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Reality of the : Towards a stronger -ontology theorem

Citation for published version: Mansfield, S 2016, 'Reality of the quantum state: Towards a stronger -ontology theorem', Physical Review A, vol. 94, 042124. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.94.042124

Digital Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1103/PhysRevA.94.042124

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Published In: Physical Review A

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Download date: 24. Sep. 2021 Reality of the quantum state: Towards a stronger ψ-ontology theorem

Shane Mansfield∗ Institut de Recherche en Informatique Fondamentale, Universit´eParis Diderot - Paris 7 and Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford

The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph no-go theorem provides an argument for the reality of the quantum state by ruling out ψ-epistemic ontological theories, in which the quantum state is of a statistical nature. It applies under an assumption of preparation independence, the validity of which has been subject to debate. We propose two plausible and less restrictive alternatives: a weaker notion allowing for classical correlations, and an even weaker, physically motivated notion of independence, which merely prohibits the possibility of super-luminal causal influences in the preparation process. The latter is a minimal requirement for enabling a reasonable treatment of subsystems in any theory. It is demonstrated by means of an explicit ψ-epistemic ontological model that the argument of PBR becomes invalid under the alternative notions of independence. As an intermediate step, we recover a result which is valid in the presence of classical correlations. Finally, we obtain a theorem which holds under the minimal requirement, approximating the result of PBR. For this, we consider experiments involving randomly sampled preparations and derive bounds on the degree of ψ epistemicity that is consistent with the quantum-mechanical predictions. The approximation is exact in the limit as the sample space of preparations becomes infinite.

