All views expressed in the Latin America Policy Journal are those of the authors or the interviewees only and do not represent the views of Harvard University, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the staff of the Latin America Policy Journal, or any associates of the Journal. All errors are authors’.

©2019 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. Except as otherwise specified, no article or portion herein is to be reproduced or adapted to other works without the express written consent of the editors of the Latin America Policy Journal. LATIN AMERICA POLICY JOURNAL SPRING 2019 RESEARCH The Venezuelan Exodus in : A First Approximation José Luis Bacigalupo and Patricio M. Goldstein

José Luis Bacigalupo is a Master in Public Administration in International Development (MPA/ ID) candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He holds a BA in Economics from Universidad del Pacífico (, Peru). He has worked at the Ministry of Education of Peru, the World Bank, and the Research Center of Universidad del Pacífico.

Patricio M. Goldstein is a Master in Public Administration in International Development (MPA/ ID) candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He holds a BA in Philosophy from Universidad de and a MA in Applied Economics from Universidad Torcuato di Tella. Prior to coming to the Kennedy School, Patricio was a Strategic Communications Advisor in the Office of the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers at the Government of .

ABSTRACT

Venezuela is facing one of the biggest economic collapses in modern history, forcing more than 10 percent of out of their country. The crisis is far from over and even more emigration is expected in the following years. Since 2016, Peru has received around 800,000 Venezuelans because of its positive socioeconomic conditions and friendly migration regime. Most Venezuelans have settled in Lima (77 percent), becoming, in only two years, six percent of the capital’s population, and turning it into the city with the most Venezuelan migrants in the world. The current situation is posing unprecedented challenges for the Peruvian government and society, which have yet to find an official coordinated response.

1. THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE VENEZUELAN EXODUS outbreaks of long-eliminated diseases such as measles, malaria, and tuberculosis.4 is facing one of the biggest eco- With 87.5 percent of households depend- nomic collapses in modern history, forcing ing on subsidized food handouts,5 and the more than 10 percent of Venezuelans to deterioration of the balance of payments migrate out of their country. Since 2013, and the government finances, it can Venezuela has lost 49 percent of its real only be expected that in the absence of GDP per capita due to a generalized eco- regime change Venezuela heads further nomic and political crisis, and is hitting into a humanitarian catastrophe in the new hyperinflation records every month. next months. Similar losses are comparable nowadays with war zones like Yemen or South Venezuela’s economic disaster is rooted Sudan.1 In the last four years, the mini- in the decision of Maduro’s authoritarian mum wage measured in affordable calories government to remain in power at all fell by 87 percent, and is currently insuffi- costs. Although the country has not cient to feed a family of five.2 According to entirely abolished democratic institutions, a national survey, 87 percent of Venezue- their meaning and impact have become lans were poor in 2017 (up from 48 percent void after a sequence of power grabs and in 2014), and 64 percent reported losing electoral redesigns. All checks and bal- body weight.3 With a collapsed public ances on the executive branch have dis- health system, Venezuela is experiencing appeared through permanent repression

