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Compromising Emanations ~tqw~ TEMPEST – Compromising Emanations Robin Lobel TEMPEST, also known as Van Eck Phreaking, is the art of turning involuntary emissions into compromising data. This mainly concerns electromagnetic waves, but it can also be applied to any kind of unwanted emanations induced by the inner workings of a device. The most common TEMPEST phenomena relate to CRT monitors. he fi rst studies concerning the phenom- enon of compromising electromagnetic What you will learn... T waves occurred in the 1950s. Through spying on encrypted Russian message trans- • you will gain enough knowledge to start building missions, the NSA discovered weak para- your own TEMPEST system. sitic rattlings in the carrying tone, which were emanated by the electricity of the encoding What you should know... machine. By building an appropriate device, it was possible to rebuild the plain text with- • you have to have some intermediate experience out having to decrypt the transmissions. with practical electronics, This phenomenon successively takes the • you should have at least basic knowledge of electromagnetic physics. names NAG1A, then FS222 in the 1960s, NACSIM5100 in the 70s and fi nally TEMPEST (an acronym for Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard, although such a name is also said to be untrue), beginning About the Author in the 1980s. Robin Lobel has conducted several IT research projects for years, including audio compression, In 1985 a Dutch scientist, Wim van Eck, pub- realtime image analysis, realtime 3D engines, etc. lished a report on the experiences that he had He studied the TEMPEST (Transient Electro- had since January 1983 in this fi eld. The report magnetic Pulse Emanation Standard) system Attack shows that such a system is creatable with lit- thoroughly in 2003 and was lucky enough to be tle means – however, it gives very little detail. In able to use a full laboratory to conduct these ex- 1986 and 1988, complementary reports were periments and succeed. He also enjoys composing published. In 1998, John Young – an American music and doing some 2D/3D artwork. He is cur- citizen – requested the NSA to publish declas- rently studying cinema arts in Paris. His web site: sifi ed information concerning the TEMPEST http://www.divideconcept.net. system. Seeing his request rejected, he ap- 36 www.hakin9.org hakin9 3/2005 ~tqw~ Compromising emanations Figure 2. A grid of pixels form a picture – the sharpness of the picture Figure 1. Red, green and blue mix depends on the pixel's density together to synthesise any colour uses electricity and that any elec- Acoustic information pealed and fi nally, in 1999, obtained tric potential induces an electro- Basically, the same possibilities as some documents which were largely magnetic fi eld proportional to the with optic emissions. However, the censored. Very little information is potential, we can then deduce back possibilities are less, because most available on this system; the majority the inner electric activity. This can of a computer system is silent and of the documents contain nothing but be applied to CRT display devices only the mechanical parts are sub- superfi cial information without giving and any unprotected cables or ject to acoustic production. There any details of a practical kind. wires. are quite a few applications for this kind of emission. A hardware keylog- So what is it? Optical ghosts ger based on acoustic events may be The principle of TEMPEST and Though being an electromagnetic a good example. its derivatives is to reconstruct wave, light doesn't have the same original data from ghost information. rules offering the same possibili- A ghost is a trace left by an object in its ties. Contrary to electromagnetic A particular study: environment. A defi nition of a ghost? emanations, the lights in a com- CRT monitor A footprint, heat, the smell of cooked puter system have specifi c roles, emanations food and even your own shadow. and are intentionally set to inform One of the most interesting emis- Such information is valuable to detec- the user about the system status. If sions in a computer comes from tives because this is the only basis you take a closer look at LEDs, they the display device, because its inner they have to reconstruct what actually respond to electric potentials too, activity clearly deals with important happened. There are three kinds of so any minimal fl uctuations in the information. Moreover, this device ghosts in the computer domain which system has an effect on LEDs and emits strong electromagnetic waves could help us retrieve data: electro- thus can be perceived with optical that are relatively easy to capture magnetic, optical and acoustic. sensors. However, this can only be and treat. helpful for specifi c events and in par- Electromagnetic emanations ticular conditions. What is more, the The way