NATO UNCLASSIFIED : \ and ""-/ EXEMPLAIRE PUBLIC DISCLOSED - N» COPY 619 ORIGINAL'- ENGLISH/FRENCH .. ^ / 24th April, "3956 "rTTrr" /' DOGUivENT . C-ÈÇ5ÔT?±

.SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE BAST. . ...': , .

R'eport by the Committee of "Politic^

PART I: MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The appearance in February of the United. Ar ab R epucIi ç , uniting and Syri a., under the dictatorial Presidency of Colonel Hasser, and the immediately, resulting establishment of its ' riv.al',;. the Arab Union, a 'federation;'.of. the. Kingdoms of and.. •,' are' political events of. the first importance. Developr'. ment s in' the/' will centre for. some time on the future of; these' two Arab groupings',' between which there are' fundamental differences. " /' •'.;.

2. Por the time being, Nasser's prestige should'allopr the. UAR to continue with its present momentum, but he is likèly later on to run into internal difficulties, particularly'economic Accordingly, although his -opportunistic policies may lead him in many directions.,- one of his .long-term objectives is certainly to obtain control, over, a sizeable part, of the. oil revenues ;of the -.-.. > area,.. ,','• ..'"" '"'/ ,. '././", ..:''';. ,•",, ; /. .,.•'•-.. 3. The Arab' Union, with Iraq's land ahd oil resources, . ; .' presents good practical' possibilities but' has not attracted " ' popular support.. It will have to show concrete, results if. it . is not to succumb to Nasser ' s designs. "-'-' -'•'• • •' ^ - ^ - ../..-/ " and other Arac régimes, outside the'së, two. groupings? are1 reluctant to join either; bloc. " .However'/''Nasserr,s increased popularity with the masses, as tho. champion of pan- / Arabisn and of radical social change,. opens' up wider, possibilities ; of .action for him. ;"/ ' •" '/; //V

// - -5.. . ' Por the. "time; being, Nasser and the'USSR s;ëè .in each!, other a means of. furthering' their individual aims in the area/.which. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED - converge • inasmuch .as: they, are, in different decrees,, directed ';/.' against'.the West.' ; -" " , //' /'"•'.. ;/-° \ ; /:''''/"/: 6/ .'.The". Palestine, problem will /continue, to/.'afford opportuni- ties for Soviet intervention in the' Middle East. ' ''" .- : ' ' - '

--7. "•-- -If. the-West -does not-take--full account of-the factors from which Nassor derives his . strength '( including -growing - Arab NATO SECRET « C-MÇ 58) 71

aspirations for unity and improved^living standards) there will he an increased;risk^ that the ^rabs 'will be .driven to further extremes even towards ' closer association with the Soviet bloc.,. Such'an . approach on the part of,.the West might be more effective if it could be.coupled with judicious-large scale economic aid "without strings"«,. But even this might fail to produce a basic change in Nasser' s policy... • . Western interests in the Middle East would be furthered by the provision . of ..increased oriental training facili- ties for Western personnel destined to work in the" area..

PART II INTRODUCTION / 8.. Since the last Middle East report, which', analysed new revolutionary forces and the resourceful Soviet intrusion., into, the .area, there have been far-reaching developments.. The Arab nation- alist movement has swung over from a struggle for.independence to ...a struggle for unification. The latest and most striking mani- festation of this evolution has been the unexpectedly rapid., emergence in January of the .(Egypt-), which produced as a reaction the formation of the Arab Union (Iraq-Jordan).

..THE- UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND' THE .ARAB- UNION - . 9o Between these two rival groups, both claiming to be . working for national Arab unity,, there are basic differences. The first, with its centre in , is a radical,. republican and .popular movement; and the second, with its centre in. Baghdad, is traditionalist, monarchist, and conservative,

THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC: STRENGTH AND" WEAKNESSES '

. 10. The United Arab Republic owes its importance to a number .of factors.: It' has a population of over 27 million(l), As the cultural centre of the , Cairo can exert great influence. :The geographical position of the UAR gives it control over the normal transit routes of practically .the whole of the oil from the Middle East.. The prestige of President Nasser, as the .champion of Arab unity and social change continues to grow.. His revolutionary dynamism,- with • the backing of the Syrian socialists, is making it- self more and more keenly felt in the propaganda campaign now being DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED conducted by Cairo-Radio in Africa and the Middle East, with noticeable effects on intellectual circles and especially youth. Finally, the' UAR is regarded by the as a .country which has -succeeded, by adopting a policy.of "positive neutrality", in

