GOMAL UNIVERSITY DERA ISMAIL KHAN Department of Public Administration
The Prospects of New Local Government System A case study of District Government Dera Ismail Khan
i
II
By
Najeebullah Khan
Supervisor: Dr. Bahadar Shah
This thesis is presented to the Gomal University, Dera Ismail Khan in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of degree of Doctor of philosophy in Management Studies April 2008
1 i| Department of Public Administration GONIAL UNIVERSITY DERA ISMAIL KHAN. (N.W.F.P) PAKISTAN ,'*
Date:. Ref. No..
DEFENCE OF PhD DISSERTATION
Certified mat Mr Nayeebuilah Khan Php Scholar Department of Public Administration, Gonial University, Dera Ismail Khan has successfully defended in public his PhD dissertation entitled "The Prospects of New Local Government System; Case Study of District Government Dora Ismail Khan, NWFP,Pakistan" on Dalod 24,12.2008 in SeminanljaH BTH, Gomel University, so his case is recommended for the award of PhD ,B6gree JnM&nacement Studies.
(Dr 8ahadaTÿ«h)" tVajidj) Supervisor, Country Eyaluator (Internal Examiner) (External Examiner) Dean, Dean, Faculty of Law & Management Sciences, Faculty of Management £ University of Hazara, Administrative Sciences, Mansckra, University of Karachi, Karachi
A-’CAJ. (Amanuitah Khm Miwikhd) (Dr.Aycsha Rahim) Chairman, Dean of Ana, LJeptt: of Public AdministratTon. Gonial University, Gonial University, Di.Khan. DlKban.
2 pedicatioÿ
I dedicate my efforts to my parents and kids .
Whose love and affection made all this possible
3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to Almighty ALLAH for the talent, ability, knowledge and wisdom He conferred upon me and bestowed me this opportunity to add a drop of information in the ocean of knowledge.
I owe an immense debt of gratitude to my supervisor Professor Dr. Bahadar Shah, Chairman Department of Public Administration and acting Dean of Arts, not only for his inspiring guidance and continuous support, but also for his scholastic contributions to this research. Despite his busy schedule, he has always been ready to share his knowledge and experience with me on different dimensions of the research.
I also place my appreciation on record for Mr. Allah Nawaz Khan, Assistant Professor Department of Public Administration for his continuous support and help. With him, I learnt how to think critically about research issues. His encouragement motivated me to study the district government empirically.
I do acknowledge the worthy contributions of my teachers and colleagues Dr. Gohar Zaman; Dr. Shadiuallah Khan; Dr. Mohammad Bashir; and Mr. Amanullah Khan, who made critical observations, comments, and valuable suggestions from the inception to completion of this research.
Using this opportunity I record my thanks for the political and administrative heads of the district government, who helped a lot in the provision of documentary record of the district government. Particularly, Major ( R) Latifullah Khan Alizai (ex- Zilla Nazim); Mr. Khudaidad Khan Mahsood, DCO DIKhan; Mr. Anwar Khan EDO, Finance; Sardar Fatehullah Khan Mainkhel, Tehsil Nazim D.I.Khan; Sardar Anaytullah Khan Saddozai, Tehsil officer (finance) TMA D.I.Khan, whose assistance was crucial in data collection.
4 Finally, it would be unjust not to put in black-n-white the unprecedented contributions of my parents, my wife, and kids for their continuous prayers, support, patience and sacrifices through out my studies.
Najeebullah Khan Ph.D Scholar
5 ABBREVIATIONS
ACRs Annual Confidential Reports AERC Applied Economic Research Centre AJK Azad Jummu and Kashmir ANOVA Analysis of Variance BD Basic Democracies BDO Basic Democracies Order CCBs Citizen Community Boards CSP Civil Services of Pakistan DC Deputy Commissioner DCOs District Co-ordinating Officers CSOs Civil Society Organizations DDACs District Development Advisory Committees DDOs Deputy District Officers DOs District Officers DPOs District Police Officers DSP District Superintendent of Police EBDO Elective Bodies Disqualification Order EDOs Executive District Officers EDO (CD) Executive District Officer Community Development EIP Extended Immunization Programme ESRP Education Sector Reform Programme FANA Federally Administered Northern Area FATA Federally Administered Tribal Area FCA Federal Capital Area FDP Federal Divisible Pool FY Fiscal Year GDP Gross Domestic Product GDS Gas Development Surcharge GST General Sale Tax
6 HMIS Health Management Information System ICG International Crises Group IMF International Monetary Fund IPD Inverse Population Density KPP Khusshal Pakistan Programme LFO Legal Framework Order LGO Local Government Ordinance LGP Local Government Plan LHWP Lady Health Worker Programme MNA Member of National Assembly MOLG Manual of Local Government MPA Member of Provincial Assembly MSAF Malawi Socio Action Fund NFC National Finance Commission NGOs Non Government Organizations NIPA National Institute of Public Administration NIPS National Institute of Population Studies NRB National Reconstruction Bureau NWFP North West Frontier Province OZT Octroi and Zilla Tax PA Provincial Award PDPR Pakistan Development Policy Review PFCs Provincial Finance Commissions PML (N) Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group PP Popular Participation PPP Pakistan People Party PSD Public Service Delivery TMOs Tehsil Municipal Officers TOs Tehsil Officers TWP Tameer-e- Watan Programme UNDP United Nation Development Plan
7 ABSTRACT
The shift from an existing local government system to a new one in itself is an indication of weaknesses in the replaced system. Thus, the new LGO 2001 is an effort to depart from the old platform to a new one with an assumption that the new system has such structural and functional features, which will not only wipeout the legacy problems but also add mundane values to the local government system in Pakistan.
Prima facie, the intentions of new system look positive, as new structures have been introduced thereby distributing the resources and authorities down to the grass root levels with better chances of good service delivery to the general public. However, it is a pre-requisite to have a possible system best in documents; it is more important and challenging to translate the theoretical system into reality. The new system may be matchless in contents but this is not the guarantee of successful implementation.
The objective of this research is to study the ground-realities of the system by gathering empirical facts and figures from real actors of the local government. The questionnaire has been applied to read the situation from all possible dimensions. To substantiate the primary data, the official record has been analyzed. The data analyses reveal several findings, which can be used as yardsticks for the prospects of new system in our country. Although, it might be taken more natural if general public is giving lower scores on the performance of new system than the councilors and government servants however, extreme attitudes are alarming.
The most striking finding of the study is that there is a lack of understanding of the system itself by all the users, which is making the system-performance-evaluation more ambiguous, complicated and thus, subject to a variety of interpretations. The regression analyses expose other variables to determine the system prospects however, the dominant beta-score of ‘popular participation’ and ‘government intervention’
8 conveys a different message. That is, efforts should be made to increase participation but more importantly a visible mechanism must be put in place to stop government intervention.
It is however, worth mentioning that the public is optimistic about the new system and they are enthusiastic about its future provided, all the publicly noticed weaknesses and problems of the new system are taken up instantly and uprooted in time.
9 Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... 4 ABBREVIATIONS ...... 6 ABSTRACT...... 8 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES...... 12
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION...... 14 1.1. Background...... 14 1.2. Problem statement...... 17 1.3. Objectives of the study...... 18 1.4. Importance of the study ...... 18 1.5. Research Hypotheses ...... 19 1.6. Organization of the thesis ...... 20
Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 22 2.1 Global Perspectives...... 22 2.2. National Perspectives...... 33 2.3. Extracted variables...... 39 2.4. Theoretical Framework...... 40 2.5 Discussion...... 41 Chapter 3 RESEARCH DESIGN...... 44 3.1. Approach...... 44 3.2. Population ...... 44 3.3. Sample & Sampling Procedure...... 45 3.4. Data Collection Methods ...... 46 3.5. Data Analysis Tools...... 46 3.6 Operationalization of the Concepts...... 47 3.7 The Case Study ...... 48
Chapter 4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS IN PAKISTAN...... 50 4.1. Introduction...... 50 4.2. Pre- Independence Period ...... 50 4.3. Post- Independence Period...... 51 4.4. Local Government 1958-69 ...... 52 4.5. Local Governments 1972-77...... 55 4.6. Local government 1979-84...... 56 4.7. Local Government 1985-1998 ...... 59 4.8. Local government 1999-onward...... 60 4.9. Discussion...... 60
Chapter 5 NEW LOCAL GOVT SYSTEM...... 62 5.1. Introduction...... 62 5.2. Changes introduced by the new system...... 63 5.2.1. Structural changes...... 63 5.2.2. Functional Changes...... 68
10 5.2.3. Procedural Changes ...... 74 5.3. Salient Features of the New System ...... 76 5.4. Problems Addressed...... 79 5.5. Challenges in Addressing the Problems ...... 80 5.6 Discussion...... 84
Chapter 6 DATA ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION...... 86 6.1. Introduction...... 86 6.2. Checking the Reliability of measure: Cronbach’s Alpha ...... 86 6.3. Descriptive Statistics: Cross Tabulations of Respondents’ Profile...... 87 6.4. Description of Research Variables...... 90 6.5. Inferential Statistics: Pearson Correlation ...... 91 6.6 Hypotheses Testing...... 92
Chapter 7 GENERAL DISCUSSION...... 114 7.1 Popular participation...... 114 7.2 Accountability and transparency...... 116 7.3 Public service delivery...... 118 7.4 Good Governance ...... 120 7.10 Prospects of the system...... 123
Chapter 8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS...... 127 8.1. Summary of the Findings...... 127 A. Institutional Arrangements...... 127 B. Operational arrangements ...... 129 8.2. Conclusions...... 132 8.3 Recommendations...... 134 8.4. Implications...... 141
Bibliography...... 144
Appendices...... 163 1. Annexure “A” Questionnaire...... 163 11. Annexure “B” Descriptive Statistics...... 179 111. Annexure “C” District Profile...... 185 1V. Annexure “D”. Tax Assignment for District, Tehsil, and Union Governments...201
11 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 2.1 Comparative statements of citizen’s views about the governance...... 37 Table 2.2 Defined Research Variables...... 39 Figure 2.3 Graphical Presentation of the Theoretical Framework ...... 41 Table 3.1 Population Distributions ...... 45 Table 3.2 Sample Sizes for Three Groups of Population...... 46 Table 3.3 Operationalized Variables...... 47 Figure 5.1 5Ds Model...... 62 Figure 5.2 Structure of District Government...... 64 Figure 5.3 Structure of Tehsil Municipal Administration...... 66 Figure 5.4 Structure of Union Administration ...... 67 Table 6.1 Reliability test ...... 86 Table 6.2 Gender vs. Type of Respondents ...... 87 Table 6.3 Education and occupation of Respondents ...... 88 Table 6.4 Area vs. Income Levels of the Respondents...... 88 Table 6.5 Membership vs. Quota of Membership of Representatives...... 89 Table 6.6 Department vs. Designation of Government Servants...... 90 Table 6.7 Descriptive Statistics on Research Variables...... 91 Table 6.8 Pearson correlation among research variables...... 92 Table 6.9 Sub-hypotheses ...... 93 Table 6.10 t-test (to compare Mean on Participation) ...... 93 Table 6.11 ANOVA (to compare Mean on Participation)...... 93 Table 6.12 t-test (to compare Mean on Participation) ...... 94 Table 6.13 t-test (to compare Mean on accountability) ...... 95 Table 6.14 Sub-hypotheses ...... 95 Table 6.15 t-test (to compare Mean on Access to Information) ...... 96 Table 6.16 ANOVA (to compare Mean on Access to Information)...... 96 Table 6.17 t-test (to compare Mean on Access to Information) ...... 97 Table 6.18 Multiple Regressions ...... 97 Table 6.19 t-test (to compare Mean on public service delivery) ...... 98 Table 6.20 Sub-hypotheses ...... 99 Table 6.21 t-test (to compare Mean on Public Service Delivery)...... 99 Table 6.22 ANOVA (to compare Mean on Public Service Delivery) ...... 100 Table 6.23 Multiple Regressions ...... 100 Table 6.24 Multiple regressions...... 101 Table 6.25 ANOVA (to compare Mean on Governance) ...... 102 Table 6.26 Sub-hypotheses ...... 103 Table 6.27 t-test (to compare Mean on Political Experience)...... 104 Table 6.28 ANOVA (to compare Mean on Political Experience) ...... 104 Table 6.29 Sub-hypotheses ...... 105 Table 6.30 t-test (to compare Mean on Capacity)...... 105 Table 6.31 ANOVA (to compare Mean on Capacity) ...... 105 Table 6.32 Sub-hypotheses ...... 106 Table 6.33 t-test (to compare Mean on Cooperation) ...... 106 Table 6.34 ANOVA (to compare Mean on Cooperation)...... 107 Table 6.35 t-test (to compare Mean on cooperation)...... 107
12 Table 6.36 ANOVA (to compare Mean on Understanding)...... 108 Table 6.37 t-test (to compare Mean on Government intervention)...... 109 Table 6.38 ANOVA (to compare Mean on system’s prospects) ...... 110 Table 6.39 Multiple Regressions ...... 110 Table 6.40 Sub-hypotheses ...... 112 Table 6.41 t-test (to compare Mean on System’s Prospects)...... 112 Table 6.42 ANOVA (to compare Mean on system’s prospects) ...... 112
13 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Local government has remained neglected, especially in the third world countries as only lip service was paid to it in the past (Rondinelli, 1981). It was only in the late 1970s that it came to light (Conyers, 1983), and resulted in greater decentralization of political, administrative and financial powers to local level and growing interest in decentralization among international agencies, such as the United Nation and the International Labor Organization (Dasgupta and Victoria, 2007; Rondinelli et al., 1989). Likewise, International documents also link democracy and local governance, (for instance, European Charter, 1985, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of 1990, the Framework convention 1994, and the Lund Recommendation 1999). In the documents of the IMF, World Bank and other donor agencies, decentralization is placed as one major factor of good state organization and good governance (See World Bank policy, 2003).
Decentralization has been recognized as an important element of governance in both developed and developing societies of the world (see for example, Dasgupta and Victoria, 2007; Faguet and Sanchez, 2006; Khan, 2006; Khan, 2004; World Bank, 1999; Manor, 1999; Crook and Manor, 1998; Shah, 1998 and Conyers, 1983). Being nearer to the public, local government is in better position to identify and solve local problems (Rondinelli et al., 1989; Oates, 1972). Decentralization refers to administrative changes, which give greater administrative authority to the lower tiers to serve the people (Khan, 2006; Zaidi, 2005; Khan, 2002). According to Rondinelli (1981a) decentralization ‘is the transfer of responsibilities of planning, management of resources, allocation and distribution of resources from central to local agencies’. Whereas Conyers (1990, cited in Nierras et al, 2002:15) defined decentralization as ‘the transfer of power and authority of planning, decision making and the management of affairs from the higher level of government to a lower one’, where the local authorities are democratically elected and wholly or largely independent of central
14 government, which can be called a democratic decentralization (See also Faguet and Sanchez, 2006)’.
Decentralization being a complex phenomenon can not be explained only through its simple definition rather depends on its various forms, having different scope and methodologies of transferring powers to local governments, such as- Deconcentration, Delegation, Devolution, and Privatization/Partnership (Falleti, 2005; Pasha, 2003). Deconcentration is a form of decentralization, where decision making powers shift from central bureaucracy to local bureaucracy, which operates under the control and supervision of the central directives, however it can take some operational decisions with out referring to the centre (Falleti, 2005; Know, 2003; Pasha, 2003; Manor, 1995). Delegation is a transfer of authority from central to local level with fair degree of autonomy in the exercise of authority; however local units still works under the directions of the centre (know, 2003). Devolution is a form of decentralization, which transfer authority from central to local government in reality. It extends full autonomy to local government in decision making (Pasha, 2003; Rondinelli et. al., 1989). Devolution is a process that is considered to improve the quality of governance and is therefore being implemented in many countries (Falleti, 2005; Pasha, 2003). Blair (2000) argues that Devolution according to UNDP ‘is the form of decentralization which ensures the proper implementation of the key elements of good governance at local levels. Good governance, in turn, ensures the formulation and implementation of local policies in accordance with the wishes of the less privileged class.’ World Bank (2000) generally equates good governance ‘with effective management and utilization of economic resources based on accountability; Participation; Predictability and Transparency’.
Under Privatization/Partnership decision making power is transferred to privately organized units. These bodies acquire resources from the government after agreement and operate independently. Government only exercises ex-post control over the use of resources (Rondinelli et al., 1989).
15 In the subcontinent, the British introduced local governments by establishing the first municipal corporation in Madras in 1688 (Arora, 1995). Pakistan inherited the local governments system from the British. Pakistan must have learned to customize it with local demands but it did not happen because it had a poor track record of democracy with long military rule. Military created all the local governments; first in 1959, then in 1979 and now the current devolution plan 2000. Given this, the history of Pakistani local government is characterized by: (1) ‘non-operational in democratic periods; and (2) each time the introduction of new system with poor linkage to the previous system (Paracha, 2003)’.
In October 1999, the then Military Chief General Pervez Musharraf by removing the elected government of Nawaz Sharif introduced “seven point agenda” to get rid of the institutional crisis. According to devolution plan (2000) and Stone et al. (2006), the agenda consists of: - “{I} confidence building {ii} empowering federation {iii} investor’s confidence building {iv} maintenance of law and order with speedy justice; {v} overhauling state institutions {vi} transferring power to local level through devolution and {vii} the maintenance of accountability. He then constituted National Reconstruction Bureau for the implementation of proposed 5Ds model (see table 5.1).
Under the old systems of administration, the provinces directly regulate the affairs of local administrative units through local bureaucracy, holding all the executive and judicial powers (Zaidi, 2005). It provided limited opportunities of participation to the elected bodies with limited democracy and accountability (Qaddus, 1981). Policies were formulated at the top with little reference to local needs. The government servants were not accountable to the people, hence had least interest to work for the public. Lack of checks and balances further aggravated the worst situation (Cheema et al., 2004). The new system took mega step to overhaul the existing system. It abolished the divisions and introduced countrywide three tier district governments comprising on district, tehsils and union with elected heads. The elected bodies operate in accordance with local preferences and being watched
16 continuously by the elected monitoring committees. Public servants are now accountable directly to the people representatives, while indirectly to the public (Devolution plan, 2000).
It is argued in this study that, as the basic aim of the devolution exercise is to establish “good governance” at grass root levels, so it depends on the proper implementation of promised principles of the system as envisaged in Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001, such as {1} popular participation {2} Transparency and {3} public Service Delivery. Higher the ratio of popular participation, degree of Transparency and accountability and improved service delivery, higher the chances of maintaining good governance at grass root levels. How meaningful is the community participation? How far are the local representatives accountable? How far is the governing body transparent? What is the level of service delivery? What is the nature of governance? And what are the major issues of local governments? are the questions of interest to understand the prospects of the system at grass root levels. Likewise, it is the satisfaction/ dissatisfaction of the masses, which defines the degree of success or failure of the system in qualifying the above stated objectives.
1.2. Problem statement
Despite the fact that the present government has taken steps in improving the administrative structure, especially at local level, there is uncertainty about the success of the new System, as it is once again introduced by the Military regime. There is a general cynicism about the successful implementation of the system in the long term.
This research study aims at finding answers to questions like: Why previous local government systems failed to operate properly? How the new local government system is being introduced? How is it contributing to maintain “good governance” at grass root levels through ensuring promised principles like, “Popular participation,
17 transparency, accountability and public service delivery as envisaged in the Local Government Ordinance 2001? How are the various factors affecting the performance of district government? What kinds of challenges local governments have to encounter? And what are the prospects of the new system in the long run?
1.3. Objectives of the study
The objectives of this research are to measure the: Extent of popular participation and the impacts of existing disparities and power relations on it. Degree of accountability of local representatives to the people. Transparency level of the system and the impacts of demographics on access to information. Level of public service delivery and the effects of contextual differences thereupon. Level of governance with extent of understanding, cooperation between political and bureaucratic heads, political experience, government intervention, and working capacity. Issues/challenges to local governments and, Prospects of the new system of local government.
1.4. Importance of the study
This study is designed to contribute to the following issues related to the new system of local government: There has not been any research on local government at District level except the articles published in the national and local press and the limited work of a few graduate students of the University; hence present study will bridge this gap in the literature.
18 Likewise, research studies on the viability of the new system of local government are yet in the offing. This study will provide clear picture of the performance of the district governments and will be helpful for making rational policies. The research will unfold the problems of local governments of Pakistan in general, and Dera Ismail Khan District in particular, thereby helping the government to develop strategies to overcome these problems. The findings will provide a sound base for understanding of the conditions of local government in District Dera Ismail Khan by the local authorities in solving different issues at grass roots level. The research will provide a measure of community participation, accountability, service delivery, governance, and the prospects of improving it further.
1.5. Research Hypotheses
Following hypotheses have been tested in this study. 1. Existing disparities and power relations determine level of popular Participation. 2. Citizens and politicians have different views on popular participation. 3. Representatives report more accountability than citizens. 4. Demographic differences affect the extent of access to information. 5. Representatives report more transparency than citizens. 6. Greater the Participation and Transparency, greater are the chances of Better Service Delivery. 7. In contrast to the public representatives, general public report poor public service delivery. 8. Context shapes and reshapes the access to Public Service Delivery. 9. Participation, Transparency and Better Service Delivery determine Good Governance.
19 10. The independent variables (five) significantly explain the variance in Good Governance. 11. In contrast to representatives, general public and government officials perceive poor governance. 12. The political Experience of Local Representatives varies with the change in their Background. 13. Contextual differences affect the capacity of local Representatives and Bureaucrats. 14. Demographic background of the representatives and bureaucrats has impacts on their cooperation with each other. 15. Local representatives are more cooperative than bureaucrats. 16. In contrast to government officials, representatives and general public have limited understanding of the system. 17. In comparison to public servants, public representatives and the public have different views about central/provincial government intervention. 18. Citizens, politicians and government officials have different views about the prospects of the system. 19. The independent variables (nine) significantly explain the variance in System’s Prospects. 20. Demographic imbalances and power relations determine System’s prospects.
1.6. Organization of the thesis
While the table of contents is a guide to what the thesis contains, some explanation is necessary to guide the readers through the eight chapters and enable him/her to identify areas of particular interest. The first Chapter is introducing the study, elaborating the research-problem and specifying the objectives and significance of the study. It also includes the research hypotheses.
20 The theoretical basis of this research is presented in Chapter two. In this chapter, global, national and local perspectives of the local governments are given and extracted variables have been specified and connected into a theoretical framework.
Research methodology is explained in Chapter three. A description of the sample surveyed and a brief identification of each of the survey instrument is presented in this section. Statistical techniques used in this research are elaborated as well. Historical background of the local government in Pakistan is presented in chapter four, while the details about the new local government system with its issues/challenges are given in chapter five.
Analyses of the survey data and its findings, including the descriptive statistics for demographics and the research variables together with tests of hypotheses are presented in chapter six. General discussion is given in chapter seven, while summary and highlights of the findings are presented in chapter eighth. This chapter also mentions the contribution of this research, recommendations for further studies, and the concluding remarks.
21 Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Global Perspectives Local government has been defined as ‘a form of government, legally constituted at sub divisional level of a state to control local affairs and to collect taxes, which is either elected or otherwise locally selected (see for example Marshall, 1995; Hill, 1974: 23).’ Uphoff and Esman (1974: 3) define Local government as “an organization that had some accountability to a local constituency, which represent local interests, and in which local people enjoy opportunity to participate”. Furthermore, according to article three of the European Charter (1985), local government ‘is constitutionally empowered to manage and govern local affairs independently in accordance with the needs and wishes of local peoples.’
Before the popularity of globalization, highly centralized systems of administration were working in the world with weak regional governments (Pose and Gill, 2002). The advent of the 21st century changed the whole scenario and caused greater tendencies towards devolution (Pose and Gill, 2003). Consequently, concern of strengthening local government has got momentum in countries of both the developed and developing world (Geddes, 2006; Devries, 2000). However, the performance of local governments varies considerably due to different demographics (Pose and Gill, 2003).
A. Local Government in Developed World The developed world traditionally has strong local government systems, which has not only accelerated the pace of development but has also established vital institutions that contributed well to the moral, social and economic uplift of the people (Asif, 2006). Devolution of power to lower level was the dreem of Blair administration, which was achieved through transfering decision-making powers and responsibilities to the local level and by filling growing divide between the state and civil society in the UK through developing closer links between democratic
22 institutions, decision-making bodies and policy effectiveness (Raco, 2003)’. The liberties of England are due to her free local institutions like counties, boroughs and city councils (Quddus, 1981:36). It is the revolutionary council in each town, city and commune in the Peoples Republic of China, which paved the way for its self-reliance in industrial and agriculture fields. It has an effective system of local government not only in urban and rural administration but also in small and big industrial units and educational institutions (Ma, 1996:5). In France, the Commune, the Department, the region (new) and the Special statute (new) do almost every thing for the government and the people, from looking after the sick and the insane burial of the dead and education of child to raising of recruits for the army (Cole, 2006). The French system of local government is so well established that a saying goes in Europe that “just get yourself born in France and the prefect will do the rest (Asif, 2006: 403)”. The county is the principal unit of local government in USA. The total number of counties having separate counties governments in the United States is 3050 (Ibid, 441). The counties administer the affairs of education, health welfare activities, highway construction, highway maintenance, local elections and many additional functions. The other local entities are municipal governments (cities), special district governments and school districts.
B. Local Governments in Developing World Developing world too is shifting from the highly centralized states to decentralized ones with slow pace and progress (Pose and Gill, 2002). It is due to demographic differences and poor attention to the critical success factors like participation, accountability, transparency and public service delivery. For example several developing countries are moving towards decentralization such as in Latin America countries (Harbers, 2007) like Colombia, Argentina (Falletti, 2005), Venezuela (Menocal, 2004), Cost Rica, Bolivia and Honduras have also moved towards decentralization. The waves of decentralization can also be seen in Mexico (Harbers, 2007; Menocal, 2004 and Ward and Rodriguez, 1999: 28) and in Brazil (Tulchin and Andrew, 2004 and Coutinho, 1996: 7). In Africa, several countries, including Tanzania, Ethiopia, Uganda, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria, have in
23 recent years undertaken major reform initiatives aimed at decentralizing to self governing local units (Pose and Gill, 2002). In the Middle East, Egypt and Jordon also adopted decentralization. Morocco since 1976 has already shifted service delivery to communes (Pose and Gill, 2003). Yemen too is transferring powers to the regional level. Furthermore, Iran, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Jerusalem are also strengthening municipalities (Ibid).
In Europe, ‘the centralized system (prevailed up to 1970s) has been converting to decentralized societies. Belgium since early 1990s has been shifted towards devolution; Italy has already turned to that direction, and the regions in Spain possess more powers than the federation. The sign of transferring powers and resources to regional level are evident in UK, Poland and France (Pose and Gill, 2003)’.
The ‘independence of fifteen constituent Republics of the former Soviet Union, the Eritrea in Africa and East Timor in Indonesia is an extreme form of such global trends of decentralization. In western Europe Spain and Poland already followed decentralization (Pose and Gill, 2002)’, and devolutionary trend has also been seen in Indonesia (Aspinall and Berger, 2001). In Asia, the dramatic flowering of decentralization initiatives can be observed in Nepal, India, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea and Pakistan (Cheema et al., 2004; Fernando, 1997:6).
Despite differences in decentralization initiatives of different countries, the decentralization of powers to local level is recognized as a process to improve the quality of governance (Rondinelli et al., 1989). According to UNDP, decentralization facilitates the implementation of the key elements of good governance at lower levels (Blair, 2000)’, while Good governance ‘ensures accountability; transparency; participation; access to information; responsiveness; efficient delivery of goods and services; rule of law; legitimacy and voice; direction; performance; and fairness (Kaufmann et al., 1999; Chopra, 1997: 32; Bandyopadhyay, 1997: 32).’
24 Given this, it is argued that the success of the new system depends on the proper implementation of the critical success factors of governance i.e. citizen’s participation, accountability and better public service delivery. Let us now review the available literature to see that what is happening in the developing world. a. Popular Participation Local government is famous for inducing broader participation in democratic governance (Jutting et al., 2004; Wallis and Oates, 1998; World bank, 1995; UNDP, 1994) and delivering services in accordance with local needs and requirements (Gustafsson and Stephen, 2005). A vast body of Knowledge exists regarding citizen’s participation at grass root levels. Some studies show that local government considerably enhances citizen’s participation in governance. A study conducted by Parry et al. (1992) in Britain concludes that local government sloved majority of local problems (44%) of the people, whereas the contribution of central government and other government institutions were limited only to 15% and (11%) respectively (Parry et al., 1992:268).
Verba et al. (1995) measured the participation level in USA and found higher levels of participation. His empirical finding reveals that local governments has the potentials to motivate the people to participate in other local matters beyond simply participation in elections (Pratchett, 2004). Manor (1995) argues that decentralization facilitates popular participation. Similarly, Crook and Manor (1998) compared the experiences of four countries, two in Asia (Bangladesh and Indian State of Karnataka) and two in Africa (Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire). Their research showed that the transfer of responsibilities, resources and accountability to local communities led to considerably enhanced levels of participation of the citizens in governance. The role of fiscal decentralization in the promotion of citizen’s participation is well recognized as indicated by Shah (1998) that there is a significantly positive relationship between citizen’s participation, political freedom, political stability and fiscal decentralization (Shah, 1998). Similarly Blair (2000) in his six country study found considerable
25 improvement in participation and representation with reduced empowerment of non- elite and poverty reduction.
Minos (2002) argues that the city of Porto Alleger, in Brazil, provides a unique example of direct participation in public budgeting. Baiochhi (2005); Tulchin and Andrew (2004) and Santos (1998) after evaluating participatory budgeting in Brazilian Municipalities concludes excessive involvement of general public in prioritizing investments, reviewing accounts, evaluating past investments and electing representatives to city council. This participatory approach uplifted the performance of municipalities, for example the city of Porto Alegre obtained substantial increase in local revenue and school enrolment (Santos, 1998).
