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Annual Review of Economics The Economics of Parenting
Matthias Doepke,1 Giuseppe Sorrenti,2 and Fabrizio Zilibotti3 1Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA; email: [email protected] 2Department of Economics and Jacobs Center for Productive Youth Development, University of Zurich, Zurich 8001, Switzerland; email: [email protected] 3Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06511, USA; email: [email protected]
Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019. 11:55–84 Keywords First published as a Review in Advance on parenting, parenting style, skill acquisition, peer effects, altruism, May 13, 2019 paternalism The Annual Review of Economics is online at economics.annualreviews.org Abstract Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:55-84. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics- Access provided by Northwestern University on 10/02/19. For personal use only. Parenting decisions are among the most consequential choices that peo- 080218-030156 ple make throughout their lives. Starting with the work of pioneers such Copyright © 2019 by Annual Reviews. as Gary Becker, economists have used the tool set of their discipline to un- All rights reserved derstand what parents do and how parents’ actions affect their children. In JEL codes: J13, J24, R20 recent years, the literature on parenting within economics has increasingly leveraged findings and concepts from related disciplines that also dealwith parent–child interactions. For example, economists have developed mod- els to understand the choice among various parenting styles that were first explored in the developmental psychology literature and have estimated detailed empirical models of children’s accumulation of cognitive and noncognitive skills in response to parental and other inputs. In this review, we survey the economic literature on parenting and point out promising di- rections for future research.
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1. INTRODUCTION Among the distinct characteristics of humans is extraordinarily slow development. We are born helpless and then go through a prolonged phase of childhood and adolescence before reaching full maturity decades into our lives. As a consequence, young humans depend on their parents. Child rearing or parenting refers to everything that parents do to support the development of their children, from basics such as providing food and shelter to guiding their emotional and intellectual development. In the past parenting was mostly studied in other social sciences such as sociology and develop- mental psychology; however, in recent years, a large literature on parenting has developed within economics. In part, this reflects the growing reach of economics, which in the case of thestudyof parenting goes back to Gary Becker’s work on the family (see Becker 1981). However, an equally important factor is the fact that recent research shows that parenting decisions have profound economic implications. In modern economies, approximately two-thirds of total income goes to workers as wages, and most of this income reflects the return to accumulated human capital rather than raw labor. A key factor in the accumulation of human capital, in turn, is parenting decisions that start in the very first years of life and continue through a child’s development to adulthood. Economists who want to study the role of human capital in economic development, determinants of social mobility, and the drivers of long-run inequality must take parenting decisions into account. Choices that matter for parenting start long before a child is born. In the marriage market, for example, one criterion in choosing a partner is what she or he has to offer in terms of expected future investments in children. Several papers on the economics of marriage analyze how future parenting plans affect premarital investments and the matching patterns in the marriage market (see, for example, Chiappori et al. 2017). In turn, these choices influence the parenting choices that take place after a relationship is formed. Even more directly, the choice of how to raise each individual child is closely linked to the choice of how many children to have in the first place. One of the central concepts in the economics of fertility is Becker’s quantity–quality trade-off, i.e., the notion that a larger number of children (quantity) tends to lower investment in each individual child (quality).1 This trade-off is inevitable, particularly in regard to parents’ time: For parents with many children, it is simply not possible to spend hours of one-on-one time each day with each individual child, whereas parents of only children have more flexibility. Fertility and other parenting decisions are therefore closely linked. Nevertheless, in this review, we focus more narrowly on child-rearing decisions that take place after parents have formed a relationship and have had a child. In part, this is because the study of the Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:55-84. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org economics of marriage and fertility has a longer history,and many surveys are available.2 Moreover, Access provided by Northwestern University on 10/02/19. For personal use only. to date, the literatures on marriage, fertility,and narrowly defined parenting have mostly developed in isolation, with a lack of research that considers, say, a joint decision involving how many children to have and with which parenting style to raise them. We believe considering interactions among different choices that affect child rearing to be an important direction for future research, and we discuss some specific issues (such as the role of single parenting) at the end of the review.
1Becker (1960) provides the initial statement of the quantity–quality tradeoff, and Doepke (2015) provides an overview of the role of this concept in the economics of fertility. 2For an overview of the economics of marriage and the family and some recent directions in this literature, the reader is referred to Browning et al. (2014), Lundberg & Pollak (2007), and Lundberg et al. (2016). Surveys with a focus on the macroeconomic implications of family decisions are provided by Doepke & Tertilt (2016) and Greenwood et al. (2017). For the economics of fertility, the reader is referred to, for example, Hotz et al. (1997) and Doepke & Zilibotti (2019, chapter 7).