(I) To -these can be. added some 5 million YemInites as. a result of the association of the with the UAR. within the framework of the "United Arab States". NATO SECRET C-MÇ58T71

freeing itself from the tutelage of. the West and.-which, v/ithout thereby falling under the exclusive influence of the USSR, has obtained from the latter apparently unconditional aid in the form of arms, equipment, finance and technicians,- sufficient to cover a substantial proportion of its economic development^programmes. 11. At the- same time, UAR exhibits certain weaknesses: ' the ; territorial separation :of Egypt and Syria; the profound racial and cultural differences between Syrians and Egyptians; the contrast between the comparative, economic prosperity of Syria and the poverty of Egypt, whose population is increasing too rapidly in relation to its food supplies; the foreign exchange shortage caused by reduced sales of Egyptian cotton in the" free-world market. Further, weaknesses stem from the growing mistrust of Egypt on the part of the moderate governments of the Middle East dm and African countries; and from the latent danger that the ' peoples of Egypt and Syria, if their expectations are frustrated, • may drive Nasser to further bold moves whose failure could imperil, the very existence .of the régime. It is unlikely'that Nasser will be'able, in the near future, significantly to improve living standards within Egypt -and Syria; accordingly one- of his 'main objectives - that of obtaining control over a sizeable part of the oil revenues- of the area - looms hearer.

12. For the time being, Nasser's prestige should allow the union.to continue-.with its present Iiiomentimi. .Thereafter, however, he-will have, to find other stimuli; the most likely field must . seem to him to be that of foreign affairs. Nasser has already launched his offensive under various forms - violent attacks on King-Saud, diatribes against the Iraq and Jordan régimes, intrigues in the and Somaliland, friendly but pressing . approaches to , clumsy manoeuvring vis-à-vis the . ^ THE ARAB UNION . . • ;' • V

13. As: compared with the UAR, the Arab Union•(Iraq-Jordan) has. the-advantage-; of territorial. contiguity; no .over-population pr col eins ( l) ; and great- natural and financial resources based on • oil and cultivable land. For the implementation of its economic development programmes the federation can moreover count on the support of the IVest. . Its government has the backing "of- tradi- tionalist forces such as the tribes and the landowners.

IU. The Arab. Union, howeven, shows a serious weakness in that it lacks popular support. The.effect•of this is felt more particularly among the Palestinians including^ the•refugees in

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED Jordan, for whom the'cause of Nasser has strong attractions. The federation is. also exposed to the latent threat of the closing of the pipelines crossing Syrian ' territory.--r " 'Unless • the Arab Union can succeed in achieving a rapid Improvement in the living conditions particularly of the Palestinian refugées, it will-have - difficulty in holding its own against Egyptian expansionism.

(l) Approximately seven million inhabitants NATO SECRET C-MC 58)71"""