I. INTRODUCTION the common ontological assumptions, each no-go theo- rem postulates some form of independence for composite A number of recent theorems have addressed the issue systems or observations; for example, for Bell this is the of the nature of the quantum state [1–5]. If we suppose locality assumption, while for PBR it is the novel as- that each system has a certain real-world configuration sumption of preparation independence. The validity of or state of the matter, the description of which we will this new assumption has been called into question else- call its ontic state, then we may pose the question of how where [11–17]. In Sec. III, we give a precise definition of a system’s quantum state relates to its ontic state. preparation independence and provide our own critique On the one hand, one might consider a pure quantum of its strength, building on earlier work by the author state as corresponding directly to, or being uniquely de- [18, 19]. In particular, it is pointed out that the assump- termined by, the ontic state, just as the state in classical tion is too strong even to allow for classical correlations mechanics (a point in classical phase space) is completely in multipartite scenarios. determined by the ontic state or real-world description of To address the issue, we propose two plausible and the system. On the other hand, the quantum state dif- less restrictive alternatives. The first allows for classical fers from a classical state of this kind in that in general it correlations mediated through a common past, while the may only be used to make probabilistic predictions about second is a much weaker, physically motivated notion of the system. Therefore, one might consider that it merely independence, which, as we will explain, is a minimal represents our probabilistic, partial knowledge of the on- requirement for enabling a reasonable treatment of sub- tic state of a system, and moreover that a given ontic systems in any theory. In Sec. IV we outline the PBR state may be compatible with distinct quantum states. argument and provide a statement of the theorem; but in Rather convincing plausibility arguments can be made Sec. V we see that the PBR argument is no longer valid to support either of these views, which are referred to under the weaker notions of independence, and demon- as ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic, respectively [6]. The the- strate this by means of an explicit ψ-epistemic toy model. orems go a step further and prove that under certain At first, this would appear to re-open the door to the pos- assumptions the ψ-epistemic view is untenable. We are sibility of plausible statistical or ψ-epistemic interpreta- especially concerned with the first of these results, the tions of the quantum state. Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem [1], which has re- However, in Sec. VI we recover two ψ-ontology results ceived the most attention and is considered by some to which hold under the weaker notions of independence. provide the most convincing case for the reality of the An intermediate step is to obtain a result which holds quantum state [7]. in the presence of classical correlations. Our main theo- Most of the PBR assumptions are common to the fa- rem holds under the minimal notion of independence and miliar no-go theorems of Bell [8], Kochen & Specker [9], approximates the result of PBR. The analysis relies on a etc. These we refer to as ontological assumptions, which proposed experiment involving randomly sampled prepa- are briefly summarised in Sec. II [10]. In addition to rations. The proof makes use of a finite de Finetti the- orem [20], establishing a mathematical connection to ψ- ontology results. It also supposes that a certain symme- try present at the phenomenological level is reflected at ∗ shane.mansfi[email protected] the ontological level. The theorem places bounds on the 2 degree of ψ epistemicity that is consistent with the exper- The question is significant because if the answer is no imentally testable quantum-mechanical predictions. Our then we may argue that the quantum state is always conclusion of approximate ψ ontology improves mono- uniquely defined by the ontic state, and is in this sense tonically as the size of the sample space of preparations an aspect of physical reality. If, on the other hand, an increases and is exact in the limit as the sample space overlap exists for some pair of distinct, pure quantum becomes infinite. states, then there would be instances in which the ontic state or real-world description of the system would not uniquely determine its quantum state. This would pro- II. ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS vide justification for understanding the quantum state as being of an epistemic nature. The first major assumption is that a system has an This allows us to distinguish between ψ-ontic and ψ- underlying physical state described by an element λ of a epistemic ontological theories, as those which do or do measurable space (Λ, L), which is referred to as the ontic not admit epistemic overlaps, respectively. The distinc- state of the system. This may or may not coincide with tion was first formalised in [6], to which the reader is the quantum state. The space of ontic states is analogous referred for a more detailed discussion. to classical phase space. Furthermore, it is assumed that Precisely, in the present discussion, we will quantify each pure quantum state ψ induces a probability distri- the epistemic overlap between pure quantum states ψ, φ by bution µψ on (Λ, L), such that preparation of the system in the quantum state ψ results in an ontic state sampled ω(ψ, φ) := 1 − D(µψ, µφ), (2) according to the distribution µψ. It is also assumed that the outcome of any measurement on the system depends where D(µψ, µφ) is the trace distance between the distri- solely on its ontic state: the probabilities of obtaining butions µ , µ . In instances in which it is clear which particular outcomes o ∈ O are determined by measure- ψ φ + quantum states are being considered, we may simply ment response functions ξo :Λ → R with the property denote this quantity by ω. Suppose that we can pre- that, for all λ ∈ Λ, pare a system in one of the quantum states ψ, φ; then X ω(ψ, φ) may be understood as the minimum probability ξo(λ) = 1. (1) of obtaining an ontic state which is compatible with both o∈O quantum states, and which thus witnesses the epistemic Note that for the purposes of this article we need only nature of the quantum state with respect to the ontolog- consider measurements with finite outcome sets. To- ical theory in question. gether, these assumptions encode the hypothesis that quantum systems should be described by some (possi- FIG. 1. The existence or non-existence of non-trivial epis- bly deeper or underlying) ontological theory. We will be temic overlaps for distributions induced by pairs of distinct, particularly interested in situations in which pure quan- pure quantum states characterises (a) ψ-epistemic and (b) ψ- tum state preparations are drawn from some finite set ontic ontological theories, respectively. The term epistemic [21]. overlap is made precise in Eq. (2). The second major assumption is that, whatever this ontological theory might be, its predictions should agree with those of . No-go theorems arise when it is found that predictions disagree for certain classes of ontological theories. Experimental tests may then be proposed to rule in favour of the predictions of quantum theory on the one hand or certain kinds of on- tological theories on the other, though to our current knowledge all experimental evidence points to the cor- rectness of quantum theory. So far, the assumptions posited are, in one form or another, common to the no-go theorems of Bell, Kochen & Specker, etc. III. INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTIONS

A. ψ-ontic vs ψ-epistemic ontologies A. Preparation independence

We can already ask the following important question. In addition to the standard ontological assumptions of the previous section, the PBR theorem requires an as- Question 1. Is it possible for distinct pure quantum sumption that systems which are prepared independently states ψ, φ to give rise to ontic state distributions µψ, µφ should have uncorrelated ontic states. More precisely, which “overlap” (see Fig. 1)? preparation independence asserts that the joint probabil- 3 ity distribution induced by multipartite preparations is For instance, Question 1 could only be posed for the case simply the product distribution. It will suffice to con- of pure states of the entire universe. We therefore pro- sider preparations drawn locally from some finite sets pose that the subsystem condition should be considered [22], and to describe the property for bipartite systems a minimal notion of independence in preparation scenar- [as in Fig. 2(a)] consisting of ontic state spaces (ΛA, LA) ios, required by any reasonable ontological theory. and (ΛB, LB). In this setting the assumption can be ex- This argument for requiring a minimal notion of inde- pressed as pendence recalls Einstein’s comments on what it would entail to completely abolish his “principle of local ac- µ(LA,LB | pA, pB) = µ(LA | pA) µ(LB | pB), (3) tion” (which was conceived in the context of measure- ment rather than preparation scenarios, but by which we for all LA ∈ LA,LB ∈ LB and pA, pB pure quantum may suppose he had in mind the kind of independence state preparations in the respective subsystems. The up to classical correlations later formalised by Bell) [23] assumption is perhaps best motivated by the fact that [24]: within quantum theory we may consider product quan- tum states of compound systems, which are completely The following idea characterises the relative uncorrelated, so it may therefore be expected that the independence of objects (A and B) far apart same situation would hold at the ontological level. in space: external influence on A has no im- mediate influence on B; this is known as the “Principle of Local Action”, which is B. Classical correlations used consistently only in field theory. If this axiom were to be completely abolished, the existence of (quasi-)isolated systems, and One way in which preparation independence might rea- thereby the establishment of laws which can sonably be violated, however, is through classical corre- be checked empirically in the accepted sense, lations arising in the ontic states, mediated through a would become impossible. common past (related points have been raised by Hall [11] and by Schlosshauer and Fine [12]). Suppose this Furthermore, the subsystem condition can be under- mediator can take values in an auxiliary measure space stood as ruling out, at the ontological level, the possi- (Λc, Lc). An effective form of preparation independence bility of superluminal influences occurring in the prepa- might then be recovered by conditioning on this common ration process. In this way, the condition is analogous past [see Fig. 2(b)], resulting in a kind of independence to the assumption of parameter independence for onto- that bears a formal similarity to Bell locality; i.e., logical models in measurement scenarios, which is borne out at the quantum-mechanical level by the no-signalling µ(LA,LB | pA, pB,Lc) = µ(LA | pA,Lc) µ(LB | pB,Lc), theorem [25]. Both preparation independence [Eq. (3)] (4) and the notion of independence up to classical correla- for all LA ∈ LA,LB ∈ LB,Lc ∈ Lc, and pA, pB pure tions [Eq. (4)] imply the subsystem condition, but not quantum state preparations in the respective subsystems. vice versa.

C. Subsystem condition D. Other notions of independence and some remarks We go a step further and propose an even weaker no- tion of independence, which we call the subsystem con- Similarly, in the language of Colbeck and Renner [2], dition. The condition is that the ontic state distribution the subsystem condition would be implied by preparation of each subsystem is uncorrelated with the preparation settings being free with respect to the causal structure of setting of the other(s) [see Fig. 2(c)]; i.e., Fig. 2(a). Another notion of independence has been proposed by µ(LA | pA, pB) = µ(LA | pA), Emerson, Serbin, Sutherland and Veitch [13]. It is similar (5) µ(LB | pA, pB) = µ(LB | pB), to the notion of independence up to classical correlations described in Sec. III B, but in their case λc would mediate for all LA ∈ LA,LB ∈ LB and pA, pB pure quantum state between the systems without the constraint (4) that jus- preparations in the respective subsystems. tifies considering it as a mediator of classical correlations Otherwise stated, it requires the existence of well- via a common past. Instead it is required that an effec- defined marginal probability distributions describing the tive kind of preparation independence as in Eq. (3) is ob- local behaviour of each preparation device. Without tained if one marginalises to “forget” the auxiliary space this, it would not even be possible for the theory to de- Λc. Problematically, however, correlations are therefore scribe the preparation of a state on a single subsystem allowed between pA, pB and λc and the subsystem condi- in isolation without having to make reference to all other tion is in general violated. Other works have attempted subsystems—simply put, one could not do local physics. to drop independence assumptions entirely, with some 4

