NO 55 IPCS ISSUE BRIEF OCTOBER 2007

Indian Border Security Poor Management in Evidence Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Gurmeet Kanwal Additional Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies

Burgeoning Threats and Challenges borders.

With a landmass of sub-continental proportions, External threats to ’s security are not the only India occupies a predominant strategic position border management issue dealt with at present by in Southern Asia and dominates the northern the national security apparatus. India’s rate of Indian Ocean with a coastline that is 7,683km- growth has far outpaced that of most of its long and an exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that is neighbours and this has generated problems like over two million square kms in size. India’s land mass migrations into India. Other threats and borders exceed 15,000kms and it shares these challenges have also emerged. The border security with seven countries including a small segment scenario is marked by: increased cross-border with Afghanistan (106kms) in northern Jammu terrorism; infiltration and ex-filtration of armed and Kashmir (J&K), now part of the Northern militants; emergence of non-state actors; nexus Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The length between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers; of India’s land borders with its neighbours varies illegal migration; left-wing extremism; separatist considerably:1 Bangladesh - 4,339kms (4,351kms movements aided and abetted by external powers; as per MoD2); Bhutan 605kms (700kms); China - and, the establishment of madrasas, some of which 3,439kms (4,056kms); - 1,425kms are potential security hazards.3 (1,643kms); Nepal - 1,690kms (1,751km); Pakistan - 3,325kms (3,244kms). Manning the with China

Due to the proclivity of India’s neighbours to The Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China offers exploit India’s nation-building difficulties, the an illustrative example of the lack of coordination in country’s internal security challenges are border management. The western sector of the inextricably linked with border management. The LAC in Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh and the challenge of coping with long-standing territorial Middle Sector along the Uttarakhand border are and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, manned by some Vikas battalions of the Special combined with porous borders along some of the Frontier Force that reports to the Cabinet most difficult terrain in the world, has made Secretariat and by the Indo-Tibetan effective and efficient border management a (ITBP) that is a Ministry of Home Affairs police force. national priority. However, due to the lack of Infantry battalions of the man the understanding of such military issues among the Sikkim border and units of the Rifles (AR) man decision-making elite, India’s borders continue to the , Nagaland, and be manned by a large number of military, para- Mizoram borders. The AR is a para-military force military and police forces, each of which has its under the Ministry of Home Affairs that is officered own ethos and each of which reports to a mostly by regular army officers. Its battalions have different central ministry at New Delhi, resulting in been placed under ‘operational control’ of local almost no real coordination in managing the army formation commanders. Though the INDIAN BORDER SECURITY PAGE 2