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We develop our discussion of the economic literature on post-birth parenting around three main themes. First, we focus on the choice of a parenting style. The term parenting style stems from developmental psychology and refers to the broad strategies that parents follow in raising their children, such as an obedience-based authoritarian style versus permissive parenting that grants more independence to children. We describe how the economics of parenting can be used to derive predictions on how economic conditions affect the choice of parenting style, and we point to empirical evidence suggesting that variation in parenting practices over time and across space lines up well with these predictions. Second, we focus on technology, and in particular on the production function allowing children to acquire and accumulate skills. Some of the issues discussed in the underlying literature are the relative importance of parental and other inputs, the effect of early versus late inputs as children develop, and the complementarity among inputs over time and across different types of inputs. Third, we focus on the effects of the environment. It has long been recognized that peer effects count for a lot in child development, especially during adolescence. This suggests that parents’ impact on their children may work in large part through their influence on their children’s en- vironment, rather than through their direct interactions with them. For example, parents choose the neighborhood in which a family lives and the schools that their children attend. We discuss how these choices can be framed as an integral part of the economics of parenting. We organize our discussion by presenting a general model that captures the main aspects of the economics of parenting. We model the decision problem of parents who care about their own utility and the welfare of their children. Following the work of Doepke & Zilibotti (2017), the concern for children allows for both altruism (parents care about their children’s utility) and pa- ternalism (parents care about their children’s actions in ways that potentially conflict with the children’s own preferences). Parents face a set of constraints that include not only standard bud- get and time constraints, but also technological constraints. For example, there is a production function that specifies how children’s skills and attitudes evolve as a function of endowments and parental inputs. The framework also allows for environmental influences outside the immediate family, such as peer effects in schools and neighborhood effects, to affect child development. Using this general framework, we discuss the economic literature on the three main issues out- lined above, and we relate theoretical results to empirical evidence. Much of the literature on the economics of parenting is recent; the research frontier is constantly evolving, and many new ques- tions raised by current research are yet to be addressed. We therefore conclude by outlining a few areas for future research on the economics of parenting that we consider particularly promising. In Section 2, we present our economic model of parenting. In Section 3, we use this model to
Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:55-84. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org discuss the economics of choosing a parenting style and compare the predictions of the theory to Access provided by Northwestern University on 10/02/19. For personal use only. data. In Section 4, we relate the recent literature on children’s skill acquisition to our model of parenting. Neighborhood and peer effects are discussed in Section 5. Conclusions and directions for future research are discussed in Section 6.
2. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF PARENTING In this section, we outline a general economic model of parenting that we use below to discuss parenting styles, skill formation, and neighborhood and peer effects. What we mean by economic model is that we conceive of parenting decisions in the same way that economists conceive of any other decision: Parents pursue particular objectives that are summarized by a utility function; they act rationally and purposefully in pursuing these objectives; and they are subject to various con- straints such as limits to their financial resources, their knowledge, their time, and the underlying technology of child development. Given that much of parenting is about parent–child interac- tions, the model also allows for children to have a say and take actions on their own. The main
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elements of the model are a combination of work on parenting style by Doepke & Zilibotti (2017) with the notion of a multistage production function for skills, as in James Heckman’s recent work with different coauthors (e.g., Cunha & Heckman 2007, Cunha et al. 2010). In the model, we limit attention to a single parent and a single child. We start with the parent’s objectives. The parent derives utility during two periods of adulthood, and also cares about the child. The value function that the parent seeks to maximize is given by = | + | + − γ v + γ v . V U1(C1, L1 A) U2(C2, L2 A) Z [(1 ) ˜ ] 1.
We use the convention that upper-case variables refer to the parent, and lower-case variables to
the child. Accordingly, Ct and Lt are the parent’s consumption and leisure in period t,andA is a vector of preference parameters for the parent. The overall weight that the parent attaches to the welfare of the child is given by the parameter Z > 0. The parent derives utility from the child in two different ways. First, she cares about the child’s actual lifetime utility v, i.e., the parent displays altruism, as in Gary Becker’s work on dynastic utility (e.g., Becker & Barro 1988, Barro & Becker 1989). Second, we also allow for the possibility that the parent may evaluate the welfare of the child through a different function v˜ that does not coincide with the true utility of the child. This feature captures paternalism, i.e., a utility derived from the child’s choices and outcomes that reflects the parent’s own distinct views on what is good for the child. Paternalistic preferences (and the related concept of imperfect empathy) play a central role in the economic literature on cultural transmission.3 The parameter γ measures the relative importance of altruism versus paternalism in the parent’s preferences. We abstract from uncertainty during the two periods of adulthood, but the setup allows for shocks that affect the child before she reaches adulthood. The utility derived from the child is therefore an expected utility. The value function that the child seeks to maximize (and that enters into the parent’s altruistic utility) is v = | + | + . u1 (c1, l1 a1 ) u2 (c2, l2 a2 ) zV 2.
