Documentof The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized Report No. 18765
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT Public Disclosure Authorized
INDIA
STATES' ROAD PROJECT (Loan 2994-IN/Credit 1959-TN) Public Disclosure Authorized December28, 1998
Infrastructure Unit South Asia Region Public Disclosure Authorized
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwisebe disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit Indian Rupee (Rs.) US$1.00 Rupee 13 (Appraisal 1988) US$1.00 = Rupee 42.5 (As of December 28, 1998)
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR April 1 - March 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADT - Average Daily Traffic ARAN - Automated Road Analyzer BOT - Build-Operate-Transfer BRCD - Bihar Road Construction Department ERR - Economic Rate of Return GOB - Government of Bihar GOI - Government of India GOM - Governmentof Maharashtra HDM - Highway Design and Maintenance Standards Model III ICB - International Competitive Bidding ICR - Implementation Completion Report IRI - International Roughness Index MBIU - Mobile Bridge Inspection Unit MDR - Major District Roads MOST - Ministry of Surface Transport NlH - National Highways NPV - Net Present Value PIU - Project Implementation Unit PMS - Pavement Management System PWD(s) - Public Works Department(s) R&R - Resettlement and Rehabilitation Rs - Indian Rupee SAR - Staff Appraisal Report SH - State Highways SRP - States' Road Project UP - State of Uttar Pradesh VR - Village Roads
Vice President Mieko Nishimizu Country Director Edwin R. Lim Sector Manager Frannie Humplick Task Leader Yoneo Oka FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
INDIA
STATES' ROAD PROJECT (Loan 2994-IN/Credit 1959-IN)
Tableof Contents PageNo.
Preface...... i EvaluationSummary ...... ii
Introductionand ProjectObjectives ...... ii ImplementationExperience and Results...... iii Summaryof Findings,Future Operation, and KeyLessons Learned ...... v
PARTI - PROJECTIMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
A. Statement/Evaluation of Objectives. B. Achievementof Objectives .2 C. MajorFactors Affecting the Project .6 D. ProjectSustainability .7 E. BankPerformance ...... 8 F. BorrowerPerformance ...... 8..8 G. Assessmentof Outcome .9 H. Future Operations.10 I. Key LessonsLearned .10
PART II - STATISTICAL TABLES
Table 1 Summnaryof Assessment.13 Table2 RelatedBank Loan/Credits .14 Table3 ProjectTimetable .14 Table4 Loan/CreditDisbursements: Cumulative and Actual.15 Table 5 Key Indicatorsfor ProjectImplementation .16 Table6 Key Indicatorsfor ProjectOperation .18 Table7 StudiesIncluded in Project.18 Table8A ProjectCost ...... 19 Table8B ProjectFinancing ...... 19 Table9 EconomicCosts and Benefits...... 20 Table 10 Status of LegalCovenants ...... 21 Table 11 Compliancewith OperationalManual Statements ...... 22 Table 12 BankResources: Staff Inputs ...... 22 Table 13 BankResources: Mission ...... 23
APPENDICES
AppendixA The ICR Mission'sAide Memoire ...... 24 AppendixB Borrower'sContribution to the ICR...... 36 AppendixC EconomicRe-Evaluation ...... 62
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization i
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
INDIA
STATES' ROAD PROJECT (Loan 2994-IN/Credit 1959-IN)
PREFACE
This is the Implementation CompletionReport (ICR) for the States' Road Project in India, Loan No. 2994-IN in the amount of US$170 million and Credit No. 1959-IN in the amount of SDR 62.2 million(US$80 millionequivalent). The project was approved on October 20, 1988 and made effective on March 2, 1989.
The loan and credit were closed on June 30, 1998, after four extensionsto the original closing date of June 30, 1995. With the exception of some of the Bihar sub-components- the Bhagalpur bridge, approach roads and supporting consultant services- all other project components were closed on June 30, 1996, after two extensions (October 31, 1995 and June 30, 1996). The Bihar components were granted two further extensions (June 30, 1997 and June 30, 1998). Disbursementswere completed on December 28, 1998 and July 12, 1994, for the loan and credit respectively. The credit was fully disbursed, and the total amount disbursed under the loan and credit was US$188,665,924. Three cancellationsof the loan balance took place during the project totaling US$66,624,998. The first two cancellationswere for the purpose of reducing the scope of the project and occurred on May 1, 1993 (US$55,000,000) and November 20, 1996 (US$6,409,545). The third cancellation, representingthe remaining balance, took place on December 28, 1998 (US$5,215,453).
The ICR was prepared by Yoneo Oka (ICR Task Leader, SASIN), Fabio Galli(Financial Analyst, SASIN), and Rodrigo Archondo (Highway Engineer, Consultant). The ICR was reviewed by all required reviewers, and Peter Long (Highway Engineer, Consultant) served as the peer reviewer.
Preparation of this ICR started during the Bank's final supervision/ICRmission in June 1998. It is based on documents in the project files, and material submitted by the Borrower. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by providing information to the ICR mission in the field. In addition, the Borrower (the implementingagencies) provided comments on the report, which are given in Appendix B of this ICR. ii
IMPLEMENTAIONCOMPLETION REPORT
INDIA
STATES' ROAD PROJECT (Loan 2994-IN/Credit 1959-IN)
EVALUATIONSUMMARY
Introduction
1. The total length of the Indian road network (based on 1996 figures) is approximately 3,321,000 km; of which National Highways (NHs) represent 35,000 kmi,State Highways (SH) 135,000 km, other Public Works Department (PWD) Roads includingMajor District Roads (MDRs) 764,000 km, and the remaining 2,387,000 km are classified as other roads'. Over the last 30 years, the road network has become the dominantmode of transportation in India for both freight and passengers. In addition, road traffic in the last decade has grown at a rate of nearly 10 percent per year, and at present, the road network carries 60 percent of all freight traffic (ton/km) and 80 percent of all passenger traffic (passenger/km).
2. In March 1987, the Government of India (GOI) expressed its interest in obtainingBank assistance for the improvement of the core state road network (SHs and MDRs). The core state road network is used to classify an intermediate category of roads that falls between national highways and rural roads, based on traffic volume and function. The States' Road Project was the Bank's first lending operation to focus on the improvement of India's core state road network.
Project Objectives
3. The principal objectives of the project were to:
(i) improve the quality of investment planningfor India's highways and to rationalize the financing,planning, and implementationof road maintenance/improvement;and
(ii) assist in rectifying the extensiveand long-standing deficienciesin the condition, structure, and capacity of the road networks of the selected states.
1 Other roads: 1,022,000 km of Panchayat Raj Roads; 211,000 km of Urban Roads; 916,000 km of Rural Roads; and, 238,000 km of Project Roads (those built and maintained by the forestry, irrigation, electric power and other departments of the govermnent). Hii
4. At appraisal, the project includedthe followingcomponents:
(i) civil works for the widening, strengthening,and improvement of road networks in the four States2 ;
(ii) procurement of specializedequipment;
(iii) staff training and technical assistance;and
(iv) consultant services for studies and supervisionof civil works.
Implementation Experience and Results
5. Civil works, includingthe improvement (widening and strengthening) of state roads to 7 meters (width of carriage-way)as well as the construction of the Bhagalpur Bridge and its approach roads, represented 86 percent of the total cost of the project. The nnajorfactors affecting the timely implementationof civil works were:
(i) the PWDs implementingthe project were unfamiliarwith the Bank's procurement practices and were not fully equipped to follow the Bank's procurement guidelines;
(ii) ownership of the project by the PWDs was weak due to the multi-state nature of the project; and
(iii) the contractors' poor physical and financialperformance delayed contract implementation.
These and other factors resulted in major delays in the implementationof project components.
6. The performance ratings reflect the poor implementationresults of the physical components of the project. The implementationratings by state are: satisfactory in Maharashtra, marginally satisfactoryin Rajasthan, unsatisfactoryin Uttar Pradesh, and highly unsatisfactoryin Bihar. Of the 1,508 km of roads that were to be completed under the reduced roads improvement scope of the project, only about 1,293 km were actually completed. Additionally,the construction of the Bhagalpur Bridge and its approach roads were not completed during the life of the project and are not expected to be completed until June 2000 at the earliest.
7. Implementationperformance of the other project components was mixed. By component, they are as follows: (i) procurement of specializedequipment was deemed highlyunsatisfactory. After long delays, only three out of the seventeencategories of equipment were actually procured; (ii) the training component was fully implemented;a total of 40 staff from the four State PWDs participated in six major training courses; (iii) the supervisionconsultancy services component was rated marginallysatisfactory. The international consultants generally provided satisfactoryresults in their performance, however the impact of their managerialand technical skills transfer to domestic
2In Bihar civilworks includedthe constructionof a newbridge across the river Ganges,and approximately100 km of State Road improvements. In Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, civil works included approximately 670 km, 870 km and 600 km respectively, of State Road improvements. iv contractors and PWDs was lower than expected; (iv) the implementationof a Pavement Management System (PMS) study was judged marginallysatisfactory. By project closure, about 30,000 km of SHs and MDRs had been surveyed and inventoriedunder the study, but the PMS's operationalization has not taken place as planned; and (v) the Maharashtra PWD Organization Study was viewed as marginally satisfactory.The study focused on the changing role of the PWD and the growing participation of the private sector in the transport sector. In implementingone of the study's recommendations,the Government of Maharashtra establishedthe Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation, which is in charge of Build-Operate-Transfer(BOT) projects in the State.
8. The economic analysisfor the improvement of roads undertaken at appraisal included 23 individualroads. These 23 roads (excludingthe Bhagalpur bridge), represented 75 percent of the original estimated total project cost and their estimated combinedERR was 30.4 percent. At the conclusion of the project, 16 of the 23 roads were completed. In order to more accurately reflect the ex-post results, the final economic analysisre-evaluated appraisal estimates to focus specifically on the 16 roads completed with project financingas well as on two roads that were completed in Maharashtra with the State's own resources. The ex-post traffic, construction costs, and construction times were measured on these 18 roads. The staff appraisal report (SAR) estimates that ADT is 3,000 for 1997, while the ICR estimates ADT for the same year at 4,800 (60 percent higher than the SAR estimate). The re-evaluated appraisalestimates average construction costs per kilometer in 1988 at Rs. 1.8 million, while the ICR estimates the average at Rs. 2.5 million (40 percent higher) for the same year. The re-evaluated appraisal estimates the average construction period as four years, while the ICR estimates 6 years. The project also experienced a two to three year delay in implementation. Consequently,for an operation period of 10 years, the re-evaluated appraisal estimate gives an ERR and net present value (NPV) in 1988 values of 32 percent and Rs. 6,000 million, and the ICR gives an ERR and NPV in 1988 values of 64 percent and Rs. 9,000 million. Despite road improvement costs that were nearly 40 percent higher and an overall implementationdelay of four to five years, the 60 percent higher traffic volume in 1997 resulted in higher ERR and NPV (which reflect the economic benefits generated by the project's road components) than originallyestimated by the SAR.
9. The construction of the Bhagalpur Bridge and its approach roads have not been completed, therefore, the ICR evaluation of this component is only for reference purposes. The economic evaluation method employedin the ICR replicates the method used in the SAR. The SAR estimates ADT at 3,000 for the year 2000, while the ICR estimate for ADT is 6,400 (110 percent higher) for the same year. A traffic growth rate of 4.5 percent after the year 2000 is assumed in the ICR analysis.The SAR estimates the total cost of the Bhagalpur Bridge component in 1988 prices at Rs. 689 million,while the ICR estimates the total cost at Rs. 864 million (25 percent higher), also in 1988 prices. The SAR estimates the construction period of the Bhagalpur Bridge component at four years, while the ICR estimate is 10 years (projected). As a result, for an operating period of 20 years, the SAR estimates the ERR and NPV as 20 percent and Rs. 400 million, while the ICR estimates the ERR and NPV as 19 percent and Rs. 260 millionrespectively. This difference is due to the 25 percent higher construction costs and much longer construction period, which more than offsets the economic benefits regardless of the higher than projected growth in traffic volumes.
10. The Bank's performance during the project preparation and implementationphases was marginallysatisfactory. The rating takes into considerationthe multi-state nature of the project and that the budgetary resources allocated for project supervisionwere most probably inadequate. v
However, during the project preparation phase, the Bank team did not accurately assess the implementationand financial capacity of the implementingagencies (PWDs), and more importantly, the capacity of the domestic construction industry. Both of these oversights led to substantial delays during the project implementationphase.
11. Overall, the performance of the PWDs during project implementationwas weak. Major factors that hampered their performance were: (i) the frequent turnover of key PWD staff, (ii) the lack of familiaritywith Bank procedures at the state level; (iii) poor institutionalmechanisms that resulted in slow decision-making;and (iv) inadequate attention to project design. Furthermore, weak inter-agency coordination and inadequate communicationwith the Bank also adversely affected project implementation. The cumulativeeffect of this was an average delay in completion of the state roads improvement component of four to five years.
Summary of Findings, Future Operations, and Key Lessons Learned
12. Implementationof the physical components can be considered satisfactoryin Maharashtra, marginallysatisfactory in Rajasthan, unsatisfactoryin Uttar Pradesh, and highly unsatisfactory in Bihar. The state roads that were improved under the project serve as major intra and inter state trunk roads. The purpose of these trunk roads is to carry heavy inter state traffic loads, and the project succeeded in reducing traffic congestion to a certain degree. However, in some cases, roads that were improved under the project have alreadybegun to deteriorate due to inadequate funding for road maintenance and poor construction quality.
13. The enhanced traffic carrying capabilityof the roads improved under the project should continue to reduce traffic congestion for the foreseeable future. In the State of Maharashtra, funding has been secured and operational plans have been designed to address the maintenance of the state road network based on the experiencegained during implementationand by utilizing organizationalunits that were establishedunder the project.
14. Project ownership and quality at entry are essential factors in ensuring the successful implementationof a complex multi-state project. With this in mind, all project preparation activities such as: (i) techno-economic feasibilitystudies; (ii) detailed engineering designs; (iii) resettlement and rehabilitation plans; (iv) environmentalstudies; and (v) site readiness, includingland acquisition and utility removal, need to be completed well before the civil works contracts are initiated on the ground.
15. The preparation and implementationof a multi-state project like the SRP has proven to be ineffectiveas a result of a reduced sense of ownership by the participating states and the inadequate supervisionresources provided by the Bank.
16. The inefficientorganizational structure and weak implementationcapabilities of some of the PWDs was a major reason for poor qualityat entry and directly contributed to the partial achievementof the development objectives. The early formation of an exclusive and empowered project implementationunit (PIU) with strong institutionalcapacity should help to ensure quality at entry. Furthermore, up-front policy and institutional strengtheningof state PWDs as well as intensivetraining in contracting and project managementskills is critical. vi
17. The use of internationallyexperienced supervisionconsultants was introduced on a pilot basis under the project. Their performance was mixed due to some resistance by the PVVDsin accepting the concept of independent supervisionconsultants, and the consultants' lack of familiaritywith operating in India. Internationallyexperienced supervisionconsultants can be effective only if implementingagencies are fully committedto using them effectively.
18. Adequate maintenancefunding in conjunctionwith improved maintenanceplanning is absolutelyessential in order to ensure the sustainabilityof project outcomes. Effective road maintenance management, includingplanning and budgeting for the roads, is the key to the sustainabilityof project roads and the entire road network.
19. Without adequate arrangements for the repair and part replacement of equipment and machinery,the sustainabilityof the procurement component for specializedequipment in any project will be uncertain. In future, the implementationof such a component should be considered from a broader perspective, including perhaps, the development and promotion of the private sector, which would help to ensure the sustainabilityof this type of component. I
IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT
INDIA
STATES' ROAD PROJECT (Loan 2994-IN/Credit 1959-IN)
PART I: PROJECTIMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIES
1. After a break of nearly20 yearsin lendingto the roads sub-sector,the GOI finallyagreed to use InternationalCompetitive Bidding (ICB) for Bank-fundedroads projects. As a result,lending resumedwith the BiharRural RoadProject (Credit 1072-IN,1980), the NationalHighway Project (Loan2534-IN, 1985), and the GujaratRural Roads Project (Credit1757-IN, 1987)3. The Board approvedthe States' Road Project(SRP) in 1988,initiating the first multi-stateroad projectin India. To ensurethat a widegeographic dissemination of socialand economicequity was generatedby activitiesunder the project,the states of Bihar,Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh(UP) were selectedto participate.
Objectives
2. The project'sdevelopment objectives were to extendpolicy and institutionalimprovements to the State levelfor the road sub-sector.In particular,the projectaimed to:
(i) improvethe qualityof investmentplanning in highwaysand to rationalizethe financing,planning, and implementationof road maintenance/improvementthrough the applicationof a systematicmaintenance management program; and
(ii) assistin rectifyingthe extensiveand long-standingdeficiencies in the condition, structure,and capacityof the road networksof the selectedstates by the introduction of largerconstruction contracts of sufficientindividual size to encouragelocal firms to mechanize,but which,when grouped, would attractinternational interest.
3. To achievethe projectdevelopment objectives, the projectincluded the followingmain components:
(i) civilworks (road improvements)to improveand widento two lanesof about 2,300 km of mostlysingle-lane roads in the four States.(In Bihar,a majorbridge across the river Gangaand about 100 km of State roads; in Maharashtra,about 670 km of State roads;in Rajasthan,about 870km of Stateroads; and,in UP, 600 km of State roads);
(ii) procurementof specializedequipment to assistthe four Statesin monitoringthe conditionand usage of their road networks;
3The National Highway Project was rated unsatisfactory while the Gujarat Rural Roads Project was rated satisfactory. 2
(iii) staff training and technical assistance which would emphasize the planning, design, and implementationof projects as well as developingthe skills of road maintenance field staff; and
(iv) consultant services for the introduction of the Pavement Management Systems (PMS) in each state, for supervisionof one of the project contracts in each. State, and in Maharashtra, for an organizationalstudy of the State PWD.
B. ACHIEVEMENTOF OBJECTIVES
4. The development objectives of the project were only partially achieved due to a combination of delays, the partial attainment of the physical components, and the weak design and implementation of the non-physical components of the project. The physical components of the project (state road improvements) were largely successfulin introducing large-scale mechanized construction techniques, the input of supervision consultants, and larger contract packages at the State level. However, due to the weak performance of the PWDs and various contractors, only about 1,293 km of state roads were improved (with substantialdelays) against a stated staff appraisal report (SAR) target of 2,353 km. Furthermore, the construction quality and design specifications of some of the roads were not adequate to meet the growing traffic volume needs that were to be carried by these roads. The attainment of the non-physical objectives of the project did not meet project expectations for a variety of reasons. First, the design of thp actual project components did not fully support the attainment of the stated non-physical objectives of the project. There was a clear contradiction between the stated objectives in the SAR and the design of the project components, which did not enable such objectives to be obtained. Second, the implementationof the non-physical components of the project (includingthe introduction of PMS, procurement of e quipment, and limited training of PWD staff) experienced delays and was deemed only partially successful by end of project.
5. Improvement of State Roads. The implementationof the civilworks component, which represented 86 percent of the original value of the project, was rated satisfactoryin Maharashtra, marginallysatisfactory in Rajasthan, unsatisfactoryin Uttar Pradesh, and highly unsatisfactory in Bihar. The civil works component includedthe widening and strengthening of roads (road improvements)from a single and/or intermediate lane to a width of 7 meters. (Some stretches of road also included hard shoulders.) As a result of the project, 1,293 km4 of roads have been widened and strengthened, out of the 2,253 km5 targeted in the SAR. Financially,with respect to road improvements, 99 percent6 of the reduced scope of work value was disbursed. Details of the implementationof the physical component in each State are described in the following paragraphs.
6. Road Improvements and Bridge Constructions in Bihar. Implementationwas determined to be highly unsatisfactory, since none of the components in Bihar vverecompleted by June 1998. Due to a wide variety of reasons, includingpoor planning and problems associated with land
41293 km of the roads were substantiallycompleted by June 30, 1996.Some other roadsthat were droppedwere funded and completedby PWDs.See table 5.
5 See table 5: KeyIndicators for ProjectImplementation.
6 With regardto total disbursementof civil works,IDA: $81,322,775out of $81,322,775and IBRD:$96,742,092 out of $96,857,721. 3 acquisition and the removal of utilities,the road improvement sub-component never began, and it was officiallydropped from the project in June 1996. Construction of the Bhagalpur bridge and its approach roads commenced in earnest only in 1993, and were far from completionby the time the project was finally closed on June 30, 19987.
7. Road Improvements in Maharashtra. Implementationwas determined to be satisfactory. Of the planned 648 km of State Roads slated for improvement,453 km, includingan additional 8.7 km for the Jalna Bypass were substantiallycompleted by June 1996. A further 204.4 km, which were dropped from the project, due to a shortage of bituminousmaterials and poor performance of the contractors, were completed by the PVVDusing its own resources by June 1997. All civil works components were therefore fully completed. By June 1996 when the Maharashtra component of the project was closed, the overall disbursement for civil works was 122 percent (in US$) of the original allocation.
8. Road Improvements in Rajasthan. Implementationwas determined to be marginally satisfactory. Of the planned 868 km of State Roads slated for widening, 641 km were substantially completed by June 1996. During the procurement process, the high price of bids and evidence of two instances of bid tampering forced the contracts to be re-packaged. Consequently, the number of contracts was reduced from eight to six. Of the six remainingcontracts, one road component was cancelled and another contract was dropped from the project, due to poor contractor performance, leaving the construction of these roads incomplete. The overall disbursementfor civil works was 138 percent (in US$) of the original allocation.
9. Road Improvements in Uttar Pradesh. Implementationwas determined to be unsatisfactory. Of the planned 600 km of State Roads slated for widening, only 198 km were substantiallycompleted by June 1996. During the procurement process, the contracts were re- packaged and reduced from nine to seven, due to the high price of bids. Of the seven remainingbids, three contracts were not awarded and were cancelledfrom the project, due to the high price of the bids. In one instance, poor contractor performance resulted in the expulsion of the contractor by the PW7Dand the work was never completed. The overall disbursementfor civil works was 46 percent (in US$) of the original allocation.
10. Procurement of Specialized Equipment. The implementationof the equipment procurement component was determinedto be highly unsatisfactory. Seventeen categories of equipment were initiallyidentified to be procured in order to enhance the PWDs' institutional capacity for road construction, monitoring and maintenancework. After substantial delays, only three categories of equipment were procured. One of the three categories of equipment (four sets of Mobile Bridge Inspection Units (MBU)), was procured only after June 1996, which was after the closing date of the component. The total disbursementfor this component was only 11 percent (in US$) of the original allocation.
11. Training. The training component of the project was fully implementedand determined to be satisfactory. A total of 40 staff, ranging from assistant executives to superintendent engineers
7The Bhagalpur bridge (4,367 m concrete viaduct, crossing the Ganges River) and its approach roads (11 kin) are expected to be completed by June 2000. As of June 30, 1998, physical and financial progress were rated 87 percent an 83 percent respectively. 4 from the four State PWDs, participated in six training courses. However, the impact-ofthis component was less than expected due to the frequent turnover among involved staff.