responsibility is that of the army, the AR battalions In the western sector in Ladakh, the lie of the LAC given to the army for border manning operations is even more ambiguous because of several are not directly under its command, an “claim lines” and due to the paucity of easily arrangement that is not conducive to fostering a recognisable terrain features on the Aksai Chin professional relationship between the plateau. This makes it difficult to accurately commanders and their subordinates. corelate ground and map, except in the area of the Karakoram Pass, which lies on the high Operationally, the Northern and Western Karakoram Range. Both the sides habitually send Commands are responsible for military operations patrols up to the point at which, in their along the LAC in portions of the Western Sector. perception, the LAC runs. These patrols leave “tell- The Middle Sector on the Uttarakhand border is tale” signs behind in the form of burjis (piles of under the operational jurisdiction of the Central stones), biscuit and cigarette packets and other Command while the Eastern Sector along the similar markers in a sort of primitive ritual to lay Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh borders comes stake to territory and assert their claim. under the operational control of Eastern Command.4 On the other hand, on the Tibetan These issues are debated during the meetings of side, the entire LAC is managed by Border Guards the China Study Group that is jointly chaired by divisions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army the Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) and the (PLA) under a single PLA commander of the Tibet Foreign Secretary. There is an inherent Autonomous Region. contradiction in sending soldiers to patrol what they are told and believe are Indian areas and The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement then tell them that they must not under any signed with the Chinese in 1993 and the circumstances fire on “intruding” Chinese soldiers. agreement on Confidence Building Measures in This is the reason why it is operationally critical to the Military Field signed in 1996 were expected to demarcate the LAC on the map and the ground reduce the operational commitments of the army after joint physical surveys. The inadequacy of from having to permanently man the difficult LAC recognisable terrain features can be overcome with China. However, it has not been possible to by exploiting GPS technology to accurately withdraw a single soldier from the border with navigate up to the agreed and well-defined LAC China so far. In fact, despite the 1996 agreement on the ground and avoid transgressing it even on Military CBMs, several incidents of Chinese unintentionally. intrusions at Asaphi La and elsewhere in Arunachal Pradesh have been reported in the press and The Western and Other Borders have been Due to the proclivity of discussed in In the west, the entire border with Pakistan is Parliament. While manned by the BSF except the Line of Control India’s neighbours to no violent (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The LoC is the exploit India’s nation- incident has responsibility of the army with some BSF battalions building difficulties, the taken place in placed under its operational control. Since the the recent past, LoC has been mostly active on a daily basis, country’s internal security there have been particularly since the early-1990s, this is a good challenges are inextricably occasions when arrangement. For over 50 years since the Kashmir linked with border Indian and conflict began in 1947-48, soon after Chinese patrols independence, the two armies were engaged in management. have met face- a so-called ‘eyeball-to-eyeball’ confrontation with to-face in areas daily loss of life and property that could justifiably like the two “fish-tail” shaped protrusions in the be called a ‘low intensity limited war.’ Since 25 north-east corner of Arunachal Pradesh.5 Such November 2003, however, an informal ceasefire meetings have an element of tension built into has been in place all along the LoC, including at them and the possibility of an armed clash can the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) along the never be ruled out. Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier.

