MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF POLITOLOGY

Contemporary Salafi Jihad in the West: a critique of Marc Sageman’s „Understanding Terror Networks “ Bachelor thesis Jakub Rafay

Supervisor: Mgr. Josef Kraus, Ph.D. UČO: 439505 Field of Study: Politologie Year of enrolment: 2014 Brno, 2017

Declaration of authorship I declare that I wrote the bachelor thesis „Contemporary Salafi Jihad in the West: a critique of Marc Sageman’s „Understanding Terror Networks“ entirely by myself and that I solely used the literature in the list of bibliography.

Brno, 15 May 2017 ……………………………………………… Jakub Rafay

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Special thanks to:

Here I would like to thank my work supervisor, Mgr. Josef Kraus, Ph.D, for his guidance, cooperation and prompt reactions to all my enquiries during the thesis’ writing. I would also like to thank my family, friends and colleagues not only for supporting me during the writing of this thesis, but for their support during my whole studies over the past years.

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Anotácia: Práca “Contemporary Salafi Jihad in the West: a critique of Marc Sageman’s ‘Understanding Terror Networks’” sa venuje fenoménu súčasného saláfistickeho džihádu v západnom svete, pričom tento jav analyzuje na dvoch úrovniach – na úrovni širšieho hnutia a na úrovni jedincov – a závery porovnáva s jedným zo základných textov odboru štúdií terorizmu, “Understanding Terror Networks” od Marca Sagemana. Kvalitatívna časť práce sa venuje zmenám vo vybraných aspektoch džihádistického hnutia, zatiaľ čo jej druhá, kvantitatívna časť pracuje so závermi výskumu profilov 121 džihádistov v období rokov 2011- 2016 a porovnáva ich so Sagemanovym profilovanim džihádistov z predošlej éry džihádistického hnutia.

Kľúčové slová: ISIS, terorizmus, Islamský štát, Západ, Marc Sageman, džihádizmus

Annotation: Bachelor thesis titled ‘Contemporary Salafi Jihad in the West: a critique of Marc Sageman’s “Understanding Terror Networks”’ analyses the jihadi movement and its activities in the Western world on two levels – wider movement and the individual level – and compares its conclusions with one of centrepiece texts of terrorism studies, Marc Sageman’s “Understanding Terror Networks.” The first, qualitative part of the thesis illustrates changes in selected aspects of the movement, while its second, quantitative part, analyses 121 profiles of jihadists active between 2011 and 2016 and compares the regularities in their background with Sageman’s own profiling research from the previous era of jihadism.

Keywords: ISIS, terrorism, Islamic State, the West, Marc Sageman, jihadism

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Table of contents

List of abbreviations ...... 6

Introduction ...... 7

1. Methodology ...... 9

1.1. Qualitative part methodology ...... 9

1.2. Quantitative part methodology ...... 9

1.2.1. Sources matrix ...... 11

2. Conceptualisation ...... 13

3. Qualitative changes in the global jihadist movement ...... 14

3.1. Joining the jihad ...... 14

3.2. Spreading of ideology ...... 16

3.3. Structure of the movement ...... 18

3.4. Methods used ...... 21

3.5. Qualitative part conclusion ...... 23

4. Profiling a jihadist – an updated picture ...... 24

4.1. Social background ...... 24

4.1.1. Geographical origins ...... 24

4.1.2. Prison experience ...... 24

4.1.3. Socioeconomic background ...... 25

4.1.4. Education ...... 26

4.1.5. Devotion as youth ...... 26

4.1.6. Occupation ...... 27

4.1.7. Family status ...... 28

4.2. Psychological make-up ...... 29

4.2.1. Mental illness ...... 30

4.2.2. History of crime ...... 31

4.2.3. Terrorist personality ...... 32

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4.3. Circumstantial reasons for joining the jihad ...... 33

4.3.1. Age ...... 33

4.3.2. Place of recruitment/radicalisation ...... 34

4.3.3. Faith level ...... 36

4.3.4. Employment ...... 36

4.3.5. Relative deprivation ...... 37

4.4. Personal findings ...... 38

4.4.1. Hijrah ...... 38

4.4.2. Form of radicalisation ...... 39

4.4.3. Known to authorities ...... 39

4.4.4. Training/attack preparation ...... 39

4.4.5. Links to jihadists ...... 40

4.5. Profiling conclusion ...... 40

5. Conclusion ...... 42

6. Appendix 1 – Visualisations, images, diagrams, tables ...... 44

7. Appendix 2 – List of profiled individuals ...... 50

8. Appendix 3 - List of sources used for the individuals profiling ...... 53

Multi-case sources ...... 53

North American Cluster ...... 53

European Cluster ...... 59

Australian Cluster ...... 75

Immigrants Cluster ...... 77

9. Bibliography ...... 82

Literature ...... 82

Online sources ...... 83

No. of characters: 96 060

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List of abbreviations

AQ – Al-Qaeda AQAP – Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQIM – Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb EIJ – Egyptian Islamic Jihad EU – European Union GIA – Group Islamique d’Algérie HUT – Hizb ut-Tahrir ICSR – International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation IED – improvised explosive device IS/ISIS/ISIL – Islamic State (since 6.2014), previously Islamic St ate of Syria and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant LeT – Lashkar-e-Taiba START – (National Consortium for the) Study of Terrorism And Responses to Terrorism

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Introduction

Events of the 9/11 provided the Western civilisation with a grim wake-up call, reminding it of until then a latent threat posed by a radical Salafi jihadism. Even though there had been attacks against the Western targets abroad, few expected an attack of such magnitude to take place in Lower Manhattan. These events – as well as several other attacks that were to follow against the West – launched a wave of terrorism research focussed on understanding the threat – who were these people, how do they operate and what drives them? However, while the booming discipline came up with a substantial sum of knowledge that helped tackle the issue in many ways, today’s global Salafi jihad has deviated in many aspects from its predecessor from the century’s beginning, making many of the original findings outdated. The aim of this work is to provide an updated comprehensive picture of the character of Salafi jihad in the West. Largely drawing on Marc Sageman’s book Understanding Terror Networks, it will compare his conclusions with the most recent data. After the introductory chapters describing the employed methodology and concepts used throughout the work, the thesis becomes divided into two parts, each providing a different angle on the phenomenon of global Salafi jihad. The first, qualitative part illustrates specific changes in the jihadi movement since 2004 (year of Understanding Terror Networks’ publication) on a broader, movement level; more specifically, it describes developments in the way one joins the jihad, new ways of spreading its ideology, movement’s structural changes and changes in tactical approaches. The second, quantitative part mirrors Sageman’s research into jihadists’ personal background. Working with a sample of 121 terrorists connected to Salafi jihad-inspired plots in the West, author evaluates Sageman’s explanations for joining the jihad in present context, while also drawing a profile of contemporary jihadist. Despite the work’s title, in no way is this thesis supposed to be or attempts to be a criticism of Sageman’s work. His conclusions have provided a very needed basis for understanding the threat at the time when it appeared. However, as he himself had admitted in his latest work, Misunderstanding Terrorism, some of his conclusions were incomplete and based on imperfect methodology and, understandably, they are based on research into a different jihadi movement than the one the world is facing today. It is for these reasons that his findings deserve re-evaluation. Furthermore, this work (and particularly its quantitative chapter) does not attempt to explain the very complicated processes behind radicalisation – it merely describes the

7 circumstances surrounding individuals’ radicalisation process and ponders their possible influence on the process. After all, Sageman’s own research shows that despite the highly variable social backgrounds of individuals in his sample, they all turned to the same ideology and ended in the same place, their origin, age or wealth notwithstanding. For this reason, Sageman’s insights into the influence of friendship, kinship and discipleship on radicalisation are also omitted.

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1. Methodology

As both chapters look at current Salafi jihadism from a different perspective, they also have to use different methodological approach. First chapter is in its nature a qualitative discursive analysis that also uses elements of comparative approach and looks on the problem from a wider movement level. Second chapter works on individual level and it is best described as quantitative statistical analysis using elements of comparative approach as well.

1.1. Qualitative part methodology

This chapter will address changes in the global Salafi jihad and update Sageman’s description of the movement by combining comparative and descriptive approaches, briefly stating how particular aspect of the movement has been perceived up to 2004 and comparing it with the situation as it is today, noting substantial developments and incidents that directed the change. Touching upon the subjects of joining the jihad, the movement’s structure, ideology spreading and of methods and tactics used, it will try also put focus in conclusion on the distinction between group- and movement-initiated changes. Author here draws the information about the movement’s shifting nature from works of experts on terrorism, both jihadi and the terrorism in general, state security institutions and their analyses, as well as from sources created by terrorist groups themselves; their publications, videos and their leaders’ statements are included here. These documents had to be included as they provide an insider-view on movement’s internal dynamics; however, their strong ideological bias had to be taken into consideration and the sources were always compared against more reliable findings.

1.2. Quantitative part methodology

Second part of the thesis updates Sageman’s research into why individuals engage in terrorism as described in the book’s chapter 3, The Mujahiden. There, Sageman tests three general approaches/explanations of turning to terrorism – “social background”, “psychological make-up” and “circumstantial joining” – against his sample of personal information collected on 172 terrorists. Drawing solely on open source information (such as court records, official statements, interviews, research findings, media and journalistic source), Sageman debunked several widely-held myths and misconceptions about the reasons why people turn to terrorism, such as low economic origins, little to no education, mental problems and other.

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In this part, the thesis adopts identical methodological approach – that is, using open source information to create a picture of an individual. Having read and analysed over 600 articles, official records, analytical pieces and research projects, author has collected personal information on 121 persons involved in jihadism-related incidents in the West. Timespan of the researched incidents has been chosen more-or-less arbitrarily to form an enclosed sample and begins 10 years after the events of 9/11, that is on 11 September 2011 and ends on 31 December 2016. Results of this research are compared against Sageman conclusions, demonstrating the changed appearance of the threat of jihadist terrorism in the West. Regarding the sample selection, individual jihadists are included in the sample if they met all following criteria: 1. They executed/planned/participated in a terrorist attack /plot in the West. 2. They were clearly inspired by the Salafi ideology of jihadism. 3. Both violent and terrorist nature of their act was apparent (i.e. it was not merely talking about the plot, but involved preparation, planning, obtaining the weapons and/or executing the plot). 4. They wittingly and willingly took part in the incident . 5. The incident was a result of their own/thei r cell’s efforts, without support or encouragement from government agents.

These criteria seek to exclude foreign fighters, non-jihadi terrorists, actors of violent Salafism-related incidents that were not terrorist in nature,1 accomplices to the plot who were not aware of helping terrorists2 and sting operations3 that are very popular in the USA. Acts that took place due to perpetrator’s mental illness are excluded as well, safe for a handful of instances when the incident was widely medialised and bore strong hallmarks of a clear-cut

1 This means exclusion of such incidents as the 2012 Cardiff mother’s killing of her son for failing to memorise Quran, several honour killings throughout Europe in the monitored timeframe or incidents of Salafism-inspired domestic violence. 2 Allegedly, this was the case with Salah Abdeslam’s friends Hamza Attou and Mohammad Amri, responding to their friend’s distress call “after an accident” and moving him from to Belgium after the Paris attacks; Mohamed Bakkali, another of the cell’s logistical supporters is a different case, as he had rented flats where the explosive belts were manufactured and had also conducted surveillance on a Belgian nuclear scientist (Le Parisien: 2016) and is therefore included in the sample. 3 Sting operations are security operations where a covert government agent provokes the target to break the law, often pretending to share the same ideology and at times even providing weapons for the attack. As Sageman notes, “even without providing overt encouragement, the informant plays the role of an enabler, offering people with extreme views but faint hearts the means to act, thereby potentially facilitating actions that otherwise might not occur.” (Sageman 2017: 26) 10 jihadi attack – simply stabbing people and shouting the takbir does not qualify here. Apart from attacks and plots, individual arrests are also included if they took place in the timespan and meet the criteria above. 1.2.1. Sources matrix As mentioned above, the research draws on open-source information. However, as Sageman himself very validly notes, “reliance on journalistic accounts is fraught with danger. There is much disinformation in the press.” To tackle this ambiguity of the available information, author has devised a matrix by which the sources’ reliability and veracity was evaluated to provide the most accurate profile of the individual. Higher-ranking sources and the information included therein takes precedence over the lower ranking ones; naturally, those published later (and possibly reflecting more recent developments) also take precedence over older sources. This helped minimise judgement calls on author’s part, although common sense had to be occasionally used instead of rigidly holding by the matrix (such as when older, local sources provided well-founded information versus recent articles by worldwide media). First, the most reliable group encompasses official and the least ambiguous sources, such as court documents, official statements of state institutions (e.g. relevant departments and ministries, security services’ reports, etc.) and the individual’s own accounts (also including his statements on verified social network accounts, martyrdom videos, bay’ah and other similar sources) due to their least questionable origin (putting aside the possibility of erroneous information being obtained and worked with by the officials). Second group includes academic sources – published books including information on the individuals, research findings, projects such as ICSR’s Crime-Terror Nexus research project, datasets of University of Maryland’s START consortium, Countering Extremism Project and several others are included here – as well as foreign-language journalistic sources from the region of the individual. Where the researchers drew solely on journalistic accounts, the information provided therein is considered as of lesser value than the local journalistic accounts. Concerning the media sources themselves, author drew on hundreds of online articles, prioritising sources closest to the researched individual, often in his native language (French, Spanish, English, German) and provided by local media outlets. First-hand accounts such as interviews with the individual’s acquaintances, childhood friends and family members provide valuable information, but are still hardly verifiable and thus rank lower than official sources. Third, lowest-ranking but still reliable are national and global mass media reports. As these often recycle accounts of smaller, regional media and do not work with information of their own, they are providing a second-hand account and thus rank lower. Nevertheless, their 11 prestige and established contacts enable them to work more closely with officials and their reporting sometimes draws on sources close to the investigation and security officials; where available, information gained this way is considered as credible and even though it is by its very nature seldom verifiable, it is being considered as well. Suspected, but directly unconfirmed information was also collected and marked with “?” in the table. After finishing the data collection, this missing information was searched for again on a case-by-case basis, investigating the specific issue (e.g. family status of Nadir Soofi or the place of recruitment of Salah Abdeslam). Only upon obtaining definite information was it included in the table. Additionally, – following Sageman’s methodology – the sample is split into geographical clusters based on the intensity of interactions among its members and their connection to the area; it is for this reason that, for example, one of San Bernardino shooters, a Saudi citizen educated in Pakistan, Tashfeen Malik, is included in the North American cluster, as this is the location where she had moved, met her husband and where they together struck. The clusters are four and cover areas of North America, Europe and Australia, with the 4th cluster encompassing immigrants from the Middle Eastern countries into the three mentioned areas. Clustering allows the regional specifics to appear and provides more adequate explanations for the differences. However, major downside of the sample used in the thesis is absence of detailed information on the Immigrants cluster (with author obtaining only 42% of the sought information, compared to over 70% in all remaining clusters); quite understandably, as there is a strong absence of any information on their background or previous life before migrating not only in open sources, but also among national security services. Research findings are then quantified and stated in the text also as a per cent of the sample where data was available, with average data availability being 68,5% per profile aspect. These figures are compared to Sageman’s findings and possible variations and developments between the two datasets are explained.

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2. Conceptualisation

Being a focal point of this work, defining “global Salafi jihad” is crucial for its correct understanding. Global Salafi jihad, as defined by Sageman, is “a worldwide religious revivalist movement with the goal of re-establishing past Muslim glory in a great Islamist state (…). It preaches salafiyyah (…), the restoration of authentic Islam, and advocates a strategy of violent jihad, resulting in an explosion of terror to wipe out what it regards as local political heresy. The global version of this movement advocates the defeat of the Western powers that prevent the establishment of a true Islamist state. (…) Salafi ideology determines its mission, sets its goals, and guides its tactics. What sets the global Salafi jihad from other terrorist campaigns is its violence against foreign non-Muslim governments and their populations in furtherance of Salafi objectives.” (Sageman 2004: 1) While there are some arguable points in this definition, it is generally well-descriptive; global Salafi jihad is an ideological/political movement (not a single group) that advocates violent approach in furtherance of its goals. Although the term “jihad” (from Arabic “struggle, effort”) has also positive connotations, throughout this work it is used in its violent meaning (as well as it derived terms, such as “jihadi”, “jihadist”, etc.) Given the ever-lasting scholarly debate about the definition of terrorism, it would be pointless to argue for a detailed and entirely correct definition here; however, as the thesis deals with terrorist actions, Daniel Byman’s basic definition as formulated in Richard English’s Terrorism: How to Respond, will be used. According to Byman, terrorism is “the use of violence or a threat of violence against civilians to achieve a political purpose and have a psychological effect.” (English 2009: 9) Throughout the thesis, term “terrorist” will be used interchangeably with term “jihadist” when speaking about violent Salafism-inspired individuals involved in terror plots in the West; where referring to other Salafists, e.g. preachers or foreign fighters departed for the Levantine battlegrounds, other terms are being used to avoid confusion. Borrowing Sageman’s definition used in his latest book, Misunderstanding Terrorism, “The West” is in this work understood strictly geographically as “the European Union, North America and Australia/New Zealand” (Sageman 2017: 25) – even though the 2015 Sousse attack resulted almost entirely in Western casualties, the geographical location of the attack excludes it from the sample.

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3. Qualitative changes in the global jihadist movement

The first part deals with the qualitative change of selected aspects of the global jihadi movement. When Sageman’s account of the phenomenon was published in 2004, it was drawing primarily on knowledge about the movement in the immediate post-9/11 age. Much of this knowledge was centred around the Al-Qaeda’s transnational activities following the Soviet war in Afghanistan, running up to the events of 11 September 2001; however, this type of description is more of a historical explanation of an overt insurgency and later terrorist group than of a global ideological movement. Coupling this with the fact that the threat of the terrorism in the West as perceived nowadays had – obviously – not yet materialised and international system has since undergone many substantial changes, Sageman’s account could not remain applicable for long. Naturally, the jihadi terrorism as a phenomenon saw considerable changes in many areas; however, author has chosen only some of them due to their significance and their impact on the new nature of terrorism.

3.1. Joining the jihad

Sageman explains how one joins the jihad on socially isolated individuals/small social groups who are not internally prone to violence, but momentarily feel pulled towards jihadism for various reason (their sense of isolation and Islam as an identity reference point being some). However, as he notes, for jihadist groups/cells “intensification of beliefs and faith are necessary, but not sufficient conditions to joining jihad. The critical and specific element to joining the jihad is the accessibility of a link to the jihad. Without it, (…) although lethal, their operations do not constitute a serious threat to society. Only the global jihad, with its organization, resources, and skills, poses such a danger.” (Sageman 2004: 120) In Sageman’s understanding, making a contact with an established jihadist is therefore essential for joining the jihad; this person would facilitate their move to Afghanistan, “where senior members of the jihad could further evaluate him” and formally accept the individual into jihad and start training him necessary skills in the camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Sageman 2004: 121). Although this might have applied in the pre-9/11 era, it hardly applies nowadays. In the 2010’s, being a jihadist no longer requires a formal acceptance by the senior mujahideen and can be better described as “belonging by self-identification.” Previously, one had to travel to terrorist camps, be deemed physically fit and adept in his religion (failure here was the reason why Zuhair Hilal al-Tbaiti, convicted for his 2002 plot on US ships in Strait of Gibraltar, was at first rejected by AQ; see Sageman 2004: 122) and personally pledge allegiance before being

14 given a part in terror plot. Today, many jihadists instead opt for a superficial contact with someone who fights in the Levant or recruits for the group in the West (and is often in no direct contact with the group’s leadership) and staging their own small-scale attack – while generally primitive and far from being the AQ-esque spectaculars, their deadliness refutes Sageman’s abovementioned claim of not posing serious threat to society. Indeed, some of the deadliest attacks in the West in 2016 were executed by lone actors with little to none connection to the “global jihad” (see Orlando nightclub shooting, Nice Bastille Day lorry attack or Berlin Christmas market ramming). Reasons for this change in recruitment are several. As Burke notes, “from 2008, the pressure brought to bear on al-Qaeda in their bases in western Pakistan by drone strikes increased steadily, (…) restricting movement (…) and eliminating many of the organisation’s most capable people. …in these conditions, just reaching al-Qaeda was much more difficult…, let alone actually being accepted, trained and given a mission by the organisation.” (Burke 2015: 170) Also, he adds, the post-9/11 recruits’ low discipline and little commitment under these conditions prompted the jihadists in the training camps to tell them “don’t send anyone [more to us].” (Ibid: 171) This, coupled with the destruction of jihadist training camps in the countries of south-western Asia (e.g. Taliban-era Khaldan, Darunta or al-Farooq camps have in early 2010s been closed for several years) made the traditional recruitment process of formal acceptance and pledging the bay’ah practically impossible. As Neumann accurately remarks, “al-Qaeda model – which had been in crisis for several years – died with bin Laden.” (Neumann 2016: 51) At first, the movement was unable to deal with the loss of opportunities to join the jihad; the inability of al-Qaeda to orchestrate another large, spectacular attack did not morally help the movement, either. The Arab Spring, conflict in the Syria, but most importantly, rise of the so-called Islamic State, however, brought about the change. Initially seen as “losers, wasting their lives on acts that no one would remember”, remotely radicalised lone attackers inspired by Anwar al-Awlaki’s videos recorded a boom in popularity. Jihadi John’s beheadings of Western hostages near the Syrian city of Dabiq have brought across an important message: “one man with a knife had humiliated America (…) and placed its citizens into a state of fear. From that point on, lone attackers were no longer second-class terrorists, and everyone understood that a knife could be just as potent a weapon as a ton of explosive.” (Ibid: 130-131) Adding into the mix Abu Mohammad al-Adnani’s 2014 speech “Indeed Your Lord is Ever Watchful, where the Islamic State’s spokesman and head of security service calls for spontaneous killings of

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Westerners, the new, highly informal course of joining the jihad had been defined and no longer required approval to spread terror in the West.