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of the opposition, and the suppression of can provide better real-time estimates freedom of the press as well as freedom of on the magnitude and scope of the exo- association.6 Beyond the threat of polit- dus. In recent years, products of search ical repression, Venezuelans face some engine queries, email logins, and the use of the world’s highest crime rates, with of social media have provided new path- the country being considered the sec- ways to understand demographic changes ond-most-dangerous country in the world, in societies, particularly those provoked only behind .7 The combination by migration. In the case of social media, of economic and political unrest has mobi- Facebook’s advertising platforms,13 geo- lized millions of Venezuelans to leave their located Twitter messages,14 and Linke- homes and families to seek a better future, dIn career histories15 have been used to mostly in nearby countries of the region. understand different features of migration patterns. In the case of Venezuela, esti- The is far from over mates of emigration have been produced and more emigration should be expected in using Facebook and Twitter data.16 Demo- the following years. According to a recent graphic data from Facebook users can be poll by Gallup, 40 percent of Venezuelans obtained through Facebook’s advertising want to escape the country.8 Not only platform, “Facebook Ads Manager.” This current economic conditions are harsh, tool allows potential advertisers to select but forecasts are far from optimistic. The specific characteristics of their target audi- IMF projects that real GDP will shrink 18 ence. For this case, since 2015 Facebook has percent, and hyperinflation will soar to included the “Expat” group, constructed 10,000,000 percent by 2019.9 Increasing through a mix of self-reported informa- economic and political distress are likely tion, logins, and user networks.17 To esti- to unleash new waves of migrants across mate the number of Venezuelan migrants, the continent. A recent estimate predicts the 2011 Venezuelan Census projections that the number of migrants could poten- for 2018 were used to estimate the size of tially reach 8.2 million in the coming years, the exodus, and the average differential in based on Venezuela’s foreign income (oil the Facebook penetration rate (that is, the revenue and remittances), given the gov- number of users per population per age ernment’s need to import food to assist group and gender) was calibrated at 10 per- a population in need.10 The Interna- centage points.18 Using Facebook data, we tional Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated the size of the global Venezuelan currently projects that the total number exodus at around 5.5 million (17 percent of migrants will increase by 40 percent of the country’s population).19 The major- during 2019.11 These estimates are highly ity of the resides in , dependent on a variety of assumptions of the , and Peru (63 percent), migrant decisions and economic forecasts with substantial communities also in regarding Venezuela’s future. , , , Argentina, , , and . The most inhabited By the end of 2018, between 3.3 million city by Venezuelans outside of Venezuela and 5.5 million Venezuelans were living is Lima, followed by Bogotá, Barranquilla, abroad, according to Facebook data.12 Buenos Aires, Quito, Medellin, and Pan- The economic decline and political ama City, in that order. chaos precipitated the massive exit of Venezuelans—a great share of them trav- eling by foot since 2015. Conservative esti- 2. THE VENEZUELAN EXODUS IN PERU mates by the IOM calculate the size of the Venezuelan exodus at 3.3 million people Venezuelan migration to Peru had some by the end of 2018, which will represent antecedents in the pre-2015 period, but 10 percent of the country’s total popu- surged in 2016, only to escalate after 2017. lation. Nevertheless, social media data Similar to other host countries, Peru had

65 LATIN AMERICA POLICY JOURNAL SPRING 2019 RESEARCH Table 1 – The Venezuelan Exodus – Principal Host Countries

Sources: IMF, WB, IOM, UNHCR, Facebook, Google Maps received Venezuelan migrants as early as between 4.4 percent and 8.5 percent of the 2002, although mostly members of the country’s population.23 With no recent upper-middle class who fled the Chavista experience accommodating migrants, government.20 Flows intensified in 2013, Peru reacted early to the Venezuelan crisis when the Venezuelan economy started by creating the Temporary Permanence rapidly deteriorating, although the num- Permit (PTP) in March 2017, which gave ber of Venezuelan residents in Peru never Venezuelan migrants legal residence for up exceeded 7,000.21 The year 2016 saw to one year and allowed them to work in Venezuelan net legal migration flows rise the formal sector. The PTP was awarded to 10,247, while in 2017 it added up to not only to migrants who had a passport, 106,771. By early 2018, net migration flows but also to those who had a birth certificate rose to 40,000, while legal migration sur- or a national ID. When migrants had no passed 700,000. Social network estimates, legal identification, they were able to solicit as well as interviews and on-the-ground refugee status. In addition, although PTP experience on the Ecuador-Peru border, is no longer valid for newcomers, there are give reason to believe that the actual num- de facto no restrictions for any Venezuelan ber of migrants might be higher than what entering Peruvian territory. Moreover, not administrative records show, due to the only Peru’s legislation facilitated migra- presence of illegal migration. tion, but also its recent growth trajectory. In the last 15 years, Peru almost doubled its Although Peru does not have recent GDP per capita and lowered poverty by 37 experience as a host country for migrants, percentage points (from 59 percent to 27 its socioeconomic conditions and migra- percent).24 This has presented opportu- tion regime have led the country to become nities for migrants, who could also bene- the second-largest host for Venezuelans. fit from the country’s exceptionally large Although Peru’s culture has been shaped informal sector. As interviews with recent not only by its colonial past, but also by migrants confirmed, Venezuelans in Peru European, Chinese, and Japanese migra- perceived a less tight labor market than in tion during the late nineteenth century,22 Colombia, where migrants had long sur- migration stagnated in the beginning of passed one million. the 20th century. By 2017, migrants only constituted 0.3 percent of the Peruvian Venezuelan migration in Peru consists population, while the number of emigrants of more males, and is on average younger, amounted to between 1.5 and 3 million, or than both the Venezuelan and Peruvian