12. Supervision Consultant Services. The supervisionconsultant services component of the project was determined to be marginallysatisfactory. As part of the project each State procured an international supervisionconsultant to supervise one road construction contract. This approach was used in order to facilitate the introduction of internationalstandards for quality control 'and contract managementof large road contracts. In Bihar, proof consultants were procured to review the design of the Bhagalpur Bridge. In general, the supervisionconsultants provided satisfactory services. However, their impact, in terms of the transfer of international standards to the PVVDsand contractors, was limited due to the lack of acceptance of the concept of independent project supervision consultants by some of the concerned PWDs.
13. Maintenance Network Management System Study. The implementationof this study was determined to be marginally satisfactory. The Maharashtra PWD took the initiativeto manage the contract, while the Ministry of Surface Transport (MOST) chaired the steering committee. The main objective of the study was to establish a maintenancenetwork managementsystem in each state, based on road inventories and conditionsincluding traffic and the maintenancecosts. For this study, an ARAN vehicle mounted systemwas procured and approximately30,000 km.of State roads in the four States were surveyed. The PMS hardware and software packages were installed in each PWD. After the road inventory survey, the Rajasthan PWD establisheda working cell to manage the PMS and has conducted some surveys with the ARAN vehicle to update the database. The Maharashtra PWD also used the PMS to maintain and update their database. HIowever,the PWDs in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have yet to fully utilize all aspects of the PMS. The study was considered successful,but it has only achieved its partial impact in Rajasthan' and Maharashtra.
14. Maharashtra PWD OrganizationStudy. The implementationof the study was determined to be marginally satisfactory. The Maharashtra PWD Organization study focused on the changing role of the PWD and the increasing participation of the private sector, including consultants and contractors, in the implementationof road infrastructure projects. The Government of Maharashtra implementedone of the study's recommendationsand establishedthe Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation to oversee Build-Operate-Transfer(BOT) projects in the State. The corporation has recently undertaken the BOT based Bombay-Nasik Expressway project.
15. The Economic Re-evaluation of the Road Improvement Sub-components.9 The economic analysis in the SAR covered 23 individualroads (excludingthe Bhagalpur Bridge) that accounted for 75 percent of the originaltotal project cost. The economic analysisconducted in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) covers only 18 roads10 includingtwo roads that were completed by the Maharashtra PWD using its own resources. In order to reflect ex-post results, the 18 roads were also re-evaluated under ex-condition (re-evaluated SAR). In the analysis, all costs and benefits were converted into Indian Rupees (Rs) at 1988 prices. The operational period of the roads was assumed to be 10 years in the case of both the re-evaluated SAR and the ICR.
8The Rajasthan PWD is suffering from ARAN's continual breakdown and lack of spare parts. 9See Appendix C. Economic Re-Evaluation. 10See table 5: Key indicators for Project Implementation. 5
16. The results of the analysis are summarizedin the table below. The values for the average ERR and net present value (NPV) in the ICR are 63.6 percent and Rs. 9,142 million respectively, and in the re-evaluated SAR they are 32.4 percent and Rs. 6,150 millionrespectively. These results indicate that the economic benefits of the roads completed are much higher than what was originally estimated by the SAR. In relation to SAR estimates, the growth in actual traffic levels (1.6 times above SAR estimates) more than offset the increased construction costs (1.4 times.above SAR estimates). In addition, construction initiation delays of two to three years and completion delays of two years (an actual total of six years as opposed to four years as estimated in the SAR), produced a higher than expected ERR/NPV. Although the ICR shows a higher than estimated ERRINPV for the project when compared to the SAR, the construction costs in Rs. terms are substantiallyhigher than estimated. These higher costs were due to: (i) actual bid prices that were higher than PWD estimates; (ii) poor designs that resulted in major re-designs, quantity changes, and adjustmentsto variation orders; and (iii) delays in the implementationof project components resulting from many factors including changes in variation orders.
Economic Re-evaluation for the Roads Completed Average ADT Average cost/km Average cost/km ERR NPV | (1997) (M 1988 Rs.) (1988 US$) (percent) (M 1988 Rs. SAR 3,055(1.00) 1.86(1.00) 140,000 30.4 NA Re-evaluatedSAR 3,055(1.00) 1.86(1.00) 140,000(1.00) 32.4 (1.00) 6,150 (1.00) ICR 4,794 (1.63*) 2.45(1.37*) 190,000(1.37*) 63.6 (1.96) 9,142 (1.49) the averageof ratio of individualroad.
17. Economic Re-evaluation for the Bhagalpur bridge Sub-component The results for the Bhagalpur Bridge are shown in the table below. Since the bridge and its approach roads have not been completed, the values are for reference purposes only. In the table, the ICR scenario is considered as the most realistic scenario. The project cost was listed in the SAR as Rs. 689 rnillion and Rs. 864 million (both in 1988 prices) was assumed as the projected completion cost in the ICR. In the re-evaluated SAR scenario, which assumes a six year delay in implementationand the same construction cost, the ERR increased to 23.8 percent from 19.6 percent and the NPV decreased to Rs. 257 million from Rs. 396 million (1988 prices). In the ICR scenario, the ERR dropped to 18.6 percent from 23.8 percent while the NPV was Rs. 256 million (1988 prices), which was nearly the same as the re-evaluated SAR figures.
EconomicRe-evaluation for the BhagalpurBrid e Average Cost Cost ERR NPV ADT (2000) (M 1988 (M 1988 US$) (percent) (M 1988 Rs)
______~Rs) SAR 2,982 (1.00) 689 (1.00) 53.1 (1.00) 20.2 (19.6*) NA (396*) Re-evaluated SAR** 2,982 (1.00) 689 (1.00) 53.1 (1.00) 23.8 257 ICR (4.5 percent traffic growth 6,353 (2.13) 864 (1.37) 66.6 (1.37) 18.6 256 rate, year 2000 onward***) recalculatedwith minor correctionsto SAR. : constructioncost, period,and trafficare the sameas that of SAR,but 6 yearsdelay in implementation. trafficgrowth rate is the same as that of SARuntil 1999. 6
C. MAJOR FACTORSAFFECTING THE PROJECT
Factors not Generally Subject to Government Control
18. For several months, the petroleum, oil, lubricant (POL) product shortages and price increases caused by the Gulf War negatively affected the progress of the civi]lworks component in several States and in particular in Maharashtra. Beginningin October 1990, and as a consequence of the Gulf War, the Bank decided to increase the percentage of civilworks expendituresfinanced under the project from 60 to 90 percent.
19. Exceptional rains during the 1996 Monsoon season damaged two partially completed well foundations (P3 and P4) that were being constructed for the Bhagalpur Bridge and its approach roads. As a result of this, and other factors such as the law and order situation in the Bhagalpur area (it was alleged that a contractor was threatened by local gangs making it difficult for him to work), the Bhagalpur Bridge and its approach roads will not be completed until June 2000 at the earliest.
Factors Generally Subject to Government Control
20. The procurement of specializedequipment was considerablydelayed and in one case (procurement of 4 MBIU's) was further delayed due to a major procurement dispute between two of the bidders. Of the 17 categories of equipmentto be procured under the project, only three were procured five to six years behind schedule. Under the procurement arrangements, MOST acted on behalf of the four States and due to this cumbersomeprocurement arrangement, much time was wasted on inter-agency communicationand extended decision-making. For example, nearly two years were spent preparing the specializedequipment specificationsfor use in Indian conditions.
21. Cash flow problems at the state level had an intermittent affect on the payment flow to contractors, which in turn affected project implementation. In the case of Bihar, payments to the contractor working on the Bhagalpur bridge were delayedby several months during the 1996 state election period. In addition, GOI did not release in a timely fashion to the States the stipulated advance for externally aided projects. This situation farther exacerbatedthe financial strain on the State governments, especiallyduring the crucial April-Juneperiod of each year.
Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agency Control
22. The average length of the procurement sequence (from pre-.qualificationto notification of award) was two to three years. This time period was considered excessive in comparison to the 10 months originally estimated for these activities. The excessive delays were the result of: (i) the PWDs lack of familiaritywith ICB; (ii) some resistance in accepting ICB; (iii) a long decision-making process/chainwithin State governments;(iv) long delays in finalizingthe pre-qualificationdocuments; (v) frequent turnover of key PWD staff, (vi) poor communicationwith the Bank; and (vii) a weak sense of ownership by the PWDs.
23. The average implementationperiod for the 16 civil works contracts that were completed under the project by June 1996 was approximatelysix years compared to a contractually stipulated period of three to four years. This delay can be largely attributed to poor project preparation, including: (i) poor topographical surveys and engineeringdesigns; (ii) insufficientsite readiness regarding land acquisition;and (iii) the removal of trees and utilities from the right of way. Most of 7 the engineeringdesigns were prepared in-house by the PWDs. These were of poor quality, often inaccurate, and resulted in extensive re-surveyingand re-design. In some cases, the contractors were forced to re-design after the contracts were awarded.
24. The contract size did not appear to be large enough to attract both internationallyexperienced and large domestic contractors. Although the tenders were designed to target not only local but also internationallyexperienced contractors, all civil works contracts funded under the project were awarded to smallto medium sized domestic contractors. At the time the contracts were awarded, the small to medium sized local contractors were inexperiencedas well as technically,financially, and manageriallyweak. Although the contracts encouraged local contractors to mechanizeand improve construction methods, their inexperienceand lack of preparedness caused delays in civilworks implementation.
D. PROJECTSUSTAINABILITY
25. The sustainabilityof the approximately1,293 km of State roads improved under the project is dependent upon: (i) adequate monitoring of road conditionsby the PWDs to address the priority maintenance needs of the road network; (ii) the availabilityof adequate maintenancefunding; and (iii) the efficient use of the scarce resources availablefor maintenance. Although all four PWDs involved in the project are fully aware of the importance of road maintenancein order to preserve the value of road assets, institutionaland financialcapabilities are generally inadequate to sustain the maintenance effort required to preserve both the roads improved under the project and the core state road network. However, in the case of Maharashtra, the State government is trying to improve maintenance funding as mentioned in its operational plan." Additionally,in the case of Rajasthan, as part of the conditions to prepare a follow-up state road project, the State government has pledged to eliminate the existing maintenancefunding gap within the next five years which is an ambitious target to achieve.
26. The sustainabilityof the equipment and machineryprocured is unlikelyto be satisfactory. Under the project, the MBIU, Dipstick Road Profilers, and Bitumen Distributors were procured for the four States. Likewise the ARAN vehicle as well as the dTIMS and dROAD software packages, were procured under the PMS study. All of these items, except for the MBIU12,are being used by the respective PWDs. However, in the long run, since most of the equipment procured under the project is not mass-produced and after-sales service is fairly limited,it will be extremely difficultto keep the equipment running. For example, the ARAN vehicle is made in Canada and there is no authorized dealer or after-sales support in India.
" See Appendix A. The ICR Mission Aide Memoire.
12 Maharashtra PWD received MBIU and uses it. Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar did not receive MBIUs as of June 1998. 8
E. BANK PERFORMANCE
27. The Bank's performance was generallysatisfactory in identifyingthe project, and unsatisfactoryin project preparation and appraisal. Consideringthe fact that it was a multi-state project and budgetary resources provided for supervisionwere inadequate, the supervisioneffort was rated as marginally satisfactory. Project preparation did not adequately take into account the actual implementationand financial capacity of the implementingagencies (PWDs) and the local contracting industry, both of which made the project very difficultto implementand supervise. This over- estimation of the local capacity to implementa complex multi-state road project in India also plagued, to an even greater extent, the implementationof the National Highway Project (Loan 2534- IN) which closed on December 31, 1993. In retrospect, a more thorough and realistic assessment of the implementingagencies' institutionalcapacity to implementa complexmulti-state project should have been conducted. This would have helped to ensure better quality at entry, and consequently, greater success during project implementation.
28. Two preparation missions and one appraisal missionwere carried out by the Bank, which focused mainlyon project design and involved the discussionof basic procurement issues, contract size, supervision method, proposed studies, and training. In the project design phase, the civil works components were selected on the basis of their techno-economicviability, which took into considerationthe need to minimizeland acquisition,resettlement, and encroachmentin the right-of- way. In addition, taking into account the multi-state nature of the project, the Bank team made an adequate effort to ensure the necessarycommitment and cooperation from both the GOI and the four States involved.
29. Even though a total of 24 supervisionmissions were fielded by the Bank, the supervision effort was probably inadequate consideringthat the multi-state nature of the project made it difficult to visit all four states during each supervisionmission. Furthermore, due to the poor performance of the Bihar components, a disproportionate amount of the supervisionresources had to be allocated to supervise these components at the expense of the other project components. Clearly, the Bank grossly over-estimated the budget savings that could be generated by implementinga multi-state road project in India.
30. Due to the continued implementationproblems of the Bihar components, Bank management took an active role in trying to resolve, at the highest level of both the GOB and the GOI, the issues affecting the implementationof these particular sub-components. As a direct result of Bank managementinvolvement it was decided to extend only some of the Bihar sub-components of the project for an additional two years, after the bulk of the project components were closed on June 30, 1996.
F. BORROWERPERFORMANCE
31. Borrower performance has been generallyweak during project implementation. Other factors like the frequent turnover of key PWD staff, lack of familiaritywith Bank procurement procedures at the state level, slow decision-makingprocesses, and inadequate attention to project design contributed to the relativelyweak implementationperformance by the Borrower. 9
32. During the early stages of project implementation,the lack of familiaritywith ICB and other Bank procedures by the implementingStates and MOST (also Director General of Supply and Disposal) delayed the procurement of contractors, supervisionconsultants, and equipment. As a result, in most cases an average of at least two years elapsed before the procurement and award of civil works contracts were finalized.
33. After the civil works contracts were awarded, poorly detailed engineering designs, inadequate site readiness, and weak pre-qualificationcriteria often led to very slow initial construction progress. Supervisionof most of the civil works was done internallyby PWDs engineeringstaff with mixed results. These mixed results were due to the inadequate experience of the PWD staff in supervising large civil works contracts and in quality control management,both of which negatively affected the speed and implementationof the civilworks contracts. Furthermore, weak oversight by MOST in coordinating the procurement of equipment and in implementingthe PMS resulted in major delays in the implementationof these two components.
34. The inexperienceand inadequate implementationcapacity of the PWDs, the long chain of command and cumbersomedecision-making process, and the high turnover of key staff hampered the Borrower's abilityto successfullyimplement the project. Furthermore, weak inter-agency coordination and inadequate communicationwith the Bank also adversely affected project implementation.
35. Finally,the implementingagencies did not consistentlymeet the reporting requirements of the project in a timely fashion. In addition to the poor reporting formats used, there were also delays in the submissionof audit reports and quarterly progress reports to the Bank by all States and particular by the State of Bihar.
G. ASSESSMENTOF OUTCOME
36. The implementationoutcome of the physical components of the project can be considered satisfactory in Maharashtra, marginallysatisfactory in Rajasthan, unsatisfactory in Uttar Pradesh, and highly unsatisfactory in Bihar. With a one year Loan/Credit extension, the majority of civil works contracts were substantiallycompleted in the states of Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. However, there were considerable delays in the procurement and the full execution of some of the civilworks contracts. The roads improved under the project serve as major trunk roads carrying heavy intra/inter-statetraffic loads and have contributed to the reduction to a certain degree to traffic congestion. However, in some cases, the physical deterioration of the roads has already occurred, which underscores the importance of construction quality and adequate maintenanceto ensure their sustainability. In the State of Bihar, none of the civilworks components were completed. The two roads slated for improvement in Bihar were dropped from the project. The only remaining civil works sub-component, the construction of the Bhagalpur Bridge and its approach roads, were commenced, but will not be completed until June 2000 at the earliest.
37. The implementationof the other project components was deemed unsatisfactory. After long delays especially in conducting the field surveys, the PMS was installed in all four states, although its full utilization was not covered under the project. The procurement of equipment was delayed substantiallyand most of the items had not been procured when this component was closed on June 30, 1996. 10
38. The project provided PWD staff with relevant training, which contributed t6 improvingthe PWDs' institutional capacity to implementsimilar projects. However.,some of the value of the training programs was lost due to frequent changes in the postings of the staff trained. Finally, through the project, the local construction industry improved its mechanization and quality control capacity, and internationallyexperienced supervisionconsultants were introduced on a pilot basis at the state level.
H. FUTURE OPERATIONS
39. All widened and strengthened road segments under the project should continue to operate successfullywith enhanced traffic carrying capabilitiesand abilityto reduce congestion. In the State of Maharashtra, concrete funding and operational plans have been drawn up to address the maintenanceof the state road network, based on the experience gained and by using organizational units establishedunder the project.
40. In the States of Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, follow-up state road projects are currently in various stages of preparation. One of the key objectives for this new generation of road projects, is to ensure improved maintenancefunding as well as maintenancemanagement for the entire road network. This is envisionedthrough the use of up-front actions, such as commitment from the highest levels in the forn of State Policy Letters, that would substantiallyincrease maintenancefunding. Furthermore, institutional strengtheningof the iimplementingagencies will be handled up-front and in a much more systematic manner.
41. In the State of Bihar, the Bhagalpur Bridge and Approach Roads components are still under implementation. All necessary arrangements, includingfunding and compliancewith the contracts, still need to be made in order to ensure the completion of work.
L. KEY LESSONSLEARNED
42. Quality at entry is essentialto ensure the successfulpreparation and implementationof a complexmulti-state project. In this regard, all project preparation activitiesincluding techno- economic feasibilitystudies, detailed engineeringdesigns, resettlement and rehabilitation (R & R)plans, and environmentalstudies need to be completed well before civilworks contracts can begin on the ground. In light of the experience gained from the implementationof the SRP, full site readiness (which includes R&R and environmentalmitigation measures) is a sine qua non condition for loan effectivenessfor the next generation of state road projects currently being prepared/implementedin India.
43. The weak organizational and implementationcapacity of the implementingagencies combined with a low sense of project ownership (caused by the multi-state nature of the project) were two of the major reasons for the poor implementationrecord of the project. This was compounded by the high turnover of project related staff which made it very difficult for staff from both the Bank and the PWDs to develop a high degree of project ownership. The early forLation of an exclusive, empowered project implementationunit (PIU) with strong implementationcapabilities is important to ensure higher quality at entry and effective project implementation. The effective use of a PIJ can also enhance the sense of ownership since the staff is working on a full-timebasis for the project. 11
Furthermore, the development of up-front policy/institutionalstrengthening action plans for the implementingagencies, together with intensiveimplementation training in contract and project management during the early stages of project preparation is necessary to enhance implementation capabilities.
44. The preparation and implementationof a multi-state project like the SRP have proven to be ineffectivedue to a reduced sense of ownership by the participating states and inadequate supervision resources provided by the Bank. More specifically,supervision resources provided by the Bank did not fully take into account the logistical difficultiesof adequately supervisinga multi-state project. To properly supervise the project (considering that it was actually four individual state road projects rolled into one), supervision resources should have been at least double the actual allocation. In order to increase the sense of ownership and provide adequate resources for project preparation and implementation,the next generation of state road projects are all single-state projects.
45. Adequate maintenancefunding together with improved maintenance planning is essential to ensure the sustainabilityof project outcomes. Some of the roads improved under the project have already started to deteriorate due to inadequate maintenance,higher than expected traffic volumes, poor construction quality and poor hydrology. Effective road maintenancemanagement, including planning and budgeting for the roads, is the key to the sustainabilityof project roads and the entire road network. For the next generation of state road projects, all participating States have committed themselvesto mobilize additional and/or alternative maintenancefunding to meet the increasing needs of the road sector.
46. Without appropriate arrangementsfor the operation and maintenance of equipment and machineryprocured under the project, the sustainabilityof this component will probably be unsatisfactory. Furthermore, the equipment procured should have been more suitable for Indian conditions. For example, one of the reasons why the ARAN survey vehicle did not perform well was because the width of the roads surveyed was inadequate and their riding quality was very low. In other words, less sophisticated equipment should have been procured to more effectivelydeal with local conditions. The implementationof such components should be reconsidered from a broader perspective, including perhaps, the development and promotion of the private sector, which would be responsible for carrying out works such as inventory surveys.
