American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments Author(S): Cheryl Misak Source: Transactions of the Charles S

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2011 Presidential Address: American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments Author(s): Cheryl Misak Source: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society , Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 2011), pp. 261-273 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.47.3.261

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This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Sun, 28 Jun 2020 16:35:13 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Abstract Pragmatists have always made use of indispensability arguments. This paper starts with a debate that raged between the found- ers of pragmatism over William James’s idea that if it is good for me to believe that p is true, then I ought to believe that p is true. 2011 Chauncey Wright and C. S. Peirce took James to task and Peirce put forward an ar- Presidential gument about how we need to hope that the regulative assumptions of inquiry are true. This insight was later picked up by C. Address: I. Lewis and W. V. O. Quine, who argued that a priori “truths” are not necessarily American true. They are simply what we need to ar- ticulate our world view. The paper con- Pragmatism cludes with some remarks about where the future of pragmatism lies. and

Keywords: Pragmatism, The Will to Believe, Indispensability Truth, Regulative assumptions, Peirce, James, 1 Santayana, Lewis, Quine, Rorty. Arguments Cheryl Misak The Classical Pragmatists: Wright, James, Peirce In the early- to mid-1870s, William James started to argue that if one needs to believe something, then one ought to believe it, even if there is no evidence in its favor. It is not easy to unwind the various things that James said about what he called the will to believe, but one thing is clear. He was ini- tially tempted to put forward a very strong point and despite the refinements he was eventually to make, his is the most conten- tious version of pragmatist indispensability arguments. Most importantly, it set the stage for how pragmatism was to evolve. In some remarks made in an 1875 review in the Nation2 and in the penultimate draft of “The Will to Believe,” James argues that, given the dearth of evidence for or

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Sun, 28 Jun 2020 16:35:13 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 262 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 47 Number 3 me ornot.If Ibelieve thatshedoeslikeme,then thatbeliefwillleadto can willtobelieve iswhenIhave likes noevidence forwhetherMary need to believe. One non- inclination andtheother examples hegives ofsituationsinwhichwe tive toactionormentalpeace)isindutyboundto…it.” point: “any onetowhomitmakesapractical difference(whether ofmo- then Ihave adutytobelieve inGod. He makesashockinglystrong against theexistenceofGod, ifbelievinginGod makesmehappier, [1896]: 26–7). need togoonourinstincts(Peirce) (1979 orour passions(James) takesitsfullcourse. Weinquiry have nochoicebut toactandsowe answer. But inmatters oflaw, ethics,andreligion, we cannotwaituntil most alwaysthecase” becauseactiondoesnot require animmediate when “objective evidencehascome.”“In scientificquestions,thisisal- says, or“momentous” asJames says,we canwaitandmakeupourmind Peirce wasalsofondofthisargument:ifamatter isn’t “vital,” asPeirce to come. Whether tobelieve inGod isoneofthose“forced” beliefs. thatwe can’tclass ofbeliefssoimportant wait around fortheevidence believing. one hasarighttobelieve aheadoftheevidence,ifoneishappierfor Will toBelieve” wasfinallypublishedtwenty years later, he arguedthat account ofthoseinteractions: friend over the matter. It quoting extensively is worth from Wright’s tohave whathethoughtwasamuch- portunity James andPeirce) wasappalledby thisidea.He laidinwaitforanop- But thisinterpretation upagainst bothJames’s runs “duty tobelieve” All readers ofJames willknow thatheattimesarguesthere isa James altered hispositionin lightofthisonslaught. When “The Chauncey Wright, theunsungthird founderofpragmatism(with even theutilitarianswouldallow tobewise. . seemed to me to be more epicurean (though he hates the sect) than tobelieve, ifoneishappierforbelieving.Butlieve, ortry even sohe word ‘duty.’ Allthathemeanttosaywasitisfoolishnotbe- asadvocated by him in theNation. He‘duty retracted the ofbelief’ Friday evening Isawhimagainandintroduced thesubjectof vigorously an explanation,whichwasmypremeditated discourse. The emphasisattractedtheyouth’s attention,andmadehimdemand had read it with interest and had not noticed any found anytypographicalerrors in William’s article. evening. His fatherremarked inthecourseoftalk,thathehadnot had instore forhim.Ifoundhimjustreturned homeon Wednesday I have carriedoutmypurposeofgivingDr. James the twolectures I 132.174.255.116 on Sun,28Jun2020 16:35:13UTC 5 .

