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Elections in Iraq: What Does the Future Hold?

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Elections in Iraq: What Does the Future Hold? COMMENTARY ELECTIONS IN IRAQ: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? Elections in Iraq: What Does the Future Hold? RANJ ALAALDIN* ABSTRACT Iraq held parliamentary elections in April, the country’s first vote since the withdrawal of U.S. troops in December 2011. Although turnout was impressive and a democratic culture has settled in Iraq, outstanding challenges, including terrorism, sec- tarian divisions and regional conflict, are unlikely to be rectified by the elections. The status quo will continue and Iraq, at best, can only attempt to contain domestic and regional problems. raq held parliamentary elections at least 94 of the Iraqi parliament’s in April 2014, the nation’s third 328 seats, gaining over 60 seats more Ivote since the U.S. invasion in 2003 than the second and third-placed ri- and the first since the withdrawal of vals. His coalition received 1,074,000 U.S. troops in December 2011. The votes in Baghdad alone. The two-term elections showed that Iraq can hold prime minister also emerged with its own: turnout was estimated to 721,000 personal votes, a marked in- be more than 60% and there were crease from the 620,000 he received in no security incidents in Baghdad, the 2010 elections. His second placed the country’s capital and a common rival received only 229,000. flashpoint for terrorist atrocities. * Visiting Scholar, Columbia The Sadrist movement of the an- University; PhD th On May 19 , the Iraqi High Electoral ti-Western radical cleric, Muqtada Candidate, Commission released the provisional al-Sadr, emerged with a total of 35 London School of Economics results of the elections, which show seats, whilst the Islamic Supreme and Political yet another electoral victory for Prime Council of Iraq (ISCI) emerged with Science Minister Maliki. The State of Law Co- 31 seats, which represented a come- Insight Turkey alition (SLC), led by Maliki’s party, back after its abysmal performances Vol. 16 / No. 2 / the Islamic Dawa Party, emerged with in previous elections. 2014, pp. 53-60 2014 Sprıng 53 COMMENTARY RANJ ALAALDIN Iraq’s main Sunni parties received a spend the next phase of the demo- total of 59 seats: 27 seats for the Mu- cratic process engaging in intense ne- tahidun bloc led by Iraq’s parliament gotiations and lobbying in an effort to speaker, Osama Nujayfi; 21 seats for form the next government and secure the list led by Ayad Allawi, the former their own political objectives. The last Iraqi Prime Minister and former head time this took place in 2010, the pro- of the now fragmented Iraqiyah bloc; cess lasted nine months. and 11 seats for the list led by Deputy Prime Minister Salah al-Mutlaq. The In reality, a number of underlying Kurds, collectively, received 62 seats. dynamics underpinning Iraqi politics Unlike the Sunni parties, the Kurds suggest it makes little difference who are expected to maintain a unified the next prime minister of Iraq is. Al- stance in Baghdad and bargain on the though the country held largely free basis of the total number of seats they and fair elections and a democratic have received collectively. culture has been gradually settling, it remains plagued by terrorist atroci- The numbers suggest Mr. Maliki is ties, an Islamist-led insurrection in a favorite within the Iraqi electorate the Sunni North, and a continuation and, despite strong opposition from of sectarian divisions that have been his rivals and widespread criticism, exacerbated by events in Syria. will seek another term in office from a position of strength. Two underlying dynamics will ensure that it will be business as usual in Iraq At the very least, the next prime and that elections, far from resolving minister will be a Shia from one of Iraq’s problems, are likely to sustain the main Shia blocs, namely the Sa- them: first, the ongoing sectarian drist movement and the ISCI, which tensions between the Sunni and Shia came second and third, respectively. communities; and second, the ongo- The ISCI’s chance of taking the pre- ing conflict in Syria, which has es- miership is much stronger than the sentially created a second front in the Sadrists’ chance, mainly because the sectarian war taking place in Iraq. latter is seen as too radical by Iraq’s various political movements as well as by regional powers. Both the Sa- Sectarian Tensions drists and the ISCI will, nonetheless, aim to prevent Mr. Maliki from hold- Sectarian tensions in Iraq deterio- ing another term in office, largely rated so quickly after the U.S.’s with- because of his consolidation and cen- drawal that many believe it is no tralizing of power in recent years. The longer a question of if, but when, the Kurds are also looking to achieve the 2006 sectarian civil war is