3.2. Spreading of ideology

In the past, extremist jihadi ideology was spread in comparably different ways than today. Technological advantages made the information sharing not only faster and more available, but what is important, more de-materialised – it is no longer necessary to own a cassette of the latest recording of a radical sermon, when the newest ISIS magazine is readily available several clicks away. This relates to another important point of the de-materialisation of the radical texts and videos and that is the absence of need of a personal link to a radical. As Sageman illustrates, the AQ Core jihadists, such as Ayman al-Dhawahiri or Usama bin Laden, had been radicalised in their youth years; Dhawahiri’s case is particularly illustrative, as his upbringing in Nasserite Egypt was strongly marked by the growing Islamist movement. Inspired by Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones, especially young people at universities in Cairo, Alexandria and in provincial cities started mobilising themselves and espousing political Islam as an alternative for the present form of government; these local Islamic student associations controlled student newspapers and printed Islamist literature, including Salafist works whose ideas embedded themselves in the young generation (Sageman 2004: 29). Later, more radical and often proscribed works of the likes of Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj or Abdullah Azzam had started being clandestinely disseminated in the circles of like-minded individuals. However, radical literature spread in this manner was highly theological and theoretical; it included scholarly arguments for installing an Islamic government, supported by Quranic quotations and ahadith and only occasionally included anything related to military tactics – the exception here being CD recordings of jihadists fighting in the Chechen conflict (see Neumann 2009: 79). Nevertheless, dissemination was still limited by the material form of manifestos, pamphlets and recordings; only exceptionally had terrorists had their own radio station broadcasting illegally and generally they were dependent on television and large stations to – unwittingly – spread their propaganda by medialising their exploits and attacks (Hoffman 2006: 199). The change came with Al-Qaeda as it took hold of technologies of its age and started recording its activities in terror training camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan, all intended for mass consumption on the new, rising medium, the Internet. As historian and terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffmann notes, “(AQ) …in fact, is unique among all terrorist groups in this respect:

16 from the start its leadership seems to have intuitively grasped the enormous communicative potential of the internet and sought to harness this power both to further the movement’s strategic aims and to facilitate its tactical operations.” (Hoffman 2006: 214) Bin Laden’s speeches from the caves of Tora Bora had spread the message across the world and in many aspects helped incentivise Muslims around the world to join him and “defend the Ummah against the Western Crusaders.” Curiously, what is more important that the group’s direct efforts are the informal initiatives that helped spread their message. By the end of the decade, jihadist forums started gaining prominence, allowing unprecedented two-way contact with the group; on these sites, adherents had a chance to ask questions directly to the AQ leadership, engage in theological discussions with them and ask them for attack justifications (Neumann 2009: 55). Moreover, the end of decade noted another important development in a form of online sermons of Yemeni- American imam and preacher, Anwar al-Awlaki. His recordings – which are still available on YouTube – were found in possession of many individuals implicated in isolated terror plots in the sample (see chapter 2). Finally, jihadist magazines published online have at this time seen a revival in popularity; starting with the little-known Jihad Recollections, AQAP took over the untouched market of online propaganda and in 2010 released the first issue of Inspire, its famous magazine which, apart from ideological texts, propaganda articles and interviews with jihadists, provides detailed instructions and manuals on attack preparation, explosives manufacture and OPSEC guides (Tsarnaev brothers used the Inspire pressure cooker manuals to build their bombs for Boston marathon bombing (Neumann 2016: 50); also, Syed Rizwan Farooq, one of San Bernardino shooters used it to create a bomb that has been also used in the attack but eventually failed to detonate) (Joscelyn: 2015). While al-Qaeda succeeded enormously in “weaponising” the internet, the Islamic State took it to a whole new level. Following the declaration of the Caliphate in June 2014, the group started a massive propaganda campaign; it released the first issue of its highly professional magazine, Dabiq (with several translations following, such as the French Dar al-Islam, Turkish Konstaniniyye or Russian Istok [Исток]), started releasing well-edited multi-lingual videos inviting to start a new life in the Caliphate, established numerous media branches with nearly every province having its own (see groups such as al-Furqan Media, Al-Hayat Media Center, al-Battar Media, Amaq News and many others), each producing tonnes of images, videos and live streams and established a remarkable presence on Twitter, with its first official accounts having several tens of thousands of supporters each (Stern 2015: 154).

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However, where IS succeeded the most was combining the two approaches of al-Qaeda – the failing, centralised approach and the underdeveloped informal approach of al-Awlaki and other supporters – and turning it into immensely effective propaganda machinery. Whereas AQ had a dedicated branch for media and publicity (Hoffman 2006: 214), IS “outsourced” the material preparation, translation and production onto thousands of individual fighters and sympathisers abroad; these “jihobbyists”, as Jarret Brachman calls them, are tasked to use their computer skills to not just disseminate the propaganda, but to make the jihadi narrative more appealing to the Western audience, giving it a brand of “cool” or “5-star jihad”, as the group’s 2013 online campaign was infamously called (Neumann 2016: 127-128; Burke 2015: 179-181).

3.3. Structure of the movement

While global Salafi jihad as portrayed by Sageman is correctly described as a movement rather than a group, his era’s version of the movement is extremely interconnected and enclosed within itself; today’s structure is in many aspects different, with the most prominent one certainly being the rise of the so-called “lone wolves” or lone actors.

Figure 1: Sageman’s Global Salafi Network visualisation. Source: Sageman 2004: 138.

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Figure 2: Author’s visualisation of global jihadi network (2011-2016).

Author opted for not making a cluster visualisation of the present network for a reason – this way it better shows the growth of unconnected individuals and small groups, which constitute 47% of the sample. As only 4 out of 27 North American cluster members are connected to the structure and the rest is dispersed between the lone wolves and unconnected groups, putting all of them into one cluster might show its internal isolation, but does not put the phenomenon into a wider, global perspective. Australian cluster is similar – even though there is a cluster noted in the visualisation, it includes only 3 out of 9 jihadists of the quantitative part sample and the rest is composed mainly of radical relatives, foreign fighters and recruiters. Majority of Australian terrorists are simply personally unconnected to the wider jihadi network. Using cluster visualisation would be therefore misleading in showing a compartmentalised picture instead of a more valuable structural one.

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Comparing it with Sageman’s visualisation, what becomes apparent is the increase of “loose ends” – that is, individual attackers in contact with only one jihadist. Even though the recent visualisation includes also several individuals that are not only terrorists (such as personally-known foreign fighters, high-ranking ISIS members and relatives), the number of loose ends is unaffected and is still higher. These are especially apparent in the Abaaoud and Kassim networks (both known to have remotely radicalised and directed Europeans to lone wolf attacks). The rise of isolated attackers can be explained by the growing importance of technology as a communication/radicalisation tool which disposes of the requirement of being in a contact with a wider jihadi milieu. Intensive online contact fosters a sense of belonging to the cause and the availability of electronic training materials eliminates the need to attend training camps abroad. While both visualisations depict the jihadi movement spanning several continents, clusters in Sageman’s versions correspond with the dominant jihadi group in the area – Maghreb Arabs belong mainly to AQIM or former GIA, Central Staff is predominantly composed of former EIJ and later AQC members and Southeast Asians are wholly Jemaa Islamiyya members. The recent sample, however, is almost entirely composed of ISIS members and sympathisers. Although there are exceptions such as Kouachi brothers (striking on AQAP’s behalf) or Muhammad Usman (allegedly former LeT bombmaker), most of the individuals became radicalised only shortly before or right after the ISIS’s growth of popularity and identify themselves with the group’s struggle. In Sageman’s sample, jihadists are either hubs (connecting other nodes and serving as a communications transit point) or simple nodes. He validly adds that in these “small-world networks,” traditional counter-terrorism strategy of decapitation is inapplicable, as the high interconnectivity of the nodes makes them resilient to leadership loss. It is at the hubs – “vulnerable because most communications go through them” – where security services should strike to dismantle the network (Sageman 2004: 141). Nowadays, this strategy would be hardly executable. Firstly, as history has shown, hub removal does not necessarily mean attack prevention – Salah Abdeslam (who sits at the centre of “Belgian network”) exhibits traits of a hub, yet his capture did not prevent the Brussels bombing. Even worse, Abdeslam’s arrest (and his very useful refusal to speak) very likely sped up the attack preparation. Secondly, in past, the hubs were the centre for communication exchange and were sitting in the middle of the network. As they had the knowledge of other terrorists’ identities, striking at hubs could have helped uncover how vast the network was. Today, unfortunately, terrorists are less reliant on “men in the middle” – progress in technology made European attack control from Syria possible

20 and conversely made it almost impossible to strike at the hub without striking at the head of the snake. Even though eliminating Abaaoud or Rashid Kassim might have prevented attacks by the Europeans that they were in contact with, it is likely that another virtual controller would have taken their place and finished the job, if the individuals had not already decided to strike in revenge and without external control. Finally, personnel elimination does not suppress the ideology that is spreading on the internet and tackling this dimension of the problem will require more than hard security measures designed for eliminating effects instead of the underlying causes. Nevertheless, where the two networks are identical is the hierarchical structure; even though the broader movement today might be more uncontrolled, there is still some system of control managed from Syria. Importantly though, while in the AQ case this structure had had close oversight and was well-informed of individual plots, today the control is more relaxed the further from the structure’s Levantine centre one goes. Often the leadership is unaware of every single asset cultivated by its deputies; in turn, these assets are at greater liberty to choose their targets, time and tools to strike. Notwithstanding the fact that today’s global jihadi movement is dominated by a single group, it is comparably more scattered, less interconnected and thus more of a challenge. No longer does arresting one attacker reveal the entire network, as almost 50% of jihadists in the used sample have operated free of any structure. It is for this reason that the threat posed by the movement should not be ascribed solely to one terrorist group, even though ISIS is quick to claim any attack perpetrated in the West for propaganda gains. Seldom there is any concrete evidence strongly linking the group to the individual and proving more than an inspirational influence.

3.4. Methods used

One of the most important developments modern global jihad has witnessed is the change in tactics. No longer are Al-Qaeda’s spectacular attacks on New York, Madrid and London the blueprint for action; while highly desirable for propaganda reasons, they put the group into the “escalation trap,”4 complicate its future development, potentially resulting in its

4 As defined by Neumann and Smith, “mass-casualty attacks and greater brutality are necessary in order for terrorists to “get through” and achieve strategic effects but which, simultaneously, lead to a public backlash that alienates the terrorists from their constituency and enables the authorities to take harsh and repressive measures to destroy the group. There may be a ceiling, therefore, at which ever greater lethality and brutality become counterproductive and, rather than improving the terrorists’ chances of success, diminish them.” (Neumann 2009: 148) As AQ’s 9/11 attacks invited a military response on its 21 demise and are simply strategically unviable. In addition, the fear of jihadi terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction never materialised and even if it ever does, using them is strategy-wise also a bad decision. Harder access to tools for spectaculars and unhindered access to basic terrorist weapons therefore make small-scale, primitive attacks of untrained individuals the most viable option. Al-Qaeda itself recognised this necessary change and dedicated whole section titled “Open Source Jihad” of its offshoot’s magazine Inspire to manuals and texts facilitating lone wolf attacks. Nevertheless, this turn does not mean that there are no attempts at centrally- orchestrated attacks that might result in tens, even hundreds of casualties – after all, the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks show just the opposite. The issue is that these attacks are operationally highly demanding – in the Paris case it took several months to prepare the attackers in Syria, send them separately in refugee waves, coordinate their gathering to France, obtain weapons, safehouses, manufacture suicide vests and strike in coordination, risking being discovered all along the way. In comparison to this, simply recruiting an individual to strike in his home country or producing propaganda that would incentivise hundreds of people to attack is the easier, cheaper and as statistics show, also deadlier course of action. Furthermore, this change was borne out of necessity; even though the cells-based approach initially worked well (especially when trained operatives could move in and out of Europe within the refugee waves) and in tandem with lone wolves, intensification of international coalition’s military operations in the Levant, increased security efforts and tighter border controls made the possibility of staging a large attack in the West from the Levant very dim. IS’s spokesman and head of security, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani admitted as much in his May 2016 speech “That They Live By The Proof” and told his followers that if foreign governments “have shut the door of hijrah [migration] in your faces,” then they should “open the door of jihad in theirs,” meaning in the West. (Joscelyn 2016) With the option of smuggling in a trained bombmaker or Syrian veteran blocked, spontaneously striking with a machete, vehicle or a firearm where available is the second best option; this assertion is also further supported by data collected as a part of this thesis (see the quantitative research chapter), which shows that 49% of profiled individuals had no previous training or had not undertaken any preparation prior to the attack.

refuge in south-western Asia, IS’s 2015 Paris attacks resulted in intensification of France’s efforts against the group. 22

3.5. Qualitative part conclusion

Salafi jihad in the West was subjected to several changes over the past years. However, it is important to note that they had been initiated predominantly by influence of outside factors instead of internal strategic decisions. The movement itself is not innovating and reinventing itself to gain upper hand, but is more reactionary, adapting and changing itself out of necessity to be able to overcome obstacles that prevent it from operating and thriving. Additionally, even though there have been changes, such as the greater use of the internet in spreading propaganda and recruiting/self-radicalisation, it is crucial to differentiate between group-initiated changes and movement-initiated ones. Although al-Qaeda initially posed as a vanguard for a united global jihad, over time due to its adversaries’ pressure it became unable to adapt and became stuck in its old ways. It took the initiative of extra-organisational individuals (such as al-Awlaki or Samir Khan, his associate and Inspire magazine editor) to initiate changes that would secure the group’s momentum and its survival (Mendelsohn 2016: 54). Following Usama bin Laden’s death, organisation’s branching out and the rise of ISIS as AQ’s contender forced the group to adopt more decentralised approach that gave more competences to regional leaders, which in turn made it more flexible. On the other hand, ISIS has shown ability to be more capable of adapting right from its outset; outsourcing its propaganda activities on its “fans and cheerleaders” (Neumann 2016: 126-129) and giving more freedom to its external operations coordinators like Abaaoud or Kassim made it less dependent on central orders and thus more dynamic and potent. As it drew attention on itself, the group started being under greater pressure – however, the established modus operandi that was independent on the Levantine central command made it more resilient and capable of operation despite its leadership being slowly picked off, resembling more Sageman’s “leaderless jihad” movement that is based around an idea rather than a group. In conclusion, in the second decade of the millennium, jihadi movement’s activities in the West became more “mass-friendly” – its members no longer require clear affiliation to a group, terrorist activities are not exclusive to a handful of camp-trained jihadists and what its attacks lack in shock factor they make up in their quantity.

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4. Profiling a jihadist – an updated picture

This chapter analyses the changes in Sageman’s research into backgrounds of jihadi terrorists in the West. Used sample comprises 121 individuals and the collected information mirrors the information collected by Sageman to evaluate his three theses of adopting terrorism as a tactic – that is, of influence of social background, the psychological explanation and the circumstantial explanation.

4.1. Social background 4.1.1. Geographical origins The first aspect mentioned in Sageman’s work is the geographical origin of the jihadists in his sample; however, given that he focused on global Salafi movement while this work limits itself to the West, this can hardly be a comparable category. Nevertheless, geographical distribution within the West is still worth mentioning as it shows strength of presence of terrorism in respective regions, but more importantly, it allows for clustering of the individuals in the sample. Out of the 121-strong sample, 24 jihadists belong to the North American cluster (includes USA and Canada), 68 to the European one (includes states of the EU), 9 are from Australia and 19 are immigrants from the countries of Middle East, forming their own cluster. This aspect must not be understood as their place of origin, but as a regional belonging based on the strength of their interactions with the area; while an individual might have been born in Morocco or Saudi Arabia, being raised, studying or living and plotting while living in Europe will classify him into the European cluster. What distinguishes these individuals from the Immigrant cluster members is the time they have spent in the West; the latter have arrived to Europe during the past few years, they do not have a citizenship there and their previous contacts with the region have been superficial, if any at all. It is this detachment from the region that influenced the creation of their separate cluster. Unfortunately, this lack of any significant connection is also the reason why there is very little information about them – given the hardships European Union has had with properly registering the refugees during the still-present refugee crisis, it cannot be expected that there would be any verifiable and veritable information in the public domain. 4.1.2. Prison experienc e Although mentioned only briefly by Sageman, this aspect has rapidly gained attention in terrorism studies over the past years, mainly for the possibility of radicalisation and

24 recruitment in penitentiary facilities. Prisons have received monikers like “breeding grounds for radicalisation”, “hotbeds” of terrorism and even “universities of terror” (ICSR 2010: 7). And this fear is not entirely unfounded – leader of the IS, al-Baghdadi had spent some time in US-operated prison in Iraq before becoming an extremist, one of Kouachi brothers was imprisoned together with Amedy Coulibaly and many other Islamistic ideologues, such as Djamel Benghal in the infamous Fleury-Mérogis prison, and Paris attacker Abdelhamid Abaaoud served his time on several occasions as well. In Sageman’s sample, previous prison experience is represented by Egyptians who had been convicted for political reasons by the Sadat regime; with 15 convicts, they represent 58% of their respective cluster. There are only 9 more former inmates in his sample of 118 with available information, putting the number of individuals with prison experience to ca. 20% Remarkably, this number has doubled in author’s dataset with 32 out of 81 having some prison experience. And as in Sageman’s case, clusters play a role in this – out of all those previously serving time, 81% belong to the European cluster. Also, political convictions are difficult to find among these individuals, as most of them have been sentenced for petty crime and not for anti-systemic political agitation. 4.1.3. Socioeconomic background As Sageman pointed out, “the conventional wisdom is that terrorism is fuelled by poverty in an asymmetrical power situation. Terrorism is the weapon of choice of the dispossessed and powerless against the all-powerful state” (Sageman 2004: 73). His research into socioeconomic background of the jihadists in his sample challenges this assumption by discovering that almost ¾ of the individuals on whom there was any information had either a middle class (55%) or upper class background (18%). Only 27% could be classified as being of lower class background, thus refuting the preconception that poverty breeds terrorism. While this conclusion still holds true, collected data shows some move downwards. In this area, author found definite data on 63 of 121 individuals, trying to avoid Sageman’s “crude judgements” for the sake of quantity, noting the information only where there was a clear picture of the individual’s socioeconomic standing. The data shows move from upper-middle classes to middle-lower classes with 71% for the middle and 29% for the lower class. There has not been an individual whose social and economic standing would clearly rank him as an upper- class member. Interestingly, 83% of all lower-class individuals were from the European cluster, while the American and Australian clusters were both composed in over 90% of middle-class jihadists.

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4.1.4. Edu cation In the second area, Sageman challenges the education-related myths, more specifically the lack of it in terrorist cases and of ideologically influenced education the individuals had received. However, the notion that “global Salafi terrorism comes from madrassa brainwashing” was refuted by his data, which states that 83% of monitored jihadists received secular education. Only 17% were educated in madrassas. The assumption remains relevant even today. In the author’s sample, there was definite information on 77 individuals’ education, with 95% having been educated in secular schools. Only 5% attended schools with religious influence, with Najim Laachraoui, the Paris/Brussels cell’s bombmaker having attended a Catholic school in Brussels. Only clear-cut Islamic school attendee as understood by Sageman in the sample is Tashfeen Malik, one of the San Bernardino shooters who got her education in Saudi Arabia and later at an Islamic school in Pakistan, steadily growing more radicalised there. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to speak about definite change towards secular education compared to Sageman’s sample, as there was no data on the education of the terrorists that came to Europe as refugees with no previous record with European security services; their possibly Islamic education might bring the values to approximately the same level. However, where there is a notable change is the level of attained education. While in Sageman’s sample 71% of persons had some post-secondary education or higher (with 5 of them even attaining a doctoral degree), current data shows a dramatical move downwards; 24% had at best finished a secondary education, while 32% did not achieve even that. No one in the sample held a doctoral or postgraduate title and only 5% completed some level of undergraduate studies. Additionally, 39% had some post-secondary education, with many of them abandoning their studies or taking only a certificate-based course. This fall in academic achievements of jihadists does not necessarily mean that they are stupider, but almost certainly is linked with the dropping level of the age of radicalisation and of worsening life conditions, perspectives or even a lack of thereof. Simply put, jihadists of nowadays either do not yet have an opportunity to gain higher education as they are still too young, or they do not aspire towards it. 4.1.5. Devotion as youth Third preconception Sageman calls a “green-diaper baby theory” – meaning that “the mujahedin had been brainwashed into extremist religious beliefs from childhood”. Collecting available data, he shows that 8% of his sample were raised as Christians, thus excluding them from the focus. Nevertheless, the data also shows that 49% of the sample were indeed raised as very religious. While 51% were raised as secular, most of them came from the sizable Maghreb 26

Arab cluster, which – heavily influenced by the French ideals – strongly propagated secularism, making this regional specific inapplicable on the global scale. Therefore, Sageman concludes that green-diaper baby theory might be valid. Author’s research, however, portraits the current situation differently. Out of a sample of 71 individuals, 23% of them were born and raised Christians, showing almost a triple raise in comparison to Sageman’s findings. Furthermore, out of those raised as Muslims, 60% can be described as secular or moderate. 40% were brought up as religious or very devout, praying and attending mosque regularly and maintaining their devotion to adulthood, in some cases even intensifying their beliefs. Nonetheless, this level of devotion in many cases still cannot match the Islamic upbringing as seen in Sageman’s sample, i.e. being raised in Pakistan and attending a Deobandi madrassa – devotion in the West is understood in a lot milder terms. And once again, lack of information on refugees might even out the numbers, but giving this too much weight would mean disregarding the facts at home. Apart from this, cluster factor does not seem to have any influence on the youth devotion, with the both American and European clusters showing equal distribution of individuals between all three categories (secular/devout/Christian), with a slight rise in the secular area. 4.1.6. O ccup ation Long-time occupation or career path is another interesting variable where notable disparities with Sageman appear. Out of 134 individuals with occupational data in his sample, one quarter was considered unskilled, continuously involved in petty crime or unemployed. Surprisingly though, 33% were considered semi-skilled (e.g. police, military, mechanics, small business, students), while 43% were considered professionals in their area, such as doctors, preachers, architects, etc.), dispelling the notion that individuals turned to terror due to bleak prospects of their careers. Recent jihadists, however, exert different traits. Portion of the unskilled ones remains the same, with 25% out of 89 persons falling into this category. Semi-skilled bracket has swelled considerably, moving from one third to over two thirds (67%). Only 8% of the sample can be considered as professionals – with over 70% of them coming from the North American cluster. This ties in with the developments in other areas and can be described as a shift to less- educated middle class in Europe. Also, it ought to be noted that the dramatic growth of the semi-skilled category might not necessarily mean that jihadists are becoming less professional. As the “semi-skilled” category includes students as well, it might point to a different fact – many jihadists of today have turned to terrorism while still only doing their studies; as will be

27 demonstrated later, in almost every cluster (safe for the Immigrants) over 20% of its members have turned to jihad while they were still only students. In summary, jihadists have recently started becoming less professionalised and educated than in the past. Also, while previously many of them joined the jihad after successfully establishing themselves professionally, their contemporary counterparts are less patient and turn to jihad at a lot younger age. 4.1.7. Family status Family information is the final dimension of the social background thesis. Sageman cites the ill-informed stereotype which states that most of terrorists are single men without any obligations towards their families to morally weigh them down, thus easing their conscience and allowing them to sow terror. As he illustrates, however, 73% of those in his sample were married, most of them also having children. The explanation he provides is that “this high rate of marriage life is consistent with the tenets of Salafi Islam. Most of the single men…were single because of age, student status and financial inability to support a family. Those who were full-time mujahiden living with other mujahiden were encouraged to marry their comrades’ sisters and daughters. Indeed, these marriages sealed their religious and political relationships.” (Sageman 2004: 79) Understandably, this explanation makes sense in Sageman’s sample whose large portion was made up of former foreign fighters (or “full-time jihadists”, as he classifies them) that heeded Abdullah Azzam’s call for defensive jihad in Afghanistan in 1984 and had moved there to start a new life among their new kinsmen, marrying their relatives and spending the rest of their time in training camps, travelling with Bin Laden and later hiding in cave complexes; a very good example of this is Abu Turab al-Urduni, who took part in organising 9/11 attacks and later married one of daughters of the AQ deputy and later its leader, Ayman al-Dhawahiri (Berger, Kroesen 2016: 86). However, as in author’s sample there are only 2 individuals who qualify for the category of “full-time jihadist” and majority of the rest were not radicalised for more than a few years, this explanation of pious Salafi life with one’s fellow mujahiden is inapplicable; also, this explanation does not apply even to those that had travelled from Europe to the Caliphate and founded their families there, as many of them had already established their families back in Europe. Despite this invalid explanation, the data is similar to Sageman’s. While there was data on little over a half of the sample, 63% of them were married or in a relationship – a 10% shift towards “single”. Of those that were married, nearly ¾ had children – a result identical with Sageman’s. Also, only 17% of those that were married had cooperated with their partner on the 28 attack/incident – again matching Sageman’s assertion that most of terrorists’ partners were kept in dark about their other half’s terror activities (Sageman 2004: 79). Regarding the distribution over clusters, the most informative cluster – the European – shows 41% of individuals being single. On the other hand, culturally similar North American cluster shows 83% of its members being married, with ¾ having children. However, 40% of them have been divorced. In general, jihadists of the past were well-educated professionals with very good career prospects, established families and they were relatively well-off. Currently, the picture is different and varies by clusters. As the collected data shows, North American jihadists are the most mature (with median age at the time of attack of 28), are predominantly of middle-class origin, with majority having some secular post-secondary education, good career prospects (almost 25% being professionals) and an established family. Faith-wise, they were well in the middle with no category having dominance. On the other pole are the Europeans, halfway between lower- and middle-class, all of them with secular education (one case of Christian education being an exception) in which 70% of individuals made it only to a secondary level. Their career prospects are inverted to those of North Americans – while majority of both clusters is considered semi-skilled, 30% of Europeans are not on the professional end of the spectrum as their American fellow jihadists, but in the unskilled category, with many of cluster members being engaged in crime. While the used dataset demonstrates some changes in the social background of jihadists, the thesis still does not explain their turn to terrorism – although in overall they are slightly more disadvantaged, less educated and particularly in Europe less tied down by family responsibilities than their predecessors in Sageman’s dataset, the monitored sample is still very far from being a bunch of marginalised, uneducated single madmen without any prospects and raised on radical ideologies. Sageman’s conclusion that this thesis does not explain turn to terrorism hence remains a valid one.