. . butconfessedtohavingwrittenunderirritation.On All usesubject tohttps://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from momentous, non- forced situation in which I 4 needed “duel” withhis typographical errors. . . . . Isaidthat . . He fought 3

American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments • Cheryl Misak 263

7 . any idea . . making; it will make it less making; it —where the belief that one will fail the belief that one —where making and make it more likely that Mary likely that it more and make making This content downloaded from Here is one of James’s staunchest defenders, is one of James’s Here 6 . true- instrumentally” (1907 [1975]: 34). “Satis . All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms . 132.174.255.116 on Sun, 28 Jun 2020 16:35:13 UTC beliefs, that is, are made true by being good to believe. Science made true being good to believe. by beliefs, that is, are

All that Prof. James had actually contended was that certainthat was contended actually had had risks James Prof. that All this parties; both faith by to treat but it was tempting to be taken by wa- of Pascal’s the apologetics as intended to revive doctrine merely pur- essential His Reason. of sacrifice the by faith glorify to and ger, Reason’ to challenge the very conception of ‘pure pose was, however, by the antithesis, and to mitigate their divergence which created works. by be justified must Faith, than less no Reason, that showing prophecies fulfilling defeatist His point is that prudence or benefit is tied to truth. That is the very That is the point is that prudence or benefit is tied to truth. His In his own words: “Any idea upon which we can ride idea upon which we “Any words: own his In All The very idea of warrant or of truth, for James, is tied up with our is tied up with The very of warrant or of truth, idea for James, James, that is, takes it as generally unreasonable to be committed to to be committed it as generally unreasonable that is, takes James, that will carry us prosperously from any one partthat will carry from experience to of our us prosperously - simplify securely, working any other part, linking things satisfactorily, is ing, saving labor, radical nature of James’s proposal. He could not be more clear than in clear than could not be more He proposal. of James’s radical nature essay was when the famous volume, to Believe Will to The the preface finally published: factorily,” for James (and this is the crux of the matter): “means more more the cruxis this (and matter): “means the of James for factorily,” their points of and individuals will emphasize satisfactorily to ourselves, everything is here therefore, a certain degree, To satisfaction differently. (1975 [1907]: 35). plastic” and faith are not separate spheres of activity, one the province of reason of reason one the province of activity, not separate spheres and faith are belief is in the of what is desirable. Religious and the other the province Rea- “pays,” false if it does not. true if it same camp as scientific belief, is James what pays. linked to inextricably son and truth are themselves - proposi between must decide not arguing that our passional natures He be decided on intellectual grounds. tions only when they can’t so that they in- the scope of “intellectual grounds” wants to broaden clude the passional. interests and passions. interests ensures or encourages the failure. or encourages the failure. ensures self- likely that Marylikely that potential and I will forgo the my friend; will become chasm a across jump to needs who climber alpine an Similarly, benefits. of the likelihood for that belief increases he can make it, should believe jump. a successful viewof truth with his view of in 1909 linking James’s Knox, Howard the will to believe: will end up my friend and that I will reap benefits. If I fail to believe, believe, I fail to If benefits. I will reap and that friend end up my will friend- undercut to actions that that will lead actions that supportactions friend- 264 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 47 Number 3 wise grounded knowledge, etc. quences—those which are empiricallyconfirmed,fitwithourother- speaks. Peircean conse- togoodandsatisfactory pragmatismlinkstruth isthatthePeircetruth latchesontothefirstoptionofwhich Pratt should bewretched ifIdid” (CP5.377;1877). took tobeJames’s “Oh, view: Icouldnotbelieve so- reasonable) isa“failure,” forit argument. The apriori method(ortheofgoingonwhatseems belief butthescientific method ofpayingattentiontoevidenceand Fixation“The of Belief,” in whichheknocks down way of fixing every Hererants usinbelievingthatitistrue. isthekeypassageinPeirce’s agreed withJames’s thatwar- ideathatifwe needsomethingtobetrue, much…” (CWJ serious man very your much goodtosayaboutJames’s essay. He writestoJames: “Ithought was clearlytouchedby thededication.Nonetheless, hedoesnothave tried vainly tokeephisdifficultfriendinacademicwork, and Peirce help thanIcanexpress orrepay.” Peirce owed aratherlottoJames, who and to whose writings in more recent years I owe more incitement and Charles Sanders Peirce, To whosephilosophiccomradeshipinoldtimes position: Peirce interested intheindispensable.But washimselfvery hedis- James dedicatedhisbookThe Will toBelieve “To My Old Friend, The essentialdifference And here isJ.B.Pratt in1909,pointingoutthefatalflaw James’s Will toBelieveexaggeratedutterance, suchasinjures a wasavery it can be no otherwise withreligious hypotheses.[1979(1896):8] it canbenootherwise scientifichypothesisisthatwhich,as we say,truest ‘works best’; and means by or falsehood can be wroughtwhich their truth out. The life, are theexperimentaltestsby whichtheyare verified, andtheonly active faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in If religious hypothesesabouttheuniverse beinorder atall,thenthe taste, unfortunately, isalways more orlessamatteroffashion somethingsimilartothedevelopment oftaste;but makes ofinquiry believe. [1909:186–7] knowledge; becauseitispleasantto andquiteanothertocallittrue that flowgrounded from itfitinharmoniouslywithourotherwise is one because thing the to logical say consequences a belief is true pleasant consequenceswhichcomefrom believingtheseconcepts.It consequences of religious concepts as such, and the matory good and made; namelybetween the‘good’, harmonious,and logically confir- consequences.Here,satisfactory however, adistinctionmustbe Pragmatism 132.174.255.116 on Sun,28Jun2020 16:35:13UTC . All usesubject tohttps://about.jstor.org/terms . . seekstoprove ofreligion thetruth by itsgoodand This content downloaded from 8 between James’s andPeirce’s accountsof 9 12: 171; 1909). 