In this case, ct and lt are the consumption and leisure of the child; at is the child’s preference vector at age t;andV is the expected continuation utility of the child after reaching adulthood, which, in a dynastic model, would be of the form in Equation 1. Unlike the parent’s preferences A,the
child’s preferences at evolve during childhood, which captures the gradual formation of attitudes
and noncognitive skills such as patience and perseverance. Leisure lt can be a vector of different activities from which the child derives enjoyment. The parameter z ∈ (0, 1) denotes the weight that the child attaches to future adult utility. Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:55-84. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Access provided by Northwestern University on 10/02/19. For personal use only. The parent’s paternalistic concern about the child v˜ is given by v = | + | + ; ˜ u˜1 (c1, l1 A) u˜2 (c2, l2 A) zV
that is, the parent’s paternalistic utility is defined over the same objects as the child’s actual util- ity but with a potentially different functional form for utility that may depend on the parent’s preferences A. The key implication of the paternalistic component in preferences is that the parent may dis- agree with the actions of the child; this scope for disagreement turns out to play a central role in the economics of parenting. In particular, parenting styles relate to how the disagreement be- tween parent and child is resolved. Our representation is rather general and can capture different
3Bisin & Verdier (2001) provide a seminal contribution to this literature; Bisin & Verdier (2011) provide a survey.
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sources of disagreement, ranging from different views regarding risk aversion or work ethic to the consumption of particular goods such as alcohol and cigarettes. A particularly common source of disagreement between parents and children (which we focus on below) stems from time preferences: The parent may wish the child to focus more on long-run success rather than instant gratification. More formally, the parent (in the paternalistic utility v˜ ) places relatively more weight on the child’s future utility V (compared to the young-age utility) than does the child in her own utility function v. Notice that, even though the same discount factor z appears in v˜ and v, our setup still incorporates the possibility of disagreement about intertem- · · poral trade-offs through the dependence of the utility functions ut ( )andu˜t ( ) on the preferences A and a of the parent and the child. As a specific example, we can capture such a difference in patience by setting the utility of the child to
v = + β + β2 a1u(c1, l1 ) a2 u(c2, l2 ) V ,3.
whereas the paternalistic preference of the parent is given by
v = + β + β2 ˜ u(c1, l1 ) u(c2, l2 ) V ,4. √ wherewedefineβ ≡ z. In this case, β is the parent’s discount factor, whereas the child’s (scalar) ≥ ≥ preference parameters a1 1anda2 1 capture additional weight that the child places on expe- riences early in life relative to the later-in-life expected utility V .4 Next, we turn to choices and constraints. The parent’s choices at time t include her own con-
sumption Ct , the child’s consumption ct , her own leisure Lt , and her own labor supply Nt .Weare particularly interested in parenting choices, i.e., choices aimed at affecting the development of the
child. The parent’s investment in the child’s development is represented by a vector It ,where = { }. It Xt , Et
In this case, Xt is a time investment in child rearing, and Et is a monetary investment (expense) in child rearing. The parent can also affect the influence of peers on the child’s development by
choosing the district of residence dt where the family lives. Finally, the parent can determine the X choice set t for the child, which determines how much freedom of choice the child has. The parent is constrained by an intertemporal budget constraint, + + + + 1 + + + = w + 1 w C1 c1 E1 q(d1 ) C2 c2 E2 q(d2 ) 1 (S) N1 2 (S) N2,5. R R
Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:55-84. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org and by a time constraint, Access provided by Northwestern University on 10/02/19. For personal use only. + + = . Lt Nt Xt 1 w Here, R is the gross interest rate, S is the skill vector of the parent, t (S) is the wage, and q (dt ) is the rental cost of living in neighborhood dt . Neighborhoods may differ for exogenous reasons, such as the quality of public schools. There may also be peer externalities, namely, the quality of neighborhood is a function of the average skills of the residents. If households cannot borrow, then the intertemporal budget constraint is replaced by two sequential constraints.