Other studies conclude lesser popular participation at local level and also highlight factors responsible for it. D’Art and Thomas (2007) is of the view that ‘ in many advanced countries considerable decrease in citizen’s participation and voter turnout is recorded. In the United States for instance, the voter’s turnout in the 1996 and 1998 elections was lower than in any election in nearly two centuries, which is effecting presidential, state and local elections. The declining trend of participation is not limited only to the United States, rather evident in national elections of 18 democratic industrialized countries, which has been dropped down approximately to 10 percentage points from what it was in the early 1950s (D’Art and Thomas, 2007)’.
Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis (1983) argue that decentralization has been failed to meet expectations. Non-political factors like poverty and insufficient resources were made responsible for such failures. Similarly Westergaard (1988) states that although representation of the less privileged class was improved but not their actual participation. Furthermore the scheduled caste members speak occasionally in meeting and when they did they were neglected.
The local level is frequently conquered by power politics and policies do not sufficiently reflect the set aims of decentralization, as highlighted by the Alam (2004);
26 Azfar et al. (1999); Crook & Sverrisson (1999). Samoff (1990) concludes that the domination of elite class and the scarcity of resources (human, technical and financial) restrict local governments to deliver services effectively (Jutting et al., 2004). Similarly Chinsinga (2005) in his study on Malawi Socio Action Fund (MASAF) argues that the social interface restrict mass participation. Marcou (2004) states that in South Eastern Europe, the main obstacles to the development of citizens’ participation are the ‘i) lack of transparency and accountability, ii) low level of citizen’s participation in decision-making, iii) passiveness of NGOs in public administration, and the limited role of media’.
b. Accountability and transparency
Decentralization is also argued for promoting accountability through transparent decision making (Nupia, 2006). Faguet and Sanchez (2006) argue that decentralized bodies can be more easily watched, accessed and monitored which facilitates holding these bodies accountable. Similarly Kendall (1991) says “people at local level know each others which make hiding the corruption more difficult than authorities far away from them. He further comments that in such situation it is also easier to hold local officials and elected office-bearers accountable as, politically, they will be less protected than official of the centre (Kendall, 1991).”
However the practical experiences of decentralized societies show mixed results regarding the level of accountability and transparency at local level. Manor (1996) reports an improved information flow between government and citizens and improved level of accountability and transparency (Faguet and Sanchez, 2006). Similarly, Blair (2000) argues that the major promise of democratic decentralization is the promotion of participation and accountability and effective public service delivery. The World Bank with the collaboration of the Colombian Government conducted study in 1995 and found distinct improvement in accountability and transparency
27 (World Bank, 1995). Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) conducted study in India by using dataset of 250 villages and found visible improvement in local democracy during early 1980s to late 1990s. He also reported significant improvement in local government spending to local preferences. Similarly Besley et al. (2004a) conducted study in south India and found more inclination of holding regular meeting in villages having higher literacy rate for resources allocation and evaluation of local government’s action plans.
Whereas, other authors, such as Nygren (2005); Anderson (2004); McCarty (2004) and Larson (2002) considered decentralization much more problematic and confusing. Similarly Commonwealth Foundation (1999) and Nierras et al. (2000) concludes that citizens from every where expressing their dissatisfaction about the performance of governments, on the basis of maladministration, irresponsiveness, corruption and weak accountability, especially of the local government officials. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a federalist state with highly decentralized government structure where, in the absence of modern internal control and audit systems, governments at all levels have failed to develop sound budget practices (World Bank, 2003a). Lack of control systems makes safeguarding against abuse, misuse, fraud, and irregularities impossible.
In Bosnia, widespread corruption is coupled with low public morale and distrust towards public institutions (World Bank, 2003a). At least one report on the country concludes that without establishing an effective control system at local level, detection and control of misconduct in public procurement is impossible (World Bank, 2002b). In the Philippines, the internal control environment and institutional arrangements for financial accountability remain extremely weak at the local level (World Bank, 2004d). The absence of key control mechanisms is one of the factors for weak governance in local government units (World Bank, 2004d and 2003c). Similarly, Indonesia has recently devolved decision-making powers on major service delivery items from the central to local level. Yet, diagnostic studies report that the
28 lack of fraud, corruption, detection and prevention systems is a major snag in improving local accountability (World Bank, 2003b).
In India, the constitutional amendments of 1993 aim for revolutionizing democratic participation and local development planning. However, the sub-national fiscal crisis of the late 1990s has revealed a number of accountability flaws in the public finance framework (World Bank, 2005c). In Argentina, recent diagnostic studies show that there is a lack of legal instruments and political willingness to improve the internal control system at the sub-national level (Baltaci and Yilmaz, 2005).
In China, sub-national governments accounted for about 70 percent of government spending in 2002 (World Bank, 2005b). However, internal control and auditing remains a weak link in the sub-national expenditure management (Mountfield and Wong, 2005). Colombia has been engaged in a major experiment of decentralization for the past fifteen years; however the legal framework is still unclear in defining the functions and responsibilities of the entities involved in their sub- national fiscal control. In the present situation, fiscal control is highly centralized, and provincial comptroller offices have little autonomy. Additionally, a multi-layer bureaucracy often makes the control process sluggish (World Bank, 2005a). Such factors lead to a vulnerable internal control environment where fraud, negligence and corruption remain significant risks to local governance (World Bank, 2005a).
Nupia (2006) concludes that, ‘decentralization increases the level of accountability in developed countries as their mechanisms allow decentralization to work properly. However, because such mechanisms usually fail in developing countries, it is not the same case for these economies. The power of local elite in these countries is one of the aspects that reduces political accountability and encourages bad governance’. Similarly Frances and Jams (2003) argue that decentralization in Uganda has not been considered as independent and accountable as it has been captured by local elite, which is an obstacle to poverty reduction.
29 C. Public Service Delivery
Decentralization through transferring powers of resource generation and allocation from central to local government can generate financial efficiency and quality gains in service delivery (World Bank Report, 2004; Lemmon, 2003 and Kwon, 2003). A local government being closer to the people is well aware about local preferences and works accordingly to serve them better (Faguet and Sanchez, 2006). Mrs. Elena Lento, City Manager, Hameenlinna Finland, states that the provision of social service through the local government ensure user’s participation, facilitates better control and honor local preferences. It also provides cost effective mechanism with more willingness to pay. Whereas centralized mechanism is more vulnerable to political interference, local resistance and rising prices (Yongjian, 1996).
However, the practical experiences of decentralized societies round the world show mixed results about the extent of public service delivery at local level. The World Development Report (1994) on infrastructure concluded that the projects under the control and management of local government show distinct improvement in quality and cost effectiveness. Similarly, Azfar et al. (1999) find positive correlation between decentralization and quality of public service delivery in the field of health and education in some areas of Philippine, whereas, Bird et al. (1995) conclude that public service delivery deteriorated after decentralization in Eastern and Central Europe.
The World Bank conducted 16 studies in Morocco and found substantial improvement in water supply, construction and maintenance of roads especially in rural areas, an expansion of primary education and the resource mobilization (World Bank, 1995). Similarly, findings of the Kwon (2003) suggest fiscal decentralization in Korea facilitated the provision of goods and services in accordance with local demands. Whereas, in Chile ‘the results of decentralization are satisfactory in health, with substantial decrease in infant and mother mortality, but not so impressive in
30 education, which is the remarkable breakthrough of decentralization and it will further improve under new government (World Bank, 1995).’
Nicaragua in 1990 shifted the control and management of public schools from central to local authorities and involved parents in policy making, which was first evaluated by King and Ozler in 1998. He concluded that although full autonomy has not been extended to such local council however, considerable improvement in student’s performance has been recorded. Similarly Fiszbein (1997) found ‘an improved service delivery with greater citizen’s satisfaction in Colombian municipalities (Fiszbein, 1997: 1030).’
The evidence from Africa is very limited about decentralized service delivery. However Francis and James (2003) conducted study in Africa and ‘argue that despite decentralization the performance of African countries such as Uganda, Botswana, Nigeria, Ghana, Cote dIvoire, Kenya and Tanzania has not improved (Francis and James (2003)’. Similarly Wunsch and olowu (2001) also reported failure of local bodies which was mainly due to limited resources, poor planning, and absence of meaningful political process. Prawda (1993) compared decentralized initiatives of four Latin American countries and found no improvement in the quality of education rather decentralization widened the gap between better off and worse off schools. Similarly Parry (1997) argues that decentralization caused inequalities in expenditures and performance of students on the basis of demographic differences. Furthermore, in health care the situation has further worsened under decentralization, which neither improved service delivery nor reduced the costs of care (Burki et al., 1999: 75-86).
The evidence from Asia is also very limited, as most of the Asian countries are recently moving towards decentralization. However, Mahal et al. (2000) conducted study in India and found positive relation between decentralization and improved child mortality and school enrolment. However, in India the provision of health and education services is the responsibility of the central government where local governments have nothing to do. Local governments only entitled to handle the
31 developmental projects determined by the state and central government and handed over to the local councils. Karalla and Madhya Pradesh is the only Indian state, where local bodies are authorized to formulate development projects especially for education and health with full financial resources. For example, the Karalla’s Popular Planning Campaign, launched in 1996, shows that expenditures of local bodies more accurately reflect local priorities but it is too early to determine their equity impact (Isaac, 2000). Furthermore, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) evaluated fiscal decentralization in India and found that an increased allocation of resources to road construction provided extra benefits to landless workers while paying negative effects on irrigation facilities and effected the landowners.
Furthermore, the decentralization initiative in Bangladesh also failed to meet the expectations. According to Crook and Sverrisson ‘the local bodies failed to improve productivity, maintain equability and to reduce the dominance of elite class as it is highlighted by eminent writers that decentralization become a mean to work for the well being of the rich and the well-born (2001: 46).’ Furthermore, the performance of disaster relief programmes 1980 was not so impressive, which was due to poor management, maladministration and misuse of the allocated resources (Ibid: 46).
D. Quality of Governance
In recent years, leading economists and political scientists are of the view that decentralized bodies in comparison to central bodies are more efficient (Lemmon, 2003; Buchanan, 1977 and Bolton and Roland, 1997). Others support decentralization due to its ability to control deficit budget and inflation (Rodden et al., 2003a; Rodden, 2003b and Rodden and Wibbels, 2002). Policy-makers and politicians have considered decentralization “as a panacea for the ills of poor governance (Ansell and Gingrich, 2003).”
32 Crook and Manor (1994) and Blair (1996) measured the relationship between decentralization and quality governance and found it positive, especially in transferring powers from central authorities to local bodies. London (1996) evaluated the decentralized education system in Canada and found substantial decrease in overhead cost. Similarly Humplick and Moini (1996) report positive relationship between decentralization and lower unit administrative cost for road and maintenance services. Similarly Fisman and Gatti (2002a) reported positive effects of decentralization on governance. A contrasting picture emerges from the results of Treisman (2002), who evaluated correlations between decentralization, corruptions and social service delivery, and found an association between corruption and decentralization.
An analysis of the global perspectives of local governments reveals that no doubt, the system has brighter prospects in the developed countries; likewise, the increasing recent global trends towards decentralization in developing countries and comparatively better performance of local governments suggests future prospects depending upon the significant improvements in the critical factors such as, participation, accountability, transparency and public service delivery. If they succeed in controlling these critical factors there will be brighter prospects of local government and vice versa. After analyzing the prospects of local governments at the global level, let us evaluate its national perspectives.
2.2. National Perspectives
President Pervaz Musharraf once remarked ‘that the World Bank and other donor agencies are appreciating the system due to its potential to serve the common man, so i am confident enough to say that the system will definitely solve local problems and will work better (Devolution plan 2000).’ The above statement claims that the new local government system will be long lasting with brighter prospects; but its actual success depends on its proper implementation, full support of all segments of the society and proper functioning.
33 The track record of democracy in Pakistan is very poor as it has been ruled mostly by the military. Military always created the local governments, first in 1959, then in 1979 and now the current devolution plan 2000. In Pakistan, always a limited local democracy had been introduced in order to give some kind of democratic legitimacy to an authoritarian regime. Sivaramakishnan (2000:423) noted this phenomenon for Pakistan, “Local government performed much better during eras of authoritarian rule than in times of democratic rule. During democratic regimes the local level often lost the attractiveness because it was not any longer the only platform available for public participation. Additionally, local government had to come to terms with bad reputation acquired under autocratic regimes”.
The new system is also introduced by the military dictator, which brought about comprehensive changes in the existing administrative structure of local government. It abolished the districts and introduced countrywide three tier district governments comprising on district, tehsil and union. It placed elected representatives as the heads of these bodies. The elected bodies have commitment to work in accordance with the wishes of the people. Elected monitoring committees are held responsible to monitor the performance of these bodies and held them accountable to the elected representatives, who are in turn accountable to the public at local level (Asif, 2006). The system of local government is aimed to increase popular participation, strengthen accountability and motivate less privileged class of the community to participate in community work and development related activities (NRB, 2001).
Given this, it is argued that the success of the new system depends on the proper implementation of the critical success factors of governance i.e. citizen’s participation, transparency, accountability and better public service delivery. Let us now review the available literature on Pakistan to see that what is happening in the country with regard to these critical factors.
34 a. Popular Participation
Despite the perceived advantages of devolution to encourage the poor people to participate, the practical experience of the country reflects disappointing results. Number of studies have evaluated the performance of district governments in the country and indicate lesser popular participation at local level (see for example, Stone et al. (2006); Khan (2006); Peterson et al. (2006); Khan (2004); Asif (2003) and Alam (2002).
Stone et al. (2006) argues that although schools monitoring committees (SMCs) and parent’s teacher associations (PTAs) have been constituted in majority of the districts but they are not working in accordance with the provisions of LGO 2001. Lack of capacity of these committees is highlighted as the main reason for such deficiency. Furthermore, lack of clear-cut mechanism to oversee health facilities and limited institutional arrangements to get feedback from the general public are reported. Paterson et al. (2006) concluded that Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) may be the most effective mechanism for the involvement of less privileged class in local affairs but due to elite domination it is looking impossible. Similarly, Kazmi (2003) is of the view that CCBs have not been formed in most of the union councils while the 20:80 partnerships of the CCBs are being captured by the elite class. Furthermore, Asif (2003) found that it could be learned that in practice, none of these bodies did exist. The villages visited neither constituted Village Councils nor CCBs.
Khan, S. (2004) reaffirmed these observations in his PhD thesis conducted in district Mansehra and Mardan of NWFP Province. He concludes that no village and neighbourhood council have been constituted, whereas, only 20 and 15 CCBs have been on paper in the districts concerned respectively. He further concludes that the majority of the respondents (63%) did not get involved at meeting and other activities of the council as well as less than 17% of the villagers participated in the developmental projects and only 24.55% and 15.25% participated in problem identification and decision-making stage respectively.
35 Similarly, Khan, S. A. (2006) in his Master Thesis, pointed out that even though the new system provided clear mechanism of popular participation in service delivery, however it is well reported that these mechanisms do exist but rarely practiced. Whereas, Alam (2002) argues that in Pakistan the initial sign are not very encouraging and Nazim in some districts are trying to run the administration in more or less authoritarian fashion, leading to fighting and mudslinging in the district assemblies. b. Accountability & Transparency
Before devolution district administration was accountable to the provinces rather to the elected representatives, however, by changing the prevailing practice new system held the public servants accountable to elected heads of the district governments. The new system took following steps to change the nature of both vertical and horizontal checks: a) monitoring committees b) citizen’s oversight through direct election and District Public Safety Commission c) District Police Officer and d) District Public Safety Commission and Complaint Cell to strengthen accountability of police.
Despite such elaborate institutional arrangements, the situation in practice still remains unchanged and the bureaucracy still retains too much administrative powers to play dominant role in the current administrative setup (Stone et al., 2006). Similarly Manning et al. (2003) argues “despite of the fact that the local bureaucracy has been placed under the control of local representative but practically it is still working under the dominance of provincial bureaucracy. The provincial bureaucrats are using them against the Nazims”. Furthermore, new accounting mechanism is not operating well due to unclear role and responsibilities, poor intra-local government coordination and limited channels of monitoring (World Bank report, 2004).
36 Asif (2003) comments that the concept of democratic accountability is undermined, as there are virtually no checks on the authority of the indirectly elected Zila Nazim. The method of internal recall of the Nazim carries prohibitive costs for council members who try to remove Zila Nazim through motion of no-confidence. If the motion is not carried in the house, the proposing members can lose their council membership. Technically, the Zila council headed by the Naib Zila Nazim retains oversight of the Nazism’s performance, but when the Nazim and the Naib Nazim belongs to one group, the executives can exert disproportionate influence over the council without the corresponding legislative checks on his/her authority.
Due to such deficiencies government neither succeeded to hold the public servant accountable nor to control the prevailing corruption as reflected by the comparative survey of five South Asian countries. The survey was conducted in (Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal) and the result indicates that along most dimensions of governance, Pakistani citizens have rated conditions in their country worst than the citizens of other countries, in the region (See Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Comparative statements of citizen’s views about the governance Table 2.1 Citizen’s views of Governance Responses Questions Most Negative Most Positive Are political leaders Corrupt? Pakistan Sri Lanka Have they become even more corrupt in the past 5 years? Nepal Bangladesh Are police officers corrupt? Pakistan Nepal Pakistan Are public representatives responsive to citizen needs? India (Yes, 15%) Pakistan Are you satisfied with the civil service? NA (Yes, 17%) Source: Adeel Malik, “Citizens’ Perceptions of Governance: An Overview,” Technical Annex to Human Development in South Asia 1999, Oxford Univ. Press.
37 c. Public service delivery
It is well documented that Pakistan is lag behind country in public service delivery (World Bank Report, 2004). However devolution offers a new set of institutional arrangements that can produce effective solutions. Section 18 (d); 54 (h); 76(j) holds responsible the Zila, Tehsil and Union administration for service delivery respectively (MOLG, 2005). Furthermore the devolution plan changes the accountability pattern for politicians and policy makers in delivering services (World Bank Report, 2004: 25). Despite considerable emphasize on required institutional arrangements, the available literature on service delivery shows mixed results. Some of the studies, such as those conducted by the World Bank (2004), show positive signs of service delivery improvements in the country. For example, in NWFP significant improvement in routine immunization has been recorded. Similarly significant improvement in voting behavior has been reported (Wilder, 1999).
Whereas, other studies conducted by Asian Development Report (2005) and Peterson, G. et al. (2006) indicates poor performance of Social sector in Pakistan. Similarly, Peterson (2002) argues that reorganization in the country caused severe damage to the quality of services. There are hardly any government hospitals in remote areas, and even where the government clinics are available the doctors are not present. Although hospitals are accessible in some areas however women living in mountains and remote areas have little or no access to health units even to family doctors.
Furthermore these areas are suffering from adequate water supplies and proper sanitation facilities causing severe damage to their health. The literacy rate in the rural areas is much below than national average. Although in some areas the school buildings are present and teachers are drawing salaries but the villagers complained that they (the teachers) hardly bother to come to schools and teach the children. The local governments are still not clear about their role in health and education sector,
38 and the conflicts between local government officials (bureaucracy) and local leaders (councilors) are increasing day by day.
Furthermore, Kazmi (2003) in his paper states that two year performance of the new system indicating its failure to meet the expectations, which are due to unclear role and responsibilities, political rift between Nazims of the three tiers and between local bureaucracy and Nazims.
2.3. Extracted variables
From the analysis of above stated literature, following variables have been extracted and used in the current research study: - gender; education; income; area/location; class; profession; participation; transparency; accountability; public service delivery; governance; political experience; government intervention; understanding of the system, working capacity of the local politicians and bureaucrats; and cooperation between political and official heads. These variables have been selected on the basis of fact that the researchers and scholars of the field considered them as true representative of the theory behind the topic, which will be latter tested in this research project.
Table 2.2 Defined Research Variables
List of Defined Variables (Working Concepts) S. Variable Brief descriptions No 1 Popular What is the level of participation (direct and indirect) of the Participation people both in the formulation and implementation of developmental and non-developmental projects and schemes? 2 Transparency What is the level of transparency of the system? What is the level of citizen’s access to information? And what is the level of accountability of local representatives to the people and government servants to the representatives?
39 3 Service What is the level of service delivery with regard to both social delivery (such as health, education, and public works) and economic (like poverty alleviation, employment opportunities and faster economic activity)? And what is the level of satisfaction of the people from the provision of services by the district government? 4 Governance What is the level of governance? How is it regulating affairs of the district? What is the condition of line of authority and law and order in the district? And what are the strategies for the development of the district? 5 Political What is the attitude of politicians toward devolution plan? Experience What is their support/opposition level? To what extent they are interfering and influencing the district government? 6 Government To what extent the district government is autonomous? What intervention is the role and interference of central and provincial government in the exercise of authority by the district government at gross roots level? 7 Understanding What is the knowledge level of the local representatives and the general public about the new system and their capacity to handle the tasks properly? 8 Cooperation What is the level of cooperation between the local politicians and the bureaucrats at district level, their working relationship and interaction with each other? 9 Capacity What is the existing capacity of the local representatives and government officials? What capacity building programmes have been initiated? 10 Prospects What are the real prospects of the system
2.4. Theoretical Framework
Theoretical framework is the network of logical relationships between all the research variables thereby producing the ‘theory of the research project’. It is the research design, which indicates the dependence and independence of research variables to form a particular theory to be tested in the project. Figure 2.3 is the schematic diagram (Sekaran, 1999: 100) of the theoretical framework with variables in the boxes and arrows showing the direction of relationships between the variables.
40 The dependent variable is the prospects of the system, which is the variable of primary interest, in which the variance is attempted to be explained by the nine independent variables such as: popular participation, transparency, public service delivery, governance, political experience, working capacity, cooperation between government officials and political heads, and understanding of the system and government intervention.
Figure 2.3 Graphical Presentation of the Theoretical Framework
Federal and Provincial Government
Participation Political 1.Direct Environment > 2.Indirect
i k s e l
b 1 r V Better Service a i
r Transparency Delivery Good a Prospects v 1.Access to 1.Social Governance c i
h Information 2.Economic p
a 2.Accountability r A g
o ik m e D Devolution Cooperation
Capacity building
2.5 Discussion
Global perspectives of Local Government reveals that the concern of strengthening local government has now become a global phenomenon. It is universally recognized that Local government being closer to the people is in better position to identify and solve local problems more positively than of the federal
41 government (Lemmon, M.E., 2003; Rondinelli et al., 1989; Oates, 1972), hence improve the quality of governance (Graham et al., 2003). Additionally, with popular support it is in better position to get the realistic development (Tordoff and Young, 1994).
The practical experiences of local governments vary from country to country and from region to region in the world. It is due to demographic differences and variation in attention to the implementation of critical success factors of good governance i.e. popular participation, transparency, accountability and public service delivery. Local governments in the developed world are deeply rooted in long traditions, well established and paying due attention to the proper implementation of critical success factors of good governance and hence have brighter prospects.
Local governments in most of the developing countries still are at the evolutionary stages, with human, financial and technical constraints. Given this, it is very hard for these countries to catch the developed world. However in line with the changing situation of the world, it is imperative for the developing countries to strengthen local institutions and pay due attention to the proper implementation of critical success factors of good governance to survive and to meet the changing needs and requirements of the world. Such global trends towards decentralization and growing concern of strengthening local governments suggest that the local government have better prospects in these developing countries as well.
The national perspective of local government reveals poor track record of democracy with long military rule. Military always created the local governments, first in 1959, then in 1979 and now the current devolution plan 2000. Despite the fact that the present government has taken steps in improving the administrative structure, strengthening accountability, political reformation, and educational progress etc; there are uncertainties about the expectations from the new Local Government System, as it is once again introduced by the Military regime. In such scenario, there are reservations about the successful implementation of the system in the long term.
42 Furthermore, the impact evaluation of decentralized strategies highlighted that the excessive interference of higher tiers in the affairs of local government, absence of constitutional guarantee and political support undermine the prospects of the new system.
Furthermore, the national perspective of local government reveals variation in performance of local governments from district to district and from region to region. It is again due to regional demographic and cultural differences. The urban areas are performing well as compared to rural, especially the backward rural areas. Besides these demographic and cultural differences, there are constraints like: bureaucratic non-cooperation, elite capture, religious restrictions especially on women, poor working relationship of local bodies, lack of coordination between members of National and Provincial assemblies and local political representatives, and the lack of capacity creates ambiguities for the prospects of local government in the long run.
43 Chapter 3 RESEARCH DESIGN
3.1. Approach As it is important to think very carefully and clearly about the problem, it is also important to take care of the research methods to be used (Majumdar, 2005). The researcher has to decide on the strategy before choosing methods. For example, experiment, survey, history, case study, archival analyses are different strategies available. The selection however depends on: “a. the nature of research questions, b. investigators control over actual behavioral events and, c. the extent of focus on contemporary rather than on historical events (Yin, 1994:1)” and the controllability of the researcher on research situation.
The case study approach is suggested as the most popularly used strategy to unfold social issues (Majumdar, 2005: 284) like the behavior of government servants, people representatives and the general public in a local government environment. According to Mutebi (2005) the application of a case study provides multi- dimensional approach for data collection. Given this, the case study approach was opted for this research study with the assumption that the approach intensively studies, describes and analyses a person, group, or organization from which theory can be derived or tested (Gillham, 2005: 1; Easton Geoff, 1992).
The project under study aims at unfolding: what, how, and why of local government in Dera Ismail Khan with an intention of exploring prospects of the system supported by empirical data. This is possible only through the application of case study approach since it is the only strategy, which attempts to answer all possible questions in any social research project (Yin, 1994: 6).
3.2. Population The target population of the study included the registered voters, local representatives and the local government officers of District Dera Ismail Khan, which
44 is the southern most district of NWFP stretching from the Sulimans across the Indus into Thal of the Sind. It is bounded on the north by Lakki Marwat and Bannu districts, on the south by the district Dera Ghazzi Khan of the Punjab Province, on the east by the Bhakkar and Mainwali districts of the Punjab Province, and on the west by the Tribal Area adjoining Dera Ismail Khan district (Shirani), South Waziristan Agency, Tank district and by the Koh-e-Suliman.
The technical distribution of the total population is given in Table 3.1. The table shows the total number of each population category (N) along with its percentage in the total population.
Table 3.1 Population Distributions S No. Strata N % 1 General Public 4, 20,002 99.74 2 Representatives 656 0.16 3 Government Servants 450 0.10 Total 4,21,108 100.00
3.3. Sample & Sampling Procedure A pilot study was conducted to prepare a proposal as well as get the required statistics for applying random sampling procedures in sample selection. The formula for finite population was used to compute the sample-size for each population category. Population was made of 4, 20,002 general public, 656 councilors and 450 government servants. The difference between different groups of the population is too big therefore; the formula for stratified sampling is not applicable because then the smaller groups are not represented properly. Given this, the formula for selecting a sample from ‘finite population’ was applied on all the populations individually, which gave the advisable size of the sample. In social sciences 95% confidence level is usable, which equals 1.96 z-values. Table 3.2 details the whole sampling procedural applications and results.
45 Table 3.2 Sample Sizes for Three Groups of Population PSn SD SE N Sampling Procedure n General Public 45 0.65 0.097 4, 20,002 170 2 2 2 2 Representatives 35 0.80 0.137 656 [ /((E /Z )+( /N))] 110 Govt. Servants 20 0.74 0.185 450 56 Total (n) of Pilot study 100 Total (N) = 4,21,108 Total (n) = 336
3.4. Data Collection Methods
1. Literature survey: There is a huge body of literature on the local government systems but data about the developing countries is lacking. However, all possible sources were used for documented facts and figures on the topic. The main sources included LGO 2001, MOLG 2005, official records, research journals, magazines and books about Pakistan experiences, newspaper cuttings, video/audio clips and Internet services.
2. Questionnaire: Based on the literature survey, a structured questionnaire was constructed to collect primary data from the sample on a 5-point scale. The decision to use questionnaire was mainly a replication of the Flowers et al. (1975); Ali et al. (1995); Zaman (2002); Khan (2004) and Khan (2006) studies, and thus it seemed appropriate for reasons of consistency to use the same method of inquiry employed by them. Three separate questionnaires were used for general public, councilors and government officers. They were first tested in the pilot study. The copies are given in annexure A.
3.5. Data Analysis Tools Given the social nature of the research project, both qualitative and quantitative methods were required to analyze data into information and derive support for the hypotheses generated from the literature. Both literature and field surveys came up with a body of facts and figures, which were analyzed both descriptively as well in
46 inferential manners. The descriptive statistics of research variables is given in Table # 1 to 9 in Annexure B). Using SPSS 12.0, empirical data was placed into a well- structured database comprising research variables and their attributes thereby getting a Data Matrix for statistical manipulation. All the descriptive tables were created from the same matrix. Twenty hypotheses were tested using different statistical tools particularly the ‘tests of significance’.
3.6 Operationalization of the Concepts
Table 3.3 Operationalized Variables S Variable Elements/Attributes No. 1 Popular Direct Participation Participation Voting, membership of Citizen Community Boards, Village Councils and Neighborhood Councils, Musalihati Jirgas and Public Safety Commission. Indirect Participation Physical/material Support, Supervision and monitoring of schemes, assessment and reporting, Members of Tehsil Council, Members of Zilla Councils, Identification of local needs and problems, Relief activities, Tax proposal, Quality of work, Fraud and embezzlement, Verbal and written complaints 2 Transparency Access to information Resources estimation, Developmental expenditure, Non- developmental expenditure, Routine matters, Rules and regulations, Provincial directives, Councils resolutions. Accountability to people Elections, Monitoring committees, Public account committees, Vigorous public opinions, Questions, Resolutions and Motions, Debates and discussions, Internal audit, Provincial account committees, and Provincial audit. 3 Public Service Social Services Delivery Formal education, Special education, Technical education, General hospital, Basic health units, Dispensaries, and water and sanitation. Economic Services
47 Zakat and usher, Charity, Poor relief package, Establishment of industries, Agricultural projects, Economic activity. 4 Good Governance Effective Administration Citizen friendly atmosphere, Clear line of authority, Rule of Law, Rational budgetary proposals, Fair and equal budgetary allocation, Better utilization of local financial resources, Public Safety commission. Better Control Speedy justice through Independent local courts, Zilla Mohtasib, Regular inspection and supervision, Continuous monitoring through committees, Public accounts committees, Support of General people, Landlords, Business community. 5 Political Experience Political background. Political Knowledge. 6 Central/provincial The degree of delegation of powers (resources) to the district Government government. intervention Interference of the upper tiers in the functioning of district government. 7 Capacity of local Pre-service Training of the councilors and government representatives and officers. government officials In-service Training. 8 Cooperation Cooperation in policy formulation, administrative decisions between Civil and and their implementation according to rules and regulations. Political Heads 9 Understanding of Knowledge of people, representatives and government official the stake holders about the features of the system. Knowledge about their role, responsibilities and authorities. 10 Prospects Depending on the analysis of all the research variables.