47. The pre-qualificationof financiallyand technicallyweak contractors had a negative effect in the implementationof the civil works component of the project. This factor was compounded by the lack of an adequate number of suitablyqualified contractors seeking pre-qualificationand by the almost total lack of internationallyexperienced contractors interested in bidding for the contracts. Since financiallyand technicallyweak contractors were pre-qualified,several civil works contracts were dropped from the project during the mid-term review and the completion of most civil works contracts took much longer than originallyexpected. Unless these two issues (pre-qualification of weak contractors and an inadequate number of interested internationallyexperienced contractors) are resolved, the implementationof road projects in India will continue to be plagued by construction delays, cost overruns, and low construction quality. In order to encourage the participation of international contractors in future projects, both the PWDs and the Bank have taken measures to reduce the risks involved in recent road projects. These measures include: (i) higher quality detailed engineering;(ii) more realistic bid estimates; and (iii) larger-sized contracts. 12
48. The primary focus of the project was on the physical improvement of the core state road network. Not enough emphasiswas placed on the design of project components, which were intended to support the stated developmentobjective of the institutionalimprovement to the implementingagencies. With the exception of the introduction of improved maintenance managementpractices through the establishmentof a PMS, procurement of some equipment, and limitedtraining of PWD staff, there was insufficientemphasis (backed by project components) on institutionalmodernization and strengthening. With the next generation of State road projects, there will be a much greater emphasis on facilitatingthe transformation of the PWDs from service providers to the managers of state road networks. This will mean that the institutional modernization and strengthening of the PWDs will not only be a stated key project development objective, but it will also be supported by up-front actions on reform, and by project components that will enable the attainment of this critical objective. 13
PART n: STATISTICALTABLES
TABLE1: SUMMARYOF ASSESSMENTS
A. Achievementof Objectives Substantial Partial Negligible NotApplicable
Macroeconomicpolicies 0 0 0 U Sectorpolicies * O3 O Financialobjectives O * ° D Institutionaldevelopment O3 * °l Physicalobjectives °3 * ° Povertyreduction O3 ° 0 P Genderconcerns E13 0 0 P Othersocial objectives O O O U Environmentalobjectives EO a3 o . Publicsector management O O O P Privatesector development E O 0 P
B. ProjectSustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain
C. BankPerformance Highlysatisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
Identification E El Preparationassistance E E U Appraisal El El U Supervision E E U
D. BorrowerPerformance Highlysatisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
Preparation E O3 K Implementation E E U Covenantcompliance El E
E. Assessmentof Outcome Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory Highly Satisfactory Unsatisfactory
E l * E 14
TABLE 2: RELATED BANK LOAN/CREDITS
Loan/Credit Title Purpose Year of Status Approval IN PE-10566 Gujarat Widening & Strengthening of priority roads, - Negotiated State Highway Project maintenance of State roads, and reform and streng nof the Stateroadage IN PE-35159 Haryana Widening & Strengthening of priority roads, - Negotiated State Highway Project maintenance of State roads, and reform and strenghening of the State road age_y_ Ln.4192-lN Widening & Strengthening of priority roads, 1997 Ongoing Andhra Pradesh State maintenance of State roads, and reform and ... ..w....jqct sten gthenng of the State road ag . Cr.23651Ln.3470-IN Modernize key sectors of national highways in six 1992 Ongoing Second National different States including Punjab, Haryana, Orissa, West TMj og Pctdes.! a. Ma.i_shatraPrad.sh.adMa..ras.tra...... Cr. 1757-IN Gujarat Construction, reconstruction, and improvement of about 1987 Closed Rural Road Project 6,300km of village roads, procurement of equipment and December 31, vehicles, construction of houses, offices, warehouses and 1995 workshops, engineering and consultant services, and
technical assistance....______. Ln.2534-IN To construct/rehabilitate national highways in 6 states 1985 Closed National Highway and foster institutional development by strengthening the December 31, Project use of economic evaluation techniques for selectilngand 1993 - roadLranking investment proposal. _ Cr.1072-lN To provideall weatherroad comnmunicationbetween 1980 Closed BiharRural Roads farmsand markets. June 30, Project 1988
TABLE3: PROJECTTIMETABLE
Steps in Project Cycle Date Planed Actual Date
Identification(Executive Project Summary) June 1987 Preparation 1987/1988 Appraisal Feb. 1988 Negotiation Sept.13-20,1988 BoardPresentation Oct. 20, 1988 Signing Nov. 17, 1988 Effectiveness March 2, 1989 ProjectCompletion June 30, 1998 Loan/CreditClosing June 30, 1995 June 30, 1998a
La : Bilharcomponents (Bhagalpur Bridge, Approach road, and consultancyservice) closed on June, 30, 1998. All other componentswere closed on 30 June, 1996. 15
TABLE4: LOAN/CREDITDISBURSEMENTS: CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL (US$ millions)
FY89 FY90 FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99
Appraisal Estimate 7.50 10.00 37.50 50.00 60.00 47.50 37.50 - - - - Appraisal Cumulative 7.50 17.50 55.00 105.00 165.00 212.50 250.00 - - - - Actual 17.98 0.00 6.99 14.15 33.19 33.23 35.76 28.88 13.75 4.69 0.05 Actual Cumulative 17.98 17.98 24.97 39.12 72,31 105.54 141.30 170.18 183.93 188.62 188.67 Actual as % of estimate 240 0 19 28 55 70 95 - - - - (for each year) Date of final disbursement December 28, 1998 16
TABLE5: KEY INDICATORSFOR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
InitialInipl- KeyImpleinentation Indicator in SAR Estimnated mentationPlan RevisedScope Actual
Parti A:.Road Wideningand Strengthening km km kmn km
Bihar ______
BhMgaIprBidjge ____4 4.4 4.4 Inoplt
_Approach Roads ___10 10.6 10.6 Incom p~e
...Haji..Mu. i~Road ___51 51 51 Dropped Sonp - ChpaRoad 50 50 50 Dropped
Total ____ 115 116 lOt 0
Maharashtra______Pune -Auran~gaba Rad 219 113,06k 113.6 113.6 Ahmnedn~ Aragb- 92 Drppd Dropd _,ura4!jbad - Jalna Road 124 112.4 Dopped Drped Nagpur-Kanp ~a4Ra 69 69 69 69 Akola-ingoliRoad 96 96 96 96 Wada - Biwadi Road 23 69.4 Lb 69.4 69.4
Palgah 7-Wada Road 47 - ~- - -
-Ahinendnag~ar - Kopargaon Road 95 96 l 96 9 Jalna Bypass - - Added 8.7 8.7 Total 673 648.4 452.7 452.7
Bhiwadi -Alwar Road ___90 2 3 5 1 235 219 Alwar - Karauli Road 145 - - -
Udaipur -Dabok Road ___16 113T- - 113 114.8 Dabok - Chittorgarh Road 97 - - - Airn~:CittogarkRoad 186 186 221.5 221.5 Sirohi -Abu Road 63 8 5 .5 b 85.5 85.5 Abu - Mount Abu Road 23 - - -
FqtehpKr- Churu Road 36 - 115 Cancelled __Cancelled Churu - Haryana Boarder 79--- Sikar - Haryanan Boader 133 133 Dropped Drpe
Total 868 867.5 655 __ 640.8
Uttar Pradesh ______Sonauli_-93 48 48 48 _____ ~ ~~- 45.2 La 45.2 46.2
Gorakl~~purBallia Road - ~~153 45a4 45 - 47 "' Cancelled Cancelled_ - 59.2 La Cancelled Cancelled
Faizabad - Allahabad Road ___ 143 47a 47.4 47.4 - 12.6 Ia 12.6 12.6 - I 86.4 64 Icmlt All ahaba - Dohri~ALtRoqad 208 208.7 Cancelled Cancelled
Total ___597 599.5 284.6 199.2
Grand total ~~~~~~~~~22532231.4 1508.3 Lc 1292_7_ 17
Part B: Consultancyervices/ Studies ProofConsultant: Bhagalpur Bridge Bihar Bihar - Bihar andApproach Road Supervison(A1unedna~g~d) Maharashtra Maharash_tra - Maharashtra SPimer - ga Raiasthan Rajasthan Raja han S-upervision(Allahabad - Faizabad) UP UP UP FeasibihtyStudy for Bom - NasikRoad Maharashtra Maharashtra PWDOrganization Study _Maharashtra Maharashtra Maharashtra Maharashtra RoadMaintenance M ana ty 4 States 4 States 4 States 4 States
Part C: ient______. Brid Insection Euipment 4 4 - 4 'g DynamicVehicle Weighing Equipment_ 8 8 - 0 AutomaticTraffic Counters 80 80 0 NuclearDen MeasuringEquipment 24 24 - 0
Dvpai icLoePenetrometers 12 12 -0 TRRLBumI grators 9 9 - DpsfflickRoad Profilers 4 4 - 2 Bitmen Distributors 8 8 - 8 Ch Spreaders __O ___ SurvEqument Sets 8 8 - 0
,.b _a . yqupme __n______1 1 -0 TrminigAids 1 1 - 0 ..... Drive Simulators 4 4 - 0 Color/Nig-Blindness Equient 24 24 0 Breahaysers______40 40 - 0 BrakeTesti uipment 24 24 - 0 Con uterSoftware 1 1 - 0
Part D: Traing ____ Pavement Rehabilitation and Modem 14 weeks 14 weeks 15 weeks 15 weeks Maintenance Management. __ __ Bridgeinspection, Rehabilitation, and 14 weeks 14 weeks 15 weeks 15 weeks MaintenanceManagemSystemfo Brides. __ ___ Contrac t of Big Projects 14 weeks 14 weeks 17 weeks 17 weeks DesignConstruction and Operationof 14 weeks 14 weeks 14 weeks 14 weeks ... ress.. ______s. E~qMi~ent procurementManagement -__ - 4 weeks 4 weeks Works ProcurementManagement - . - 4 weeks 4 weeks la Roadsection was split into two or three sections. -: Roadsections were combinedinto one section. LI 429.9 km of roads were cancelledin May 1993and further337.4 km were dro4pd as per the requestof the Departmentof Economicsin August 1993;the 8.7 kni-JalnaBypass (Maharashtra), and 35.5 km and minor 1.8 km (Rajasthan)were addedto the project. The 337.4km and 101km road componentwere officiallydropped on June 30, 1996 fromthe project,and 86.4 km are incomplete.All components,except Bhagalpur Bridge and its approachroads, were closedin June 1996 afterone-year extension from the originalclosing date of June 30, 1995. /d: includessome components substantially completed under the projectand fullycompleted by June 1997with PWDs' ownresources. /e Programchanged from Planning, design, and Constructionof Interchangesto Contractmanagement of Big Projects. -: These programswere added. Only oneunit was receivedto Maharashtra.Other three unit were procuredby MOSTbut were not deliveredto other statesyet. 18
TABLE6: KEY INDICATORSFOR PROJECT OPERATION Estimated/ Actual:Cumulated road length (km)'/ Revised(km) RoadWidening and Strengthening 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Bihar 115/116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Maharashtra 668/452.7 155 265 348 445 452.7 - - Rajasthan La 868/655 51 179 306 502 640.8 - Uttar Pradesh La 597/284.6 34 76 121 159 199.2 - - Total 2248/1508.3 240 520 775 1106 1292.7 1292.7 1292.7 / The road lengthwidening and strengtheningcompleted was calculatedbased on the physicalprogress of eachcontract.
TABLE7: STUDIESINCLUDED IN PROJECT
Study Purposeas definedat Status Impactof Study AppraisaVRedefined
1. Pavement To determinedesirable The studywas completed In Maharashtra ManagementStudy annualoutlays to repair/ in September1996 with and Rajasthan, (PMS) rehabilitate priority sections four participating states PMS is utilized in in a net work and assess PMScells under the a limitedfashion requirementof fund SteeringCommittee in their allocations.It providesa chairedby MOST. About maintenance rapid and systematic 30,000kmof road planing and measurefor managementto inventorydata overthe budgeting. assessand comparedifferent four statewas storedin In Uttar Pradesh operationalstrategies. PMS. The Rajasthan and Bihar, it has PWDestablished a PMS not been utilized cell for the systemand and its impact is utilizesit including negligible. AutomatedRoad Analyzer. 2. Organization Study Define objectives and The study was completed The Government of PWD of Maharashtra organization,recommend and final reportwas of Maharashtra how best it should be staffed submitted by the established the to meet its commitmentsand Consultantto the MaharashtraState how its resourcesshould be Government. Road structuredand deployed Development throughoutthe statein order Corporation. to achieveoptimum efficiency.It ascertainsthe budgetaryneeds of the recommended organisation. 3. FeasibilityStudy for FeasibilityStudy for Studywas completed in The expressway Bombay- Nasik Road proposed150 km of express, June 1996. initiatedas BOT Tahaneto Nasik via basis by PWD. Bhiwandi. 19
TABLE8A: PROJECTCOSTS (USD million)
Appraisal estimate Actual/ latest estimate L Item Local costs Foreign costs Total Local costs Foreign costs Total Civil Works 277.3 109.5 386.8 213.4 0.3 213.7 Land Acquisition 6.8 - 6.8 - - - Supervision of civil works 36.3 - 36.3 3.6 3.2 6.8 Equipment 0.7 5.0 5.7 0.5 0.1 0.6 Training 1.0 1.0 2.0 0.9 0 0.9 Studies 0.7 11.9 12.6 2.5 1.1 3.6 Total 322.8 127.4 450.2 218.5 4.7 225.6
La: Some figures are estimated.
TABLE 8B: PROJECTFINANCING (IJSD million)
AppraisalEstimates ActualLa Component World Bank Government Total World Bank Government Total Group of India Group of India Bihar State Roads 56.6 42.4 99.0 28.1 12.1 40.2 - & Bhagalpur Bridge Maharashtra State Roads 49.7 38.1 87.8 53.5 7.4 60.9 Rajasthan State Roads 58.0 45.6 103.6 70.9 11.5 82.4 Uttar Pradesh State Roads 85.7 74.1 159.8 36.2 5.9 42.1 Total Disbursement 250.0 200.2 450.2 188.7 36.9 225.6
/a: Some figures are estimated. 20
TABLE9: ECONOMICCOSTS AND B]ENEfITS (1988 USD million)
Net Present Cost Benefits la Value @12% Lb ERR (%) Bihar State Roads SAR 22 48 6 16 ICR - - - - Bhagalpur Bridge Le SAR 39 297 31 20 ICR 67 269 20 19 Maharashtra State Roads SAR 44 330 111 45 ICR (Roads completed) 396 83 Rajasthan State Roads SAR 53 344 99 33 ICR (Roads completed) 240 64 Uttar Pradesh State Roads SAR 82 216 38 19 ICR (Roads completed) 68 31
In ICR an analysisperiod is a 14-yearincluding a 10-yearoperation period. In the caseof Bhagalpurbridge, a 25-yearincluding a 20-yearof operationperiod.
La :NPVincludes 25 % of salvagevalue. 1k:Net presentvalues (NPV) for SARare re-calculated. ICRvalues for Bhagalpurare projectedvalues. 21
TABLE 10: STATUSOF LEGAL COVENANTS
Original Revised Agreement Section Covena Presen fIuflunFe hlfilhment Description of covenant Comments nt type t status nt date date Project 2.01(a) 5 CD Each State shall carryout its respectivepart of the After delay compliedwith. Agreement Project with due diligenceand efficiently and m conformitywith appropriateadministrative, financial and engineeringpractices. 2.01(bXi) 2 C 03/31/1990 Each State to carry out its part of the Project in Compliedwith. accordancewith InplementationProgram containedin Schedule2 of Project Agreement. 2.01(b)(ii) 5 C 03/31/1990 Each State to design,construct, strengthenand Compliedwith. maintain roads under the Project m accordance with designstandards and specificationsspecified by India Roads Congressin their issue numbers 3, 37 and 73. 3.01(a) 9 C Each State shall maintain records and accounts in Compliedwith. accordancewith sound accountingpractices, their operationsand financial conditionsin respect of the Project. 3.01(b) 1 CP Audit - each State (due within mine months of FY SOE audit report for approach end). road contract in Bihar is overdue and is expectedby 06/30/98. Schedule 5 C Each State to establish a supervisoryunit to assist 2, A1 in the coordinationof implementationof its respectivepart of the Project. Schedule 5 CP 12/31/1992 06/30/1995 Each State to completea study to introducea Study started in November 1992 2, A.3(i) Road MaintenanceManagement System (RMS). and completedJune 1995. Schedule 5 CP Statesto progressivelyintroduce RMS. 2, A.3(ii) Schedule 5 CP Each State to submit next year's construction 2, A.4 program. Schedule 5 NC Each State shall furmishinvoluntary resettlement In Bihar there was issue in Road 2, A5(i) components,but these were abandoned. Schedule 5 NC Each State takes steps for resettlementand In Bihar there was issue in Road 2, A5(ii) rehabilitation of individualsadversely affected by components,but these were the project abandoned Schedule 9 NC 06/30/1989 01/30/1993 Bihar to furnish to the Bank action plan for New deadline set in folow-up 2, B.6(i) BhagalpurBypass. letter. Schedule 5 C 12/31/1990 06/30/1994 Maharashtrato completePWD reorganization Study started July 1993 and 2, C.7(i) study. completed in September1994. Development 2.02(b) 3 C 12/31/1989 GOI to maintain a Special Accountin dollars. Compliedwith. Credit Agreement 3.01(b) 3 C GOI to make proceedsof loan available to each Compliedwith. State in accordancewith GO's standard arangements for developmentassistance to the Statesof India. 4.01(a) 1 C For expendituresmade on basis of SOE, records Complied with. and accountsreflecting these expendituresshall be maintained in accordancewith sound accountingpractices. 4.01(b) 1 CP 12/31/1993 Audit of SOE (due within nine months of FY Audit report for approach road end). contract in Bihar is expectedby 06/30/98. 4.02 1 NC 09/30/1993 Audit - SpecialAccount (due within six months of Not complied with. FY end). 4.03 5 CP 09/30/1989 GO, through MOST, shall (i) assist the States in Several items of equipmentwere procurementof goods,works and consultants' not procured by June 30, 1996, services required for project; and (ii) coordinate and componentwas closed at that arrangementsfor the provisionof tramiingunder time. Part F(b) ofthe Project.
CovenantTypes: 1= Accounts/audits 7 = Involuntaryresettlement 13=Other. 2 = Financial performance/revenuegeneration from beneficiaries 8 = Indigenouspeople. Present Status: 3 = Flow and utilization of project fbnds. 9 = Monitoring,review, and reporting. C = covenant compliedwith. 4 = Counterpartfunding. 10 = Project implementationnot coveredby categories 1-9. CD = complied with after delay. 5 = Managementaspects of the project or executingagency. 11 =Sectoral or cross-sectoralbudgetary or otherreources allocation. CP = complied with partially. 6 = Enviromnentalcovenants. 12 = Sectoralor cross-sectoralpolicy/regulatory/institutional action. NC = not complied with. 22
TABLE 11: COMPLIANCEWITH OPERATIONALMANUAL STATEMENTS
There was no significant lack of compliance with an applicable Bank Operational Manual Statement (OD or OP/BP).
TABLE 12: BANK RESOURCES: STAFF INPUTS Stage of project Planned Actual Weeks US$ Weeks US$
Preparationto appraisal n.a. n.a. 45.3 106,600 Appraisal n.a. n.a. 35.2 70,100 Negociationsthrough Boad approval n.a. n.a. 17.3 38,900 Supervision'@ n.a n.a 259.4 623,500 Completion n.a. n.a. 19.9 56,400 Total n.a. n.a. 377.0 895,500
Staff Week
FY 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total Preparation to appraisal 4.1 41.1 45.2 Appraisal 23.0 12.2 35.2 Negociationthrough 17.3 17.3 Boad approval Supervision'/ 0.1 12.5 20.8 34.5 45.2 47.3 34.5 23.1 19.9 12.1 9.4 259.4 Completion 9.4 10.5 19.9 Total 4.1 64.2 42.0 20.8 34.5 45.2 47.3 34.5 23.1 19.9 12.1 18.8 10.5 377.0
USS(1,000)
FY 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Total Preparation to appraisal 7.4 99.2 106.6 Appraisal 50.2 19.9 70.1 Negociationthrough 38.9 38.9 Boad approval Supervision-/ 27.8 41.7 75.3 106.8 117.6 74.4 74.8 49.6 29.0 26.5 623.5 Completion 26.4 30 56.4 Total 7.4 149.4 86.4 41.7 75.3 106.8 117.6 74.4 74.8 49.6 29.0 52.9 30 895.5
La:This was multi-stateproject therefore the supervisioncosts need to be lookedat in the contextof a multi-state project. Alsothe supervisionmissions were often combinedwith otherproject suchas the NationalHighway Project. 23
TABLE 13: BANK RESOURCES:MISSIONS
Stageof Project Month/ Numberof Daysin Specializedstaff PerformanceRating Lb Typesof Year persons field skills represented/a__ problems Implemen- Developmen tation status t objectives
Throughappraisal 6/87 2 19 E Oct-Nov/87 4 18 E, EC, DC Appraisal Feb/88 6 22 E, EC,DC Supervision Feb-Mar/89 2 30 E Oct-Nov/89 3 23 E, EC 2 1 Jan-Feb/90 4 19 E,EC 2 1 May/90 6 19 E,EC 2 1 Nov-Dec/90 2 18 E 2 1 Mar/91 4 19 E 2 1 Sep-OctJ91 5 17 E,EC 2 1 Feb-Mar/92 3 25 E 2 2 Jul/92 2 21 E, EC 3 2 M, P Sep-Oct/92 3 19 E 3 2 M,P RestructureJan/93 Feb-Mar/93 6 37 E 3 2 M, P Jul/93 5 26 E, O, I 3 2 M, P Oct-Nov/93 3 21 E, O 3 3 M, P Mar/94 3 25 E 3 3 M, P Jul/94 3 17 E, O U U M, P Feb/95 4 - FA, E, I U U M, P Jul-Aug/95 4 1 FA,E U U M,P Nov-Dec/95 3 1 FA,E U U M, P Jul/96 2 7 FA, E U U M, LC, En Mar/97 1 1 FA - - M, En May/97 3 6 FA,E S S Fi,M,LC, En Dec/97 2 4 E - - M,LC, En Jan/98 1 1 FA - - M, LC, En Supervision/Completion Jun/98 3 5 FA,E U S M Nov/98 1 5 E - a: E = Engineer, EC = Economist;FA = FinancialAnalyst; 0= OperationOfficer : HS or I = Highlysatisfactory; S or 2 = Satisfactory;U or 3 = unsatisfactory;HU or 4 =HighlyUnsatisfactory Fu = Funding;Fi = Finance;T = Training;P = ProcurementM = ProjectManagement; LC = LegalCovenant; En Engineering 24 Appendix A
IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT
INDIA
STATES' ROAD PROJECT (Loan 2994-IN/Credit 1959-uN)
INITIATIONOF IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT AISSION
AIDE MEMOIRE (August 4, 1998)
1. A World Bank mission visited India during June 8 to 26, 1998 to initiate work on the preparation of the ImplementationCompletion Report (ICR) for the States' Road Project (Ln. 2994/Cr. 1959-IN). The full mission comprisingMessrs. Fabio Galli (FinancialAnalyst, SASIN), Yoneo Oka (Highway Engineer, SASIN), and Moncef Chaabouni (Consultant) visited Patna and Bihar during June 8 - 12, while Mr. Yoneo Oka visited Mumbai, Maharashtra during June 15 and 16 and Messrs. Fabio Galli and Yoneo Oka visited Jaipur, Rajasthan during June 18 and 19. Also Messrs. Yoneo Oka and A. K. Swaminathan(Highway Engineer, SASIN) met in N. Delhi with officialsof Ministry of Surface Transport (MOST) on June 23 and with officialsof Government of Uttar Pradesh on June 25. The mission wishes to thank officialsof the Bihar Road Construction Department (BRCD), the PWDs of Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and UP, and MOST for the cooperation and patient assistance extended to the Bank mission.
Introduction
2. A loan in the amount of $170 million and a credit in the amount of SDR 62.2 million ($80 millionequivalent) for the States' Road Project were approved on October 20, 1988 and became effective on March 2, 1989. The expected project completion date was June 30, 1995. The project covered four states, namely, Bihar, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. The project components included; (a) the widening and/or strengtheningof about 2300 km of state roads; (b) construction of a bridge over the Ganga river at Bhagalpur; (c) procurement of specialised equipment to assist the management of the road systemincluding procurement of a pavement management system (PMS) and; (d) staff training, technical assistance, and consultant services.
3. Lack of familiaritywith Bank procurement procedures for the Governments, poor engineering,weak project quality of contractors, cash flow problerns, and removal of utilities etc., caused major delays in project implementation.As a result, the project was initiallyextended to October 31, 1995, and subsequentlyto June 30, 1996. By this date, with the exception of the Bihar components, most of the project components had been completed, even though some civil works contracts equivalent to US$62 millionhad been cancelled.
4. On June 30, 1996, selective components of the project were extended by a further one year to June 30, 1997, namely; (a) Bhagalpur Bridge contract in Bihar; (b) Approach Roads to Bhagalpur Bridge contract and; (c) remaining consultant services contracts for Bhagalpur Bridge and Approach Roads contracts. However, the completion of the bridge contract had been set back because of the need to reconstruct two partially completed well foundations washed away by exceptional scouring 25 Appendix A action during 1996 monsoon. Because of this, a further one year extension was granted by the Bank to June 30, 1998 for the same components. Although the construction of the Bhagalpur bridge and approach roads was not completed by June 1998, only approximatelyUS$5.3 million remained undisbursed under the project.
The Project
5. The project's main objectives were to extend the policy/ institutionalimprovements, which were begun under the National Highway Project (Loan 2534-IN), to the State level, in particular by; (a) promoting the use of modem maintenancemanagement systems, which each of the four states would put in place along the lines of what was being instituted by MOST for national highway network; (b) introducing improved constructionmethods through larger contract packages of a sufficient size to encourage local firmsto mechanise,but which, when grouped together, would also attract international interest and; (c) introducing supervisionby internationallyexperienced consultants on selected civilworks contracts in all four states.