11 10 He scorned what he and- . so, becauseI . . [And] . [And] American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments • Cheryl Misak 265 Not only should the fact that an Not 14 . sentiments in their development will be will their development in . sentiments . . This content downloaded from All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 132.174.255.116 on Sun, 28 Jun 2020 16:35:13 UTC is either true or false—holds for any question into which we trueeither p is we into which any question for false—holds or 12 For instance, we must assume that, in general, our observationsgeneral, that, in assume must we instance, For that there is some ascer- hope that there question, we discuss a vexed when we forever on go to not truthis tainable discussion the that and it, about claim that it is an in- and to no purpose. A transcendentalist would an ascertainable is true that there answer dispensable ‘presupposition’ to every to talk like that, myself; for when intelligible question. I used the udders of filled from I was a babe in philosophy my bottle was substan- come to want something more this time I have by Kant. But tial. [CP 2. 113; 1902] very greatly determined by accidental causes. Now, there are some peo- some are there Now, causes. accidental by determined very greatly who, is to be found, that my reader whom I must suppose ple, among theirs is determinedsee that any belief of when they circumstance any by in words admit not merely moment that from will facts, the to extraneous itthat so it, of doubt real a but will experience is doubtful, that belief that a belief. [W3:ceases to be added] 253; 1877 emphasis I cannot help seeing that help seeing I cannot 13 Peirce wants to naturalize Kant. He thinks of indispensability argu- of indispensability thinks Kant. He naturalize to wants Peirce Indispensability comes into Peirce’s position in the following way. way. in the following position Peirce’s comes into Indispensability Peirce’s point is that a genuine belief—one that is aimed at truth—is point is that a genuine belief—one Peirce’s But it is important to see that Peirce does not want to make any make to want not does importantis it Peirce that see to But A related assumption is that for any matter into which we are in- are which we assumption is that for any matter into A related ments in a modest, low profile way. profile ments in a modest, low He thinks that there are “regulative assumptions” that we have to ac- to have that we assumptions” “regulative are that there thinks He cept. - experience or in the knowl of recalcitrant in the face such that it resigns that did not take experience a method into place by edge that it was put seriously. assumption is indispensable to our practice of inquiry not convince us of its necessary truth,of its truth. convince us it should not even He claim about special logical status (that the principle of bivalence is a the principle of bivalence claim about special logical status (that logical truth); that it is true nor even in some plainer sense; nor that the The principle must hold. bivalence world is such that the principle of a by logic of law a be to logicians by taken is says, Peirce bivalence, of own approach distinguishes his He unjustified leap. an “saltus”—by that of the transcendentalist: from are inquiring. are can be explained and that there are real things whose characters are characters are things whose real are and that there can be explained be discovered of our beliefs about them and can both independent (W3. empirical investigation 254; 1877). through on us. to the question that is pressing would find an answer quiring, we only Otherwise, into the issue: “the it would be pointless to inquire of success” can act rationally is the hope assumption upon which [we] need to assume the principle of bivalence— Thus we (W2. 272; 1869). any p, for 266 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 47 Number 3 port itmaybe”port (CP7.219;1901) embrace it,withoutbelieving“however sup- destituteofevidentiary which we practice, we cannot continue an important must somehow positive fact” (CP5.603;1903).Faced withanassumptionwithout inquiry, forinstance,we will“bequiteunabletoknow anythingof says, by “desperation.” If we donotmake theassumptionsrequired by that isdesired. Our reason formakingtheassumptionsisdriven, Peirce sumptions—assumptions that allow thepracticeto go oninthe way chasm. If we wantto succeedintheseendeavors, we needtomakeas- ing friends,preventing orjumpinga from beingruined, your country the successful continuation of a practical matter—whether it be mak- be comprehensible and able to be carried out. His point is a point about those engagedinthatpracticemustassumeorder forthepracticeto Aregulativesert.” assumptionmakesaclaimabout apracticeandwhat which hecanandshallcapture it” (CP7.219;1901). mustgoonthehypothesisthatthere ruined, issomewayin country same reason thatageneralwhohastocapture apositionorseehis 1902, seealso3.432;1896). We mustmaketheseassumptions“for the dispensability directly affectedmybalance,intheleast” (CP2.113; have given checkstothatamount.But Ihave never foundthatthein- may be indispensable that I should have $500 in the bank—because I says: “Idonotadmitthatindispensabilityisanyground ofbelief. It Like Peirce (althoughwithoutacknowledging it),Santayana holdsthat: weighed intotheindispensabilitydebate inanilluminatingmanner. George Santayana, studentofJames andpragmatist fellow- The Next Generation: George Santayana andC.I.Lewis James’ of pragmatismmarches on. asthehistory that makesgoodsense,butwe shallseethathisideafares betterthan air aboutwhetherthepropositional attitudeenvisionedby Peirce isone man worldaswe know itisimperiled. they are mere thehu- assumptions orhopes—withoutwhich,itistrue, regulative assumptions are goingto be hard to dislodge. Nonetheless, man—seeking rightanswers toourquestions,forinstance,thenthese Peirce’s is that “we view are obliged to suppose, but we need notas- If that practice is at the very heart ofwhatwe thinkmakesushu- heart If thatpractice isatthevery therefore ofhope. .[CP1.405;1890] be guided by therule escape beingkilledby hisenemy. Despair isinsanity. redoubtable, tousehispistolblowemy very hisown brainsoutto pistol to defend himself against an enemy were, on finding that en- gible isaself- acttothinkathingunintelli- ble; andtothinkyet inthatvery The soleimmediatepurposeofthinkingistorender thingsintelligi- 132.174.255.116 on Sun,28Jun2020 16:35:13UTC All usesubject tohttps://about.jstor.org/terms stultification. It isasthoughamanfurnishedwith This content downloaded from 15 : 16 There willbequestionsin the . . . We must traveller, American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments • Cheryl Misak 267 . . . . otherwise would you . .