monitors work The most discreet and informative acquired information might not be of All colours can be broken down trace. Given that every computer great value. into three fundamental colours: red, green and blue (see Figure 1). It is possible – through the combination On the Net of these three colours – to recre- ate any colour, by varying these • http://upe.acm.jhu.edu/websites/Jon_Grover/page2.htm – a handful of basics on fundamental proportions. An image van Eck phreaking, • http://www.eskimo.com/~joelm/tempest.html – the complete but unoffi cial is considered a complex assem- TEMPEST information page, bly of colours through the use of • http://www.noradcorp.com/2tutor.htm – NoRad company's CRT Monitors as a a pattern of pixels (see Figure 2). Source of Electromagnetic Waves page, A pixel is a point composed of the • http://xtronics.com/kits/rcode.htm – resistor colour codes, three colours: red, green and blue. • http://web.telia.com/~u85920178/begin/opamp00.htm – operational amplifi er It is possible to recreate accurate explanation, images by increasing the density of • http://www.hut.fi /Misc/Electronics/circuits/vga2tv/vga2palntsc.html – Tomi Eng- pixels in a single area. The resolu- dahl's synchronisation signal converter. tion of an image is represented by x*y, with x being the number of pix- hakin9 3/2005 www.hakin9.org 37 ~tqw~ a frequency of 50–100 Hz; as the for a screen having a resolution of electrons pass through the fl uores- 800*600 with a refresh rate of 70 Hz, cent layer, it emits a light. This layer the changes of voltage can reach also becomes phosphorescent in a frequency of 800*600*70=34 that it continues to emit a light after MHz, that is to say 34,000,000 times its initial stimulation for approximate- a second). ly 10 to 20 ms. Its brightness is deter- mined by the debit of electrons, which Inductance phenomena is regulated by a Wehnelt (electronic Any difference of potential (that component). The beam then passes is, when an amount of electrical Figure 3. A beam of electrons through two bobbins (one to deter- tension gets higher or lower) in an produce the actual picture on the mine the vertical deviation, the other electrically conductive material screen, by exciting a phosphore- for the horizontal deviation, using produces an electromagnetic wave scent layer from left to right and top electromagnetic forces) to direct proportional to the potential: this is to bottom its trajectory, so that it scans the called inductance phenomena (see whole screen and can reconstruct Figure 4). This process involves a complete picture (see Figure 3). Maxwell equations, which describe The video signal passes through electromagnetic waves' behaviour. several channels (6 channels for However, it's not necessary to under- the video signal itself). Meaning, stand all the mathematical and the Red, Green and Blue channels physical rules behind this in order to as well as their respective masses; exploit the phenomena. 2 synchronisation channels for the The invert phenomena is also horizontal and vertical scanning and true: any electromagnetic wave the communal mass of synchronisa- meeting an electrically conductive tion signals. material will produce a difference of The synchronisation signals, potential proportional to the strength which indicate the passage to the of the wave. This is basically how LW following line or the return of the radio receptors works: the stronger Figure 4. A difference of potential beam to the beginning of the screen, the wave, the stronger the signal in a conductive cable generates an are simple differences of potentials received. electromagnetic wave of a few volts. They take place (for For an electromagnetic fi eld to be a screen of a resolution of 800*600 created, there must be differences of els horizontally and y the number of pixels with 70 Hz refresh) 70 times potentials: a constant voltage won't pixels vertically (examples: 640*480, a second for the vertical synchroni- produce any radio waves. In the 800*600, 1024*768, etc.) sation signals, and 600*70=42,000 same way, no signal can be received A monitor screen is composed of times a second for the horizontal if the magnetic fi eld is static (that's several modules. The fi rst one, the synchronisation signals. why dynamos need to be constantly cathode tube, is what reproduces Video signals are at a voltage in motion to produce electricity). the actual image. An electron beam of 0 V to 0.7 V, which defi nes the scans a fl uorescent layer at an brightness (the higher the voltage, Application to CRT monitors extremely high speed thereby creat- the brighter the pixel) at the point Before being projected in the form ing the image. The scanning goes where the scanning takes place of an electron beam, the video across the entire screen from left (this voltage is thus able to vary for signal is amplifi ed to a high voltage.
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