6. The project comprised components; (a) civil works; (b) procurement of specialised equipment to assist the participating four states in monitoring the condition and usage of their road networks and promoting road safety; (c) staff training, technical assistance (studies) and; (d) supervision consultant services. The civilworks component includedabout 2,300 km of road widening and/or strengtheningin four states. The procurement of specializedequipment included a device for measuring roughness of roads which was decided to be used in determining road condition, modern traffic counters, and mobile bridge inspection platforms, etc.. Training and technical assistance included a variety of training, the installationof a pavement management system study, and road inventory surveys pertaining to the study for establishingin each state a network maintenance management system.
Mission's Findings
7. Achievement of project objectives. As of June 1996, all civil works components were substantiallycompleted in Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. As regards to the Bihar components none of the project components were completed as of June 1998 the revised closing date of the project. Out of 2300 km of state roads scheduledto be improved under the project, about 1500 km have completed while the remainingwere cancelledand withdrawn from the project. The status of physical completion of all of the project components is attached to the AM.
8. Procurement of most of the equipment, staff training, studies, and consultant services were substantiallycompleted as of June 1996. However, there were major delays in the procurement of the equipment and the installation of the PMS was also delayed.
9. The State of Bihar Components. The Bihar components of the project comprised four civil works contracts and a proof consultant service. Two of the civil works components (Hajipur- Muzzaffarpur (51 km) and Sonepur-Chhapra (50 km) roads) were not started due to lack of familiaritywith Bank procurement procedure, land acquisition,and resettlement and rehabilitation issues. These two components were formallyclosed on June 30, 1996. The remaining components of the project; the Bhagalpur Bridge, Approach Roads to the bridge, and Proof Consultant Services were on the other hand extended four times to June 30, 1998. 26 Appendix A
10. Work on the Bhagalpur bridge contract, which includes a 5 km concrete bridge across the Ganga River, started in April 1991, two years after the project became effective. This was caused by procurement delays due to a lack of familiaritywith Bank procurement rules. Furthermore during 1996 monsoon season, two partially completed well foundations (P3 & P4) in the navigational portion of the bridge were washed away by floods. By the end of June 1998, physical and financial progress was respectively 87% and 83%. This componentis expected to be completed by June 2000 at the earliest. The reconstruction of the two well foundationsis currently under arbitration and could further delay the completion of the bridge works. The Approach Road contract started on the ground only in December 1996 because of a variety of reasons including the reluctance of contractors to work in the Bhagalpur area. By the end of June 1998, the works of embankment and subgrade were substantiallyfinished and financialprogress was about 58%. This component is expected to be completed by June 1999, though there are currently law and order problems on site which could delay the completion of the works. The proof consultant contract for the bridge component was expected to be extended to at least June 30, 1998.
11. The mission also visited the Hajipur-Muzzaffarpurroad section. High traffic volume was observed on this section where the pavement was stilldistressed even though periodic pavement maintenanceworks had been executed. The other road section Sonepur-Chapra was reclassifiedby MOST in 1997 as a National Highway (NH19) and will be maintainedas part of the NH network.
12. The State of Maharashtra Components. The Maharashtra components of the project originallycomprised seven civil works contracts, a supervisionconsujltant service, the PWD organisational study, and part of the PMS. Seven civil works contracts were procured from July 1990 to January 1992. Due to slow implementationprogress, two contracts were withdrawn from the project during mid-term review. A supervisionconsultant contract, which was for one of the withdrawn civilworks contracts, was also terminated at the same time. In conjunction with the mid- term review, the construction of the Jalna Bypass and the feasibility study of Bombay-NasikRoad components were added to the Maharashtra components of the project. All Maharashtra components with the exception of the two cancelledcivil works contracts, were substantiallycompleted by June 30, 1996. The two cancelled civilworks contracts were fully completed by the PWD using their own funds in 1997.
13. The PWD organisational study was also completed on time even though most of the recommendationsof the study have only been partially implementedby GOM. However, as a result of the PWD organisational study, GOM has establishedthe Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation which is in charge of BOT projects in the state. The Corporation has taken up construction of Mumbai-Pune expressway on BOT basis.
14. The mission visited Pune - Ahmadnagarroad section which was completed in 1995. The mission observed high volumes of traffic on the road section and the pavement was in good condition thanks to regular road maintenanceworks. The road roughness is surveyed regularly and utilised for the annual maintenancework program.
15. The State of Rajasthan Components. The Rajasthan components of the project comprised six civil works contracts, a supervisionconsultant contract and a portion of the PMS. Out of these components, one civil work was cancelled from the project during the midterm review due to poor implementationprogress, and one civil work was not commenced and technically closed June 1996. 27 Appendix A
The other four civil works contracts and the supervisioncontract were substantially"completed by June 30, 1996.
16. The mission visited the Mahaura - Bhiwani road section which was fully completed by mid-1997. The mission observed that long streches of the improved road section have already deteriorated with cracks, pot holes particularlyin middle of the road which were maintainedby patching. Possible reasons for this premature deteriorationare; (a) hydrology of the road was not adequately taken into account during detailed engineering;(b) improper pavement execution for the center part of the road due inadequate diversion of traffic flow and; (c) much higher than expected axle loads.
17. -TheState of Uttar Pradesh Components. The Uttar Pradesh components of the project comprised nine civil works contracts, a supervisionconsultant contract and part of the PMS. Of the nine civil works contracts, three were fully completed by 1995, while three were cancelled during the mid-term review. The final three civil works contracts started late and progressed slowly, and out of these three, two had been fully completed by 1997 with the state's own resources while the third has still not been completed.
18. Pavement Management Study. The contract included procurement of a software package including dTIIMSand dROAD and etc., to establish a PMS, inclusiveof an automated road analyser (ARAN) to enable systematic road condition surveys in the four states. Surveys of about 30,000 km of road inventory were carried out over the four states and this was stored in the PMS. A steering committee chaired by MOST was establishedto manage the surveys and the establishment of the PMS in the four states covered by the project. Also training programs includingoperator and system training for the ARAN vehicle were carried out. The Rajasthan PWD, after completing the road inventory survey, established a working cell to managethe PMS and has conducted some surveys with the ARAN vehicle to update the road conditioninventory database. The Maharashtra PWD also uses the PMS to maintain an updated database of the condition of the core road network and conducts regular surveys using the ARAN vehicle. However, in the case of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the PMS is currently not being utilized.
19. Procurement of Equipment. The procurement of equipmentunder the project was done by MOST on be half of the four states. However, due to the lack of familiaritywith Bank procurement procedures and weak coordination between MOST and the four states, not all of the equipment was procured by June 30, 1996 when this component was closed. As a matter of fact, the procurement of four mobile bridge inspection units under the project has still not been completed due to litigation proceedings.
Key Lessons Learned
20. Quality at entry is essential for the successfulimplementation of a complex multi-state project. Detailed engineering design and site readiness for civil works includingland acquisition, resettlement and rehabilitation, and removal of utility are major government responsibilitiesto ensure quality at entry. Weak organisational and implementationcapabilities of implementingagencies was a major reason for poor quality at entry and hence partially achieved development objectives. In future projects, site readiness should be a sine qua non condition for project readiness for appraisal together with full awareness by the implementingagency of its responsibilitiesto implementthe project. 28 Appendix A
21. The State Governments' familiaritywith procurement and other Bank procedures is crucial to expedite project implementation. This project was the first attempt to introduce ICB at State level. Lack of familiaritywith ICB caused major delays in procuring civil works under the project. Furthermore, policy/institutionalimprovement of state PWD's together with intensive training in contract management skills are important to enhance implementationcapabilities.
22. Internationally experienced supervisionconsultants are effective in transferring knowledge and technology of contract managementand quality control to PWI) and contractors. However if implementingagencies are not committed and do not feel full ownership of the project, the use of internationallyexperienced supervisionconsultants can even cause delays and increase costs in the execution of the civilworks contracts. Governments should take fuillresponsibility for the coordination of all parties involved in the project, particularlythe supervisionconsultants.
23. A multi-statesproject can weaken the sense of ownership of the project by individual states. This can cause implementationdelays and difficultiesin supervisingthe project. More effective institutionalarrangements including single state projects are needed to enhance project ownership and project implementation.
24. Periodic maintenance after the completion of widening and strengthening of roads is important for sustainabilityof outcomes. Some parts of the roads improved in the project have already started deteriorating due to heavy freight traffic and poor hydrology. Effective road maintenancemanagement includingplanning and budgeting for the roads is the key for the sustainabilityof project roads and the network.
25. Large size of the procurement works introduced in the project were effective to encourage local contractors to mechanize and to introduce improved construction methods although achievementswere not fully satisfactory. Further mechanisationis required to improve both the quality and durability of the roads improved.
ICR Preparation
26. The mission discussed the ICR preparation and requested PWWDsand BRCD of the four states and MOST to prepare and provide the Bank with informationrequired for ICR tables as follows:
a) Key Indicators for Project Implementation; b) Key Indicators for Project Operation; c) Studies, Training, equipment procurement includedin Project; d) Project Costs and; e) Project Financing.
27. The mission requested PWDs and BRCD to provide the Bank traffic data for each road required for comparison with the predicted data in Staff AppraisalReport.
28. It was agreed that PWDs, BRCD, and MOST will prepare the above data and will forward it to the Bank by August 12, 1998 and the Bank will review all the information received and send commentsby August 31, 1998. It was also agreed that PWDs, BRCD, and MOST will forward to the Bank revised and additional data based on the Bank's comments before September 30, 1998. 29 Appendix A
29. The mission requested PWDs and BRCD to provide the Bank fully prepared7operational plans by August 12, 1998, which include future maintenance,operational, and budgeting plans for road sections improved and other studies procured under the project.
30. Borrower's contribution to ICR. The mission requested PWDs, BRCD, and MOST to prepare their own project evaluation reports. It should cover: (a) the project's execution and the initial operation characteristics of its key components; (b) the costs and benefit of the project; (c) the performance of the borrower, executing agencies, and the Bank with regard to their respective obligations under the Loan and Credit agreements; and (d) the extent to which the development objectives of the loan/creditwere achieved. This information is annexed to the ICR as a borrower's report. Advice for preparing borrower's contributionto ICR is given in Attachment.
31. It was agreed that PWDs, BRCD, and MOST will forward their own project evaluation reports to the Bank by September 30, 1998. 30 Appendix A
Attachment: Status of Completion of Project Components
Appraisal Initial Implementation Restructured Implementation Implementation Completion Bihar _ . _ km ckm km 1 Bhagalpur Bridge 4 Bhagalpur Bridge (1/1) 4.4 Bhagalpur Bridge 4.4 Incomplete 2 Bridge Approach Road 10 Bridge Approach Road (2/1) 10.6 Bridge Approach Road 10.6 Incomplete 3 Hazipur-Muzzaffarpur 51 Hazipur-Muzzaffarpurroad 51 Closed (6196) Road (2/3) 4 Sonepur-Chhapra Road 50 Sonepur-Chhapra Road(2/2) 50 Closed (6/96) 5 Supervision Supervision for Bhagalpur Proof consultant for Bridge Bhagalpur Bridge 6 Equipment By MOST By MOST Partially completed 7 Training By MOST By MOST through NMITE Completed 8 Maintenance By Maharashtra PWD By Maharashtra PWD Completed Management Study
Maharashtra km km km 1 Pune -Aurangabad Road 219 Pune - Ahmednagar Road 113.6 Pune - Ahmednagar Road 113.6 Completed (7/90- (2) 11/95) _- Ahmednagar-Aurangabad 92 Cancelled (8/93) Completed (6/90- Road (3) 6/97 by PWD) 2 Aurangabad - Jalna Road 124 Aurangabad - Jalna (Jalna) 112.4 Cancelled (8/93) Completed (6/90- Road (4) 6/97 by PWD) 3 Nagpur - Kanpa Road 69 Nagpur - Kanpa Road (6) 69 Nagpur - Kampa Road 69 Completed (1/92- 6/95) 4 Akola - Hingoli Road 96 Akola -Hingoli (Hingoli) 96 Akola - Hingoli (Hingoli) 96 Completed (6/90- Road (5) Road 3/95) 5 Wada-Biwadi Road 23 Wada-Bhiwadi, Palghar- 69.4 Wada-Bhiwvandi,Palghar- 69.4 Completed (12/90- Wada Road (1) Wada Roacl 5/97 by PWD) 6 Palgarh-Wada Road 47 _ 7 Ahimendnagar- 95 Ahmendnagar-Kopargaon 96 Ahmendnagar-Kopargaon 96 Completed (8/90- Kopargaon Road Road (7) Road 12/94) 8 Supervision Supervision for 92 Closed (6/96) __ Ahmednagar-Aurangabad Road 9 Equipment By MOST By MOST Partially completed 10 Training By MOST By MOST through N1THE II Maintenance Maintenance Management Maintenance Management Completed (11192- Management Study Study Study 9/96) 12 Organisation Study of Organisation Study of PWD Organisation Study of PWD Completed (7/93- PWD 9/94) Jalna Bypass (8) 8.7 Completed (4/94- 1/97 by PWD) Feasibility Study of Completed (3/94- Bombay-NasikRoad 6/96)
R*ajsthan km km km 1 Bhiwadi - Alwar- Road 90 Bhiwadi-Alwar-Karauli 235 Bhiwadi-Alwar-Karauli 235 Completed Road (1/1,2/lA) Road 2 Alwar-Karauli Road 145 _ Completed 3 Udaipur-Dabok Road 16 Udaipur-Dabok-Chittorgarh 113 Udaipur-Dabok-Chittorgarh 113 Completed Road (1/2) Road 4 Dabok-Chittorgarh Road 97 __ __ 5 Ajimer-Chittorgarh Road 186 Ajimer-Chittorgarh Road 186 Ajimer-Chittorgarh Road 186 Completed (113,2/3A) 6 Sirolii-Abu 63 Sirohi-Abu-MountRoad 85.5 Sirohi-Abu-Mount Road 85.5 Completed (2/8) 7 Abu-Mount Road 23 _ 31 Appendix A
Appraisal Initial Implementation Restructured Implementation Implementation Completion 8 Fatehour-Churu 36 Fatehpur-Churu-Haryana 115 Cancelled (5/93) Border (2/6) 9 Chulu-Haryana Border 79 _ 10 Sikar-Haryana Border 133 Sikar Haryana Border (1/4) 133 Cancelled (8193) Work closed and left incomplete 11 Supervision Supervision for Ajimer- Supervision for Ajimer- Completed Chittorgarh Road Chittorgarh Road 12 Training By MOST By MOST through NiTrE Completed 13 Equipment By MOST By MOST Partially completed 14 Maintenance By Maharashtra PWD By Maharashtra PWD Completed Management Study
Uttar Pradesh km km km 1 Sonauli-Gorakhpur Road 93 Sonauli-Farenda Road (1/1) 48 Sonauli-Farenda Road 48 Completed Farenda-Gorakhpur 45.2 Farenda-Gorakhpur Road 45.2 Completed Road(1/2) 2 Gorakhpur-Ballia Road 153 Gorakhpur-Ballia Road 45 Gorakhpur-Ballia Road 45 Completed (1/3) Gorakupur-Ballia Road 47 Cancelled (5/93) (1/4) Gorakupur-Ballia Road 59.2 Cancelled (5/93) (1/5) 3 Faizabad-Allahabad 143 Allahabad-Faizabad 47.4 Allahabad-Faizabad Road 47.4 Completed Road Road(2/7) Allahabad-Faizabad 12.6 Allahabad-Faizabad Road 12.6 Completed Bypass(2/8) Allahabad-Faizabad (2/9) 86.4 Allahabad-Faizabad Road 86.4 Incomplete 4 Allahabad-Dohrigat 208 Allahabad-Dohrigat (2/6) 208.7 Cancelled (5/93) Road 5 Supervision Supervision for Allahabad- 146.4 Supervision for Allahabad- 146.4 Completed Faizabad Faizabad 6 Training By MOST By MOST through N1THE Completed 7 Equipment By MOST By MOST Partially completed 8 Maintenance By Maharashtra PWD By Maharashtra PWD Completed Management Study 32 Appendix A
ATTACHMENT: GUIDANCEON GOVERNMENTS'CONTRIBURTION TO THE ICR
1. Governments' (Ministry of Surface Transport, State of Bihiar,State of Maharashtra, State of Rajasthan, and State of Uttar Pradesh) own project evaluationreports are an important part of an ICR. It is attached, unedited, to the ICR sent to the World Bank Board. It should cover, from borrower's perspective: (a) the project's execution and the initialoperation characteristics of its key components; (b) the costs and benefit of the project; (c) the performance of the borrower, executing agencies, and the Bank with regard to their respective obligationsulnder the Loan and Credit agreements; and (d) the extent to which the development objectives of the loan/credit were achieved. The topics to be covered and addressed in the report are project design, appraisal, implementation, and project results.
2. For project design, the contribution could address such questions as the appropriateness of the project's objectives, the size of the project and scope of the inviestmentsproposed, aspects of design leading to easy (or difficult) implementationand the effect on government institutions.
3. For project appraisal, comments should concentrate on any significantchanges in the objectives, size, and scope of the project and whether these were appropriate.
4. For project implementation,comments and experience should cover the introduction and procurement of maintenance managementstudy, larger construction contracts, international supervisionconsultant, and encouragement of local firms to mechanize.
5. For project result, comments should include an assessment of the direct physical benefits arising from the project. Since economic re-analysiswill be includedin ICR, it is suggested, if government so wishes, that contribution could most usefully comment on the effects of the project from the government's perspective. Such an analysiswould be a most useful contribution to the ICR.
6. Based on the foregoing sections, contribution should list the main lessons learned from the implementationexperience and arising from the above analysis.
7. The World Bank will be happy to provide any further elaboration or clarification needed to assist in the preparation of the contribution. 33 Appendix A
ATTACHMENT:OPERATIONAL PLAN
State of Bihar (Received Sept. 28, 1998)
Since Ganga Bridge at Bhagalpur along with its approaches is a part of State Highway, this is to ensure uniform State level maintenance standards and funding levels to meet in prioritized manner the maintenance requirement of the whole bridge and road net work.
State of Maharashtra (Received Sept. 31, 1998)
1. The Government of Maharashtra (GOM) ensured Completion of works under the contracts awarded for the projects. Except for Contract No. 1 all other contracts are closed financially. Final account will be closed for this contract during 1998-99 financialyear.
2. Roads improved under this projects are looked after by the same executing Divisions. Special funds are made availableby the GOM for these up-keep and further improvement necessity caused due to increased traffic viz. widening of bridges and small culverts, geometrical improvementsto avoid accidents and to make each stretch of improved road, free of accident spots. Monitoring of this activity is done by a officer of the rank of SuperintendingEngineer.
3. Three studies were carried out under this project viz. Organization Study of PWD, Pavement System and Feasibility Study of Mumbai (Bombay) - Nasik Expressway.
i) Recommendationsacceptable to GOM are underway for implementation.
ii) GOM gives high priority for training of more officers to PMS installed and extend the system to other important roads in the GOM's network.
iii) GOM is keen to execute the work of Expressway for which land acquisition is in progress. Clearance from EnvironmentalDepartment is at advance stage. GOM is likelyto take up this work through BOT in the near future after obtaining land in possession and getting Environment clearance. Consultant have been appointed to carry out detailed engineeringfor this project.
4. Recently Improved road sections under State Roads World Bank Aided Projects are valued addition to the State Road Network in the State. Government Of Maharashtra gives special attention for the upkeep of these road stretches. Specialrepair funds are reserved for the upkeep of these road sections. The re-newal strategy is based on every years roughness measurement observations. Road sections where the roughness gone above the level of 2000 mm per km are necessarilytackled for. Roughness Observationsare take normallyprior to on set of Mansoon which normallyby middle of June every year. Re-newal programs are chalked out & finalize up by October & execution is carried out during November to next May. Re-newal treatment is normally40 mm thick A.C. 34 Appendix A
5. On some road sections if traffic demands widening by providing 1.5 metre hard shoulders is also taken up through repair programs. Traffic Count data is observed during third week of May & Dec. every year on these road sections.
6. For other State roads the rate of fund is assumed as Rs.31,500/ 25,575/ 25,475/ 19,708 per km. for State Highway/Major District Road/Other District Road & VillageRoads. All the Maintenance Offices submit their Statistical data to Government of Maharashtra in the first quarter of new financialyear, which is from 1st April to the next Calendar Year 31st March. Repair funds are distributed on the basis of the length within the jurisdiction of that maintenanceoffice. Additional grants for special works are allotted by Government Of Maharashtra on its merits e.g. Maintenance to repair to major bridges, heavy repairs to road stretches under repairs, improving& strengthening program (RISP),Ghat Roads, Caution boards etc. At the end of financial year work done during the year is reported to the Government of Maharashtra for monitoring & planningof grants for the new year.
State of Rajasthan (Received Nov. 2, 1998)
1. Maintenance of roads developed under State Road Project is done through non-plan budget of the State Govt. The state has a total no. of 78493kms.of all kinds of roads of various categories as under:- 1. National Highways(NHWs) 2964kms. 2. State Highways(SHIWs) 10039kms. 3. Major District Roads(MDRs) 5760kms. 4. Other District roads(ODRs) 12792kms. 5. Village Roads(VRs) 46938kms.
2. Although there are norms evolved by the XFinance Commission to determine the budget allotment in the maintenance of these roads on a per km. basis, the funds exactly required as per these norms are not available on account of the non-availabilityof resources. However funds allotted for maintenance are increased every year as per availabilityof resources.
3. National Highways are maintainedagainst the funds provided by the MOST, Govt. of India. The state funds as allotted are spent as per requirement of State Highways, MDRs, ODRs and Village Roads in the year. State Highways carry highest volume of traffic amongst the roads other than National Highways and the requirement of maintenanceis therefore is maximum on the State Highways, next in the order of priority are MDRs, ODRs and then Village roads. The development of 641kms. of these four roads in the State Road Project has saved some money from the amount which were spent on these roads before this development and these savings are now diverted to other roads for better maintenance.This way development of these roads has helped in the maintenance of the MDRs and ODRs. The maintenanceexpenditure is also categorized into four categories of roads as above and at the end of the each financial year data of allotment / expenditure is maintained. 35 Appendix A
4. On some of these roads, re-construction and upgradation is also to be taken up on account of inadequacy of crust for the increasedvolume of traffic at a particular point of time. Such upgradation are carried out either through maintenancebudget or through the budget allotted at modernization through the State Plan. The network of State Highways and MDRs as well as ODRs is deficient in road crust as well as in bridging, rail crossing etc. and effort are being made to find the additional funds for these requirements either through the State Plan or through Externally Aided Projects. The Government of Rajasthan has committedto further increase the maintenance allocation during the IXFive Year Plan extended up to 2003.
State of Uttar Pradesh (ReceivedNov. 25, 1998)
Although the present maintenance& budget plan of the Department is not sufficientfor sustainable maintenanceof such good qualityroads but now as per Mew State Road Policy more stress has been given on the management& budget provisions of roads. In this way proper maintenance shall be carried out to meet out the basic objectives of the project. 36 Appendix B
IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT
INDIA
STATES' ROAD PROJECT (Loan 2994-IN/Credit 1959-IN)
Borrower's Contribution to the ICR
The State of Bihar
A. THEPROJECT EXECUTION AND THE INITIALOPERATION CHARACTERESTICS OF ITS KEY COMPONENTS
Implementation Experience
1. The Department with the overall responsibilityfor the implementationof the project was the Bihar Road Construction Department (RCD). Although,the project became effective on March 2, 1989, it could not gather momentumtill 1991, due to delays in finalizingthe contract for the works and for other reasons enumerated below.