19 such. Santayana says that instead of using such. Santayana hearted supporter central te- of one of the This content downloaded from and- All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

17 He notes that he, like James, makes use of the idea of makes use of that he, like James, notes He 18 132.174.255.116 on Sun, 28 Jun 2020 16:35:13 UTC on the behavior of the universe in its contact with us. So I with us. So in its contact bet on the behavior of the universe have been a fool and got a ducking for it. [2009 (1920): 61] have - to jump it? Be can jump a ditch help you Why does belief that you legs could jump it, that your cause it is a symptom of the fact that you A wide and not twenty. yards fit and that the ditch was two were confi- your you of these facts has given rapid and just appreciation dence, or at least has made it reasonable Chauncey Wright a nearly forgotten philosopher of real merit, taught a nearly forgotten philosopher of real Wright Chauncey that I must not say necessaryme when young that about the universe, whether anything is necessary know that we or not. I believe don ‘t we can describe myself as a betabilitarian. In regard to the original articles of the animal creed—that there is a there articles original to the creed—that animal of the regard In and and found, can be sought things that is a future, that there world, I am be offered. can possibly can be eaten—no guarantee things seen some day will perhaps the event often false; and these dogmas are sure while life lasts But altogether. all; and they will lapse falsify them [1923: 180] endure. this faith must When Santayana uses the word “faith” and Peirce uses the word the word uses and Peirce “faith” uses the word When Santayana Santayana was a whole- was Santayana Santayana, Wright, and Peirce struggled articulateto mightily the Peirce and Wright, Santayana, Santayana is at pains to distinguish his position on this matter from from his position on this matter is at pains to distinguish Santayana “instinct,” they do not mean to mark something that is unbacked by unbacked by something that is “instinct,” they do not mean to mark bet to reason have they that say to mean They reasons. and experience on the truth being such- “so brutal a term as animal faith,” he might have used “cognitive in- brutal used “cognitive have a term as animal faith,” he might “so (1951 [1940]: reason” practical stinct, empirical confidence, or even could not be any clearer: He just choose what to believe. can’t We 586). nets of pragmatism: we have to start with where we find ourselves, find ourselves, we to start have where with we nets of pragmatism: cannot simply shed in light of of belief which we laden with a body to suspend beliefs might as we Try certainty. for Cartesian requirements way of life and the need to act get in the in want of guarantees, that are that suspension. good side of the thought. Their friend and fellow founder of pragma- friend and fellow Their thought. the of side good puts their point beautifully: Holmes, Wendell tism, Oliver “the fundamental presuppositions that I cannot live without making” without making” that I cannot live presuppositions fundamental “the the fact not infer from does Santayana 505). But (1951 [1940]: 499; can choose the beliefs we beliefs that we to accept some have that we in success could nerve view “faith that sometimes should accept. James’s is, operation” own its itself by so justify about, and bring success us to at his worst—a worst in which thought typical of James he says, “a (2009 [1920]: 60). is always a good side” there that of James. 268 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 47 Number 3 matic one. The law of excluded middle merely consistent underitsown terms. The choice ofwhichtoadoptisaprag- felicity asintellectualinstruments” (1970[1923]:239). grounds when theexpandingboundariesofexperiencereveal theirin- our categoriesofmind.” They “are subjecttoalterationonpragmatic selves” and“represent nooperationsoftheobjective world,butonly lute spaceandtime,thelawsofinference are “addressed toour- brothers are male,”categoriesthatunderliescience suchasthatofabso- and speech” suchas (1970[1923]:232).Definition, analytictruths “all “principles of intelligent thought of procedure, rules the parliamentary pensable ifwe are tomakesenseofexperience. The lawsoflogicare 239). They are not necessary, as Kant argued. They are simply indis- man purposesandtheexigencies of human cooperation” (1970 [1923]: mon, andbeatenout,likeotherpathways,by thecoincidenceofhu- products, reached inthelightofexperienceswhichhave muchincom- (1970 [1923]: 237). Such frameworks, he says, “are peculiarly social conceptual frameworkornetwork ofcategoriesanddefinitive concepts “uncompelled initiative ofhumanthought” (1970[1923]:238).It