3.7 The Case Study
Dera Ismail Khan is the southern most district of North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. It is reported that in 1469, Malik Sohrab Khan founded the town of Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khann and Dera Fateh Khan and named them on the names
48 of his three sons Ismail Khan, Ghazi khan and Fateh Khan respectively. The district is bounded on the north by Tank and Lakki Murwat district, on the east by Mainwali and Bhakkar district of the Punjab Province, on the south by Dera Ghazi khan district of the Punjab Province and on the west by Tribal area adjoining Dera Ismail Khan district, South Waziristan Agency and Tank district. The total area of the district is 7326 square Kilometers (District Census Report, 1998). According to 1988 census, DI Khan has a population of 8, 53,000 (including 4, 48,995 males and 4, 04,005 females). Out of those only 14.75% of the population lives in urban areas, while, the rest of 85.25% of the population lives in rural areas. There are total of 4, 21,018 (including 2, 33,690 male and 187328 female) registered voters in the Dera Ismail Khan District. It has five tehsils i.e. Dera Ismail Khan, Paharpur, Daraban, Kulachi and Paroa with 47 Union Councils (21, 11, 4, 4 and 7 Union Councils respectively). The detail profile of the district is given in annexure C.
Since access to 47 Union Councils of the district would have been difficult, so the researcher randomly selected 12 Union Councils (5 out of 21, 3 out of 11, 1 out of 4, 1 out of 4, 2 out of 7 from tehsil DIK, Paharpur, Daraban, Kulachi and Paroa respectively) to give equal representation to each of the area. For the collection of data a separate questionnaire for general public (Consisting of employees both public and private, businessmen/shopkeepers, ulemas/pir groups, formers/workers and landlords/khawaneen/maliks); local representatives (consisting of Nazims and Naib Nazims and members of the Zilla, Tehsils and Union Councils); and government officials (consisting of the officials of BPS-17 and above, particularly the DCO, ADCO, EDOs, DDOs, DOs, TMOs and TOs), was designed incorporating valid and reliable measures for the nine independent variables of popular participation, transparency, service delivery, governance, capacity, cooperation, political experience, understanding and government intervention and the dependent variable of system’s prospects.
49 Chapter 4 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS IN PAKISTAN
4.1. Introduction
Pakistan got independence on 14th August 1947. It originally had two wings, West Pakistan and East Pakistan but the latter got separated in 1971 and became Bangladesh. Pakistan now consists of four provinces Sind, Punjab, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan, two federally administered areas (Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA); Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK); and the Federal Capital Area (FCA) of Islamabad (Stone et al., 2006).
Pakistan being a federal state is governed by the constitution of Pakistan1973. The constitution allocates functions and demarcates powers between federal and provincial governments. The constitution empowered the federal government to legislate on matters presented in the Federal Legislative List, both the central and provincial governments are authorized to legislate on subjects of the Concurrent Legislative List while the residuary powers vested to the provinces. Until the introduction of LFO, 2002, the Constitution of Pakistan did not fully recognize local governments as a separate tier of government with their own powers and functions. The local units were considered as parts of the provincial governments hence some powers were delegated to it through the provincial legislature. The brief history of local governments in Pakistan is as under: -
4.2. Pre- Independence Period The areas comprising Pakistan had remained under control of the Mughal and British rulers before it became an independent state. Before independence “Pakistan shares with India the colonial experiences of decentralization and local government. The area, which constituted Pakistan, in particular, had no progressive system of local self-government (Reforma and Guzman, 1993)”. Thus soon after independence the
50 newly born state adopted the same weak system of local government of the Indian. Furthermore, due to the lack of agreement on constitution and diversion of government energies to different national problems, no attention could be paid to this important aspect of national life and the institution did not advance much beyond its pre-independent circumscribed scope (Quddus, 1981). The above discussion verifies that at the independence Pakistan had a poor system of local government confined mainly to Punjab not based on adult franchise and was under the severe control of local bureaucracy with no role of the elected representatives (Asif, 2006; Waseem, 1994).
4.3. Post- Independence Period In the decade following independence, government took certain decisions for democratization of local government and decided: a) to introduce universal adult franchise in place of restricted franchise; b) to make the district local bodies fully elective; and c) to extend Panchayat system to the whole of Pakistan (Quddus, 1981: 67).
However, despite these decisions, the desired results were not achieved due to the failure of government to follow up the matters by positive action. The bureaucratic control continued in improving public administration rather than introducing public participation. Another exercise was undertaken soon after integration of West Pakistan into one unit. The following decisions are worth mentioning at this juncture: a) Establishment of panchayat system was extended to the whole of Pakistan. b) Plans were prepared to make Local Government Laws uniform throughout Pakistan. c) An election commission was appointed to arrange elections. d) A journal on local government was started. These decisions, however, could not be translated into action and the actual practice went into opposite direction, as 24 out of 34 District Boards stood superseded in1957. The situation in N.W.F.P was even more discouraging as in 1952 all the local government institutions of this province were suspended (Paracha, 2003).
51 The decade of the 1950s was a period of political instability and heavy centralization with domination of civil and armed bureaucracy (Callard, 1957; Talbot, 1998). The role of Muslim League in Pakistan as compared to Congress in India remained passive, especially in strengthening local bodies to be used as political base thus failing “to replace the district administration as a rival source of patronage (Waseem, 1997)”. The period of approximately 11 years from 1958 to 1969 has a unique history with three distinct characteristics such as the Martial Law, the Military government and the system of Basic Democracies. Soon after removing the central and provincial legislature the Military government introduced system of local bodies to gain popular support (Qaddus, 1981:68).
4.4. Local Government 1958-69 Soon after the promulgation of first Martial Law in 1958 and the removal of national and provincial governments, the then military dictator issued Public Office (Disqualification) Order in March 1959 to damage the prevailing political system. The lengthy and complicated procedure of PODO generated Elective Bodies (Disqualification) order (EBDO) to be applicable to position holders and elected bodies and disqualified 6000 politicians and officials (Noman, 1988; Sayeed, 1980; and Feldman, 1967).
After dissolving the elected government General Ayub the then Military Chief established local governments in the form of “Basic Democracies” (BD) (ICG, 2004). BDs were used by Ayub to legitimize the Constitution of 1962. The said constitution empowered the office of president by declaring 80,000 Basic Democrats as an Electoral College for the election of the President and National and Provincial Assemblies (Asif, 2006).
While introducing the Basic Democracies on 27 October 1959, the president said that the system was ‘designed to prepare the base on which an upward pyramid of a sound political system can be developed, and encourage direct participation of the
52 people in managing their own affairs through representative bodies not far away from their own village and mohalla (Inayatullah, 1963: 336)’. Though several provisions of the Basic Democracies Order of 1959 would apply to municipal areas, yet urban complexities necessitated another enactment after thirteen months. It was known as the Municipal Administration Ordinance of 1960. It supplemented the provisions of Basic Democracies Order of 1959 with reference to urban areas. Unlike the Panchayati Raj in India, the two enactments therefore produced an integrated pattern of urban-rural local government in Pakistan.
As in the past, Basic Democracies inaugurated by the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, were the responsibility of the provincial government, which would be hierarchical in character and built up of four tiers. Starting from the lowest tier, they consisted of {1} Union councils and Town Committees (rural areas) and Union Committees (urban areas); {2} Thana councils (East Pakistan) and Tehsil Councils (West Pakistan) (rural areas), and Municipal Committees and Cantonment Boards (urban areas); {3} District Councils and {4} Divisional Councils (Khan, 2006; Zaidi, 2005).
4.4.1 Features: {1} Introduced new tier (the union council) and provided four-tier structure {2} Coverage extended to the whole country except the Federal Capital, Federally administered areas and Tribal areas {3} A uniform pattern for the whole country; urban/rural distinction maintained. {4} Indirect election beyond Union Council for a period of five years. {5} Non- official Chairman for only Union Councils, Town and Union Committees; for all other local government bodies, the Chairman was an official. (6) Nominated members initially; latter on ex-officio members were added. (7) Union Council, Town Committee/Union Committees members were empowered to elect the President and the members of National and Provincial Assemblies. {8} All bodies except Union Councils composed of three categories of members: elected, bureaucrats and government appointees. {9} All the lowest levels had no compulsory
53 functions. The tehsil/divisional level have only coordinative role; for District Councils & Municipal bodies, functions were divided in to compulsory & optional categories. {10} Elections to the Local Councils were held on non-political basis (Abid, 2004:135; Zia-ud-din, 2004; Quddus, 1981: 68-71; saddique, 2000: 139).
4.4.2 Drawbacks a) Bureaucratic Control: In line with British tradition the system of Basic Democracies was placed under severe control of controlling authorities vested to local bureaucracy. The Deputy Commissioner was the controlling authority for the Union Council and Tehsil Council and the Commissioner for District Council. The controlling authorities were empowered to suspend proceedings, resolutions, proposed plan and to direct the local councils (Quddus, 1981; Zaidi, 2005). Thus “The Basic Democracies was not in reality a democracy, as it did not represent control by the people over government power except in an extremely limited manner (Friedman, 1960: 144)”.
b) Electoral College: The role of basic democrats as an electoral college to the office of president was the most controversial. Such role of democrats behind the scene had the following intensions of the military dictator a) to provide guardianship, b) to limit popular participation, c) to avoid weak and unstable governments and to secure the mandate as highlighted by Gauhar (1996) that this partly bureaucratic and partly political system was used for distributing resources and patronage in order “to secure a mandate for Ayub (Gauhar, 1996: 84)” and build a constituency for the military regime (Burki, 1980).
c) Full of Corruption and Patronage: it is well reported that this system provided wider opportunities of corruption and extended undue patronage. Such irregularities irritated the general public and leads to strong reaction against military regime, which adopted the shape of violence against Basic Democrats (Feldman, 1972: 255).
54 d) Rural Bias: Also much like the British attempts before, the Basic Democracies system had a pronounced and deliberate rural bias both in terms of representation and flow of resources: Rural areas were given access to development resources through being associated with the Rural Works Programme. This bias was not surprising as the main source of Ayub’s support lay in the rural areas. Union Councils were given some developmental functions and were empowered to impose local taxes for local projects. They were also conferred with certain judicial functions under the Conciliation Courts Ordinance 1961 and with arbitration powers in divorce proceedings under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 (Rizvi, 1976). The “constituencies from which local councilors got elected were small enough to be kept under the coercive control of the civil servants, and the Union Councils could again be managed and manipulated through the patronage and coercive powers that the central government could exercise through the deputy commissioners and their lower echelons. In this way the urban areas were out- flanked and the president’s power came directly from the quiescent rural areas (Sayeed, 1980: 55)”.
e) Urbanization: Such divide caused severe urbanization in Pakistan, which is well reported (see for example Burki, 1972; Ali, 2002 and Sayeed, 1995). Burki (1972) states that “such rural bias shifted the people from rural areas to urban areas especially in Punjab (Burki, 1972). Arif and Ibrahim (1998) also reported rapid rate of urbanization in Pakistan in fifties and sixties (Arif and Ibrahim, 1998). Similarly ever increasing urbanization from Muslim minority areas in India were reported by the Burki, 1991; Ali, 2002 and Sayeed, 1995.
4.5. Local Governments 1972-77 The Basic Democracies system continued till 1971 when it was abolished by the Pakistan People Party (PPP) regime in1972. The Bhutto regime after abolishing the BD system introduced new system under local government ordinance, 1972. All
55 the provincial governments latter passed legislations in line with this ordinance and implemented them in their respective provinces. The old Union, Tehsil and Divisional Councils were abolished, and member of the local bodies were not given an electoral role in Provincial and National assembly polls. For the Punjab and Balochistan, a three tier rural council was introduced i.e. Dehi council at the level of each revenue estate (village), Halqa council at the sub-district level and people district council at the district level. On the other hand, Sind and NWFP preferred a single- tier rural council namely people district council.
In the urban sector of all provinces, there were to be Town Committees for towns and Municipal Committees for cities. The Karachi Corporation was divided into six and the Lahore Corporation into four peoples Municipalities. Members of all the bodies were elected for a period of three years. The chairmen of different local bodies were also to be directly elected. There was no provision for officially nominated and/or indirect elected members. To allow for the representation of disadvantaged groups whose members could not be elected on their own in open election, the system allowed representation of peasants, tenants, workers women and other such group according to well defined formula at all tiers of local government.
The local bodies enacted under Bhutto could not become operative because no elections were held. As a consequence, official administrators governed local institutions from 1971 to 1979. Since the political system at the grass root levels was inadequate to articulate and resolve local problems, the bureaucracy continued to have a free hand with no accountability. Similarly, the IRDP promoted during the Bhutto period faced a severe constraint due to non existence of local bodies.
4.6. Local government 1979-84 After Bhutto, the local government was revived by another Martial Law dictator General Zia-ul-Haq in 1979. He kept centralization and decentralization side by side by retaining powers of the centre and transferring some powers of the provinces to the districts to legitimize his regime.
56 A) Centralization: The centralization was exercised through enforcing military rule, keeping the constitution in abeyance and through 8th constitutional amendment, which gave immense powers to the president through 58 2B. B) Decentralization: It was exercised through a) promulgation of local government ordinance 1979 b) local bodies’ elections during 1979-1980. In essence, the then government adopted the policy of divide and rule (Jalal, 1995). Like Ayub, Zia also sought to neutralize the influence of political parties through non- party based elections (Cheema et al., 2004). Moreover he disqualified the candidates of PPP in 1979 (Waseem, 1994).
4.6.1 Features {1} Two-tier of rural and three tier of urban structures. {2} Coverage extended to the whole country except the Capital Islamabad. {3} A uniform pattern for the whole country; and urban/rural distinction preserved. {4} Formal integration between rural and urban local government discontinued. Hierarchical relations between bodies modified except between Union and Tehsil. Divisional Council was abolished. {5} Direct elections at all level on the basis of adult franchise. Indirect elections for seats reserved for peasants and women only. {6} Non-official Chairmen for all local government bodies. {7) No nominated or ex-officio members. {8} Local government was made independent of political franchise through non-party based elections {9} Term of office reduced to four years. {10} Similar arrangements but the number of functions at different levels slightly increased (Abid, 2004:193 and Siddique, 2000: 139-140).
4.6.2 Drawbacks Following are the drawbacks of the Local government system 1979:- a) Reduced bureaucratic control: - Zia sought to reduce bureaucratic control by elevating ‘elected’ members as the heads of local councils and by declaring the ‘elected house’ as the controlling authority. This was differed from BDO (1959) where the Deputy Commissioner was both the ‘controlling authority’ and the executive head of the District Council (Asif, 2006 and Zaidi, 2005).
57 b) Rural-urban divide: Zia’s LGO also created a legislative rural-urban divide by defining autonomous local councils for urban areas. This was a deviation from BDO (1959), which emphasized rural-urban coordination through district councils that had representatives from both rural (tehsil councils) and urban areas (municipal committees). A consequence of this separation was, contrary to the previous situation, a bias in favor of urban areas both in terms of local government income generation and expenditures. The income generation bias was partly an outcome of legislative design: Urban local councils were given access to more sources of revenue such as the ‘octroi’ and the legislative separation between rural and urban councils meant that the latter were under no legal obligation to allocate money to develop their rural areas. This resulted in inequality between the income of rural and urban councils, which has persisted into the nineties (Cheema et al., 2004). c) Administrative rather than population as a criterion: This system made administrative status rather than population size as a criterion for the declaration of urban area, which was the deviation from the past practices where both administrative status and population size was considered for declaring area as an urban (Ali, 2002). d) Political mobilization: - The urban-rural divide in local governments was partly a response to socio-demographic changes, in particular to the fast rate of urbanization that had taken place in Pakistan during its first thirty years. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that the legislative importance accorded to urban areas reflects the political calculus of the state and is perhaps a reflection of the state’s intention to mobilize urban middle class, especially in the Punjab (Cheema et al., 2004).
History speaks that during his early period Zia intended to mobilize urban middle class to get support for his illegal regime. He succeeded in consolidation of Motahida Qoomi Movement (MQM) in Karachi and Nawaz Sharif in Punjab, which was remained continue until the empowerment of Nawaz in Punjab. Furthermore, Addleton (1992) and Zaidi (1993) comments that government facilitated the Punjabi
58 urban middle class groups’ trough excessive remittances especially in the Gulf (Addleton, 1992; Zaidi, 1993) and through high rate of urbanization. However such trends were discontinued with the revival of provincial assemblies in 1985.
4.7. Local Government 1985-1998 The elections of national and provincial assemblies 1985 were dominated by the local politicians as wilder (1999) states that excessive dominance of local politicians at national and provincial level helped to transplant the culture of local body politics at higher levels (Wilder, 1999). The non-party nature of the assemblies enabled the politicians (especially the ministers) to mobilize government resources to get popular support for re-election in the next election. This personalization of politics remained continued despite of the party based federal and provincial legislature and government, which was due to the intension of then government to weaken political parties as highlighted by Wilder (1999) when he argues that “it is due to adverse de jure and de facto measures of both the regimes (Wilder, 1999)”. So the distribution of party tickets or even ministries was based on individual bargaining rather than on party manifestos. Furthermore, “non-party politics created missing links between different tiers of government and tensions between provincial and local governments (Wilder, 1999). This competition had real consequences as MPAs and MNAs began to progressively take over functions performed by locally elected representatives, including the running of the District Development Advisory Committees (DDACs) (Zaidi, 1999). Various Prime Ministers/Chief Ministers’ special development programmers gave the elected provincial and federal parliamentarians, a control over the allocation and utilization of local resources. Furthermore, the control of provincial governments over local resources curtailed the financial capacity of local units. These changes further centralized the provision of local services at the provincial level. Consequently, local bodies remained suspended from 1993 to 1998, which were due to the negative role of democratic forces (Niazi, 1994).
The eighties differ from the earlier period due to negative policy of the then government towards civil bureaucracy. Despite of the fact that civil bureaucracy was
59 working as junior partner of the military bureaucracy, the latter took following steps to curtail the role of civil bureaucracy: a) the retention of the elite cadre b) induction of military officers c) horizontal and vertical movement of bureaucrats across cadres and d) the power of recruitment (Waseem, 1994).
4.8. Local government 1999-onward The detail of this system is given in the preceding chapter.
4.9. Discussion History of local government in Pakistan has been provided to understand the dilemma of local government in the country. In the subcontinent, the British introduced local governments through the establishment of Municipal Corporation in Madras. Pakistan inherited the local governments system from the British. Pakistan must have learned to customize the local government system with local needs and demands but it did not happen because it was dominated by military rule. While the military governments always created the local government systems and prefers to introduce limited local democracy to give some kind of democratic legitimacy to an authoritarian regime.
Pakistan has implemented two systems of local government before the introduction of present system. These were the Basic Democracies in 1959 (The Pakistan Gazette, 1959), and the Peoples Local Government System 1979, (Quddus, 1981) both during military regimes. Under the old system of administration provincial governments directly regulates local affairs through local bureaucracy and vested them with executive and judicial powers to limit the role of the elected representatives. All the policies were formulated by the top directory without considering local needs and requirements and the civil servants were held accountable to the upper tiers.
60 The underlying idea of both the systems was to adopt participatory approach. Both the systems did make some achievements in terms of physical targets, but it could not emerge as a vehicle of change due to inherent contradiction in the system itself, lack of people participation, political role assigned to it and the complete bureaucratic control on its operations especially in the Basic democracy system (Quddus, 1981). The most important cause of the failure of these two systems of local government in Pakistan was the absence of constitutional protection.
61 Chapter 5 NEW LOCAL GOVT SYSTEM
5.1. Introduction In October 1999, the then Military Chief General Pervez Musharraf by removing the elected government of Nawaz Sharif introduced “seven point agenda” to get rid of the institutional crisis. According to devolution plan (2000) and Stone et al. (2006), the agenda consists of: - “{I} confidence building {ii} empowering federation {iii} investor’s confidence building {iv} maintenance of law and order with speedy justice; {v} overhauling state institutions {vi} transferring powers to local level through devolution and {vii} the maintenance of accountability. He then constituted National Reconstruction Bureau for the implementation of 5Ds model (see table 5.1).
Figure 5.1 5Ds Model
DEVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER
f ThiH \ f liftr'A 'V / AlAfFMl \ f lMrflllHlA.1 ill \ l-Miriny 1 A. iini i V Elen. Ml'fuljn and JDJIU DECENTRALISATION QF DISTRIBUTION OF All Ml N RTRATIVF RESOURCES TO THE AUTHORITY _ _ __H9TVHCT3 1.«jc Here ijpL'TG ti Lin nl Piiv-iHr I i . UL:t'ic1 FEHI .HI 1 IHT IS.fHI 1II I I II i eve i asp-aftitiierMf lfali£jlt Hi’ 1 i HI’S, t if fli v I / 5DS Of Iowa r tiers. Hew Local Govt. system
DE~ noNOFfjrRATinNi DIFFUSION OF OF . THE POWER AUTHORITY MAN ATiFMFIM r £ÿ FUNCTIONS NEK U S
Source: (NRB, 2000)
62 5.2. Changes introduced by the new system The new local government system introduced structural, functional and procedural changes to empower grass root levels. The description of which is as under: -
5.2.1. Structural changes
The new system of Local Government consists of three tiers i.e. District/City Government, TMA and Union Administration. Each level consists of elected Nazim supported by the government officials, Naib Nazim, an elected Council. This structure is summarized below:
A. District/City Government
a. Administrative structure: - The new system replaced the inherited system of district administration with countrywide district governments. Zila Nazim (the elected representative) heads the district government and coordinated by a District Coordinating Officer (Section, 17). The administration consists of 13 departments each is placed under the control of Executive District Officer.
All the EDOs are supervised and controlled by DCO. Under the EDOs there are DOs who heads sub-offices at the District Headquarters, while Deputy District Officers working under the DOs are in charge of specific functions in Tehsils. Under Section (27) the Executive District Officers primarily co-coordinate the work of the sub-offices. Figure 5.2 illustrates the structure of district Government.
63 Figure 5.2 Structure of District Government
Zila Nazim Zila Council Internal Audit
Haib Zila Nazim District Coordination Officer EDO. Civil Dftonc! EDO. Cu'jidirftticii -— EDO. Human Rescue i Msiiitieimril I i l I i i i r EDO EDO EDO EDO EDO EDO EDO EDO EDO EDO Agriculture Community Education FinanwS Health Information Law Literacy Revenue Wefts S Development Plarnrig Tednology Sendees
Oflltt* Hcsri eri by Du* i i n i_ ? IS?| ifj"! lli I f il' i 0ÿ iÿ= * $«l|s !|1 lK £ eM Hiffil'"UÿS S-T L =>= S3 * - s - I1 B k i 5 *3*4 ih r*t a a a HJhi £• *S 5 i! 3- o :ÿ i. E=r I 5 !'< 3 : v I lsS3 o I' ! IS' *" £ U i i =L ; I sI IS'itj I i
Source: (NRB, 2000)
b. Financial structure: - Previously the provincial governments used to spend funds at district level through District Account Office. With the promulgation of devolution plan, many functions previously vested with the provincial Government are now carried out at the district level. Therefore, the funds spent through provincial authority have now been vested with the district government, particularly the use of “Local Fund”. For the financial autonomy of the district government the office of the
64 EDO finance has been established. And now the District Government itself has to prepare and approve its annual budget.
c. Others: - new system established the following institutions at district level to ensure smooth operation of the district government: - a) District Mushavirat Committee: Under section (140) of the ordinance District Mushavirat Committee has been constituted for crystallization of vision for integrated development of the District. b) Monitoring Committees: - The New System under Section (138-1) of the MOLG, 2005, provided for the formulation of elected Monitoring Committees to monitor the operational activities of the District Government. c) Zila Mohtasib: - To strengthen accountability the LGO provided for the appointment of Zilla Mohtasib in every district under section (134) of the MOLG, 2005. d) Transparency: - Under section (137) of the ordinance the district government is responsible for the establishment of an information system for official oversight and legislative monitoring and for easy access to public information.
B. Tehsil Municipal Administration
a. Administrative structure: - Tehsil Municipal Administration has been formed at tehsil level. Section 56 states that “Tehsil Nazim is the head of the Tehsil Municipal Administration. Under the Nazim there is a Tehsil Municipal Officer (TMO) who is the co-ordination officer of the Tehsil Municipal Administration. There are four Tehsil Officers (TOs) i.e. (i) Regulations (ii) Infrastructure and Services (iii) Planning (iv) Finance, and Chief Officer reporting to the TMO (Section, 53)”. Figure 5.3 illustrates the structure of T. M.A of category -1.
65 Figure 5.3 Structure of Tehsil Municipal Administration
TEHSIL MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATION
TEHSIL IWZIW IriTfrTl.ll Audit TEHBIL COUNCIL HI tiid* H CurqilajjiLt Cell
TEHSIL MUNICIPAL Gr nrrul Eÿtab.fAdnorv Tietisll Conned! NAIB TEHSIL fiAZIM OlFFICFS OtfJee Converaer Puiilir
thirl Officer at fHKr fr* SI Plimlng Inlrjiljijr.liri- hlunlcTpal I inmr.ft Tmm Holt- 1 HR HU anjSffTktt PAijuilitianv
* e>3dalphrj:Bl + V&fcr Supply. * Ljju nu :K1 * Ascotarta * * Fÿli|*t£ * 1 BrtV- UiJ Ct* Dkiin:
fcdrdL and uncnsAÿlliigc Otmcta Cliers
Source: (NRB, 2000)
b. Others: - the new system established following institutions at Tehsil/Town level to ensure smooth operation of the Tehsil/Town Municipal Administration: - a) Monitoring Committees Under section (138-2) the monitoring committees at TMA level are responsible for monitoring and preparation of evaluation reports.
66 C. Union Administration
a. Administrative structure: - Union Nazim is the head of Union Administration, while three secretaries (Secretary Union Committees, Secretary Municipal Functions, and Secretary Community Development) work under the executive control of the Union Nazim. The Union Councils under section (74) of the ordinance are responsible for meeting the needs and requirements of the concerned villages. Figure 5.4 illustrates the structure of Union Administration.
Figure 5.4 Structure of Union Administration
UNION ADMINISTRATION
Union Council T'nii>u Nazim
Nail) Union Nasim
Secretory Secretory Secretary rnrirninity I Jninn Munir pn Development Committees Services
Source: (MOLG, 2005)
b. Other: - Furthermore, the new local government system made following institutional arrangements to ensure broader popular participation in public service delivery: - a) Village and Neighborhood Councils: - Section (93) of the MOLG, 2005 provides for the formation of Village and neighborhood councils to promote participation in the democratic process. b) Citizen Community Boards: - Section (98) of the ordinance states that non- elected citizens voluntarily will set up a Citizen Community Board in every council for the development of the area.
67 c) Musalihati Jirgas: - Section (102) of the MOLG, 2005 provided for the constitution of Musalihati Jirgas in each Union Council to settle local disputes”. d) Monitoring Committees: - Under section (138-3) the monitoring committees of Union Council are responsible for monitoring the functioning of the offices of the District Government, TMA and Union Administration for effective public service delivery.
5.2.2. Functional Changes Under the previous arrangements the general administration of the district was vested with the Deputy Commissioner. He had key position in the district administration. He was the general controlling authority over all the departments in the district (Keefer et al., 2005). His functions can broadly be categorized under following headings: -
a) Maintenance of law and order: - As a district Magistrate, he was in charge of the control and supervision of sub-ordinate magistracy and was generally responsible for the preservation of peace and order in the district (Rehman, 1997).
b) Revenue collection: - the Deputy Commissioner as District Collector was responsible for revenue collection and administration of all matters connected with land, other than irrigation, agriculture and forestry in their technical aspects. He was responsible to the provincial government through the Board of Revenue. In his capacity as District Registrar he was responsible for the maintenance of land records and returns of crop production (Rehman, 1997).
c) Development: - the Deputy Commissioner by virtue of direct and close contact with the people of the area was also responsible for the implementation of development programmes and schemes (Rehman, 1997: 213).
68 The concentration of executive, judicial and development powers in administrative functionaries paved ways for arbitrariness, red-tapism, and mismanagement of government operations. The new system of local government introduced following functional changes to get rid of these problems by separating such multifarious functions, strengthening grass root levels and improving the efficiency of local administration: - a. Administrative Revenue function is assigned to the revenue department. The revenue department is now responsible for revenue assessment and collection as well as management of land record. Magistracy power has been vested with the judiciary and thereby each civil judge now also acts as a judicial magistrate, while the District and Session Judge exercises the powers of the district magistrate. Developmental functions have been assigned to the elected local bodies i.e. Union Councils, Tehsil Councils and Zilla Councils each with the specified sphere. b. Financial In the past, local governments have been unable to discharge their assigned functions primarily because of the shortage of resources (Khan, 2004; Hyder, 1999; Rizvi, 1980). Federal grants were generally ad hoc; at flat rate and did not take into account the needs of local bodies, which hampered their performance (Siddique, 2000: 146), however, the new plan initiated following steps to address this issue:
a) Formula-based fiscal transfer. The new plan provided a formula-based fiscal transfer between the provinces and the local governments. The “Provincial Finance Commission” awards determine the non-discretionary intergovernmental fiscal transfer process. Moreover, in addition to this, the budgetary transfers are no longer lapsable (Paracha, 2003).
69 b) Establishment of Local Funds and Public Accounts: Under Section (107) of the MOLG, 2005, a District Fund, has been established for the District Government.
c) Power to Levy & Collect Taxes: Local governments are empowered to impose taxes with the approval of the respective local council. The second schedule part-1 (see annexure D), section 39(b) of the ordinance empowered the Zila council to levy the taxes (Manual of Local Govt., 2005).
d) Power to Prepare and Approve Budgets: Section (111) and (112) of the MOLG, 2005 fully empowered the District council to prepare and approve annual budgets.
Additionally, the new system comprehensively described the duties and responsibilities of the functionaries of the district government, the brief summary of which is as under: -
A. City/District Government According to section (13) of the MOLG, 2005 the district government consists of Zilla Nazim and District administration with the following powers and functions: -
Functions and powers of City/Zilla Nazim, DCO and Zilla Council: Zilla Nazim is the head of District Government and performs such functions and exercises such powers as have been assigned to him under LGO, 2001, and is assisted by the DCO. DCO is a civil servant of the Federation or of the Province, as far as possible in Basic Scale 20. It is further provided that in City District, the DCO may be a civil servant of Basic Scale 21. Under sub-section (2) of section 28 the DCO is the coordination head of the District Administration. Whereas, the Zilla Council is a legislative body and accord approval to all legislative proposals of the district government (section 39).
70 B. Tehsil/town Municipal Administration Previously, the union and urban areas were divided into Union and District Councils for the rural and Town and Municipal Committees for the urban areas with separate controlling authorities. This created the urban-rural divide. In addition these Municipal Committees were responsible for the municipal services in the urban areas (Asif, 2006:172). While, the new system of local government introduced following functional changes at Tehsil level: -
1. Administrative: - under the new system of local government Tehsil/Town Municipal Administration has been constituted to provide municipal services to the people of both urban and rural areas in an integrated manner. 2. Financial: - At tehsil level, increased capacity to address local development priorities has been created through the following financial empowerments: -
i. Formula based fiscal transfer. Under section (55), the Tehsil Municipal Administration receives formula based fiscal transfer from the district Government.
ii. Establishment of Local Funds and Public Accounts: Under section (107), there has been established a Tehsil/Town Local Fund for the Tehsil Municipal Administration.
iii. Power to Levy & Collect Taxes: Local governments are empowered to impose taxes after getting approval of the concerned local council. The second schedule part-III (see annexure D), section 67 (1) of the ordinance empowered the Tehsil council to levy and collect taxes (Manual of Local Govt., 2005).
iv. Power to Prepare and Approve Budgets: Section (111) and (112) of the MOLG, 2005 fully empowered the Tehsil/Town council to prepare and approve annual budgets.
71 Additionally, the new system of local government comprehensively described the functions and powers of the functionaries at Tehsil level. Following is the brief description of these functions and powers: -
Functions and Powers of Tehsil/Town Nazim, TMO and Tehsil Council: Tehsil Nazim is the political head of TMA and exercise such powers and such functions as given to him under Section (57) of the Ordinance and is assisted by the TMO who is principal accounting officer and a liaison of the TMA and is a focal person. Whereas, the Tehsil/Town council is a legislative body and accord approval to all legislative proposals of the TMA (section 67).
C. Union Level Previously, the Union Councils had exists in the rural areas; urban areas did not have the equivalent of Union Council. Union Councils have suffered from endemic factionalism in rural areas due to the failure of electoral system, lack of vertical integration with higher-level elected institutions and the lack of identifiable and verifiable functions of the Union Council (Asif, 2006: 120). However under new arrangements the Union Councils have been extended to the urban areas as well for equal local representation throughout the country. Women have been fully included in the Union Councils with 50% of the seats. Electoral Conflict has been mitigated through multi-member, union council election wards that permitted representation of more groups. Reduction in the level of conflict between the Zilla/Tehsil Council and Union Council have been achieved through the dual role of the members of Zilla/Tehsil council and Nazim and Naib Nazim of Union Council, which is improving communication and liaison.
Additionally, the new system of local government introduced following functional changes at Union level: -
72 1. Administrative: - under the new system of local government Union Administration has been constituted to provide municipal services to the people of both urban and rural areas through an integrated approach. Moreover, the integrated Tehsil Council is mitigating rural-urban fractions by providing opportunities for representation in proportion to the population, and taxation in proportion to the services.
2. Financial: - For increasing the capacity to address at Union level, local development priorities have been created through the following financial empowerments: -
i. Formula-based Fiscal transfer. The new plan provides a formula- based fiscal transfer to the Union Administration. Moreover, in addition to this, the budgetary transfers are no longer lapsable (Paracha, 2003).
ii. Establishment of Local Funds and Public Accounts: Under section (107) of the MOLG, 2005, there has been established a Union Local Fund for the Union Administration.
iii. Power to Levy & Collect Taxes: Local governments are empowered to impose taxes (see annexure D) with the approval of the respective local council. The second schedule part-1V, section 88 (b) of the ordinance empowers the Union Council to levy and collect taxes (Manual of Local Govt., 2005).
iv. Power to Prepare and Approve Budgets: Section (111) and (112) of the MOLG, 2005 fully empowers the Union council to prepare and approve annual budgets.
73 Furthermore, the new system of local government comprehensively describes the powers and functions of the Union Administration. Following is the brief explanation of these functions and powers: -
Functions and powers of Union Nazim and Union Administration: The entire population of the union council directly elects Union Nazim and Naib union Nazim. Under section (80) of the MOLG,2005 the Union Nazim is the head of union administration and is held responsible for the formulation and approval of all developmental project and effective coordination of activities at union level. Where as Union Council is a legislative body at union level which accord approval to all developmental plan and budgetary proposals of the Union Administration.
5.2.3. Procedural Changes Before the introduction of devolution plan, the office of Deputy Commissioner, at district level, had all the administrative powers of public policies implementation (World Bank Report, 2004:5). All the decisions about local level planning and development were taken by the central government with little reference to local needs and priorities. The civil servants were also accountable to higher tiers with little interest in delivering quality services and the absence of proper checks and balances left the system open to be abused (Asif, 2006: 123). The Superintendent Police was supposed to be answerable to the Deputy Commissioner, in his capacity of District Magistrate (Rehman, 1987:206).
The new system of local government introduced democratic control at the local level with the following procedural changes to have an effective, efficient, and public supported system of government performance, aimed at removing the evils of the inherited legacy.
74 A. Decision-making With the introduction of new system the decision-making authority has been shifted from individual bureaucrats to people’s representatives. The new system replaced the legacy; inherited from the colonial masters by empowering the District Government; whereas, detailed instructions for the disposal of business in the District Administration are issued by the DCO. The instructions for making contracts on behalf of the district government and the execution of such contracts and all assurance of property are being made by the Zilla Nazim. The channel for obtaining or transmitting the orders of the Zilla Nazim is the EDO or an officer specifically authorized in this behalf by the DCO (Rule 7 of the Rule of Business).
Under rule (12) of the Rule of Business, now the DPO keeps the Zilla Nazim generally informed of all the matters affecting public tranquility. He submits report through the Zilla Nazim, to the Provincial Government of all cases likely to have major political repercussions. The DPO coordinates with the Zilla Nazim for the maintenance of law and order in the district and complies with all his orders. Following is the detail of procedural changes introduced by the new system: - a. Reference to concerned Local Council: - Under section (18), (57) and (80) the Zilla, Tehsil and Union Nazim respectively refer the case to the concerned council for approval or otherwise, whereas, before devolution all decisions at local level were taken by the Provincial bureaucrats. Under rule (22) of the Rule of Business the District Government presents all the byelaws prepared under the Ordinance to the Zilla Council for approval. The District Government also obtains approval of the Zilla Council for the imposition of taxes on the subjects specified. The District Government gets approval of the Zilla Council for the developmental plans, budgetary proposals of and intra-district fiscal transfers. b. Reference to Provincial Government: - Under section 28 (3) the matters requiring authentication of the Provincial Government are referred to the department of Local
75 Government and Rural Development through Local Council Board, Government of NWFP, Peshawar.
B. Business Allocation Under section (32) District Government can assign any of its function to a TMA or Union Administration, on the mutually agreed terms and conditions.
C. Provisions for Advisory Committee Under section (140) a crystal vision for integrated development of the district has been decided through Zilla Mushawarat Committee at its periodic meetings.
D. Relations with Provincial Local Government Commission Under rule (20) of the Rule of Business, the Zilla Nazim shall cooperate with the PLGC in the due discharge of its functions under Article (132) of the Ordinance. In case of dispute between local departments, the Nazim shall prepare a complete case with all the documents required and the DCO shall forward the case to the secretariat of the Provincial Local Government Commission. Provided that if the dispute is not amicably resolved, the aggrieved party is entitled to move the case before the Chief Executive of the Province for resolution through the Chief Secretary of Government and the decision of the Chief Executive thereon shall be final.
5.3. Salient Features of the New System Despite similar in its context and content in a number of ways, the new devolution plan, however, exhibits some significant departures from the previous two local government systems. Following are the salient features of the new system: - i. Reduced voter’s age from 21 to 18 years to bring youths in to the politics. Prescribed matriculation as a minimum educational qualification for the candidates of Nazims. Training is compulsory for the elected representatives. Election now held by Central Election Commission of Pakistan instead of
76 provincial election authorities to ensure transparent, fair and free conduct of elections, which were held in phases (LGO, 2001).
ii. Replaced old system of district administration with the creation of three countrywide levels of governments: District, Tehsil, & Union. These local governments are politically linked to each other. To ensure supremacy of the political leadership over the administration, the district administration and district police is subordinated to elected representatives. Division as an administrative tier is ceased to exist. DCO is placed under the control of Zila Nazim and also reports to him. Furthermore, the old magistracy powers of the DCO have been curtailed (Cheema et al, 2005). iii. The new system of local government made the prior approval of the concerned council mandatory for the head of each local government to take any actions. iv. The new system of local government has minimized rural-urban divide through integrating them and through allocating equal resources both to the rural and urban areas. The new system has also devolved many important provincial functions to the District and Tehsil levels like budgeting; planning and development.
v. Another most important features of the current local government system is the reservation of one-third (33%) of seats for women and (5%) for other marginalized groups like peasants, workers and minorities to provide opportunities of participation in local politics to the less privileged class. vi. The leading feature of the new system is the political and electoral integration of the union into higher tiers of governments through declaring directly elected Union Nazim and Naib Union Nazims as the members of the District and Tehsil councils respectively. Such integration of the union council to the higher
77 tiers enables the union councilors to take dual financial benefits and to hold the higher tiers of local government accountable (MOLG, 2005).
vii. The establishment of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) is another major contribution of the new system, which was initiated to motivate the non-elected members of the society to play a leading role in local development. CCBs received 20% finance from the volunteer contributions of the community and 80% from local government for carrying out different development activities (LGO, 2001). viii. The new system also brought remarkable shift in the development structure of the country and empowered local bodies to propose development projects. The participation of general public in the identification and development of developmental projects is also mandatory. The three tiers of local government have been assigned clear powers, responsibilities and service delivery functions. The district government is responsible for carrying out services relating to social and human development such as basic health care, education and social welfare. Municipal services such as water, sanitation and urban services have been assigned to the tehsil government (Zaidi, 2005).
ix. Fiscal decentralization is another important feature of the new system. The new system of local government empowered the local governments to design their own budgets and expenditures for delivering services. The central and provincial government only issue policies, guidelines as well as monitor the functioning of local governments. These local governments receive funds directly from the Provincial Finance Commissions under formula based fiscal transfer. Local governments have been authorized to levy taxes (MOLG, 2005 and Zaidi, 2005).
78 5.4. Problems Addressed The new local government system is designed to cope with the problems, which have, so far, almost jammed the local governments to operate according to their local requirements. These problems continue to exist thereby causing the death of previous local governments. The new system is intentionally so configured that long- lasting issues could be taken-up through devolution of power, popular participation and localizing the government matters without unnecessary interference from the provincial and central governments. Following are well-known local government problems, which are the targets of new system:
i. Bureaucratic Authority: Since independence, political power has vested in the hands of bureaucratic elite, which has seldom stood responsible to the people. Unless the power to rule the district is handed over to the local representatives, real future development is unimaginable.
ii. Administrative Inequalities: The practices, procedures and regulations, which served reasonably well during the colonial era, have become grossly inadequate for public services in Pakistan. However, the successors of the formal colonial civil servants have tried their best to continue in the same shoes thereby serving their own interests rather than that of community. iii. Poor Job-Analysis and Job Specification: Research shows that in Pakistan civil services, duties and responsibilities are seldom defined. Evasion of responsibility has remained a common feature. Furthermore, the constant transfers and shifting of personnel causes frustration amongst the public servants resulting in inefficiency and ineffectiveness. iv. Declining Standards: There has been a decline in the standards of service for the public officials. The corruption prevailed due to the exceptional role of the public services in the social structure. The most killing aspect of the declining
79 standards for the government services in Pakistan has always been the lack of accountability to the general public.
v. Political Influence: Throughout the history of Pakistan, political influence of the feudal, commercial and industrial pressure groups has commanded the bureaucracy. When an officer obliges a political chief, he also prices his service at the cost of public-exchequer. Political influence therefore corrupts the bureaucracy for not only political powers but also for the bureaucracy itself. vi. Lack of Popular-Participation: All previous systems came-up with new models of people participation but in practice instead of giving the people full discretion in matters of local concern, control mechanisms were provided at every step to fetter the discretion of people. It creates tension and frustration and instead of bridging the gulf between the administration and people, further widens it up. vii. Red-Tapism: - In government offices, every thing has to follow a formal procedure. This is not bad in itself however, when these procedures are used as tools to exploit the public, they become dangerous. Every person adds a note against the note of subordinate. This point of issue is lost in the voluminous noting and the files continue to multiply. There is need to shuffle this up for the good of local governments.
5.5. Challenges in Addressing the Problems
The previous systems aimed at eliminating the same problems but failed due to several challenges, which could not be managed by the governors in local government systems. The present system also has to work in the same environment with bigger challenges and, off course, new and advanced resources. These challenges are those issues, which can either turn into opportunity, if harnessed properly, or become threats for the new government. Following challenges have to be understood and managed:
80 Military Nature of the System Pakistan has a poor track record of democracy with more than half of its history under military rule. Before LGO 2001, Pakistan experimented with two local government systems, which were both introduced during military regimes but failed to deliver. The new system is also designed by the military government resulting into: a) local government was negated by the democratic forces and 2) every time new system was designed with minor links with the previous systems (Paracha, 2003).
Limited Democracy There has always been a ‘limited local democracy’ in order to give some kind of democratic legitimacy to an authoritarian regime. A researcher notes that in Pakistan, local governments worked much better during authoritarian rule than under democracy. In democratic governments local level often lost its attractiveness because it was no longer the only platform available for pubic participation. Additionally, local government had to come to terms with bad reputation acquired under autocratic regimes (Sivaramakishnan, 2000:423).
Challenges in Social Service Delivery The delivery of public services in Pakistan was poor due to limited finance, unclear role and responsibilities, absence of effective monitoring system, lack of proper auditing and checks and balances system and limited participation and accountability (Moriani, 2003).
System Ambiguities Several researchers (see for example, Talpur, 2001; Asif, 2003; Paracha, 2003; World Bank Report, 2004) have highlighted political, administrative and financial uncertainties in the new system. Politically, there are unclear roles and responsibilities; lack of capacity and knowledge about the system; weak relationship between three tiers of local government and between local, provincial and national governments and lack of working relationship between local representatives and members of provincial and national assemblies. Likewise, administratively, many
81 things are unclear. For example, weak decentralization; reluctance of bureaucrats to work under politicians; unclear coordination and multiple reporting channels; the limited powers of hiring and firing of employees; and shortcomings in smooth transition. Financially, there is dependence on federal/provincial transfers; delayed announcement of PFCs; expenditure restrictions on districts; duplication of taxes; and weak Audit and Accounting.
Furthermore, Mahmood (2000), states that the present system has many internal challenges like poor public accountability, weak economy, failed political system, dysfunctional public services and problematic development agenda. Similarly, Kaelin (1998) identifies weak legal base; the existence of precarious; unclear functions and powers; too limited and too broad functions and powers; lack of institutional links; insecure access to resources; the autonomy regarding appointment and dismissal of staff is curtailed; subject to excessive control of he Provincial Government’.
Weak Reforms ICG (2004) reports that the reforms under the new system have not enhanced democracy rather strengthened the military rule and risen the risk of internal conflict, caused excessive rigging and manipulation in local government elections, granted cover to centralized control, misused officials during April 2002 presidential referendum and October 2002 General Elections, extended nominal powers to local governments and facing strong opposition of the major political parties, civil society and media.
Zaidi (2005), states that ‘despite the big claims, it is noteworthy that local government is still not part of the Constitution. Only the highly controversial 17th Amendment allows some partial and time bound protection to local government. The first year or so of the new system had considerable teething problems, and the studies of that period, not surprisingly, were critical. Even after four years, however, research is still lacking and there is need to examine the system in some detail. However, as has
82 always been the case, electoral politics at the higher tiers (provincial and national) has once again hindered the evolution of the local government system in Pakistan, and any research, which examines the performance of local government, cannot ignore this imposing reality.
Political Disorder Party leaders from all fronts raising their concern about the encroachment of number of provincial subjects by the central government, which is an attempt to eliminate provinces, said the PML-N’s Ahsan Iqbal (ICG interview, 2004). Similarly Bhutto (2001) remarked that such an attitude of the central government is creating confusion amongst the citizens but would never succeed in eliminating the provinces. All political groupings, particularly the regional political outfits, were opposed to the devolution plan. They considered the plan as an encroachment on provincial autonomy (Waheed, 2002).
In a seminar on the devolution plan enunciated by the present government drew both flak and applause by the speakers, representing various walks of life, in a seminar on "Devolution and Prosperity" (Anonymous, 2001). The Councilors highly criticized the limited transferring of powers to local governments and unanimously decided to challenge it in the Peshawar High Court (Anonymous, 2003) Elected representatives in the district governments are facing an uncertain future due to hostile attitude of parliamentarians, both from the treasury as well as the opposition benches, and the resistance by the bureaucrats furious over curtailment of their powers under the new system (Mahmood, 2003).
Imran khan the chief of Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI) strongly criticized the military role in the country as the military rulers had destroyed every institution in the country by using judiciary for legitimating take-over, election commission for getting desired results and local government system and the National Accountability Bureau for prolonging their rules.
83 5.6 Discussion
No doubt, the new system was launched with high expectations of empowering the people to handle their administrative and developmental matters at the grass root levels. Similarly, benchmarks have been configured to achieve these objectives. Appreciations are also coming from several corners. For example, NRB (2000) says that the present devolution plan is primarily designed to provide greater opportunities of people participation in local affairs and especially in public service delivery through creating enabling environment to make them masters of their own destiny. The system is based on five fundamentals: devolution of political power, decentralization of administrative authority, decentralization of management functions, diffusion of the power-authority nexus, and distribution of resources to the district level.
The latest reforms are the most comprehensive so far (World Bank Report, 2004: 3) because they have gone much further in terms of their extent and scope (Cheema et al., 2004). The Manual of Local Government (2005) and the Police Order (2002), provide for an unprecedented range of bodies to encourage and accord a mandatory status to citizen engagement in local governance. Most noteworthy are Citizen Community Boards (CCBs), but which are complemented by local arrangements for alternative dispute resolution, monitoring of conduct, promoting justice, accountability of the police and administrative grievance redressal (World Bank Report, 2004).
It is however, notable that there is measurable gap between the theory and practice of the system. For example, there are difficulties linked with the weak governance capacities at local level (Crook & Sverrisson, 1999), lack of sufficient resources (Khan, 2004) in a big number of communes, especially in mountain rural areas, tendencies of concentration of wealth in some large but few urban areas, weak citizen’s participation in community affairs (World Bank Report, 2004), and a strong dominance of political interest over community interest (Zaman, 2002). In addition,
84 the plan’s association with the political schema of a military regime undermines both its legitimacy as a system and its prospects of survival. In such conditions, the level of devolution in practice will take a long time.
85 Chapter 6 DATA ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION
6.1. Introduction A descriptive and inferential analysis of the primary data exposes an array of trends, correlations and dependencies of the research variables. The evidence in the favor of or against the hypotheses pinpoints the reality of the case study. Since data was assembled from a wide range of resources therefore the analysis and interpretation opens-up new levels of understanding about the nature, problems, opportunities and the prospects of the new local government system in Pakistan, in general, and in DIK, in particular. The data was analyzed using SPSS (V.12.0) to examine the following: 1. The establishment of Cronbach’s alpha for the measure. 2. The cross tabulation of the demographic variables. 3. Descriptive statistics for research variables. 4. The Pearson correlation matrix, and 5. Hypotheses testing
6.2. Checking the Reliability of measure: Cronbach’s Alpha
The inter-item consistency reliability or the Cronbach’s Alpha reliability coefficient of the nine independent and dependent variables is obtained. They are all above .80. The sample of the result obtained for Cronbach’s alpha test for the dependent variable (system’s prospects) is shown in Table 6.1.
Tablet 6.1 Reliability test
Reliability Coefficients N of Cases = 336 N of Items = 10 Alpha = .82
86 The results indicate that the Cronbach’s Alpha for the ten items is .82. The closer the reliability coefficients to 1.0, the better. In general, the reliabilities less than .60 are considered to be poor, those in the .70 range, acceptable, and those over .80 good (Sekaran, 1999: 311) As the Cronbach’s Alpha for all the ten items used in this study is about .82, thus inter-item reliability of the measures used in this study can be considered good. 1
6.3. Descriptive Statistics: Cross Tabulations of Respondents’ Profile :
Table 6.2 Gender vs. Type of Respondents I : Category of Respondents i
General public Local Government 'j Politicians servants Total jj r Gender of respondents N % N % N % N % 3 r n r
Male 120 35.7 72 21.4 53 15.8 245 72.9 3 Female 50 14.9 38 11.3 3 .9 91 27.1 0
Total 170 50.6 110 32.7 56 16.7 336 100.0 0 i' 3 . i 0 0 l T 0 0 ? c >, fl 0 0 0 i1 7 ID i 0 0 £ $ o I t i. o O t=0 * s 5C c c ~ 5 $ t > \ o |uno3 0 .1 « G ° li > ffl 0 0 I I *£ ® ", 0 L s 7. h 4-
T 87 c Percent C D *5 ! c- ty *> * '1' I n ’ÿ>. = = = Table 6.3 Education and Occupation of Respondents Education class of respondents Highly Educated Un educated Total educated Profession of respondents N % N % N % N % Government servants 71 21.1 12 3.6 1 .3 84 25.0 Private employees 9 2.7 9 2.7 3 .9 21 6.3 Businessmen/shopkeepers 17 5.1 26 7.7 17 5.1 60 17.9 :
Formers 4 2.1 14 4.2 39 11.6 57 17.0 'j \ Workers 1 .3 10 3.0 11 3.3 22 6.5 \ Students 7 2.1 14 4.2 3 .9 24 7.1 £-,'ÿÿ?
Landlords 6 1.8 8 2.4 8 2.4 22 6.5 j. r Housewives 0 0 8 2.4 38 11.4 46 13.7 Total 115 34.2 101 30.1 120 35.7 336 100.0 : Ml i 0 r T I 1 r T ists : 7 0 v £ - 1 CBQIDL o ( a O o v i O o 0 1 i ai o 1 1 5 0 0 # SiSÿfJt 3 a 5 0 0 n o / m r V } If t siifi 0 H -T: C-S : t 0 0 P&5 o P l t- o FKt a Table 6.4 Area vs. Income Levels of the Respondents 'ÿ E S * Area of respondents
Urban'J Urban-cum- Rural Total c rural uT. Income of respondents D N % N % N % N % 1000 to 5000 32 9.5 36 10.7 89 26.5 157 46.7
5001 to 10000 :=ÿ 9 2.7 11 3.3 30 8.9 50 14.9 10001 to 15000 C 0 0 3 .9 32 9.5 35 10.4 hu
15001 tos 20000 0 0 6 1.8 18 5.4 24 7.1
20001 to 25000PEncant 0 0 8 2.4 2 .6 10 3.0 * 25001 to 30000 47 14.0 3 .9 10 3.0 60 17.9
J 30000 and above 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total rt 88 26.2 67 19.9 181 53.9 336 100.0 2?
88 71 I/I I TI * u a- = = I — — — 0 “i 0 - o U * o ” 0 -F * r r - = : : : c ] “ uOOrOOOÿ tfo oo n 3 $ £ 0000 [ o O T n O 0 ij \ 0 - \ ooo o 0 o o o 0 (J (\ o \ o 1C 0 \ O n - V - 0 -H I.-, o \ o o -ÿ r\ i5 ! -H o o o o n -H U ; IJ 3 o 0 ffl -p o > r- i" 0 0 P»O H if t 0 o I u Percent r # = nljj fl i! r l"l r OH t j BE ‘1 0 : L 4- f. T-
Table 6.5 Membership vs. Quota of Membership of Representatives : ’ji +1
Membership of Councilors [ ] :
c Total ?ÿ Union Council Tehsil Zilla T: c Council Council »«t « n Quota of Councilorso N % N % N % N % * - c TJ
General• Muslim (Male) 24 21.8 0 0 0 0 24 21.8 H t n General• Muslim (Female) 26 23.6 0 0 0 0 26 23.6 s DO r Peasants and Workers (M) 20 18.2 0 0 0 0 20 18.2 J j stsiis-;
I Peasants and Workers (F) 10 9.1 0 0 0 0 10 9.1 ( I -ÿ
Minorities 4 3.6 0 0 0 0 4 3.6 0 - Naib Nazim 0 0 13 11.8 0 0 13 11.8 R 0 3 Nazim 3 0 0 0 0 13 11.8 13 11.8 3
Total 84 76.4 13 11.8 13 11.8 110 100.0 J CL 3 3 3 0 l 3 r i i 3 \ 89 •K G C 0 L 0 C \ v (A \ c \ s 0 L G 0 lows \ i c I“I = OL :ÿ c I b> C Hi G c c tf » = I 1/ Percent ?» I u * kl I I TI r-. I i= I a* 5* •C = I — = F * DC I = Table 6.6 Department vs. Designation of Government Servants > 3F Designation of government servants Department of EDO DO DDO TMO TO Total -• government servants N % N % N % N % N % N % «:: Health 1 2.0 3 6.1 2 4.1 0 0 0 0 6 12.2 - Social Services 0 0 1 2.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.0 Agriculture 1 2.0 1 2.0 1 2.0 0 0 0 0 3 6.1 Community 1 2.0 2 4.1 1 2.0 0 0 0 0 4 8.2 development < Finance and planning 1 2.0 2 4.1 1 2.0 0 0 0 0 4 i 8.2 Information 0 0 2 4.1 1 2.0 0 0 0 0 3 6.1 - technology r Revenue 0 0 1 2.0 1 2.0 0 0 0 0 2 4.1 Works and Services 0 0 1 2.0 1 2.0 0 0 0 0 2 4.1 D £L S - i Legal 0 0 1 2.0 1 2.0 0 0 0 0 2 4.1 <- 5 I- L' " Coordination, HRM & 0 0 2 4.1 2 4.1 0 0 0 0 4 8.2 >R civil defense D i/l Literacy 0 0 1 2.0 3 6.1 0 0 0 0 4 8.2 » a 3 - TMA D.I.Khan 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.0 4 8.2 5 L 10.2 :ÿ TMA Kulachi 0 0 0 0 0 0 1Count 2.0 4 8.2 5 10.2 TMA Paharpur 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2.0 4 8.2 5 10.2 a \ s Total 4 8.2 17 34.7 14 28.6 3 6.1 11 22.4 49 100.0 ? _ÿ n ?;* H \ \ 5 l C =ÿ i ? c ~ \ c A I SgS|ÿB s 5 = 5 o t I 0 S= U * M 3 4 i c £ U S3* £ - 0 i= »! & '} s t CD3 I i 3 ~ < fiJ if u r Cfl 2 J C _i -I j. 0 r u M if < A I < 4 o -I 1 C ID]I 0 4 O - n I* 3 I H ' j u I d Lit: ft JUrr St " n 3 1 0 rt 0 0 0 -t Dli -.i ft M rt 0 0 cciT?S3):>dSfS=5JCT:i3 n_ cli; : 3 3 3 e 3 j :ÿ : 7 6.4. Description of Research Variables Descriptive statistics such as maximum, minimum, means, standard deviation and variance are obtained for the interval-scaled independent and dependent variables. 90 The results are shown in Table 6.7. It is worth mentioning that all the variables are tapped on 5-point scale. From the results, it may be seen that the mean on political experience is rather low (2.11), as was the mean on public service delivery (2.15), understanding (2.16) and people participation (2.17). While Cooperation (2.29), capacity (2.38), government intervention (2.61), good governance (2.37), transparency (2.60) and the system’s prospects (2.65) is about average on a 5-point scale. The mean of (2.65) for the system’s prospects indicates that most of the respondents are indifferent about future of the system. The minimum of 1.43 indicates that there are some who do not see the future of the system, and the maximum of 4.43 indicates that some of the respondents are foreseeing brighter prospects of the system. The variance for cooperation, capacity, public service delivery, good governance, popular participation, government intervention, and prospects is not high. The variance for political experience, transparency and understanding is slightly high, indicating that most of the respondents are very close to the mean on all variables. Table 6.7 Descriptive Statistics on Research Variables Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Variance Deviation Popular Participation 280 1.20 3.40 2.1671 .50549 .256 Transparency 336 1.13 4.50 2.5975 .67614 .457 Public Service Delivery 336 1.36 3.57 2.1510 .41503 .172 Good Governance 336 1.58 4.00 2.3673 .49183 .242 System’s prospects 336 1.43 4.4.3 2.6539 .61110 .373 Political Experience 280 1.00 4.25 2.1116 .67521 .456 Understanding level 336 1.00 4.00 2.1644 .70362 .341 Government intervention 166 2.00 4.00 2.6104 .61966 .384 Cooperation 166 2.00 3.75 2.2964 .40877 .167 Capacity 84 2.00 3.75 2.3810 .48545 .236 6.5. Inferential Statistics: Pearson Correlation The Pearson’s correlation matrix obtained for the ten interval scale variables is showed in table 6.8. From the result, we can see that participation; transparency; 91 public service delivery; good governance; understanding; and political experience are significantly positively related to system’s prospects. The capacity of the political and official heads is also positively correlated to system’s prospects. Table 6.8 Pearson correlation among research variables PP TRA PSD GG PE UOS GI CAP COP PROS PP Pearson corre 1 .301* .413* .583* .830* .324* -.037 .450* .-131* .451* Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .498 .000 .016 .000 N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 TRA Pearson corre .301* 1 .682* .709* .172* .620* .528* .368* .453* .453* Sig. ( 2-tailed) .000 . .000 .000 .002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 PSD Pearson corre .413* .682* 1 .768* .341* .502*. .328* .293* .217* .459* Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .000 .000 000 .000 .000 .000 .000 N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 GG Pearson corre .583* .709* .768* 1 .480* .565* .312* .388*. .204* .482* Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 000 .000 .000 N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 PE Pearson corre .830* .172* .341* .480* 1 .348* .-266* .240* .-331* .391* Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .002 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 UOS Pearson corre .324* .620* .502* .565* .348*.. 1 .506* .523* .413* .344* Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 .000 N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 GI Pearson corre .-037 .528* .328* .312* .-266* .506* 1 .766* .942* .045 Sig. (2-tailed) .498 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .416 N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 CAP Pearson corre .450* .368* .293* .388* .240* .523* .766* 1 .721* .156* Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 .004 N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 CO Pearson corre -.131* .453* .217* .204* -.331* .413* .942* .721* 1 .006 Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . .911 N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 PROS Pearson corre .51* .453* .459* .482* .391* .344* .045 .156* .006 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .416 .004 .911 . N 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 6.6 Hypotheses Testing Twenty hypotheses have been developed and tested through the application of t-test, ANOVA and Multiple Regression. The results are significant if their probability of occurrence (P-value) is equal to or less than 0.05 levels. This research focuses on the contextual impacts on local government and the interplay of operational variables like participation, transparency etc. 92 H1. Existing disparities and power relations determine level of popular Participation. Table 6.9 Sub-hypotheses CATEGORIES HYPOTHESE CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES 1.1 GENDER H1.1o is: μw = μM 1.4 INCOME H1.4o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4 H1.1A is: μw ≠μM H1.4A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4 1.2 CLASS H1.2o is: μ1 = μ2 1.5 LOCATION H1.5o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3 H1.2A is: μ1 ≠ μ2 H1.5A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 1.3 EDUCATION H1.3o is: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 1.6 PROFESSION H1.6o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4= μ5 H1.3A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 H1.6A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4≠μ5 Table 6.10 t-tests (to compare Mean on Participation) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p- value Results Variables value 1.1 Gender Male 192 2.63 .63 278 5.379 1.960 .000 Null is rejected Female 88 2.24 .40 1.2 Class Elite 131 2.71 .65 278 5.598 1.960 .000 Null is rejected Non-Elite 149 2.33 .49 Table 6.11 ANOVA applications (to compare Mean on Participation) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F- Table P- Results Variables value value value 1.3 Education Highly Educated 59 2.71 .63 2 5.309 3.00 .005 Null is rejected Educated 101 2.52 .68 Un-Educated 120 2.41 .49 277 1.4 Income 1000 to 10000 184 2.37 .58 3 14.031 2.60 .000 Null is rejected 10001 to 20000 26 2.72 .59 200001 to 30000 18 2.77 .45 300001 and above 12 3.17 .29 276 1.5 Location Urban 41 2.60 .57 2 .988 3.00 .347 Null is accepted Urban-cum rural 67 2.55 .57 Rural 172 2.47 .61 277 1.6 Profession Ulemas/ pir groups 53 2.58 .61 4 6.249 2.37 .000 Null is rejected Servants 49 2.25 .44 Businessmen 60 2.61 .57 Formers/workers 57 2.33 .53 Landlords 61 2.71 .68 275 93 The above results show that the main hypothesis (alternative) has been accepted showing the impacts of demographic differences on participation. The results in table 6.10 and 6.11 clearly reflect the contextual implications for the participation levels of community when categorized on the basis of Income, Profession, Class, Gender and Education. Income effect is most significant and highly operative in shaping the participation trends in the general public with F- value of 14.031. The next highest impact comes from the profession with 6.249 F-value. But surprisingly, the influences of gender, class and education are decreasing as they fall on the tail in the priority list of demographic implications with t value 5.379, 5.598 and F-value 5.309 respectively. Location has no impacts on participation as indicated by F-score of .988. H2. Citizens and politicians have different views on popular participation. Table 6.12 t-test (to compare Mean on Participation) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p- value Results Variables value Category General Public 170 2.33 .60 278 -6.576 1.960 .000 Hypothesis is Local 110 2.78 .49 accepted Representatives T-test comparing responses of representatives with the general public indicates that there is a significant difference in the mean scores (see table 6.12) for popular participation. The mean for representatives is 2.78, which is significantly higher than the mean 2.33 for the general public. The difference in the means with standard deviations of .49 and .60 for representatives and the general public respectively on popular participation is significant at .000 levels. As at 278 degree of freedom, the calculated t-value -6.576 is greater than the table value 1.960, and hence, hypothesis 2 is substantiated. 94 H3. Representatives reports more accountability than citizens. Table 6.13 t-test (to compare Mean on accountability) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p- value Results Variables value Category General Public 170 2.29 .73 278 -8.003 1.960 .000 Hypothesis is accepted Local 110 2.97 .65 Representatives There are also differences between the responses of representatives and citizens (see table 6.13) on system accountability. Mean responses of representatives and citizens indicate that citizens are significantly less satisfied with accountability level. Representatives have significantly higher level of agreement (M= 2.97) than the citizens (M=2.29) to the accountability of the local representatives. The difference in means is significant at .000 levels. Since the calculated t-value (-8.003) is greater than the table value (1.960) at 278 degree of freedom, the Hypothesis 3 has been proved. H4. Demographic differences affect the extent of Access to Information. Table 6.14 Sub-hypotheses CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES 4.1 GENDER H4.1o is: μw = μM 4.4 INCOME H4.4o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4 H4.1A is: μw ≠μM H4.4A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4 4.2 CLASS H4.2o is: μ1 = μ2 4.5 LOCATION H4.5o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3 H4.2A is: μ1 ≠ μ2 H4.5A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 4.3 EDUCATION H4.3o is: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 4.6 PROFESSION H4.6o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4= μ5 H4.3A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 H4.6A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4≠ μ5 95 Table 6.15 t-tests (to compare Mean on Access to Information) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table value P- Results Variables value 4.1 Gender Male 192 2.69 .80 278 5.388 1.960 .000 Null is rejected Female 88 2.18 .54 4.2 Class Elite 131 2.84 .80 278 6.813 1.960 .000 Null is rejected Non-Elite 149 2.26 .61 Table 6.16 ANOVA applications (to compare Mean on Access to Information) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F-Value Table P-Value Results Variables value 4.3 Education Highly Educated 59 2.79 .09 2 5.590 3.00 .004 Null is Educated 101 2.53 .08 rejected Un-Educated 120 2.39 .06 277 4.4 Income 1000 to 10000 184 2.33 .68 3 22.210 2.60 .000 Null is 10001 to 20000 58 2.81 .74 rejected 200001 to 30000 26 2.94 .52 300001 and above 12 3.60 .32 276 4.5 Location Urban 41 2.56 .73 2 .125 3.00 .887 Null is Urban-cum rural 67 2.54 .74 accepted Rural 172 2.51 .76 277 4.6 Profession Ulemas/ pir groups 53 2.67 .82 4 6.769 2.37 .000 Null is Servants 49 2.17 .50 rejected Businessmen 60 2.66 .77 Formers/workers 57 2.31 .68 Landlords 61 2.78 .82 275 The above results confirm that demographic differences determine the degree of peoples’ access to information. The results in Table 6.15 and 6.16 shows that income effects are highly significant with 22.210 F-value. The elite capture is the next highly significant factor with 6.813 F-value. The other most influencing factors are the profession and education with F values of 6.769 and 5.590 respectively. The influence of gender is the minimum with t- score 5.388. 96 H5. Representatives reported more transparency than citizens. Table 6.17 t-test (to compare Mean on transparency of the system) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p- value Results Variables value Category General Public 170 2.29 .70 278 -7.787 1.960 .000 Hypothesis is Local 110 2.93 .63 accepted Representatives There are also differences between the responses of representatives and citizens (see table 6.17). Mean responses of representatives and citizens indicate that citizens are significantly less satisfied with transparent decision making especially with their access to information. Representatives have significantly higher level of agreement (M= 2.93) than the citizens (M=2.29) to the transparency level in decision-making process. The difference in means is significant at .000 levels. Since the calculated t- value (-7.787) is greater than the table value (1.960) at 278 degree of freedom, the Hypothesis 5 has been proved. H6. Greater the Participation and Transparency greater are the chances of Better Service Delivery. Table 6.18 Multiple Regression Dependent Independent R R df F-value P-value Beta Score Significan variable variables Square ce PSD Participation .742a .525 2 152.846 .000a .321 .001 Transparency 277 .423 .000 The results of two independent variables against the dependent variable can be seen in table 6.18. The second column of the table lists the two independent variables that are entered in the Regression model and R .742 is the correlation of the two 97 independent variables with the dependent variable. The R Square (.52), which is the explained variance, is actually the square of the multiple R (.742). The F value 152.846 is significant at 000a level. In the df (degree of freedom) in the same table, the first number represents the number of independent variables (2), the second number (277) is the total number of complete responses for all the variables in the equation (N) minus the number of independent variables (K) minus 1. (N-K-1) (280- 2-1) =277. The F statistics (152.846) is significant at 000a level. What the results mean is that 52% of the variance (R-Square) in the public service delivery has been significantly explained by the two independent variables. Thus Hypothesis 6 has been substantiated. The calculated Coefficient helps us to see which of the two independent variables influence most the variance in the public service delivery. If we look at the Beta column, we see that the highest number in the beta is .42 for the transparency, which is significant at the .000 level. It may also be seen that the beta is .32 for participation, which is significant at 001 level. The positive Beta weight indicates that for the improvement of public service delivery, more transparent and participative system is indispensable. H7. In contrast to representatives, general public reported poor public service delivery. Table 6.19 t-test (to compare Mean on public service delivery) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p- value Results Variables value Category General Public 170 2.33 .44 278 -7.520 1.960 .000 Hypothesis is accepted Local 110 2.71 .38 Representatives 98 Since there are two groups and the variable is measured on interval scale, a t- test is used to test the hypothesis. The results of the t-test are shown in table 6.19. The result indicates that the difference in the means of 2.33 and 2.71 with standard deviations of .44 and .38 for the general public and local representatives on public service delivery is significant, as at 278 degree of freedom, the calculated t-value - 7.520 is greater than the table value 1.960, and hence, hypothesis 7 is substantiated. The negative t-value shows opposite relationship between representativesness and the provision of public service delivery. It shows that with their election, the representatives become more self-oriented and self-seeker than work for the well being of general public. H8. Context shapes and reshapes the access to Public Service Delivery. Table 6.20 Sub-hypotheses CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES 8.1 GENDER H8.1o is: μw = μM 8.4 INCOME H8.4o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4 H8.1A is: μw ≠μM H8.4A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4 8.2 CLASS H8.2o is: μ1 = μ2 8.5 LOCATION H8.5o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3 H8.2A is: μ1 ≠ μ2 H8.5A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 8.3 EDUCATION H8.3o is: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 8.6 PROFESSION H8.6o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4= μ5 H8.3A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 H8.6A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4≠ μ5 Table 6.21 t-tests (to compare Mean on Public Service Delivery) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p-value Results Variables value 8.1 Gender Male 192 2.54 .49 278 3.589 1.960 .000 Null is Female 88 2.34 .34 rejected 8.2 Class Elite 131 2.64 .47 278 6.005 1.960 .000 Null is Non-Elite 149 2.34 .38 rejected 99 Table 6.22 ANOVA applications (to compare Mean on Public Service Delivery) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F-Value Table P-Value Results Variables value 8.3 Education Highly Educated 59 2.50 .47 2 2.671 3.00 .071 Null is Educated 101 2.45 .49 accepted Un-Educated 120 2.44 .39 277 8.4 Income 1000 to 10000 184 2.36 .43 3 14.422 2.60 .000 Null is 10001 to 20000 58 2.72 .48 rejected 200001 to 30000 26 2.63 .30 300001 and above 12 2.81 .34 276 8.5 Location Urban 41 2.53 .30 2 .882 3.00 .415 Null is Urban-cum rural 67 2.44 .42 accepted Rural 172 2.47 .47 277 8.6 Profession Ulemas/ pir groups 53 2.49 .41 4 2.674 2.37 .032 Null is Servants 49 2.34 .43 rejected Businessmen 60 2.57 .49 Formers/workers 57 2.40 .43 Landlords 61 2.31 .47 275 The results of t-tests and ANOVA applications in table 6.21 and 6.22 support the acceptance of main alternative hypothesis, clearly indicating the impacts of demographics on public service delivery. The impacts of income are highest and far- reaching in accessing the services with 14.422 F- score. The elite capture (t-score =6.005) is the next dominating factor showing more access to service delivery mechanism. The impacts of gender and profession are proved with t-scores of 3.589 and F-value 2.674. But surprisingly education and location have no impacts, whatsoever, on public service delivery as reflected by their respective 2.674 and .882 F- values. Similarly, the impacts of location have not been substantiated. H9. Participation, Transparency and Better Service Delivery determine Good Governance. Table 6.23 Multiple Regression Dependent Independent R R df F-value P-value Beta Score Significance variable variables Square Good Participation .874a .765 3 298.888 .000a .206 .003 Governance Transparency 276 .395 .000 PSD 349 .000 100 The result of the regression model is given in table 6.23. In the fourth column of the table, the R Square (.76), which is the explained variance, is actually the square of the multiple R (.874)2. In the df column, the first number represents the number of independent variables (3), and the second number (276) represents the total number of complete responses for all the variables in the equation (N-K-1) [(280-3-1) = 276]. The F Statistics produced (F = 298.89), which is significant at the .000a level. 76% of the variance (R-Square) in the good governance has been significantly explained by the three independent variables. Thus Hypothesis 9 has been substantiated. The coefficient calculation helps us to see which of the three independent variables influences most the variance in good governance. If we look at the column Beta, we see that the highest number in the beta is .40 for transparency, .35 for public service delivery and .21 for participation, which is significant at 000, 000 and 003 levels respectively. The positive Beta weight indicates that good governance requires more transparent, improved public service delivery and increased participation of the people. H10. The five independent variables significantly explain the variance in Good Governance. Table 6.24 Multiple regression Dependent Independent R R df F-value P-value Beta Score Significance variable variables Square Good Political .876a .751 5 166.262 .000a .658 .000 Governance experience Government .272 .032 intervention 275 Capacity -.090 .444 Understating .138 .047 Cooperation -.058 .320 101 Table 6.24 indicates that at 275 degree of freedom the computed F-value (166.262) is significant at the .000a levels. The results mean that 75% of the variance (R-Square) in the good governance has been significantly explained by the five independent variables. Thus Hypothesis 10 has been substantiated. The Coefficients calculation tells which of the five independent variables influences most the variance in good governance. If we look at the Beta column, we see that the highest score in the positive beta is .66, .27 and .14 for political experience, government intervention, and understanding which is significant at .000, 032 and 047 respectively. The positive beta indicates that for good governance, experienced politicians, limited intervention of government and better understanding of the system is imperative. H11. In contrast to representatives, general public and government officials perceive poor governance. Table 6.25 ANOVA applications (to compare Mean on Governance) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F-Value Table P-Value Results Variables value Category General Public 170 2.13 .66 2 56.230 3.00 .000 Hypothesis is Local 110 2.89 .64 accepted Representatives 333 Government 56 2.17 .24 officials Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed to see the affect of category of respondents on the extent of local governance. The category affected the responses. ANOVA, which compared the responses given by general public, local representatives and government officials, indicate that local representatives give more positive responses than the general public and government officials (see table 6.25). Local representatives with means of 2.89 have significantly higher scores in response to 102 “good governance” than general public and government officials with mean of 2.13 and 2.17 respectively. The df, the third column refers to the degrees of freedom, and each source of variation has associated degrees of freedom. For the between groups variance, df= (K- 1), where K is the total number of groups or levels. Because there were three groups, we have (3-1) =2df. The df for the with in groups sum of squares equals (N-K), where N is the total number of respondents and K is the total number of groups. As there was no missing response, the associated df is (336-3) = 333. The mean square for each source of variation (column 5 of the result) is derived by dividing the sum of squares by its associated df. Finally, the F value itself equals the explained mean square divided by the residual mean square. MS explained F = ------MS residual In this case, F= 56.230 (20.632/. 367). The F value is significant at .000 levels, as the calculated value 56.230 is greater than the table value 3.00; hence the Hypothesis 11 has been substantiated. . H12. The political Experience of Local Representatives varies with the change in their Background. Table 6.26 Sub-hypotheses CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES 12.1 GENDER H12.1o is: μw = μM 12.4 INCOME H12.4o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4 H12.1A is: μw ≠μM H12.4A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4 12.2 CLASS H12.2o is: μ1 = μ2 12.5 LOCATION H12.5o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3 H12.2A is: μ1 ≠ μ2 H12.5A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 12.3 EDUCATION H12.3o is: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 12.6 PROFESSION H12.6o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4= μ5 H12.3A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 H12.6A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4≠ μ5 103 Table 6.27 t-tests (to compare Mean on Political Experience) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p-value Results Variables value 12.1 Gender Male 72 3.02 .65 108 4.977 1.960 .000 Null is Female 38 2.39 .60 rejected 12.2 Class Elite 49 3.07 .69 108 3.532 1.960 .001 Null is Non-Elite 61 2.62 .64 rejected Table 6.28 ANOVA applications (to compare Mean on Political Experience) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F-Value Table P-Value Results Variables value 12.3 Education Highly Educated 59 3.31 .54 2 8.837 3.00 .000 Null is Educated 101 3.02 .73 rejected Un-Educated 120 2.60 .62 107 12.4 Income 1000 to 10000 27 2.81 .57 3 5.577 2.60 .001 Null is 10001 to 20000 45 2.59 .71 rejected 200001 to 30000 26 2.96 .70 300001 and above 12 3.42 .54 106 12.5 Location Urban 41 2.83 .59 2 .743 3.00 .478 Null is Urban-cum rural 67 2.93 .67 accepted Rural 172 2.75 .74 107 12.6 Profession Ulemas/ pir groups 53 3.13 .62 4 3.099 2.37 .019 Null is Servants 49 2.32 .59 rejected Businessmen 60 2.80 .67 Formers/workers 57 2.88 .50 Landlords 61 2.92 .89 107 The results in Tables 6.27 and 6.28 are showing impacts of demographic characteristics on the political experience of local representatives. The role of education is highly significant with 8.837 F-value. The income has the next highest impact with F-value 5.577. Furthermore, the gender has decreasing impacts as it has (4.977) t-value. The role of class and profession are decreasing with respective t and F–value (3.532 and 3.099). 104 H13. Contextual differences affect the capacity of local Representatives and Bureaucrats. Table 6.29 Sub-hypotheses CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES 13.1 GENDER H13.1o is: μw = μM 13.4 INCOME H13.4o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4 H13.1A is: μw ≠μM H13.4A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4 13.2 CLASS H13.2o is: μ1 = μ2 13.5 LOCATION H13.5o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3 H13.2A is: μ1 ≠ μ2 H13.5A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 13.3 EDUCATION H13.3o is: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 13.6 PROFESSION H13.6o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4= μ5 H13.3A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 H13.6A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4≠ μ5 Table 6.30 t-tests (to compare Mean on Capacity) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p-value Results Variables value 13.1 Gender Male 72 2.26 .83 164 1.810 1.960 .072 Null is Female 46 2.00 .79 accepted 13.2 Class Elite 67 2.19 .85 164 -.012 1.960 .990 Null is Non-Elite 99 2.18 .81 accepted Table 6.31 ANOVA applications (to compare Mean on Capacity) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F-Value Table P-Value Results Variables value 13.3 Education Highly Educated 69 2.65 .74 2 23.787 3.00 .000 Null is Educated 35 1.79 .80 rejected Un-Educated 62 1.90 .68 163 13.4 Income 1000 to 10000 27 2.11 .97 3 6.467 2.60 .000 Null is 10001 to 20000 45 1.82 .60 rejected 200001 to 30000 47 2.23 .85 300001 and above 47 2.54 .76 162 13.5 Location Urban 72 2.64 .77 2 25.478 3.00 .000 Null is Urban-cum rural 31 1.86 .76 rejected Rural 63 1.83 .64 163 13.6 Profession Ulemas/ pir groups 16 1.67 .71 4 7.699 2.37 .000 Null is Servants 71 2.55 .84 rejected Businessmen 35 1.91 .75 Formers/workers 31 2.10 .75 Landlords 23 2.19 .82 161 105 The above tables (6.30 and 6.31) confirm the demographic influences on the working capacity of local representatives and bureaucrats. The location and education are highly significant with 25.478 and 23.787 F-values. The impacts of profession are due to the same reasons of varying interests and priorities from profession to profession. As far as income effects are concerned, the poor representatives always lag behind the rich in capacity building. The role of gender and class was not found on this variable. H14. Background has impacts on the cooperation of representatives with bureaucrats. Table 6.32 Sub-hypotheses CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES 14.1 GENDER H14.1o is: μw = μM 14.4 INCOME H14.4o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4 H14.1A is: μw ≠μM H14.4A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4 14.2 CLASS H14.2o is: μ1 = μ2 14.5 LOCATION H14.5o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3 H14.2A is: μ1 ≠ μ2 H14.5A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 14.3 EDUCATION H14.3o is: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 14.6 PROFESSION H14.6o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4= μ5 H14.3A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 H14.6A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4≠ μ5 Table 6.33 t-tests (to compare Mean on Cooperation) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p-value Results Variables value 14.1 Gender Male 72 2.71 .64 108 4.117 1.960 .000 Null is Female 23 2.23 .47 rejected 14.2 Class Elite 61 2.33 .48 108 -4.408 1.960 .000 Null is Non-Elite 49 2.82 .68 rejected 106 Table 6.34 ANOVA applications (to compare Mean on Cooperation) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F-Value Table P-Value Results Variables value 14.3 Education Highly Educated 13 2.69 .56 2 3.008 3.00 .054 Null is Educated 35 2.71 .77 rejected Un-Educated 62 2.42 .52 107 14.4 Income 1000 to 10000 27 2.82 .66 3 5.303 2.60 .002 Null is 10001 to 20000 45 2.38 .62 rejected 200001 to 30000 26 2.35 .35 300001 and above 12 2.35 .48 106 14.5 Location Urban 16 2.25 .35 2 2.347 3.00 .101 Null is Urban-cum rural 31 2.65 .61 accepted Rural 63 2.07 .70 107 14.6 Profession Ulemas/ pir groups 16 2.63 .67 4 5.053 2.37 .001 Null is Servants 15 2.40 .41 rejected Businessmen 35 2.60 .66 Formers/workers 23 2.40 .40 Landlords 21 2.59 .64 105 Given the results of the above sub-hypotheses, the main alternate hypothesis has been accepted, showing the effects of contextual differences on cooperation of representatives. The results in Tables 6.33 and 6.34 indicate that profession is highly significant with 5.053 F-values. Likewise, the educated people are more friendly than less educated and illiterates. Similarly, the low-income representatives are more cooperative than high-income class. The gender differences have also been proved by the study. Negative impacts of class have been recorded in the study. That is, as the class difference increases, the politicians become more self-oriented and thus non- cooperative. The representatives from the non-elite class have been found more cooperative showing the negative relationship between cooperation and income. H15. Local representatives are more cooperative than bureaucrats. Table 6.35 t-test (to compare Mean on cooperation) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table P- value Results Variables value Category Councilors 110 2.55 .62 164 3.770 1.960 .000 Hypothesis is accepted Government 56 2.20 .39 servants 107 Since there are two groups and the variable is measured on interval scale, a t- test is used to test the hypothesis. The results of the t-test are shown in table 6.35. The results indicate that the difference in the means of 2.55 and 2.20 with standard deviations of .62 and .39 for councilors and government servants respectively on cooperation between representatives and bureaucrats is significant, as at 164 degree of freedom, the calculated t-value 3.770 is greater than the table value 1.960; hence hypothesis 15 has been substantiated. H16. In contrast to government officials, representatives and general public have limited understanding of the system. Table 6.36 ANOVA (to compare Mean on Understanding) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F-Value Table P-Value Results Variables value Category General Public 170 1.81 .51 2 75.049 3.00 .000 Hypothesis is Local 110 2.42 .58 accepted Representatives 333 Government 56 2.77 .67 Servants Since there are more than two groups and the understanding of the system is measured on an interval scale, ANOVA is used to test this hypothesis. The results of ANOVA are presented in table 6.36. The df, the third column, refers to the degrees of freedom, and each source of variation has associated degrees of freedom. For the between groups variance, df= (K-1), where K is the total number of groups or levels. Because there was three groups, we have (3-1) =2df. The df for with in groups’ sum of squares equals (N-K), where N is the total number of respondents and K is the total number of groups. As there was no missing response, the associated df is (336-3) = 333. 108 The mean square for each source of variation (column 5 of the result) is derived by dividing the sum of squares by its associated df. Finally, the F value itself equals the explained mean square divided by the residual mean square. MS explained F = ------MS residual In this case, F= 75.049 (58.199/. 456). This F value is significant at .000 levels, as the calculated F-value is greater than the table value 3.00; hence main Hypothesis 16 has been substantiated. H17. In comparison to public servants, public representatives have different views about the central/provincial government intervention. Table 6.37 t-test (to compare Mean on Government intervention) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p-value Results Variables value Category Councilors 110 2.78 .68 164 6.269 1.960 .000 Hypothesis is Government 56 2.18 .32 accepted servants The results of t-test are shown in table 6.37, which indicates that the difference in the means of 2.78 and 2.18 with standard deviations of .68 and .32 on central/provincial governments intervention in the affairs of local government between representative and bureaucrats is significant, as at 164 degree of freedom the calculated t-value 6.269 is greater than the table value 1.960; hence hypothesis 17 has been substantiated 109 H18. Citizens, politicians and government officials have different views about System’s prospects. Table 6.38 ANOVA (to compare Mean on system’s prospects) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F-value Table P-Value Results Variables value Category General public 170 3.23 .46 2 18.117 3.00 .000 Hypothesis is Local 110 3.28 .59 accepted representatives 333 Government 56 2.82 .37 Servants One-way ANOVA is applied to measure the hypothesis. The results of ANOVA are shown in table 6.38. The df for the between groups (3-1) =2, while df for with in groups is (336-3) = 333. The calculated F= 18.117 (.1.695/ .157), is significant at the .000 level. Since the calculated F-value is greater than the table value 3.00, hence hypothesis 18 has been substantiated. H19. The nine independent variables significantly explain the variance in System’s Prospects. Table 6.39 Multiple Regression Dependent Independent R R df F-value P-value Beta Significance variable variables Square Score System’s Participation .602a .363 9 20.633 .000a .371 .001 Prospects Transparency .281 .001 Service .175 .019 delivery Good .003 .975 Governance Political -.0171 .523 experience Government .234 .001 intervention Understating -.420 .024 Capacity 326 -097 .517 Cooperation .275 .070 110 To test this hypothesis, multiple regression analysis is used. The results of the independent variables against the dependent variable are shown in table 6.39. The second column of the table lists the nine independent variables that are entered into the Regression model and R (.602a) is the correlation of nine independent variables with the dependent variable, after all the inter-correlations among the nine independent variables are taken into account. The R Square (.36), which is the explained variance, is actually the square of the multiple R (.602a)2. In the df (degree of freedom) in the same table, the first number represents the number of independent variables (9), the second number (326) is the total number of complete responses for all the variables in the equation (N), minus the number of independent variables (k) minus 1. (N-K-1) [(336-9-1) = 326]. The F Statistics produced (F = 20.633) is significant at the .0001 level. What the results mean is that .36% of the variance (R-Square) in the prospects has been significantly explained by the independent variables. Thus hypothesis 18 has been accepted. The calculation of Coefficients helps us to see which among the independent variables influences most the variance in the system’s prospects (i.e. the most important). If we look at the column beta, we can see that the highest number in the positive beta is .37, for popular participation, .28 for transparency that are significant at .001, .001 levels respectively, which indicates that the independent variables are significant one. The positive beta weights that for maximizing the system’s prospects, greater popular participation and increased accountability with higher transparency level of the system is imperative. The highest number in the negative beta is .42 for government intervention, which is significant at the .024 levels. The negative beta weight indicates that if the system’s prospects are to be increased, the intervention of upper tiers must be reduced 111 H20. Demographic imbalances and power relations determine System’s prospects. Table 6.40 Sub-hypotheses CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES CATEGORIES HYPOTHESES 20.1 GENDER H20.1o is: μw = μM 20.4 INCOME H20.4o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4 H20.1A is: μw ≠μM H20.4A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4 20.2 CLASS H20.2o is: μ1 = μ2 20.5 LOCATION H20.5o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3 H20.2A is: μ1 ≠ μ2 H20.5A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 20.3 EDUCATION H20.3o is: μ1 = μ2 = μ3 20.6 PROFESSION H20.6o is: μ1 = μ2= μ3= μ4= μ5 H20.3A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3 H20.6A is: μ1 ≠ μ2≠ μ3≠ μ4≠ μ5 Table 6.41 t-tests (to compare Mean on System’s Prospects) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df t-value Table p-value Results Variables value 20.1 Gender Male 240 3.22 .50 334 2.396 1.960 .017 Null is Female 96 3.07 .50 rejected 20.2 Class Elite 165 3.23 .55 334 2.072 1.960 .039 Null is Non-Elite 171 3.12 .47 rejected Table 6.42 ANOVA applications (to compare Mean on system’s prospects) Categorical Groups N Mean SD df F-value Table P-Value Results Variables value 20.3 Education Highly Educated 115 3.12 .54 2 6.913 3.00 .001 Null is Educated 101 3.34 .47 rejected Un-Educated 120 3.10 .49 333 19.4 Income 1000 to 10000 184 3.23 46 3 3.344 2.60 .019 Null is 10001 to 20000 58 3.22 60 rejected 200001 to 30000 47 3.12 50 300001 & above 47 2.98 53 332 20.5 Location Urban 88 3.06 .57 2 3.133 3.00 .045 Null is Urban-cum rural 67 3.20 .50 rejected Rural 181 3.22 .48 333 20.6 Profession Ulemas/ pir groups 53 3.35 .51 4 13.257 2.37 .000 Null is Servants 49 3.12 .46 rejected Businessmen 60 3.29 .50 Formers/workers 57 3.25 .49 Landlords 61 3.24 .55 332 112 Based on the results of t-test and ANOVA for the above-mentioned sub hypotheses, the main alternate hypothesis have been accepted, showing the impacts of demographic imbalances on system’s prospects. The results indicate that profession has the maximum F-score 13.257, and is highly significant with p-value .000 levels. The impact of education and class has also been found. Similarly, the elite are more optimistic than the non-elite. The people living in deep rural and urban-cum-rural areas perceive the prospects positively than the voters in urban location. The impacts of gender and class are again significant with reference to the prospects of the system. 