2. The construction of Ganga Bridge at Bhagalpur comprises of 4.3672 km of the Main Bridge and 10.6 km of its approach roads (the southern approach road is 1.6 km and northern approach road is 9.0 km). The work of Main Bridge was awarded for Rs.550 million, as per the contract agreement; the work was scheduled to start on April 5, 1991, and to be completed on April 4, 1996. Initially,there was a delay in transferring the Railway Yard at Bhagalpur to the contractor. It was transferred in December 1991, which resulted iinthe extension of the contract completion date to December 31, 1996.
3. As per the Loan Agreement, the project completiondate vvas June 30, 1995. It was extended till June 30, 1996, by the World Bank.
4. In the second package of the World Bank, there was the wiork of construction of approach roads of the Ganga Bridge at Bhagalpur. All the formalities etc, for the pre- qualificationtender & Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) for this work were prepared and tenders were invited in 1993 as per the approval norms and criteria laid down by the World Bank. The tenders were invited several times. First time, there was no tender. Second time, there was only one tender which was too high to be approved. Third time, there were two tenders, but again the rates were high. The RCD rejected the tenders and decided to do the work departmentally. But the World Bank did not approve of this action, nor did they agreed to divide the works into smaller groups. Finally,with the approval of the World Bank, the work was awarded for Rs. 421.934 million. As per the Contract Agreement, the work of approach roads was to start on June 6, 1996, and to be completed on June 5, 1999.
5. Considering all aspects, the World Bank Loan was again extended from June 30, 1996 to June 30, 1997. 37 Appendix B
6. The date of the completion of the contract Agreementfor the construction of the Main Bridge at Bhagalpur was further extended from December 31, 1996, to December 31, 1997, due to a variation of soil parameters in the well foundations. In actual condition, the soil met with in foundation in many wells were clayeyin place of sandy one. Clayey strata takes more time in sinkingthan sandy.
7. The work was going on as per schedule, but there were setbacks due to the unprecedented floods and a change in flow pattern of the river during the 1996 rainy season, which resulted in the loss of two partially constructed well foundations in the navigational portion of the bridge. Because of this, the Bank granted a one year further extension to the project to June 30, 1998. The contractor submitted clams for the reconstruction of these two wells which were rejected by GOB and as per the terms of the contract, the agency preferred to go for arbitration. Due to the losses of these two wells and some other reasons, the contractor agreement was also given an extension till June 30, 1999, to match the completion date of the contract for the approach road works. Finally,the Bank didn't extend the loan agreement beyond June 30, 1998; although the project had not yet been completed. By the end of June 1998, the physical and financial progress of Main bridge was 87 % and 83 % respectively and the work in the embankment and subgrade in its approach roads were substantiallycompleted and its financial progress was about 58 %. The Ganga bridge and its approach roads at Bhagalpur are expected to be completed by June, 2000 at the earliest. Now, GOB has to complete the project using its own resources.
8. There is every expectation of some problems comingin the way of such a huge gigantic project like construction of Ganga Bridge at Bhagalpur and that also in such a large meandering river like Ganges whose behavior can not be predicted at all. As such, the delay in completion of such project cannot be ruled out.
9. Supervision by Proof Consultants: The civil works were supervisedby the Proof Consultant. Mls COWI consultant of Denmark, a firm of International repute, was appointed as Proof consultant for the construction of Ganga Bridge at Bhagalpur by GOB after obtaining concurrence of the World Bank. M/s VPWI consultant was also appointed as proof consultant for the construction of its approach roads by entering into a supplementaryagreement for the same. The scope of work for the Proof Consultantwas to check and recommend the designs of the bridge and to supervise the works on site includingthe quality control works and to suggest and recommend steps required for early and efficient execution of the works.
10. The project has succeeded in achievingnow physical objectives too. Regarding the procurement of construction and laboratory equipment: in all 7 items were to be procured for Bihar as per the SAR, but finallyonly two items namely (i) Bitumen pressure distributor - 2 Nos. (ii) Mobile bridge Inspection Unit - 1 No. were procured. Procurement of the other five items were dropped by MOST as per discussionwith a World Bank mission in July/August 1995, as the cost of only three items exceeded the total provision made in the SAR for the Bihar State. Regarding training of personnel, it was conducted by the National Institute for the Training of Highway Engineers, New Delhi; under the supervisionof MOST, personnel were given training at New Delhi and abroad. Regarding Pavement Management Study, it was taken up and done under the direct supervision of MOST by the Maharashtra PWD. 38 Appendix B
Project Sustainability
11. The civil works under this project were not completed by lune 30, 1998, the closing date of the loan agreement. But 87 % of the works so far have been completed for the Main Bridge and the 58 % (financialprogress) of the works have been completed for the Approach Roads through June 30, 1998. The quality of the works are very good. It is expected that after completion, these works will meet with design life. The amount that will be allocated for maintenance of the approach roads will be as per norms prescribed by the Government.
Economic Re-evaluation
12. The work of Ganga Bridge at Bhagalpur has not been completed as yet. The actual economic re-evaluation can only be done after the bridge is complete and open to traffic.
B. BORROWER'SPERFORMANCE
13. The start of construction of the Ganga Bridge was delayed due to delays in the finalizationof the bidding and the contract by the RCD and GOB. The start of construction of the approach roads to the Ganga Bridge was also delayedmuch as the finalizationof its contract and approval by the World Bank took time due to complicationsin different stages of the tender. As such, the RCD could not receive World Bank assistance earlier than 1990 - 1991. Moreover, the two project components of Hazipur - Muzaffarpur Road and Sonepur - Chhapra Road as shown in SAR could not be taken up due to non-acquisitionof land, removal of trees, electric poles, public Health Engineering installations,and telephone poles etc. in time and World Bank assistance for these projects were not extended beyond June 30, 1996. There were further set backs due to the loss of two partially constructed foundation wells in constructing the Ganga Bridge from unprecedented floods and a change in the flow pattern of the river during the 1996 rains, and the settlement of claims associated with its reconstruction submitted by the contractor which took time due to an arbitration process. As such, the actual completion of the project was further delayed. Finally,World Bank assistance was not extended beyond June 30, 1998, and the GOB could not utilize the full loan sanctioned for Bihar.
C. PERFORMANCEOF WORLD BANK
14. Performance of the World Bank during both the project processing and implementation phases has been satisfactory except that while settling the contract for Approach Roads of Ganga Bridge at Bhagalpur, the Bank didn't agree to some of the proposals of GOB resulting in award of the contract at high rate. The Bank was very responsiblefor increasingthe disbursement percentage of CivilWorks to 90 % from the original 60 % as enumerated in the SAR. However, the borrower could not utilize much of the World Bank Loan till June 30, 1995, the original date of the completionof Loan Agreement due to various unavoidable reasons explained in Borrower performance. However, the World Bank was kind enough to extend the project four times and finallytill June 30, 1998. The implementingagency considers that the World Bank SupervisionMissions gave valuable guidance and support. 39 Appendix B
D. THmEXTENT TO WHICH THE DEVELOPEMENTOBJECTIVES OF TH1ELOAN WERE ACHIEVED
15. Under this project, only the major project component, the construction of a High Level Bridge and its approach roads across the river Ganges at Bhagalpur has been taken up. However, this has also not been completed despite the closure of the Loan Agreement. But when completed, this will significantlyimprove access to the under developed northern part of the state. There is at present no permanent crossing of the river for 280 kms from the bridge at Mokameh to the Farakka Baridge at the West Bengal State border. The bridge which lies about half way between these two structures, will substantiallyreduce the distance for many trips and promote north south integration. Ultimately,the bridge will form part of a proposed National Highway running from the industrialbelt in southern Bihar to Jogbani near the Nepal border. It will facilitate the exchange of agriculturaland mineralresources availableon the two sides of the river and to reduce the distance of the prominenttown/cities, such as, Katihar, Purnea, Saharsa, Forbesganj, and Khagaria from Bhagalpur. However, to avoid adding the bridge traffic to the already severely congested down town area, bypass of Bhagalpur is desirable. 40 Appendix B
The State of Maharashtra
A. INTRODUCTION
1. Maharashtra State's Road Project is the first project of such a kind in the State to improve the State's secondary network system fallingin between the primary network of National Highways and Territory network of other District Roads and Rural Roads. State Highways are the main trunk roads within the State Territory which carry almost 60% of the passenger and goods traffic. The Project was undertaken to remove the deficienciessuch as inadequate carriage way width, crust thickness and to improve the riding quality, etc.
B. OBJECTIVESAND PROJECTDESCREPTION
2. The project's main objectiveswere (i) to remove deficienciesin widths and the crust of the pavement which were inadequate compared to the traffic volume plying on the road sections, (ii) to improve the riding quality of the road surface, (iii) to promote use of modem maintenancemanagement system, on the similarlines, on which it has been instituted by the Ministry of Surface Transport, GOI, for the National Highways ,(iv) to introduce improved construction methods through larger contracts of a sufficientlyindividual size to encourage local contracting firms to mechanizebut which if grouped together would attract intemational interest, and (v) to introduce supervisionby a Consultant of Intemational repute on some project.
3. The project consisted of eight civil works contracts covering a length of 668 km of State Highways to be improved to two lane carriage way. This was modified and clubbed in seven civil contracts on FIDIC III form as per decisionstaken during the visit of the World Bank Mission from October 14 to November 15, 1989. The length to be covered was modifiedto 673.80 kmn.Out of these seven contracts, contract Nos. m & IV were deleted from the World Bank Assistancein September 1993 and one civil works contract, No. VIII, the construction of bypass outside Jalna city and secondjob of feasibilitystudy of Mumbai (Bombay) -Nashik Expressway, was included in November 1994.
4. The objectiveswere to be met through (a) improvements of about 673 km of eight State Highway links, (b) the procurement of specializedequipment to assist the State in monitoring conditions of the State's road network, (c) staff training and technical assistance that would emphasize the planning, design and implementationof project and develop skills of road maintenance, and (d) consultancy services for the introduction of Pavement Management System.
5. As per SAR completion, the date for all the items of works in the project was December 21, 1994. For several reasons, this was extended up to June 30, 1996. The total cost of the project, includingphysical & financial contingencies,was US$87.8 Million,out of which, the Bank's share was to be US$49.7 Million. The balance, US$38.1 Million,was to be the borrower's share. The US$49.7 Million had two components 1) an IBRD Loan of US$33.796 Million& 2) an IDA Credit of SDR 12.395 Million(US$15.904 Million equivalent). 41 Appendix B
5.1. The rate of upliftment of the loan amount was very slow in the initialperiod., The Gulf war had it's effect on this issue. Bank agreed to enhancethe rate of disbursementsfrom 60% to 90% of the expenditure on civil contracts from September 1, 1990. This was continued till the last date of the closure of the agreement, June 30, 1996. Full reimbursementwas received from the World Bank by this date.
6. The Govermmentof Maharashtra had no difficultyin arranging for allocatingmatching grants in the annual budget estimate.
C. IMPLEMENTATIONEXPERIENCE
7. The P.W.D. Government of Maharashtra was responsible for project implementation, includingthe preparation and management of all civil contracts. Althoughthe agreement was signed on November 17, 1988, and the project became effective on March 2, 1989, the agreements for six civil works costing Rs. 1034.047 Millionwere signed between June 1990 to December 1990. One civil works contract, C-VI, costing Rs. 131.804 Million, for improvementsto Nagpur - Umred - Kanpa Roads had to be resigned due to non-cooperation from the contractor to pay initial securities. Bids were re invited for this contract and the work order for C-VI was issued in January 1992. As per agreement with the Bank one of the civil contracts was to be supervisedby a SupervisionConsultant. A separate contract was signed for the appointment of a SupervisionConsultant to look after works in C-III. According to the SAR, the supervisionconsultant was to be on the ground by June 1, 1989, however this was delayed due to late approval of the short-list. The SupervisionConsultant arrived on the ground on April 10, 1991. The contract with the SupervisionConsultant was terminated on the date of closure of the agreement with the Consultant. Works in C-I,C-II,C-V,C-VI& C-VII were completed between December 31, 1994 to May 28, 1997.
7.1. Out of seven contracts signed, works in C-III, improvementsto the Ahmednagar- Aurangabad road & in C-IV, and improvementsto the Aurangabad-Jalna-Mantharoad could not progress well. After a review taken by the visiting World Bank Mission in June 1993, these works were withdrawn from the World Bank assistance in September 1993. The Government Of Maharashtra decided to execute these works from its own funds.
7.2. The Government Of Maharashtra proposed to include two additional works to be added in this project in lieu of two works deleted in September 1993. The World Bank agreed to this and accordinglythe civil works construction of the Jalna Bypass and the second work of Feasibility Study of Mumbai-(Bombay)Nashik Expressway were added in this project in November 1994. The construction work of the Jalna Bypass, C-VIII, was started in April 1994 & the construction work was completed in January 1997. The easibilityStudy of the Mumbai- (Bombay) Nashik Expressway commenced on January 17, 1994 & the final report was submitted by the Consultant in June 1996.
8. Though two civilworks in Contract No III and Contract No. IV were deleted from the World Bank Assistance, these two jobs were successfullycompleted by PWD through Government of Maharashtra' s funds in June 1997. 42 Appendix B
9. The implementationrecord of the project is good. All the civil works have been completed, includingthose two which were deleted from World Bank Assistance. Detailed informationin this respect is given in table under para 18 (II) titled "Implementationof the project". Feasibility study of Mumbai (Bombay) - Nashik Expressway has been completed. Pavement Management System has been installed. Twelve officers were sent for Training through NITHE (National Institute for the Training of Highway Engineers) in New Delhi. Detailed informationin this respect is given in a note (A) on Training.
9.1. As per SAR, 17 Nos. of Items of Equipment were to be purchased. This was planned to be centrally purchased by the MOST for all the four participating States. The MOST could purchase one unit of Mobile Bridge Inspection Unit, one unit of Dipstick Road Profiler & two units of Pressure Bitumin Distributors before the closure of the World Bank Assistance. Informationin respect of this is given in note (B) on Equipment.
10. Organizational Study of the State PWD was one of the items of the agreement. TATA Consultancy Services from India completed the Study and the acceptable recommendations of the Study are planned to be implemented.
D. PROJECTRESULTS
11. The physical objectives for the civil works are achieved to the extent of satisfactory levels. Items which were in balance as on June 30, 1996, have been subsequentlycompleted. As per SAR, the average cost of improvementworks was expected to be Rs. 1.597 Millionper km. On completion, it is revealed that the actual average cost per krn for the improvement works, works out to Rs.3.188 Millions per km.
12. The cost of the project as per SAR was to be Rs. 1265.30 Million or US$87.1 Million. At the time of signing of the agreement, conversion rate was Rs. 13.65 per US Dollar. During the entire period of the project implementationit kept on changing and at the time of the closure it went up to Rs.35.03 per US Dollar. On the closure day i.e. June 30, 1996, the expenditure was to the tune of Rs.1674.48 Millionsi.e. 132.34 % of the total cost of the project, as per SAR. After completing all the balance items it was observed that the total cost of this project on all the items includingcontingencies was Rs.2510.35 Million i.e. 198.99% of the cost of the sanctioned project as per SAR. The large increase in the project cost was mainlydue to an increase in the conversion rate and due to additional Civilworks and the feasibilitystudy of the Mumbai (Bombay)-NashikExpressway Project. The additional cost is also attributed to some extent to the additionalworks executed on some of the improvement works.
13. In the past, the hot mix plants, vibratory rollers, pavers etc. were availablein and around a few big cities (ie. Mumbai, Pune and Nagpur). Use of such machinery was restricted on the Primary Network i.e. National Highways or city streets only. With the implementationof State Road projects, sophisticated equipment like computerizedControlled Hot Mix Plants, vibratory rollers, and electronicallycontrolled Sensor Pavers are now a common feature of the tender conditions, not only for big size projects but also for works of'routine maintenance such as renewal works. In almost all Districts 4-5 hot mix plants, vibratoty rollers, integrated crushingunits and couple of sensor pavers are available. 43 Appendix B
14. The Pavement Management System has been installed. At present only two trained Engineers are available. The Govt. of Maharashtra has planned to develop a training program, along with other three participating states: Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihar, so that every year, 10-12 Engineering officers will get trained on this system.
15. The works completed under this project are being maintainedunder regular maintenance program. Operational plan of PWD to ensure sustainabilityis appended separately.
E. FiNDINGSAND LESSONS LERANED
16. Very important lessons have been learned by the Officers of the Government of Maharashtra while implementingthis projects, which will help in improvingthe performance of such large size projects in future. Some of these are listedbelow.
(a) Actions necessary at the time of project preparation:
(i) Detailed Engineering and advance preparation is necessary to avoid additional items and increase in quantities during execution which leads to cost overrun.
(ii) Proper rate analysismatching with the specificationfor the items expected to be executed by the Contractor in order to avoid higher quotation by the intendingbidders.
(iii) Identification of quarry for the materials to be used in construction is necessary to ensure that realistic lead charges are included in the estimate. This also helps in giving proper rates in the bids by the intendingbidders.
(b) Action prior to call for Bids:
(i) If the quarries are acquired by the employerwell in advance, time overruns due to extra time taken by the Contractor for execution work can be avoided.
(ii) Physical shifting of utility servicesprior to invitationof bids can avoids problem of time overrun in execution.
(iii) Pre-qualificationon the basis of similarworks & of similar magnitude helps in keeping the progress of works at desired level.
(c) Action during Implementation:
(i) Work needs to be supervisedby an experiencedEngineer, to avoid delays in preparation of Planning Schedules& giving necessary decisions at appropriate time, thereby reducing the time over run.
(ii) Trained Foremen on a works reduces chances of improper action on the work, requiring corrections. 44 Appendix B
(iii) Positive participation of all concerned Government agencies is necessary to avoid undue delays in giving necessary permits.
F. PROJECTREVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'SPERSPECTIVE
17.1. Project Design and Organization. Preparation of initial project report, investigation, detailed engineeringdesigns, bid documents etc. were done by the PWD's Engineering officers in house. A committee of three SuperintendingEngineers was formed under the chairmanship of Chief Engineer, P.W. region, Mumbai. The main task was subdividedin to sub tasks: Survey, Preparation of Plans & Estimates, Feasibilityreports, detailed engineering,Designs of structures etc.; these tasks were assigned to differentdivisions working in the state PWD. Project preparation was done by the road project wings and designs were done by the Design Organisation of PWD. Bid documents and pre-qualificationdocuments were prepared by the committee members. During executions, modificationsin respect of pavement structures, C. D. structures, grades etc. were redesigned. Preparation of working drawings etc. were done by the staff of PWD in charge of the implementationof a particular work.
17.2. Implementation of the Project. There were seven packages consisting of 8 works as per the Table given below. The packages were of very large size when compared to the normallythen used in the Governmentjobs. Banks guidelineswere followed for pre qualification.Although the size of the package was large for the domestic contractors, this could not attract foreign contractors.
17.3. The project completion date was December 21, 1994, as per SAR. This date was extended by the bank up to June 30, 1996. The table given below indicates delays in completing works in almost all contracts. Scheduled dates could not be adhered to for reasons such as, short supply of bitumen & diesel, non-availabilityof spare parts & piece works / Labour firms. There were some difficultieswhich led to delayed completionie. difficultiesin obtaining Quarry Permits, Electrical Connection, Foreign Exchange, Clearance from Pollution Control Authorities, Shifting of Utility Services. External events like Gulf war also delayed completion mainly due to sudden & steep rise of prices of Petroleum products, vvhichhad adverse effects on Contractor cash flow.
Contract Name Of Roads. Project Start Date % Achievement on Date on which Nos. Length of work 30.6.96 (date on 100% work (kmn) which W.B. was completed. assistancewas closed) I Wada- Bhiwandi Road & Palghar-Wada 69.410 12.01.90 90 05.28.97
iRoad I______II Pune-Ahmednagar Road 113.600 07.24.90 100 11.30.95 III Ahmednagar-Aurangabad Road. 92.000 06.17.90 53 06.20.97 IV Aurangabad-Jalna Road 112.400 06.17.90 62 06.20.97 V Akola-Hingoli Road. 96.000 06.10.90 100 03.31.95 VI -Nagpur-Umred-Kanpa Road. 69.000 01.29.92 100 06.29.95 VII Ahmednagar-Kopargaon Road 96.000 08.02.90 100 12.31.94 VIII Jalna Bypass 8.660 04.28.94 91 01.11.97
Feasibility Study Of Mumbai (Bombay)- _ January, 100 June 1996 Nasik Expressway. 1994 Pavement Management System Study - 11.24.92 100 IJune 1996 _____I State Average: 87 45 Appendix B
18. Pavement Management System Study. The Pavement Management System has been developed for an identified network of heavy density corridors, consisting of 8,000 km of road lengths. A PMS cell is establishedat Aurangabad,where this program has been loaded. For updating the data loaded in this system, all field officers send updated data to the cell every year in the month of April or May. Two technical officers have received training for operating this system. Government of Maharashtra has planned a training program so that every.year about 10 to 12 officers will receive trainingto make them capable of operating this system.
19. Training. Under this item, 12 Nos of officers of the rank of Executive Engineer, SuperintendingEngineer & Chief Engineer were sent for training abroad. This was centrally arranged by NITHE (National Institute for the Trainingfor Highway Engineers), New Delhi. Table on page 56 under note (A) Training, gives information about the names of the Officers with designations, titles of the training, period of the training & Countries where this training was imparted. This table also indicates that 21 Man-monthsof Executive Engineers, 5 Man- months of SuperintendingEngineers & 2 Man-months of Chief Engineers were used for receiving this training programs.
20. Organization Study. OrganizationalStudy of PWD for Government of Maharashtra was another item for which Banks assistance was received. Tata Consulting Services, Mumbai carried out this study and submitted their report on 19.09.94. Some of the Recommendations made by the TCS are under consideration at the Governmentlevel.
21. Feasibility Study of Mumbai (Bombay) -Nasik Expressway. M/S. Wilbur Smith & Associates of USA were appointed as Consultants to carry out this feasibilitystudy. The Consultant carried out feasibilitystudy from April 1994 to April 1996 and submitted their report in June 1996. This report has been used for taking up this project under BOT. Government Of Maharashtra is very keen on taking up construction work of Mumbai (Bombay)- Nashik Expressway project. Actions of obtaining clearances from the EnvironmentalDepartments, land Acquisitionproceedings & preparing Detailed Engineeringare at advance stage. All these activities are monitored periodicallyby a specialOfficer of the rank of Secretary at the government level.