4 | = | = These utilities can be mapped into Equations 1 and 2 by setting u1 (c1, l1 a1 ) a1u (c1, l1 ), u2 (c2, l2 a2 ) β | = | = β a2 u (c2, l2 ), u˜1 (c1, l1 A) u (c1, l1 ),andu˜2 (c1, l1 A) u (c2, l2 ). In Section 3.2, we focus on the case where = > = 2 a2 a 1anda1 a . This case yields a constant intertemporal trade-off, where the child’s discount factor β/ β v = 2 + + 2 a is smaller than the adult discount factor . In this case, we can write a u(c1, l1 ) bu(c2, l2 ) b V v = + β + β2 = β/ <β and ˜ u(c1, l1 ) u(c2, l2 ) V ,whereb a .
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The child’s choices are leisure lt and a vector of own investment in skills xt . The choices of the child are constrained by the choice set imposed by the parent: { }∈X . lt , xt t
The choice set reflects time constraints as well as additional restrictions potentially imposed by X the parent. In turn, the parent’s choice of t has to respect technological constraints, i.e., there is X X ∈ X X a set of feasible choice sets t ,andtheparentmustsatisfy t t . The feasible set t may in turn depend on the investments It , capturing the idea that restricting or expanding the child’s choice may be costly (e.g., time spent monitoring the child). For example, the parent may spend effort to force the child to study more for school and to spend less time playing video games, or the parent may force the child to adopt a particular occupation (e.g., accountant instead of circus performer). Conversely, the parent may expose the child to role models or activities that broaden the range of actions among which the child can choose.5 The final set of constraints for both parent and child concerns the technology of skillaccu-
mulation. The child’s skills consist of cognitive skills ht and noncognitive skills (e.g., preferences, ={ } attitudes, and values) at .Letst ht , at denote the entire skill vector of the child. Let s1 denote the initial skill vector of the child. In the first period of childhood, the child’s skills evolve asa
function of initial conditions, the parent’s investment, the environment, and the child’s effort x1: = . s2 f1(S, s1, I1, d1, x1 ) 6.
In the second period (adolescence), we have = S f2(S, s2, I2, d2, x2 ), 7.
where S ={H , A } is the child’s skill vector at the beginning of adulthood, which in turn deter- mines the child’s utility as an adult V . We now have all the pieces in place to discuss the three specific elements of the economics of parenting outlined in the introduction (Section 1). In Section 3, we focus on parenting style, which relates to how the disagreement between parent and child is resolved. In Section 4, we deal with the technology of skill formation, which relates to the specific properties of the technology in Equations 6 and 7 and how these properties interact with other aspects of parenting. The role
of the choice of a neighborhood dt in parenting is analyzed in Section 5.
3. THE ECONOMICS OF PARENTING STYLE Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:55-84. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
Access provided by Northwestern University on 10/02/19. For personal use only. The framework outlined in Section 2 can shed light on a variety of aspects of parent–child in- teractions. In developmental psychology, starting with the seminal work of Baumrind (1967), the concept of parenting style takes a central place in categorizing types of parenting. For us, the choice of parenting style describes the extent to which parents interfere with their children’s own inclinations and how they go about getting children to conform to their own wishes.
3.1. Parenting Styles in the General Model = In the general framework above, consider the child’s choices xt in period t 1, 2, which may in- clude actions such as effort put into studying for school, but also other choices with potential
5The parent’s control over the child’s choice set relates our model to Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory. According to this theory, children learn from role models to which they are exposed. Saez Marti (2018) incor- porates this notion into an economic model of cultural transmission through endogenous parental influence.