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populations. As Facebook data shows, and rainforest regions. Regions’ populations is also confirmed by administrative data appear to be the key factor determining from the Peruvian migration department migration shares, as well as average wages (SNM) and IOM surveys, more than half of and distance from Tumbes’ border, which the Venezuelan migrants in Peru are young partly explains why Trujillo has a sub- adults between the ages of 18 and 34.25 This stantially larger share of migrants than represents a larger share for this age group . both relative to the age distribution of Venezuelan residents (that is, Venezuelans Figure 1 – Peruvian Citizens and Venezuelan in Venezuela), and of Peruvian citizens. Expats in Peru Age and Gender Pyramid Senior citizens (older than 65 years) are the smallest demographic group within migrants, and are underrepresented in comparison to Venezuela’s population. The share of male migrants is also substantially larger than the male share of Venezuelan and Peruvian residents. According to an IOM survey, at least half of migrants are married, although 73 percent traveled without children, which is consistent with the relatively low share of minors among migrants. As interviews reveal, some Ven- ezuelans initially migrate without their children (sometimes without their spouse/ partner), waiting for them to migrate once Source: FB, INEI (own estimate) the first parent has found stable employ- ment and is adequately settled. Migrants have higher levels of edu- cation than both locals and Venezuelan Most Venezuelan migrants in Peru have residents. As Facebook data shows, settled in Lima (77 percent), becoming in Venezuelan expats in Peru have on average only two years six percent of the capital’s a higher level of educational attainment population, and turning it into the city than both Peruvian citizens and Venezuelan with the most Venezuelan migrants in residents, as well as Venezuelan expats in the world. Venezuelan migrants are not Colombia. Facebook data shows that 45 evenly distributed across Peru. While 29 percent of Venezuelan expats in Peru have percent of the country’s population lives in completed some type of tertiary or college Lima Metropolitana, at least 76.6 percent degree, while administrative data yields 55 of migrants inhabit the city, according to percent for the same category. There is no social media data, although in adminis- complete registry on the number of profes- trative records the share is as high as 86 sionals that have arrived in Peru, although percent.26 Expats in Lima amount to 6.7 out of 394,000 administrative registries (a percent of the city’s population, making third of actual migrants), there appears to the capital the most Venezuelan city out- be at least 23,000 engineers, 21,000 profes- side Venezuela. Additionally, there are sors, 22,000 technicians, and 9,000 nurses.27 medium-sized communities in Trujillo (representing 2.1 percent of the region’s Venezuelan migrants appear to be population), Arequipa, and , generating challenges for Peru’s society and small communities in , , in three key areas: labor markets, services , , Ica, , Tumbes, and provision, and public health. According . Apart from Cusco, the majority to standard immigration economics liter- of the diaspora has settled on the Pacific ature, a sudden significant migrant shock coastline, avoiding the highlands and expands the labor supply, generating lower

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equilibrium wages in the short-run, while the government should restrict Venezuelan labor demand adjusts in the medium- to migration to some degree. This increasing long-run for higher wages. Although trend in public opinion, as well as the rise in our research neither descriptive nor of anti-immigrant candidates in the recent causal estimates show significant changes municipal elections in Lima, has created in or wages, interviews a climate for political backlash against the reveal that that Venezuelans face labor government.30 mismatches because they are overquali- fied or work in different occupations than There is no definite forecast of how before, most of them in the informal sector many Venezuelans will arrive in Peru in (95 percent). There are also new challenges the near future, and estimates are highly to services delivery, both in terms of pro- sensitive to swings in international pol- viding the necessary assistance to avoid itics. In addition to the problems that a humanitarian crisis, and to facilitate inte- arise when estimating future aggregate gration to education and health services, Venezuelan refugee flows, specifically which risk being overrun by the increase in predicting flows to Peru involves making demand. Our research also shows that the assumptions about Peru and other host marginal net fiscal impact of the migration countries’ migration policies that deter- is small and manageable, but sensitive to mine the relative cost of migration. As increases in migration rates and labor mar- an example, Peru’s announcement of the ket behavior. Finally, Venezuela’s crisis has end of the PTP for migrants arriving after generated a resurgence of diseases such as November 2018 produced a local peak in malaria and measles, long eradicated in the October. Moreover, Ecuador’s tightening region, causing a public health emergency of the border in January 2019, after the in recipient countries. It is worth mention- killing of a woman and increasing episodes ing that given the unequal geographical of xenophobia in Peru’s northern neighbor, distribution of migration, these three key appear to be sending more migrants to the policy areas have heterogenous effects border in the start of 2019.31 As previously across the Peruvian territory. stated, the decision to migrate to a partic- ular country depends on the benefits and The Venezuelan diaspora is encounter- costs of migration, and these may fluctuate ing increasing episodes of xenophobia and as countries become more or less welcom- may be creating political backlash against ing. As of 2018, on average, an increase in the government. Within migrants surveyed 100 migrants entering Colombia is signifi- in Tacna exiting Peru, 39 percent reported cantly associated with 68 migrants entering episodes of xenophobia and discrimina- Peru around three months later. It is not tion, 55 percent of them in public spaces clear how local Colombian, Ecuadorian, and 41 percent in the workplace. These epi- and Peruvian politics may affect this rate. sodes were also reflected in our interviews with migrants in Lima. As early as July The current situation is posing unprec- 2017 (when there were fewer than 200,000 edented challenges for Peruvian govern- Venezuelans in Peru), only 17 percent of ment and society, which have yet to find Peruvians considered that migration had an official coordinated response. Peru, a positive impact, and 56 percent thought and more specifically the city of Lima, the country had “too many migrants.”28 are experiencing an increase in foreign In a more recent poll, 55 percent of Lima’s population that has no precedents in the citizens have expressed negative views over country’s history, although there might Venezuelan migration.29 Forty-six percent be an antecedent in the internal migra- of Limeños emphasized a negative impact tion from the highlands in the mid-20th in the labor market, while 28 percent saw century. In addition to the societal Venezuelans as crowding out public ser- challenge of assimilating a new popula- vices. Moreover, 94 percent consider that tion, the Peruvian government needs to