22.1. Performance by Borrower. The performance of borrowers is considered to be very satisfactoryin achieving above mentioned objectives. The average achievement as on 30th June 1996, the date on which the World Bank assistance was closed, as can be seen from the table given in para 18 was approximately87%. All the balance improvement works have been completed physicallyin the subsequent period and the improved road stretches are serving very well to the road users. As of today wide roads, bridges and improved riding quality led to attract large traffic volume on these road sections. For long distance travelers the travel time has been reduced by 16 to 18%. Substantialsaving in the Vehicle Operating Cost has resulted in increase of ERR. This project helped immenselyin bringing modern techniques in the highway construction industry, and introduction of modern machineryand equipment. PWD Engineers and Engineers working in the road construction Industry with the contractor have been benefited by this project. Recently GOM has taken up a very ambitiousprogram of improvement of State Roads ( Speciallyin the relativelybackward area) of the state through state funds. Techniques learned during implementationof this World Bank Projects are being used on these new road projects. The size of the packages are large and intending contractors are required to possess fleet of modern machinery. 46 Appendix B
22.2. Pavement Management System has been installed. At present this system ineludes data for 8000 km lengths of some of State Highways. Extending this system for all state highways and Major District Road is yet to be completed. There is need to train many more officers. GOM is launching a regular feature of imparting training to 10 to 12 officers every year.
22.3. There were some problems due to which the benefits of use of supervisionof a project by a independent consultant could not yield desired results. The supervision consultant appointed for supervisingthe works in contract No. III was well familiarwith the FIDIC conditionsof the contract. He was impartialand was willingto guide the contractor in programmingthe project. The consultant introduced the modem method of time-distance programmingto monitor the road project. With the consultants Association with an international consultants the departmental staff and the Indian counterpart of the consultant's team learn new methods and techniques of supervision,management of the large package contracts. Unfortunately,the contractor could not accelerate or complete the work and supervisionconsultant had to be discontinuedafter expiry of his original contract period. The supervisionconsultant being a foreign national had some problems in communicationwith the contractors lower level staff as well with outside agenciesindirectly concerned with the project. The supervisionconsultant was not familiarwith the qualities and nature of Indian materials. Therefore he insisted on full testing even for stone like good black basalt. The proved conventional methods of construction in vogue created problemsto the consultant who was more familiar with mechanised construction methods and this led to frustration at times.
23. Bank Performance. Visits of the World Bank Mission proved to be very helpful in understanding problems and issues pertaining to the works executed and studies carried out. In the course of execution, some modificationswere felt necessary to achieve desired results. During Mission's visits suggestions made by PWD Officers of GOM were considered favourably by the Mission. When requested by PWD, GOM for adding two works in lieu of two works dropped, the request was considered favourablyby the Mission.
24. Relationship with Bank Officers of State PWD, Government of Maharashtra. would like to keep on record their appreciationof the valued support, substantialguidance and professional advice received by them from the members of the visiting mission during the course of implementationof this project. GOM looks forward for such co-operation from the bank in the forthcoming new projects.
NOTES ON TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT
A. TRAINING
1. As per SAR the training in the four States was to focus on the planning, design and management of Highway works with particular emphasisin the fields of construction, maintenance, and composition and managementof the equipment holdings. The courses were arranged through the National Institute for the Training of Highway Engineers (NITHE) New Delhi. 47 Appendix B
2. From Maharashtra in all 12 officers right from the rank of the Chief Engineer to the level of Executive Engineers had undergone differentcourses. These 12 officers consisted of one Chief Engineer, three SuperintendingEngineers and eight Executive Engineers.
3 . Following table gives the title of the course, duration and the country where training was arranged and the names of the officers who undergone this course.
Sr. Title Duration Country Number and level of Officerwho No _ undergonethe course I Pavement Rehabilitation& Modem Feb.1993 to April Australia Three Executive Engineers. MaintenanceManagement 1993 2 Bridge hispection and Rehabilitation, Feb.1993 to April U.K One SuperintendingEngineer and Maintenanceand Management 1993 one Executive Engineer. 3 Contract Managementof big Projects. Sept.1993to U.K. One Chief Engineer & one I L_ _ Oct 1993. SuperintendingEngineer. 4 Design Constructionand operationof Sept 1993 to Canada Three Executive Engineers. Expressway. Dec.1993. 5 Equipmentprocurement Management. 2.5.94 to 27.5.94 Italy One Executive Engineer. 6 Works ProcuremnentManagement 2.5.95 to 26.5.95. Italy One Superintendin-Engineer.
B. EQUIPMENT
4. As per SAR, some Modem Equipment were to be procured under this contract. MOST was to act as Coordinating agency and ordered for these items centrally. List of items as per SAR, Annexed 4.1 and actual receipt is as indicated in the following table.
Sr. Items Nos. per state Nos. of units of No. as per SAR equipment received by GOM actually 1. Mobile Bridge Inspection Unit. 1 I 2. Dynamic Vehicle Weighing Equipment 2 Nil 3. Automatic Traffic Counters 20 Nil 4. Nuclear Density Measuring Equipment 6 Nil 5. Dynamic Cone Penetrometers 3 Nil 6. TRRI, Bump Integrator 2 Nil 7. Dipstick Road Profilers I S. Bitumen Distributors 2 2 9. Chip Spreaders 2 Nil 10. Survey Equipment Sets Not specified Nil 11. Laboratory Equipment Not specified Nil 12. Training Aids Not specified Nil 13. Drivers Simulators I Nil 14. Colour/Night Blindness Equipment 6 Nil 15. Breathalysers 10 Nil 16. Break Testing Equipment 6 Nil 17. Computer Software Not specified Nil
Out of these items Bridge Inspection Unit could not be put in use. There04&resomre problemns with the machine requiring repairs. Training to the operators and some legal issues are to be sorted outi. after sorting of these issues the unit can be put on use. Other items are already put on use 48 Appendix B
The State of Rajasthan
A. PROJECTDESIGN AND ORGANIZATION
The World Bank had agreed for creditfloan assistance for the State Road Project for Rajasthan estimated to cost US$106 million (which is being revised) to provide (i)Widening, Strengthening,Cross Drainage works and Bypasses to the heavy traffic density corridors for the four State Road Projects, (ii)Constructionwith updated technology (iii)Improvingthe traffic movement on important roads to provide cost benefits to the road users.
ICB was done for selection of contractors, as per prevailingprocedure of World Bank.
The loan amount sanctioned under the project was US$58 millions. The agreement was signed on Nov. 17, 1988.
The engineering investigation, design and cost estimates for project roads were done by the regular divisions of state P.W.D. For construction & implementation,dedicated divisions and circles were created for the project. The requirement of consultant for designing road was considered only for one road i.e. Ajmer to Chittorgarh. It is now felt that consultants should have been engaged for complete project preparation as well as supervision,and the Engineers of the department should have been associated closely with them during preparation and supervisionto acquire more experience of large projects. It could be done in two Phases. (i) Project preparation consultant to conduct feasibilitystudy and economic evaluation for selection of roads. (ii) Construction Supervisionconsultant who could act as an advisor to Chief Engineer and can also be entrusted with the job of project financemanagement and preparation of ICR etc.
It is suggested that frequent training, workshops and seminars are arranged by the department during project preparation and execution, in which World Bank officials, Consultants, Engineers of the state and other states are invited to share the knowledge of FIDIC conditions and technology. It is also suggested that for survey and design, equipments of the latest technology should be used and on the completion of the project such equipments including hardwares and softwares which are procured through consultants should become the property of the department for further use in the department.
B. IMPLEMENTATIONOF THE PROJECT
For implementationof the project, contracts for each project road were awarded to the contractors. The road wise contract amounts are as under: (i) Ajmer Chittorgarh Road Rs 442.13 million (ii) Udaipur Dabok Chittor Road Rs 261.00 million (iii) Sirohi Mount Abu Road. Rs 219.37 million (iv) Alwar Bhiwadi Karauli Road Rs 742.60 million Eligiblecontractors were pre-qualified as per World Bank's / GOR guidelines. Unfortunatelyparticipation of foreign contractors was very limited. 49 Appendix B
Initiallythe project covered six roads are as under:-
(i) Ajmer ChittorgarhRoad (ii) Udaipur Dabok Chittor Road (iii) Sirohi Mount Abu Road. (iv) Alwar Karauli Bhiwadi Road (v) Fatehpur Churu Rajgarh Road. (vi) Sikar Pilani Road
The road at sl no. (v) was dropped altogether since the ceiling of credit / World Bank loan reached with the five projects already sanctioned and the road at sl. no. (vi) was dropped on account of failure of the contractor M/s Gammon India Ltd. The work on the four roads sl. no. (i) to (iv) commenced in Oct. '90 and completed in June '96 The World Bank extended the completion period by one year to June 30, 1996. The work on the Bhiwadi Karauli road could not be completed mainlydue to financial constraints.
There have been time and cost overruns on the project. Substantialtime over run were involved in land acquisition, shifting of utilities, liaisonwith Railways and for Rail Road crossing, ROBs and finalisationof design of project roads. Since the initial surveys were done by the regular divisions subsequentlytime was taken in confirmation and transfer of survey data, modificationand updating of design in the department. This time and consequently cost over run could have been saved by the engagement of project supervisionconsultant as mentioned above. In addition to the above, there was a general shortage of bitumen which contributed in delays in execution of the project. The World Bank mnissionin each of their visit has guided the project implementationwhich immenselyhelped in accelerating the progress.
C. PERFORMANCEBY BORROWERS
The objective of the project was to provide the required width and strength of the roads for the traffic to save on the vehicle operating cost and the accidents etc. These objects have been achieved satisfactorily. The execution of 26 nos., bypasses (of length about 68km.) at various locations and the four lanning of the Udaipur - Dabok Chittorgarh road has considerably improved the movement of the traffic together with the saving in travel time and cost on these roads. The cost on recurring maintenancehas also been saved as the crust is now properly designed and provided on these roads.
The pavement management system which was taken up as a part of the project has immenselyhelped the staff of the department, in learningthe methodologyto prepare and plan the maintenance operation on the State roads in a more scientificand cost saving basis. The local and overseas training has helped the Engineers to equip themselves with latest techniques and practice in planning, design and construction of roads. At the time of start of this project there were few local contractors capable for construction of quality road works. Presently many other local contractors have come up who are capable to execute works of good quality. The contractors have procured vibratory rollers, hot mix plant, paver finishersand other latest machinerywhich has increased the out put of work as well as has improved the quality. However still there is scope of improvement in site management and utilisation of machinery. 50 Appendix B
Most of the deficienciesin pre-qualificationscriteria identifiedduring implementationof the project are being taken care of for future externally aided projects. For further projects, it is proposed that land acquisitionand shifting of utilities, statutory clearance construction of ROBs and rail crossing with railways should be taken up and completed at least three months before the construction work is awarded to the contractor. This could be done with Technical Assistanceloan and specificbudgetary provision by the GOR. It would also help in providing unhindered stretches of road as desired by the contractor to build on. The hindrances free sections to be handed over shouldbe decided in such a way that minimuminconvenience is caused to the traffic during constructiornperiod. It is also felt that simpleland acquisition procedure enablingthe department, to acquire the land at market rates in a period of three to six months may be considered by the GOR through the amendments in the Land AcquisitionAct. It will immenselycut down the time over run on account of land acquisition.
The road works completed under project have been transferred to the regular divisions for maintenance as was stipulated in the SAR.
D. BANK'S PERFORMANCE
The World Bank mission during each visit imparted valuable guidance and support by suggesting corrective measures in the project implementationand in design of the project. Interaction with Bank and its supervisionmission were useful in initiating corrective measures for speedy implementationof the project.
E. RELATIONSHIPWITH THE BANK
The Govt. of Rajasthan would like to place on record its appreciationof the valuable support, guidance and professional advise from successiveBank missionsduring the course of the project which indeed went a long way in the successfulcompletion of the project. The Govt. of Rajasthan would look forward for such co-operation in the future for development activities in the state. 51 Appendix B
The State of UttarPradesh
World Bank Aided State Road Project was the first Externally Aided Project in the Road Sector of State of U.P.. This project was planned for rehabilitation& Improvement of 604 km. Roads Costing Rs. 231.26 crores which was divided in 9 packages. Three package works were deleted by the World Bank due to exceptionallyhigh tender rates. Later, due to very slow progress on the work in contract package 9, the contractor was expelled & the State Government decided to execute the balance work of CP-9 from its own resources. In this way the project work was reduced to a length of 201 km, costing Rs. 177.51 crores on the following roads:
(i) Sonali Gorakhpur Road - 95 Km. (ii) Gorakhpur-Ballia Road - 45 Km. (iii) Faizabad Allahabad Road - 61 Km.
A. PROJECTEXECUTION AND THE INITIALOPERATION CHARACTERESTICS OF ITS KEY COMPONETNTS
The State Road Project was planned to be executed by UPPWD, which is well settled & Technicallyequipped Department of the State. Although the Survey & Planning Work of Project was started in the year 1987 but as it was the first externallyAided Project in which the incorporation of FIDIC conditions, ICB & Evaluation of big contracts, and Planning & Management of large contract Packages took considerabletime & hence Project's execution could start in the year 1991. The execution of works have been carried out satisfactorily according to the Implementation Schedule & almost all the schedule works have been completed in the Bank's loan period i.e. up to 30. 6. 96.
(i) idening & Strengtheningof Sonali-GorakhpurRoad-95 km. completed by 30. 6. 96.
(ii) Widening & Strengtheningof Gorakhpur-BalliaRoad-45 km. completed by 30. 6. 96.
(iii) Widening& Strengtheningof Faizabad-AllahabadRoad-61 km. completed by 31. 3. 97.
The execution work of Contract Package - 9 of Faizabad - AllahabadRoad (km. 141 to 226.1 i. e. 86 km.) was not be carried out by contractor as per schedule & as per mile stones of the contract agreement despite all the efforts from the Consultant - Engineer & Employment side, and ultimately the contractor was expelled in 1/95 & it was decided by the GOUP to executed the Balance work of Package from its own resources.
The initial operation characteristics of its key components have been satisfactorywhich are summarisedbelow:
(i) A Supervisory unit was establishedfor execution of the Project headed by a Senior officer named as 52 Appendix B
Chief Engineer World Bank Project (Road) U.P.P.W.D., Lucknow
The unit was consisting of adequate number of suitablyqualified & experienced staff. This supervisory unit has executed the Project work in the schedule time as detailed above. In accordance with World Bank Conditionfor One Road i.e. Faizabad - AllahabadRoad, an InternationalAgency i.e. MIS N. D. Lea was engaged for Consultancy & Supervisionof the work.
(ii) All necessary steps have been taken for training of staff of the P.W.D. at all the levels. Even some technical staff was sent for training in abroad countries so as to & learn advanced techniques and technology being adopted in the Road sector.
(iii) The studies have been carried out to introduce a Road Maintenance management system. An ARAN survey for about 8000 kms. important roads have been carried out and sufficientdates have been collected for improvement in the Maintenance & Management system of the State Roads. The Staff has also been trained in the above sector. A cell named as Pavement Management SystemPMS has been establishedin the Department which is well equipped & having sufficientdata.
B. THE COST & BENEFITSOF THE PROJECT
The project was designed to support two lines of action at state level i.e. (i) to upgrade the roads from single lane to two lane and to increase their structural strength to levels commensurate with current & expected traffic & (ii) to introduce network management techniques which may result in better and more effective road maintenance & planning of road investments. Now with the Project's execution 201 kms long important State Highway have been upgraded from single lane to two lane & these roads have gained much structural strength so as to accommodate current & expected traffic smoothly resulting Socio-economic development of the state. The economic benefits arising out of saving in travel times & operating costs were estimated as per RUCS recommendations.The average Economic Internal Rate of Return was estimated in SAR to be 19 %. Now after Project execution the average ERR is growing to increase substantially& thus the estimated benefits have been achieved.
C. THE PERFORMANCEOF THE BORROWER,EXCECUTION AGENCC1ES AND THE BANK WITHREGARDS TO THEIRRESPECTWE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTHE LOAN CREDITAGREEMENT
The main objectives of the Project were to improve the planning design and execution of construction and maintenancework of state as well as to identify appropriate means of mobilizingresources needed to implement economicallydesirable increases in road outlays in the state.
The performance of Borrower is considered to be satisfactory in achieving the above objectives as important State highways of 201 kms. Length have been upgraded & strengthened 53 Appendix B so as to impart & accelerate the Socio-economicDevelopments of the Backward areas of State. Almost all the project works have been completed in the scheduletime of the Banks, Loan Term. Projects' schedule monitoring,upkeep of all the accounts & their submissionto the appropriate offices have been carried out properly & in time. During the operation of Project the Bank's guidance has been sought in all the sectors of Project i.e. Finance, Technical& Management etc.
The World bank's performance during the execution of Project has been found completelysatisfactory. The Bank's missionduring each visit imparted valuable guidance & support by suggestion new methodology and corrective measures in Project implementation. Flow of funds and reimbursementof claims of the Project have been done timely by the bank.
Relationship with Bank. GOUP and U.P.P.W.D., would like to place on record its appreciation of the Valued support, guidance and professional advice from Bank mission during the course of the Project which indeed went a long way in successful completion of the Project.
D. THE EXTENTTO WHICH THE DEVELOPMENTOBJECTIVES OF THE LOAN/CREDITWERE ACIEVED
All the Development objectives of the Loan/Credit have been achieved by upgrading & strengthening about 200 kms. Important State Highways of State as needed for Socio-economic development of the State. The Project has also establisheda Pavement Management System which will help the Department in Maintenance& Management of Road network of State effectively.
E. EXPERIENCE& SUGGESTIONS
The experience gathered from the execution of the Project & Suggestionsfor better & speedy completion are as below:
(i) Planning & Management of Works should be more comprehensive so that the works be completed well in the schedule time. It requires that the Land Acquisition,Removal of Utilities & Designs & Drawings of all works shouldbe completed in advance so that the progress may not suffer on these aspects. Proper co-ordinationis required in all the concerned departments & executing Agencies. World Bank may also suggest the Borrowers in this context.
(ii) Contract Packages in such large volume are not desirablefor the developing State like Uttar Pradesh because the local contractors with such huge Financial& Technical Status are rarely available.Hence size of Packages should be medium having work value ranging from 150 to 250 millionRupees.
(iii) International Supervision Consultancyis not desirablein the state like U.P. because where there is sufficientTechnical know how in the Department, then it becomes uneconomical. In this project, two roads have been completed successfullyby the State PWD in its own supervision. 54 Appendix B
(iv) It is also desirablethat when due to certain unforeseen complicationsin the execution of work some extra time is needed for completion of work the Bank should pay cooperative attitude by extendingthe loan term so that the basic objectives of the project be achieved completely& all the beneficiariesbe benefited.
(v) It has been experienced that in the Department an organization with experienced & willingpersonnel be established exclusivelyfor Externally Aided Projects so that the problems & inconveniencescaused due to changes & shifting of unit & personnel be rectified & also the project works be executed speedily & smoothly.It is also desirable that the World Bank may also suggest strongly the GOUP in this aspect. 55 Appendix B
The Ministry of Surface Transport
A. TRAINING
(a) Execution
As per the SAR the training of officers of the four beneficiary states was to focus on the planning design and managementof Highway works with particular emphasisin the field of construction, maintenance and managementof Highway projects.
Suitable training programs were prepared and co-ordinated by the 'National Institute for Training of Highway Engineers" (NITHE) which is a principal institute for training of Highway Engineers in the country establishedunder the agencies of the Ministry of Surface Transport.
In all six training courses were conducted on the following subjects:
(i) Course I: Pavement rehabilitationand maintenancemanagement system by Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology(RMIT), Australia. (ii) Course II: Bridge inspection, rehabilitationand maintenance management system at Transport Research Laboratory in U.K. (iii) Course III: Contract managementof Big Projects at the British Council in U.K. (iv) Course IV: Design, Construction and Operation of Expressway including interchanges at Ontario, Canada. (v) Course V: Equipment procurement managementin Italy, and (vi) Course VI: Works procurement managementin Italy.
In all, 42 officers from the four beneficiary states received training as detailed below:
Course Bihar Maharashtra Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh Total
I 1 3 -2 6
ff 2 2 - 2 6 III 3 2 2 2 9 IV 4 3 8 4 19 V- I I VI - 1 - 1 Total 10 12 10 10 42
(b) The program provided a total of 148 person-monthsof training which comprised academic in India and field module in Australia, U.K, Canada and Italy.
Total expenditure on training was about Rs. 24 million.
The training programmes have been very useful and beneficialin
(i) upgrading the capacity of PVVDin execution of highway projects. (ii) providing exposure to the PWD officersto new technology in highways and bridges. (iii) management of highways works includingmaintenance and management of the equipment holding. 56 Appendix B
(c) Performance of Borrower/executiveagencies and the Bank.
The performance of the borrower, the executive agencies and the Bank on this component has been highly satisfactoryin achievingthe objectives.
(d) Achievement of objectives
the main objectives of the training component of the loan vvasto assist the borrower state in bringing up institutional development of beneficiarystates, 42 officers have been trained under this loan in various roads or highway design, construction and maintenance including exposure to new technologies. Thus, the objectives of the loan have been met to a large extent. However, further follow up actions are required to be taken by the borrower states so as to bring about effective changes in the respective states. Since training is a continuous process, the same should be continued to achievethe required institutionaldevelopment.
B. PROCUREMENTOF SPECIALIZEDEQUIPMENT
(a) Execution
17 categories of equipment totaling to 257 nos. were identifiedto be procured for the State Road Project as per the Staff Appraisal Report for the loan. In Sept. 1991, it was decided in consultation with beneficiary states and the World Bank that only 9 items of high priority equipment, totaling to 157 nos. should be procured.
As agreed by the respective States and the World Bank, the Ministry of Surface Transport acted as the modal Ministry on behalf of beneficiarystates for procurement of equipment.
The entire procurement of equipment was done by Director General of Supplies and Disposals (DGS&D), being the central procuring agency on behalf of Govt. of India. Specificationsof equipment were finalizedby the Ministryin consultation with the beneficiary states and were concurred in by the World Bank.
After obtainingthe details of the consigneesfrom the beneficiary states, indents were placed on DGS&D in August-November 1993. DGS&D however, could invite tenders under ICB procedure for all the equipment in June 1994 after obtaining further details of the states. After obtaining necessary clarificationsfrom the Internationalbidders and technical evaluation, the requisite concurrence of the World Bank was sought, DGS&D was able to place the orders for supply of 5 categories of equipment before the closing date of the loan, procurement of only 3 categories of following equipmenttotaling to 14 nos. could materialize.
1. Dip Stick Read Road Profilers (one each to U.P. & Maharashtra) 2 nos. 2. Bitumen Pressure Distributors (two nos. each to Bihar, U.P., Maharashtra and Rajasthan) 8 nos. 3.Mobile Bridge Inspection Units (one each to all the four beneficiarystates) 4 nos. 14 nos. 57 Appendix B
The first two equipment have alreadybeen supplied to the consignees. Out of the four MBIU's two nos. have already collectedby the cosignees of Maharashtra and Bihar states and the remaining two MBIUs are yet to be collected by the consignees. Beneficiary states are not willingto take over the units as the loan had already expired on 30h June, 96. Ministry has made a request to the World Bank for providing necessary funds under the Second National Highway Project (Loan No. 3470/Cr-2365) as a special case to the state so that the units can be used by them.