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long-run consequences, such as drinking alcohol, having unprotected sex, and similar risky behav- iors. In the analysis of Doepke & Zilibotti (2017), parenting styles come down to whether, and
how, parents interfere with the child’s choice. If the child can choose xt freely, then she will do this with the objective of maximizing her own utility in Equation 2. How will the parent feel about this choice? If the parent is purely altruistic (i.e., if γ = 0, so that only the altruistic component enters Equation 1), then the parent will necessarily agree. Such a parent simply wants the child to be happy and thus approves of anything that contributes to the child’s happiness. However, if the parent is at least somewhat paternalistic (γ>0), then there may be disagreement. For example, if the parent places relatively more weight on the child’s future relative to the enjoyment of the present, then the parent will wish the child to put more effort into education than what the child would choose of her own accord. Similarly, if the parent’s paternalistic preferences incorporate more risk aversion than the child’s own utility, the parent may wish the child to stay away from certain risk-taking activities that the child would like to engage in. The three traditional parenting styles in developmental psychology can be understood as archetypes of resolutions of this conflict between parent and child.6 The permissive parenting style is one where the parent lets the child have her way and refrains from interfering in the
choices xt . The authoritarian style is one where the parent imposes her will through coercion. In the model above, coercion (i.e., authoritarian parenting) is captured through the notion of re- X X stricting the choice set t . An authoritarian parent chooses a small set t that leaves little or no leeway to the child. The third parenting style, authoritative parenting, is also one where the par- ent aims to affect the child’s choice. However, rather than using coercion, an authoritative parent
uses persuasion: She shapes the child’s preferences a2 through investments I1 in the first period of life. For example, such a parent may preach the virtues of patience or the dangers of risk when the child is little, so that the child ends up with more adult-like preferences when the child’s own decisions matter during adolescence. What determines the trade-off among these parenting styles? All parenting styles come with costs and benefits. Permissive parenting maximizes the utility of the child, but the child mayend up making choices that go against the paternalistic drive of the parent. An authoritarian parent directly influences the child’s choice, but this lowers the happiness of the child and may haveother repercussions, particularly if there are economic benefits (in terms of the child’s future expected utility) to making independent decisions. An authoritative parent also influences the child’s choice, but this parenting style requires costly effort on the part of the parent and may also reduce the child’s welfare. How these trade-offs are resolved depends in part on the level of paternalism γ . More importantly, for a given level of paternalism, what matters are the economic conditions that
Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:55-84. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org shape the impact that a given decision will have on the child’s future. Access provided by Northwestern University on 10/02/19. For personal use only.
3.2. The Impact of Economic Conditions on Parenting Style We illustrate the interaction between economic conditions and parenting styles with a specialized version of the model in Section 2 in which the dimension of child preferences that parents aim to influence is patience.7 Patience is a natural starting point for a theory of parent–child transmission of preferences, both because disagreement about how to weigh immediate gratification versus future payoffs is a particularly salient aspect of parent–child interactions and because patience
6Neglecting parenting is sometimes considered to be a fourth parenting style. We abstract from this parenting style in this review (for a discussion, see Doepke & Zilibotti 2017). 7Models of endogenous patience were first applied by Becker & Mulligan (1997) and Doepke & Zilibotti (2005, 2008).
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matters for future-oriented investments such as education.8 The stylized model is based on the work of Doepke & Zilibotti (2017) and Agostinelli et al. (2019). The model is stripped down to the essential elements needed to bring out the main trade-offs involved in choosing a parenting style. We abstract from goods consumption and labor supply. For the parent, the period utility function = − is linear in leisure, given by L1 1 X1,whereX1 is parenting effort. There is no parenting effort in the second period, so that (ignoring constants) the utility in Equation 1 takes the form − + − γ v + γ v . X1 Z [(1 ) ˜ ] For the child, we abstract from utility during the first (early childhood) period. During the second
(adolescence) period, the child gets linear utility from leisure l2, which depends on the child’svector x2 of education investments. There is disagreement about the intertemporal trade-off between the child and the paternalistic parent, as in Equations 3 and 4. Given that utility is only derived in the second period, we can rewrite Equations 3 and 4 as v = + β a2l2 V ,8. v = + β ˜ l2 V ,9.
≥ where a2 1 is the extent to which the child places more weight on fun in the present versus welfare in the future. Next, we turn to the technology of skill formation. In the first period, the technology in ={ } Equation 6 for the accumulation of the skill vector s2 h2, a2 takes the form = h2 fh,1 (S, d1 ), = . a2 fa,1 (S, X1, d1 )
That is, the child’s cognitive skills in adolescence h2 evolve passively depending on endowments (represented by the parent’s skill vector S) and the environment (represented by the neighborhood
quality d1, taken as fixed in this case). We abstract from investment in cognitive skills byboththe parent and the child at this stage. Instead, parental involvement is crucial for the acquisition of
noncognitive skills, represented in this case by the child’s preference parameter a2. In addition to S and d1, this parameter depends on the parent’s time investment X1. Intuitively, increasing the child’s patience (in this case, by lowering the enjoyment of the present a2) requires a socialization X effort that is costly in terms of time. In the first period, the parent also chooses the choice set 2 that constrains the child’s choice in the second period.
Annu. Rev. Econ. 2019.11:55-84. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org In the second period (adolescence), adult skills are formed. At this stage, parents make no fur- Access provided by Northwestern University on 10/02/19. For personal use only. ther direct investment, and the ball is in the child’s court. The child is now called on to make
decisions x2 in two dimensions: the choice of an occupation k and an investment in human capital ={ } = xh,2, i.e., x2 k, xh,2 . The acquisition of adult skills S H hinges on xh,2 and the values and skills that the child has acquired in the early period: = . H fh,2 (S, h2, d2, xh,2 )