a. {ψ, φ} preparation devices. Consider a prepara- FIG. 2. (a) Spatially separated, preparation-independent de- tion device that is capable of preparing a system in ei- vices. (b) A classical correlation scenario in which correla- ther of these two quantum states. Regardless of which of tions may be mediated through a common past. (c) Dashed lines represent correlations forbidden by the subsystem condi- the preparations is actually made, there is probability at tion. least ω > 0 of this device generating an ontic state which witnesses the epistemic overlap, where ω is defined as in λA λB Eq. (2). b. Joint systems. We now consider a second such preparation device, spacelike separated from, and to be preparation preparation device device operated in parallel with, the first [as in Fig. 2(a)]. The assumption of preparation independence is invoked to de- duce that, regardless of which individual preparations are p p 2 A B (a) made, there is probability at least ω > 0 of both devices generating ontic states which witness the epistemic over- λ λ A B lap, and, moreover, that in such a case it should be im- possible to make any distinction about which of the joint preparation preparation preparations device device p ∈ {(ψ, ψ), (ψ, φ), (φ, ψ), (ψ, ψ)}

pA pB has been made. More generally, we may wish to consider a joint system consisting of m subsystems, each equipped with a {ψ, φ} preparation device, for which this deduc- tion generalises in the obvious way. λc (b) c. Contradiction. The contradiction arises because λA λB quantum theory does, in fact, allow such distinctions to be made. In particular, for all pairs of states, quan- preparation preparation tum theory admits conclusive exclusion measurements device device [34] on joint systems of the kind described above. In the simplest case, in which only two subsystems are con- sidered, a conclusive exclusion measurement would give p p A B (c) outcomes in the set

{¬(ψ, ψ), ¬(ψ, φ), ¬(φ, ψ), ¬(φ, φ)}, success, though they obtain correspondingly weaker re- with the property that outcome ¬(ψ, ψ) has probabil- sults that only rule out strong forms of ψ epistemicity ity zero whenever the joint preparation (ψ, ψ) has been [26–31]. made, so that its occurrence precludes the possibility of It is implicit in (3) and (5) that the set of ontic states in the joint preparation having been (ψ, ψ), and so on [35]. a composite system is simply the Cartesian product of the Theorem 1. (PBR [1]). Suppose there exists a conclu- sets of ontic states in the component subsystems (Leifer sive exclusion measurement for a joint system in which refers to this as the Cartesian product assumption [7]); each subsystem is equipped with a {ψ, φ} preparation de- where they differ is in terms of the constraints placed on vice. In any preparation-independent ontological theory global correlations. The situation is somewhat different which can describe this experiment, ψ and φ have zero in classical correlation scenarios; we will return to this epistemic overlap. issue in Sec. VI. Note also that each of the definitions (3)–(5) generalises beyond the bipartite scenario in the In other words, epistemic overlaps cannot be reconciled obvious way. with conclusive exclusion measurements if we accept the assumption of preparation independence. Nevertheless, within quantum theory, such measurements can be spec- IV. THE PBR ARGUMENT ified for all pairs of quantum states. So it follows that any preparation-independent ontological theory which is The PBR theorem [1] demonstrates a contradiction consistent with quantum theory is necessarily ψ ontic. between the predictions of quantum theory, on the one hand, and of ψ-epistemic, preparation-independent onto- logical theories on the other. In this section, we briefly V. WHEN PBR NO LONGER APPLIES outline the argument [32]. To obtain the contradiction, it is supposed that some pair of distinct pure quantum In the absence of the assumption of preparation in- states ψ, φ give rise to an epistemic overlap [33]. dependence, however, it is still possible find ψ-epistemic 5