(b) Cost and Benefits
Against the total budget provision of US$ 22.4 millionfor this component, the total expenditure for procurement of 3 categories of equipment works out to US$ 2.596 million and Rs. 40.15 rnillion(i.e., total expenditure of approximatelyUS$ 3.6 million).In terms of percentage, the total utilization against the budge provisionis approximately 16%. However, the expenditure amountingto US$ 2.446 millionwas not reimbursed from the loan, as the closing date had already expired by the time the equipmenthad reached India.
Full benefits of procurement of specializedequipment could be achieved due to the following issues which were encountered during procurement.
(i) Preparation of specificationstook almost 2 years as these were required to be prepared on the basis of availabilityof equipment in internationalmarket and its use in Indian conditions.
(ii) World Bank took 5-6 months or sometimesmore time for approval of the specifications.
(iii) States took 1-2 years to intimate the consignee details. This oculd be avided, if the consignee details had been finalisedat the time of Approval.
(iv) In many cases the internationalfirms did not submit tenders in accordance with Ministry's instruction/specificationand DGS&D requirements. This necessitated seeking of clarificationsfrom concerned parties, resulting in delay in evaluation.
(c) Performance of Borrower/ Executive agency/ Bank
The performance of the borrower and the executive agency was not satisfactory. Moreover, the performance of the Bank was also not up to the mark because of the delays in certain approvals.
(d) Achievement of Objectives
the equipment procured were required to enhancethe road productivity and quality. In this particular direction, the objective have not been fully achieved as all equipments envisaged in the loan could not be procured within the time frame. 58 Appendix B
C. PAVEMENTMANAGEMENT ST1JDY
(a) Excecution
Pavement Management Study was implementedin the states of Bihar, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh with the objective of introducing a modem Pavement Management Study (PMS) to ensure effective use of the road rehabilitation and mnaintenancefunds.
The consultancy services for the study was awarded to M/s N.D. Lea International Ltd. & Associates on 24.11.92. However, the consultant commenced the work in November, 1993. The period of services was 2 years. A Pavement MaintenanceManagement System (PMMS) Cell was created at Aurangabad in Maharashtra. The cousultant prepared the program for PMS. Primary training for use of computer was given by the consultant to the Data collection Engineer of the PWD's for collectingthe road data and carry out pavement management study (PMS). Mls N. D. Lea International Ltd. & Associates also procured one Automated Road Analyser (ARAN). The vehicle was deployed in all the four states and field data for a total length of 29,706 Kms (Bihar-5872 Kms, Maharashtra-8343 Kms, Rajasthan-7887Kms and U.P.-7604 Kms) were recorded.
The consultant had organised traffic count survey training at five locations i.e. Aurangabad, Akeluji, Pune, Nanded and Nagpur with traffic count data at 36 locations. The consultant carried out axle load survey of eight location in Maharashtra during January, 1995 and loadman survey for 1600 Kms. length was carried out in the month of April and May, 1995. The consultant had also organised training on computer software on the following topics.
(i) Pre-requisite computer training (ii) Data collection and auditing (iii) Data processing (iv) Maintenance program development and budgeting.
The PMS scope covered state highways and Major District Roads in the Project States and was designed as computer aided system for utilising relational data base, and for Planning programming and Budgeting of pavement works. Three modules, viz., Planning and Programming Module (PPM), Design and Estimates Module (DEM) and Routine Maintenance Module (RM14) were developed.
Data collectionwas done using automated equipment,ARAN for Road inventory and visual survey along with Falling Weight Deflectometer (FWD) LOADMAN, ARAN AND LOADMAN were calibratedusing 'MERILYN' and benkelmanbeam.
The study has been completed and systeminstalled in the four states. Detailed documentation prepared which include final report, user manuals for DEM, RMM and PPM as also the system manuals for DEM and RMM.
(b) Cost and Benefits
The consultancy services for the PMS was awarded to M/s N. D. Lea & Associates at a cost of Rs. 110 million (US$ 1.523 million+ DKK 3.37 million+ Rs. 18.97 million).Under this 59 Appendix B study, an ARAN was procured for road inventory and visual survey with FallingWeight Deflectometer (FWD) and about 30,000 Kms of state and major roads in all the four states were surveyed and inventoried. PMS hardware and software package was also installed in each P.W.D.
(c) Performance of borrower/ executive agency/ Bank
The performance of the borrower, executive agency and Bank for the component of this loan was satisfactory.
(d) Objectives
The requisite objectives under the pavement management study have been achieved in full. The principal objective of the study was to establish in each state maintenancenetwork, management systembased on (a) an inventory of their network, detailed road geometry, pavement type and condition (b) a continuing record of traffic flows and (c) the local costs of remedial treatments ranging from simplepothole repair to a full pavement reconstruction. However, the Rajasthan PWD, after completingthe road inventory survey, establisheda working cell to manage the PMS and has conducted some survey with the ARAN vehicle to update its road condition inventory data-base.
Maharashtra PWD also uses the PMS to maintain and update data base of the condition of its core road network. In U.P. and Bihar, PMS is currently not being utilised. The study was successfulbut its operationalisationhas not fully occurred.
D. BANKPERFOEMANCE
The Bank's performance in achievingthe objectiveshas been generally satisfactory except in procurement of specialized equipment.
E. KEYLESSONS LEARNED
(i) Project Preparation. Project preparation of all Highway Projects should be carried out with the use of internationally experienced consultants so as to ensure good quality project.
(ii) Pre Construction Activities. All project preparation activities like techno-economic feasibilitystudies, detailed engineeringdesign, environmentalstudies pre-construction activities like land acquisition, shifting of utilities and award of work should be completed before civil works contracts can start on the ground. Even the loan negotiations should commence only when the pre-construction activitieshave been substantiallycompleted and pre-qualificationsof contractors have been approve by the Bank.
(iii) Evaluation of Tenders. Evaluation of tenders shouldbe carried out expeditiouslyand thoroughly. For this purpose tender documents should contain structured questions so that the response of tenderers is unambiguous. It is advisableto have pre-award meetings with the 60 Appendix B successful tenderers to finalize any outstanding issues regarding details of deployment of equipment, personnel and cash inputs.
Special attention should be paid about the participation of all joint ventures partners.
(iv) Organization Set Up. Dedicated team of officers should be deployed by PWDs for project implementationPolicy/institutional strengthening of the State PWDs, together with intensivetraining in contract and project managementskills at initialstages of project is important to enhance implementationcapabilities.
(v) Supervision of Work. External consultant shouldbe engaged for supervisionof works as 'Engineer' for better contract operations. Certain powers should also be authorized to 'Engineer' for issue of variation orders.
(vi) Familiarity with the Bank's Procedure. Lack of familiaritywith ICB and other Bank procedures caused major delays in implementingcivil works and other components under the project. Hence familiaritywith Bank procedures and ICB is a must lto start the project.
(vii) Contructor. Contractor's project managementcapabilities need to be strengthened. Positions like Plant Engineer and Quality Surveyor are generally missingin the contractor's organization. This should be filled in for proper managementof equipment and preparation of statement of account and claims. Presently, there is no monitoring of works by contractors. Conditions of contract should specifythat the contractor would furnish monitoring report along with any remedial measures taken/proposed to be taken by them. Changes in contractor's personnel should be avoided or at least minimized.
(viii) Changes during Execution. Changesin specificationand design during execution should be avoided, unless it is very essential.
(ix) Contract management. Undue interference of Employer in contract management shouldbe avoided. Besides certain procedures should be streamlinedto avoid delays. Payment to contractors should be made at the earliest, after issue of Payment Certificate, but in no case later than 30 days as envisaged in the contract. As per present practice, measurement books are required to be fulfilledin by hand. Computer outputs duly signed should be accepted for measurement purposes. Approval of Auditor General should be obtained for the same by GOI.
(x) Montoring. A modem on-line monitoring system should be established at the Employer's office.
Dedicated team for monitoring should be establishedin the Employer's office who should be reporting the bottlenecks to the authorities regularly. Close monitoring shouldbe carried out, even on a weekly basis, right from commencement.
(xi) Bank's involvement. Visits of Bank's missionsare welcome. It has been noted that sometimesthe Mission renders advice on contractual matters to the employer and the contractor. This has created some contractual problems in the past. As per the norms of the Bank, complaints of contractors and consultants should be passed on to the executive agencies 61 Appendix B for consideration. It is advisablethat Bank's Mission refrains from any direct advice on contractual matters unless asked for by executing agencies.
(xii) Sustainability of Project. Some of the roads improved under the Project have already started to deteriorate due to inadequate maintenance,higher traffic volumes, etc. Effective road maintenance management, includingplanning and budgeting for the roads, is the key for sustainabilityof project roads and entire road projects.
(xiii) Institutional modernization. With the new generation of state road projects there will be much more emphasis on facilitatingthe transformation of the PWDs from providers to managers of the state road networks. This will mean institutionalmodernization and strengthening will be key project developmentsobjective.
(xiv) Institutional procurement Arrangement. The complete procurement of machinery etc. shouldbe the direct responsibilityof the beneficiarystate to avoid cumbersome institutional procurement arrangement. This will reduce the wastage of time in inter-agency communications and decision making. 62 Appendix C
IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT
STATES' ROAD PROJECT (Loan 2994-IN/Credit 1959-IN)
ECONOMICRE-EvALUATION
Preface
1. This appendix presents the economic re-evaluation of the hIdia States' Road Project. It summarizes:the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) economic evaluation methodology;the ImplementationCompletion Report (ICR) economic re-evaluationmethodology and assumptions; and, an ex-post comparison.
Economic Evaluation Methodology in SAR
2. The SAR presents the economic evaluation of the road strengthening and widening (improvements)works in Bihar, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh and the economic evaluation of the Bhagalpur bridge in Bihar. The SAR quantifiedthe benefits accruing from vehicle operating costs savings, time savings of working passengers and goods in transit, and road maintenancecosts savings. In the case of road improvements,these benefits have been quantified using the Highway Design and Maintenance StandardsModel III (HDM), and in the case of the Bhagalpur bridge, benefits have been estimated by road user costs savings by the distance reductions and from avoiding the present transshipmentfrom vehicle to ferry then back to vehicle again.
3. Road Improvements. To estimate the net benefits of the road improvement components, the SAR used the 1HDMwhich simulateslife cycle conditions, estimates road agency and user costs, and provides economic decision criteria for alternativemaintenance or improvements investments. The analysisperiod was set to fourteen years to capture ten years of project net benefits after the estimated four years construction period, and the salvage value at the end of the analysisperiod was set to 25 % of the investment costs. The SAR presented the internal economic rates of return (ERR) for each investment option as well as the average for each state and the overall project (see Table A3), but it did not present the net present value (NPV) of project benefits. The estimated overall ERR for the road works was 30.4 % and the ERR range was from 11.5 to 96.8 %.
4. The SAR estimated that in 1988 the range of road roughness of the project roads was from 5.0 to 8.5 the international Roughness Index (IRI) and most roads were over twenty years old, in need of strengtheningand widening (improvements)to a two lane standard of 7.0 m with in some cases hard shoulders. The daily traffic range in 1988 for the project roads was from 538 to 3144 ADT with an average of 1630 ADT, and the range of the expected traffic growth from 1988 to 2001 was from 6.3 to 7.5 % per annum.
5. Bhagalpur bridge. To evaluate the Bhagalpur bridge, which included its approach road, ERR was calculated by costs and benefits in the "with" and "without" scenarios. In the cost stream, construction and maintenance costs (0.5% of construction cost) were considered. In the benefit stream, vehicle operating cost saving,transshipment savings, and time savingswere considered. These were assessed by the diverting traffic from two road-cum-rail bridges and ferries, which cross the river 63 Appendix C
Ganges, after applying a least distance matrix to the Origin Destination survey data. -The estimated ERR was 20.2 %.
6. Road Improvements. The ICR ex-post economic evaluation was done for 16 roads that were completed under the project and 2 roads that were dropped but completed by the PWD own resources. To perform the ICR ex-post economic evaluation,the HDM, 1988 prices, and 0.8 financial to economic conversion factor were used. These assumptions are the same as those used in the SAR. A sample vehicle operating costs used in the ICR analysis,which is the most influential factor in the HDM, are shown in the table below.
VehicleOperating Costs (1988 Rs pervehicle-kin) Roughness,IRI (rn/k) Car Bus MediumTnick 2 2.5 3.9 2.7 4 2.6 4.0 2.9 6 2.8 4.1 3.3 8 2.9 4.3 3.6 10 3.1 4.5 3.9
7. In the ICR ex-post economic evaluation,following steps were taken. (i) the first step taken was to replicate the SAR economic evaluation using the HDM based on the HDM inputs by provided on the SAR for roads and vehicle fleet characteristics (vehicle operating costs) as well as investment and maintenance costs. The SAR did not provide all the required inputs; therefore, the missing data was estimated based on current experience on Indian roads and adjusted to replicate exactly the SAR rates of return. The estimated data that was obtained this way was used consistently in the ex-post economic evaluation. (ii) The second step was to re-evaluatethe SAR rates of return, by increasing the analysisperiod from 14 to 20 years. This was done because the SAR economic evaluation computed 10 years of net benefits after the four years construction period but the actual works were delayed on an average of three years with an average construction period of six years. Therefore, to evaluate the consequences of the works completion delays and to compute at least ten years of project benefits after the construction period, the analysisperiod was increased to 20 years (1988 to 2007) for both the re-evaluated SAR calculationsand the new ICR calculations. (iii) The third step was to perform the ICR ex-post evaluation taking into consideration updated traffic data, construction costs, and construction period and timing, with an analysis period of 20 years and the same unit vehicle operating costs as in the SAR. (iv) Finally,the fourth step was to compare the re- evaluated SAR results with the ICR results.
8. Bhagalpur bridge. To perform the ICR econonic evaluation for the Bhagalpur bridge, the same methodology that was used in the SAR was applied assumingthe completion of construction by June 2000. The construction costs and the maintenancecosts have been revised to reflect the actual and projected construction costs. The benefits (vehicle operating cost saving, transshipment savings, and time savings) have been revised to reflect the projected bridge traffic data in 2000 provided by the GOB. These benefits were calculated by assumingthe same ratios of diversion in the SAR. The evaluation period is the same as the SAR, 1989to 2013, but the operation period was 19 years (1995-2013) in the SAR, while it was 14 years (2000-2013) in the ICR. For the analysisfollowing steps were taken. (i) The first step was to replicate the SAR. (ii) The second step was to re-evaluate SAR rates of return in the condition of delay in construction but the same construction cost. (iii) The third step was to re-evaluate the SAR, in the condition of re-estimated construction cost and period, and traffics. (iv) The fourth step was to compare the re-evaluated SAR and the ICR results. 64 Appendix C
9. Table Cl presents the ADT for each road in 1997 of the SAR estimates and ICR actual traffic. It also presents the SAR estimates for traffic growth for the 1988-1997 period and the actual traffic growth for the same period. The actual traffic in 1997 is, for most roads, higher than the SAR estimates by an average of 60 % for the roads that are completed. Consequently, the actual growth rates are 1.8 times higher than the SAR estimates. For example,Maharashtra, the state with the most dynamiceconomy, had an average actual growth rate of 12.3 % compared to an SAR estimate of 6.6 %, and the average actual 1997 traffic is 1.7 times higher than the SAR estimates.
10. Figure C1 shows the histograms of the ICR/SAR ratios for the 1997 traffic and the 1988- 1997 average annual traffic growth rate. It is observed that only 23 % of the project roads had a 1997 traffic ICR/SAR ratio below 1.0, while 77 % had a ratio higher than 1.0, with 18 % having a ratio higher than 2.0. This indicatesthat the SAR grossly underestimatedthe expected traffic growth in these states, and this is corroborated by the 1988-1997 annual traffic growth ICR/SAR ratio histogram.
11. The estimated traffic for the Bhagalpur bridge in the SAR and the ICR are shown in the table C 1. The ICR traffic estimation is far beyond the one in the SAR. For the year 2000, it was estimated 3226 ADT in the SAR while it is 6995 ADT in the ICR. This is 2.2 times higher than that of the SAR. This is mainly due to the expectationfor vivid traffic growth between south and north area of the state includingNepal.
12. Table C2 presents the project financialcosts for the roads that were completed under the project: (i) the project costs per km as estimated in the SAR; (ii) the actual costs per kin; (iii) the ICR/SAR ratio for project costs per km; (iv) the completion year; and, (v) the construction period. All project financial costs are expressed in 1988 mnillionRs, the SARPcurrency. Hence, the costs were converted to 1988 Rs based on the costs distributionover the years of each project adjusted to 1988 costs using India's wholesale price index. The average road improvements costs estimated in the SAR for the roads that are completed was 1.9 million 1988 Rs per km ($140,000 in 1988 US$ per kin) and the average actual costs is 2.5 million 1988 Rs per km ($190,000 in 1988 US$ per km), which represents about 5.2 million 1998 Rs per km. The SAR assumed a four-year construction period with a construction costs annual distributionof 12 %, 23 %, 43 %, and 22 %; while the average actual construction period was six years with an average construction costs annual distributionof 18 %, 22 %, 25 %, 18 %, 10 %, and 7 %. Table C2 also shows that project costs for the roads that are completed are on average 1.4 times higher than the SAR estimates (in 1988 Rs), with Rajasthan being the state with the highest cost increases (about 50 %). The reasons for higher costs includes; (i) high bids by contractors (lower estimationby PWIDs);(ii) poor designs that resulted in quantity changes and variation orders and; (iii) delays in implementationthat involved many factors and resulted in variation orders.
13. The histogram of ICR/SAR ratios of the project financialcosts per km for the roads are shown in figure C2. From the figure, it is observed that only 11.1 % of the projects had an ICR/SAR ratio below 1.0, and 61.1 % had a ratio between 1.0 and 1.5, and 28 % had a ratio higher than 1.5. The histogram of actual construction period shows that 61 % of the roads had a construction period between four and six years, and only 6 % had a construction period below four years. The average construction period is 5.8 years. 65 Appendix C
14. The financial construction cost for the Bhagalpur bridge was 689 million 1988 Rs in the SAR (construction period 1989-1994) and 864 million 1988 Rs is estimated in the ICR (construction period 1991-1999).
15. Road Improvements. The economic analysisof the SAR covered 23 individualroads that accounted for 75% of the original total project cost. The economic analysis of the ICR covers 18 roads"3 including 2 roads that were completed by the Maharashtra PWD's own resources. In order to reflect ex-post results, the 18 roads were also re-evaluatedunder ex condition (re-evaluated SAR). In the analysis, all costs and benefits were converted to Indian rupees of 1988 price. The roads operational period is assumed 10 years in the cases of the re-evaluated SAR and ICR.
16. The economic re-evaluation are summarizedin table C3, C4 and the table below. The average ERR and NPV in the ICR are 63.6% and 9,142 millionRs in 1988 price, and in the re-evaluated SAR they are 32.4 % and 6,150 millionRs respectively. This indicates that economic benefits of the roads completed are higher than that were estimated in the SAR. This impliesalso that, in relation to the SAR estimates, the increased actual traffic (1.6 times) compensated economic results although in the ICR there are devaluation by the increased construction costs (1.4 times) and the construction delays (2 to 3 years delay in commencingthe works and 6 years of actual construction period in the ICR while 4 years construction period in the SAR). Although the ICR shows the higher ERR and NPV, the costs are enormously higher than estimated and are explained;(a) high bids by contractors (lower estimation by PWDs); (b) poor designs that resulted in quantity changes and variation orders; and (c) delays in implementationthat involved many factors and resulted in variation orders.
Economic Re-evaluation for the Roads Copleted Average Average cost/km Average cost/km ERR (%) NPV .______ADT (1997) (M 1988 Rs) (M 1988 US$) (M19884 Rs) SAR_ 3,055 (1.00) 1.79 (1.00) 138,000 30.4 NA Re-evaluated SAR 3,055 (1.00) 1.79 (1.00) 138,000 (1.00) 32.4 (1.00) 6,150 (1.00) ICR 4,794 (1.57) 2.20 (1.23) 170,000 (1.23) 63.6 (1.96) 9,142 (1.49)
17. Bhagalpur bridge. The result is shown in the table below. Since the bridge and its approach road have not been completed, the values are only for reference. In the table, the case of the ICR, which is with 4.5 % traffic growth rate in the year 2000 onward and six year delay in implementation, is considered as a most realistic scenario. The project cost is 505 million 1988 Rs in the SAR, while 691 million 1988 Rs is assumed in the ICR as the projected project cost. In the re-evaluated SAR, where a six-year delay in implementationand the same construction cost are assumed, ERR increases to 23.8 % from 19.6 % and NPV devalues to 257 millionfrom 396 millionin 1988 Rs. I n the ICR, ERR dropped to 18.6 % from 23.8 % while NPV is 256 million 1988 Rs, which is almost the same as the re-evaluated SAR. Table CS shows the calculation of the case of the ICR.