repeated. same objective. The conflict between Sunni and Shia communities took the country to the The politics will now begin. Every- brink, claimed thousands of lives thing is on the table and all sides will and divided Baghdad along sectari- 54 Insight Turkey ELECTIONS IN IRAQ: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? However, Iraq’s Sunni Arabs have At the very least, the been mobilized by the Sunni Arab elite since 2003, both politically and vio- next prime minister lently. Mobilized, that is, to reject the will be a Shia from new Iraq in which Shia political actors one of the main Shia are the most powerful, largely as a re- sult of a democratic process in which blocs, namely the Iraq’s Shias have taken advantage of Sadrist movement their demographic superiority in re- sponse to the Sunni Arab’s rejection. and the ISCI, which Not all Sunni Arabs supported the po- came second and litical and violent rejection of the new third, respectively Iraq; these individuals, however, have been side-lined by more extreme ele- ments and faced constant threats from within their own communities. an boundaries. Yet, in many respects, Iraq has been in a state of continuous As the trajectory of Iraqi politics civil war since 2006, claiming, in the shows, it was after 2005 that Iraq’s process, hundreds of thousands of Shia political actors reconciled their lives. internal differences and contested elections as a unified bloc in response Sunni-Shia divisions were a strong to the Sunni Arab mobilization. The component of the Iraqi state and Sunni Arab rejection and mobiliza- society before the U.S. toppled the tion against the new Iraq also pro- Baath regime in 2003. In the new duced the 2006 civil war. Iraq’s Shia Iraq, those differences were not rec- community decided that they could onciled and a settlement never took no longer restrain themselves from place between Iraq’s Sunni and Shias. retaliating, having been constantly What exacerbated divisions and ulti- attacked since 2003. mately led to violent conflict was the mobilization of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs to Rather than giving way to a peaceful reject the new Iraq. settlement, as some have suggested, what really took place after the civil The understanding has mistakenly war was a tactical retreat by Sunni been that after the 2006 sectarian civil militants who accepted defeat and re- war there was reconciliation; that the alized they could no longer confront Americans helped transform Sunni their rivals in head-to-head combat, militants and tribes into local secu- choosing instead to do so as amor- rity forces (known as the Awakening phous entities waging war through movement) and together with the indiscriminate terrorist atrocities. Shia they moved to defeat Al-Qaeda. Iraq then started to move forward as The absence of a settlement and con- one, so the argument goes. tinuation of the conflict today, most 2014 Sprıng 55 COMMENTARY RANJ ALAALDIN tutions. The myth continues to domi- The conflict between Sunni nate Sunni Arab perceptions today, to their detriment and to the detriment and Shia communities took of all Iraqis. This myth persistently the country to the brink, underpins the violent mobilization of claimed thousands of lives the Sunni Arab community and the overlap between indigenous secular and divided Baghdad along Iraqis and domestic, as well as foreign, sectarian boundaries jihadists. It has made reconciliation a distant, if not impossible, reality. On the other hand, Iraq’s Shia com- notably in the Anbar province where munity fears returning to the past, militants still control Fallujah, means where, like the Kurds, they were bru- that Iraq has been in a state of civil tally oppressed under a Sunni-domi- war since 2003. Violence, however, is nated state. Thus far, Iraq’s Shias have underpinned by both the belief that refrained from full-blown retaliation, the conflict is a battle for the future of owing largely to the efforts of Ayatol- the country and conflicting visions of lah Sistani. The new Iraq gives them that future. their greatest weapon by way of their demographic superiority – democ- Iraq’s Arab Sunnis believe that they racy. As one Iraqi Shia told me last are marginalized and the downfall of month in Baghdad, just before cast- the former regime also brought their ing his vote, “every vote is a bullet for downfall. From the outset, they were al-Qaeda.” encouraged to reject the new Iraq and its constitution by members of the Sunni Arab elite, who promoted the The Kurds idea that the Sunni Arabs were being suppressed and marginalized in an ef- Baghdad also continues to be em- fort to win local support and strength- broiled in tensions with the Kurdis- en their bargaining power during tan Regional Government (KRG). state and government formation ne- This dispute has been centered on gotiations.
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