4.2. Psychological make-up

Another proposed explanation for turning to terrorism is that terrorists are in some way psychologically unhealthy and mentally different in comparison to other people, as “normal” people would not indiscriminately attack others; this assertion gained even greater prominence in the past few decades with the rising use of suicide attacks. Precisely this inability to understand the motivation behind sacrificing oneself for political or ideological goals makes

29 many turn to the easiest explanation at hand – that terrorists are crazy, mentally ill or abnormal in any other way. Unfortunately, as Sageman – a professional psychiatrist himself – remarks, “lack of empirical data is the plague of overt psychological research on terrorism and leaves this field open to wild speculation” (Sageman 2004: 80). As this was relevant in 2004 during his research, it remains very much so today – out of 121 individuals, there was some definite information about their mental health only in 19 cases. Additionally, as the author does not have a psychiatric education anywhere near Sageman’s, it would be inappropriate to make assumptions or conclusions of individuals’ psychological profile. For this reason, information on their mental health was included only if it was explicitly stated in the used sources. Also, where some mental issue was being suspected, this information was noted as well as in a separate category to avoid distortion. 4.2.1. Mental illness In his sample, Sageman has observed the absence of any major mental disorder; one of the terrorists had probable mild mental retardation and two others had some form of psychotic disorder in early adulthood (Sageman 2004: 81). This corresponds to about 2% of the overall sample and can hardly be pinpointed as the guiding principle behind engaging in terrorism. Sageman further explores other explanations with psychological abnormalities, such as sociopathic or psychopathic background of the individual, yet neither of these shows any support for the psychological make-up thesis. He explains this near-null presence of sociopaths in his sample by their inability to work in a group. Their peculiar personalities, lack of dedication, unwillingness to coordinate with and obey the group (along with many other flaws) make them unsuitable for group-based terrorism activities. Extending this “group incompatibility” argument, it can be said that the same applies to individuals suffering from mental illnesses, as their instability might be dangerous to the group’s security and might hinder the attack preparation and execution. However, as Sageman himself admits, while antisocial people are poor group terrorists, they might become individual terrorists instead. By extending the argument on mentally ill individuals, the data appears to support this contention. Out of 10 people with a confirmed mental illness in the author’s dataset, 7 were involved in lone actor attacks, putting 70% of the mentally ill individuals into the individual terrorist category. Curiously enough, if we add to the confirmed cases all those where some form of mental illness was suspected, the number of individual attackers rises to 78% (with 11 out of 13 in the “suspected mental illness” bracket being involved in lone wolf attacks). Almost 80% of the cases where some form of mental illness was suspected or present were lone attackers. 30

Whether this points to a higher probability of psychologically unstable people to suddenly attack alone is hard to tell, as there might be other factors at play; after all, all but one of the 9 individuals with existing evidence of no previous psychological problems were lone attackers, too. Nevertheless, what it almost certainly demonstrates is the unwillingness of terrorist groups to recruit mentally unstable individuals. Out of those 5 with an actual or suspected mental illness and involved in group attacks, not one of them was invited to join an established group – Omar Kutobi was arrested with his flatmate when filming their bay’ah, Michael Adebowale took part in the Lee Rigby murder with his friend, Michael Adebolajo, Adel Kermiche was remotely put into contact with another young radical, Abdel Malik Petitjean, by ISIS’s virtual coordinator, Abdul Kareem was allegedly the head of the trio that attacked the Garland Convention Center in 2015 and Amedy Coulibaly is listed as having contacts with the Kouachi brothers and as possibly having coordinated the January 2015 attacks in Paris with them, but he struck alone. Comparing the datasets, there is one notable difference, and that is the quadruple increase in the occurrence of mental problems in the sample. While Sageman found only 2% of the sample with some mental issues, current data shows over 8% with confirmed and over 10% with suspected mental issues. 4.2.2. History of crime Criminal history has been mentioned by Sageman only briefly, but given the attention the possible “crime-terror nexus” receives these days in academia,5 it merits greater attention here. In connection to the previously refuted explanations through anti-social psychology of the individuals, he speculates whether terrorists are not simply criminals and whether their previous experience of illegality influences their turn to terrorism. His conclusion is that “terrorists are not just criminals in the usual sense; they break the law in the path of God and not for personal benefit” (Sageman 2004: 82), supporting the claim with data that shows about 25% of the sample having previously engaged in criminality, with all of them being Maghreb Arabs in Europe or North America. Furthermore, Sageman states that some of these people had had a criminal past and they understood the turn to jihad as a form of “purgatory”. After joining jihad, however, these individuals allegedly returned to the petty criminality, this time to support of their religious cause and to raise the funds for the terrorism.

5 For an example par excellence, see ICSR’s “Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures” research project. Furthermore, even though not a recent work, Tamara Makarenko’s “The Crime – Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism” is also highly insightful. 31

Recent data paints a different picture. Sageman’s “about ¼ involved in petty criminal activities” has risen dramatically into 66% of the sample with available data (76 persons or 63%). Also, his claim that these former criminals later return to crime in order to support jihad is also refuted, as there was only one case of the individual remaining an active criminal after joining the jihad. Cluster effect appears to be at play here as well: out of all cases of involvement in crime, 72% belonged to the European cluster. This in a way corresponds with the previously mentioned findings of 83% of lower- class, 73% of unskilled and 70% of secondary-level-or-lower educated individuals originating in this area. Coupling these factors, a grim picture appears: European jihadists are a disenfranchised lot with very weak career prospects that might potentially turn to criminality to provide for themselves. At this point it has be mentioned that this very basic profile must not be interpreted as a mould for every future jihadist; after all, not every Western European criminal with poor background ends up committing suicide attack in the name of God. This is simply to show a trend which in individual cases develops very distinctively. In this context, one final point ought to be mentioned: greater criminal activity logically means greater likelihood of individuals ending up in prison and as mentioned previously, prisons might have a negative effect in a sense of turning one to more radical understanding of his faith. 4.2.3. Terrorist personality Last psychological explanation scrutinised by Sageman is that terrorists have a “terrorist personality.” As he explains, “while acknowledging the lack of major psychopathology in terrorists and substantially acknowledging their normality, these sophisticated versions claim that terrorists suffer from some form of personality pathology due to childhood trauma. That is, psychological forces compel them to commit acts of violence.” (Sageman 2004: 83; emphasis in original). There are three main forms of this explanation, focusing either on pathological narcissism, paranoia or authoritative personality of their parents formed during their upbringing. It is important to note that this aspect was the most difficult to get data on, as it required deep knowledge of the individual’s background and very often, this information was not available (an exception are the perpetrators of large or well-medialised attacks, in which cases the information was often readily available in interviews with their family and childhood friends). While these defects have their origins in childhood traumas, in author’s sample there was very little evidence of tumultuous childhood – in only 10% of the sample there was definite information of having experienced some form of childhood trauma, such as parent’s death or leaving, divorce, physical abuse, humiliation, living in a foster care and so on. None of these 32 individuals exhibited signs of a narcistic, grandiose behaviour as described by Sageman that would support the first form of explanation. Man Haron Monis, the Sidney Lindt Café attacker comes probably the closest to this assessment, but his psychological profile corresponds more with the second form of explanation, and that is the paranoia. Overt signs of paranoid behaviour, pervasive concerns over one’s security, at times bordering on delusion were present in 5 cases. As Sageman notes, some degree of carefulness is quite expectable among terrorists and other individuals planning on engaging in highly illegal violent activities; however, in no case where information on paranoid behaviour was present was this the case, as not one of them has been involved with any terrorist cell or in any attack planning, suggesting that the individuals simply suffered from some sort of paranoid personality disorder. Nonetheless, 5 cases out of 121 (ca. 4%) hardly form an explanative sample for why individuals join the jihad. The third, final form of the “terrorist personality” explanation tries to pinpoint the terrorists’ servility and aggression towards outsiders to their upbringing under an authoritative personality of their parents. And as those preceding it, neither this explanation is convicting, with the data showing evidence of hard, authoritative growing up in only 4 cases. In conclusion, none of the psychological explanations have proved to be valid, even though some changes compared to Sageman’s data are apparent. There has been rise in the likelihood of having some mild form of mental disease among the terrorists and a rapid increase in the number of those previously engaged in crime. The latter is especially instructive as, in most cases, this factor has had more to do with a circumstantial pressure to turn to illegality than with a long-time, childhood-trauma-induced personality make-up, which brings us to the last of Sageman’s explanations.

4.3. Circumstantial reasons for joining the jihad

As Sageman notes, joining the jihad is often misinterpreted as a single decision that directs the individual’s later actions. This assumption he claims to be false, because turning to terrorism as a tactic is not a single point in time but a gradual process influenced by the circumstances one finds himself in. 4.3.1. Age In this regard, Sageman criticised what is known as the “immaturity thesis” – reacting to other analysts, he demonstrates that terrorists in his sample were not inexperienced, easily manipulated young men, but that “most people joined the jihad well past adolescence when they were responsible young men in their mid-twenties and should have been able to resist any

33 mysterious brainwashing.” (Sageman 2004: 92) In his dataset, average age of joining jihad (AOJJ) was 25.69 years. In his clusters, the lowest AOJJ found was in Core Arabs cluster, with the number standing at 23.75 years; alternatively, the oldest one was the Central Staff cluster with 27.9 years. The landscape shifts considerably with the recent data. Average AOJJ is 23.5 years – lower than Sageman’s lowest cluster AOJJ. Median age is even lower, at 23.0 years. In respective clusters, the change is also apparent, with the North American cluster being the oldest one (24.9 years at the AOJJ) and the Australian being the youngest one – while the average AOJJ here stands at 22.3 years, one must take into consideration the 50-year-old Man Haron Monis and adjust accordingly; median AOJJ in this cluster therefore stands even lower, at 18.0 years. This age distribution corresponds with the previously mentioned factors – American jihadists are generally more “rooted” in their lives, with many having good careers, education, even established families. Australian cluster, on the other hand, included many youngsters, with two thirds being less than twenty at the time of joining jihad. Currently, it appears that Sageman’s “immaturity thesis” of easy influencing is partially right – while in some clusters the age is higher and in conflict with it, in others the AOJJ is remarkably low, making the thesis applicable. After all, 15-year-old Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar has had reportedly attended a Hizb ut-Tahrir6 lecture less than an hour before he went on and murdered a finance worker Curtis Cheng outside police headquarters in a Sidney suburb (Mitchell 2015). 4.3.2. Pl ace of recruitment/radicalisation Another factor of influence in turning to violent Islamism is the place of person’s residence at the time when he/she started incorporating radical Islamist values. Sageman shows in his dataset that (out of 165), “115 (70 percent) joined the jihad in a country where they had not grown up. They were expatriates – students, workers, refugees, fighters (in the jihad against the Soviets) – away from home and family. Another 14 were second generation in France, Britain, and the United States, where they might have felt a strong pull for the country of their parents and not been completely embedded in the host society.” (Sageman 2004: 92) There has been data available on 93% of the sample, but due to its West-oriented nature, the growth of the “2nd generation” category is naturally being expected; however, its 67%

6 Hizb ut-Tahrir (HUT) is “an international organisation founded in 1950s and dedicated to the restoration of the caliphate through peaceful activism.” (Burke 2015: 163) For its alleged links to the 7/7 bombing in London, proscribing the group has been one of the points of Tony Blair’s 12-point plan for tackling terrorism after the 2005 London attacks (see Hewitt 2008: 53). 34 dominance – or, more specifically, the 14% modesty of “no connection to the country” category – clearly shows that the threat of jihadi terrorism is not external, but internal. Nevertheless, Sageman’s assertion that most of the jihadists were “cut off their cultural and social origins, far from their families and friends” is hardly applicable in the author’s sample. While conducting the research, emphasis was put on the location where individuals had undergone the socialisation process. Indeed, most of those 67% were raised and schooled in the West with all members of their family being around and their friends being Westerners like they were. One hardly can speak about “uprooting” out of one’s society and the sense of disenchantment as was the case of the Islamist ideologue Sayyed Qutb and his bitter experience of his 3-year visit of the United States in late 1940’s. (Burke 2003: 50) After all, the Abdeslam brothers were prior to the Paris attacks in no way unlike other young people in the West: they liked to drink, smoke marihuana, play Playstation at their bar in Brussels and hung around with girls. (RTBF: 2015) Whether this was just a very well-executed taqiyyah7 is hard to say, but the situation was similar with many others in the sample. The problem here is not so much the uprooting from one’s society and culture, but a far more complicated question of a personal identity. As Peter Neumann put it while speaking about European foreign fighters in the Levant, “what unites them is not some demographic or socio-economic marker, but their lack of identification with the Western societies they (or most of them) were born and grew up in.” (Neumann 2016: 90) Inability to merge their ancestral identity with their present, modern identity of a Westerner, the fundamental question of “what it means to be a Muslim in the West” is what lies at the core of radicalisation. Looking at separate clusters, the North American looks the most diverse of them, with 55% being 2nd generation immigrants, 36% having joined the jihad in a country of their parents’ origin (this was in most cases also the location of their attack; in this cluster, all but one of this category were Americans born and raised as Christians who later converted to Islam) and only 9% being immigrants. Europe and Australia, however, look more homogenous. In both clusters, majority of the jihadists (92% and 88%, respectively) belongs to the “2nd generation immigrant” category, implying that all of them joined the jihad in a country with which they and their family had culturally very little in common. This supports the Neumann’s “identity crisis” explanation above. Final cluster of Immigrants was predominantly composed of either individuals joining

7 According to The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, taqiyyah is a Shi’i concept of “precautionary denial of religious belief in the face of potential persecution.” (Esposito, ed.: 2014) The concept is nowadays often mentioned in connection to potential jihadists pretending not being pious Muslims in order to avoid attention of security services. 35 the jihad in a country to which they held no connection (immigrants in Europe) or in a country of their parents’ upbringing – those belonging to the latter category having been radicalised in their country of origin, mostly Syria. 4.3.3. Faith level Sageman’s research has found that “there was a definite shift in degree of devotion to Islam in adulthood by the mujahiden, preceding their recruitment into the jihad.” (Sageman 2004: 93) His explanation connects to the previously touched-upon subject of identity crisis: Muslims in the West often find themselves in an unknown environment with diametrically different and shifting values and norms of behaviour, where Islam represents the only constant. Loneliness and need for companionship makes these individuals turn to mosque, which provides them with a community of people with similar social background. This need for a sense of belonging is what makes them more observant and devout. In his sample, the shift was dramatic: 99% exhibited signs of increased devotion prior to joining the jihad, such as donning the traditional robe, strictly observing Ramadan, praying regularly 5 times a day and frequently attending the mosque. This category was, naturally, compared against the previous known level of devotion in childhood. In the author’s sample, the numbers are very similar, although not as monolithic. Out of 70 individuals on whom there has been any direct information of increased observance, 65% were indeed more religious shortly prior to their radicalisation. Curiously enough, out of the 10 individuals in the “no increase category” (14%), 6 have already been very religious since their youth, further increasing the first number. And finally, the remaining 21% were recent converts to Islam. To connect to the previous factor, out of those 45 individuals who became more religious, 34 (76%) belonged to the “2nd generation immigrant” category; this supports both Neumann’s and Sageman’s explanations. Lonely people with problems of belonging and who question their identity might turn to religiosity, as it offers them one valid identity reference point to which they can cling to. Group dynamics within this new accepting community – coupled with a redefined identity and one’s broader identification with the Muslim Ummah – then make it easier to adopt a radical, violent and fundamentally anti-Western interpretation of the ideology. 4.3.4. E mpl oymen t Employment at the time of joining the jihad is the last factor that has been researched. As Sageman puts it, “although most of the mujahiden had strong occupation skills (see above),

36 few were employed full-time” (Sageman 2004: 94) Many in his sample were those who stayed in Afghanistan after the war against the Soviets to wage global jihad (falling into the “full-time jihadist” category). Others had been students, unemployed criminals or held part-time jobs at the time when they became jihadists. Very few of them held full-time jobs. Author’s research mirrors these results, although with several changes and additions. Out of the 83 individuals with existing data, 25% were unemployed, 29% were students and only 20% held full-time jobs. The major change is that only 2 jihadists (little under 2%) can be described as “full-time jihadists”, having experience of fighting in other conflicts and/or being jihadists for notable period of time. Moreover, author’s addition is a new category that lists those individuals that found themselves in prison at the time of their radicalisation/joining the jihad. These represent 17% of the sample. This shift must be understood in its historic context. Sageman’s research has focused on the roots of the rising phenomenon of global Salafi jihad. It was the War in Afghanistan that laid the fundaments for its development at thus it cannot come as a surprise that many in his sample had joined the global jihad after the conflict as an already established characters of the movement. Conversely, the security environment has changed drastically since then and there are few people that can “join the jihad” as full-time jihadists already – however, demise of the IS in the forthcoming years might open this possibility once again and future members of this category will include deserters and veterans of the conflict in the Levant. New development here is the prison radicalisation – while in Sageman’s dataset those imprisoned were predominantly Egyptians who were jailed precisely on the grounds of unacceptably zealous Islamism, nowadays the situation is different – many are imprisoned for regular criminality and convert/grow radical while in prison. 4.3.5. Relative deprivation Although this factor has been present in Sageman’s research, author did not work on it for several reasons: Sageman himself has dismissed the relative deprivation theory as inapplicable to jihadi terrorism, he did not back it with empirical data and it essentially amounts to omitting of the root of the problem by jumping to its secondary effect; nevertheless, it merits some attention. Its integral thesis that the sample individuals felt isolated in an unknown territory, underemployed and spiritually empty is invalid here, as most of the sample had been living in the West for most of their lives. However, the notion of a personal feeling of grudge, discontent or confusion hints at the above-mentioned identity problem – even though they were Westerners per se, these people did not identify with its community, often feeling more pull towards the global Muslim Ummah and infuriated by what they perceived as Western injustices 37 against the Muslims everywhere. But they did not become radicals because they were poor or deprived – their inability to identify with the society they lived in resulted in low socio- economic situation, which only compounded their sense of exclusion, thus pushing them toward other, often radical identity.

4.4. Personal findings

During the research, author has focused on 5 more factors that are crucial for describing modern jihadism. Mapping jihadists’ recent travel history, form of radicalisation, training/attack preparation, links to jihadists and authorities’ knowledge of the individual’s radical beliefs, author tries to improve the profile of a contemporary jihadist in the West. Additionally, it ought to be mentioned that in this area there are occasions where the numbers add up to over 100% - that is because in the respective factor, several categories apply to one individuals at a time, e.g. an individual was radicalised both by personal contact and by internet or one has had a hands-on training in using firearms, but used online schematics for building an IED used in the attack (as was the case of Syed Rizwan Farooq, the San Bernardino attacker). 4.4.1. H ijrah Originating in Quranic Arabic and standing for Muhammad’s escape to Medina, this term is used in modern jihadist literature to denote the flight to dar al-Islam (a land of Islam; here meaning the predominantly Islamic countries). During the research, three modes were primarily monitored – violent hijrah (essentially being a foreign fighter abroad under the banner of jihad), peaceful hijrah (attending a school in any Islamic country, travelling there for visiting family, studying Arabic, etc.) and an attempt to commit either of them. Finding information on 100 out of 121 total in the sample, 29% did not travel to any of the monitored countries. Seeing how two thirds of the sample were 2nd generation immigrants, it is surprising to see that only 6% of them had travelled for peaceful purposes, such as visiting their ancestral country or their family there. However, 32% have travelled abroad to fight and 15% more tried to travel there, but for various reasons were prevented by the authorities from doing so. None of Australian cluster members travelled abroad; on the other hand, nearly half of all Europeans have committed the hijrah for violent reasons, with further 17% having attempted to do so. No other cluster comes this close to violent hijrah, for obvious reasons – for North Americans (with 17%) and Australians it is too far and too expensive a journey. However, this

38 does not mean that there are no foreign fighters from these countries, but simply that those in the sample that had been involved in terrorist activities in the West did not elect to do so if they were not from Europe and chose instead to attack in their home countries. Finally, nineteen percent were found inapplicable for the category, most of them being immigrants from dar al- Islam, travelling to the West. 4.4.2. Form of radicalisation Out of 71 individuals with information on the way they have been radicalised, nearly 50% have become more radical over the internet – either by being in contact with a jihadist online, having consumed jihadist literature and videos (such as YouTube sermons of Anwar al- Awlaki) or by taking part in online jihadist forums – due to lower frequency of spending time in prison, geographical remoteness and absence of radical imams in these clusters, this was the predominant way of radicalisation in the North American and the Australian clusters (with 79% and 57%, respectively). Out of total, 34% percent became radicalised via personal contact, that is by attending a radical mosque or being under sway of a personally-known radical. Interestingly, 24% have been radicalised while serving their time in prison; quite shockingly though, European cluster makes up 88% of this amount. Apart from that, European cluster is rather evened out – 39% were radicalised via personal contact, 29% via internet and 29% of the cluster while in prison. 4.4.3. Known to authorities Analysing information on 102 people of the sample, 27% were completely unknown to the police of security services and their attacks were therefore hard to stop in advance. More worrying, though, is the fact that 64% of them were in fact on their radars for their radical tendencies; this number was the highest in Europe, with authorities being aware of radicalism of 72% of jihadists there. The remaining 9% were known to the authorities, but not for their radicalism, making stopping them more likely, but still very hard; there are thousands of people known for their criminality, but not everyone becomes a jihadist. 4.4.4. Training/attack preparation Working with data on 95 individuals, it has been found that 44% made some preparations prior to the incident or had a hands-on training, such as having been instructed in bomb crafting or having taken part in a conflict and gaining combat experience there. As expected, 63% of those of the Immigrant cluster were in this category. Only in 7 out of all the cases was the individual trained via internet, either by using readily-available jihadist training

39 manuals included in magazines such as AQAP’s Inspire or by being tutored remotely by a jihadist, putting the threat posed by these documents into question. More worrying is the fact that 49% did not make any prior preparations or were not trained; these included spontaneous stabbings, beheadings, shooting, vehicle ramming and other rudimentary forms of attack. Absence of proper preparation for the attack did not dissuade these individuals from seeing it through nonetheless. With the increased security measures being adopted in the West, it is highly likely that this is the form the future attacks will take. 4.4.5. Links to jihadists Information on links to jihadists was present in 100 individuals of the sample; 25% had no known links; curiously, out of those 25 individuals, 5 had a confirmed mental illness and 6 are suspected of having one, making 44% of those with no links very likely to be simply mentally ill. Anyhow, 30% of the sample had been in contact with a jihadist abroad, while nearly 50% had contacts to radicals, either a Salafi group operating in the West or straight-out contacts to the IS, AQ or other major group; several individuals were even formal members of the organisation, holding high positions in its hierarchy. Furthermore, 68% of the Immigrants cluster had links to a jihadist group. In Australia, the most predominant were remote contacts to a jihadist (57%). Surprisingly, in 68% of the North American cluster there has been found no connection whatsoever and they were self-radicalised, making their discovery harder than in other clusters. Only one fifth of the European cluster had no connection to jihadists whatsoever; the remaining 80% were distributed between the links to a group and remote contact with an individual abroad (48% and 32%, respectively).