13 See table 5: Key indicators for Project implementation. 66 Appendix C
EconomicRe-evaluation for theBh______bridge_| Average Cost Cost ERR NPV ADT (2000) (M 1988Rs) (M 1988US$) (%) (M 1988Rs) SAR 2,982 (1.00) 689 (1.00) 53.1 (1.00) 20.2 NA (396*)
______(19.6*) ______Re-evaluatedSAR** 2,982 (1.00) 689 (1.00) 53.1(1.00) 23.8 257 ICR (4.5%traffic growthrate, 6,353 (2.13) 864 (1.25) 66.6 (1.25) 18.6 256 year 2000onward***) recalculatedwith minor corrections to SAR. : constructioncost, period, and trafficare thesame as thatof SAR, but 6 yearsdelay in implementation. trafficgrowth rate is the same as that of SARuntil 1999. ,;7 Appendix C
INDIA
STATES'ROAD PROJECT
TableCl - TrafficAppraisal Estimates and ActualValues
1997Average Daily Traffic 1988-1997Annual Traffic Growth (%) Estimated Actual ICR/ Estimated Actual ICRI SAR ICR SAR SAR ICR SAR BIHAR Hajipur - Muzzaffarpur* 4295 NA NA 7.5 NA NA Sonepur- Chhapra* 3641 NA NA 7.0 NA NA BhagalpurBridge ** 3226 6995 2.2 NA NA NA Average 3721 6995 2.2 7.3 NA NA
MAHARASHTRA Pune- Aurangabad 4955 9484 1.9 6.4 14.3 2.2 Ahmednagar- Kopargaon 4513 10660 2.4 6.5 17.2 2.6 Ahmednagar-Aurangabad 4568 7774 1.7 7.9 14.3 1.8 Aurangabad- Jalna 3710 3144 0.8 6.4 4.5 0.7 Akola- Hingoli 1972 4099 2.1 6.3 15.3 2.4 Nagpur- Kanpa 3091 3069 1.0 6.4 6.3 1.0 Wada- Biwadi 2832 4426 1.6 6.5 11.9 1.8 Palgarh- Wada 3571 6712 1.9 6.5 14.2 2.2 Average 3652 6171 1.7 6.6 12.3 1.9
RAJASTHAN Bhiwadi- Alwar 1412 2459 1.7 7.0 13.8 2.0 Alwar- Karauli 1782 2667 1.5 7.0 11.9 1.7 Udaipu- Dabok 5780 6612 1.1 7.0 8.6 1.2 Dabok- Chittorgarh 1366 2733 2.0 7.0 15.6 2.2 Ajimer- Chittorgarh 4423 7600 1.7 7.0 13.6 1.9 Sirohi- AbuRoad 3885 4187 1.1 7.0 7.9 1.1 Abu- MountAbu Road 989 2648 2.7 7.0 19.4 2.8 Fatehpur- Churu* 1088 1029 0.9 7.0 6.3 0.9 Churu-HaryanaBdr.* 1090 1189 1.1 7.0 8.0 1.1 Sikar - HaryanaBdr. * 2664 1703 0.6 7.0 1.8 0.3 Average 2448 3283 1.5 7.0 10.7 1.5
UTTARPRADESH Sonauli- Gorakhpur 1542 2954 1.9 7.5 15.6 2.1 Gorakhpur-Ballia 2590 2254 0.9 7.5 5.9 0.8 Faizabad- Allahabad 2013 2817 1.4 7.5 11.6 1.5 Allahabad- Dohrighat* 3856 3886 1.0 7.5 7.6 1.0 Average 2500 2978 1.3 7.5 10.1 1.4
ROADWORKS Average*** 3055 4794 1.6 6.9 12.3 1.8 Standard Deviation*** 1434 2650 0.5 0.4 4.1 0.6
* The roadsthat are dropped. ** SAR estimatefor 2000and currennt estimate for 2000. The averageand standard deviation are calculatedfor theroads that are completed(not dropped). Appendix C 68
INDIA
STATES'ROAD PROJECT
TableC2 - FinancialProject Costs Appraisal Estimates and ActualValues (1988 Million Rupees)
Estimated - SAR Actual- ICR Cost Length Total Cost Length Total Cost per km Completion Construction in km Cost per km in km Cost per km ICR/SAR Year Years BIHAR Hajipur- Muzzaffarpur* 51.0 204.5 4.0 Work droppedin 1996 Sonepur- Chhapra* 50.0 260.2 5.2 Work droppedin 1996 BhagalpurBridge* 4.4 688.5 156.5 4.4 691.0 157.0 1.00 2000 Average 35.1 384.4 55.2 4.4 691.0 157.0
MAHARASHTRA Pune- Aurangabad 113.6 142.8 1.3 113.6 145.0 1.3 1.02 1995 5.3 Ahmednagar-Kopargaon 95.0 123.1 1.3 95.0 174.6 1.8 1.42 1994 4.3 Ahmednagar- Aurangabad 105.4 142.8 1.4 92.0 171.4 1.9 1.38 1997 6.9 Aurangabad-Jalna 124.0 201.2 1.6 112.4 166.8 1.5 0.91 1997 6.9 Akola- Hingoli 96.0 123.7 1.3 96.0 125.5 1.3 1.01 1995 4.7 Nagpur- Kanpa 69.0 120.3 1.7 69.0 250.4 3.6 2.08 1995 3.4 Wada- Biwadi 47.0 68.4 1.5 47.0 93.2 2.0 1.36 1997 6.4 Palgarh- Wada 23.0 32.1 1.4 23.0 45.6 2.0 1.42 1997 6.4 Average 84.1 119.3 1.4 81.0 146.6 1.9 1.33 5.5
RAJASTHAN Bhiwadi- Alwar 90.0 144.6 1.6 83.9 187.5 2.2 1.39 1997 6.0 Alwar- Karauli 145.0 186.0 1.3 135.1 301.9 2.2 1.74 1997 6.0 Udaipu- Dabok 16.0 85.7 5.4 16.3 98.6 6.1 1.13 1997 8.0 Dabok- Chittorgarh 97.0 128.3 1.3 98.5 147.5 1.5 1.13 1997 8.0 Ajimer- Chittorgarh 186.0 268.5 1.4 221.5 490.7 2.2 1.53 1996 6.0 Sirohi -Abu Road 63.0 69.0 1.1 62.5 135.6 2.2 1.98 1996 5.0 Abu - MountAbu Road 23.0 29.4 1.3 23.0 49.9 2.2 1.70 1996 5.0 Fatehpur- Churu* 36.0 32.9 0.9 Work droppedin 1993 Churu- HaryanaBdr. * 79.0 68.7 0.9 Work droppedin 1993 Sikar - HaryanaBdr. * 133.0 136.9 1.0 Work droppedin 1996 Average 86.8 115.0 1.6 91.5 201.7 2.7 1.52 6.3
UTTARPRADESH Sonauli- Gorakhpur 93.0 270.1 2.9 94.2 310.1 3.3 1.13 1995 6.0 Gorakhpur- Ballia 153.0 454.5 3.0 45.0 124.3 2.8 0.93 1995 6.0 Faizabad- Allahabad 143.0 412.6 2.9 60.0 249.1 4.2 1.44 1997 5.0 Allahabad- Dohrighat* 208.0 628.0 3.0 Work droppedin 1993 Average 149.3 441.3 2.9 66.4 227.8 3.4 1.17 5.7
ROADWORKS Average* 93.4 166.8 1.86 82.7 181.5 2.45 1.37 5.8 StandardDeviation* 47.5 118.2 48.5 107.9 1.2 1.2
* The avarageand standarddeviation are calculatedfor the roadsthat are completed(not dropped). Figure C1 - Traffic ICRISAR Ratios
1997 Average Daily Traffic ICR/SAR Ratio 1988-1997 Annual Traffic Growth ICRISAR Ratio
35 32 30 27
30 - 27 25 - 23 25 -23 20 -18 18 20- 15-
10 - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~10 9
5 45
0 - , 0 - 0.0-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-1.5 1.5-2.0 2.0-2.5 2.5-3.0 0.0-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-1.5 1.5-2.0 2.0-2.5 2.5-3.0 Rangeof 1997Daily Traffic ICR/SAR Ratio Rangeof 1988-1997Annual Traffic Growth ICR/SAR Ratio
FibureC2 - ProiectCosts ICRISAR Ratios and Actual Construction Duration
Road Works Project Costs ICR/SAR Ratio Actual Construction Duration (years)
70 -35- 61 60 30 -28
50 -125 - 22
R40 20 2 2 a'.30 - 2a,15
20 -10
10 5 0 0 0.0-0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0-1.5 1.5-2.0 2.0-2.5 2.5-3.0 3 -4 4 -5 5 -6 6 -7 7 -8 8 -9 Rangeof RoadWorks ProjectCosts ICRISARRatio Rangeof ActualConstruction Duration States'Road Project Re-estimatedTraffic Volume TableC 5 Economic Re-Evaluationof Bhagalpur Bridge 4.5% Growth Rateafter 2000 (Rs million) Actual constructioneconomic cost Case(c) Year Cost Benefits Net Benefits VehicleOperating Cost Savings TransshipmentSavings Time Savings Induced Total Cars Buses Trucks Other Total Pass. Goods Total Pass. Goods Total 2000- 2000- 2000- 1989 0 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4,5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 0.0 1990 18.9 -18.9 1991 4.3 -4.3 1992 38.9 -38.9 1993 71.5 -71.5 1994 69.8 -69.8 1995 73.0 -73.0 1996 117.7 -117.7 1997 104.8 -104.8 1998 134.8 -134.8 1999 57.3 -57.3 2000 3.5 12.7 27.0 61.6 1.1 102.4 17.3 62.4 79.7 9.5 2.7 12.2 29.1 223.4 220.0 2001 3,5 13.3 28.2 64.4 1.1 107.0 18.1 65.2 83.3 9.9 2.8 12.7 30.5 233.5 230.0 C 2002 3.5 13.9 29.5 67.3 1.1 111.8 18.9 68.1 87.1 10.4 2.9 13.3 31.8 244.0 240.5 2003 3.5 14.5 30.8 70.3 1.2 116.8 19.8 71.2 91.0 10.8 3.1 13.9 33,3 255.0 251.5 2004 3.5 15.1 32.2 73.5 1.3 122.1 20.7 74.4 95.1 11.3 3.2 14.5 34.8 266.4 263.0 2005 3.5 15.8 33.7 76.8 1.3 127.6 21.6 77.7 99.3 11.8 3.3 15.2 36.3 278.4 275.0 2006 3.5 16.5 35.2 80.2 1.4 133.3 22.6 81.2 103.8 12.4 3.5 15.9 38.0 291.0 287.5 2007 3.5 17.3 36.8 83.8 1.4 139.3 23.6 84.9 108.5 12.9 3.6 16.6 39,7 304.1 300.6 2008 3.5 18.1 38.4 87.6 1.5 145.6 24.6 88.7 113.4 13.5 3.8 17.3 41.4 317.7 314.3 2009 3.5 18.9 40.2 91.6 1.6 152.2 25.8 92.7 118.5 14.1 4.0 18.1 43.3 332.0 328.6 2010 3.5 19.7 42.0 95.7 1.6 159.0 26.9 96.9 123.8 14.8 4.2 18.9 45.3 347.0 343.5 2011 3.5 20.6 43.9 100.0 1.7 166.2 28.1 101.2 129.4 15.4 4.3 19.8 47.3 362.6 359.1 2012 3.5 21.5 45.8 104.5 1.8 173.6 29.4 105.8 135.2 16.1 4.5 20.6 49.4 378.9 . 375.4 2013 3.5 22.5 47.9 109.2 1.9 181.5 30.7 110.6 141.3 16.8 4.7 21.6 51.6 396.0 392.5 Total Benefit= 3490.6 EIRR = 18.58% NPV(120k)= $255.73
(1) VehicleOperating Cost Savings:mutiplied by the ratioof ADT as of 2000, ICR/SAR.Cars = 1796/770,Buses = 1704/863,Trucks = 2853/1349,Motor cycle = 602/244. (2) TransshipmentSavings: the sameas SAR until2000. After 2000,4.5% of growthrate is assumed. (3) Time Savings:the same as SAR until 2000. After 2000,4.5% of growthrate is assumed. INDIA
STATES' ROAD PROJECT
Table C4 -ICR Economic Evaluation Net Benefits
Without Wth Net Without With Net Without Wth Net Without With Net Without With Net Without Wth Net Without With Net Wthout Wth Net IProject Proiect Beceltt Project Proleet Benetits Proieed Proiect Benefits Proledt Projedt Benefits Project Project Beneitts Project Project Benefits Project Proect Benefitt Proied Prolect Benefits Maharashtra Mahrashtra MaharashtMra Maharashtra Maharashtra Maharasitra Maharashtra Maharastra Pune - Ahmednagar Ahmednagar - Kopargaon Ahrnednagar- Aurangabad Aujnngabad - Maotha Akola - Kanhellon NasPur - Kanetd Pabgar- Wada Wada - Ambadij 1 365 365 0 345 345 0 296 296 C 307 307 0 131 131 0 132 132 0 93 93 0 61 61 0 2 419 419 0 402 402 0 336 336 0 318 318 0 148 148 0 138 138 0 105 105 0 69 69 0 0 3 491 491 0 473 473 0 393 393 0 340 340 0 173 173 0 150 150 0 123 123 0 81 81 4 576 576 0 564 570 -6 461 461 0 363 363 0 203 203 0 162 162 0 144 144 0 95 98 0 5 675 689 -14 656 678 -22 540 540 0 387 387 0 238 250 -12 176 200 -24 168 168 0 112 112 0 6 793 820 -27 764 814 -50 634 634 0 412 412 0 278 301 -23 190 236 -46 196 196 0 131 131 0 7 934 984 -S0 889 911 -22 745 763 -19 438 456 -18 326 369 -43 205 291 -86 229 238 -9 10 155 -4 8 1104 1129 -26 1036 741 295 877 913 -35 467 S00 -34 383 405 -22 221 265 -44 267 283 -17 171 180 -8 9 1312 982 329 1207 869 338 1024 1090 -66 497 560 -63 450 365 85 239 202 37 307 338 -32 195 211 -16 10 1555 1125 429 1406 1019 387 1174 1208 -34 530 563 -32 530 421 109 258 215 43 349 365 -16 222 230 -8 11 1800 1289 511 1637 1195 442 1337 954 383 567 416 151 627 486 141 280 229 51 398 283 114 253 178 74 12 2048 1482 506 1904 1401 502 1521 1092 429 606 435 171 745 561 184 304 244 so 453 324 129 287 204 84 13 2327 1720 607 2218 1944 574 1731 1251 480 649 455 194 890 648 241 330 259 71 51e 371 145 327 233 94 14 2455 1857 598 2341 1748 598 1825 1330 496 697 483 214 961 692 269 359 275 84 545 393 151 345 248 97 15 2601 2020 581 2480 1858 624 1931 1427 504 739 513 226 1019 742 278 391 294 97 576 418 159 365 265 100 16 2756 2203 553 2628 1980 649 2042 1535 507 782 544 238 1079 798 280 427 316 110 610 445 164 368 285 101 17 2920 2415 50 2785 2127 659 2158 1661 497 828 581 247 1142 861 281 466 340 126 645 477 168 408 308 t00 16 3094 2660 434 2951 2288 664 2285 1801 484 877 624 253 1208 930 278 503 366 137 682 513 169 432 334 98 19 3279 2943 336 3127 2463 664 2422 1961 460 929 671 258 1279 1007 272 534 395 139 722 552 170 4568 363 94 20 3474 3243 231 3314 2620 694 2566 2105 461 983 685 298 1353 1096 286 586 377 189 763 578 186 483 386 96 NPV 1,283 1,540 879 370 506 118 273 172 ERR 108.4% 115.6% 95.9% 60.8% 63.5% 23.6% 75.7% 86.7% Uttar Pradesh tRajasthan Rajasthan Rajasthan Rajasthan Rajasthan Rajasthen Rajasthan Bhjwadi - Alwar Aiwar - Karamu UdaiPur- Dabox n Dabok - Chittorparh Ainter - CNttorgarh Sirohi - Abu Road Abu Roal - Mount Abu Sonau i - GortPur 1 86 86 0 171 171 0 86 50 0 81 91 0 469 469 0 146 146 0 17 17 0 90 90 0 2 97 97 0 191 191 0 61 61 0 105 105 0 536 538 0 158 158 0 20 20 0 103 103 0 3 113 113 0 218 218 0 69 69 0 123 123 0 627 627 0 175 175 0 24 24 0 122 122 0 4 131 131 0 248 248 0 77 77 0 145 145 0 734 734 0 193 193 0 28 28 0 143 143 0 5 151 151 0 283 283 0 85 88 0 171 171 0 858 858 0 212 212 0 34 34 0 166 168 0 6 175 175 0 321 321 0 95 104 -9 201 214 -14 1004 1044 -39 233 246 -13 40 45 -S 197 226 -29 7 202 221 -19 366 397 -31 106 124 -18 236 262 -27 1177 1253 -76 257 282 -25 48 57 -9 231 288 -56 8 233 270 -37 416 476 -59 119 152 -33 277 327 -50 1385 1527 -141 283 330 -47 57 74 -17 272 377 -105 9 270 339 -69 474 865 -111 133 150 -17 326 352 -25 1637 1709 -72 311 336 -24 68 77 -9 320 373 -54 10 313 348 -35 541 598 -57 150 108 42 384 278 106 1946 1432 514 344 265 79 81 60 21 377 258 89 11 363 262 101 619 451 169 168 118 S0 453 322 131 2328 1632 696 381 286 95 97 72 25 448 333 112 12 417 298 119 710 505 205 184 128 86 528 373 155 2730 1860 870 423 309 114 115 86 29 528 386 143 13 474 339 135 813 565 248 200 140 60 609 431 178 3107 2146 961 470 334 137 137 103 34 628 446 182 14 502 360 142 871 600 271 211 1S0 61 644 458 186 3277 2330 947 508 354 154 145 109 36 676 474 202 15 531 382 149 922 637 285 223 161 62 682 486 196 3466 2538 928 541 378 163 153 116 38 715 504 212 16 563 405 167 977 677 300 236 175 62 722 518 204 36685 2792 873 572 405 167 182 123 40 758 539 218 17 596 430 166 1034 725 309 250 190 60 764 555 209 3874 3078 797 606 436 169 172 130 42 802 579 223 18 631 459 172 1095 780 315 264 206 58 809 596 213 4096 3411 688 641 470 171 182 138 44 849 624 226 19 668 492 177 1160 840 320 280 225 54 857 640 216 4340 3796 544 679 508 170 192 146 46 889 672 227 20 707 486 221 1228 841 396 296 227 68 907 660 246 4598 4157 441 718 522 186 203 145 58 981 665 287 NPV 226 427 97 358 1,670 272 63 303 ERR 45.3% 48.5% 40.6% 60,1% 82.2% 52.9% 42.4% 37.0% Uttar Pradesh Uttar Pradesh Bihar State BhagaltpurBridge Maharastra State Rajasthan State tJttar Pradesh State Overae Road Works Overall Project _ Gorahpw - Ballia Faizabad - AHahabad Costs Benefits Net Benefits Road Works Road Works Road Works _ 1 239 239 a 185 185 0 0 0 0 1731 1731 0 1037 1037 0 514 514 0 3282 3282 0 0 2 252 252 0 206 206 0 0 a 0 1935 1935 0 1169 1169 0 5862 562 0 3665 3665 0 0 3 272 272 0 235 235 0 -4 0 -4 2225 2225 0 1349 1349 0 629 629 0 4202 4202 0 -4 4 293 293 0 266 266 0 -39 0 -39 2568 2574 -8 1596 1556 0 703 703 0 4826 4832 -6 -45 5 316 316 0 302 302 0 -72 0 -72 2951 3023 -72 1794 1794 0 786 786 0 5531 5603 -72 -144 6 339 380 -41 343 400 -57 -70 0 -70 3397 3543 -146 2070 2150 -81 879 1006 -127 6346 6699 -354 -423 7 364 442 -78 389 498 -109 -73 0 -73 3916 4166 -250 2391 2598 -205 984 1228 -243 7291 7990 -699 -772 8 391 536 -145 441 646 -205 -118 0 -118 4525 4416 109 2770 3156 -386 1104 1859 -455 8399 9130 -732 -849 9 420 495 -74 501 606 -105 -105 0 -108 5230 4617 613 3220 3549 -328 1241 1474' -233 9691 9639 52 -53 10 452 348 104 570 424 146 -135 0 -135 6025 5146 878 3760 3090 669 1399 1060 338 11183 9297 1888 1751 3482 11 486 369 116 649 474 178 -57 0 -57 6698 5030 1668 4409 3142 1266 1581 1176 405 12888 9349 3839 12 524 391 133 738 529 209 -3 223 220 7868 5744 2125 5107 3559 1548 1791 1306 485 14765 10608 4157 4377 13 565 414 151 830 591 238 -3 237 233 8988 6582 2406 5810 4058 1752 2023 1452 571 16821 12092 4729 4962 14 610 439 171 878 627 251 -3 251 248 9527 7024 2503 6158 4361 1796 2163 1541 623 17848 12928 4922 5170 1s5 92 466 186 930 e66 264 -3 286 263 10102 7535 2567 6518 4698 1820 2297 1635 662 18917 13868 5049 5312 1e6 61 494 196 985 708 277 -3 282 279 10709 8107 2602 6897 8095 1802 2433 1741 691 20038 14943 5095 8374 17 731 525 207 1043 757 286 -3 299 296 11352 8769 2583 7296 8544 1751 2576 1861 715 21224 16174 5050 5346 18 775 558 216 1104 811 293 -3 317 314 12033 9516 2517 7718 6060 1658 2728 1963 735 22479 17569 4910 5223 19 820 597 224 1169 870 299 -3 336 333 12747 10355 2392 8174 6647 1527 2888 2139 749 23809 19141 4698 5000 20 869 554 315 1237 816 422 -3 3586 353 13502 11080 2442 8657 7039 1618 3058 2034 1024 25217 20133 5083 5436 21 -3 377 374 . 374 22 -3 400 397 397 421 23 -3 424 421 24 -3 450 446 446 25 3 477 473 473 NPV 237 347 321 5,141 3,114 887 9,142 9463 ERR 2s.8% 29.6% 20.3% 83.3% 63.5% 31.3% 63.6% _5.5% Appendix C 72
INDIA
STATES'ROAD PROJECT
Table C3 - EconomicIndicators SAR and ICR Estimates
SAR SAR* ICR ICR/SAR* ERR ERR NPV ERR NPV ERR NPV (N1 (%) (M 1988 Rs) (%) (M 1988 Rs) ( BIHAR Hajipur- Muzzaffarpur 20.2 Work dropped in 1996 Sonepur - Chhapra 12.3 Work dropped in 1996 Bhagalpur Bridge 21.2 23.8 257 20.3 321 0.9 1.2 State 18.9 23.8 257 20.3 321 0.9 1.2
MAHARASHTRA Pune - Aurangabad 49.9 50.0 731 108.4 1283 2.2 1.8 Ahmednagar- Kopargaon 96.8 96.9 664 115.6 1540 1.2 2.3 Ahmednagar- Aurangabad 49.8 50.5 734 95.9 879 1.9 1.2 Aurangabad- Jalna 38.7 39.7 636 60.8 370 1.5 0.6 Akola - Hingoli 23.3 26.1 168 63.5 506 2.4 3.0 Nagpur- Kanpa 22.3 25.7 166 23.6 118 0.9 0.7 Wada - Biwadi 40.3 41.2 208 75.7 273 1.8 1.3 Palgarh - Wada 52.4 53.0 148 86.7 172 1.6 1.2 State 43.6 47.3 3455 83.3 5141 1.8 1.5
RAJASTHAN Bhiwadi - Aiwar 21.6 24.2 139 45.3 226 1.9 1.6 Alwar- Karauli 29.1 31.3 346 48.5 427 1.5 1.2 Udaipu - Dabok 23.9 25.5 88 40.6 97 1.6 1.1 Dabok - Chittorgarh 25.7 27.7 171 60.1 358 2.2 2.1 Ajimer- Chittorgarh 38.8 39.9 936 82.2 1670 2.1 1.8 Sirohi - Abu Road 45.3 46.5 324 52.9 272 1.1 0.8 Abu - Mount Abu Road 26.4 28.2 26 42.4 63 1.5 2.4 Fatehpur- Churu 30.1 Work dropped in 1993 Churu - Haryana Bdr. 28.2 Work dropped in 1993 Sikar - Haryana Bdr. 43.1 Work dropped in 1996 State 32.2 32.7 2030 63.5 3114 1.9 1.5
UTTARPRADESH Sonauli - Gorakhpur 11.7 15.5 62 37.0 303 2.4 4.9 Gorakhpur- Ballia 19.2 22.0 351 28.8 237 1.3 0.7 Faizabad- Allahabad 17.9 20.0 252 29.6 347 1.5 1.4 Allahabad - Dohrighat 24.5 Work dropped in 1993 State 19.6 19.7 665 31.3 887 1.6 1.3
ROAD WORKS ** 30.4 32.4 6150 63.6 9142 1.96 1.49
PROJECT 27.5 28.7 6407 55.5 9463 1.93 1.48
*2SAR is reevaluatedSAR where ERR and NPV are calculated basedon SAR data with a 20 years analysis period. ** The values for SAR* and ICRISAR*are calculatedfor the roads that are completed. The values for SAR* and ICR/SAR*are for the roads completedand Bhagalpur Bridge.