islamic Bank Tel.No.600 000/ 608 888 then dial 0 for ext.-operator-Nisisa

SAUDI GERMAN HOSPITAL 60th Street Sanaa Tel. No. 313 333

THE EYE CONSULTANTS Zubairy Street, Insurance Company Building, 3rd floor Clinic Phone: 401 670 / 402 005

YEMEN GERMAN HOSPITAL After Seteen and hadda crossing Phone number: 418 000

LEBANON HOSPITAL 24th street Haddah Sanaa, Yemen Telfax: 411 700

MILITARY HOSPITAL Ali Mohd Nagi Phone: 222 512-4 / 257 004

The contents of this unclassified presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and unclassified embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support. Fax: 222 515/222 517

AL-THAWRA HOSPITAL Phone: 246 966 to 8; 246 971 to 7; 246 983-80

CDC Country-specific Vaccination and Health Guidance

Visit the CDC’s “Health Information for Visitors to Yemen” at: http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/destinations/yemen.htm for specific information on health matters and vaccinations for Yemen.

Tips on How to Avoid Becoming a Victim

Best Situational Awareness Practices

Practicing good security measures can reduce the risk of becoming a victim.

U.S. nationals should not be lulled into a false sense of security. The local culture is conservative, and foreigners should be careful not to offend local (Islamic) sensibilities. Dress should be conservative, and women should avoid wearing shorts, short skirts, and sleeveless attire. Women should dress modestly when walking outdoors. Men also should avoid wearing shorts. Public display of affection should be avoided and is considered a violation of local law.

Avoid locations frequented by large groups of Westerners. If possible, let a friend or acquaintance know when you are out, where you will be, and where you can be reached.

Vary routes and times. Vary routines and places of activities.

Carry your mobile phone with emergency numbers pre-programmed and do not use your phone while driving. Always keep your vehicle doors locked and windows closed; do not leave valuables in plain view.

If approached by a police officer, ask for identification.

Control the keys to your residence. If you will be away from your residence for any length of time, have a friend check on the residence. Leave lights on and doors and windows locked.

If you are being followed, do not drive home. Go to a safe area, such as a police station or friendly embassy. If your follower is in a vehicle, try to obtain a license plate number and vehicle description.

Use caution when riding in taxicabs. Mini-bus taxis or “dababs” should be avoided.

Residents and visitors are advised to avoid demonstrations and protests.

U.S. Embassy Location and Contact Information

Embassy Address and Hours of Operation

The contents of this unclassified presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and unclassified embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support. The U.S. Embassy is located at Sa’awan Street, Himyer Zone, Sanaa. The Embassy is open Saturday – Wednesday from 0800-1630. The Embassy is closed on both Yemeni and U.S. national holidays.

Embassy Contact Numbers

The main Embassy phone number is 967 (1) 755-2000. For emergency assistance after duty hours, weekends and holidays, call 967 (1) 755-2170. Post One: 01-755-2170 RSO: 01-755-2222 Consular Section: 01-755-2266 Health Unit: 01-755-2052

As the U.S. Department of State continues to develop information on any potential security threats to U.S. interests overseas, it shares credible threat information through Travel Warnings and Travel Alerts, available online at www.travel.state.gov. Travelers can also hear recorded information by calling the Department of State in Washington, D.C. at 202-647-5225 from their telephone.

The U.S. Embassy sends updated information regarding security threats via the warden message system to registered Americans within its consular district. The RSO office encourages U.S. nationals residing or travelling in Yemen to register with the U.S. Embassy consular section at https://travelregistration.state.gov/ibrs/ui/.

For additional information, please review the Consular Affairs information sheet on Yemen at: http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/english/country/yemen.html.

OSAC Country Council Information

The Embassy does not have an official OSAC Country Council. However, there is a close working relationship between U.S.-based companies and the RSO office. Security Officers are active on the OSAC Google Group Sanaa. This electronic group is used frequently for rumor control, threat alerts, and information sharing. The Embassy is establishing a quarterly OSAC meeting.

The contents of this unclassified presentation in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the United States Department of State, or the United States Government, except as otherwise noted (e.g., travel advisories, public statements). The presentation was compiled from various open sources and unclassified embassy reporting. Please note that all OSAC products are for internal U.S. private sector security purposes only. Publishing or otherwise distributing OSAC-derived information in a manner inconsistent with this policy may result in the discontinuation of OSAC support.