4.5. Profiling conclusion

In summary, one can clearly see the changes over time in comparison to Sageman’s dataset and identify the differences among the clusters. While many of his assumptions remain relevant, Sageman’s profile of jihadists as socio-economically satisfied, well-educated and professionally established persons with families is no longer applicable, with varying degrees of this departure in various clusters. Generally, the socio-economic background has moved from upper-middle to middle- lower class, career prospects of jihadists in the sample are not very promising and they attain lower levels of education than their predecessors, with many joining the jihad while studying. Moreover, the number of those previously serving time has doubled and the number of converts

40 has tripled. What remains constant is the secular nature of their education and their familiar status, although there is a slight move in favour of the “single” category. Regarding the psychological thesis, it still fails to provide a comprehensive explanation for joining the jihad. While the number of those with a confirmed mental illness has quadrupled and another 10% are being suspected of having some mental illness, this 18% segment is hardly explanative of the whole sample. Significant change has been noted only in the crime-terror nexus, with the percentage of those previously engaged in criminality jumping from 25% to 66% - however, past criminality cannot be seen as a precondition for joining the jihad, but simply as one of the factors that might play a role in the process of radicalisation. Finally, neither the childhood traumas provide a satisfactory explanation for radicalisation. The two previous theses were seeking what in essence was to be a rigid “one size fits all” form for radicalisation – and both are inadequate. The third, circumstantial thesis avoids this unifying principle and opts for a more fluid explanation. To sum it up, the average age of joining jihad is lower by more than 2 years compared to Sageman’s sample, with this divide further deepening in some clusters. Modern jihadists are no longer frustrated expatriates but unsatisfied and marginalised homegrown radicals without a sense of being Westerners. While there are changes in comparison to Sageman’s sample, the thesis – coupled with findings in the previous areas – is more satisfactory than the others. It is not the background nor a mental state that directs one’s slow descent to radicalism, but it is an interplay of all those factors strongly influenced by a lacking self-identification with the Western civilisation. What’s new compared to the past is the widespread prison radicalisation, with nearly 20% having turned radical there. Jihadists of today are also seeking to find a new life – or simply different to their life in the West – in their idealised lands of Islam, with 55% of the sample travelling or attempting to travel to Islamic countries in the past. However, very worrying is the fact that almost one third did so for violent purposes. While many of the findings are old in nature, modern jihadists are very new in some key aspects – they took good hold of technology, with almost half of them turning more radical thanks to the internet. Also – and what is more worrying for Westerns security services – these individuals (64% of them) were known for their radicalism, nearly a half of them had no previous training and only 25% had no contacts to radicals at all. This paints a grim picture of present (and possibly future) jihadists in the West as being more spontaneous, less prepared, but all very firm in their beliefs and well-connected to the wider jihadist milieu.

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5. Conclusion

This thesis demonstrated substantial changes in the phenomenon of global Salafi jihadi movement and their influence on its activities in the West. As has been shown, the movement has witnessed several changes that distinguish it from its previous version embodied by Al- Qaeda shortly after the attacks of 9/11. Probably the greatest factor influencing several of those changes was proliferation of technologies and the movement’s extensive and intelligent use of them. Technology made the recruitment and propaganda spreading easier than ever before, but it had to be accompanied by relevant changes within central groups of the movement. However, these internal changes were seldom influenced by internal pressure to innovate – just the opposite, as many of these changes were simply out of necessity, since the pressure brought to bear on groups and on movement itself forced them to change their ways if they wanted to exist and operate. Also, intra- movement rivalries and outbidding both started and sustained this race for adaptation and greater relevance. This made the movement far more decentralised than its previous versions ever were, de-formalised the relations among its members and changed the preferred modus operandi of its terrorist attacks, forgoing previously highly-desirable grandiose plots for considerably smaller and more primitive, but far more numerous and therefore potentially equally devastating attacks of small groups or individuals radicalised remotely via internet and having little to no previous experience with attack preparation. Curiously enough, although far more open and accessible to anyone, contemporary jihad in the West is centred around one group, while in the past there was definite distribution of members among various local groups. As shown by the quantitative research, profile of a jihadist in the West has also changed considerably. No longer are the men terrorising the West well-educated, mature, prospective individuals from wealthy families. Even though this change manifested itself in every cluster, its intensity varied. Their age of joining the jihad has dropped by two years, with some clusters seeing even more dramatic decrease. As a result of this – but not exclusively because of it – jihadists of today are less educated (or still studying) and worse off in their professional prospects, with many of them having a prison record (with almost ¼ of them becoming radical while serving time). They are far from being religiously enlightened, pious Muslims, as almost half of them became religious only recently and nearly one quarter converted to Islam from Christianity. And even though there was some marginal increase in potential mental illness, they are still not a bunch of psychopathic thugs.

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Who or what they are is also clear – they are socio-economically disadvantaged children of first or second generation immigrants, but almost no one can be labelled straight-out as poor. They have families, but more of them than in Sageman’s sample are single – very likely result of their lower age and inability to provide for a family. What is more worrying, though, is the fact that they are growingly more criminal and almost one third of them travelled abroad to fight and kill in the name of their ideology. Significant is also knowledge that generally, these individuals had been known to authorities prior to their attacks taking form – which, in 49% of the cases, had little to none preparation. Majority of them was in some contact with radicals and, as remarked in the qualitative chapter, almost a half of them all had been radicalised via the new medium, the internet. The face of jihadi terrorism in the West has changed. This changed nature of the still- present threat will demand new approaches and methodology in fighting it. No longer are heavy-handed approaches applicable – if they ever were. As we could see, these resulted in immigrant waves that facilitated transport for many skilled radicals, exacerbating the situation further. And importantly, simply abandoning this approach must be accompanied by acknowledging the demand for a more comprehensive, soft-security and possibly multidisciplinary approach to minimise the threat of terrorism. Western governments and their respective security services must therefore recognise these changes and step up their game – when facing an incredibly adaptive and rapidly changing adversary, sticking to one’s outdated approaches designed to tackle different threat is a recipe for failure.

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6. Appendix 1 – Visualisations, images, diagrams, tables

Image 1: Sageman’s Global Salafi Network visualisation. Source: Sageman 2004: 138. (see p. 18.)

Image 2: Author’s visualisation of global jihadi network (2011-2016). (see p. 19.)

Tables 1-4: Comparison of Sageman’s and author’s quantitative profiling research + personal findings8 Tables 5-8: Cluster composition in author’s profiling research Tables 9-12: Percentage of cluster cases per category

COMPARISON WITH SAGEMAN

TABLE 1. SOCIAL BACKGROUND Sageman Author SG % Author % Imprisoned prior to joining Jihad/time in Available data: 81 No - 49 - 60% Yes 24 32 ca. 20% 40% SocEcon Background Available data: 63 Lower-class 28 18 27% 29% Middle-class 56 45 55% 71% Upper-class 18 0 18% 0% Education: Character Available data: 77 Secular school 114 73 83% 95% Religious school 23 4 17% 5% Education: Level attained Available data: 82 Less than secondary 22 26 17% 32% Secondary 16 20 12% 24% Some post-secondary/uni/college 38 32 29% 39% Undergraduate (BA, BS, etc) 44 4 33% 5% Postgraduate (MA, MSc, etc) 7 0 5% 0% Doctoral 5 0 4% 0% Faith as youth/previous known devotion Available data: 71 Secular 55 33 47% 46% Religious 53 22 45% 31% Christian 9 16 8% 23% Occupation (long-time) Available data: 89 Unskilled 33 22 25% 25% Semi-skilled 44 60 33% 67% Professional 57 7 43% 8% Family status Available data: 61 Single 31 21 27% 38% Married/in a relationship 83 10 73% 18% Married with children "most" 25 - 45% Partner cooperation - 6 - 17%* Separated/divorced - 8 - 23% * Value in relation to the two “married” categories above.

8 Figures in Table 2 – Terrorist Personality and Table 3 – Employment not included as in the text there was no specific number given or incomplete information was mentioned by Sageman; see relevant chapters (4.2.3 and 4.3.4.) for more information. 44

TABLE 2. PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE-UP Sageman Author SG % Author % Mental Illness ** Available data: 32 Yes 3 10 2% 31% (8,3) No 169 9 98% 28% Suspected - 13 - 41% (10,3) History of crime Available data: 76 Yes ca. 43 50 ca. 25% 66% No ca. 129 26 ca. 75% 34% Terrorist Personality Available data: 24 Pathological narcissism 15 10% Paranoia 5 4% Authoritative personality 4 3% ** Number in brackets is the proportion to the whole sample. TABLE 3. AD HOC CIRCUMSTANCES OF JOINING THE JIHAD Sageman Author SG % Author % Age of "joining jihad" 25,69 23,54 - - Place of recuitment/radicalisation Available data: 112 Country of their parents' growing up 36 21 22% 19% 2nd generation of immigrants in the West 14 75 8% 67% No connection to the country/immigrant 115 16 70% 14% Faith level Available data: 72 Not more religious 1 10 1% 14% More religious/rapid increase 154 47 99% 65% Recent converts to Islam N/A 15 N/A 21% Employment Available data: 83 Unemployed 21 25% Student 24 29% Part-time job 5 6% Full-time job 17 20% Full-time jihad 2 2% In prison 14 17% TABLE 4. PERSONAL FINDINGS Sageman Author SG % Author % Hijra Available data: 100 No - 29 - 29% Hostile/jihadi character - 32 - 32% Peaceful/educational character - 8 - 8% Attempted - 15 - 15% Inapplicable - 19 - 19% Radicalised Available data: 71 Personal contact - 27 - 34% Internet - 34 - 48% Prison - 17 - 24% Inapplicable - 4 - 6% Known to authorities Available data: 102 No - 28 - 27% Yes - 25 - 64% Not for radicalism - 9 - 9% Training/attack preparation Available data: 94 None - 46 - 49% Yes; part in a conflict/hands-on training - 41 - 44% Yes; learned via Internet - 7 - 7% Links to jihadists Available data: 99 None - 25 - 25% Remote contact with a jihadist - 30 - 30% Links to a jihadi group - 49 - 49%

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CLUSTERS DATA - CLUSTER COMPOSITION

TABLE 5. SOCIAL BACKGROUND North N.Am. % Europe Europe % Australia Australia % Immigrant Immigrant % America Imprisoned prior to joining Available 81 Jihad/time in prison? data: No 15 79% 24 48% 8 100% 2 50% Yes 4 21% 26 52% 0 0% 2 50% Available SocEcon Background 63 data: Lower-class 2 10% 15 42% 0 0% 1 50% Middle-class 18 90% 21 58% 5 100% 1 50% Upper-class 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% Available Education: Character 77 data: Secular school 21 95% 44 94% 7 100% 1 100% Religious school 1 5% 3 6% 0 0% 0 0% Available Education: Level attained 82 data: Less than secondary 0 0% 17 37% 4 50% 5 83% Secondary 4 18% 15 33% 1 13% 0 0% Some post-secondary/uni/college 16 73% 13 28% 2 25% 1 17% Undergraduate (BA, BS, etc) 2 9% 1 2% 1 13% 0 0% Postgraduate (MA, MSc, etc) 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% Doctoral 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% Faith as youth/previous known Available 71 devotion data: Secular 7 35% 22 51% 1 25% 3 75% Religious 6 30% 12 28% 3 75% 1 25% Christian 7 35% 9 21% 0 0% 0 0% Available Occupation (long-time) 89 data: Unskilled 3 14% 16 29% 1 14% 2 40% Semi-skilled 14 64% 38 69% 5 71% 3 60% Professional 5 23% 1 2% 1 14% 0 0% Available Family status 61 data: Single 2 17% 15 41% 2 50% 2 67% Married/in a relationship 2 17% 6 16% 2 50% 0 0% Married with children 8 67% 16 43% 0 0% 1 33% Partner cooperation 3 30% 3 14% 0 0% 0 0% Separated/divorced 4 40% 3 14% 1 50% 0 0% TABLE 6. PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE-UP North N.Am. % Europe Europe % Australia Australia % Immigrant Immigrant % America Available Mental Illness 32 data: Yes 0 0% 3 23% 3 75% 1 25% No 5 45% 6 46% 1 25% 0 0% Suspected 6 55% 4 31% 0 0% 3 75% Available History of crime 76 data: Yes 8 42% 34 72% 2 33% 3 75% No 11 58% 13 28% 4 67% 1 25% Available 24 Terrorist Personality data: Pathological narcissism 2 9 1 0 Paranoia 2 1 1 1 Authoritative personality 2 3 0 0

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TABLE 7. AD HOC CIRCUMSTANCES OF JOINING THE JIHAD North N.Am. % Europe Europe % Australia Australia % Immigrant Immigrant % America Average age 27,2 25,4 22,8 25,6 Age of "joining jihad" 24,9 23,0 22,3 24,2 Available Place of recuitment/radicalisation 112 data: Country of their parents' growing 8 36% 5 8% 0 0% 8 47% 2nd generation of immigrants in 12 55% 55 92% 7 88% 1 6% the West No connection to the 2 9% 0 0% 1 13% 8 47% country/immigrant Available Faith level 70 data: Not more religious 5 28% 3 7% 2 33% 1 25% More religious/rapid increase 6 33% 33 77% 4 67% 3 75% Recent converts to Islam 7 39% 7 16% 0 0% 0 0% Available Employment 83 data: Unemployed 6 30% 12 24% 2 29% 1 1% Student 4 20% 14 27% 5 71% 1 1% Part-time job 1 5% 4 8% 0 0% 0 0% Full-time job 8 40% 9 18% 0 0% 0 0% Full-time jihad 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 2% In prison 1 5% 12 24% 0 0% 88 96% TABLE 8. PERSONAL FINDINGS North N.Am. % Europe Europe % Australia Australia % Immigrant Immigrant % America Available Hijra 100 data: No 5 28% 13 22% 7 88% 1 6% Hostile/jihadi character 3 17% 29 49% 0 0% 0 0% Peaceful/educational character 6 33% 5 8% 0 0% 0 0% Attempted 3 17% 10 17% 1 13% 1 6% Inapplicable 1 6% 2 3% 0 0% 16 89% Available Radicalised 71 data: Personal contact 3 16% 19 39% 2 29% 1 25% Internet 15 79% 14 29% 4 57% 1 25% Prison 1 5% 14 29% 0 0% 1 25% Inapplicable 0 0% 2 4% 1 14% 1 25% Available Known to authorities 102 data: No 7 37% 9 15% 4 44% 8 62% Yes 11 58% 44 72% 5 56% 5 38% Not for radicalism 1 5% 8 13% 0 0% 0 0% Available Training/attack preparation 94 data: None 9 43% 26 51% 6 86% 5 31% Yes; part in a conflict/hands-on 8 38% 23 45% 0 0% 10 63% training Yes; learned via Internet 4 19% 2 4% 1 14% 1 6% Available Links to jihadists 99 data: None 13 68% 12 20% 2 29% 2 11% Remote contact with a jihadist 3 16% 19 32% 4 57% 4 21% Links to a jihadi group 3 16% 28 47% 1 14% 13 68%

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CLUSTERS DATA - % OF CLUSTER PER CATEGORY

TABLE 9. SOCIAL BACKGROUND North N.Am. % Europe Europe % Australia Australia % Immigrant Immigrant % America Imprisoned prior to joining Available 81 Jihad/time in prison? data: No 15 31% 24 49% 8 16% 2 4% Yes 4 13% 26 81% 0 0% 2 6% Available SocEcon Background 63 data: Lower-class 2 11% 15 83% 0 0% 1 6% Middle-class 18 40% 21 47% 5 11% 1 2% Upper-class 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% Available Education: Character 77 data: Secular school 21 29% 44 60% 7 10% 1 1% Religious school 1 25% 3 75% 0 0% 0 0% Available Education: Level attained 82 data: Less than secondary 0 0% 17 65% 4 15% 5 19% Secondary 4 20% 15 75% 1 5% 0 0% Some post-secondary/uni/college 16 50% 13 41% 2 6% 1 3% Undergraduate (BA, BS, etc) 2 50% 1 25% 1 25% 0 0% Postgraduate (MA, MSc, etc) 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% Doctoral 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% Faith as youth/previous known Available 71 devotion data: Secular 7 21% 22 67% 1 3% 3 9% Religious 6 27% 12 55% 3 14% 1 5% Christian 7 44% 9 56% 0 0% 0 0% Available Occupation (long-time) 89 data: Unskilled 3 14% 16 73% 1 5% 2 9% Semi-skilled 14 23% 38 63% 5 8% 3 5% Professional 5 71% 1 14% 1 14% 0 0% Available Family status 61 data: Single 2 10% 15 71% 2 10% 2 10% Married/in a relationship 2 20% 6 60% 2 20% 0 0% Married with children 8 32% 16 64% 0 0% 1 4% Partner cooperation 3 50% 3 50% 0 0% 0 0% Separated/divorced 4 50% 3 38% 1 13% 0 0% TABLE 10. PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE-UP North N.Am. % Europe Europe % Australia Australia % Immigrant Immigrant % America Available Mental Illness 32 data: Yes 0 0% 3 43% 3 43% 1 14% No 5 42% 6 50% 1 8% 0 0% Suspected 6 46% 4 31% 0 0% 3 23% Available History of crime 76 data: Yes 8 17% 34 72% 2 4% 3 6% No 11 38% 13 45% 4 14% 1 3% Available 24 Terrorist Personality data: Pathological narcissism 2 9 1 0 Paranoia 2 1 1 1 Authoritative personality 2 3 0 0

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TABLE 11. AD HOC CIRCUMSTANCES OF JOINING THE JIHAD North N.Am. % Europe Europe % Australia Australia % Immigrant Immigrant % America Average age 27,2 25,4 22,8 25,6 Age of "joining jihad" 24,9 23,0 22,3 24,2 Available Place of recuitment/radicalisation 112 data: Country of their parents' growing 8 38% 5 24% 0 0% 8 38% 2nd generation of immigrants in 12 16% 55 73% 7 9% 1 1% the West No connection to the 2 18% 0 0% 1 9% 8 73% country/immigrant Available Faith level 70 data: Not more religious 5 45% 3 27% 2 18% 1 9% More religious/rapid increase 6 13% 33 72% 4 9% 3 7% Recent converts to Islam 7 50% 7 50% 0 0% 0 0% Available Employment 83 data: Unemployed 6 29% 12 57% 2 10% 1 5% Student 4 17% 14 58% 5 21% 1 4% Part-time job 1 20% 4 80% 0 0% 0 0% Full-time job 8 47% 9 53% 0 0% 0 0% Full-time jihad 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% In prison 1 1% 12 12% 0 0% 88 87% TABLE 12. PERSONAL FINDINGS North N.Am. % Europe Europe % Australia Australia % Immigrant Immigrant % America Available Hijra 100 data: No 5 19% 13 50% 7 27% 1 4% Hostile/jihadi character 3 9% 29 91% 0 0% 0 0% Peaceful/educational character 6 55% 5 45% 0 0% 0 0% Attempted 3 20% 10 67% 1 7% 1 7% Inapplicable 1 5% 2 11% 0 0% 16 84% Available Radicalised 71 data: Personal contact 3 12% 19 76% 2 8% 1 4% Internet 15 44% 14 41% 4 12% 1 3% Prison 1 6% 14 88% 0 0% 1 6% Inapplicable 0 0% 2 50% 1 25% 1 25% Available Known to authorities 102 data: No 7 25% 9 32% 4 14% 8 29% Yes 11 17% 44 68% 5 8% 5 8% Not for radicalism 1 11% 8 89% 0 0% 0 0% Available Training/attack preparation 94 data: None 9 20% 26 57% 6 13% 5 11% Yes; part in a conflict/hands-on 8 20% 23 56% 0 0% 10 24% training Yes; learned via Internet 4 50% 2 25% 1 13% 1 13% Available Links to jihadists 99 data: None 13 45% 12 41% 2 7% 2 7% Remote contact with a jihadist 3 10% 19 63% 4 13% 4 13% Links to a jihadi group 3 7% 28 62% 1 2% 13 29%

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7. Appendix 2 – List of profiled individuals

North American Cluster AGE (at the time RELATED RELATED NAME of incident) COUNTRY INCIDENT DATE 1. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev 19 USA 15.4.2013 2. Tamerlan Tsarnaev 26 USA 15.4.2013 3. Alton Nolen 30 USA 24.9.2014 4. Martin Couture-Rouleau 25 Canada 20.10.2014 5. Michael Zehaf-Bibeau 32 Canada 22.10.2014 6. Zale H. Thompson 32 USA 23.10.2014 7. Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud 23 USA 21.2.2015 8. Elton Simpson 30 USA 3.5.2015 9. Nadir Soofi 34 USA 3.5.2015 10. Abdul Kareem 43 USA 3.5.2015 11. Munir Abdulkader 22 USA 21.5.2015 12. Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez 24 USA 16.7.2015 13. Faisal Mohammad 18 USA 4.11.2015 14. Syed Rizwan Farook 28 USA 2.12.2015 15. Tashfeen Malik 29 USA 2.12.2015 16. Edward Archer 30 USA 7.1.2016 17. Mohamed Barry 30 USA 11.2.2016 18. Ayanle Hassan Ali 27 Canada 14.3.2016 19. Omar Mateen 29 USA 12.6.2016 20. Aaron Driver 24 Canada 10.8.2016 21. Sebastian Gregerson 29 USA 31.8.2016 22. Dahir Adan 22 USA 17.9.2016 23. Ahmad Khan Rahami 28 USA 17.-19.9.2016 24. Abdul Razak Ali Artan 18 USA 28.11.2016

European Cluster AGE (at the time RELATED RELATED NAME of incident) COUNTRY INCIDENT DATE 25. Mohamed Merah 23 France 11.-22.3.2012 26. Jérémie Louis-Sidney 33 France 19.9.2012 27. Michael Adebolajo 31 United Kingdom 22.5.2013 28. Michael Adebowale 25 United Kingdom 22.5.2013 29. Alexandre Dhaussy 21 France 25.5.2013 30. Ibrahim Boudina 23 France 11.2.2014 31. Abdelkader Tliba 29 France 11.2.2014 32. Mehdi Nemmouche 29 Belgium 24.5.2014 33. Brusthom Ziamani 19 United Kingdom 19.8.2014 34. Suhaib Majeed 21 United Kingdom 25.9.2014 35. Tarik Hassane 21 United Kingdom 7.10.2014 36. Nadir Syed 22 United Kingdom pre-11.11.2014 37. Bertrand Nzohabonayo 20 France 20.12.2014 38. Chérif Kouachi 32 France 7.1.2015 39. Saïd Kouachi 34 France 7.1.2015 40. Amedy Coulibaly 32 France 9.1.2015 41. Khalid Ben Larbi 23 Belgium 16.1.2015