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The border with Nepal was virtually unattended till Issues for better Border Management very recently as Nepalese citizens have free access to live and work in India under a 1950 Ideally, border management should be the treaty between the two countries. Following the responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs during eruption of a Maoist insurgency in Nepal, peacetime. However, the active nature of the however, efforts have been made to gradually LoC and the need to maintain troops close to the step up vigilance along this border as India fears LAC in a state of readiness for operations in high the southward spread of Maoist ideology. The altitude areas, have compelled the army to responsibility for this has been entrusted to the permanently deploy large forces for this task. (SSB), the erstwhile Special While the BSF should be responsible for all settled Security Bureau, that is now a Ministry of Home borders, the Affairs force. For the Bhutan border, the BSF shares responsibility for the advances in surveillance the responsibility with the SSB. Since the Royal unsettled and Bhutanese Army drove out the Bodo and ULFA disputed borders, technology, particularly insurgents from its territory some years ago, the such as the Line satellite and aerial imagery, border has been relatively quiet. The border with of Control (LoC) can help to maintain a Myanmar also remains operationally active and in J&K and the several insurgent groups have secured sanctuaries Line of Actual constant vigil along the for themselves in Myanmar despite the Control (LAC) on LAC and make it possible cooperation extended by the Myanmarese army. the Indo-Tibetan to reduce physical The cross-border movement of Nagas and Mizos border, should for training, purchase of arms and shelter when be that of the deployment as and when pursued by Indian security forces, combined with Indian Army. The modern surveillance assets the difficult terrain obtaining in the area, make this principle of can be provided on a border extremely challenging to manage. This ‘single point border is manned jointly by the army and some control’ must be regular basis to the units of the AR. followed if the formations deployed borders are to be Along the Bangladesh border that has seen effectively forward. increasing action in recent years, the BSF is in managed. charge. This border remains in the news as there Divided responsibilities never result in effective are frequent clashes between the BSF and the control. Despite sharing the responsibility with Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). This border has a peculiar several para-military and police forces, the army’s problem that is usually referred to as ‘Enclaves commitment for border management amounts to and Adverse Possessions.’ “There are 111 Indian six divisions along the LAC, the LoC and the AGPL enclaves (17,158 acres) within Bangladesh and 51 in J&K and five divisions along the LAC and the Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110.02 acres) in India.”6 Myanmar border in the eastern sector. Thirty-four tracts of Indian land are under the adverse possession of Bangladesh and 40 pieces This is a massive commitment that is costly in terms of Bangladeshi land are in India’s adverse of manpower as well as funds, as the deployment possession. Though the Land Border Agreement of areas are mostly in high altitude terrain, and needs 1974 has provisions for the settlement of the issue to be reduced gradually. The real payoff of a of adverse possession, it has not been rapprochement with the Chinese would be the implemented so far as the problem is politically possibility of reducing the army’s deployment on sensitive. Unless the political leadership invests the LAC. To some extent, the advances in time and effort to resolve this sensitive issue, surveillance technology, particularly satellite and unseemly clashes that do no credit to either side aerial imagery, can help to maintain a constant will continue to occur and spoil relations between vigil along the LAC and make it possible to reduce the two countries. physical deployment as and when modern surveillance assets can be provided on a regular basis to the formations deployed forward. Similarly, the availability of a larger number of helicopter Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies developing an alternative framework for peace and security in the region units will enhance the quality of aerial surveillance terrorists and arms. It also examined measures to and the ability to move troops to quickly occupy establish closer linkage with the border population defensive positions when it becomes necessary. to protect them from subversive propaganda to However, these are both costly ventures and need prevent unauthorised settlements and to initiate to be viewed in the overall context of the special developmental programmes.10 The availability of funds for modernization. recommendations of the task force have been accepted by the GoM and are being The deployment patterns of central police implemented in phases. While some action has organizations (CPOs) are marked by ad hoc been taken, clearly, much more needs to be decisions and knee-jerk reactions to emerging done to make border management more threats and challenges, rather than a cohesive effective. long-term approach that maximises the strength of each organization. G P Bhatnagar has Endnotes identified the following lacunae: deployment of multiple forces in the same area of operations; 1. Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (Retd.), “Changing lack of any doctrinal concepts; designed for a Battlefields,” Force, August 2004, p. 50. ‘fire fighting’ approach rather than a ‘fire 2. “National Security Environment: An Overview,” prevention’ or proactive approach; based on a Ministry of Defence, www.mod.nic.in. strategy of ‘reaction and retaliation’ rather than 3. G P Bhatnagar, “Border Security,” SP’s Land on holistic response to a situation, resulting in stress Forces, Vol. 2, Issue 6, 2005. and decision-making problems at the functional 4. “Seal of Trouble,” Force, Vol. 1, No. 12, August level; wastage of energy and efforts; and, lack of 2004. coordination and synergy between the security 5. “An IB (Intelligence Bureau) report (No. DIBUO management organizations.7 No-12) which corroborates the Chinese consolidation and LAC violation has been sent The recent nomination of the Central Reserve to the PMO and the home ministry… The IB Police Force (CRPF) as the national-level counter- report says that until last October, there were insurgency force should enable the other central 195 successful attempts by the Chinese to para-military forces (CPMFs) like BSF and ITBP to violate the LAC.” Ajay Upreti, “Watch that return to their primary role of better border Line: China Violates LAC and Intensifies management, as recommended by the Task Activities on the Border,” The Week, 1May, Force on Border Management constituted by the 2005. Group of Ministers (GoM) formed to review 6. Bhatnagar, n. 3. issues pertaining to the management of national 7. Ibid. security after the Kargil conflict.8 The task force led 8. “Report of the Group of by former Home Secretary, Madhav Godbole, has Ministers on National made several far-reaching recommendations. It Security,” Ministry of has recommended that all para-military forces Defence, mod.nic.in/new managing unsettled borders should operate additions/chapter-i.pdf. directly under the control of the army and that 9. PK Vasudeva, “Reorgan - there should be lateral induction from the army to ising the Defence Set-up,” the para-military forces so as to enhance their Tribune, 27 November, operational effectiveness and suggested several 2000. perceptive measures for better intelligence 10. “Internal Security and INSTITUTE OF PEACE coordination.9 Border Management,” PIB Press Release, AND The task force studied steps needed to improve pib.nic.in/archieve/ border management and suggested measures for lreleng/lyr2000/rjun CONFLICT STUDIES appropriate force structures and procedures to 2000/r13062000.html. B 7/3 Safdarjung Enclave, deal with the entry of narcotics, illegal migrants, New Delhi 110029 INDIA