isa nilly, asitisandnototherwise.” The apriori,ontheotherhand,is fail tobeaware ofthatelementinhisexperiencewhichhefinds,willy yana, itisexperiencethatcompelling:“no consciousbeing matic conceptionoftheapriori.”For aswithPeirce Lewis, andSanta- donment ofevidenceandreasons tothevagaries ofwantsandneeds. desired) toact” isdeadset againsttheaban- (1970[1940]:111).Lewis it iscorrect tobelieve andthatuponwhichitisdesirable(notmerely we we determinethatwhich determinetruth, faculty member):“When (whose papershe“lived with” fortwoyears upon arrival atHarvard asa pragmatism. asthebridgebetweenthinking ofLewis classicalandcontemporary his influenceon own student, Quine, provides anargumentfor than Santayana. But hisengagementwiththelogicalempiricistsand tently aself- what we canassume. interpretation” (1923: 3). factors are a check on These compulsory from amore optionalandargumentative factorcalledsuggestionor beliefs,” onecandistinguish“a factorcalledfactsorthings compulsory “shocks” towhichwe mustpayattention. Lewis argues that thereLewis are, for instance, several logics, each self- He callshisposition“conceptual pragmatism” andoffersus“a prag- In thegreat debatebetween Peirce andJames, hesideswithPeirce was also James’sC. I.Lewis studentand,unlike Santayana, consis- Echoing Peirce, Santayana thinksthatexperiencecomesby wayof term shallbedesignated by itsnegative. It declares ourpurposeto formulates ourdecisionthatwhatever is notdesignatedby acertain 132.174.255.116 on Sun,28Jun2020 16:35:13UTC described pragmatist. Lewis wasonlytwentydescribed pragmatist.Lewis years younger All usesubject tohttps://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from 20 “In thetangleofhuman . . . can American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments • Cheryl Misak 269 And 21 What- leaving 23 24 . The decision that The . . . . The higher up a concept stands in our The . . . This content downloaded from All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms reaching the results will be. results the reaching , written in 1929, long before before long in 1929, written , Order World the and Mind he soon grew wary of the label. Perhaps he wanted to seemhe wanted wary soon grew he Perhaps the label. of 132.174.255.116 on Sun, 28 Jun 2020 16:35:13 UTC 22 the whole body of our conceptual interpretations form a sort form of hier- conceptual interpretations the whole body of our those of such as the most comprehensive, or pyramid with archy birds’] swans are and the least general such as [‘all logic, at the top, con- with this complex system of interrelated etc, at the bottom; that particular fit them, to attempt experiences and approach cepts, we fail- Persistent patterns. into its preformed and somehow, somewhere readjustment. leads to ure disturb it, because the more to are we reluctant pyramid, the more radical and far- make, for everymake, instead— of experience, dichotomy a complete term, a tripartite basis of on the classifying choose—of might as we division between ground and the middle (as black and white) into opposites only our of such tripartite represents division rejection Our the two. [1970 (1923): 232] simplicity. penchant for would be ‘swans’ been defined as as have no such creatures are there - no such things as Euclid are The conclusion that there unimportant. should be And if we ean triangles, would be immensely disturbing. that nothing in experience possesses any stability— to realize forced a merely can both be and not be,’ was that our principle, ‘Nothing than momentarily—that de- applying to nothing more verbalism, [1929: 305–6] our world to its foundations. nouement would rock This is from from is This Here is how Lewis suggests we think of the a priori. The anticipa- of the a priori. think Lewis suggests we is how Here That new Jamesian was Richard Rorty, who wanted to “substitute who wanted to “substitute Rorty, was Richard That new Jamesian The Debate Continues: Contemporary Continues: Pragmatism The Debate the de- to how thoughts as I want to turn to some brief and speculative started Although Quine off calling himself a bate manifests itself today. pragmatist, it is very similar to Peirce’s view of how we should regard what we find what we should regard we view of how it is very similar to Peirce’s sim- They are necessarily true. not are indispensable. A priori “truths” could be revised, They need to articulateply what we our world view. cost to that world view. but only at great Lewis’ own students—Quine and Goodman (and Morton White) bi- (and Morton and Goodman students—Quine own Lewis’ started to use these veryzarrely thoughts against Lewis himself. tion of Quine, it will be noted, could not be stronger: it will be noted, could tion of Quine, the idea of ‘unforced agreement’ for that of ‘objectivity’” (1991: 38). It (1991: 38). It for that of ‘objectivity’” agreement’ the idea of ‘unforced the ground wide open to be taken over by a new Jamesian. a new by Jamesian. to be taken over wide open the ground ever the explanation, Quine abandoned the pragmatist camp, Quine the explanation, ever to not be simply trumpeting his teacher’s view, although trumpet Lewis’ although trumpet Lewis’ view, to not be simply trumpeting his teacher’s the had captured he felt that James view he most certainly did. Perhaps the position that pragmatist flag and wanted to distance himself from and others. Moore, Russell, had attracted so much scorn from 270 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 47 Number 3 force ofexperience. ments ofnecessity. They are humanstandards, heldincheckby the not given to us by God. And they are not given to us by the require- connection withtheworld- reason- norms andstandards, whichcomefrom withinourpracticesofinquiry, of pragmatism, I submit, lies in this modest stance, in which there are mas (the mistake of Kant it and, is I necessarily would true argue, Haber- mistake of taking what we need to believe so seriously as to think that need tobelieve whileavoiding twomistakes. We mustnotmakethe ticulated by Peirce and Wright. We need to take seriously that which we own stories(Rorty 2000[1989]:40). we cansay“thus Iwilledit” andwe canmakeourselves authorsofour By andcircumstances from redescribing ourown history pointofview, of experience.Allischosen,ifnotby individuals,thenby communities. irony lefttoadjudicatebetween them. There isnoplaceforthecheck Given that norms are human norms,there is nothingbutplayand There andwarrantover isnothingtosayabouttruth andabove that. position isasfollows: ifwe needtothinkp,thenwe oughttobelieve p. oftruth”theory (Rorty 1995c:71).For onewayofthinkingRorty’s matism “tend tocenteraround James’s version is nosurprisetofind sayingthathis Rorty own narratives aboutprag- ——— (1979 [1891]). “The Moral——— (1979[1891]).“The Philosopher andtheMoral Life.”In The James,(1975–1988). William Howe, Mark DeWolfe (ed.)(1941).Holmes- Habermas, J(1990).“Discourse Ethics: Notes onaProgram ofPhilosophical Jus- Dewey, John Pragmatism (1977 [1908]. “What Means by Practical.” In Apel, K- REFERENCES But we mustreturn, Isubmit,tothemore firstar- moderateview Works of William James, vi: sity Press. Burkhard, F. Bowers, and I. K.Skrupskelis. Cambridge Mass: Harvard Univer- Harvard University Press. Mr. Justice Holmes andSir Frederick Pollock, 1874–1932.CambridgeMass: Controversy. CambridgeMass: MITPress, 60–110. tification.” In S. Benhabib and F. Dallmayr, eds.,TheCommunicative Ethics 116. ed. Jo AnnBoydston, CarbondaleIl: Southern Illinois University Press, 98– dle Works ofJohn Dewey 1899–1924,iv:Essays, Moral Principles inEducation, Cambridge Mass: MITPress, 23–59. S. the Relationship between Ethics, Utopia, andtheCritique ofUtopia.” In 25 Benhabib andF. Dallmayr, eds.,TheCommunicative Ethics Controversy. ) or true insomeplainersense(themistakeofJames).) ortrue The future giving, andjustification. Theyare notgiven tous by adirect O. “Is the Ethics of the Ideal Communication Community a Utopia? On 132.174.255.116 on Sun,28Jun2020 16:35:13UTC All usesubject tohttps://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from The Works of William JamesThe Works, 18volumes, ed.F.of William H. as- The Will toBelieve andOther Essays inPopular itis independentlyofinquirers. They are Pollock Letters: theCorrespondence of . . . ofthepragmatic The Mid- American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments • Cheryl Misak 271 vi: Quarterly Quarterly Proceedings of the of Proceedings The Works of William The Works James, , and Reviews Comments, Essays, xvii: xvii: This content downloaded from All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms . Oxford: Oxford Oxford Oxford: . Philosophy American of Handbook Oxford The 132.174.255.116 on Sun, 28 Jun 2020 16:35:13 UTC , Columbia: University of , Columbia: University and Prospects Sources Its (eds.), Pragmatism: Zeltner , ed. F. H. Burkhard, F. Bowers, and I. K.Skrupskelis. Cambridge Cambridge K.Skrupskelis. and I. Bowers, F. H. Burkhard, F. , ed. Philosophy 141–162. Press, University Harvard Mass: H. Burkhard, , ed. F. Philosophy in Popular Essays Other and to Believe Will The Press, University Harvard Mass: Cambridge and I. K.Skrupskelis. Bowers, F. 13–34. of William The Works In Stewart.” James, - Har Mass: Cambridge I. K.Skrupskelis. and Bowers, F. H. Burkhard, ed. F. 290–294. Press, University vard Cited Virginia. of Press University Charlottesville: skelis and E. M. Berkeley. year. number: page number; as CWJ volume , 8: 33–77. Reprinted in Olin (1992), 161–195. in Olin Society, 8: 33–77. Reprinted Aristotelian S.U.N.Y Press. Cambridge eds.;vii and viii, ed. A. Burks. Weiss, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. and paragraph number. Cited as CP plus volume Press. Belknap Mass.: Press. University Indiana Bloomington: E. Moore. Press. Columbia University York: P. 21–39. Press, Carolina South (1992), 196–211. in Olin Repr. . London: Allen and Unwin. osophical Essays 257–284. 