OTHER MIDDLE EAST STATES

15» The policy of SAUDI-ARABIA will :seek to maintain the status quo in the Middle Eastf and will .thus assume a position of neutrality between the two Arab groupings» ". • ^The re-emergence of Crowri Prince Peysal may,, however, incline Saudi Arabia towards Nasser somewhat more than in the recent past, although the ruling family must.be well aware of the dangers implicit in such a course. Some increase of pressure on Western economic ;and strategic interests is to be expected, as well as a more, intransigent policy towards Israel8 .. 16. The YEMEN has already been attracted into Nasser's orbit and joined his Republic in a loose' form of association known as 11 ^fche "United Arab States 8 This will help to increase Egyptian influence there and enable Nasser to cause trouble, for King Saud • and to join in the Yemen's campaign against "imperialism" by supporting her attempt to incorporate the Aden Protectorate... It will also give him a base for subversive activity against the West's .position in the Horn of Africa. . Although.Nasser cannot on the other hand have, much sympathy for the Imam's régime, its loose association with Egypt serves as a useful precedent• to. attract. .. other Arab rulers. He will probably find it convenient to support the Imam as long as the latter pursues policies which suit Egypt. •The Imam, for-his part, probably hopes to preserve his régime and to counterbalance the growing Soviet influence in his .territory. ,17® The ruler of KUiVAIT is aware of the popular, enthusiasm for Nasser in his country, and is also suspicious .of Iraq, but he . will seek to avoid any open commitment, to either :the UAR or the ^Arab Union so as to-preserve Kuvmit's equilibrium. The remainder Pof the PERSIAN GULP territories may be expected to follow the same pattern, i.e. general support for Nasser among such public opinion as 'exists, from which the Rulers feel publicly unable to dissociate themselves. Their attitude will, in any case, be closely affected by that of Saudi Arabia; 18. The LEBANON^almost completely isolated and with.an internal political structure based'on a fragile compromise., appears intent on safeguarding, along with its independence, its own indi- viduality as the essential requisite for its prosperity. The forthcoming presidential elections in Lebanon have greatly increased the tensions in that:country. 19. The SUDAN, on the strength of its recent elections * . seems also determined, to preserve its independence. It may perhaps draw DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED closer to Ethiopia which, having likewise many Moslem, communities., feels that it too is threatened by the subversive propaganda. put out by Nasser. •20. In LIBYA the King shows little sympathy for Nasser's policy. He has" recently shown his interest in a union of the ; ... A large section of the population, however, favours NATO SECRET C-MÇ 58) 71- "

Nasser. Furthermore., both the-.King and. the Government are unwilling to antagonise Egypt. -

21. ISRAEL'S reaction, to the two" new Arab groupings has so far been restrained. While propaganda attacks on Israel have not' been particularly vigorous on .the part of either grouping, the rival Arab unions may well be -tempted in the future to court .. popular favour by vying wi'thone another in the' expression of anti-Israeli sentiment. Israel has already gone on record that she will react strongly to any, serious alteration of the status quo along her frontiers. While for the moment all parties appear -to be desirous to avoid a serious conflict, the situation remains potentially dangerous.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST / 22. Egypt's dependence on the USSR, already complete in th^^ military field, is tending to become equally complete in the economic'field.; Recently, however, Nasser has shown some signs of discomfort over the extent of his involvement with the Soviet Union. Although he may wish, to return to a balance neutralism as between East and West, so long'as he actively pursues ambitious expansionist objectives his dependence on the USSR is bound to increase. Although not particularly enthusiastic over the formation of the UAR, the USSR will continue to make vigorous attempts to extend its influence. within it and to exploit all other potentialities for damaging Western interests. Further- more, as long as no just and lasting solution has been found to. certain basic problems in the Middle East, and In particular to the Palestine and refugee problems, the Soviet Union will be in a position to play an active part in the affairs of the Middle East.

23. . The Afro-Asian Solidarity conference demonstrated the ability of the USSR to identify itself with the forces of nation- alism and discontent. At the same time, however, Nasser's attitude towards the conference indicated his intention to use the- Afro-Asian Solidarity movement for his own purposes. 21+. Soviet policy and its execution increasingly profits from the systematic'linguistic and area training of both ' specialists and technicians for the Middle East, as well as from the intensive study in the Soviet Union of Middle East problems. This is a technique still relatively undeveloped by the West.

00 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 25. The Middle East has entered upon a new phase in which the pattern of states of the past forty years is changing. The creation of the United Arab. Republic and the Arab Union has so far had the effect of polarising in Cairo and'in Baghdàd two NATO SECRET -6- C-MÇ 58)71 '•'''•

rival trends, both aiming at Arab unity and. at. an improvement in' the standard of..living, though • stemming from different concepts and proceeding along different lines. •• " - „In -spite of rivalries and. disputes between the. régirne.s, Arab unity; is a concept which: appeals s.trongly to. the deepest aspirations of the Arab-masses. A general, .though often muddled aspiration for a higher living standard,, provides a..further incentive for unity.-., .Although these aspirations may conflict with certain established Western positions., an unsym- pathetic attitude on the part , of the West v^ould risk inflaming the extremist tendencies of these emotional and sensitive people and thereby;-bring the Arabs closer to the Soviet camp. Such a sympathetic approach would.be most effective if it were to be accompanied by judicious, large-scale economic aid "without strings".

( Signed) A.. CASARDI Chairman DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED