Crime, Delinquency and Justice: a Caribbean Reader

C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

CRIME, DELInQUENCY AND JUSTICE

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MAP OF THE CARIBBEAN

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CRIME, DELInQUENCY AND JUSTICE A Caribbean Reader

edited by Ramesh Deosaran

Ian Randle Publishers Kingston Miami

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Published in Jamaica, 2007 by Ian Randle Publishers 11 Cunningham Avenue P.O. Box 686 Kingston 6. www.ianrandlepublishers.com

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the National Library of Jamaica.

ISBN: 978-976-637-296-5 (pbk)

Epub Edition @ August 2013 ISBN: 978-976-637-715-1

Crime, Delinquency and Justice: A Caribbean Reader. Copyright © 2007 by Ramesh Deosaran. All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Conventions. By payment of the required fees, you have been granted the nonexclusive, non-transferable right to access and read the text of this e-book on screen. No part of this text may be reproduced, transmitted, downloaded, decompiled reverse-engineered, or stored in or introduced into any information storage and retrieval system, in any form or by any means, whether electronic or mechanical, now known or hereinafter invented, without the express written permission of Ian Randle Publishers.

Cover and book design by Ian Randle Publishers Printed in the United States of America

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Table of Contents

List of Figures / ix List of Tables/ xi Foreword/ xv Preface / xvii List of Acronyms and Abbreviations/ xxiii

PART ICARIBBEAN CRIMINOLOGY: THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS

1. Towards a Caribbean Criminology / 3 Kenneth Pryce 2. By Your Theories You Shall Be Known: Some Reflections on Caribbean Criminology / 19 Christopher Birkbeck 3. Towards a Caribbean Criminology: Prospects and Problems / 43 Richard R. Bennett and James P. Lynch 4. Constructing the Crime Problem through the Media: Melodrama in Venezuela, 1950–99 / 66 Christopher Birkbeck

PART II JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE CARIBBEAN EXPERIENCE

5. School Violence and Delinquency: The Dynamics of Race, Gender, Class, Age and Parenting in the Caribbean / 89 Ramesh Deosaran 6. Thinking Violent Thoughts: Students’ Attitudes to Violence within Secondary Schools in Trinidad and Tobago/ 133 Jerome De Lisle (Noreen Ramkhelawan, Carol Joseph, Sean Annisette, Indra Maraj, Anna Singh, Kameel Ali, Teckler Thomas, Lyn Murray and Joy-Ann Walcott) 7. Juvenile Delinquency, Juvenile Justice and Legal Reform: A Case for an Evidence-Based Approach / 149 Betsy Ann Lambert Peterson 8. Juvenile Delinquency in Trinidad and Tobago: Challenges for Social Policy and Caribbean Criminology / 159 Ramesh Deosaran and Derek Chadee

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PART III DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN THE CARIBBEAN

9. Provocation: The Difficulty Encountered by the Courts and the Defence’s Impact on ‘Battered Woman’s Syndrome’ / 199 Satnarine Sharma 10. Innovative Community Approach to Ending Domestic Violence / 224 Jo-Ann Della-Giustina

PART IV COMMUNITY POLICING, POLICING STYLES AND USE OF FORCE IN THE CARIBBEAN

11. A Caribbean Portrait of Crime, Justice and Community Policing / 241 Ramesh Deosaran 12. Rough Justice: Political Policing and Colonial Self-Rule in Guyana / 265 Joan R. Mars 13. Policing Styles in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Jamaican Case / 284 Anthony D. Harriott 14. Use of Force by Police in the Caribbean: Towards a Social Psychological Analysis / 301 Ramesh Deosaran

PART VCORRECTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN

15. Client Rehabilitation or Sanitisation of the Penal Language? Analysis of Correctional Reforms in Jamaica / 323 Marlyn J. Jones 16. Variables Associated with Probation Outcomes in Venezuela / 348 Christopher Birkbeck 17. Prison Recidivism in Trinidad and Tobago: A Baseline Study / 368 Ian K. Ramdhanie

PART VI CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN

18. Crime and Development in the Caribbean: An Investigation of Traditional Explanatory Models / 401 Richard R. Bennett, William P. Shields and Beth Daniels 19. Paradise Lost? Crime in the Caribbean: A Comparison of Barbados and Jamaica / 430 John W. King 20. A Longitudinal Study of Serious Crime in the Caribbean / 441 Klaus de Albuquerque and Jerome McElroy

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PART VII THE JURY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE CARIBBEAN

21. The Jury on Trial / 475 Ramesh Deosaran 22. Pre-Trial Publicity and Juror Prejudice: A Case Study / 497 Ramesh Deosaran 23. Ensuring Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Criminal Justice System (The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (NAA) and Saint Lucia) / 526 Adrian Saunders and Jacob Wit

PART VIII DRUG TRAFFICKING AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN

24. Conflict and Cooperation in the War on Drugs: The Caribbean Experience / 545 John W. King 25. Does Drug Enforcement Reduce Crime? An Empirical Analysis of the Drug War in Central American and Caribbean Countries / 555 Horace A. Bartilow

PART IX TERRORISM, INSURRECTION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN

26. The Politics of Information and the People’s Revolutionary Government (The 1979 coup in Grenada and the 1983 US Intervention) / 581 Ramesh Deosaran 27. The Psychology of Political and Social Conflict (The 1990 Muslimeen Insurrection in Trinidad and Tobago) / 597 Ramesh Deosaran

PART XVICTIMISATION IN THE CARIBBEAN

28. Human Trafficking and the Dominican Republic: A Victim-Centric Approach / 627 Janice Joseph, Zelma W. Henriques and Patrice Morris 29. Effects of Ethnicity and Nationality on Driving Attitudes and Perceived Risk of Victimisation / 645 Michael R. Norris and Jacqueline Bergdahl 30. Perceptual Fear and Risk of Victimisation / 653 Derek Chadee and Jason Ditton

Contributors / 674 Index / 676

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list of figures

Figure 3.1 Homicide in Selected Caribbean Nations and the US, 1977–93/ 49 Figure 3.2 Assault in Selected Caribbean Nations and the US, 1977–93 / 50 Figure 3.3 Burglary in Selected Caribbean Nations and the US, 1977–93 / 51 Figure 3.4 Percentage of Violent to Property Crime in Two Nations, 1977–93 / 52 Figure 5.1 Students’ Race by Social Class Distribution (%) / 104 Figure 5.2 School Type by Race (%) / 105 Figure 5.3 School Type by Social Class (%) / 106 Figure 5.4 Parental Structure by Race (%) / 107 Figure 5.5 Parental Structure by Social Class (%) / 108 Figure 5.6 Six Categories of Violence and Delinquency by Gender (Means and Standard Deviations) / 114 Figure 5.7 The Pentagon Model: Configuring Strategic Partnerships / 124 Figure 8.1 Ethnic Background (%) of Youths in Juvenile Homes and General Population in Trinidad and Tobago (10–19 Years) / 180 Figure 8.2 Educational Attainment (%) of Youths in Juvenile Homes and General Population in Trinidad and Tobago (10–19 Years) / 181 Figure 8.3 Religious Background (%) of Youths in Juvenile Homes and General Population in Trinidad and Tobago (10–19 Years) / 182 Figure 8.4 Serious Crimes, Minor Crimes and Offences Reported in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1996 / 184 Figure 8.5 Crime Reports, Prosecutions and Convictions: Average Figures for 1987–96 (Ten Year Period) / 185 Figure 11.1 Challenges for Community Policing in the Caribbean / 250 Figure 11.2 The Way Forward for Community Policing / 254 Figure 14.1 Expected and Actual Use of Force by Police Under Varying Levels of Direct Threat / 315 Figure 14.2 An Interactionist Perspective on Use of Force / 316 Figure 17.1 Number of Persons Convicted and Sent to Prison by Sex, 1988–99/370 Figure 17.2 Number of Persons Convicted and Sent to Prison by Age Group, 1991–98 / 371 Figure 17.3 Number of Persons Convicted and Sent to Prison / 372 Figure 17.4 Number of Persons Convicted and Sent to Prison by Crime/Offence Committed, 1990–99/ 373 Figure 17.5 Classification of Inmates (All Prisons)/ 379 Figure 17.6 Age of Inmates (All Prisons)/ 380 Figure 17.7 Ethnicity of Inmates (All prisons)/ 381 Figure 17.8 Religion of Inmates (All Prisons)/ 382 Figure 17.9 Major Crimes/Offences Committed by Inmates (All Prisons)/ 385

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Figure 17.10 Length of Sentence of Inmates (All Prisons)/ 386 Figure 17.11 Type of Sentence Served by Inmates (All Prisons)/ 388 Figure 17.12 Sex of Inmates by Crime/Offence Committed/ 389 Figure 17.13 Types of Crimes/Offences Committed and Inmates’ Ages/ 391 Figure 18.1 Homicide Rate by Nation, 1975–95/ 408 Figure 18.2 Aggravated Assault Rate by Nation, 1975–95/ 409 Figure 18.3 Rape Rate by Nation, 1975–95/ 409 Figure 18.4 Burglary Rate by Nation, 1975–95/ 410 Figure 18.5 Larceny Rate by Nation, 1975–95/ 410 Figure 18.6 Violent to Property Crime Ratio by Nation, 1975–95/ 411 Figure 18.7 Violent Crime by Social Variables Barbados, 1975–95/ 416 Figure 18.8 Violent Crime by Social Variables Trinidad, 1975–95/ 416 Figure 18.9 Violent Crime by Social Variables Jamaica, 1975–95/ 417 Figure 18.10 Violent Crime by Economic Variables Trinidad, 1975–95/ 418 Figure 18.11 Violent Crime by Economic Variables Barbados, 1975–95/ 418 Figure 18.12 Violent Crime by Economic Variables Jamaica, 1975–95/ 419 Figure 18.13 Property Crime by Social Variables Jamaica, 1975–95/ 420 Figure 18.14 Property Crime by Social Variables Trinidad, 1975–95/ 420 Figure 18.15 Property Crime by Social Variables Barbados, 1975–95/ 421 Figure 18.16 Property Crime by Economic Variables Barbados, 1975–95/ 422 Figure 18.17 Property Crime by Economic Variables Trinidad, 1975–95/ 422 Figure 18.18 Property Crime by Economic Variables Jamaica, 1975–95/ 423 Figure 20.1 Murder Rates per 100,000 Population: 1969–73 vs. 1989–93/ 466 Figure 20.2 Robbery Rates per 100,000 Population: 1969–73 vs. 1989–93/ 467 Figure 20.3 Rape Rates per 100,000 Population: 1969–73 vs. 1989–93/ 468 Figure 21.1 Jurors Opinion Change During Trial/ 486 Figure 22.1 Eligible Jurors’ Perception of Bias from Pre-trial Publicity (n=779)/ 509 Figure 25.1 The Effects of Interdiction on Drug Revenues when Demand is Elastic/ 561 Figure 25.2 The Effects of Interdiction on Drug Revenues when Demand is Inelastic/ 561 Figure 27.1 Diffusion of Muslimeen Land Conflict Over Time/ 620

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list of tables

Table 1.1 Unemployment in the Caribbean/ 10 Table 5.1 Parental Structure by School Type (%)/ 109 Table 5.2 Correlation Matrix for Six Categories of Deviance/ 110 Table 5.3 Race and Delinquency (Means, Standard Deviations and Mean Differences) (Tukey HSD Used)/ 111 Table 5.4 Social Class and Delinquency (Means, Standard Deviations and Mean Differences) (Tukey HSD Used)/ 113 Table 5.5 Gender and Delinquency/ 114 Table 5.6 Student Parental Structure by Six Categories of Delinquency (ANOVA)/ 115 Table 5.7 Age by Six Categories of Delinquency (ANOVA)/ 116 Table 5.8 School Type by Six Categories of Delinquency (ANOVA)/ 117 Table 6.1 Subscale and Total Scores on the Maudsley Violence Questionnaire (MVQ) for Males and Females / 140 Table 6.2 Subscale and Total Scores on the Maudsley Violence Questionnaire (MVQ) for Forms 4–6/ 140 Table 6.3 Ten Highest Scoring Machismo Questions/ 140 Table 6.4 School Type, Location, and Performance on the Maudsley Violence Questionnaire (MVQ) / 141 Table 6.5 Mean Scores, P-values, and Effect Sizes for Subscale and Total Scores Using Three School Classifications/ 142 Table 6.6 Rank of Students from Different Communities on Machismo and Acceptance Scores/ 143 Table 8.1 Offences Committed by Youths in the Three Homes/ 172 Table 8.2 Parental Background of Youths in Homes/ 175 Table 13.1 Police Killings, 1977–96/ 291 Table 14.1 Complaints Received on Police Use of Force: Police–Civilian Encounters (1997–2000)/ 311 Table 15.1 Department of Correctional Services, Jamaica, Parole Data, 1995– 2005 / 332 Table 15.2 Department of Correctional Services Jamaica, Recidivism rate, 2001– 04 / 338 Table 16.1 Variables Associated With Probation Failure (Bivariate Analysis)/ 355 Table 16.2 Logit Regression Coefficients for Personal Characteristics Compared with Failure on Probation/ 357 Table 16.3 Logit Regression Coefficients for Criminological and Personal Characteristics Compared with Failure on Probation/ 358 Table 18.1 Correlations of Violent Crimes by Social Economic Factors/ 413

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Table 18.2 Correlations of Property Crimes by Social Economic Factors/ 414 Table 19.1 Socio-Demographic and Economic Profiles/ 438 Table 19.2 Summary Crime Statistics for Barbados and Jamaica (Offences per 10,000 Persons)/ 439 Table 20.1 Murder Rates for Selected Caribbean States, 1980–96/ 458 Table 20.2 Robbery Rates for Selected Caribbean States, 1980–96/ 459 Table 20.3 Rape Rates for Selected Caribbean States, 1980–96/ 460 Table 20.4 Burglary Rates for Selected Caribbean States, 1980–96/ 461 Table 20.5 Larceny Rates for Selected Caribbean States, 1980–96/ 462 Table 20.6 Selected Indicators for Barbados, 1980–96/ 463 Table 20.7 Crime Rates for Barbados, 1980–96/ 464 Table 20.8 Regression Results/ 465 Table 21.1 Jurors’ Sex and their First Impressions of the Accused/ 484 Table 21.2 Two Most Important Factors Perceived by Jurors in Deciding Verdicts of Cases/ 487 Table 22.1 Eligible Jurors’ Perception of Pre-trial Bias and their Evaluation of the Media’s Role/ 510 Table 24.1 Caribbean Maritime Counter-Drug Agreements/ 549 Table 25.1 Crime in Central America and the Caribbean, 1984–2000 Structural Equation Three Stage Least Square/ 570 Table 25.2 Crime in Central America and the Caribbean, 1984–2000 Structural Equation Three Stage Least Square/ 571 Table 29.1 Respondent Employment, Licensure and Concerns/ 648 Table 29.2 Behaviours that Respondent Always Does/ 649 Table 29.3 Conditions Under Which Respondent Feels Very Safe/ 649 Table 30.1 Ratio of Crime Reported to Police and Crimes Reported in all Daily Newspapers in Trinidad and Tobago for the Period May–August 2000/ 656 Table 30.2 Ratio of Crime Reported to Police and Crimes Reported in the Express Newspaper in Trinidad and Tobago for the Period May–August 2000/ 656 Table 30.3 Ratio of Crime Reported to Police and Crimes Reported in the Trinidad Guardian Newspaper in Trinidad and Tobago for the Period May–August 2000/ 657 Table 30.4 Ratio of Crime Reported to Police and Crimes Reported in the Newsday Newspaper in Trinidad and Tobago for the Period May–August 2000/ 657 Table 30.5 Ratio of Crime Reported to Police and Crimes Reported in all Newspapers and in each Newspaper in Trinidad and Tobago for the Period May–August 2000/ 658 Table 30.6 Descriptives of Media Consumption/ 659 Table 30.7 Regression of Fear of Crime / 660

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Table 30.8 Studies Comparing Subjective Risk and Subjective Fear/ 662 Table 30.9 Percentages of Each Type of Respondent at Each Wave/ 664 Table 30.10 Per cent Stability to Safety (17–20) and Fear (29–42) Questions (Waves 1–3)/ 667 Table 30.11 Concealed Instability to Safety (17–20) and Fear (29–42) Questions (Waves 1–3)/ 668 Table 30.12 Per cent Stability to Safety (17–20) and Fear (29–42) Questions (Waves 1–2–3)/ 669

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foreword

Todd R. Clear, Distinguished Professor John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York

The post-Columbian history of the Caribbean is a story of struggle. For centuries after the Europeans came, there was the struggle between native peoples and colonisers for the bounteous fruits of these beautiful islands. There was also the struggle for ethnic and racial coexistence. Both struggles proved tragically one- sided, and by the time of the War for Independence in the United States, there was not much left of what had been native life. There was, however, a large population of slaves, former slaves, and workers dominated by a small elite of landowners and colonialists. The struggle thus shifted toward one in which the classes of labour fought for their social and economic equality. In most places this meant that everyday people had to be willing to fight to break free of the European governments that held the island as a colony. Yet even after success at the struggle for nationhood, the quest for political rights became a struggle for social justice. That struggle continues today. Side-by-side with this history of political and social struggle — perhaps even one of its driving forces — has been a longing for personal safety. Many brave men and women were willing to sacrifice their personal safety in the short term for the vision of a deeper and more substantial future foundation of safety for them and their children. This book is about crime and justice in the Caribbean. In a sense, therefore, it is about a location on the globe, an archipelago that spans an arc from mainland Florida to the very edge of Venezuela, forming an island bridge between North and South America. Yet in perhaps a greater sense, this book is about an idea, that these islands and peoples, diverse as they are in language, local history, custom, and governance, share a common framework for understanding problems of crime and justice. The book is an impressive series of papers by an imposing list of scholars, delving into common themes about promoting safety and advancing justice. We might say that this collection of studies, taken as a set, demonstrates the usefulness of an idea of Caribbean Criminology. The papers ably maintain the historical theme of “struggle” to which I have referred, most of them without ever using the word directly. Sometimes the struggle is to find a way to protect vulnerable populations such as children. Sometimes the struggle is to find a way to promote justice in the context of difficult

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circumstances. Sometimes, the struggle is to find a way to translate research results achieved in other settings to the Caribbean. Always, there is this sense of energy, effort and fidelity to the ideal of a Caribbean Criminology. There could not be a better time for the arrival of this book. Criminology in the Caribbean has now reached a new plateau of vibrancy, with local projects in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, and an active research programme that is establishing a science of crime prevention in the region. Their annual meeting is widely attended by people not only from the Caribbean but by scholars from Europe and the Americas, as well. At the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology, a growing Caribbean Criminology group meets each year to share news of their research and action agendas. A regular exchange of advanced students now flows between the Caribbean and the US. The time is ripe for a new expansion of theory and action about criminology in the Caribbean. This book is a signal of the readiness for a new stage in the struggle for social peace and social justice.

September, 2006

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preface

Ramesh Deosaran

The state of crime, delinquency and justice across the Caribbean has become increasingly problematic in the last 20 years. Among the major reasons are ineffective policing and judicial institutions, weak law enforcement, crimes and violence driven by drug trafficking, technologically-driven crimes, poor policymaking, lack of relevant research and analysis, low-control homes and families, fragmented, uncivil communities, value conflict, socioeconomic disparities, and for youths especially, an environment clouded by visions of hate, conflict and violence. Governments in the Caribbean, almost all now independent for 40 or so years, are now in a tailspin. The widening option they now choose for rescue is to hire police and security teams mainly from the United Kingdom and the United States. Part of the irony in the current outsourcing of national security by Caribbean governments is linked to the fact that during the negotiations with the British government for political independence these governments, especially the Trinidad and Tobago one, insisted on having executive control over the police service. What all this essentially means is that the region was not well prepared for this ‘crime crisis.’ In fact, governments did respond, sporadically and briskly, but mainly with short-term, quickened law enforcement measures, leaving behind most of the fundamental reasons why crime, delinquency and violence have occurred and why they will reoccur, and this at great cost, financially, socially and psychologically. Public policy fell far short of the challenges. What this Caribbean Reader seeks to do for the region is to create an opportunity for reflection, a platform for further research and analysis, and a bridge to policymakers. There are still some gaps we hope to fill soon in another publication. Among these are white-collar crime, crime and the media, cyber-crime, deportees, environmental crime and feminism and crime. The 30 papers in this Reader have been selected from several sources, many of them from the fourth International Conference on Crime and Justice in the Caribbean sponsored by the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice at the St Augustine Campus, The University of the West Indies, Trinidad. Some papers have been taken from the Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology. A few have been specially prepared for this Reader. From the search for indigenous explanations and solutions in the early papers to some hard data in the later papers, the Reader goes as far back as l976 with the late Ken Pryce paper on the outlines of what I will call ‘rebellious criminology.’

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That is, passionately pointing to the relationship between the ‘social class struggle and crime.’ This theme is handled empirically, to some extent, in the more recent paper on school violence and delinquency and which throws a damper on the social class-delinquency connection. The ideological dissonance created should inspire a more refined conceptualisation of the social class-delinquency-crime hypothesis in the Caribbean. In fact, the three other papers in Part One of this Reader, two by Christopher Birkbeck and one by Richard R. Bennett and James P. Lynch, skilfully attract us towards putting on the agenda the prospects for a ‘Caribbean Criminology.’ There is a great and obvious danger in a region having its youth population intensely engaged in violence and delinquency, especially at school. It foretells a grim future. The four papers in Part Two on Delinquency and Public Policy bring some clarity to the youth violence and delinquency problem in the Caribbean. My own paper begins with the traditional search for delinquency in the controversial realm of social structure and demography. Race, age and family structure, as the results show, do connect to school violence and delinquency, but with social class, not so much. The connection between social structure and the type of school a young person attends breeds social inequity. It is a painful connection requiring urgent public policy attention. Jerome De Lisle and his nine colleagues point to student attitudes as dispositional factors towards violence. Their suggestions for violence-reduction programmes are noteworthy. Peterson’s paper does a crisp review of juvenile legislation and the kind of reforms needed to heal the several breaches which now prevent more effective care for offending juveniles. We strongly support her call for policies based on research and evidence, not on opinions and expediency. The paper by Deosaran and Chadee shows how girls and boys from weak social and academic backgrounds fill our juvenile homes. Part Three really breaks new ground with two papers stretching from the role of provocation as a legal defence in domestic violence by Trinidad and Tobago’s Chief Justice Satnarine Sharma to a proposal to ‘end domestic violence’ by Della- Giustina. This latter paper gives us some useful insights towards reforming domestic violence reduction programmes in the Caribbean. Sharma’s paper is particularly useful in providing us with the agony which a judge likely endures in trials where the allegation of violence clashes with the defence of justification, in this case, provocation. This line of defence is increasingly being used in Caribbean jurisdictions and so the Chief Justice’s contribution here is extremely timely and useful for us. Ineffective policing, police indiscipline and corruption, and weak law enforcement have all unfortunately become part of the saddening drawback in the ‘fight against crime’ in the Caribbean. Crime and criminals are in themselves the problem, but when your crime-fighting agencies become part of the crime problem, the public suffering is doubled, that is, double victimisation for the

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public. Caribbean governments, some more than others, have been pressed by their respective populations to treat more seriously with the problem, a pressure which no doubt has contributed to their willingness to bring in ‘foreign police officers’ at very great cost. This is particularly so with Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, St. Kitts, St. Lucia to Guyana. The four papers in Part Four therefore contribute to an understanding of the ‘police problem’ in the Caribbean and point the way towards reforms and the evolution of an effective, accountable police culture in the Caribbean. The first paper in Part Four (Deosaran) examines community policing not so much as ‘an alternative’ but more so as an embracing form of policing, with law enforcement always remaining as a strategic, vitally necessary component. Joan R. Mars and Anthony D. Harriott spread the net to include Guyanese and Jamaican policing respectively. Mars examines the phenomena of police force in Guyana, reminding us how very subversive such practice could become to an entire police service which depends so much on information from a trusting citizenry. This is a lesson echoed by the very first paper in this section which all Caribbean governments and their respective police services should now take on board with the utmost urgency. The tradition of ‘voluntariness’ and community service in the Jamaican constabulary is discussed by Harriott but only to remind us how far away from such early public respect Caribbean policing has now become, especially with rising allegations of ‘police brutality.’ Given repeated public complaints in recent times over the use of police force, the paper on “Use of Force by Police in the Caribbean,” should suggest some directions for both research and public policy. In Part Five, Marlyn Jones in a rather detailed manner exposes the stark differences between what ‘prison officials’ tell us about prison conditions, rehabilitation programmes, etc., and what the prisoners themselves tell us. Why are the two groups, officials and prisoners, so far apart in their discourse? The answer is certainly not confined to Jamaica but to all other Caribbean states, some of which are now gradually experiencing more and more prisoner revolts of one kind or another. It seems only a matter of time for things to get worse. This Reader can be used to sound the required warnings for urgent and effective public policy reforms much beyond what Jones called ‘the sanitisation of the penal language.’ Through Christopher Birkbeck’s paper, Venezuela joins the Reader with an analysis of the probation process in that country. Ian K. Ramdhanie’s paper tells a very useful story of prisoner demography and social structure. In showing a prisoner recidivism rate of almost 60 per cent in Trinidad and Tobago, the data exposes the prison population as largely poor, of African descent, male and rather young. The fact that so many offences are drug- and robbery-related helps explain the nature and implications of crime in the Caribbean. That so many are in crowded prisons for a few months and for relatively minor crimes should stimulate reforms in both sentencing procedures and penal practices. Part Six opens with a paper on crime and development where the traditional explanatory model is seriously questioned, especially for application in the

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Caribbean. Using three Caribbean states — Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica — Bennett, Shields and Daniels argue that the relationships between developmental indicators and crime are not linear but have much more variability especially when linked to specific crimes in the Caribbean. In fact, recent data shows that the relationship between unemployment and serious crime, especially murders and kidnappings, in Trinidad and Tobago is largely an inverse one; that is, as unemployment goes down (from 18 to 8 per cent) the crime rate goes up. And as GDP increases, serious crimes also increase. When such results are combined with the fluctuating social class-crime relationships found in another paper in this Reader, we see a clear and necessary duty for Caribbean scholars to re-examine quite carefully the traditional research paradigms in criminology before applying them on Caribbean soil. This is especially so for variables such as social class, gender and ethnicity. John King’s paper on ‘Paradise Lost’ fits the current mood in the Caribbean. With crime, delinquency and the justice system, there is a state of gloom, moderated only by patriotic hopes for a better tomorrow and wiser governments. In comparing Barbados and Jamaica, King instructs us as to how much such tourist- dependent countries can lose by failing to reduce their respective levels of crime and incivility. Paradise will be lost to the criminals. Based on data from nine Caribbean states, Albuquerque and McElroy’s paper inserts a very helpful methodology, the longitudinal technique, to examine crime trends. It is worse than it looks, they assert, and the future does not look quite bright if urgent policy action is not taken. It is very instructive to note that in almost all papers, the appeal for more thoughtful, data-driven public policies in the area of crime and justice keeps being repeated. Trial by jury is a critical pervasive judicial institution across the Commonwealth Caribbean but very rarely subjected to scientific inquiry here. The major reasons are jury secrecy and legal prohibitions. But at the same time, too many miscarriages of justice and jury mistakes have been reaching public attention, many of such concerns emanating from judges themselves. It has always been an intriguing spectacle to see how the legal and judicial system sometimes protects itself from scrutiny by putting up fences around its suspect practices. The jury system needs a serious review in the Caribbean but like in its motherland itself, England, it remains shrouded with so much tradition and myth that public opinion will likely find any drastic change hard to bear. Two of the three papers in Part Seven focuses on the jury. In the first paper, the author illustrates several weaknesses in trial by jury, some procedural, some institutional. The second paper links public opinion with jury behaviour in a widely publicised and very high-controversial manslaughter trial where a senior police officer of African descent was alleged to have killed a young man of East Indian descent. The data presented puts not only the jury on trial but implicitly suggests that the jury itself may be guilty of injustices and vulnerable to courtroom manipulations. But who will bell the cat? These two papers provide a jumpstart for public policy review. The third paper deals with a