13. London: Routledge . London: Constable. Philosophy Hill. Lennox York: . New count of his Life , 210/2. Reprinted in Shook (2001). in Shook , 210/2. Reprinted Review Press. Washington of University Seattle, Society, 30: 4, pp.739–775. S. Peirce of the Charles Transactions Ethics.” Press. University sity Press. ——— (1979 [1896]). “The Will to Believe.” In In Believe.” to “The[1896]). (1979 Will ——— and Balfour Tait Guthrie Peter by Unseen, [1875]). “The——— (1987 Universe William- of , i–xii, ed. I. K. Skrup The Correspondence ——— (1992–2004). James Truth,” of The Evolution [1909]). “Pragmatism: (2001 Howard Knox, . Albany NY: . Albany NY: Pragmatist The Last Great C.I.Lewis: G. (2005). Murray Murphey, . London: Routledge. in Focus Pragmatism James: (1992). William Doris, Olin, , i–vi Peirce Sanders of Charles (1931–58). Collected Papers Charles Sanders Peirce, , ed. Edition A Chronological S. Peirce: of Charles Writings ——— (1900– ). The University. Harvard Library, Houghton Papers, ——— Charles S. Peirce . New Essays and Other Relativity Ontological (1969). Orman van Willard Quine, and R. Mulvaney In in Empiricism.” Place ——— (1981). “The Pragmatist’s - Phil In Truth.” Conception of Bertrand (1992 [1966]). “William James’s Russell, 1909– Papers, Logical and Philosophical In ——— (1992 [1909]). “Pragmatism.” of to a System Introduction Faith: (1923). Scepticism and Animal George Santayana, Thoemmes Press. Bristol: , i–v. of Pragmatism Critics Early (ed.) (2001). John Shook, - Some Ac With Wright: (1971 [1878]). Letters of Chauncey Bradley James Thayer, . of Pragmatism and the Foundations Wright (1963). Chauncey Edward Madden, and Truth in Turn Transcendental the and Cheryl Misak, “Pragmatism (1994). (2008). ——— - Univer Oxford . Oxford: Pragmatists ——— (forthcoming 2012). The American “Pragmatism’.” James’s “Professor [1907]). (1992 E. G. Moore, 272 T R A N S A C T I O N S Volume 47 Number 3 113; 1902). a quantityofbigadmissions, as indispensableVoraussetzungen oflogic” (CP2. apothecaries, asIcallthem—they are soskilfulinmakingupabill—who callfor that there isphysicalcausation.(See 1871:131) writings. He thinksthatwe needtomakethe“a prioriassumption,”forinstance, had indiagrammaticcontexts,forinstance. (willing tobelieve). [CP6.485;1908] control thought,todoubt,andweigh reasons) withwilling nottoexert thewill andinsuchconfusionsofthoughtasthatactive willing(willingto of truth, become infectedwithseedsofdeathinsuchnotionsasthat which heattributestoJames, Schiller, and“the pragmatistsof today”: altered lestit“flatlycondemnallhuman reasoning” (CWJ12:171–172;1909). 12: 171; 1909). James of truth The view advances is “careless” and needs to be my life’. For Peirce, isnotlinkedtothiskindofconsequence.For truth James, itis. belief can’t ‘itissatisfyingtome’ beofthesort or‘ithasacommandinginfluenceon an old- to show thatthehypothesisisbelief- to putinplaceistellinglydifferent. He thoughtthatthere isoneandonlyway inquiring whethertheismisalegitimatedoctrine,butthetestforlegitimacyhetries question ofwhetheritisrationaltobelieve inGod. He wasjustaskeenJames in James closetoPeirce’s presents uswithsomething very oftruth. view Moralhave. At times(forinstance,in“The Philosopher andtheMoral Life”), lieve were in the long run, we to have all the evidence and argument we could here andnow, whereas Peirce tobewhatwouldgood- alwaystakestruth excerpt quotedhere. must turntotheexcellent Madden (1963:45)tofindthelonger, more interesting draft. Research, and the audience at the C. S. Peirce Society, for comments on an earlier NOTES ——— (1971[1877]).Philosophical Discussions,ed.CharlesEliot Norton, New Wright, Genesis ofSpecies.” Chauncey(1871).“The In Wright (1971[1877]). 14. He hasnograndioseplansforthem:“Iamnotoneofthose transcendental 13. Wright wasinterested inasimilaridea,butitwasundeveloped in his scant 12. Peirce arguesthatrecalcitrant experiencecantakemanyforms—itbe It seemstomeapitytheyshouldallow aphilosophysoinstinctwithlifeto 11. In 1908hedistanceshimselffrom theJamesian brandofpragmatism, 10. Peirce thinksthatJames’s Pluralistic Universeis even “more suicidal” ( CWJ 9. That this is Peirce’s clear when we is see made howvery view he handled the 8. Anotherdifference isthatJames tobewhatworks sometimestakestruth 7. Knox (2001[1909]:5). 6. For asustainedinterpretation of James onthisscore, seeMisak (2012). 