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42. Soufiane Amghar 26 Belgium 16.1.2015 43. Marouan El Bali 25 Belgium 16.1.2015 44. Moussa Coulibaly 30 France 3.2.2015 45. Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein 22 Denmark 14.-15.2.2015 46. Unknown minor no. 1 14 United Kingdom 1.4.2015 47. Sid Ahmed Ghlam 24 France 19.4.2015 48. Mohammed Rehman 25 United Kingdom 28.5.2015 49. Sana Ahmed Khan 24 United Kingdom 28.5.2015 50. Yassin Salhi 35 France 26.6.2015 51. Ayoub El Khazzani 26 France 21.8.2015 52. Abdelhamid Abaaoud 28 France/Belgium 13.11.2015 53. Salah Abdeslam 25 France/Belgium 13.11.2015 54. Mohamed Abrini 31 France/Belgium 13.11.2015 55. Bilal Hadfi 20 France 13.11.2015 56. Brahim Abdeslam 31 France/Belgium 13.11.2015 57. Chakib Akrouh 25 France 13.11.2015 58. Samy Amimour 28 France 13.11.2015 59. Omar Ismail Mostefai 29 France 13.11.2015 60. Foued Mohamed-Aggad 23 France 13.11.2015 61. Hasna Ait Boulahcen 26 France 18.11.2015 62. Reda Hame 29 France 18.11.2015 63. Mohamed Bakkali 29 France/Belgium 26.11.2015 64. Muhaydin Mire 29 United Kingdom 5.12.2015 65. Raouf El Ayeb 29 France 1.1.2016 66. Unknown minor no. 3 15 France 11.1.2016 67. Mohammad Syeedy 21 United Kingdom 18.2.2016 68. Mohammad Kadir 24 United Kingdom 18.2.2016 69. Safia Schmitter 15 Germany 26.2.2016 70. Mohamed Belkaid 35 Belgium 15.3.2016 71. Ibrahim El Bakraoui 29 Belgium 22.3.2016 72. Najim Laachraoui 24 Belgium 22.3.2016 73. Khalid El Bakraoui 27 Belgium 22.3.2016 74. Osama Krayem 23 Belgium 22.3.2016 75. Yussuf T. 16 Germany 16.4.2016 76. Mohammed B. 16 Germany 16.4.2016 77. Larossi Abballa 25 France 13.6.2016 78. Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel 31 France 14.7.2016 79. Adel Kermiche 19 France 26.7.2016 80. Abdel Malik Petitjean 19 France 26.7.2016 81. Mesa Hodžić 25 Denmark 31.8.2016 82. Ines Madani 19 France 4.9.2016 83. Sarah Hervouet 23 France 4.9.2016 84. Ornella Gilligman 29 France 4.9.2016 85. Unknown minor no. 5 15 France 10.9.2016 86. Haroon Ali-Syed 19 United Kingdom 13.9.2016 87. Hicham Diop 43 Belgium 5.10.2016 88. Unknown minor no. 6 12 Germany 26.11.-5.12.2016 89. Oussama Ahmad Atar 32 France N/A 90. Abdelilah Himich 26 France N/A 91. Rashid Kassim 29 France N/A 92. Fabien Clain 39 France N/A

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93. Salim Benghalem 36 France N/A

Australian Cluster AGE (at the time RELATED RELATED NAME of incident) COUNTRY INCIDENT DATE 94. Numan Haider 18 Australia 23.9.2014 95. Man Haron Monis 50 Australia 15.12.2014 96. Mohammad Kiad 25 Australia 11.2.2015 97. Omar Al-Kutobi 24 Australia 11.2.2015 98. Sevdet Ramadan Besim 18 Australia 18.4.2015 99. Unknown minor no. 2 17 Australia 8.5.2015 100. Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar 15 Australia 2.10.2015 101. Unknown minor no. 4 16 Australia 24.4.2016 102. Ihsas Khan 22 Australia 10.9.2016

Immigrants Cluster AGE (at the time RELATED RELATED NAME of incident) COUNTRY INCIDENT DATE 103. Rafik Yousef 41 Germany 17.9.2015 104. Ahmad al-Mohammad 25 France 13.11.2015 105. M. al-Mahmod ? France 13.11.2015 106. Adel Haddadi 28 France 10.12.2015 107. Muhammad Ghani Usman 34 France 10.12.2015 108. Tarek Belgacem 24 France 7.1.2016 109. Saleh A. 25 Germany 2.6.2016 110. Hamza C. 27 Germany 2.6.2016 111. Abd Arahman A. K. 31 Germany 2.6.2016 112. Mahood B. 25 Germany 2.6.2016 113. Riaz Khan Ahmadzai 17 Germany 18.7.2016 114. Mohammad Daleel 27 Germany 24.7.2016 115. Khaled Babouri 33 Belgium 6.8.2016 116. Mahir al-H 17 Germany 13.9.2016 117. Ibrahim M 18 Germany 13.9.2016 118. Mohamed A 26 Germany 13.9.2016 119. Mohammed M. 16 Germany 20.9.2016 120. Jabar al-Bakr 22 Germany 8.10.2016 121. Anis Amri 24 Germany 19.12.2016

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8. Appendix 3 - List of sources used for the individuals profiling

Multi-case sources

• http://icsr.info/wp -content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR -Rep ort -Criminal -Past s-Terrorist -Fu tures - Europ ean -Jihadists -and-the-New-C rim e-Terror-Nexus.pdf • Kilcullen, David. 2016. Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror. • Burke, Jason. 2015. The New Threat from Islamic Militancy. • http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp -content/uploads/2017/03/HSJ - ISIS -1.pdf

North American Cluster 1. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev

• Burke, Jason. 2015. The New Threat from Islamic Militancy. • Kilcullen, David. 2016. Blood Year. Islamic St ate and the Failures of the War on Terror. • http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/27/us/tsarnaev -13th -juror -jahar-radicalization/index.html

2. Tamerlan Tsarnaev

• Kilcullen, David. 2016. Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror. • Burke, Jason. 2 015. The New Threat from Islamic Militancy. • http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/01/us/tsarnaev -fami ly/ • http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/21/us/tamerlan -tsarna ev -t imeline/ • https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/02/28/homeland -secu rit y-releas es -immigration -fi les - decea s ed -marath on -bomb er -a nd-friend/Byftvg8GyYhe8i431mMmmM/story.html • http://www.ibtimes.com/boston -ma rathon -bombing -immigration -files-tam erlan -t sarna ev-his -friend - releas ed -2326934 • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -2733996/Widow-Boston -b omb er -rema rri ed -n ew-bab y- relati ves-reveal.html • https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national -security/no-links-s een -b et ween -boston -suspects - and-forei gn -t errorist -groups-officials -say/2013/04/23/f08c9b7e -ac4b -11e2-b6fd - ba6f5f26d70e_story.html

3. Alton Nolen

• https://www.washin gtonpost.com/news/post -nation/wp/2014/09/30/what -we-know-about-alton - nolen -wh o-has-b een -charged -with-murd er -in-th e- oklah om a -beh eading- case/?utm_term=.be79960831a0 • http://kfor.com/2016/02/11/arraignment -s et-for-oklah oma -man-accus ed -in-co-workers -beheading/ • https://www.jihadwatch.org/2016/08/oklahoma -mus lim-who-beh ead ed -cowork er -justified -his- actions-bas ed -on-his-reading -of-th e-quran • http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/29/justice/oklahoma -beh eading-suspect/ • http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us -n ews/a lt on -nolen -okla homa-b eheading -suspect -com petent -stand - trial-judge-n453111 • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3290414/Psychologist-Ok lahoman -cha rged -b eheading- wants -execution.html

4. Martin Couture -Roul eau

• http://montrealgazette.com/tag/martin -c outure-rou leau - s evera l artic les

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• http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/who -is-martin -c outure -rouleau -1.2807285 • www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/10/21/martin -couture -rouleau_n_6025050.html • http://montreal.ctvnews.ca/martin -couture-rou leau -want ed -more-victims -coron er-1.3206926 • http://montreal.ct vnews.ca/a -radicalized -man-wh o-was -ma rtin -couture-rou leau -1.2064326 • http://calgaryherald.com/news/national/9999 -lang-h ow-ra dicalize • http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/martin -couture-rouleau -a -hom egrown -madman/ • https://www.counterextremism.com/people/martin -c outure-rouleau • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -2801102/radicalized-canadian -muslim -con vert -runs-t wo- young -s oldiers-ca r- shot-d ead -police.html

5. Michael Zehaf -Bibeau

• http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/22/world/canada -shoot er/ • https://www.theguardian.com /world/2014/oct/23/ottawa -shooting -susp ect -micha el -zehaf -bibeau - canada-parliament • http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/rcmp -releas e-unseen -video-from -zehaf-bibeau - s-manifest o- 1.3092462 • http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/michael -zehaf-bib eau -addict -drifter -wa lki ng-contradiction/ • http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/michael -zehaf -bibeau -j ourney-to-death - on-parliament -hill

6. Zale H. Thompson

• http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -2820584/Hatchet-wi elding-Musli m-radical-att acked - rookie-New-York-c ops-spent -months-visiting -jihadist -websites-stalk ed -offic ers -hours .html • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -2806731/Was-terror-attack -P olic e-prob e-extremist -links- onlin e-rants-New-York -hatchet -attacker-em erge-sh ot -d ead -attack -group -c ops-Queens.html • https://www.nytimes.c om/2014/10/25/nyregion/man -who-attacked -polic e-with-hatchet -ranted - about-us-officials -sa y.html • http://www.reuters.com/article/us -usa -newyork -hatchet -idUSKCN0IC2RG20141024 • https://nypost.com/2014/10/23/man -shot-dead -aft er -st riking-cop -in-the-head -with -ax/

7. Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud

• https://www.fbi.gov/contact -us/field -offices/cincinnati/news/press -releases/columbus -ohio-man- charged -with-providing-mat erial -support -to-terrorists • https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press - releases/attachments/2015/04/ 16/mohamud_indictment.pdf • http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us -n ews/ ohios -s yria -train ed -t error -susp ect -pleads -not-guilt y- n343486 • http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/04/16/columbus -man-terrorism -indictment.html • https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/us/ohio -man -t rained -in-s yria-is-charged -with -p lanning- terrorism -in-us.htm l

8. Elton Simpson

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -us-canada-32582704 • https://www.theguardian.com/us -news/2015/may/05/elton -simpson -fbi-had-monitored -t exas- gunman -since-2006 • http://abcnews.go.com/US/garland -sh ootin g-susp ect -elt on -simpsons -father -s on- made/story?id=30782088 • http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/05/us/texas -shooting-gunmen/ • http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/garland -sh oot er-elton -simpson -tied -previ ous-terror - probe-artic le-1.2209345

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• http://www.abc15.com/news/region -phoenix -metro/central -phoenix/texas -shooting -susp ects -who-is- elton -simpson • http://abc7chicago.com/news/elton -simpson -shoot er -outsi de-prophet -cart oon -c ont est -from - illinois/695565/ • https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/us/garland -t exas-shooting -muhammad -cartoons.html

9. Nadir Soofi

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -us-canada-32582704 • http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/05/us/texa s-shooting-gunmen/ • https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/nadir -soofi • http://www.latimes.com/nation/la -na-ga rland -gun -20150801 -story.html • http://www.vocativ.com/usa/nat -sec/nadir-s oofi -named -as-s econd -susp ect -in-t exas -shooting/ • http://www.nbcnews.com/ n ews/us-n ews/d ra w-muhammad -cont est -shooting-grandmother -ca lls-nadir - soofi -good-boy-n353636

10. Abdul Kareem

• https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdul -mali k -abdul-kareem • http://www.dallasnews.com/news/garland/2016/09/25/prosecutors -s eek -life-s entenc e-man-planned - garland -t error-attack • http://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2017/02/08/man -helped -plot-garland -t errorist -attack -gets - 30-yea rs -pris on • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/us/garland -t exas-att ack -abdul-malik -abdul -kareem.html • http://www.wfaa.com/news/ c rim e/jury-con victs-ari z-man-in-connection -to-ga rland -t error - attack/87009113 • http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2015/07/03/trial -s et-for -man-ti ed -to-ga rland -shooting/ • http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2017/01/25/sentencing -d ela yed -for-man-who-plott ed -ga rland -a ttack/ • http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/Third -Man-Arrest ed -in-Garland -Dra w-Muhammad -Shooting - Authorities-307578041.html

11. Munir Abdulkader

• https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio -man-s entenc ed -20-ye ars-pri son -p lot-attack -us-governm ent - officers

12. Muhammad Youssef Abdulaze ez

• http://time.com/3962344/chattanooga -muhammad -youss ef -abdulazeez/ • http://www.businessinsider.com/what -we-know-about -muhammad -youss ef -abdula zeez -2 015-7 • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/muhammad -youss ef -abdula zeez -chattanooga - suspect -nam ed -as-engineering-graduate-10395126.html • https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national -security/chattanooga -shooter-cam e -from-middle- class -mus lim-family/2015/07/16/815c39c2 -2c04-11e5 -bd33- 395c05608059_story.html?utm_term=.386b756982e4 • http://edition.cnn.com/ 2015/07/17/us/tennessee -sh oot er-mohammad -yous suf-abdulazeez/ • https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/muhammad -youss ef-abdulazeez

13. Faisal Mohammad

• http://www.dailynews.com/general -news/20151106/uc -merced -student -wh o-stabbed -4-sought - revenge • http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/faisal -moh ammad -cali fornia -college-sta bber-ma y- have-s elf -radicalized -fbi-n541086

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• http://thehill.com/blogs/blog -bri efing -room/news/273524 -fbi-student -in-uc-m erc ed -ca mpus- stabbing-inspired -by-t erroris t • http://www.me rcedsunstar.com/news/local/education/uc -merced/article112440962.html • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/university -of-ca li fornia -campus-a ttacker- faisal -m ohammad -inspired -by-isis -but-s elf -radicalised -a6939686.html

14. Syed Rizwan Farook

• http://www.news.com.au/world/north -america/muslim -sh ooter -s yed -fa rook -and-his-wife-ta shfeen - malik -object ed -to-him-ha ving-to-att end -a-work-xmas -part y/news- story/20c3230f0d81976a8b59556026454919 • http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/03/us/syed -farook -tashfeen -malik -ma ss-shooting-p rofile/ • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/12030481/Syed -Fa rook -what-we- know-about-th e-San -B ernard ino-gunman.html • https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/us/san -bernardino-a ttackers -discussed -jihad -in-privat e- mes sages -fbi-sa ys.html • https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/us/san -bernardino-a ttackers -discussed -jihad -in-privat e- mes sages -fbi-sa ys.html • https://www.theguardian.com/us -news/2015/dec/16/san -bernardino-attackers -jihad -soci al-media-fbi • http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la -me-san -bernardino-t error --20160909-snap -story.html

15. Tashfeen Malik

• http://www.news.com.au/world/north -america/muslim -sh ooter -s yed -fa rook -and-his-wife-ta shfeen - malik -object ed -to-him-ha ving-to-att end -a-work-xmas -part y/news- story/20c3230f0d81976a8b59556026454919 • http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/03/us/syed -farook -tashfeen -malik -ma ss-shooting-p rofile/ • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/12030481/Syed -Fa rook -what-we- know-about-th e-San -B ernard ino-gunman.html • http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/04/us/ta shfeen -ma lik -san-bernardino -shooting -what -we- know/index.html • https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/us/san -bernardino-a ttackers -discussed -jihad -in-privat e- mes sages -fbi-sa ys.html • https://www.theguardian.com/us -news/2015/dec/16/san -bernardino-attackers -jihad -soci al-media-fbi • http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la -me-san -bernardino-t error --20160909-snap -story.html

16. Edward Archer

• http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us -news/police -s eek -three-possib ly-ti ed -gunman -who-s hot- philadelphia -c op-n494376 • https://www.counterextremism. com/extremists/edward -arc her • http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/01/09/fbi -investigating -alleged -pa-c op-shoot ers-t rips-to-middle- east.htm l • http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/20160110_Attempted_murder_charges_for_Archer_in_ officer_s_ambush.html • http://ab cnews.go.com/US/man -accused -sh ooting -philly-c op-con fess ed -c ommitting - act/story?id=36169588 • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/us/philadelphia -police-offic er -wounded -in-ambu sh -on-his - patrol-car.htm l

17. Mohamed Barry

• http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us -n ews/ ohio -machet e -attacker -acted -his -own-polic e -s a y-n517716

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• https://www.jihadwatch.org/2016/02/ohio -muslim -wh o-s lashed -restaurant -patrons -wit h-machet e- wa s-on-fbis-radar • http://www.cbsnews.com/news/machete -attack -nazareth -restaurant-c olumbus-ohi o-sta bbing/ • http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/12/us/columbus -machet e -attack -motive/ • https://www.fbi.gov/contact -us/field -offices/cincinnati/news/press -releases/update-on-the- feb ruary-11-2016-incident -in-columbus-ohio • http://abc6onyourside.c om/investigators/update-investigators -sa y-machet e-attacker -had-computer - background • http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/man -machet e-killed -p olice-restaurant -attack -article- 1.2529272

18. Ayanle Hassan Ali

• http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ayanle -hassan -a li-fit-for-tria l-1.3700687 • http://www.cbc.ca/beta/news/canada/toronto/who -is-ali -1.3493209 • http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto -stabbing-military-recruitment -c entre-1 .3491719 • http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ali -work ed -at-p ea rson -1.3494809 • https://www.thestar.com/news/crime/2016/05/31/accused -in-military-c entre-stabbing-n ow-charged - with-t errori sm-offense.html • http://www.therecord.com/news -story/6699413 -rcmp -charges-a yanle-hassan -a li -27-with-terroris m- relat ed -offence-aft er-knife-a ttack -at-canadian -fo/

19. Omar Mateen

• http://abcnews.go.com/US/omar -mat een -suspect ed -orlando-night-c lub-shooter/story?id=39790797 • http://time.com/4553844/orlando -shoot er -omar -mateen -wi fe-noor-sa lman/ • http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us -n ews/n oor-salman -wi fe-orlando-sh oot er-omar -mat een -a rrest ed - n707451 • https://www.theguardian.com/us -news/2016/jun/20/omar -mateen -911-calls -orlando -shooting -fbi - releas e-isis • http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/23/us/orlando -shoot er -hos tage-n egotiator-ca ll/ • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics /orlando -shooting -omar -mateen.html • https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/troubled -quiet -macho-angry-the-volati le-life-of-oma r- mateen/2016/06/17/15229250 -34a6-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html?utm_term=.0551a37c7e1e • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -us-canada-36513468

20. Aaron Driver

• http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/who -is-aa ron -d river-what -we-know-so-far -about- the-man-ki lled -by-rcmp-instrathroy/article31374573/ • http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/ontario -c ommunit y-k ept-in-dark -qu est ions-polic e- handling-of-t error -case/article31396673/ • http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/aaron -driver-troubled -chi ldhood -isis- support er -1.3716222 • http://torontolife.com/city/crime/aaron -dri ver -isis -suicide-bomb er -next-d oor/ • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -us-canada-37053521

21. Sebastian Gregerson

• http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit -city/2016/12/22/terror/95753462/ • http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2016/12/30/sebastian -gregers on -det roit - terror -suspect/96004900/ • http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/02/politics/fbi -arrest -d etroit -man/ • http://www.reuters.com/article/us -michigan -exp losives -idUSKCN10H0JW

57

22. Dah i r Adan

• http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/19/dahir -adan -the-s oma li-c omputer-student -wh o-stabbed - nine-in-minne/ • http://www.startribune.com/dahir -adan -what-we-know/394013681/ • https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/an -unassuming-life-before-a-susp ects-rampa ge- in-a-minnes ota -mall/2016/09/19/f2a608f0 -7e7a-11e6 -9070- 5c4905bf40dc_story.html?utm_term=.4565cdc171dc • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3824581/Officials-provid e-update-Minnesota -mall- stabbing-prob e.html • https://www.theguardian.com/us -news/2016/sep/20/minnesota -stabbing-dahir-ahm ed -ad an-college- securit y-guard • https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/07/fbi -minnesota -ma ll-stabbing-iphone-dahir- adan -isis • http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us -n ews/dahir -ahmed -ada n-named -polic e-st-c loud -minnes ota - stabbing-suspect -n651061 • http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/20/dahir -adan -minnesota -mall -attacker-wa s- rec ent -c oll/ • http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/19/us/minnesota -ma ll-sta bbing/

23. Ahmad Khan Rahami

• http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/19/us/ahmad -khan -rahami/ • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/nyregion/ahmad -rahami-manhattan -bombing-susp ect - court.html • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -us-canada-37426212 • https://www.washington post.com/news/post -nation/wp/2016/09/20/new-york-b ombing-suspect - charged -with-using -weap ons-of-mass -destruction/?utm_term=.001fcb0bd9b7 • http://www.newyorker.com/news/benjamin -wa llac e-wells/ wh o-exact ly-is-ahmad -khan-rahami • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/20 16/09/19/new-york-b ombing-suspects/ • https://www.theguardian.com/us -news/2016/nov/10/ahmad -khan-rahami-court -new-york -new- jers ey-bombs

24. Abdul Razak Ali Artan

• https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/abdul -ra zak -ali-a rtan -ohio-stat e-attack er -self- radicalised -isis -c laim-s oldier-a7446546.html • http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us -n ews/ ohio -stat e-attack -what-we-know-about-abdul-razak -ali - n689556 • http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/28/us/ohio -state-attacker-abdul-ra zak -a li-artan/ • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -us-canada-38136658 • http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ohio -stat e-universit y-atta ck -whats-known -about -susp ect -abdul- razak -ali -artan/ • https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdul -ra za k -ali-a rtan

58

European Cluster 25. Mohamed Merah

• Kilcullen, David. 2016. Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror. • Burke, Jason. 2015. The New Threat from Islamic Militancy. • http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20160108.OBS2451/en -prison -j-en-ai-vu-p lein -des -p etits- blonds-se-c onverti r-en-un-m ois.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/08/09/mohamed -merah -etait-en-phas e-de-radicalisation - des-jan vier-2011_1744363_3224.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/08/01/affaire -merah -avi s-favorab le-de-declassification - de-docum ents -s ecret -defense_1740903_3224.html • http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/21/world/europe/france -s hooting -suspect -profi le/ • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-17456541

26. Jérémie Louis -Si dn ey

• http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20121010.OBS5203/jeremie -louis-sidney-itin eraire-d -un- delinquant -tent e-par -le-jihad.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/10/07/a -strasbourg-j eremie-louis -sidney-voulait -finir - en-martyr_1771369_3224.html • http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite -france/2012/10/06/01016 -20121006ARTFIG00398 -jerem y-sidney- un-delinquant -converti -a-l-is lam -radical.php • http://www.leparisien.fr/faits -divers/une-c ompagn e -de-j eremie-louis-s ydn ey-je-n-ai-p as-s enti-qu- il-s-etait-radicalis e-11-10-2012-2223161.php • http://www.france24.com/fr/20121007 -france-j eremi e-lou is-sidney-apprenti -t errorist e-vou lait -finir- mart yr-djihad • http://www.rtl.fr/actu/terrorisme -quel-est-le-parcours-de-jeremi e-louis -sidney-7753280926

27. Michael Adebolajo

• https://www.mi5.gov.uk/attack -plots -in-th e-uk • Burke, Jason. 2015. The New Threat from Islamic Militancy.

28. Michael Adebowale

• Kilcullen, David. 2016. Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror. • Burke, Jason. 2015. The New Threat from Islamic Militancy.

29. Alexandre Dhaussy

• http://www.bfmtv.com/societe/militaire -p oignard e-a -la-d efens e-s on-a gres s eur-p eut -il-etre-juge- 927796.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/police -justice/article/2015/09/25/alexandre -dhauss y-n -est -pas -un-fou-de- dieu-il-est -fou_4771444_1653578.html • http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Societe/Alexandre -22-a ns-francais-djihadiste-517746 • http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/06/14/attaques -au-couteau -contre-des-polici ers-et-des - militaires -les-precedents_1459290

30. Ibrahim Boudina

• https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/europe/isis -a ttacks-paris-brussels.html • http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/france -s uspected -i sis-link/ • http://atelier.leparisien.fr/galaxie -djihadiste/profil/ibrahim -boudina/P111

59

• http://jssnews.com/2015/06/28/ibrahim -boudina-arret e -alors-quil-planifiait -un-ca rnage-au- carnaval -de-nice/ • http://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2014/12/02/2003339 -jihad -services-antiterroristes -c onfront es - jeunes -radicalises- retou r-syrie.html

31. Abdelkader Tliba

• http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/france -s uspected -i sis-link/ • http://atelier.leparisien.fr/ga laxi e-djihadiste/profil.php?id=P112 • http://atelier.leparisien.fr/galaxie -djihadiste/profil/abdelkader -t liba/P112

32. Mehdi Nemmouche

• https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/01/suspect -arrest -bruss els -jewish -museu m-shooting • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europe-27654505 • http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/05/25/le -tueur -du-musee-juif-au rait -ete-en-li en -avec - les -com mandos-de-pa ris-et-bruxelles_4926021_3224.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/12/12/tuerie -au-musee-juif-de-b elgiqu e-reclam e-pa r- bruxelles -un-marseillais -ecroue_4539952_3224.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/06/02/le -cas-de-n emm ouche -ne-s era -pas -le- dernier_4430682_3224.html • http://www.lesoir.be/1311309/article/actualite/belgique/2016 -09-07/confidences -m ehd i- nemm ouche-un-d et enu -ont-fuite

33. Brusthom Ziamani

• http://www.bbc.com/news/uk -31987242 • https://www.theguardian.com/uk -news/2015/mar/20/brusthom -ziamani -jai led -plot -beh ead -soldier- lee-rigb y • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/teenager -b rusthom-ziamani -jai led -for-22-years-for- plotting -to-beh ead -british -solider-in-attack -10122505.html • http://www.bbc.com/news/uk -31540281 • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism -in-th e-uk/11420541/Islamist -fanatic-gui lt y-of- plot -to-beh ead -British -soldier.html • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/woolwich -inspired -t eenager -arrest ed -on-his-wa y-to- behead -b ritish -s oldi er -in-london -court -hea rs -10034204.html • https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp -content/uploads/2015/03/ziamani_sentencing.pdf • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -2960250/Teenager-guilt y-p lotting -beh ead -B ritish - soldier.html

34. Suhaib Majeed

• http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3553717/Tarik-Hassane -Turnup -Terror-Squad -jailed - life.htm l • http://metro.co.uk/2016/03/23/london -t error -ph ysics -student -guilt y-over-i sis-p lan -to-kill-s oldiers- and-polic e-in-uk-5771350/ • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/22/british -home-grown -isi l-inspired -t errorist s-jailed -for - life-over/ • http://www.express.co. uk/news/uk/651544/physics -studen t -Suhaib -Majeed -murd er -Ala n-Henning- justify-p lan-dri ve-by-sh ootin g • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/drive -by-ji hadists-tarik -hassane -and-suhaib -majeedi - jailed -for -life-a6997116.html • http://www.bbc.com/news/uk -35834693

60

35. Tarik Hassane

• http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3553717/Tarik-Hassane -Turnup -Terror-Squad -jailed - life.htm l • http://metro.co.uk/2016/03/23/london -t error -ph ysics -student -guilt y-over-i sis-p lan -to-kill-s oldiers- and-polic e-in-uk-5771350/ • http://www.t elegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/22/british -home-grown -isi l-inspired -t errorist s-jailed -for - life-over/ • http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/651544/physics -studen t -Suhaib -Majeed -murd er -Ala n-Henning- justify-p lan-dri ve-by-sh ootin g • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ crime/tarik -hassa ne-british -m edical-student -arrest ed -on- terror -charges-ma y-ha ve-just -return ed -from-soma lia -9783141.html • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/drive -by-ji hadists-tarik -hassane -and-suhaib -majeedi - jailed -for -life-a6997116.html • http://www.bbc.com/news/uk -35834693

36. Nad i r S yed

• https://www.theguardian.com/uk -news/2016/jun/23/nadir -syed -jailed -p lanning-isis -inspired - beheading -remembrance-sunday • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3303041/Man-accused -p lotting -Lee-Ri gb y-st yle- execution -Rem embrance -Da y-sa ys-bu ying -kitchen -knife-gift-mother.html • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3656207/Remembrance-Da y-t error -plott er -jailed -life.htm l • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/23/jihadist -jailed -for-li fe-over -popp y-da y-p lot/ • http://www.standa rd.co.uk/news/crime/islamic -stateinspired -extremist -jailed -for -life-over -plot-for - lee-rigb yst yle -attack -on-remembrance-a3279411.html • http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk -news/isi s-jihadist -jailed -li fe-a fter -8268034 • http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk -36609694

37. B ertran d Nzohabonayo

• http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/06/14/attaques -au-couteau -contre-des-polici ers-et-des - militaires -les-precedents_1459290 • http://www.leparisien.fr/faits -divers/commissariat -attaque-p res-de-tours-qui-est -b ertrand -n-le- principal-suspect -21-12-2014-4390307.php • http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/rue89/rue89 -polic e -justice/20150127.RUE7632/attaque -t erroriste -a- joue-les-t ours -des-questions -demeurent.html • http://www.ledauphine.com/france -monde/2015/01/07/joue-les-t ours -la-fa mille-de-bertrand - nzohabonayo -lance -un-appel-a-tem oins • http://www.europe1.fr/faits -divers/qui -est-l-agress eur -des-polici ers -tue-a-j ou e- les -tours-2323997 • http://france3 -regions.francetvin fo.fr/centre -va l-de-loire/2014/12/22/qui -etait-bertran d - nzohabonayo -l-auteu r-d es -agressi ons-de-j oue-les-t ours -618002.html • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11307094/French -knife -att acker - Bert rand -Nzohabonayo -wa s- Islamic -convert.html • http://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits -divers/attaque -du-commissariat -a-j ou e-les -tours/qui -et ait-l- agres s eur-d es -trois-p oliciers -a-j oue-les-tours_779225.html

38. Chérif Kouachi

• Kilcullen, David. 2016. Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror. • http://www.ouest -france.fr/charlie-hebdo/charlie -h ebdo-c es -djihadistesfous -da llah -de-la-fi liere- irakienne -3103734

61

39. Saïd Kouachi

• Kilcullen, David. 2016. Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror. • http://www.ouest -france.fr/charlie-h ebdo/charlie -h ebdo-c es -djihadistesfous -da llah -de-la-fi liere- irakienne -3103734

40. Amedy Coulibaly

• http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/09/amedy -cou libaly-paris -kosh er-market_n_6444418.html • http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2015/01/09/amedy -c ou libaly-une-personnalite-immatu re-et- psychopathique_1177384 • http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite -france/2015/01/09/01016 -20150109ARTFIG00172 -l-iti neraire -d- amed y-c oulibaly-suspect -de-la-p ris e-d-otages-de- vincenn es.php • http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/fait -divers/qui -et ait-le-p reneur -d-otages-de-la-port e-de- vincennes_1639203.html

• http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/01/09/amedy -c ouliba ly-de-l-esp oir -de-la-reinsertion - au-terroris me -sectaire_4552778 _3224.html

• http://www.lemonde.fr/police -justice/article/2015/10/13/un -interlocuteur-a -cons ei lle-a-am ed y- coulibaly-d -a ller-au-plus -facile_4788726_1653578.html

41. Khalid Ben Larbi

• http://www.lameuse.be/1199068/article/2015 -01-27/l-etat -is lamique-a -diffus e-sur -les-res eaux- sociaux -les-visa ges-d es -deu x-terroris

42. Soufiane Amghar

• http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/32684/Coup -de-filet -antiterroriste-en- Belgique/article/detail/2196227/2015/01/27/L -EI-publi e-les -portraits-d es -djihadistes -t ues-a - Verviers.dhtml • http://www.sudinfo .be/1214064/article/2015 -02-15/la-fam ille-de-s oufian e-am ghar -abattu -a- vervi ers -le-15-janvi er-d erni er-t em oign e-o • http://atelier.leparisien.fr/galaxie -djihadiste/profil/soufiane -amghar/P050 • http://www.lameuse.be/1199068/article/2015 -01-27/l-etat -is lamique-a -diffus e-sur -les-res eaux- sociaux -les-visa ges-d es -deu x-terroris

43. Marouan El Bali

• http://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/cellule -de-vervi ers -gros-se-p res ente -comm e-un-p etit- 58b99689cd704dd7c0b63944 • http://www.dhnet.be/actu/belgique/cellule -t errorist e -de-vervi ers-16-p ersonnes-poursuivies- 56f06c3f35708ea2d3c982ab • http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/01/23/la -belgi que-s ous-t ension -en-rais on -de-m enaces - terroristes -persistantes_4562486_3214.html • http://www.levif.be/actualite/belgique/cellule -jihadiste-de-vervi ers-el-bali -s eul -survi vant -de-l- assaut -policier-adm et -a voir -joue-un-role-cle/article-n orm al-500067.html • http://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/a -vervi ers-p our-fum er -des -joints-54b9729d35703897f83df0e5

44. Moussa Coulibaly

• http://www.fdesouche.com/559861 -nice-qui-est-m oussa -c ouliba ly-lagress eur -des-3-militaires# • http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20150204.OBS1628/qui -est -mous sa-c ouliba ly-auteur- presum e-de-l-attaque -de-nice.html 62

• http://www.lexpress.fr/actual ite/societe/qui -est-m oussa -coulibaly-l-a gress eur -presum e-des- militaires -a-nice_1647969.html • http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1532751 -20150204 -nice-moussa -cou libaly-h omm e-a gress e- militaires • http://www.francetvinfo.fr/faits -divers/qu e-sait -on-de-moussa-cou lib aly-l-agress eur -presum e-de- trois -mi litaires-a -nice_815521.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/02/04/en -ga rde-a -vue-m oussa-c ouliba ly-evoque-sa- haine-des -mi litaires -et-d es-juifs_4569935_3224.html

45. Omar Abdel Hamid El -Hu ss ein

• http://edition.cnn.co m/2015/02/17/europe/denmark -cop en hagen -gunman/ • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/copenhagen -shootings -suspect ed -gunman -omar - abdel-hamid -el-huss ein -was -a-danish -national-with -a -10047741.html • http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/02/15/omar -abdel-hamid -el-hussein_n_6688612.html • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/copenhagen -sh ooting -susp ect - omar -el-hussein -a- past-full-of-contradictions • https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/terrorists -desc ent -into-violenc e-had-roots -in-a - copenhagen -gang/2015/02/16/cc236992 -b618-11e4 -bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html • http://www.reuters.com/article/us -d enmark -attacks-huss ei n -specia l-repor- idUSKBN0ND0EJ20150422 • http://www.cbsnews.com/news/copenhagen -gunman -oma r -abdel-hamid -el-huss ein -just -out-of- prison -ap-sou rces/

46. Unknown minor no. 1

• http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism -in-th e-uk/11904327/Britains -youngest -terrorist - planned -to-b ehead -his -teach ers-c ourt -hea rs.html • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism -in-th e-uk/11756794/Britains -youngest -terrorist - admits-plotting-An zac -Da y-t error -attack -in-Australia.html • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/02/uk -schoolboy-li fe-s ent ence -austra lia -t error -plot • http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk -news/britains -youn gest -terrorist -gi ven -life-6552066 • http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk -news/an zac -da y-boy-a ged-14-5552143 • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism -in-th e-uk/11756822/Channel -Proj ec t -under-fire- after-c onviction -of-B ritain -youngest -terrorist.html

47. Sid Ahmed Ghlam

• http://www.ouest -france.fr/societe/faits -divers/attentats -dejou es -sid-ahm ed -gh lam -un-jeun e- homm e-ordin aire-et-discret -3 353678 • http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Faits -divers/Temoignages -contradictoires -autour -de-la-radicalisation - de-Sid-Ahm ed -Gh lam -729270 • http://www.sudouest.fr/2016/11/19/un -mineur-radicalis e -en-li en -a vec-le-jihadiste -rach id -kassim- mis-en-exam en -et-ec rou e-25 74246 -6093.php • http://www.lalsace.fr/actualite/2015/04/23/une -soeur -de-s id-ahmed -ghlam -estim e-qu-il-ne-s-est- pas-radicalis e • http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/sid -ahm ed -ghlam -et-l-attentat -d ejou e-de- villejuif_1774257.html • http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/attentats -terroristes -a -paris/20160429.OBS9566/attaque -de- villejuif -sid-ahm ed -ghlam -a-telephone -pendant -des-m ois -depuis-sa-cellule.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/04/23/sid -ahmed -ghlam -etudiant -sans-histoires-et- terrorist e -amateur_4621431_3224.html

63

• http://5minutes.rtl.lu/laune/actu/905348.html

48. Mohammed Rehman

• http://www.bbc.com/news/uk -en gland -35198500 • http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/630301/Silent -Bomb er -s entenc ed -to-life-in-pris on • http://www.getreading.co.uk/news/reading -b erkshire -news/reading -terror-suspects -were-n eed y- 10597551 • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3381530/What-drove-ma gistrat e-s-daught er -plot-bomb- massacre -week -Britain -s -unli kely-jihadi-jailed -life-an guish -lovin g-middle-c lass -parents.html

49. Sana Ahmed Khan

• http://www.bbc.com/news/uk -en gland -35198500 • http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/630301/Silent -Bomb er -s entenc ed -to-life-in-pris on • http://www.getreading.co.uk/news/reading -b erkshire -news/reading -terror-suspects -were-n eed y- 10597551 • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ne ws/artic le -3381530/What-drove-ma gistrat e-s-daught er -plot-bomb- massacre -week -Britain -s -unli kely-jihadi-jailed -life-an guish -lovin g-middle-c lass -parents.html

50. Yassin Salhi

• https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/faits -divers-justice/attentat -saint-quentin -fa lla vi er -ya ssin -sahli -s - est -suicide-en-p rison -1450856178 • http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/31902/La -m enac e-EI/article/detail/2377265/2015/06/26/Qui -est-Ya ssin - Sahli.dhtml • http://www.lci.fr/faits -divers/attentat -en-i sere-qu e-sait-on-de-ya ssin -sah li-lauteur -pres ume-de- lattaque-1525932.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/police -justice/article/2015/06/26/qui -est-yassin -sa lhi-le-princi pal-susp ect - de-l-attentat -en-isere_4662742_1653578.h tml • http://www.leparisien.fr/faits -divers/attentat -en-is ere-un e-voisine-de-yassin -sahli -a va it-alert e-les- gendarm es-27-06-2015-4899157.php • http://www.20minutes.fr/lyon/1688063 -20150916 -attentat -is ere-yas sin -sah li-a gi -vengeance- personnelle

51. Ayoub El Khazzani

• http://www.elmundo.es/cronica/2015/08/30/55e16564268e3e79128b456f.html • http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/24/europe/france -train -att ack -what-we-know-ab out -sus pect/ • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34032218 • https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/world/europe/thalys -train -attack -france-m orocca n - suspect.html • http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/justice/le -ti reur-du-thalys -pret end -qu-il-vou lai t -s-attaquer- a-des -americains_1860806.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/socie te/article/2016/12/14/attaque -du-thalys -le-djihadiste-a you b -el- khazzani -ni e-a voi r- voulu -c ommett re -un-m eurt re-de-masse_5049063_3224.html • http://www.20minutes.fr/monde/1980555 -20161214 -attentat -manque-thalys -a youb -el-k hazzani -va- enfin -li vrer-indices -c les-att entats-paris • http://www.lci.fr/faits -divers/attentat -manque-du-thalys -le-djihadiste -a youb -el-khazza ni -assume- ses -responsabilites -2017432.html • http://www.rfi.fr/france/20161219 -terroris m e-franc e-attaque-thalys -el-khazzani -revelations

64

52. Abdelhamid Abaaoud

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34832512 • https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt -for-paris -attackers.html • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34835046 • https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/who -wa s-abdelhamid-abaaoud -isis- paris/416739/ • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/abdelhamid -abaaoud -paris-attacks-ringlead er - mingled -with-polic e-whi le-bataclan -massac re-unfolded -a6747556.html • https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/profile -paris -attack -ringleader -abdelhamid -abaaoud • http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2015/11/17/01003 -20151117ARTFIG00178 -qui-est- abdelhamid -abaaoud -t errorist e-b elge-et-commanditaire-presum e-des -attaques -de-paris. php • http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques -a -paris/article/2015/11/16/qui -est-abdelh amid-abaaou d -le- commanditaire -presum e-d es -attaques-de-paris_4811009_4809495.html • http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/abdelhamid -abaaoud -etait-il-un-espion -de- daech_1757294.html

53. Salah Abdeslam

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34832512 • http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Societe/Attentats -de-Pa ris-Qui-est-vraiment -Sa lah -Abdesla m- 1179086 • http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Societe/Abedeslam -Le-rate-des-renseignements -b elges -1089073 • https://www.rtbf.be/info/dossier/attaques -terroristes -a-paris/detai l_salah -abd es lam-sa-vie-sa- cavale-comm ence -et-finit-a-molenbeek?id=9244408 • http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques -a -paris/article/2015/11/22/ce -que-l-on-sait-de-sa lah -a bdesla m-en- fuite-d epuis-les -attentats -du-13-novembre_4815178_4809495.html • http://www.liberation. fr/france/2015/11/22/les -freres -abdes lam -t enanciers -blin g-bling_1415358

54. Mohamed Abrini

• http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/brussels -attacks/man -hat-spills-t error -gang- s-s ec rets -n693046 • https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt -for-paris -attackers.html • http://www.ouest -france.fr/attentats -paris/qui -est -moham ed -abrini-lautre-fugiti f-ami -de-sa lah - abdeslam -3872564 • http://www.europe1.fr/international/attentats -a -paris -et-b ruxelles-qui-est -moham ed -ab rini-2715055

55. Bilal Hadfi

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34832512 • http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/20/bilal -hadfi-paris-t errorist -left-soci al-media- clue/ • http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/Bilal -Had fi-kamikaze-de-20-ans-866517 • http://www.sudouest.fr/2015 /11/18/photos-et-parc ours -qui-sont -les-huit-terroristes -des -attentats- de-paris -2189685-6155.php • http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/justice/la -radicalisation -du-terrorist e-bi lal -hadfi-a vait-ete- signalee -par-son-ecole_1748886.html • http://www.parismatch .com/Actu/Societe/Bilal -Hadfi -a va it-et e-signa le-sans-succ es-pa r-s on-ec ole- 887325

56. Brahim Abdeslam

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34832512

65

• http://www.sudouest.fr/2015/11/18/photos -et-parc ours -qui-sont -les-huit-terroristes -des -attentats- de-paris -2189685-6155.php • https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt -for-paris -attackers.html • http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brahim -abdes lam -paris- attacks_us_564a687de4b045bf3df092fd • http://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/qui -sont-vraim ent -les -trois-freres-abdesla m-portrait - 564a2d673570bccfaf15e7a9 • https://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/detail_le -parcou rs-d -entrepreneurs -des-freres- salah -et-brahim- abdeslam -a-molenbeek?id=9139640

57. Chakib Akrouh

• http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/01/15/chakib -akrouh -la-m ort -aux-trousses_1426796 • http://www.leparisien.fr/attentats -terroristes -paris/attentats -de-paris -chakib -akrouh -le-li eutenant - d-abaaoud -inhume-a-bru xelles-15-11-2016-6331488.php • http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2016/01/14/qui -est-chakib -akrouh -kamikaze-saint -denis- attentats_n_8982292.html • http://www.lesoir.be/1093894/article/actualite/france/2016 -01-14/un -deuxiem e -belge-i dentifie - parmi-commandos-d es -attent ats-paris • http://www.bbc.com /news/world -europ e-34832512 • http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris -at tacks-man-killed -in-saint -d enis-police- raid-identifi ed -by-pros ecutor -a6813166.html

58. Samy Amimour

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34832512 • https://www.nytimes.com/intera ctive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt -for-paris -attackers.html • http://www.sudouest.fr/2015/12/27/attentats -de-paris -inhume-pour -noel-a mimour -l-introverti - devenu -as sassin -au-bataclan -2228516 -6155.php • http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques -a -paris/article/2015/11/17 /sam y-amim our -de-la-pri ere-en-cachett e- au-djihad_4811828_4809495.html • http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris -t errorist -sam y-a mimour -train ed -at-french - polic e-gun-c lub-before-batac lan -attack -a6756146.html • http://www.spiegel.de/international/eur op e/a-t rip -through -the-paris-banli eu e-of-t errori st -sam y- amimour -a-1079033.html • http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris -t errorist -sam y-a mimour -train ed -at-french - polic e-gun-c lub-before-batac lan -attack -a6756146.html • https://www.theguardian.com/w orld/2015/nov/16/paris -attackers -fath er -tri ed -extract -s on-isis -s yria- sam y-amimou r

59. Omar Ismail Mostefai

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34832512 • https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt -for-paris -attackers.html • https://www.th eguardian.com/world/2015/nov/15/paris -attacker -oma r-i smail -m ost efai • https://www.rtbf.be/info/dossier/attaques -terroristes -a-paris/detail_attentats -de-paris -qui-est-oma r- ismail -mostefai -l-un-des -ka mikazes-du-bataclan?id=9136736 • http://www.lemonde.fr/attaque s-a -paris/article/2015/11/15/ismael -omar -m ost efai -l-un-des- kamikazes -francais-du-bataclan_4810208_4809495.html • http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2015/11/14/omar -ismai l-m os tefai -terrorist e-bataclan - radicalise_n_8565662.html

66

• http://www.rtl.fr/actu/societe -faits-divers/attentats -a-pa ris-qui-sont-oma r-is mail -m ost efai -et-le- deuxi em e-kamika ze -identifi e -7780516416 • http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/attentats -terroristes -a -paris/20151115.OBS9514/ce -que-l-on-sait-d- omar -isma el-mostefai -l-un-des -kamikazes -du-bataclan.html

60. Foued Mohamed -Aggad

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34832512 • http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/09/europe/paris -attacks-th ird -attacker - id/index.html?sr=fbCNN120915 • http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques -a -paris/article/2015/12/09/qui -etait-fou ed -m oham ed -a ggad -le- derni er -kamikaze-du-batacla n -identifie_4827693_4809495.html • http://www.rtl.fr/actu/societe -faits-divers/attentats -a-pa ris-l-ex-p etite-ami e-de- foued -moham ed - aggad -racont e-sa-s oudaine-radicalisation -7780802212 • http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite -france/2015/12/09/01016 -20151209ARTFIG00394 -qui-est -foued - moham ed -aggad -le-troisiem e -kamikaze-du-bataclan.php • http://memri.fr/2015/12/10/profil -exclusi f-de-foued -moha med -a ggad -implique-dans-lat tentat -du- bataclan -le-13-novembre-a -paris/

61. Hasna Ait Boulahcen

• http://www.leparisien.fr/tremblay -en-france-93290/hasna -ait-boulahcen -inhumee-a -trembla y-15-03- 2016-5629767.php • http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/hasna -a it-boulahc en -fami ly-of-woma n -wrongly- accused -of-suicide-b ombing-sa y-she-wa s-murd ered -during-a6824516.html • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-35375297 • http://www.b bc.com/news/world -europ e-34877374 • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/20/hasna -ait-boulahc en -part y-girl -wh o-b ecam e-pa ris- suicide-bomb er • http://www.leparisien.fr/attentats -terroristes -paris/terrorisme -la-m ere-de-hasna -ait-boulahcen -la- polic e-a -tue-ma-fi lle-gratuitement -05-05-2016-5770621.php

62. Reda H ame

• https://emmejihad.wordpress.com/tag/reda -hame/ • http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine -35872562 • https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/isis -s ent-operatives -to-europe-lon g-b efore- brussels -attacks-1.2590854 • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/world/europe/isis -a ttacks-paris-brussels.html