68 LATIN AMERICA POLICY JOURNAL SPRING 2019 RESEARCH Table 2 – The Venezuelan Exodus – Principal Host Cities in Peru

Sources: Facebook, INEI, Google Maps

6Human Rights Watch, “Crackdown on Dissent: guarantee the integration of migrants to Brutality, Torture, and Political Persecution in ensure both their wellbeing and the welfare Venezuela,” 29 November 2017, https://www.hrw. of Peruvian citizens. Without any built-in org/report/2017/11/29/crackdown-dissent/brutal- capability within the Peruvian bureaucracy ity-torture-and-political-persecution-venezuela. to deal with a migration crisis of this scale, 7Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, “Informe the Peruvian government needs to care- OVV de Violencia 2017,” 5 January 2018, https:// fully understand the heterogeneous effects observatoriodeviolencia.org.ve/informe-ovv-de-vi- of the migration wave and act accordingly, olencia-2017/. keeping in mind both the increasingly con- 8Justin McCarthy, “Four in 10 Venezuelans Would flictive politics at the national scale and Leave Venezuela Behind,” Gallup, 6 March 2018, outside pressures from regional powers https://news.gallup.com/poll/228338/four-venezu- (Colombia, Brazil) and international insti- elans-leave-venezuela-behind.aspx. tutions (UN, OAS, IADB) that may affect 9International Monetary Fund, World Economic the policy space. Outlook: Challenges to Steady Growth. 10Dany Bahar and Douglas Barrios, “How Many More Migrants and Refugees Can We Expect Out NOTES of Venezuela?” Brookings Institution (blog), 10 December 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ 1International Monetary Fund, World Economic up-front/2018/12/10/how-many-more-migrants- Outlook: Challenges to Steady Growth (Washing- and-refugees-can-we-expect-out-of-venezuela/. ton, DC: IMF, October 2018). 11United Nations Higher Commissioner for Refu- 2Ricardo Hausmann, “Venezuela’s Unprecedented gees (UNHCR) and International Organization for Collapse,” Project Syndicate, 31 July 2017, https:// Migration (IOM), Regional Refugee and Migrant www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/venezu- Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from ela-unprecedented-economic-collapse-by-ricar- Venezuela, 2018, https://s3.amazonaws.com/ do-hausmann-2017-07. unhcrsharedmedia/2018/RMRP_Venezuela_2019_ 3ENCOVI, “Encuesta sobre Condiciones de Vida OnlineVersion.pdf. Venezuela 2017,” 21 February 2018, https://www. 12Figures are authors’ estimates. ucab.edu.ve/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/02/ Ficha-T%C3%A9cnica.pdf. 13Emilio Zagheni et al., “Leveraging Facebook’s Advertising Platform to Monitor Stocks of 4Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela: Numbers Migrants,” Population and Development Review Highlight Health Crisis,” 15 November 2018, 43, no. 4 (2017): 721–734; Spyridon Spyratos et al., https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/15/venezue- Migration Data Using Social Media, EUR 29273 EN la-numbers-highlight-health-crisis. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 5Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela: Numbers Union, 2018). Highlight Health Crisis.” 14Bartosz Hawelka et al., “Geo-Located Twitter 69 LATIN AMERICA POLICY JOURNAL SPRING 2019 RESEARCH as Proxy for Global Mobility Patterns,” Cartogra- fewer than 1,500 inhabitants. Third, estimates are phy and Geographic Information Science 41, no. 3 extremely sensitive to assumptions on Facebook (2014): 260–271; Emilio Zagheni et al., “Inferring penetration: changing the difference in the plat- International and Internal Migration Patterns form penetration rates between Venezuelan res- From Twitter Data,” in Proceedings of the 23rd idents and the diaspora from 0 to 10 percentage International Conference on World Wide Web points raises estimates on the size of the diaspora (New York: ACM, 2014): 439–444. by almost a million residents. 