5. See Peirce Important “Vitally Topics” (CP5:616–661;1898). 4. Part ofthis letter canbefoundin Thayer (1971[1878]:341–43).But one 3. (1987[1875]:293);emphasisinoriginal. 2. James (1987[1875]:293). 1. Thanks gotoDiana Heney, thephilosophersatNew SchoolforSocial York: Burt Franklin. fashioned kindofevidencefororagainstit. The consequencesrelevant to 132.174.255.116 on Sun,28Jun2020 16:35:13UTC All usesubject tohttps://about.jstor.org/terms This content downloaded from worthy—to showworthy—to thatitissuchwe canget . . . themutability American Pragmatism and Indispensability Arguments • Cheryl Misak 273 5. 45; 1903, and contingent’ preconditions of preconditions contingent’ 2. 146; 1902, CP This content downloaded from 4. 98: 107; 1908). Note that in moral and political mat- 4. 98: 107; 1908). Note All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1. 332–336; 1905, CP issue. The main matter is that Peirce very clearly pulls apart the matter is that Peirce The main issue. See Misak (1994): “Pragmatism and the Transcendental Turn in Turn Transcendental the and “Pragmatism (1994): Misak See

Pollock Letters vol. 2: 252; 1929. Letters vol. Pollock sentence kind of verificationism. That is what is attacked by Quine. by That is what is attacked sentence kind of verificationism. 132.174.255.116 on Sun, 28 Jun 2020 16:35:13 UTC by- ‘non- ‘necessary’, the ‘universal’, They are

Otto Apel, who argued that it is a “pragmatic presupposition” of communi- presupposition” who argued that it is a “pragmatic Apel, Otto 22. See, for instance, Quine’s essay “Ontological Relativity,” part inau- the of Relativity,” “Ontological essay Quine’s instance, for See, 22. (1992 [1907]) and (1992 [1909]) and (1992 [1966]), Moore Russell 23. See in Empiricism.” Place “The24. See Pragmatist’s Habermas’and is that of Jurgen view25. One that styled itself after Peirce 21. As Murphey (2005: 331) notes, Lewis, with the logical em- in fitting in 21. As Murphey - alterna attitude, is a propositional that there be suggesting seems to 15. Peirce to Believe Will also collected in The “The Determinism,” of 16. In Dilemma “I stand in phi- made this remark: could have or Peirce Santayana 17. Either to “TheWill of the classical pragmatist response complete the picture To 18. 20. (1923: 139f), on the brute compulsion and shock Peirce emphasis his. For 19. Holmes- gural Dewey Lectures (1969: 26). Lectures gural Dewey view. of James’s of the reception (2008: 197–223) for a sustained discussion Misak Karl- treat in our deliberations and that we aim at and expect consensus cation that we that these claims—these things They concluded with respect. others equally and of objectivity The necessary communication—are in truths. presuppose we that they grounded, morals and politics and the democratic principles of discourse are 1990: 1990:24, see Habermas (Apel manner” argued, “in an undisputably valid 79–80) It goes against the grain of the holism that is expressed in the above passage. in the above goes against the grain of the holism that is expressed It CP 5. 382; 1877. towards sometimes moved during his later work, current piricist debates that were a sentence- communication. Transactions of Transactions a view, for the argument that this is too strong and Ethics” Truth Society, 30: 4, pp.739–775. S. Peirce the Charles tive to belief, which is appropriate in certain circumstances. It is of course an open course an is of certain in It which is appropriate circumstances. to belief, tive ‘this the proposition towards kind of attitude adopting this question whether instill be sufficient to would this position’ can capture or ‘we chasm is jumpable’ the position. or capture jump the chasm to successfully required the confidence that is a side- But - the likeli true being of believing p or from the rationality from of p’s desirability truth.hood of its argues that we He position. the Peircean towards seems to move James volume, continue in the way we to are of the will, if we freedom have to act as if we have think necessary. not be honest otherwise.” I stand in daily life; I should losophy exactly where It of sentence first the Indeed, vi). (1923: pen Santayana’s from come to happens is compelled to “plunge tells us that the philosopher Faith Scepticism and Animal ” (1923: 1). in media res of a belief in the happy consequences for a believer Dewey: is here to Believe,” for, the existence of such a being, probable, more or render not prove, “can God depend upon accepting such an the argument, these desirable consequences by Works (Middle existence” of experience, see CP ters, a belief’s making life go better might indeed be relevant to its warrant. For ters, a belief’s to its warrant. For go better might indeed be relevant making life the inquirythere be about what makes life go better. might well