TABLE I. Let ∆ denote the measurable set of ontic states TABLE II. Probability table (or empirical model to use the which witness an epistemic overlap of ψ and φ (the overlap terminology introduced in [37]) representing the quantum- 0 region), let ∆ be its complement, and choose any ω1, ω2 > 0 mechanical predictions for the probabilities of observing each such that ω1 + ω2 ≤ 1. For each possible pair of preparations of the four outcomes (columns) to the PBR conclusive exclu- (pA, pB ), the table specifies the probabilities that the resul- sion measurement, for each possible joint preparation (rows). tant ontic states (λA, λB ) lie within the specified regions. pA pB ¬(ψ, ψ) ¬(ψ, φ) ¬(φ, ψ) ¬(φ, φ) p p (∆, ∆) (∆, ∆0) (∆0, ∆) (∆0, ∆0) A B ψ ψ 0 1/4 1/4 1/2 ψ ψ 0 ω1 ω1 1 − 2ω1 ψ φ 1/4 0 1/2 1/4 ψ φ 0 ω1 ω2 1 − ω1 − ω2 φ ψ 1/4 1/2 0 1/4 φ ψ 0 ω2 ω1 1 − ω1 − ω2 φ φ 1/2 1/4 1/4 0 φ φ 0 ω2 ω2 1 − 2ω2

ment response functions.  1 if λ = (λ , λ )  2 2 1 models for the prediction of conclusive exclusion mea- ξ¬(ψ,ψ)(λ) := /2 if λ ∈ {(λ3, λ2), (λ2, λ3)} surements. This is because the reasoning about joint 0 otherwise systems from Sec. IV is no longer valid.  1 if λ = (λ , λ )  2 1 1 Consider, for example, a pair of {ψ, φ} preparation de- ξ¬(ψ,φ)(λ) := /2 if λ ∈ {(λ3, λ1), (λ2, λ3)} vices comprising a joint system which behaves according 0 otherwise to Table I. Restricting our attention to the behaviour of  (6) 1 if λ = (λ , λ ) either device in isolation, by considering the correspond-  1 2 1 ing marginal probabilities, it is clear that there is proba- ξ¬(φ,ψ)(λ) := /2 if λ ∈ {(λ1, λ3), (λ3, λ2)} bility at least ω > 0 for the individual device to produce 0 otherwise an ontic state witnessing an epistemic overlap of ψ and φ,  1 if λ = (λ , λ ) regardless of which preparation was made. Nevertheless,  1 1 1 when the system is considered as a whole, we find that ξ¬(φ,φ)(λ) := /2 if λ ∈ {(λ1, λ3), (λ3, λ1)} there is zero probability that both ontic states lie in the 0 otherwise overlap region at once. The quantum-mechanical predictions for the PBR exper- The behaviour described in Table I does not satisfy iment [1] (Table II) are then reproduced by the opera- preparation independence. However, it can easily be tional probabilities checked that it does satisfy the subsystem condition (5), X and indeed it can even be shown to exhibit independence p(o | pA, pB) := ξo(λA, λB) µ(λA, λB | pA, pB), up to classical correlations (4). Moreover, based on this λA,λB ∈Λ behaviour, it is not difficult to contrive a ψ-epistemic on- (7) 1 tological model which reproduces precisely the quantum- when ω1 = ω2 = /2 [36]. mechanical predictions of the conclusive exclusion exper- iment proposed by PBR, which will thus satisfy both (4) and (5). VI. TOWARDS A STRONGER THEOREM

In this section, we establish ψ-ontology results which hold under the less restrictive notions of independence introduced in Sec. III, beginning with the case in which preparations are only assumed to be independent up to classical correlations (4). First, however, some care is required in order to A. ψ-epistemic Model for PBR properly treat classical correlation scenarios [Fig. 2(b)]. What previously constituted a full ontological descrip- tion (λA, λB) ∈ Λ × Λ of the combined system has, in a classical correlation scenario, been supplemented with an If we set Λ := {λ , λ , λ }, let µ have support 1 2 3 ψ additional element λc ∈ Λc, whose status it is necessary {λ1, λ3}, and let µφ have support {λ2, λ3} (i.e., ∆ = to address before proceeding. There are two consistent {λ3}), then Table I fully determines the behaviour of the approaches available to us. preparation devices. We choose the following measure- 6