63. Mohamed Bakkali

• http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/35524/Aanslagen -Parijs/article/detail/2780511/2016/06/30/Ook -Mohamed - Bakkali -mag-aan-Frankrijk -overgeleverd -worden.dhtml • http://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/exclusif -l-incroyable -metamorphose-de-m oham ed -bakkali -le-logeur- de-sa lah -abd es lam-a -scha erb eek -56ce114d3570ebb7a8b3f6c6 • http://www.lameuse.be/1599358/article/2016 -06-15/liege -moham ed -bakkali -inculp e -pour- terrorism e -dans-le-cadre-des -attentats-de-par • http://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/l -at eli er -d-explosifs-de-m ohamed -bakkali -a-scha erb eek - 5690178b3570b38a5809b53a • http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/35522/Attaques -en-s erie-a- Paris/article/detail/2780632/2016/06/30/Mohamed -Bakkali -va-bel-et-bien-et re- remis -a -la- France.dhtml

67

• http://www.rtl.be/info/regions/bruxelles/le -point-sur -l-en quete-belge-qui-s ont- les -six-pers onnes- inculpees--774802.aspx • http://www.lacapitale.be/1673551/article/2016 -09-16/mohamed -bakkali -suspect e-d -etre-le-logeur - de-terroristes -a-sch aerbeek -rec lam e-14 • http://www.brusselstimes.com/eu -affairs/5897/the-europ ean -arrest -wa rrant -for- moham ed -bakkali - is-now-enforceable • http://atelier.leparisien.fr/galaxie -djihadiste/profil/mohamed -bakkali/P094 • http://www.brusselstimes.com/eu -affairs/5897/the-europ ean -arrest -wa rrant -for- moham ed -bakkali - is-now-enforceable

64. Muhaydin Mire

• http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3350045/Family-attempted -murder-suspect -called -polic e- tube-attack.html • http://www.dailyma il.co.uk/news/article -3348758/Man-29-charged -attempted -mu rder-Tube-station - two-m en-attacked -man -a llegedly-d ec la red -S yria.htm l • http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/leytonstone -tube-attack -muh yadin -mires-fami ly-c ontacted -polic e-over- mental-h ealth -c onc erns -1532235 • http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/624719/Muhaydin -Mire-cha rged -leytonstone -t error -attack -name

65. Raouf El Ayeb

• http://www.espacemanager.com/raouf -el-a yeb -le-tunisien -qui-fonc e-sur -4-mi litaires -en-criant- allah -akbar.html • http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite -franc e/ 2016/01/03/01016 -20160103ARTFIG00150 -valence-mis -en- exam en -l-as saillant -voulait -t uer -des-militaires.php • http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Faits -divers/Attaque -des -mi litaires -a-Va lenc e-l-agres seu r -ne-trouvait - pas-de-plac e-p our- se-garer-7 66871 • http://www.leprogres .fr/rhone/2016/01/04/la -derni ere -fois -que-je-l-ai-vu-il-etait -t res -bizarre- deprim e

66. Unknown minor no. 3

• http://www.france24.com/en/20170303 -france-ma rs ei lle -t een -jai l-mach et e-attack -j ewi sh -teach er - yarmu lke • http://www.france24.com/en/20160111 -france-t een -stabbing-j ewish -t each er -mars eille • http://www.timesofisrael.com/jewish -man-injured -in-sta bbing-at-mars ei lles -s yna gogue/ • http://www.bfmtv.com/societe/marseille -un-mineur -desequilibre -bless e-legerem ent -un-juif-a vec- une-machett e -942572.html • http://www.lejdd.fr/So ciete/Faits -divers/Marseille -un-mi neur-desequilibre -bles s e-legerem ent -un- juif-avec-un e-mach ett e-768035 • http://www.lindependant.fr/2016/01/11/marseille -un-ado-agres s e-un-ens eignant -juif-a -la-machett e- au-nom-d-allah,2140056.php

67. Mohammad Syeedy

• http://www.it v.com/news/2016 -08-24/is-supporter-accus ed -of-bludgeoning -imam -to-dea th -at-la rge- jury-t old/ • http://www.bbc.com/news/uk -en gland -manchest er -37388073 • http://www.bbc.com/news/uk -en gland -manchest er -37160729 • https://www.theguardian.com/uk -news/2016/sep/16/former -manchest er -united -st eward -convict ed - murder-imam -m ohamm ed -s ye ed y

68

• https://www.theguardian.com/uk -news/2016/sep/05/alleged -killer-ima m-c ourt-is lamic -state- rochdale • http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/isis -inspired -mu rder -of-imam-s ees-mohamm ed -s yeed y- convicted_uk_57dc3fb7e4b05d79136fc18b

68. Mohammad Kadir

• http://www.itv.com/news/2016 -08-24/is-supporter-accus ed -of-bludgeoning -imam -to-dea th -at-la rge- jury-t old/ • http://www.bbc.com/news/uk -en gland -manchest er -37160729 • https://www.theguardian.com/uk -news/2016/sep/16/former -manchest er -united -st eward -convict ed - murder-imam -m ohamm ed -s ye ed y • https://www.theguardian.com/uk -news/2016/sep/05/alleged -killer-ima m-c ourt-is lamic -state- rochdale

69. Safia Schmitter

• http://www.dailymail.co .uk/news/article -3476986/Teenage-fema le- ISIS -fanatic- radicalised -a ge- seven -stabbed -German -polic e-offic er -unable-mak e-S yria. html • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/18/german -t een -who-stabbed -p olice-officer-in-isil- attack -told-briti/ • https://www.theloca l.de/20170126/16 -year -old-isis -sympathizer-gets -to-si x-years -jai l-for -stabbing- officer • http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/759236/isis -teenage-gi rl-ma rt yrdom -attack -jailed -stabbing- polic eman -safia-s • http://www.dw.com/en/from -hanover -to-is-th e-cas e-of-safia-s/a-36094144 • http://in.reuters.com/article/germany -s ecurit y-idINKCN12K176 • http://www.dw.com/en/16 -year-old-s entenc ed -to-si x-yea rs -aft er -stabbing-german -p olice-offic er - for-is/a -37278881

70. Mohamed Belkaid

• https://www.rtbf.be/info/societe/detail_forest -m ohammed-belkaid -etait-volontaire-p our -mou rir -en- kamikaze?id=9243697 • http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/kolumnister/peterkadhammar/article22531578.ab • http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques -a -paris/article/2016/03/19/mohamed -b elkaid -mort -en-prot egeant - la-fuite-d-abdes lam -et-logisticien -des-att entats-de-paris_4886074_4809495.html • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/world/europe/belgium -terrori sm-suspect.html • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris -attacks-isis-sa lah -abdes lam s -fingerprint - and-dna-found -at-sc ene -of-gun-battle-at-bruss els -flat -a6938831.html • https://nypost.com/2016/03/19/dead -bruss els-gunman -wan ted -to-be-isis -suicide -bomb er/ • http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/attentats -m oham ed -b elkaid -a-j oue-un-role-c le- 56f973ad35708ea2d3ffa3f5 • http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article24011093.ab

71. Ibrahim El Bakraoui

• http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la -fg-susp ect -in-bru ssels-attacks-is-s ought -20160323- story.htm l • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/europe/expanding -port raits-of-bruss els -bombers- ibrahim-and-khalid -el-bakraoui.html

69

72. Najim Laachraoui

• http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la -fg-susp ect -in-bru ssels-attacks-is-s ought -20160323- story.htm l • http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/brussels -attacks/najim -laachra oui -what -we-know-a bout- suspect ed -bomb-maker-n543996 • http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/attentats -terroristes - bruxelles/20160327.OBS7231/attentats -de-b ruxelles-p lon gee-dans-l-en fance-des-el-ba kraoui -les- freres-kamikazes.html • http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/faits -divers/attentats -a-b ruxelles -vu-le-pass e-des -freres-el- bakraoui -pourquoi -n -etaient -ils -pas-en-pris on --804697.aspx • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/09/world/europe/najim -laachra oui -paris -bruss els -attacks.html • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/world/europe/najim -laachra oui -24-bomb -maker-for -paris -and- brussels -attacks.html • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/21/brussels -bomber -najim-laachraoui -work ed -at-ai rport - for-five-yea r/

73. Kh ali d E l B ak raoui

• https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/world/europe/expanding -port raits-of-bruss els -bombers- ibrahim-and-khalid -el-bakraoui.html • http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la -fg-susp ect -in-bru ssels-attacks-is-s ought -20160323- story.htm l • https://www.wsj.com/a rticles/europes -t error -subsidies -1470435810 • http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/attentats -terroristes - bruxelles/20160327.OBS7231/attentats -de-b ruxelles-p lon gee-dans-l-en fance-des-el-ba kraoui -les- freres-kamikazes.html • http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/fait s-divers/attentats -a-b ruxelles -vu-le-pass e-des -freres-el- bakraoui -pourquoi -n -etaient -ils -pas-en-pris on --804697.aspx

74. Osama Krayem

• http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1822975 -20160409 -attentats-bruxelles -osa ma-kra yem -interpelle - moham ed -abrini • http://www.indepen dent.co.uk/news/world/europe/osama -kra yem-s wedish -jihadist -linked -to- brussels -bombings-charged -with-t errori st -murd er-in-pari s-a6993236.html • http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/brussels -attack -wh o-osama -kra yem -jihadi-malm o-a rrested -m an-hat- 1554105 • http://www.dailymail .co.uk/wires/afp/article -3531796/Osama-Kra yem -S wedish -radical -link ed - Brussels-attacks.html • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-36009196 • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-36005709 • http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/International/Qui -est -Osama-Kra yem-c omplic e-pres ume-d es - kamikazes -942455 • http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite -france/2016/04/20/01016 -20160420ARTFIG00310 -attentats-de- bruxelles -qui-est-osama -kra yem -le-d euxi em e-h omm e-du-met ro.php • http://www.expressen.se/nyheter/lamnade -fami lj en -for-att -ansluta-sig-till-is/ • http://www.expressen.se/kvallsposten/klasskamraten -han-umgicks-m ed-fel-folk/ • http://www.expressen.se/kvallsposten/osama -kra yem-23-h aktad -for -terrorbrott/

70

75. Yus suf T .

• https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/sikh -t emp le-bombing-in-german y-wa s-ca rri ed- out-by-isis-sympathisers -a7007166.html • http://www.dw.com/en/sikh -bomb-attack -in-ess en -politically-motivated/a -19422247 • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/21/two -a rres ted -aft er-explosi on -at-sikh -temp le-in- german y • https://www.jihadwatch.org/2016/04/germany -mus lim-t eens-admit-bombing-sikh -temp le-on e-was- in-deradicalization -program

• https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/3 -mus lims -bombed -germa n -sikh -temp le-found - guilt y- kallirai?articleId=7741553973404953317

76. Mohammed B.

• http://www.dw.com/en/sikh -bomb-attack -in-ess en -politically-motivated/a -19422247 • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/21/two -a rres ted -aft er-explosi on -at-sikh -temp le-in- german y • http://www.reuters.com/article/us -german y-secu rit y-idUSKCN0XI2GO • https://www.jihadwatch.org/2016/04/germany -mus lim-t eens-admit-bombing-sikh -temp le-on e-was- in-deradicalization -program • https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/3 -mus lims -bombed -germa n -sikh -temp le-found - guilt y- kallirai?articleId=7741553973404953317

77. Larossi Abballa

• http://www.bb c.com/news/world -europ e-36526067 • http://www.lemonde.fr/meurtres -de-p oliciers -a-magnanville/article/2016/10/03/magnanville - laros si -abballa-a -ete-enterre-au-maroc_5007359_4950044.html • http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite -france/2016/06/14/01016 -20160614ARTFIG000 67-marc-trevidic- le-djihadiste-la rossi -c -est-m oi-qui-l-ai-mis-en-exam en.php • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/world/europe/france -stabbing-polic e-magnanville- isis.html?_r=0 • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/14/french -police-officer-wife-murd ered -laros si - abballa-i sis

78. Mohamed Lahouaiej -Bouh l el

• https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/15/world/europe/nice -france-truck -bastille-da y.html • http://www.reuters.com/article/us -europ e-attacks-nice-att acker -idUSKCN0ZW0PV?il=0 • http://www.dw.com/en/prosecutor -t ruck -attack-on-nice-was-premeditated/a -19408446 • http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la -fg-france -nice-aftermath -20160718 -snap -story.html • http://www.leparisien.fr/faits -divers/attentat -de-nic e-le-s uspect -n-a vait-jamais-fait-de-pris on - souli gn e-le-ministre-de-la-justice-16-07-2016-5972495.php • https://www.challenges.fr/france/20160716.CHA1906/qui -est -moham ed -lah ouaiej -b ouhlel-l-auteur - de-l-attentat -de-nice.htm l

79. Adel Kermiche

• https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/normandy -church -attack -adel-k erm ich -isis- franc e-saint-eti enne -du-rouvra y-jacques-ham el-a7157316.html • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/french -authorities-under-pres sure-to-explain - releas e-of-pri ests -killer

71

• https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/teenager -wh o-murdered -french -pri est -wa s-lik e-a - ticking-time-b omb • http://www.lemonde.fr/police -justice/article/2016/07/27/saint -eti enne-du-rouvra y-p ou rquoi -l-un- des-aut eurs -de-l-att entat -a-et e-remis -en-libert e-en-mars_4975134_1653578.html • http://www.tdg.ch/geneve/actu -genevoise/jeune-francais-radicalise -arrete-a eroport - geneve/story/11754052 • http://www.ledauphine.com/france -monde/2016/07/26/quel -est-le-p rofil-d es-aut eurs -de-l-attaque • http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/ adel-kermiche-sa-vi e-en-pri son -06-10-2016-2074111_23.php

80. Abdel Malik Petitjean

• https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/french -authorities-under-pres sure-to-explain - releas e-of-pri ests -killer • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/europe/france -church-attack.html?_r=0 • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/28/second -normand y-attacker -wa s-on-s ec urit y- regist er • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/teenager -wh o-murdered -french -pri est -wa s-lik e-a - ticking-time-b omb • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ne ws/2016/07/27/normandy -ch urch -attack -who-is-th e-susp ect -adel- kermich e/ • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-36914706 • http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Societe/Le -p ere-d -Abdel-Ma lik -P etitj ean -craint -une-vengeance - de-sa-fi lle-1028644 • http://www.ledauphine.com/savoie/2016/07/28/abdel -mali k -petitjean -le-tueur -qui-vena it -d- apparaitre-dans-les-radars-de-l-antiterrorisme • http://www.francesoir.fr/societe -faits-divers/pretre -egorge-qui-est -abdel-malik -nabil-petitjean -le- deuxi em e-terroriste

81. Mes a Hod ži ć

• https://www.thelocal.dk/20160901/christiania -shooter-is-isis-sympathizer • https://www.thelocal.dk/20160901/christiania -shooting-what-we-know • https://www.thelocal.dk/20160901/two -polic e-offic ers -one-ci vi lian -shot -in-christiania • http://nyheder.tv2. dk/krimi/2016 -09-08-soennen -skoed -b etjent -i-hoved et -j eg-er-vred-p aa-ham-m en- han-vil-a ltid -va ere -mit • http://www.bt.dk/krimi/ven -til-d oed-pistolmand -fra-christiania -han-hadede-politi et -og-elsk ede- vaaben • http://www.b.dk/nationalt/mesa -hod zics-li v-vidner-om-en-forraa et -loeb ebane

82. Ines Madani

• http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Ines -Orn ella-Sarah -Am el-qui-sont-les -femm es-qui- vou lai ent -attaquer- Paris -808318 • http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1921623 -20160909 -attentats-dej oues-paris -femm es -commando-li e- bonbonnes-ga z • http://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2016/11/07/ines -madani-la-djihadiste-qui-se-faisait - passer-pou r-un-homme_5026435_1653578.html • http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1956359 -20161107 -attentat -dejou e-paris-djihadiste-in es -madani- fait-pass er -hom m e-s eduire-c omplic e • http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash -actu/2016/09/09/97001 -20160909FILWWW00202 -bonbonnes-de-ga z- ines-madani-c onnue-d es -enq ueteu rs-b elges.php

72

83. Sarah Hervouet

• http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Ines -Orn ella-Sarah -Am el-qui-sont-les -femm es-qui- vou lai ent -attaquer- Paris -808318 • http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1921623 -20160909 -attentats-dej oues-paris -femm es -commando-li e- bonbonnes-ga z

84. Ornella Gilligman

• http://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Ines -Orn ella-Sarah -Am el-qui-sont-les -femm es-qui- vou lai ent -attaquer- Paris -808318 • http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world -news/female -isis -t errorist -c ell-wanted -8812233 • http://www.leberry.fr/chalette -sur-loing/faits-divers/2016/09/11/ ornella-gi lli gman -la-t errorist e - chalettoise-presumee -aurait-affirm e-que-la-t our-ei ffel -etait-une-cible_12066904.html • http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/1505/Monde/article/detail/2866864/2016/09/12/Ornella -m ere-de- famille-mari ee-a-un-djihadiste-par -telephone.dhtml • http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1921623 -20160909 -attentats-dej oues-paris -femm es -commando-li e- bonbonnes-ga z • http://www.leparisien.fr/faits -divers/une-m ere-de-fami lle-devenue-terrorist e-12-09-2016- 6113033.php

85. Unknown minor no. 5

• http://www.bbc.com/news/worl d -europ e-37334836

86. H aroon Al i -Syed

• http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3787560/London-teenager -19-plott ed -carry-na il-b omb- attack.html • http://metro.co.uk/2016/09/13/teenager -19-plotted -to-ca rry-out-t error -attack -on-oxford -street - 6126398/ • https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1777657/een -appea rs -in-c ourt-accus ed -of-planning-ma ss-casua lt y- nail-bomb -attack -on-pa lace-a nd-elton -j ohn/amp

87. Hicham Diop

• http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/faits -divers/hicham -diop-aurait-poignard e-d es -polici ers-a- schaerb eek -s ous-l-effet -de-m edicaments -presc rits-par -s on-m edecin -857947.aspx • http://www.lacapitale.be/1688720/article/2016 -10-05/hicham-diop-kick-boxeur- et-ex-m ilitaire- attaque-des -polici ers -en-rue-a-schaerbee • http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/3007/Bruxelles/article/detail/2916273/2016/10/12/ Les-a vocats-du-frere- d-Hicham-Di op-d emandent -sa-remis e-en-liberte.dhtml • http://www.dhnet.be/regions/bruxelles/hicham -diop -l-hom me-qui-a-attaque-les -polici ers-a- schaerb eek -criait -tu ez-moi -57f6a273cd70871fc426b33c • http://www.dhnet.be/actu/faits/la -mere-d -hicham-diop-l-h omm e-qui-a-attaque-trois -policiers - radicalis e-m on-fi ls-il-laiss e-ca-aux-autres -57f55bc0cd70e9985fea5170

88. Unknown minor no. 6

• https://www.thelocal.de/20161216/12 -year -old-attempted -to-b omb-christmas -ma rket -report • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -4039992/Boy-a ged-TWELVE -youngest -pers on -Europ e- arrest ed -t error -offenc es -plan ning-bomb-Christma s-ma rket -Germany.html • https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/boy -12-h eld-on-suspicion -of-trying -to-bomb- german -mark et-1.2908839

73

89. Oussama Ahmad Atar

• http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/16/europe/oussama -atar -profile/index.html • http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2016/08/17/oussama -atar-le-cousin -d es -kamikazes -des- attentats-de-bruxelles -activement -recherche -par-les -autorites-belges_4984153_3214.html • http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2016/11/08/qui -est- oussama -atar-soupconne -davoir -coordonne-les - attentats-paris -bruxelles/ • http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/09/02/oussama -atar -encomb rant -djihadiste- belge_4991540_3210.htm l • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/oussama -atar-i sis-pari s-bruss els-a ttacks- mastermind -coordinator-abou -ahmad -bakraoui -brothers -s yria-a7404631.html

90. Abdelilah Himich

• https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abu -su leyman -al-fi ransi • https:/ /www.propublica.org/article/us -id entifies-k ey-p la yer-in-isis -attacks-on-europe • http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques -a -paris/article/2016/11/23/abdelilah -himich -le- legionnaire-de-l- etat-islamique_5036387_4809495.html • https://www.sofx.com/2016/11/23/us -names -forei gn-legion -vet eran -man -behind -paris-brussels - attacks-ibtimes/ • https://www.propublica.org/article/us -id entifies-isi s-p lanner -in-attacks-on-europ e • http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us -names -french -forei gn -legi on -veteran -isis -susp ect -b ehind -paris- brussels -attacks-1592907http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us -nam es -french -forei gn -legi on -vet eran -isis- suspect -b ehind -paris-bruss els-attacks-1592907http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us -nam es-fren ch -foreign - legi on -vet eran -isi s-susp ect -b ehind -paris-brus sels-attacks-1592907http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us - names -french -forei gn -legi on -veteran -isis -susp ect -b ehind -paris-bruss els -attacks- 1592907http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/us -names -french -forei gn -legion -vet eran -i sis- suspect -behind - paris-bruss els -attacks-1592907vvv • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/world/europe/isis -paris-brus sels-attacks.html • http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/attentats -terroristes -a -paris/20161123.OBS1635/abdelilah -himich - de-s oldat -de-la-legion -et rangere -a-li eutenant -de- l-ei.html • http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/u -s-id entifi es-i sis-plann er -in-attacks-on-europe/ • http://www.rfi.fr/france/20161020 -Abdeli lah -hamich -cerveau -13-novembre-attentats -a rmee-s oldats - defens e

91. Rashid Kassim

• http://www.france24.com/en/20160912 -france-rachid -kass im-terrorism -plots-i sla mic -st ate-group - paris-polic e • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-37340697 • http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/saint -etienn e-du-rouvra y-rachid -kassim -le-djihadiste-qui- a-inspire-les-a ssassins -du-pere-hamel_1822206.html • http://www.leparisien.fr/faits -divers/rachid -kassim-puni-par-daech -29-11-2016-6388731.php • http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1921887 -20160909 -video -attentats-d ejou es -paris -rach id -kassim- emin ence-gris e-t errorism e • http:// www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2016/09/16/rachid -kassim-le-gourou -des- enfants - terroristes_4998559_3224.html

92. Fabien Clain

• http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2016/06/21/fabien -clain -jihadiste-proch e-laros si -abballa-saad -rajraji - terrorism e -enquet e-polici ers-tues-magnanville_n_10584392.html • http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/04/10/fabien -clain -le-djihadiste -pass e-partout_1445311

74

• http://www.lemonde.fr/police -justice/article/2016/09/24/terrorisme -une-s -ur-de-fabien -clain -mis e- en-examen_5002955_1653578.html • http://www.leparisien.fr/faits -divers/attentats -la-s oeur-de-fabien -clain -a rret ee-mardi-soir -a-roiss y- cdg-21-09-2016-6138575.php • http://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2016/06/22/2370668 -fabien -c lain -tou lous e-raqqa -itineraire- tueur.html • http://www.vsd.fr/actualite/exclusif -un e-proch e-de-fabien -clain -t em oign e -dans-vsd-m es-petits - enfants-sont-sous -les-b omb es-13089 • http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques -a -paris/article/2015/11/18/fabien -clain -la-voi x-du-ma ssacre-de- paris-avait -deja-m enace -le-b ataclan -en-2009_4812298_4809495.html

93. Salim Benghalem

• http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2014/10/01/mandat -d-arret -international-c ontre-le- djihadiste-francais- salim -benghalem_4498356_3224.html • http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite -france/2014/10/01/01016 -20141001ARTFIG00344 -qui-est -sa lim- benghalem-ce-djihadiste -francais-rech erch e-par -les-etats -unis.php

Australian Cluster 94. Numan Haider

• http://newsstore.smh.com.au/apps/vi ewDocument.ac;jsessionid=86C3BB971DB8A60E9C232FB1E59 3F4DD?sy=afr&pb=all_ffx&dt=selectRange&dr=1month&so=relevance&sf=text&sf=headline&rc=1 0&rm=200&sp=brs&cls=540&clsPage=1&docID=SHD140928D23L2ADL8ED • https://www.theguardian.com/australia -news/2016/mar/07/po lic e-had-no-choic e -but-to-shoot - numan -haider-inquest -h ears • http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/inquirer/numan -haider-li fe-and-d eath -of-a -t eenage- jihadist/news -story/8b063949e551c2531ea009482ec72e24 • http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/numan -haider-had-b een-radicalis ed -b efore-he-stab bed -polic e- inquest -hea rs-20160311-gngxyt.html • http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016 -03-07/father-of-m elbou rne -terror-suspect -una wa re-s on- radicalised/7226790 • https://www.theguardian.com/australia -news/2016/mar/25/rapid -radicalisation -the-cas e-of-numan - haider-sh ocks-fami ly-and-experts -a like • http://www.smh.com.au/national/numan -haider-t eenagers-phone-acc ess ed -vi olent -is-vi deos-da ys- before-attack -inquest -told -20160321 -gnndv6.html • http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/piecing -puzzle-of-how-numan-haider -turned -radical/news - story/cfcc5e061b017566987e758bd042537b

95. Man Haron Monis

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -austra lia -30484419 • http://time.com/3634388/man -haron -monis -s ydn ey/ • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/sydney -si ege-gunman -identifi ed -by-polic e- as-well-known -is lamist -c leri c-sheikh -man-ha ron - monis -9926122.html • http://www.dailylife.com.au/news -and-vi ews/dl -opinion/sydney-si ege-man-haron -m onis-history-of- violenc e-a gainst -wom en -was -a-wa rning-sign -no-on e-t ook -s eri ous ly-20141216 -128g8e.html • http://abcnews.go.com/International/sydney -hostage -taker -identifi ed -man-haron - monis/story?id=27607179 • David Killcullen (2016): Blood Year

75

96. Mohammad Kiad

• http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/police -station -terror -plott er -m ohammad -kiad-an- islamic-state-support er-c ourt -hea rs/news -story/c2dc8342b95e5be33f7a70a7a5fd0623 • http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/sydney -t error -p lott ers-oma r-alkutobi -and-mohammad -kia d-jailed -for- 15-yea rs -20161209 -gt7l0f.html • http://www.news.com.au/national/nsw -act/courts - la w/t wo -s ydney-t error -p lott ers-jai led -for -15- years/n ews-story/d679d438bc780f1b4a459db882d274c5 • http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/omar -a lkutobi -and-mohamma d -kiad-plead -gui lt y-to-plotting-t errorist - attack -20160727 -gqetgx.html • http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/sydney -t error-p lott ers-oma r-a lkutobi -a nd-mohammad - kiad-jailed -for -15- yea rs/news-story/6332ed5338597e58744fb1b066bcd04d • http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016 -12-09/mohammad -kiad-and-omar -al-kutobi-s ent encing- hearing/8105976

97. O mar Al -Ku tobi

• http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/police -station -terror -plott er -m ohammad -kiad-an- islamic-state-support er-c ourt -hea rs/news -story/c2dc8342b95e5be33f7a70a7a5fd0623 • http://www.smh.com.au/ns w/ s ydney-t error -p lott ers-oma r-alkutobi -and-mohammad -kia d-jailed -for- 15-yea rs -20161209 -gt7l0f.html • http://www.news.com.au/national/nsw -act/courts - la w/t wo -s ydney-t error -p lott ers-jai led -for -15- years/n ews-story/d679d438bc780f1b4a459db882d274c5 • http://www.smh.c om.au/nsw/omar -a lkutobi -and-mohamma d -kiad-plead -gui lt y-to-plotting-t errorist - attack -20160727 -gqetgx.html • http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/sydney -t error-p lott ers-oma r-a lkutobi -a nd-mohammad - kiad-jailed -for -15- yea rs/news-story/6332ed5338597e58744fb 1b066bcd04d • http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016 -12-09/mohammad -kiad-and-omar -al-kutobi-s ent encing- hearing/8105976

98. Sevdet Ramadan Besim

• https://www.theguardian.com/australia -news/2016/aug/01/anzac -da y-terrorism -plot-sevdet -b esim- want ed -to-emu late-numan -haider • https://www.theguardian.com/australia -news/2016/jun/30/melbourne -teena ger -accused -of-anzac - day-t errorist -p lot-p leads -guilt y • http://www.news.com.au/national/victoria/crime/melbourne -t een -s evd et -ramadan -besim -jailed - over-an zac-da y-p lot/n ews -story/121a5a7ce86 ef2de2a6a25b21fbd6c45 • http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/sevdet -b esim -19-get s-10-yea rs -jail-for-an zac -da y-plot -to- behead -p olice-officer-20160905-gr8u95.html • https://aussiemadness.com/2015/07/24/uk -muslim-boy-p leads-guilt y-to-inciting-aussie-t error/ • http://www.smh.com.au/world/life -sent ence -for-en glish -boy-wh o-h elped -p lan-m elbou rne-an zac- day-attack -20151002 -gk0d74.html • http://www.smh.com.au/national/keyboard -wa rri or -anzac -terror -plot-accus ed -s evd et -b esim- alleged ly-guided -onlin e-20150508 -ggxlaz.html

99. Unkn own min or no. 2

• http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/law -order/teenager -p leads-guilt y-to-planning-m others-da y- terrorist -attack -in-melbourne/news -story/2ffaf966f87e4c5c62a98d282bbe4b0f • http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/how -operation -to-th wa rt-a lleged -m oth ers -da y-t error -attack - unfold ed -20150509-ggxyse.html

76

• https://www.theguardian.com/australia -news/2015/may/09/alleged -m oth ers -da y-attacks-foiled -by- polic e-raids-in-melb ourne -an d-s ydney • http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016 -12-07/teen -c onvict ed -of-p lanning-m elbourn e-t errori st -attack - sentenced/8100502

• http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016 -09-05/teen -partia lly-ma de-explosi ve-d evic e-in-t error -plot-c ourt- told/7816444

100. Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar

• http://www.s mh.com.au/nsw/parramatta -sh ooting -gunman -identified -as-farhad -jabar-kh alil- mohammad -20151003 -gk0jze.html • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3258532/Final-m om ents-Parramatta -gunman -F arhad -Jabar- Kha li l-Mohammad.html • http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/australi a/72664821/sydney-gunman -farhad -khali l-moham mad -jabar- wa s-a -15 yearold -boy • https://www.theguardian.com/australia -news/2015/oct/03/parramatta -sh ooting -gunman -wa s- radicalised -15-yea r-old-reports-sa y • https://www.businessinsider.com.au/nsw -p olic e-sa y-th e-s hooti ng-by-a -15-yea r- old-t eenager-at- s ydney-p olice-hq-was -linked -to-terrorism -2015-10 • http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/parramatta -sh ooting -fa rhad -khalil-m ohammad -jabar -named -as- killer-of-curtis -chen g/news -story/55aa5e61e1ea7c2f5988c8689461fe9f

101. Unknown minor no. 4

• https://www.theguardian.com/australia -news/2016/apr/25/sydney -b oy-16-charged -with-terrorism - offences -linked -to-an zac-da y • https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/25/sydney -b oy-16-a lleged ly-tri ed -to-get-gun-for-us e- in-anzac-da y-t errorist -attack

102. I hsas Khan

• http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/minto -t error -attack -islamic-radical-ihsas -khan-had-a- plan-to-kill-an-aussi e-polic e-wi ll-allege/news-story/9387ee0207ae009f7ee6f525e0eb5bad • http://www.news.com.au/national/nsw -act/crime/ihsas -kha n-minto-t error -accused -wish ed -his- classmat es -a-nic e-li fe/news-story/f67895f2dfe7b124a8fce1ff08312003 • http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/minto -t error-accus ed -ihsas -khans-previous -propert y-attack -motivat ed - by-iraq-and-afghanistan -wa rs -20160912 -grec6j.html • http://www.dailymail.co.u k/news/article -3784941/Alleged-Minto-stabbing-t errorist - Ihs as-Khan- told -police-2013-hated -Australia.html • http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/man -charged -with-com mitting-a -terrorist -act-and-attempt ed -mu rder- in-s ydney-20160910-grdlh8.html • https://www.independent.co.uk /news/world/australasia/sydney-stabbing-isis-t errori sm-ihsas-khan- wa yn e-greenhalgh -att empted -murd er -a7236871.html

Immigrants Cluster 103. Rafik Yousef

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34284044 • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3238837/German-police-kill-known - Is lamic -terrorist - western -B erlin -attacked -s eri ously-injured -fema le-offic er -knife.html • https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06BERLIN3565_a.html • https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07FRANKFURT445_a.html

77

• https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08FRANKFURT2271_a.html

104. Ah mad al-Mohammad

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34832512

105. M. al-Mah mod

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-34832512

106. Adel Haddadi

• http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques -a -paris/article/2016/04/26/at tentats-du-13-novembre -je-d evais- aller -en-france-pour -accomplir-une-mission_4908547_4809495.html • https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national -security/how-europ es -migrant -crisi s-becam e-an- opportunity-for -isis/2016/04/21/ec8a7231 -062d-4185 -bb27- cc7295d3541 5_story.html?utm_term=.7f9732649a14 • http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite -france/2016/07/29/01016 -20160729ARTFIG00237 -attentats-du-13- novembre-qui-sont -les-d eux-suspects-remis -a-la-france.p hp

107. Muhammad Ghani Usman

• http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques -a -paris/article/2 016/04/26/attentats -du-13-novembre -je-d evais- aller -en-france-pour -accomplir-une-mission_4908547_4809495.html • https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national -security/how-europ es -migrant -crisi s-becam e-an- opportunity-for -isis/2016/04/21/ec8a7231 -062d-4185 -bb27- cc7295d35415_story.html?utm_term=.7f9732649a14 • http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite -france/2016/07/29/01016 -20160729ARTFIG00237 -attentats-du-13- novembre-qui-sont -les-d eux-suspects-remis -a-la-france.php

108. Tarek Belgacem

• http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2016/01/07/t irs-commissariat -18e-arrondissement - paris_n_8928138.html?utm_hp_ref=paris • http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2016/01/22/tarek -belgac em -commissariat -goutt e-d or -res eau - islamiste_n_9049912.html • http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/l -as saillant -du-commissariat -habitait -un-foyer-de-refugi es-en- allemagn e-10-01-2016-2008496_23.php • http://www.leparisien.fr/faits -divers/commissariat -a-pari s-les-enquet eurs-pas-c ertains-de-l- identite-de-l-assai llant -08-01-2016-5432083.php • http://www.lci.fr/france/attaque -du-18e-lassaillant -sappelle-tarek -belkac em-et-a-et e-i dentifie -par - des-p roch es -1243582.html • http://www.linternaute.com/actualite/societe/1270468 -tarek -belgac em -le-veritable -nom -de-l- homm e-abattu -a-barb es -paris -18/ • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris -shooting -man-ki lled -by-p olice-had-li ved - in-german -refugee-camp -a6805076.html

109. S al eh A.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/world/europe/germany -duss eldorf -isis.html • https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany -arrests -3-s yrians -over -terror-attack -plot -on-bus y- dusseldorf -street -1464872522 • http://www.politico.eu/article/dusseldorf -t error -german y-news -isi l-fou r-a rrest ed -attac k -planned - s yria/

78

• https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany -a rrests -3-susp ect ed -s yrian -t errorists -foils- alleged -i slamic -stat e-plot/2016/06/02/31e29767 -6df7 -496b-aa47 - 5b8911459f13_story.html?utm_term=.f8286ce2e3e4

110. H amza C.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/world/ europe/germany-duss eldorf -isis.html • https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany -arrests -3-s yrians -over -terror-attack -plot -on-bus y- dusseldorf -street -1464872522 • http://www.politico.eu/article/dusseldorf -t error -german y-news -isi l-fou r-a rrest ed -attac k -planned - s yria/ • https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany -a rrests -3-susp ect ed -s yrian -t errorists -foils- alleged -i slamic -stat e-plot/2016/06/02/31e29767 -6df7 -496b-aa47 - 5b8911459f13_story.html?utm_term=.f8286ce2e3e4

111. Abd Arahman A. K.

• https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/0 3/world/europe/germany -duss eldorf -isis.html • https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany -arrests -3-s yrians -over -terror-attack -plot -on-bus y- dusseldorf -street -1464872522 • http://www.politico.eu/article/dusseldorf -t error -german y-news -isi l-fou r-a rrest ed -attac k -planned - s yria/ • https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany -a rrests -3-susp ect ed -s yrian -t errorists -foils- alleged -i slamic -stat e-plot/2016/06/02/31e29767 -6df7 -496b-aa47 - 5b8911459f13_story.html?utm_term=.f8286ce2e3e4

112. Mahood B .

• https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/0 3/world/europe/germany -duss eldorf -isis.html • https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany -arrests -3-s yrians -over -terror-attack -plot -on-bus y- dusseldorf -street -1464872522 • http://www.politico.eu/article/dusseldorf -t error -german y-news -isi l-fou r-a rrest ed -attac k -planned - s yria/ • https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany -a rrests -3-susp ect ed -s yrian -t errorists -foils- alleged -i slamic -stat e-plot/2016/06/02/31e29767 -6df7 -496b-aa47 - 5b8911459f13_story.html?utm_term=.f8286ce2e3e4

113. Riaz Khan Ahmadzai

• http://www.ibtimes.co.uk /german -train -attack -ria z-khan-a hmadzai -left-lett er -sa ying -m uslims -must- defend -thems elves-1571681 • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3698818/Did-ISIS-a xe-attacker-LIE -Afghanistan -Claims- train -jihadi-hid-Pakistani -background -high er -immigration -status-Germany.html • http://www.n -tv.de/politik/Was -ueb er -d en-Axt-Attentaeter -bekannt -ist-article18232006.html • http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/attackers -in-german y-had-contact - with-s uspected -is- memb ers-a -1106271.html

114. Mohammad Daleel

• http://www.reuters.c om/article/us-europ e-attacks-german y-da leel -insight -idUSKCN10823G • https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/world/europe/germany -refugees -terrorism.html?_r=0 • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-37059100 • http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ansbach -der-auffaelli g-unauffaellige -taet er-mohammad - daleel -a-1104809.html

79

• http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/attackers -in-german y-had-contact - with-s uspected -is- memb ers-a -1106271.html

115. Khaled Babouri

• http://www.lanouvellegazette.be/1641039/article/2016 -08-08/forc e-a -quitter -le-t erritoi re -khaled - babouri -le-t errorist e-de-charleroi -d evait -r • http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/1502/Belgique/article/detail/2824719/2016/08/08/Le -t erroriste-de- Charleroi -a vait-t out -tente-p our-rest er-en-Belgique.dhtml • http://www.fdesouche.com/753907 -belgique-un-homm e-at taque-deu x-polici ers-a vec-une-machett e- pres -du-commissariat -de-cha rleroi • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3729141/Belgian-officia l-sa ys -mach ete -attacker -known - pett y-crim e.htm l • http://lepeuple.be/gouvernement -a-t -m enti-la lgerien -tueur -de-charleroi/70427 • http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/32684/Menaces -terroristes -en- Belgique/arti cle/detail/2828950/2016/08/12/Khaled -est -un-migrant -pas-un-t errorist e -de-l-E I.dhtml • http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article -3729141/Belgian-officia l-sa ys -mach ete -attacker -known - pett y-crim e.htm l

116. Mahi r al -H

• http://www.reuters.com/article/us -german y-secu rit y-arres ts-idUSKCN11J0RQ?il=0 • https://www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/499736/ • http://www.dw.com/en/three -s yrians -arrest ed -in-german y-linked -to-pari s-attackers/a -1 9547328

117. I brahi m M

• http://www.reuters.com/article/us -german y-secu rit y-arres ts-idUSKCN11J0RQ?il=0 • https://www.theatlantic.com/amp/article/499736/ • http://www.dw.com/en/three -s yrians -arrest ed -in-german y-linked -to-pari s-attackers/a -1 9547328

118. Mohamed A

• http://www.reuters.com/article/us -german y-secu rit y-arres ts-idUSKCN11J0RQ?il=0 • https://www.theatlantic.com /amp/article/499736/ • http://www.dw.com/en/three -s yrians -arrest ed -in-german y-linked -to-pari s-attackers/a -1 9547328

119. Mohammed M.

• http://www.dw.com/en/mother -of-s yrian -youth -in-c ologn e-suspect ed -of-b elongin g-to-i slamic -state- speaks-out/a-35900576 • http://www.dw.com/en/cologne-polic e-detained -refugee-from -s yria -planned -bomb -atta ck/a - 19565999 • http://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/12415/3435437

120. Jab ar al -Bak r

• http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-37641263 • http://www.bbc.com/news/world -europ e-37638631 • http://www.newsbud.com/2016/10/17/the -jaber -al-bakr -st ory-h ow-a-whit e-helm ets -volunteer- alm ost -b lew-up-berlin -airport/ • http://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/politik/inland/Terrorverdaechtiger -hatte-fac ebook -k ontakt -zu-is- 100.html • http://www.reuters.com/article/us -german y-b omb -susp ect -idUSKBN12F07R

80

• https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/terror -suspect -jab er -albakr -found -dead -in-c ell- leipzi g-german y-b omb -p lot -s yria -a7358546.html • http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016 -10/chemnitz-sachsen -sprengstoff-jab er-a-faq

121. Ani s Amri

• http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/22/europe/anis -am ri -b erli n -christmas-ma rk et/ • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/20/everything -k now-suspect ed -b erlin -christ mas-ma rket - attacker/ • https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article160489493/D as-ist-u eber -den-n eu en - Tatverdaechtigen -bekannt.html • http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/04/gun -used -b erlin -christmas -attack -matches -on e-found - anis-amri/ • http://www.dw.com/en/police -delve-into-berlin -attack -sus pects-p otential -s wiss -links/a-37044366 • https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/berlin -attacker -anis-am ri-dru g-us e-post -mort em- autops y-isi s-inspired -christm as-mark et-a7611936.html • http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/776846/berlin -attacker -anis-am ri-s ea rched -fac ebook -wife- marria ge-a void -d epo rtation • https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/21/berlin -at tack -suspect -anis-am ri -under -monitoring - since-january

81

9. Bibliography

Literature

Burke, Jason. 2003. Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. London: I.B.Tauris. 292 p. ISBN 1 85043 396 8. Burke, Jason. 2015. The New Threat from Islamic Militancy. London: The Bodley Head. 290 p. ISBN 9781847923479. Cockburn, Patrick. 2015. The Rise of the Islamic State. ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution. London: Verso. 172 p. ISBN-13 978-1-78478-040-1. English, Richard. Terrorism: How to Respond. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 178 p. ISBN 978-0-19-959003-2. Hewitt, Steve. 2008. The British War on Terror. London: Continuum. 158 p. ISBN 978- 0-8264-9900-4. Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism. Revised and Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University Press. 512 p. ISBN 0–231–51046–2 (electronic). Kilcullen, David. 2016. Blood Year. Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror. London: Hurst & Company. 288 p. ISBN 978-1-84904-555-1. Mendelsohn, Barak. 2016. The al-Qaeda Franchise. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 288 p. ISBN-13 978-0190205614. Nanninga, Pieter. 2016. “Liminality of "Living Martyrdom."” In: Ultimate Ambiguities: Investigating Death and Liminality. Ed. Peter Berger, Justin Kroesen. New York City, NY: Berghahn Books. p. 78-93. Neumann, Peter R. 2009. Old & New Terrorism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 218 p. ISBN- 13: 978-0-7456-4375-5. Neumann, Peter R. 2016. Radicalised. New Jihadists and the Threat to the West. London: I.B.Tauris. 235 p. ISBN 9781784536732. Sageman, Marc. 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 220 p. ISBN 0812238087. Sageman, Marc. 2017. Misunderstanding Terrorism. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 213 p. ISBN 978-0-8122-4889-0. Stern, Jessica, Berger, John M. 2015. ISIS: The State of Terror. London: HarperCollins Publishers. 385 p. ISBN 978-0-00-812093-1.

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Online sources

Brisard, Jean-Charles, Jackson, Kévin. 2016. “The Islamic State’s External Operations and the French-Belgian Nexus.” In CTC Sentinel, Vol. 9, Issue 11. p. 8-15. West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Centre (https://goo.gl/OBuEBF). Accessed 17.2.2017. Chertoff, Michael. 2017. “How to Reform Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism.” War on the Rocks. 1.2.2017 (https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/how-to-reform-transatlantic-counter- terrorism/). Accessed 18.3.2017. Esposito, John L. (ed.). 2014. “Taqiyah.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (online). Oxford Reference (https://goo.gl/nFRokF). eISBN: 9780199891207. Accessed 1.4.2017. GLOBSEC Policy Institute. 2016. “GLOBSEC Intelligence Reform Initiative.” Bratislava: GLOBSEC (online). (https://goo.gl/nBSHLe). Accessed 15.2.2017. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). 2016. Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus. London: ICSR. (http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist- Futures.pdf). Accessed 18.2.2017. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR). 2010. Prisons and Terrorism. Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries. London: ICSR. (https://goo.gl/j8Mv36). Accessed 18.2.2017. Joscelyn, Thomas. 2015. “San Bernardino terrorists allegedly studied AQAP’s Inspire magazine, pledged allegiance to Baghdadi.” FDD’s Small Wars Journal. 17.12.2015 (https://goo.gl/h14xBJ). Accessed 19.3.2017. Joscelyn, Thomas. 2016. “Terrorists in Normandy swore allegiance to Baghdadi before attacking church.” FDD’s Small Wars Journal. 27.7.2016 (https://goo.gl/hUcKmy). Accessed 10.4.2017. Le Parisien. 2016a. “Attentats de Paris : transféré de Belgique, Hamza Attou a été écroué à Fleury-Mérogis.” Le Parisien. 30.6.2016 (https://goo.gl/zEZYZ5). Accessed 20.3.2017. Mitchell, Georgina. 2015. “Parramatta shooting: Teen gunman Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar's alleged links to extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir.” Sidney Morning Herald. 4 October 2015 (https://goo.gl/2mHMbO). Accessed 2.3.2017. Mullins, Sam. 2017. “Lone-actor vs. Remote-Controlled Jihadi Terrorism: Rethinking the Threat to the West.” War on the Rocks. 20.4.2017 (https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/lone-actor-vs-remote-controlled-jihadi-terrorism- rethinking-the-threat-to-the-west/). Accessed 20.4.2017.

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RTBF. 2015. "Brahim et Salah Abdeslam: de la Jupiler, du shit et peu de religion.” RTBF. 19 November 2015 (https://www.rtbf.be/info/dossier/attaques-terroristes-a- paris/detail_brahim-et-salah-abdeslam-de-la-jupiler-du-shit-et-peu-de-religion?id=9141318). Accessed 13.2.2017. START. 2016. “Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002—2015.” College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IslamicStateTerrorismPatterns_BackgroundReport_ Aug2016.pdf). Accessed 12.3.2017. Wood, Graeme. 2015. “What ISIS Really Wants.” The Atlantic, March 2015 (https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/). Accessed 8.3.2017.

* Articles mentioned in the Appendix 3 partially also belong here, as some of them provided substantial information about changes in the global jihadi movement. Due to their volume, the thesis supervisor suggested attaching them as a separate appendix sans citing norm.

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