15Mikkel Barslund, and Matthias Busse, “How 20José Koechlin, “Migración venezolana al Perú: Mobile Is Tech Talent? A Case Study of IT Profes- Proyectos migratorios y respuesta del estado,” in El sionals Based on Data from LinkedIn,” Centre for exodo venezolano: entre el exilio y la emigración, European Policy Studies, CEPS Special Report no. eds. José Koechlin and Joaquín Eguren (Lima, Perú: 140, 2016; Bogdan State et al., “Migration of Pro- Colección OBIMID, 2018). fessionals to the U.S.,” in International Conference 21Government of Perú, Instituto Nacional de Esta- on Social Informatics (New York: Springer, 2014): distica e Informatica, Perú: Estadisticas de la Emi- 531–543. gración Internacional de Peruanos e Inmigración 16Ricardo Hausmann et al., “Measuring Vene- de Extranjeros, 1990-2015 (Lima, Perú: INEI, 2016). zuelan Emigration with Twitter,” Kiel Institute 22Ernesto Maguiña Salinas, “Un acercamiento al for the World Economy Working Paper no. 2106 estudio de las inmigraciones extranjeras en el Perú (May 2018); Miguel Ángel Santos, “¿Cuántos son y durante el siglo XIX y las primeras décadas del siglo qué perfil tienen los venezolanos en el exilio? Una XX,” Tierra Nuestra 8, no. 1 (2016): 65–96. aproximación a través de Facebook,” Prodavinci, 19 23Estimates from World Bank and Superintenden- December 2018, https://prodavinci.com/cuantos- cia Nacional de Migraciones data. son-y-que-perfil-tienen-los-venezolanos-en-el-ex- ilio-una-aproximacion-a-traves-de-facebook/. 24Estimates from World Bank data. 17Spyratos et al., Migration Data Using Social 25International Organization for Migration, Mon- Media. itoreo de flujo de población venezolana en el Perú DTM ronda 4 (Lima, Perú: IOM Perú, 2018); Gov- 18The former assumption was based on the obser- ernment of Perú, Superintendencia Nacional de vation that emigrants are more likely to adopt a Migraciones, “Informe Migratorio: Caracteristicas Facebook account in the country of destination sociodemograficas de ciudadanos venezolanos when the country has a higher penetration rate que tramitaron el Permiso Temporal de Perma- than in Venezuela (taking into consideration the nencia-PTP en el Perú 2017-2018,” October 2018, Facebook penetration rate in South America is 20 https://www.migraciones.gob.pe/comunica- percentage points higher than in Venezuela by the ciones/publicaciones/Caracteristicas-sociode- end of 2017). mograficas-de-ciudadanos-venezolanos.pdf. 19Our estimates also include Colombian return- 26Government of Perú, Superintendencia Nacional ees, as well as the early emigrants of the Chavista de Migraciones, “Informe Migratorio.” era. Moreover, though the methodology allows researchers to gather real-time information on 27Government of Perú, Superintendencia Nacional de migration beyond what administrative records Migraciones, administrative data from January 2019. can show—taking into consideration not only 28Gideon Skinner and Glenn Gottfried, “Global their scattered and late publication, and the lack of Views on Immigration and the Refugee Crisis,” records on illegal migration—and provides insights Ipsos, 13 September 2017, https://www.ipsos.com/ on patterns of the Venezuelan migration, it also has en/global-views-immigration-and-refugee-crisis. some important shortcomings. First, there is no 29Ipsos, “Informe de Opinion Data,” 2018. clarity on what is mean by “Expat” in Facebook’s 30 Advertising API. If reported data is used to estimate “Candidatos rechazan discurso de Belmont con- Expat users, the number of Facebook users might tra los venezolanos,” El Comercio, 22 August 2018, not be revealing of who is an expat. Nevertheless, https://elcomercio.pe/politica/candidatos-rechaz- if Facebook logins and user networks are used to an-discurso-ricardo-belmont-venezolanos-noti- define “Expats,” Colombian and Peruvian return- cia-549621. ees, as well as international students and workers, 31“Ecuador Tightens Rules for Venezuelans might bias our estimates. Second, Facebook data After Brutal Murder,” Associated Press, 21 is rounded to the thousand level, which prevents January 2019, https://www.apnews.com/ estimates to capture geographical localities with e9f7c99bd95441649f17aae8f2c595dc.

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