1. We may suppose that λc is an integral part of is invariant under permutations of those devices. The the ontic description, and accordingly that the pair quantum-mechanical description is certainly invariant (λi, λc) — rather than just λi — is statistically suf- under permutations, and so the symmetry assumption ficient for determining the outcome probabilities for merely supposes that this is also reflected at the onto- any measurement on the subsystem labelled by i. logical level. More precisely, the joint behaviour of the preparation devices will be described in an ontological 2. Alternatively, we may suppose that λc merely theory by some n-partite conditional probability distri- serves as a classical mediator between the λis, and bution σ. A permutation π ∈ Sn acts on σ as follows: that λi is still statistically sufficient for determin- ing the outcome probabilities for any measurement π·σ(L1,...,Ln | p1, . . . , pn) = on the subsystem labelled by i. (8) σ(Lπ−1(1),...,Lπ−1(n) | pπ−1(1), . . . , pπ−1(n)).

Both of these approaches are deserving of considera- The distribution σ is said to be symmetric if it is invariant tion; however, for the remainder of this article, we will under all permutations π ∈ Sn. commit to the integral-past approach 1, and this is the This kind of shift in focus from independence to sym- context in which the results in this Sec. will hold. In this metry (or exchangeability) is standard in Bayesian statis- case, the issue of nature of the quantum state no longer tics. As well as appearing to be a rather natural assump- comes down the (non-)existence of overlaps for the dis- tion in the present context, note that both preparation tributions µψ, µφ on (Λ, L), but rather for distributions 0 0 independence and independence up to classical correla- µψ, µφ on (Λ × Λc, L × Lc). tions imply symmetry, but not vice versa. In other words, symmetry is a strictly weaker assumption than either as- Proposition 1. [38]. Suppose there exists a conclu- sumption of independence. A simple illustration of this sive exclusion measurement for a joint system in which fact is provided for instance by the well-known example each subsystem is equipped with a {ψ, φ} preparation de- of P´olya’s urn [39]. vice. For any ontological theory which can describe this experiment and which is preparation-independent up to In order to prove our main result, we will also make integral-past classical correlations, the ontic state distri- use of a generalisation (to conditional probability dis- tributions) of Diaconis and Freedman’s finite de Finetti butions µψ and µφ necessarily have non-overlapping sup- ports. theorem [40], which is due to Christandl and Toner [20]. In the present setting, this theorem establishes that any 0 0 0 Proof. Suppose that µψ(L ) > 0 for some L = (L, Lc) ∈ symmetric behaviour of the preparation devices which 0 L . By (4), we know that conditioned on Lc we have fac- satisfies the subsystem condition may be approximated torisability of the joint probability distributions. With Lc by a description which is independent up to classical cor- fixed, the proof of Theorem 1 may therefore be adapted relations [41]. We let kµ − νk denote the trace distance 0 to apply to the probability distributions µ (− | ψ, Lc) between any two (conditional) probability distributions 0 and µ (− | φ, Lc), which as a result must have non- µ, ν on the same measurable space [20], and use this to 0 0 0 quantify the approximation. overlapping supports. Now, if µψ(L ) = µ (L | ψ, Lc) > 0 0 0 0 then it must hold that µφ(L ) = µ (L | φ, Lc) = 0. Thus µ0 and µ0 have non-overlapping supports. Theorem 2. (Christandl and Toner [20]). Suppose that ψ φ σ is a symmetric n-partite conditional probability distri- We now turn to proving a ψ-ontology theorem under bution on the minimal notion of independence, the subsystem con- n n n n dition (5). The analysis refers to an experiment similar (Λ × P , L × Σ ) (9) to the one previously considered, but with an important modification. In the simplest case, the PBR experiment which satisfies the subsystem condition, and can thus be involved a conclusive exclusion measurement on m = 2 marginalised to a unique m-partite conditional probability subsystems. Recall, however, that in general m depends distribution µ on on the angular separation of ψ and φ. We consider an ex- (Λm × P m, Lm × Σm), (10) periment in which a conclusive exclusion measurement is performed on m subsystems equipped with {ψ, φ} prepa- for m < n. There exists a probability distribution µc ration devices, with the crucial caveat that these subsys- on a finite set of single-subsystem conditional probability tems are uniformly sampled from a larger ensemble of distributions labelled Λ , such that n  m subsystems. Note that the quantum-mechanical c predictions are the same regardless of which m subsys- tems are taken. X m µ − µc(ω)µω ≤ While we will not be assuming either preparation in- ω∈Λc dependence or independence up to classical correlations, 2m|P ||Λ||P | |P |m(m − 1) we will require an additional symmetry assumption: that min , . (11) the joint behaviour of the {ψ, φ} preparation devices n n 7