113 Chapter 7 GENERAL DISCUSSION Several studies have evaluated the impacts of new local government system on good governance, but most of these studies were of descriptive nature and limited to the analysis of different dimensions of the system itself rather than its real impacts (see for example, Khan, 2006; Zaidi, 2005; Asian Development Bank Report, 2005; Khan, 2004; Alam, 2004; World Bank Report, 2004; Zaman, 2002 and Alam, 2002). However, the research at hand is conducted to evaluate the District Government Dera Ismail Khan empirically. The quantitative data has been gathered about the critical factors of good governance such as; popular participation, transparency and public service delivery. The data give mixed results about the role of these factors due to the impact of contextual factors. Each variable is now discussed one by one to pinpoint the variations as observed through primary facts and figures supported by secondary data. 7.1 Popular participation Some studies show that local government systems have considerably enhanced citizen’s participation in governance (Baiochhi, 2005; Crook and Manor, 1998; Shah, 1998; Santos, 1998 and Manor, 1996). While, many others (Peterson, 2006; Gerard, 2004; Dulani, 2003; Crook & Sverrisson, 1999; Webster, 1990; Samoff 1990; Westergaard, 1986 and Rondinelli et al., 1983) have reported limited citizen’s participation at local government level due to the gender and income inequality, elite capture and religious differences (Khan, 2004; Zaman, 2002; Blair, 2000 and Azfar et al., 1999). The findings of this study also reveal the existence of ‘limited participation’ (average for participation is 2.16 on 5point scale; see table 6.7), however, reasons to this are multifarious and playing different roles. For example, the village and neighbourhood councils and musalihati jirgas has not yet been constituted (see annexure B, table 1), whereas, citizen community boards (CCBs) are functioning in 114 some union councils. Furthermore, the image of these CCBs is very frustrating amongst the general public, as many respondents raised concerns about the constitution, financial self-raising and the functioning of CCBs. They complain that majority of CCBs have been illegally constituted by the influential rather than the poor people. These elite manipulate the situation by presenting required number of N.I.Cs (taken from the illiterate voters especially in rural areas) and depositing 20% contribution thereby registering the CCB with the government. Thus, they receive other 80% from the government, which is then at their personal disposal (Peterson, 2006). Although the research confirms that rich people make more financial contributions however, it also appears that more non-financial contributions are made by the poor masses such as, free labor in the projects (see annexure B, table 3). Income inequality is reported as major cause of limited people participation (D’Art and Thomas, 2007; Khan, 2004; Zaman, 2002), which is substantiated in this research (see sub-hypothesis 1.4), however, the reservation of 5% seats for peasants and workers and minorities has increased the ratio of poor people’s participation. The next highest impact comes from the profession, indicating more inclination of the landlords and businessmen to participate than the other groups. The elite capture also restricts the participation of common man (Dasgupta and Victoria, 2007; Bond, 2007; Alam, 2004; Alam, 2002 and Azfar et al., 1999), which is proved by this research (see sub-hypothesis 1.2). The scenario however is now changing or as World Bank Report (2004) and Bari (2001) states that “the induction of new blood and faces in local politics is reducing elite’s dominance.” Furthermore, the horse-trading in local body’s election 2005 for Nazims (both tehsil and Zilla) also reveals the weakened status of traditional elite. Political participation is much more common among people with higher level of education (D’Art and Thomas, 2007), which is also found in this study but is less important, showing that formal education has little impact, if any, rather political consciousness is the main determinant of filling the participation-gap between the 115 educated and uneducated (see sub-hypothesis 1.3). Likewise, gender may also influence the propensity to participate (D’Art and Thomas, 2007), however, in this study this variable is emerging as less important (see sub-hypothesis 1.1) perhaps with the present government initiatives to increase the role of women in political system of the country, which is inconsistent with the findings of Levinson et al. (2005). Furthermore, the scenario is now changing or as Khan (2004) puts it “the new arrangement of the system contributed well in the increase of female participation in local affairs.” By reserving 33% seats for women in the new local government setup the rate of women participation in the local government affairs has substantially increased although there are still barriers to this effect as evident from the fact that many seats of women councilors are still vacant. The impacts of the distance of location on people participation are evaluated but not proved significant by this research. The people of urban, urban-cum-rural and deep rural areas have similar participation trends (see sub-hypothesis 1.5). Furthermore, the general public and local representatives perceived people participation differently (see hypothesis 2). The difference in means shows that representatives’ claim of involving common man in the formulation and implementation of different schemes has not been proved by the research as limited participation is reported by the general public. In addition to these factors, unawareness, poverty and illiteracy come out to be the main reasons of non- participation (see annexure B, table 4 to 6). 7.2 Accountability and transparency Some studies show that local governments have considerably promoted the level of accountability (Besley et al., 2005; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Blair, 2000; Manor, 1996 and World Bank, 1995), while many others (Peterson, 2006; World Bank, 2004d; 2003a; 2003c; 2002b; Narayan et al., 2000a and Commonwealth foundation, 1999) report limited accountability. This study also reveals limited accountability both vertical as well as horizontal (average for accountability is 2.59 on 5point scale (see table 6.7). 116 Horizontal accountability refers to the fact that government workforce is accountable to public through their representatives in a democratic government. Some institutional forms of accountability include horizontal checks and balances such as reporting systems (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001). In the case of local government, bureaucratic accountability to elected officials is often weak (Blair, 2000). Many studies (Golooba-Mutebi, 1999; Kullenberg and Porter, 2001) identify factors which contribute to this deficiency a) incomplete attempts at devolution, b) civil servants are often unwilling to accept posting to local government and in an effort to ameliorate dissatisfaction, posts often remain tied to central government, c) weak capacity of local government staff: often key to malpractice and poor internal accountability, particularly relating to book keeping, d) the skill differential between the more senior technocrats in government service, and elected councilors leaves councilors dependent on officials’ recommendations and can create working tensions that can descend professional relations into political wrangling, e) Indeed, the capacity of elected representatives to decide, monitor and enforce accountability of officials is weak. There is both downward and upward accountability. Downward accountability is the responsiveness of representatives to the general public. There are different mechanisms of official accountability to the public such as, elections; political parties etc., all have clear problems (Blair, 2000: 32). Electoral choice is the key mechanism to hold representatives accountable for example; they clearly rejected the unpopular and corrupt politicians in the local bodies’ election 2005. However, this strength is dependent on the structure of electoral system, the regularity of elections and the extent of genuine voter choice (Rakodi, 2001). Furthermore, the study found limited existence of the other available mechanisms of accountability for example; highly infrequent open forum public meetings are reported in this study. Whereas, upward accountability is the same to higher levels of government authorities. Research shows that where there is committed political will on the part of 117 central and provincial governments, local governments are more accountable (Blair, 2000; Minogue et al., 1997; Tendler, 1997). The mechanism of upward accountability consists of rules and regulations, external auditing, checks and balances through public account committees etc. However, the upper echelons of government to threaten and embarrass the local governments can also use the same devices negatively. For example, the provincial government embarrassed the ex-Zilla Nazim on the charges of corruption through external audit and special inquiries, which were then dropped due to the non- availability of the evidence. Likewise, the Tehsil Nazim Dera Ismail Khan was suspended by the provincial government on corruption charges, which were not supported by the court. Many studies argue that accountability of local governments highly depends upon the transparent local government system (Blair, 2000). The present devolution plan provides mechanisms of transparency by declaring citizens’ right to information thereby forcing the district government to display public information but the present study reveals limited transparency regarding the business of local governments. The public in general and the poor in particular have no access to information (hypothesis 3), for instance, the researcher himself visited the DO Social Welfare several times to get the list of registered CCBs, but did not succeed. Although it is well documented that a transparent system makes it easier to hold the local government accountable; however, transparency itself depends on the demographic characteristic of the society as verified by this study (hypothesis 4), which are not very conducive among the population under study. 7.3 Public service delivery It is well documented that the decentralized local government can more easily identify people’s needs, and thus supply the appropriate form and level of public services (Francis and James, 2003; Oates, 1972; Mahal et al, 2000; Enemuo, 2000 and 118 Rondinelli et al., 1989), still there are other studies that reveal negative relationship between decentralized local governments and the public service delivery (Peterson, 2006; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001 and Crook, 2000). The present study also supports the negative relationship between decentralized local governments and the public service delivery (the mean value for public service delivery is 2.15 at 5point scale (see table 6.7). No doubt, theoretically, the new system is service oriented and intends to improve the public service delivery but in practice nothing is happening like that as reflected by the mean score (2.15). The district government is working for the provision of education and health facilities at district level, but the provincial government finances all these projects (Peterson, 2006). The contributions of district government to this end are not only negligible rather the promotion fund of education is usurped and misused1. If any thing was initiated, it was based on political affiliation rather than merit oriented. As for as the provision of clean drinking water, improvement of drainage system and housing and sanitation is concerned, the district government has not realized its targets in full. This can be verified by observing the present condition of water supply lines, drainage system, housing and sanitation even in the urban areas of the district. Similarly, market prices are running out of control of district government as is evident from the prevailing market prices of meat, mutton and spices in the market. However, since government has appointed a price control magistrate who is taking steps to control the prices of basic items through surprise visits and frequent checking of quality and weight of the products and by filling challans and fixing fines on the spot, the situation is likely to be brought under some control. The political rift between tehsil and district government, corruption and lack of proper monitoring are the main reasons for poor service delivery (see annexure B, table 9, 11 and 12). Additionally, the independent variables- transparency and popular 1 Reported by the EDO Education D.I.Khan that the promotion funds of education, which is transferred to district government has been usurped and misused. 119 participation also have major impacts on the public service delivery; amongst them the transparency has greater impacts (see hypothesis 6). The three groups have different opinion about the state of public service delivery. The councilors and government officials view improvement, while the general public perceives public service delivery otherwise (see hypothesis 7). Furthermore, Income is also affecting, showing that people with high income have more access to public services due to their control over CCBs (see sub- hypothesis 8.4). Additionally, the elite capture of public service delivery, as reported by Bond (2007), Zaman (2002) and Azfar et al. (1999), is proved by the present study (see sub-hypothesis 8.2) however, the existence of Public Safety Commission, CCBs and Monitoring Committees, are reducing the dominance of elite. The elite are more dominant in the deep rural areas than in urban and urban-cum-rural areas therefore, they are major beneficiaries of public service delivery than the poor people. The impacts of gender and profession are also proved (see sub-hypotheses 8.1 and 8.6). The gender impact is due to cultural and religious restrictions on women to involve in the provision of services to the people. Similarly, the impacts of profession show that businessmen and Ulemas/Pir groups have more access to public services due to their interest and influence. But surprisingly education and location have no significant impact on public service delivery (see sub-hypotheses 8.3 and 8.5). It shows that education is becoming least effective because of the fact that it is the political support and not the education, which increases the access to public services. Similarly, the impacts of location have not been substantiated. 7.4 Good Governance In recent years, economists and political scientists have been asserting that decentralized political institutions are more efficient and effective (Buchanan, 1977; Bolton and Roland, 1997) and have the ability to contain budget deficits and inflation (Rodden and Wibbels, 2002; Rodden, 2003a and Rodden, 2003b) so they pushed it as 120 a panacea for the ills of poor governance (Ansell and Gingrich, 2003 and Litvack et al., 1998). The findings of this study do not support the above-mentioned idea as reflected from the average score (2.36) of governance (see table 6.7). It is due to the weak administration, bureaucratic non-cooperation and excessive involvement in corruption of the local politicians (sees annexure B, table 19). Furthermore, the lack of political experience of the local politicians, non-cooperation of bureaucrats, lack of capacity and absence of clear understanding of the system are the main factors responsible for the poor governance at grass root levels. Amongst them, the most striking factor is the lack of political experience; and the next important factor is the intervention of central and provincial governments (see hypothesis 10). In addition to these, the absence of popular participation, lack of transparency and poor service delivery are the main causes of poor governance, as these three independent variables affect the variance in governance level. Amongst them the transparency has the highest impacts, the next highest impact comes from of the service delivery & the lowest impact is of the popular participation (see hypothesis 9). Furthermore, different groups of respondents perceived local governance differently (see hypothesis 11). The differences in means show that representatives are confident to claim that governance has improved but the general public and bureaucrats are of the view that the elected representatives have not fully succeeded in establishing good governance at local level as many cases of fraud and embezzlement have been recorded. 7.5 Political experience Political experience of elected representatives is very important from the point of view of modernization and social change, which could be of national, provincial or local level (Zaidi, 2005). The local politicians have to supervise and guide the 121 government servants but being usually illiterate and in-experienced they have to rely upon the local officials and it becomes the case of blind man leading the blind. Data was gathered about the past political experience of local representatives and found it limited (2.11 on 5-point scale, table 6.7). The lack of political experience is the result of government policy to induct new blood in local politics (Khan, 2004 and Bari, 2001). Likewise, research also shows that political experience depends on demographics such as gender, education, income, class & profession (hypothesis 12). 7.6 Understanding There is lack of understanding on the part of both the general public and elected representatives about the system’s features and their usability (see for example, Zaidi, 2005; Alam, 2004; World Bank Report, 2004; Paracha, 2003 and Azfar, 1999). This study confirms this problem with a finding of 2.16 on 5-point scale (table 6.7) however; the understanding of citizens and representatives is significantly lower than government officials (hypothesis 16). 7.7 Capacity The administrative and technical capacities of public representatives and functionaries need to be strengthened through systematic programme of recruitment, training and career planning. Central government initiated capacity building programme through NRB but constant discrimination on demographic characteristics is widely reported. This research shows lack of capacity (2.38 on 5-point scale, see table 6.7) as well as discrimination on the basis of demographic characteristics (hypothesis 13). The location and education are highly significant. For example, representatives of urban and urban-cum-rural areas are preferred on those from deep- rural areas in capacity building programs. Similarly, highly educated representatives get more capacity building opportunities than the less educated and illiterate. Likewise, the profession and income also affect the availability of capacity building facilities to the representatives. 122 7.8 Cooperation between representatives and government officials Good working relationship of public representatives and government functionaries is imperative for efficient and effective delivery of service. However, most of the Nazim report non-cooperation of the bureaucrats. They behave so because: a). a large proportion of their functions have been handed over to the representatives and the office of DC has been abolished. b). Provincial bureaucracy at the local level has been made accountable to the elected heads of district and Tehsil Municipal Administration. Cheema et al. (2004) notes, despite this devolution, the provincial secretariats still retain considerable administrative authority over district bureaucrats (Manning et al., 2003). The finding of the present study also found non-cooperation of bureaucrats as the main cause of poor governance (see annexure B, table 14). Furthermore, politicians report higher levels of non-cooperation than the government servants (hypothesis 15). 7.9 Government intervention Despite the initial enthusiasm and claims of devolving powers and empowering local government, excessive involvement of central/provincial government in the affairs of local governments is reported (see for example, Zaidi, 2005; Cheema et al., 2004; and Paracha, 2003). The score of 2.68 on 5-point scale (see table 6.7) is a proof of the government intervention. It should be also noted that politicians report greater government intervention than the civil servants. 7.10 Prospects of the system If we see the prospects of the system in the historical perspective of Pakistan, several questions arise, as the country has poor track record of democracy during the last fifty-nine years after independence. It has mostly been ruled by the military (about 123 30 years plus). There has always been a limited local democracy in order to convey some kind of democratic legitimacy to an authoritarian regime. Sivaramakishnan (2000:423) notes “local government did much better during eras of authoritarian rule than in times of democratic rule. During democratic regimes the local level often lost the attractiveness because it was not any longer the only platform available for people participation. However, the scenario is changing as the new system introduced third tier (the district government) under the provisions of LGO 2001, empowering (politically, financially and administratively) the district government at grass root levels. Furthermore, the commitment and determination of central government reflects brighter prospects of the system, however it needs political support, which is still missing. As for as the critical success factors of good governance are concerned the new system was designed to increase popular participation, ensure transparency and accountability to enable the people to see what is happening around them and not only to improve the public service delivery but also to provide it at their doorsteps. The findings of this study show that there is a relationship between popular participation and the prospects of the system. It is proved that if the people’s participation is greater, then there is greater prospect of the system and vice versa (see hypothesis 19). Unfortunately, there is still limited popular participation, but with the passage of time it will change as reflected from the increased number of contestants, increased voting rate in the election 2005 as compared to the election of 2001, and the increased participation of the people in the developmental and non-developmental schemes. Such changing trends indicate that the new system have brighter prospects. The most accountable and transparent systems can gain rapid popularity and can work for longer period of time (Paracha, 2003). It is also substantiated by this study that if the system is transparent it has brighter prospects to survive and vice 124 versa (see hypothesis 19). Whereas, the transparency level of the district government under study is not encouraging one as shown by the mean score. However, the increasing pressure of the donor agencies as well as the general public will compel the district government to work transparently to enable the people to see what is happening and to evaluate the performance and make future decisions. As far as the accountability of the politicians and government officials is concerned, the people demonstrated their right to vote in the local bodies’ election 2005, when they neglected the unpopular, corrupt and inefficient local politicians. While the accountability of the government officials has not been exercised as it is reported by the politicians that the government officials seldom appear in the sessions of councils, if yes, they do not meet the demands of the politicians. There is no clear accountability system to keep check over their performance. The success and failure of the system depends on the quality of public service delivery, but unfortunately, the district government under study has not yet succeeded to improve the quality of public service delivery (see hypothesis 19). One can observe the cleanliness of the streets, bazaars and Mohallas and can find the piles of scattered waste, the damage water pipelines, the drainage system etc. However, gradually by increasing awareness among the people, the scenario is now changing as the TMAs are now working for the improvement of public service delivery through monitoring committees and CCBs, as reported by the World Bank Report 2004, “the decentralized local governments are contributing well to improve the public service delivery, but not yet succeeded to meet the standard.” It is well documented that the level of governance determines the future of the system; if there is a good governance then there are brighter prospects of the system and vice versa. This is also substantiated by this study (see hypothesis 19), but unfortunately the district government under study has not yet succeeded in maintaining good governance as proved by the deteriorating law and order situation, prevalence of high commodity rates, absence of coordination between DCO and Zilla Nazim, the existence of political rift between Zilla Nazim and Tehsil Nazims, 125 increasing rate of corruption of the local politicians as reported by the local news papers, horse trading in the local bodies election 2005 and the present attempt of vote of no confidence against the Zilla Nazim, in which sufficient amount of money were offered to the councilors for vote. However, despite all these observations, it is still hoped that the system qualifies to be retained, especially for the well being of the general public. If given a fair chance and sufficient time to show its potentials, the system will certainly meet the expectations of the people and will play an important role in the development at grass root levels. Furthermore, the present study found varying views of the three main stakeholders about the future of the system. The results indicate that the local representatives and general public are more confident about the prospects of the system than the government servants (see hypothesis 18). The passive attitude of the government servant is due to their rivalry towards the new system as it deprived them of their overbearing powers. The research also found the impacts of demographics on the future prospects of the system (see hypothesis 20). Profession has the leading impacts on the prospects of the system. Respondents belonging to religious groups, landlords and businessmen are more confident about the system prospects than the serving-class (both public and private), formers and the workers. The impact of education and class is also evident in the sense that educated people are more optimistic about the system than the less educated people. Similarly, the elite are more optimistic than the non-elite. The people living in deep rural and urban-cum-rural areas perceive the system more positively than the voters in urban location. The impact of gender and class is again insignificant with reference to the prospects of the system. 126 Chapter 8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 8.1. Summary of the Findings The new system of local government was primarily designed to be people- centered, responsibility-based and service-oriented. Appropriate steps were taken to overhaul the entire political, administrative and financial structure at local level and provide an elaborate mechanism for the implementation of the critical success factors for good governance i.e. popular participation, transparency and public service delivery. In order to achieve the study objectives 20 hypotheses have been tested and the findings are presented as: a). Institutional arrangements and b). Operational arrangements. A. Institutional Arrangements Popular Participation i. Village and Neighborhood Council: - Despite provision for setting up an elected village and neighborhood councils under section 93 LGO 2001 no village and neighborhood council has been established so far. ii. CCBs: - Out of 205 CCBs registered under section 98 LGO 2001 only few are being involved in developmental activities. iii. Musalihati Jirgas: - Though provisions are made under section 102 LGO 2001 for the constitution of Musalihati Jirga in each union council but no Musalihati Jirga has been constituted up till now. Accountability Provincial Local Government Commission: - The LGO 2001 under section 133 provides for the establishment of Provincial Local Government Commission but the government of NWFP took a long time in the establishment of this Commission. Though the Provincial government has 127 started working on the establishment of this commission by publishing proposed working procedure and holding seminars in different parts of the province but the commission has yet to be made operational. Zilla Mohtasib: To strengthen accountability the LGO 2001 provided for the appointment of Zilla Mohtasib in every district under section 134 LGO 2001 but practically the Zilla Mohtasib has not been appointed in the district so far. Transparency Access to information: Despite the fact that LGO 2001, under section 137 declared citizen’s right to information (clause 1); bound every office to provide information if not restricted on the prescribed form and on payment (clause 2); and bound the offices to display information about staffing and performance at a prominent place of the office (clause 3) but practically all such things are missing in the operations of the district government, tehsil municipal administration and union administration. Public Service delivery Inspection and supervision: Despite provisions for the appointment of inspecting officers to examine the performance of TMA and Union administration in relation to service delivery, no such appointment has been made by the Zilla Nazim in the district. Monitoring committees: Although provisions are made under section 138 for monitoring committees to be elected by the Zilla, Tehsil and Union councils to monitor the functioning of district government, tehsil municipal administration and union administration respectively, yet practically only a few of them are actually working at Tehsil municipal administration level. 128 B. Operational arrangements Popular Participation The study found limited Popular Participation as shown by the mean (2.16) on 5-point scale. Although rich people make more financial contributions, a significant part of non-financial contributions is made by the poor people such as free labor (see annexure B table 3). Income inequality (sub-hypothesis 1.4); professional difference (sub-hypothesis 1.6); elite capture (sub-hypothesis 1.2); education differences (sub- hypothesis 1.3) and gender inequalities (sub-hypothesis 1.1) are the main factors of limited participation, while unawareness, illiteracy and poverty (see annexure B table 4,5,6) are the main reasons that are causing limited popular participation. Furthermore, general public reported limited people’s participation than public representatives. Accountability and Transparency There is also limited accountability and transparency as indicated by the mean (2.60) on 5-point scale. The district and tehsil governments as well as the district, tehsil and union administrations failed to display public information. The people in general and poor in particular have no access to information (see hypothesis 5). Poor systems of checks and balances, auditing, monitoring and improper implementation are the main reasons of limited accountability and transparency (see annexure B table 9). Income inequality (sub-hypothesis 4.4); elite capture (sub-hypothesis 4.2); professional differences (sub-hypothesis 4.6); educational difference (sub-hypothesis 4.3) and the gender inequality (sub-hypothesis 4.1) are the main factors that limit the transparency level of the system. Public service delivery The study finds poor public service delivery as indicated by the mean (2.15) at 5point scale. The district government is working for the provision of education and health facilities at district level but these are the contributions of provincial government who finances all these projects, whereas, the contributions of district 129 government are only negligible one. Little attention has been given to the construction of roads however, condition of streets especially in the urban areas of the district. No remarkable progress has been shown in the provision of clean drinking water, improvement of drainage system and housing and sanitation. Furthermore, the district government is still striving hard to get control on the prevailing market prices and quality of the commodities. Political rift between tehsil and district government, corruption, and lack of proper monitoring are the main reasons (see annexure B table 11). Furthermore, limited transparency and participation are also the causes of poor service delivery (see hypothesis 6). Income inequality (sub-hypothesis 8.4); elite capture (sub-hypothesis 8.2); gender inequality (sub-hypothesis 8.1) and professional differences (sub- hypothesis 8.6) are other factors responsible for poor service delivery. It is also worth noting that general public and government officials perceive poor service delivery than local representatives (see hypothesis 7). Governance The findings of the study also reveal poor governance as shown in the average score (2.37). According to the data, weak administration; bureaucratic non- cooperation and excessive involvement in corruption of the local politicians (see annexure B table 13, 14), limited participation, transparency and poor service delivery are the main factors responsible for poor governance. Furthermore, inexperience, lack of cooperation of bureaucrats, limited capacity, and undue interferences of central/provincial government, are also responsible for poor governance (see hypothesis 10). Here also, the general public and government officials endorse the views of poor governance than the local councilors/representatives (see hypothesis 11). Political Experience The study finds lack of experience of the representatives (Mean = 2.11 on 5- point scale, see table 6.7) as one of the main problems for poor local governance. 130 Illiteracy, poverty and elite capture are the reasons for the lack of political experience. Furthermore, educational differences (sub-hypothesis 12.3); income inequality (sub- hypothesis 12.4); gender difference (sub-hypothesis 12.1) and elite capture (sub- hypothesis 12.2) are the factors responsible for limited political experience. Capacity of local representatives and government servants The findings of the study reveal limited capacity of both the representatives and government officials. The location (sub-hypothesis 13.5); educational differences (sub-hypothesis 13.3); professional differences (sub-hypothesis 13.6) and income inequalities (sub-hypothesis 13.4) are perceived to be the factors responsible for lack of capacity. Cooperation between local representatives and bureaucrats The study finds lack of cooperation between the political and official heads in the District of study. The professional differences (sub-hypothesis 14.6); educational differences (sub-hypothesis 14.3); income inequality (sub-hypothesis 14.4) and the gender inequality (sub-hypothesis 14.1) are reported as factors responsible for the lack of cooperation. Furthermore, representatives and bureaucrats hold different perceptions about their mutual cooperation (see hypothesis 15). Understanding of people, representatives and servants The findings of the study also indicate lack of understanding of the main stakeholders (average is 2.16 on 5-point scale, see table 6.7). The three groups have different views about the new system (see hypothesis 16). Central/provincial government intervention The study finds increased intervention of central and provincial governments in the affairs of local government, as reflected by the mean (2.61 on 5-point scale, see table 6.7). Furthermore, public representatives reported increased intervention of the higher tiers in the affairs of local government than the government officials (see hypothesis 17). 131 Prospects of the system Poor track record of democracy; limited popular participation; excessive intervention of higher tiers in local affairs and limited understanding of the main stakeholders, all develop doubts about the future of the system (see hypothesis 19). Furthermore, the three groups (citizens, councilors and servants) also have different perceptions about the future prospects of the system (see hypothesis 18). However, it is hoped that the system is too good to be retained for a long time. If LGO 2001 is implemented both in letters and spirit and the system is given fair time to show its potentials, there is every possibility that it will meet the expectations of the people and will play an important role in the development at grass root levels. 8.2. Conclusions The new system of local government overhauled the entire machinery to customize it with the new requirements for the critical success factors of good governance. The condition of these indicators helps in determining the future of the new system. This study developed and tested a set of empirical measures of the future prospects of the new system to analyze the impacts of devolution plan at the grass root levels. It is concluded that greater the popular participation, understanding and lesser the intervention of central/provincial government, greater the future prospects of the system. Following conclusions have been drawn from the study: The present local government system, as compared to previous systems, have increased the participation level as substantial number of local representatives got elected at union, Tehsil and district level. However, popular participation both direct and indirect is still limited. It is due to the institutional absence, unawareness, illiteracy, income inequality; professional difference; and elite dominance. Illiteracy (especially in rural areas) is the most dominant factor in reducing participation. Gender and income inequality is also restricting popular participation. Given this, it is 132 concluded that there is a gap between theory and practice as reality is far behind the provisions of LGO 2001. If such practices remain continued in similar fashion, survival of the system will be questionable. The new system provides a comprehensive mechanism for access to information and accountability. Furthermore, the new system places elected political heads as compared to bureaucrats at district, Tehsil and union levels. These political heads are easily accessible and accountable to the people, as people can contact them freely and inquire. However, despite all such provisions, the study found limited transparency due to poor access to information and accountability failure of the government officials. Poor access to information is also due to the structural weaknesses. For example, it is difficult for a layman to visit the offices to get information. Likewise, interested people have to pay for the information they intend to get from the office thereby posing a restriction to transparency. Similarly, lack of accountability of the government officials is due to institutional absence of Zilla Mohtasib and the passive attitude of the government officials to comply with the decisions of Zilla council. It is now imperative to overcome these problems as early as possible, otherwise the history may repeat itself. Public service delivery depends upon the availability of resources and the implementation of the system. As for as the resources are concerned the new system made formula based fiscal transfer to the three levels and empowered them to generate local funds through local taxes. However, despite all such measures the study found limited public service delivery. Obviously, it is not due to financial constraints but because of poor implementation strategy of the government. The study highlighted many reasons of it, however lack of transparency, poor monitoring and corruption are the critical. Furthermore, political interference and elite capture are other reasons for poor public service delivery. Proper attention to these issues is indispensable to ensure the survival of the system in the long run. 133 Governance is more the question of implementation than the development of the system. Therefore, specific hurdles to implementation, as identified by the people, are several with multiple roles. It is however notable that ‘non- cooperation of government officials was placed as the top reason to the alleged bad governance.’ The government officials are non-cooperative because the new system deprives them from the powers thereby placing them under the control of local politicians. Effective and efficient administration requires more experienced politicians, high caliber workforce having both administrative and technical capacity, maximum cooperation and coordination between political and official heads and full empowerment of local governments with limited intervention of the higher tiers, but it is missing at grass root levels. Given this, it can be concluded that there is a big gap between theory and practice, as the ground realities are far from the contents of the devolution plan. If the gap will not be filled as early as possible, the new system will face the same destiny as faced by the previous local government systems. However, despite such observed limitations, there is some improvement and it is hoped that the system may be retained for a longer period of time. If it is given fair time to show its potentials, definitely it will further improve and meet the expectations of the people and will play an important role in the development at grass roots level. 8.3 Recommendations Given the findings of this study, it is now possible to come up with fact-based recommendations to change rather adjust certain aspects of the new local government system. The recommendations fall into two categories: Institutional and Operational. Institutional refers to the structural arrangements as given in LG2001 documentation while operational is the use of the same structure and the procedural details of the local government system. 134 A. Institutional Arrangements Every project, small or large, public or private, local, national or global; all depend on the quality of institutional arrangements for the purpose. Local government should develop customized institutions, methods and procedures. Following institutional adjustments were found to be crucial and taken up by the authorities: a) As per LGO 2001, the government should ensure the constitution and functioning of elected village and neighborhood council and Musalihati Jirgas to handle municipal and community welfare facilities and settlement of disputes. b) The District Social Welfare Office (DSWO) is dealing with CCBs affairs because in NWFP, EDO (CD) Group of offices has not yet been established (Ali, 2006). Thus, DSWO has come under extra burden resulting delay in the registration of fresh CCBs and maintaining standard scrutiny procedure for the purpose. Having said that, it is recommended that the immediate establishment of such an office can expedite the registration process. c) Mohtasib is supposed to address the complaints and grievances of citizens beyond the legal and judicial structure available. This institution is vital to the popularity and success of a local government system but unfortunately, no appointment of the Zilla Mohtasib has yet been made in the district. It will be a substantive support to the new system if the office of Mohtasib is physically conceived. B. Operational arrangements It is said that good decisions and professional plans end up in dust if they are not properly managed at the operational levels. The problem is that planning is limited to those aspects of any project about which facts and figures are available, while several operational details cannot even be perceived before their real happening. So a 135 mismatch between the plans and operational arrangements, functions and procedures is a universal threat to the success of any project including local government initiatives. The operational problems also refer to the availability, accessibility of resources, commitment of the workforce (government officers and people representatives) and the cooperation of general public if required for a project, as is the case of local government projects. It is quite obvious from the research findings that resources are available and can even be generated but the bottlenecks are “de- motivated government officers” and “self-oriented representative” who are responsible for the operational degradation of the several local government projects. There is a need to take practical measures in redressing the operational problems at different levels of operation. 1. Popular participation Despite elaborate mechanism, the participation, particularly of the less privileged class is very limited. It is due to the unawareness of people about their rights, duties and roles in running the new system. Followings steps are suggested to enhance awareness amongst the general public: a) Holding monthly meetings in the office of union council are neither appropriate nor effective to motivate the people, especially the less privileged class. It is therefore, recommended that frequent open public forum meetings should be held in every village/ mohallah to inform and motivate the people for participation. Furthermore, public debates and discussions at village/mohallah level on different issues will also be helpful to increase their acquaintance level. This can be managed by the councilors or by the local NGOs. b) The government must utilize the print and electronic media, especially radio and local cable network to telecast speeches, debates and discussions by renowned scholars, educationists etc., to educate the people. c) Primary education can be made compulsory and free particularly for the villagers. Special informal evening education programs should be started to 136 educate the rural adults. Special training programs should be managed to train the villagers to participate and monitor the ongoing schemes. The role of local NGOs will be very helpful in achieving this objective. d) Only consultation of the people on various decisions is not an appropriate and effective strategy. They can be allowed to play decisive role in the decision making process. It is therefore suggested that local representatives should willingly place issues before the people to discuss and decide. The local representatives should follow the decisions taken by the majority of people. 2. Accountability Accountability is the commitment of an officer to his duties with the clear-cut understanding and acceptance of reward or punishment according to his performance. But all this is possible only if the mechanism for implementing accountability criteria is in place and functional. This research comes up with very lower score on the accountability aspect of the officers and elected representatives. Several reasons can be attributed to this problem however; non-functioning monitoring committees, limited people participation and poor system of checks & balances are the most important. Following recommendations are forwarded in this regard: a) Politicians have limited control over the government officials, for example, they have the power to write their ACRs but this has proved ineffective. Thus, it is recommended that the politicians should be empowered to have greater authority on the job and services of the officials to ensure their presence in the sessions of the councils. It will help making monitoring committees functional to get access to official records and acquire full cooperation of the officials in enquiries and investigations. b) Though vote buying and vote bargaining are critical elements of urban governance (Davas et al., 2001), elected representatives are most clearly held accountable through the election process. It is therefore recommended that free, fair and regularly scheduled elections should be held to improve accountability 137 of local representatives to citizens. There should be public meetings of the elected representatives where there are open discussions on policy issues like, the proposed budget and then the opinions of the local population concerning their wants, needs, and concerns should be listened, as well as there need to more formal surveys of public opinion. The officials must be transparent because unless information is available to constituents, they cannot participate effectively. c) For holding local governments accountable to the centre it is recommended that the system of external audit and public accounts committees must be made properly functional. Incentives can be used to combat corruption through district scrutiny of accounts and, as Mutebi (1999) found in Rakai district, Uganda, salaries might be withheld when discrepancies are found. Local governments must meet minimal standards, such as ensuring standard financial practices otherwise, funds should not be released. 3. Transparency The study found limited transparency in the operations of local Governments. It is due to many reasons. However, limited access to information is the most crucial. Despite declaring the citizen’s right to information, the government offices responsible to provide and display information are falling short of it. Both the political and administrative heads are not ready to share information with the people rather prefer to maintain secrecy to hide their irregularities. For transparent decision making following steps are recommended. a) Openness: Open decision-making environment can be promoted. All-important policies/decisions can be made in the presence of people’s representatives, journalists and representatives of local NGOs so that they can inform the general public about the proceedings. b) Proper display and provision of information: Local governments should display or report public information, such as weekly posting of budgets in local papers and/or on notice board in the local government building. If the decisions about budgets, programs and spending are publicly posted, people will get the 138 opportunity to evaluate the performance of local government. Thus, it is recommended that requested information should be available to public and it must be free of cost. 4. Public service delivery It is said that if end is good then all is good. If public service delivery is according to the public’s expectations, then many of the systems weaknesses can be accommodated. The reported Poor public service delivery is alarming in the sense that it dissatisfies the public in toto. There are multiple causes to this effect but poor system of monitoring is identified as the most crucial. To improve the system, following steps are suggested: - a) Vigilance Committees. Vigilance committees can be manned with honest, educated and dedicated people. These committees will monitor the on-going schemes; check the quantity and quality of material used and, in case of any fraud, report to the concerned authorities for necessary action that must follow these recommendations by taking prompt action against the reported maladies. b) Proper monitoring system: Monitoring committees are formed in the district but majority of them are non-functional. It is therefore recommended that the monitoring committees be made powerful to have an access to the official records to pinpoint any irregularities in the allocation and utilization of funds. The committee should be powerful to fix damages in case of fraud and embezzlement and thereby recommend actions to the concerned authorities. In case of non-compliance of the concerned authorities the cases should be referred to the ordinary courts and/or to the NAB for further necessary action. c) Effective internal audit: The system of internal audit is working, but it is too poor to block corrupt practices. It is therefore recommended that the internal audit system should properly be enforced. The internal auditors can visit the location to validate the utilization of funds rather than relying only on the verbal/written formalities. 139 5. Good Governance The satisfaction of general public is the indicator of good governance but the findings of this study provide otherwise evidence. There are many reasons to this, however, lack of capacity and non-cooperation of bureaucrats are the most crucial. To overcome such deficiencies following steps will be helpful: a) Capacity building: Despite the efforts to develop the required capacities amongst the politicians and the bureaucrats, the results are still far from being sufficient and effective. There is a need for more targeted efforts including on- job training about the possible job-challenges and the required capacities to handle them properly. This can be more effective if handed over to local NGOs. b) Change in Attitude: Since the new system of local government has deprived the bureaucrats from many of their powers therefore, they are reluctant to accept it. However, change in attitudes is indispensable for creating cooperative work environment with the local politicians. Though, it is challenging however, ethical orientations and effective training programs can be helpful. c) Rule of law: The prevailing inequalities are major concerns in the developing societies. The execution of ‘rule of law’ is the only way-out to offset existing disparities. It requires a strong judiciary and further reformations in the policing system. 6. Prospects of the system: The study shows that most of the respondents are neither confident nor frustrated about the future of the system. Such a mixed attitude can be attributed to the poor track record of democracy in the country, absence of full constitutional guarantee, political support and lack of popular participation. Given this, the prospects of system can be enhanced with the following steps: a) Constitutional coverage: Though government has given constitutional coverage to local governments under 17th amendment for a period of 7 years up to 2009, but this is not sufficient. It is therefore recommended that the local government 140 should permanently be made a part of the constitution through amendment in the constitution of 1973. b) Political support: Massive political support is possible only if power is distributed at the grass root levels but all this can happen by establishing real democratic environment. It is therefore, suggested that power should be devolved from centre to province and downwards. 8.4. Implications 1. Knowledge Implications The collection of primary data through self-administered questionnaires and backup interviews provided an opportunity to not only interact with government officials, representatives and general public but also discuss with them different dimensions of the devolution plan. These discussions with target population were helpful in getting useful information about the contents of the new system, its intensions and purposes thereby increasing their understanding of the system. Thus the respondents of this research are now discussing the problems in a broader and deeper perspective. Moreover, it created awareness amongst the general public and local representatives (especially the illiterates in rural areas) about their roles and responsibilities in the successful implementation of the devolution plan. In addition, findings of the study contribute to enhancing knowledge and understanding of the readers about the ground realities of the system. It is also an addition to the literature on local government in Asia; a region where research, in general, and empirical research in particular, is limited. 2. Practical Implications This is ever first study of its kind, as no such empirical study has ever been conducted in the region before therefore, the findings are worth mentioning. The study provides a comprehensive view of the theoretical and practical aspects of the devolution plan, so one can fairly identify the gap between theory and practice. 141 Moreover, the findings are expected to help the readers assess the impacts of demographics on the research variables as well as know, which one of them is the most critical? In addition, since data was collected with great care and efforts were made to authenticate the data in identifying weaknesses of the system and highlight reasons of limited participation, transparency and public service delivery, the findings of the study can guide the district management to take appropriate measures and overcome this weakness and thereby contribute to the success of the system. 3. Research Implications Given the newness of the project, findings of the study will provide useful guideline to the future researchers for further research to explore new areas. Future research is needed to replicate this study in other areas of the country in an effort to construct a more general set of empirical measure to indicate real future prospects of the system. Moreover, measures could be used to investigate the relationship between Federal, Provincial and Local governments or the relationship between three tiers of the local government. In addition, future research should be conducted to investigate how the proposed measures can be used to 1) design and analyze more effective devolution plan, and 2) whether the proposed empirical measures can be aggregated and used in comparative studies related to the application of devolution plan. 4. Future implications Since it is argued in the study that greater the popular participation, transparency and public service delivery the greater the future prospects of the system and vice versa, but data shows limited participation, transparency and poor service delivery and thus limited future prospects of the system. However, despite such observations it is hoped that the scenario will change very soon, as the main stakeholders are showing their increased interest in the system for example; the large contesting candidates with high voters turn over in the local bodies’ election 2005 as compared to election 2001. Furthermore, it is argued that if appropriate and timely steps are taken to overcome weaknesses highlighted by this study, it will work for a longer time. 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(2002), ‘Rural Development’: An assessment of Participatory Rural Development Approaches, A case study of Pak German IRDP, SRSC and AKRSP in Mardan, Kohat and Northern Areas of Pakistan’, PhD thesis Institute of Management Studies, University of Peshawar. Zia-ud-din. (2004), ‘Development without Empowerment: the Case of Pakistan, the Print man, Peshawar Cantt. 162 Appendices 1. Annexure “A” Questionnaire QUESTIONNAIRE FOR GENERAL PUBLIC The prospects of New Local Government System (A case study of District Government Dera Ismail Khan) Personal Information Name: Gender: Male Female Qualification: Profession: Income: Union council: Address: Popular Participation Did you cast vote in the last local bodies election? Yes No Has the Village/Neighborhood council been constituted in your council? Yes No Has the CCB been constituted in your union council? Yes No Did you ever contribute to the CCB? Yes No Has the CCB been constituted properly? Have the Monitoring Committees been constituted in your union council? Yes No Are you satisfied with the performance of CCB in your union council? Yes No Please tick () your choices Not at all To some extant To great extent a. The city community board has initiated/completed projects on self-help basis. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The people worked personally or provided material support to the contractor for the development/non-developmental work of your union council. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The people supervise/monitor the development works in your street/mohalla/village. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The representatives consult the people at the identification of local needs/problems. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 163 e. The union representatives involve the people in the relief activities in natural calamities. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The union representatives discuss the tax proposals with the people. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The elected local members are rightly representing you at union / Tehsil / Zalli council. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. The local representatives invite the people to check the quality of work and report. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. You complained about the fraud/embezzlement of the union representatives to zilla/Tehsil Nazim and the actions were taken. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. No arrangement has been made to develop awareness amongst the people Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree k. The illiteracy and the poverty of people are the main causes of non participation Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree l. The sardars/jagirdars avoid people participation and work for their interest Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Accountability Yes No 1. Did you ever visit the office of union/Tehsil and Zilla council? 2. Did you ever visit the office of Tehsil Nazim or District Nazim? Yes No 3. Did you ever demand public information? Yes No 4. If yes, did you get the required information? Not at all To some extent To great extent 5. Please tick () your choices a. The union representatives regularly meet and inform the people about the proceeding of the union council. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. They inform the people about the sanctioned schemes for your union council. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 164 c. They provide the details of developmental/non-developmental expenditure. [ Strongly agree I Agree Neutral I Disagree I Strongly disagree ] d. The secretariat of District Nazim/Tehsil Nazim displays public information for the information of general public. [ Strongly agree I Agree Neutral I Disagree I Strongly disagree ] e. The Union Nazim/Union Naib Nazim ensured proper distribution of zakat and supporting funds to the deserved people. [ Strongly agree I Agree Neutral I Disagree I Strongly disagree ] f. People can freely obtain any public information from any office of district govt. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. People keep regular vigilance over the activities of representatives [ Strongly agree I Agree Neutral I Disagree I Strongly disagree ] h. People identify the irregularities of representatives and report to the higher authorities Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. TMAs continuously monitor the activities of union administration. Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. The district government is maintaining proper checks and balances over TMAs. [ Strongly agree I Agree Neutral I Disagree I Strongly disagree ] k. The local government commission and public accounts committees are monitoring the activities of district government. [ Strongly agree I Agree Neutral I Disagree I Strongly disagree ] l. Lack of proper implementation of the system is causing non-transparency. [ Strongly agree I Agree Neutral I Disagree I Strongly disagree ] m. Poor system of checks & balances, auditing, and monitoring is responsible for non- transparency. [ Strongly agree I Agree Neutral I Disagree I Strongly disagree ] n. The district government is intentionally maintaining the secrecy to hide its irregularities [ Strongly agree I Agree Neutral I Disagree I Strongly disagree ] Better Service Delivery Please tick () your choices. a. The district government is working for the establishment of primary schools in your council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The government has established middle schools or upgraded primary schools. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The government has established high schools or upgraded middle schools Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 165 d. The government has established basic health unit in your council Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The government has established any hospital in your council Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The government is providing mobile health facilities Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The TMA staff daily cleans the streets, roads and bazaars. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. The government is repairing the roads and streets of the whole district. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. TMAs are working on the provision of clean drinking water for the people of rural areas. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. TMAs are ensuring the provision of commodities of basis necessities at controlled prices. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree k. The government is working for the provision of recreation facilities in every union council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree l. The district government is working for the improvement of drainage system Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree m. The government is working for the improvement of housing and sanitation. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree n. The govt. is establishing small-scale industries to provide employment opportunities. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree o. The political rift b/t the TMAs and district government is creating hindrances in the provision of better service delivery to the people. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree p. The representative’s involvement in corruption is causing poor service delivery. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree q. Poor system of checks & balances, monitoring & control are the main causes of bad service delivery Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Good governance Please tick () your choices. a. The new system is more representative and friendly in character. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The new system has a clear line of authority for every one. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The system is observing rule of law for every one irrespective of his status, position and post. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The system is ensuring equal distribution of funds to every village/ward. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 166 e. The public safety commission and police is playing important role in the maintenance of Law and order in the district. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The new system is providing speedy and cheep justice to the people. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The district government is continuously monitoring the administrative system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. The elected local government has full support of the public. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. The representative govt. failed to maintain good governance at local level due to week administration. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. The bureaucratic non-cooperation is the main cause of bad governance. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree k. The excessive involvement of the local politicians in corruption and mal- administration is the main cause of bad governance. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Political environment Please tick () your choices a. The local politicians have political experience to run the affairs of the district government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The local government has full support of all the local political parties. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. There is a good working relationship between the members of National/Provincial assemblies and the members of district / Tehsil / union council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. There is a working relationship between the three tires of district government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Government Please tick () your choices a. The district government is empowered to initiate any kind of action independently. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The Central & Provincial governments have limited interference in the affairs of district govt. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. There is a good working relationship between the district, provincial & central govt. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The district government has full support of provincial/Central government Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Understanding of the new system Please tick () your choices a. The people know the details of the new local government system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The people are well aware about the features of the new local government system. 167 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The district government has made proper arrangements to develop awareness among the general public about the new local government system Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The people are satisfied with the current administrative structure at district level. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The new local government system is working for the welfare of the people. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Capabilities of Local Representatives a. The representatives are cable enough to perform their functions Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The local representatives were provided pre-service training to get orientation with the system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The govt. is providing in-service training to the representatives Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. There is Cooperation between representatives and govt. officials Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The officials are satisfied with the current administrative setup at district level Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The officials are cooperative with the representatives in the exercise of authority Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The officials follow the instructions of the representatives Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. There is better coordination between the officials and the representatives Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Prospects Please tick () your choices. a. The present system of district government is a best replacement of the previous system of district administration. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The new system ensures the proper devolution of power at gross routes level. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The elected local representatives are better solving the local problems. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The new system has brighter prospects. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The new system has no political support; hence its survival is a question mark. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The new system will be winded up with the end of the present military regime. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 168 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ELECTED LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES The prospects of the New Local Government System (A case study of District Government Dera Ismail Khan) Personal Information Name: Gender: Male Female Membership: Village Neighborhood City community Union Tehsil Zilla council council board council Council council Quota: General Female Peasants $ Minorities seats workers Qualification: Income: Union council: Address: Popular participation Did you cast vote in the last local bodies election? Yes No Has the Village/Neighborhood council been constituted in your union council? Yes No Has the CCB been constituted in your union council? Yes No Has the CCB been constituted properly? Yes No Did the people contribute towards the CCBs? Yes No Have the monitoring committees been constituted in the union council? Are you satisfied with the performance of CCB in your council? Yes No Not at all To some extant To great extent Please tick () your choices. a. The city community board has initiated/completed projects on self-help basis. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The people work personally or provide material support to the contractor for the development/non-developmental work of your union council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The people supervise/monitor the development works. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The councilors consult the people at the identification of local needs and problems. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The councilors involve the people in relief activities in natural clamaties. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The union representatives discuss the tax proposals with the people of the union council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The union representatives are rightly representing the people at union/tehsil/zalli council. 169 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. The union representatives invited the people to check the quality of work and report. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. The people complain about your fraud/embezzlement to zilla/Tehsil Nazim. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. No arrangement has been made to develop awareness amongst the people Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree k. The illiteracy and the poverty of people are the main cause of non participation Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree l. The sardars/jagirdars avoid people participation and work for their interest Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Accountability Do the people visit the office of union / tehsil and zilla council? Yes No Do the people visit the office of tehsil / zilla Nazim? Yes No Do the people demand information? Yes No If yes, do they get the required information? Not at all To some extant To great extent Please tick () your choices. a. The union representatives meet & inform people about the proceedings of the union council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The union representatives informe the people about the schemes for their union council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The councilors provided them the details of developmental/non-developmental expenditure. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The secretariat of union, Tehsil and District councils display public information. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The Union Nazims properly distributes the Zakat and other funds to the needy people. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The people can freely obtain information from any office of district government Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. People keep proper vigilance over the activities of union representatives Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. People identify the irregularities of representatives and report to the higher authorities. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. The TMA is continuously monitoring the activities of union administration. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. The district government is maintaining proper checks and balances over TMAs. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 170 k. The public account committees are monitoring the activities of district government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree l. Lack of proper implementation of the system is causing non-transparency. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree m. Poor system of checks and balances, auditing, and monitoring is responsible for non- transparency of the system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree n. The district government is intentionally maintaining the secrecy to hide its irregularities Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Better service delivery Please tick () your choices. a. The district government is working for the establishment of primary schools in your council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The government has established middle schools or upgraded primary schools. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The government has established high schools or upgraded middle schools Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The government has established basic health unit in your council Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The government has established any hospital in your council Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The government is providing mobile health facilities Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The TMA staff daily cleans the streets, roads and bazaars in urban areas. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. The elected government is repairing the roads and streets of the whole district. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. TMAs are working on the provision of clean drinking water for the people of rural areas. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. The district government is working for the improvement of drainage system Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree k. TMAs are ensuring the provision of commodities of basis necessities at controlled prices. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree l. The government is working for the improvement of housing and sanitation Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree m. The government is working for the provision of recreation facilities in every union council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree n. The government is establishing small-scale industries to provide employment opportunities. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree o. The political rift between the TMAs and district government is creating hindrances in the provision of better service delivery to the people. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree p. The representative’s involvement in corruption is causing poor service delivery. 171 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree q. Poor system of checks & balances, monitoring & control are the main causes of bad service delivery. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Good governance Please tick () your choices. a. The new system is more representative and friendly in character. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The new system has a clear line of authority for every one. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The district government is maintaining rule of law for every one. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The present structure ensures equal distribution of funds for every village/ward. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The public safety commission and the police is playing important role in maintaining law and order. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The new system is providing speedy and cheep justice to every one. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The district government is continuously monitoring the administrative setup. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. The elected local government has full support of the general public. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. The representative government failed to maintain good governance at local level due to week administration. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. The bureaucratic non-cooperation is the main cause of bad governance. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree k. The excessive involvement of the local politicians in corruption and mal- administration is the main cause of bad governance. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Political environment Please tick () your choices a. The local politicians have political experience to run the affairs of the district government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The local governments have full support of all local political parties. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. There is a good working relationship between the members of National/Provincial assemblies and the members of district/Tehsil/union council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. There is a good working relationship between the district, provincial and central government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 172 Government Please tick () your choices. a. The district government is empowered to initiate any kind of action independently. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The Central/ Provincial governments have limited interference in the affairs of district govt. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. There is a good working relationship between the district, provincial & central govt. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The central/provincial government is fully supporting the district government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Understanding of the new system Please tick () your choices a. The local representatives know the details of the new local government system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The local representatives are well aware about the features of the new system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The government has made arrangements to develop awareness among the local representatives. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The local representatives are well aware about their role in the respective local body. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The local representatives better know the duties and responsibilities. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Capacity of the local representatives Please tick () your choices a. The local representatives are capable enough to perform their functions Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The local representatives were provided pre-service training to get orientation. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The government is providing periodic in-service training to the local representatives to update their knowledge and skill. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The NRB is providing comprehensive training to the local representatives. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Cooperation between the official and political heads Please tick () your choices a. The official heads are satisfied with the current administrative set up. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The officials are cooperating with the political heads in the exercise of administrative authority. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The official heads always follow the instructions and guidance of the political heads. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. There is an ideal coordination between the official and political heads. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 173 Prospects Please tick () your choices. a. The present system of district government is a best replacement of the previous system of district administration. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The new system properly has completely devolved the powers at gross routes level. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The elected local government is free from the external control to work at grass route levels. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The new system has a lot of structural deficiencies. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. Due to opposition of the politicians the survival of the new system is difficult. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The new system of local government will be wind up with the end of present Military regime. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 174 QUESTIONNAIRE NO 3 FOR THE GOVERNMENT SERVANTS The prospects of the New Local Government System (A Case Stusy of District Government Dera Ismail Khan) Personal information Name: Gender: Male Female Designation: Department: Accountability Do the people visit your Offices? Yes No Do the people demand information? Yes No If yes, do they get the required information Not at all To some extant To great extent Please tick () your choices. a. The official heads informs the People/representatives about its policies and strategies. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. They provide the details of the developmental/non-developmental expenditure to the people/ representatives. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. All the departments of the district government provide the details of the routine matters. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. All the departments of the district government display public information. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The people/ representatives can easily get the required information form any department. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The TMA is continuously monitoring the activities of the union administration. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The District govt. is maintaining proper checks & balance over TMAs. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. The provincial government is maintaining check over the district government through local government commission and public account committees. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. Lack of proper implementation of the system is causing non-transparency. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. Poor system of checks and balances, auditing, and monitoring are responsible for non- transparency of the system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree k. The district government is intentionally maintaining the secrecy to hide its irregularities Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Better service delivery Please tick () your choices. a. The district government is working for the establishment of primary schools in the district. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 175 b. The government has established middle schools or upgraded primary schools. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The government has established high schools or upgraded middle schools Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The government has established basic health unit in your council Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The government has established any hospital in your council Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The government is providing mobile health facility Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The TMAs staff daily cleans the streets, roads and bazaars in urban areas. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. The elected government repaired the roads and streets of the whole district. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. TMAs are working on the provision of clean drinking water for the people of rural areas. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. The district government is working for the improvement of drainage system Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree k. TMAs are ensuring the provision of commodities of basis necessities at controlled prices. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree l. The government is working for the improvement of housing and sanitation Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree m. The government is working for the provision of recreation facilities in every union council. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree n. The government is establishing small-scale industries to provide employment opportunities The local government have initiated relief package to help the poor. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree o. The political rift between the TMAs and district government is creating hindrances in the provision of better service delivery to the people. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree p. The representative’s involvement in corruption is causing poor service delivery. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree q. Poor system of checks & balances, monitoring & control are the main causes of bad service delivery. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Good governance Please tick () your choices. a. The present system of local government is more representative and friendly in character than the previous ones. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The new system with clear line of authority is better managing the local affairs. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The new setup of district government is maintaining rule of law for every one. 176 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The present structure of district government gives equal weight to every village//ward. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The public safety commission is playing important role in the maintenance of law and order in the district. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The new system of local government is providing speedy and cheep justice. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The district government is ensuring proper checks and balances over the action/activities of the whole administrative setup through continuous monitoring. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree h. The representative government failed to maintain good governance at local level due to week administration. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree i. The bureaucratic non-cooperation is the main cause of bad governance. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree j. The excessive involvement of the local politicians in corruption and mal- administration is the main cause of bad governance. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Government Please tick () your choices. a. The district government is empowered to initiate any kind of action independently. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The Central and Provincial governments have only limited interference in the affairs of district government Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. There is a good working relationship between the district, provincial & central govt. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The district government always gets in time aids and help of the provincial/Central government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Understanding of the new system Please tick () your choices. a. The official heads know the details of the new local government system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The official heads are well aware about the features of the new local government system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The district government has made proper arrangements to develop awareness among the officials about the new local government system. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The official heads are satisfied with the current administrative structure at district level. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The new local government system is working well for the welfare of the people. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 177 Cooperation between the official and political heads Please tick () your choices. a. The official heads are satisfied with the current administrative structure of the district government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The official heads cooperates with the political heads in the exercise of administrative authority of the district government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The official heads always follows the instructions and guidance of the political heads. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. There is an ideal coordination between the official and political heads of the district government. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree Prospects Please tick () your choices. a. The present system of district government is a best replacement of the previous system of district administration. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree b. The new system properly devolved the power at gross roots level. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree c. The elected local government is better solving the local problems. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree d. The new system has brighter prospects. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree e. The new system has lot of structural deficiencies. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree f. The new system has no political support; hence its survival is a question mark. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree g. The new system of local government will be winded up with the end of present military regime. Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 178 11. Annexure “B” Descriptive Statistics a. Frequencies Table 1 Village and Neighborhood Council Table # 1 Constitution of village and neighborhood council Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Yes 39 13.9 13.9 No 241 86.1 100.0 Total 280 100.0 Table 2 CCBs Table # 2 Constitution of Citizen community board Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Yes 99 35.4 35.4 No 181 64.6 100.0 Total 280 100.0 Table 3 Contribution to CCBs Class of respondents Statement Elite Non-elite Total Responses n % n % n % People work personally or SDA 20 7.1 15 5.4 35 12.5 provide material support for DA 60 21.4 53 18.9 113 40.4 developmental work N 9 3.2 8 2.9 17 6.1 A 39 13.9 57 20.4 96 34.3 SA 3 1.1 16 5.6 19 6.7 Total 131 46.8 149 53.2 280 100.0 179 Table 4 Unawareness Table # 4 Unawareness amongst the general public Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 8 2.9 2.9 Disagree 56 20.0 22.9 Neutral 67 23.9 46.8 Agree 137 48.9 95.7 Strongly agree 12 4.3 100.0 Total 280 100.0 Table 5 Illiteracy Table # 5 Illiteracy Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 1 .4 .4 Disagree 20 7.1 7.5 Neutral 72 25.7 33.2 Agree 183 65.4 98.6 Strongly agree 4 1.4 100.0 Total 280 100.0 Table 6 poverty Table # 6 Poverty Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 5 1.8 1.8 Disagree 13 4.6 6.4 Neutral 53 18.9 25.4 Agree 106 37.9 63.2 Strongly agree 103 36.8 100.0 Total 280 100.0 180 Table 7 Representatives avoids participation Table # 7 Representatives consciously avoids people’s participation to hide irregularities Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 14 5.0 5.0 Disagree 57 20.4 25.4 Neutral 87 31.1 56.4 Agree 102 36.4 92.9 Strongly agree 20 7.1 100.0 Total 280 100.0 Table 8 Lack of proper implementation Table # 8 Lack of proper implementation is the main cause of non-transparency Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 10 3.0 3.0 Disagree 32 9.5 12.5 Neutral 54 16.1 28.6 Agree 198 58.9 87.5 Strongly agree 42 12.5 100.0 Total 336 100.0 Table 9 Poor system of checks and balances Table # 9 Poor system of checks and balances, auditing and monitoring is responsible for non- transparency Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 2 .6 .6 Disagree 34 10.1 10.7 Neutral 63 18.8 29.5 Agree 196 58.3 87.8 Strongly agree 41 12.2 100.0 Total 336 100.0 181 Table 10 provisions of necessities at control prices Table # 10 TMAs are ensuring the provision of basic necessities at control prices Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 43 12.8 12.8 Disagree 198 58.9 71.7 Neutral 53 15.8 87.5 Agree 40 11.9 99.4 Strongly agree 2 .6 100.0 Total 336 100.0 Table 11 Political rift between tehsil and district government Table # 11 Political rift between Tehsil governments and district government is creating hurdles in the provision of better public service delivery Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 1 .3 .3 Disagree 43 12.8 13.1 Neutral 61 18.2 31.3 Agree 183 54.5 85.7 Strongly agree 48 14.3 100.0 Total 336 100.0 Table 12 Involvement in corruption Table # 12 The representatives involvement in corruption is causing poor service delivery Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 6 1.8 1.8 Disagree 60 17.9 19.6 Neutral 60 17.9 37.5 Agree 170 50.6 88.1 Strongly agree 40 11.9 100.0 Total 336 100.0 182 Table 13 Weak administration Table # 13 Bad governance is due to weak administration Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 4 1.2 1.2 Disagree 59 17.6 18.8 Neutral 63 18.8 37.5 Agree 155 46.1 83.6 Strongly agree 55 16.4 100.0 Total 336 100.0 Table 14 Bureaucratic non-cooperation Table # 14 Bureaucratic non-cooperation is the main cause of bad governance Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 5 1.5 1.5 Disagree 59 17.6 19.0 Neutral 49 14.6 33.6 Agree 175 52.1 85.7 Strongly agree 48 14.3 100.0 Total 336 100.0 Table 15 Involvement in corruption Table # 15 Excessive involvement in corruption of the local politicians is the main cause of bad governance Responses Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent Strongly disagree 2 .6 .6 Disagree 68 20.2 20.8 Neutral 58 17.3 38.1 Agree 152 45.2 83.3 Strongly agree 56 16.7 100.0 Total 336 100.0 183 b. Central Tendencies and Dispersions Table 16 Reasons of non-participation Statement n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Unawareness 280 1 5 3.32 .937 Illiteracy 280 1 5 3.30 .659 Poverty 280 1 5 3.20 1.008 Avoidance of Jagirdars 280 1 5 4.03 .952 Avoidance of representatives 280 1 5 3.20 1.008 Table 17 Reasons of non-transparency Statement n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Lack of implementation 336 1 5 3.68 .915 Poor system of checks and 336 1 5 3.71 .830 balance Political rift between TMA and 336 1 5 3.70 .879 district government Table 18 Reasons of poor service delivery Statement n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Political rift between TMA and 336 1 5 3.70 .879 district government Involvement in corruption 336 1 5 3.53 .977 Table 19 Reasons of poor governance Statement n Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Bad governance 336 1 5 3.59 .997 Bureaucratic non-cooperation 336 1 5 3.60 .984 Involvement in corruption 336 1 5 3.57 1.011 184 111. Annexure “C” District Profile Table 1 Map of the District iSNAIL Kl IHN K l KIL'l L1 { bU uri i_I _ .p1- --- . i I.TJ L \ W pi ?/ h T ffl i j i n r. b . _ , * -- hi ' - / .ÿ r _ ' -L + l v v -f \ 1 rsT- M \ K H 4nr 4 . LI lb \ > "m ! .. . H i. .- T Source: Dera Ismail Khan District Map. 1st Edition1988, published by Survey of Pakistan 185 1. General description of the District 1.1 Geography: Name, Location, Boundaries and Area In 1469, Sultan Hussain, the Governor of Multan, made Sohrab Khan, the Baloch chief, the charge of Indus Frontier, who ultimately founded the towns of Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Fateh Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan and named them on the names of his three sons (Ismail Khan, Fateh khan and Ghazi Khan) respectively. According to another source, Ismail Khan himself founded it. Dera Ismail Khan is the southern most district of NWFP lying between north latitude 30 36 and 32 33 and east longitude 70 14 and 72 27. It consists of a long block of country stretching from the foot of the Suleiman across the Indus into the Thal. It is bounded on the north by the Lakki Marwat and Bannu districts, on the south by the district Dera Ghazi Khan of the Punjab Province, on the east by Bhakkar and Mainwali districts of Punjab Province, and on the west by Tribal Area adjoining Dera Ismail Khan district (Shirani), South Waziristan Agency, Tank district and by independent territory of the Koh-e-Suleimans. It is divided in to five Tehsils i.e., Dera Ismail Khan, Kulachi, Paharpur, Daraban Kalan and Paroa. 1.2 Physical Features/ Topography Dera Ismail Khan District has dry alluvial plain commonly referred to “Daman”. The only hills, with in the district, are those of Khasor Range which lies in the northeastern part of the district. The khasor Range is also known as the Ratta Koh or Koh-e-Surkh, meaning the red mountain. It runs close to the Indus River in the northeast to the southwest direction. Parallel to the Khasor Range along the boarder of Dera Ismail Khan and Lakki Marwat districts, is the Marwat Range, which runs up to the Pazu pass in the northwest. The highest point in Khasor Range is 1046 meters above sea level while the highest point of Marwat Range is 1376 meters. 1.3 Rivers and Streams Dera Ismail Khan District’s western boundary is surrounded by the mountains and hills of South Waziristan Agency and Tribal Area adjoining Dera Ismail Khan 186 District. The western part of the plain is, therefore, drained by a large number of streams and hill torrents. For greater part of the year they remain dry. After the rain, the hills torrents spread the alluvial soil, which is predominantly clay. After continuous rain, it becomes soft and tenacious mud. The plain extends down into Dera Ismail Khan District of the Punjab province that is known as “Derajat”. The Indus River flows along the eastern boundary of the district. The old Paharpur canal gets regular water from river Indus. Additional water supply has been provided by the Chashma Right Bank Canal (CRBC). The prominent streams, flowing within the district are Gomal, Luni, Gajestan, Sawan, and Gudh in the west and Paniyala in the north. They have little perennial flow so none of these reaches the Indus River except when there is flood. 1.4 Climate The summer season is dry and hot. Temperature begins to rise from April and the month of May, June, July and August are extremely hot. The June and July are the holiest months during which the maximum temperature is recorded around 50 c. In May and June the humidity is very low. The area is under periodic dust storms. The hot wind known as “Loo” blow across the district. The cool waves start somewhat in October. December, January and February, which are the cold months. The date palm trees are found in abundance in Paharpur, Paniyala and Musazai circles. The Dhakki date variety is one of the finest and most popular variety. Mangoes are grown in Paniyala and Musazai areas since long. The major corps of the district is wheat, grams, barley, tara mira, rap seed, jowar and millet in the Rod Kohi/Barrani areas. Rice and sugarcane cultivation has increased during the last three decades. Melon, the most famous crop of the Daman in general and Kulachi lands in particular have over the years suffered by melon fly attacks. 187 2. History, Tribes and Culture 2.1 History Nothing is known of the early history of the district. The Daman, if left to the state of nature, would be a desert; the state of the Thal without wells would be even worse, and probability in early historic times nearly the whole district was a barren waste. Alexander the Great, sailed down the Jhelum to its junction with the Indus. His land forces marched in two bodies on either side of the river. The District has been settled by a double immigration from opposite directions; an immigration of Jats and Balochs up the valley of the Indus from the south, and of Pawanda and Pathans from the northwest. Before the fifteenth century the lower portion of the district was probably occupied by a few scattered tribes of Jats, depending on their cattle for substance. The valley of Indus was a dense jungle, swarming with pig and hog-deer, and frequented by numerous tigers; while the Thal and Daman must have almost unoccupied. All the traditions of the people go to show that an immigration of mixed tribes of Jats set in about the beginning of 15th century, from the Multan and Bhawalpur direction. They gradually passed up the valley of Indus to the Mianwali tehsil, occupying the intervening country. Most of their villages would have been located on the edge of the Thal and the portion of the immigrants probably crossed the river and settled along its right bank. After these came the Baloch. They also came from the south, but in large bands under recognized leaders. They appear to have taken military rather than proprietary possession of the country. They were the ruling caste, and served under their chiefs in the perpetual little wars that were then going on in any direction. The archeological settlements of the Kafir Kot Fort and Temple tell the tale of Hindu Shahi domination. Then Muslim-Pashtun tribes migrated from the Suleiman Range in 12th and 13th centuries. The Lodhi tribes of Frangi, Suri, Sarwani were the first settlers. The Lohani tribes whose sub branches Dualat Khel, Marwat and Mainkhel got settled in Daman. 188 In the beginning of 17th century Kati Khel branch of Daulat Khel settled in Tank under Khan Zaman Khan, who managed to push Marwat further north to the desert area of Lakki. In 1467 Hussain Shah, the ruler of Multan gave this area to a Baloch Chief, Sohrab Khan, who established posts and forts to guard against raiders from the west. The town of Dera Ismail Khan was founded on the name of his son Ismail Khan somewhere in the beginning of 16th century. In the end of 18th century the area went under the direct rule of Ahmad Shah Abdali, whose son Taimur Shah gave the Nawabi of Dera Ismail Khan to the Sadozai Chief Nawab Muhammad Khan, a cousin of the ruler of Multan Nawab Muzaffar Khan Saddozai. The Sikhs took it over in 1836 just before the death of Ranjit Singh and appointed their own Governor here. In 1847-48, the first British officer Sir Herbert Edwards visited the area. He was then the additional Resident at Lahore. After the second Sikh war in 1849 the British like the rest of Punjab too annexed this district. In the beginning, the Bannu district was a part of Dera Ismail Khan District but latter in 1861 Bannu was separated from the Dera Ismail Khan district. The Dera Ismail Khan district from 1861 to 1901 had five tehsils i.e. Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Kulachi, Bahkkar and Lieya. Dera Ismail Khan was also made the divisional headquarter in 1861 and remained as such till the formation of NWFP as a separate province in November 1901. The Vahova circle of Dera Ghazi Khan was also till then the part of Kulachi sub-division of the Dera Ismail Khan district. In 1901, when NWFP was created, the areas of Bhakkar, Lieya and Vahova circle of Dera Ghazi Khan was separated and given to Punjab. The Dera Ismail Khan district since then had been having three tehsil i.e. Dera Ismail Khan, Tank and Kulachi till recently, wherein 1992 Tank was upgraded to the status of district and Paharpur, Daraban and Paroa to a tehsil in 1995, 2005 respectively. 189 2.2 Tribes The Dera Ismail khan has in addition to the pathans tribes of Koh-e-Surkh, a large mixed population of Baloch and Jat tribes who had migrated here from south areas. Dera Ismail Khan City has a large number of families referred to in the earlier documents as Mootani-pathans; these are Alizais, Saddozais, Khawjakzais, Khakwanis and Barakzais. After partition over 8000 refugees from India mostly of Rajputs were settled in Dera Ismail Khan. 2.3 Culture, Customs and Traditions Religion dominates cultural pattern of the people of the district. The population of the district is almost Muslims. Spiritual leaders have a great influence over public particularly over illiterates. The people also believe much in the power of these leaders. The pathans generally are very strict in observing prayers, keeping fast and performing other religious duties. The Jats and Balochs, though religious minded are not as strict as the Pathans. Being descendants of the warriors, the people of the area feel pleasure in hunting, shooting, riding and such other games, Horse breeding is common in villages. Fishing by nets is a common practice in the district. Kabaddi, douda, wrestling and tent pegging are the farourate games of the villagers. Music is popular and the people delight themselves by playing flute, thali, ghara, dhol-sharn, dholak, tabla, harmonium. However, flute is more popular. The Pathans have their own classical dances, but the other people are fond of jhumar, Dario and dharak. The Pashto songs are sung by the Pathans, but other people are found of Hindko folk songs. Eid-ul-Fitr, Eid-ul-Azha, Eid-milad-un-Nabi and Nou-roz are the usual festivals. All sects celebrate eid-milad-un-Nabi with great pomp and show. National days enthusiastically celebrated. Other festivals are Mela Bilot, Mela Shah Alam, Mela Sabir Shah and annual horse and cattle show. Inter family marriages are common in the district. Parents engage a girl at an early age, generally, on payment of money by the suitor or in exchange of the engagement of a girl in the suitor’s family 190 with a boy in the girl’s family. Among the Bhittanis, if parents of both the parties agree, then the father or guardian of the boy calls on the girl’s father along with jirga. A formal request is made and a date for Nikah and Wida ceremony is fixed. In Jats and Baloch tribe’s mutual agreement of parents of both the parties is considered sufficient for betrothals. Girls are seldom consulted 3. Demographic profile of the district The population is the mix of ethnic Balochi and Pashtoon segments, while a significant of Urdu speaking immigrants is also present. Urdu, the national language is understood and spoken by all, while Saraiki is the native language and language of the people of the district. Pashto is also spoken, but is mostly restricted to the Pashtoons only. Table 2. Percentage of population by Mother Tongue Areas Urdu Punjabi Sindi Pashto Balochi Saraiki Others All areas 3.26 0.91 0.06 22.02 0.05 72.47 1.22 Rural 0.60 0.43 0.04 23.12 0.05 74.55 1.22 Urban 18.60 3.74 0.16 15.70 0.01 60.46 1.34 Source: District Census Report 1998-D.I.Khan 3.1 Population characteristics According to 1988 Census, D.I.Khan has a population of 8, 53,000 (including 4, 48,990 male and 4, 04,005 females). Out of those only 14.75% of the population lives in urban areas, while, the rest of 85.25% of the population lives in the rural areas. Table 3. Population enumerated by the 1998 District Census Report Description 1951 1961 1972 1981 1998 Population (in Thousands) 222.90 271.89 380.23 494.43 853.00 Interval increase (percent) - 21.98 39.85 30.03 72.52 Average Annual Growth Rate - 2.01 2.93 3.23 3.26 Source: District Census Report 1998-D.I.Khan 191 3.2 Projected Population Trends The population of D.I.Khan was estimated to be 9, 83,000 in 2004, which was projected to rise to 11, 33,000 in 2011. According to the NIPS, the population of Dera Ismail Khan will increase to 13, 31,000 by 2021 if the present trends continue. The table below details these. Table 4. Population in Thousands Estimated for the years Description 1998 2001 2004 2011 2021 Population in Thousands 853 922 983 1133 1331 Interval Increase - 8.08 6.62 15.26 17.47 Source: District Census Report 1998-D.I.Khan 3.3 Population Density The total area of D.I.Khan District is 7326 Square Kilometers. This gives us a population density of 116.4 people per square kilometer area. The population density grew to 134.2 in 2004 and is projected to reach 154.65 and 181.75 by 2011 and 2021 respectively. The following table has been compiled from NIPS data and details the trends Table 5. Population destiny Areas 1998 2001 2004 2011 2021 7324 Square Kilo meters 116.4 125.85 134.2 154.65 181.70 Source: District Census Report 1998-D.I.Khan 3.4 Population Breakups D.I.Khan District has a rural leaning as 85.25% or 7, 27,188 live in rural areas versus 14.75% or 1, 25,807 who lives in urban localities. The following table details this breakup. Table 6. 1998 Census population Breakups Population Both Sexes Males Females Rural Urban 852995 448990 404005 727188 125807 Percentage 100.00 52.64 47.36 85.26 14.74 Source: District Census Report 1998-D.I.Khan 192 Table 7. Population by Tehsil-wise Tehsils Urban Rural Total D.I.Khan 92114 2,70,676 3,62,790 Paharpur 27,611 1,90,978 2,18,589 Kulachi 19,113 48,143 67,256 Daraban - 73,658 73,658 Paroa - 1,30,702 1,30,702 Total 1,38,838 7,14,157 8,52,995 Source: District Census Report 1998-D.I.Khan 3.5 Population Age Groups Age wise breakup of the population in D.I.Khan district makes clear that it has a very young population. The largest population group is under 15 years of age and comprises majority of the total population. The second largest group is only slightly older as the 15-29 year age. This means that the bulk of the total population comprises of less than 30. This trend continues as you move up in the age hierarchy. The district has only 16% of its population in the 30-40 years of age group. The smallest group at 5% is that of people over 59 years old. The following table details these facts. Table 8. Population by age groups Age Groups (in years) Total Population Both Sexes %age Male %age Female %age Under 15 398,474 46.71 2,08,484 46.43 1,89,990 47.03 15-29 207,859 24.37 107,227 23.88 100,632 24.91 30-44 131,172 15.38 70,115 15.59 61,157 15.14 45-59 63,267 8.84 41,037 9.14 34,492 8.51 60 & above 75,492 4.70 22,227 4.95 17,834 4.41 Total 852,925 100.00 4,48,990 100.00 4,04,005 100.00 Source: Pattan Development Organization 3.6 Population by Religious Beliefs A breakup of the census figure according to religious beliefs reported by the population tells that District Dera Ismail Khan is predominantly Muslim. Only 0.20% report to be Christians, while Muslims are 99.39%. Other religions and schedule 193 castes also number very few. The following table gives the details on religious affinities of people in Dera Ismail Khan. Table 9. Population by Religious Beliefs Religion All areas Rural Total Muslim 99.39 99.58 98.29 Christian 0.20 0.04 1.11 Hindu (Jati) 0.05 0.01 0.27 Qadiani/Ahmadi 0.13 0.12 0.18 Scheduled Caste 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* Others 0.22 0.24 0.14 Source: District Census Report 1998 *Refers to negligible percentage 4. Socio-economic indicators 4.1 Human Development Index National Human Development Report 2003, describes that Dera Ismail Khan Stands 69th on the HDI ranks with $912, which clearly portray the backward and poverty ridden state of the District. Table 10. Human development index Literacy Enrolment Immunization Infant Real GDP per Education Health Income HDI HDI Ranking Ratio Ratio Survival capita ($) Attainment Index Index (District wise) Ratio Index 31.2 24.2 58.8 96.3 9.12 0.289 0851 0.137 0.425 .69 Source: Pattan Development Organization 4.2. Educational Facilities Dera Ismail Khan District has 1421 Schools from pre-primary to higher secondary level for both boys and girls. However, at the high and higher secondary levels there are more schools for boys than girls. The availability of teachers however, goes with the numbers of school and hence there are more teachers up to the higher secondary standards for boys than girls. Out of the total 5,057 teachers, 3412 are male teachers, while female’s teachers are just 1645. The following table details these facts. 194 Table 11. Educational Facilities Schools Teachers School Enrolment Level Male Female Mixed Total Male Female Total Level Male Female Total Mosque 134 - 134 135 0 135 Pre- 23345 10346 33,691 primary Primary 677 421 - 1,098 1741 1076 2,817 Primary 41,751 22,686 64,437 Middle 76 29 - 105 489 207 696 Middle 12,605 6,964 19,569 High 55 19 - 74 765 299 1,064 High 5,506 3,213 8,719 Higher 8 2 - 10 282 63 345 Higher 1,246 364 1,610 Sec Sec Total 950 471 0 1,421 3,412 1,645 5,057 Total 84,453 43,573 128,026 Source: Pattan Development Organization 4.3 Health Facilities There are 74 health facility units are available in the district. Of these, 06 are major hospitals. All are located in major urban centers of the district. There are also 04 Rural Health Centre (RHC) where no beds are available for patients. Some dispensaries have the provisions for admission and the government in the district runs 24 dispensaries. There are no sub health centers, 01 TB clinic and no municipal health centers by the local government institutions. Overall the situation of health facilities is very grim in the district. The following table details these facilities. Table 12. Health Facilities Institutions Numbers Beds Number of hospitals 06 - Dispensaries 24 - Rural Health Centers 4 - Basic Health Units 39 - Sub-Health Centre - - TB Hospital 01 - MC Health Centre - - Total 74 - Source: Pattan Development Organization 195 4.4 Sources of Drinking Water Majority of the people has access to drinking water inside their houses both in the urban as well as rural areas of District Dera Ismail Khan. Hand pumps are the largest source of drinking water both in the urban as well as rural areas as the population uses these. However, villagers rely more on hand pumps than urban dwellers that have an access to piped water for almost 31% of the population. Some 70.18% people in the village and 1.29% in urban areas have to fetch water outside their own premises. Wells and pounds are used by a very small fraction of the population as source of drinking water in the district. The following table details the situation. Table 13. Sources of Drinking Water Sources of drinking water All areas Rural Urban All sources 100 100 100 Inside 63.30 58.08 95.14 Pipe (Null) 13.74 11.00 30.14 Hand Pump 49.17 46.70 64.21 Well 0.40 0.38 0.52 Out side 36.70 41.92 4.86 Pound 20.71 23.96 0.86 Others 7.18 8.14 1.29 Source: Pattan Development Organization 4.5 Sanitation Facilities The rural personality of Dera Ismail Khan manifests itself when it comes to sanitation facilities in the district. Only 33% people have an access to latrines while only 29% have bathrooms at their residential facilities. Of those only 17.01% have separate latrines while 16.77% shares these in their households. Similarly, only 13.29% of the bathrooms are separate while the whole family shares 15.67%. The situation of sanitation facilities is vary urban in its location as 89% have latrines of which 57.71% are separate and 33.72% are shared leaving only 8.58% population without any latrines facilities at their place of residence. Similarly, only 24.38% do not have bathrooms in the urban areas versus 71% in the rural areas where 66.2% do 196 not have access to latrines and go out in the fields to relieve themselves. The following table details the sanitation situation in District Dera Ismail Khan. Table 14. Sanitation Facilities Facilities All areas Rural Urban Bathrooms All 100 100 100 Separate 17.72 13.29 44.73 Shared 17.82 15.67 30.89 None 64.46 71.03 24.38 Latrines All 100 100 100 Separate 22.75 17.01 57.71 Shared 19.15 16.77 33.72 None 58.10 66.22 8.58 Source: Pattan Development Organization 4.6 Industries Limestone and gypsum are one among the numerous natural resources. The northern mountain of Sherani has the resources, which remained under explored. Lucky Cement Factory is utilizing the Sheikh Badin limestone. Other prominent industrial units are as follows: 1. Tribal Textile Mills 2. National Woolen Mills 3. Chashma Sugar Mill 4. Miren Sugar Mill Other small industrial units include 5 floor mills with 2 ghee mills working in the district. Along with this the German Wood Working Centre whose drying plant is functioning with in the premises of the district. 2.7. Transportation and Communication The Dera Ismail Khan though the southern most district of NWFP Province, was not lucky to have proper and adequate communication network. D.I.Khan has not railheads and highways to other provinces, as D.I.Khan is located at the junction of 197 three Provinces. D.I.Khan did not have direct links with Punjab and Sind till 1983. Dera-Darya Khan Bridge was opened for traffic in 1985, which connected it with Punjab and Sind. To have connection with northern Punjab, a Dera Chashma road was constructed in 1984. The PIA service was available for District, which started in 1966. 5. Political Profile Dera Ismail Khan is a southern most district of NWFP Province. The enrolment ratio is just 24.2%, and educational attainment index is 0.289, which is among the lowest in the province. Majority of the people are Sunni Muslim and have strong religious inclinations. Many Taliban have been the graduates from religious institutions run by Mulana Brothers. Apart from Mulana Brothers, Kundis, Alizais, Gandapurs, Mughdooms and Mainkhels are prominent political forces in the district. PPP has also a reasonable vote bank in district D.I.Khan as in the general election 2002, Faisal Karim Kundi of PPP from NA 24, and Dawar Kundi from NA 25 were the runner ups securing 32% and 27% of the total polled votes respectively. Faisal Karim also won from NA 18 in 1990, defeating Mulana Fazl ur Rehman. Mulana Fazl ur Rehman won both the seats from NA 24 and NA 25 in general election 2002. 5.1 National and Provincial Assemblies Elections (1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002) Table 15. Registered Voters Seat wise Breakup Seat Male Female Total NA 24 D.I.Khan 1,44,562 1,16,127 2,60,689 NA 25 DIK-Cum-Tank 89,128 71,201 1,60,329 PA 64 PK-1 49,804 41,760 91,564 PA 65PK-11 40,417 31,728 72,145 PA 66 PK-111 46,373 35,193 81,566 PA 67 PK-1V 46,380 32,897 79,277 PA 68 PK-V 50,716 45,750 96,466 Total 2,33,690 1,87,328 4,21,108 NA-47 Tribal Area XII (FR DIK) 11,621 7,394 19,015 Source. Election Office D.I.Khan 198 5.2 Local Government Elections (2001 & 2005) Elections were held under LGO 2001 from December 2000 to September 2001 in six phases. These elections were held to fill local Government seats in 46 Union Councils as per the devolution of power plan of the government, which was articulated in the LGO 2001. The second elections under the LGO were held in 2005, which were scheduled to be completed in three phases but took six months to complete, so an extra phase was added by default owing to LGO amendments separating the election of Naib District Nazims and District Nazims in the indirect third phase. Although these elections were declared non-party, yet almost all the parties contested under different groups as the new structure were perceived to be powerful at local level. Table 16. Number of Tehsils & Union Councils in Local Elections. 2000-2001 2005 No of Tehsils No of Union Councils No of Tehsils No of Union Councils 3 46 5 47 Source: Election Office D.I.Khan Table 17. Name of District Nazims and Naib Nazims in Elections Election Nazim Naib Naazim 2001-2005 Maj. ® Latifullah Khan Alizai Sardar Inatullah Khan Mainkhel 2005-2007 Muhammad Mukhtiar Ahmad Khan Haji Malik Abur-ur-Rashid 2007- to date Abdul Rauf Haji Malik Abur-ur-Rashid Source: Election Office D.I.Khan Dera Ismail Khan is the home town of national opposition leader Mulana Fazl- ur-Rehman, who belongs to the top leadership of MMA and is the president of his own political party JUI (F). Despite this fact, In the Local Government election 2001 the seats of District Nazim and District Naib Nazim were won by the candidates of ittihad of Alizais and Mainkhels. Maj. ® Latifullah Khan Alizia and Sardar Inatullah Khan Mainkhel won the seats of District Nazim and District Naib Nazim respectively by defeating the candidates of Mulana Brothers. 199 While in Local Government Election although the candidates belonging to JUI (F) won most of the town Nazim and Naib Nazim seats, yet Mukhtiar Ahmad Khan who is an ex-senator and a member of PML (Q) won the seat of District Nazim. He is the uncle of Senator Waqar and brother of Senator Gulzar who also belongs to PML (Q). District Nazim Mukhtiar and Senator Gulzar were formerly the members of PPP. District Nazim Mukhtiar Ahmad Khan became District Nazim by defeating the younger brother of Mulana Fazl-ur-Rehman, Mulana Lutf-ur-Rehman. However JUI (F) managed to get their District Naib Nazim candidate elected. Table 18. Name of Tehsil Nazims and Naib Nazims in Elections Elections Tehsil Nazim Naib Nazim 2001-2005 D.I.Khan Sardar Fetehullah Khan Miankhel Mazhar Jamil Alizai Kulachi Israrullah Khan Allaudin Khan Paharpur Mukhdoom Altaf Hussain Shah Muhammad Nawaz 2005-2009 D.I.Khan Sardar Fetehullah Khan Miankhel Hameedullah Khan Kulachi Sameeullah Khan Javed Khan Paharpur Mukhdoom Altaf Hussain Shah Nazar Muhammad Niaz Daraban Sardar Qaizar Khan Mainkhel Musharaf Rehman Khan Paroa Sardar Fakhar ullah Khan Mainkhel Malik Muhammad Arshad Naveed Source: Election Office D.I.Khan 200 1V. Annexure “D”. Tax Assignment for District, Tehsil, and Union Governments a. District (Zila) Council 1 Education Tax 2 Health Tax 3 Tax on vehicles other than motor vehicles 4 Any other tax authorized by the Government 5 Local rates on lands assessable to land revenue 6 Fees in respect of schools, colleges, and health facilities established or maintained by the district government 7 Fees for licenses granted by the district government 8 Fees for specific services rendered by a district government 9 Collection charges for recovery of tax on behalf of the government 10 Tolls on new roads, bridges, within the limits of a district, other than national and provincial highways and roads b. Tehsil and Town Councils 1 Local tax on services 2 Tax on the transfer of immovable property 3 Property tax on annual rental value of buildings and lands 4 Fee on advertisements and billboards 5 Fee for fairs, agricultural shows, cattle fairs, industrial exhibitions, tournaments and other public events 6 Fee for approval of building plans and erection and re-erection of buildings 7 Fee for licenses or permits and penalties or fines for violation of the licensing rules 8 Charges for execution and maintenance of works of public utility like lighting of public places, drainage, conservancy, and water supply 9 Fee on cinemas, dramas, theatrical shows and tickets thereof, and other entertainment 10 Collection charges for recovery of any tax on behalf of the Government, District Government, Union Administration of any statutory authority c. Union Councils 1 Fees for licensing of professions and vocations 2 Fee on sale of animals in cattle markets 3 Market fees 4 Fees for certification of births, marriages and deaths 5 Charges for specific services rendered by the union council 6 Rate for the remuneration of Village and Neighborhood guards 7 Rate for the execution or maintenance of any work of public utility like lighting of public places, drainage, conservancy and water supply Source: Local Government Ordinance, 2001 201 202