We are now in a position to state and prove a ψ- not allow for any correlations in the global ontic state of ontology result which holds under the minimal notion a multipartite system, though in light of the theorems of of independence. Bell and Kochen and Specker it is known that any onto- logical theory that accounts for the predictions of quan- Theorem 3. Suppose there exists an m-partite {ψ, φ} tum mechanics will necessarily have such correlations at conclusive exclusion measurement, and suppose, more- the ontological level. over, that the m subsystems on which the conclusive ex- We have seen that it is still possible to obtain ψ- clusion measurement is to be performed are uniformly ontology results by assuming less restrictive notions of sampled from a larger ensemble of n > m such subsys- independence, which to varying degrees do allow for cor- tems. For any symmetric ontological theory satisfying the relations in the global ontic state, and which can be more subsystem condition and describing this experiment, the strongly justified than preparation independence. Propo- epistemic overlap of ψ and φ is subject to the bound sition 1 allows for independence up to classical correla- 4m|Λ|2 2m(m − 1) tions, and Theorem 3 applies more generally for any cor- ω(ψ, φ) ≤ min , . (12) relations consistent with the the very minimal notion of n n independence, the subsystem condition (5). At the same Proof. Let ∆ be the measurable set of ontic states wit- time it must also be noted that these results inevitably introduce other assumptions (the integral-past and sym- nessing the epistemic overlap of µψ, µφ. Then metry assumptions), the implications of which remain

ω(ψ, φ) = min µp(∆) to be further explored, and whose justifications should p∈{ψ,φ} (13) equally treated with due circumspection. = min π · µ(∆, Λ,..., Λ | p, P, . . . , P ), From a theoretical perspective, Theorem 3 rules out ar- p∈{ψ,φ} bitrarily small ψ-epistemic overlaps, since quantum the- for all permutations π ∈ Sm. The first line follows from ory can perfectly well describe ensembles of n subsystems a re-statement of Eq. (2), and the second follows from equipped with {ψ, φ} preparation devices for arbitrarily the symmetry assumption together with the definition large n. Therefore, while it is always possible to con- of marginalisation to a single subsystem. By Theorem trive ψ-epistemic toy models for conclusive exclusion ex- 2, we know that there exists a probability distribution periments by exploiting correlations in the global ontic ν = P µ (ω)µm satisfying (11). Since ν describes state, as demonstrated explicitly for the PBR experiment ω∈Λc c ω preparation correlations which are independent up to in Sec. V, any full-blown ontological theory which admits conditioning on ω ∈ Λ , Proposition 1 tells us that arbitrary composition of (sub)systems and respects our c symmetry and integral-past assumptions is necessarily ψ- ontic [43]. νp(∆) = 0, (14) From an experimental perspective, of course, it is still for all p ∈ {ψ, φ}. Then meaningful and of importance to test whether it is in fact the quantum-mechanical predictions or those consistent ω(ψ, φ) ≤ µp(∆) with, in this case, certain ψ-epistemic ontological theo- ries that are borne out by observation, and Theorem 3 = |µp(∆) − νp(∆)| suggests a means of placing experimentally established = |µ(∆, Λ,..., Λ | p, P, . . . , P ) bounds on epistemic overlaps. −ν(∆, Λ,..., Λ | p, P, . . . , P )| (15) ≤ kµ − νk 4m|Λ|2 2m(m − 1) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ≤ min , , n n The author thanks Samson Abramsky, John-Mark where the first line again follows from the definition of Allen, Jon Barrett, Roger Colbeck, Lucien Hardy, Matty ω [Eq. (2)], the second from Eq. (14), the third from Hoban, Dominic Horsman, Matt Leifer, Matt Pusey, Rui Eq. (13), the fourth from the definition of trace distance, Soares Barbosa, an anonymous referee, and especially and the final line from Eq. (11) and the fact that the Adam Brandenburger, for valuable comments and discus- cardinality of the set of preparations is |P | = 2. sions at various stages of this work, as well as audiences at the Besan¸con Epiphymaths´ and Oxford Philosophy of Physics seminars. This research was carried out both at VII. CONCLUSION l’Institut de Recherche en Informatique Fondamentale, Universit´eParis Diderot - Paris 7, and at the Depart- All no-go theorems rest upon certain assumptions, the ment of Computer Science, Oxford University. Finan- justifications for which should in each case be carefully cial support is gratefully acknowledged from the Fonda- considered [42]. In particular, the PBR theorem relies tion Sciences Math´ematiquesde Paris, postdoctoral re- on the assumption of preparation independence, which search grant eotpFIELD15RPOMT-FSMP1, Contextual we have argued here may be too strong. Indeed, it does Semantics for Quantum Theory, the Networked Quantum 8

Information Technologies (NQIT) hub, and the Oxford outcome o ∈ O, provided that the ontological theory is Martin School, University of Oxford via the programme parameter independent or non-contextual [44]. There- for Bio-inspired Quantum Technologies. fore, we can also meaningfully ask whether measurement outcomes can give rise to epistemic overlaps [45].

Appendix A: ψ-ontology in relation to nonlocality Outcome-ontic theories in this sense are precisely the and contextuality deterministic, non-contextual ontological theories; deter- minism being the requirement that for all measurements and all λ ∈ Λ the corresponding distribution over out- A natural question to ask is how the notion of ψ on- comes is a δ-function. The failure of an empirical model tology and the no-go results discussed in this article (i.e.,a probability table representing either empirical data relate to the notions of nonlocality and contextuality or theoretical predictions for empirical data) to be realis- as established by the no-go theorems of, e.g., Bell and able by a deterministic, noncontextual ontological model Kochen and Specker. A first observation is that all of is precisely an instance of contextuality. Equivalently these notions are couched in terms of ontological theories: [37], contextual empirical models may be characterised as the theorems all suppose the ontological assumptions of those which fail to have realisation by a factorisable on- Sec. II and identify differing operational predictions be- tological model, and thus contextuality generalises non- tween certain classes of ontological theories (ψ-epistemic, locality (a term which applies in the special case of a local, noncontextual, or subclasses of these) and quantum multipartite measurement scenario). theory. In [18], we posed the question of whether objects other Any instance of nonlocality or contextuality in a quan- than the quantum state might give rise to epistemic over- tum mechanically realisable empirical model, therefore, laps on space of ontic states. For instance, if we accept provides a contradiction between the predictions of quan- the ontological assumptions then the ontic state is sta- tum mechanics and those of outcome-ontic ontological tistically sufficient for determining the outcome proba- theories. The theorems of Bell, Kochen and Specker, bilities for any given measurement on the system. So etc., which identify such empirical models, can thus be for each measurement the theory determines a family of re-interpreted as no-go theorems which rule out outcome- probability distributions on a set O of outcomes condi- ontology. Note the apparent duality here: while ψ- tional on the ontic state λ ∈ Λ. From this, by Bayesian ontology theorems rule out certain ψ-epistemic theories, inversion, we can also obtain a family of probability dis- nonlocality or contextuality theorems rule out certain tributions on the set of ontic states Λ conditional on the outcome-ontic theories.

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