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comparison between two criminal justice systems (British and Dutch) by Caribbean Court of Justice judges, Adrian Saunders and Jacob Wit. The time has certainly come for us in the Caribbean to know more about the criminal justice systems of other places and especially if they are working well in areas where we are weak. Justices Saunders and Wit do us such a service, especially when we consider the role of the jury under the British judicial system. Part Eight brings us to the drug trade and public policy. First, King examines the extent to which there could be cooperation between Caribbean states and the United States particularly, especially when faced with such treaties as ‘the Ship-Rider’ Agreement. Then, Horace A. Bartilow raises a very critical argument about the extent to which current drug policies, especially by the United States in the Caribbean and Latin America, are really worth it. His paper certainly does not bring closure to this very important question but it does open the doors for further examination and, hopefully, our eyes to a new way at looking at this growing problem of drug trafficking and public policy. Terrorism has not as yet hit the Caribbean in its more dastardly and virulent forms such as the destruction of the World Trade Centre Towers or the train bombings in London or Spain. But the Caribbean has had its share. We have had two bouts of serious terrorism-type political violence. Among the conditions which define terrorism are enforcing change through political violence and the instigation of fear. The two papers in Part Nine remind us of these two episodes, the first one in Grenada in l979 when the People’s Revolutionary Army staged a coup against the government and the subsequent United States’ intervention (also called ‘invasion’ by the antagonists) in Grenada in l983. In that paper (Deosaran), the ‘Politics of a Caribbean Revolution’, the PRG’s justification and the accompanying violence are reflected in the long battle between the revolutionary government in Grenada (PRG) and the privately-owned Caribbean media, a close ally of the United States. The second paper on the Muslimeen insurrection in Trinidad examines how a culture of lawlessness and public policy carelessness could unwittingly contribute, in fact, fuel, a violent insurrection against the government. Lives were lost in Trinidad and many more in Grenada. Both groups, Grenada’s PRG and Trinidad’s Muslimeen, have been described as ‘terrorists’ by several sections of the Caribbean population, especially Caribbean governments. But several other groups, especially some labour unions and community-based organisations, saw them differently. Such distinction brings to mind the saying that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’ The interesting feature for Caribbean criminology in both violent episodes is the justification provided by the rebels themselves. In both cases, they saw themselves as ‘crusaders for the people,’ and not as architects of violence. The last section in this Reader, Part Ten, throws a wide perspective on victimisation in the Caribbean. We move from Joseph, Henriques and Morris’s paper on the victimisation wrought by human trafficking in the Dominican Republic, then an unusual look by Norris and Bergdahl at demography and ‘road

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risks’ in Jamaica, to Chadee and Ditton’s paper on fear of crime as a form of crime victimisation. These three papers, like many of the above ones, do point the way towards a new look at some old problems in the Caribbean. For university lecturers, researchers, policymakers, students, journalists and concerned citizens, this Reader should stimulate not only fresh ways in understanding and reducing crime, delinquency and violence in the Caribbean but also encourage governments and policymakers to respond more thoughtfully and urgently to the serious challenges now facing Caribbean people. And of course, to all my professional colleagues near and far who so willingly and dutifully supplied me with their papers for this Reader, I say thanks very much. To my long-standing friend and well-respected colleague and criminologist, Professor Todd Clear, I express my very warm appreciation for writing that all- important Foreword to this historic publication for Caribbean Criminology. Finally, I wish to express my deep appreciation to Ian Ramdhanie for the consistently diligent and responsible manner in which he assisted me with this compilation of papers. To Vidya Lall, for her ever-ready support and care in seeing that this Reader is brought to successful completion, I express my deep gratitude. I also wish to convey my appreciation to Kathy-Ann Belmar-Thomas and Toni Hinds for their valuable administrative support. My thanks also go out to the other members of our publication support staff, Nikita Dindial, Rainah Seepersad, Petal Sampson and Tennille Fanovich.

August, 2006

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acronyms and abbreviations

ACCP Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ANOVA Analysis of Variance AP Associated Press BOOT Build, Own, Operate, Transfer BWS Battered Woman’s Syndrome CANA Caribbean News Agency CARICOM Caribbean Community CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIB Criminal Investigations Bureau CICAD The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission CID Criminal Investigation Department CJRA Criminal Justice Reform Act COIN Center for Integral Orientation and Investigation (Centro de Orientación e Investigación Integral) CONAPRO Matagalpa Division of the Union of Professional Workers CPBA Caribbean Publishers and Broadcasters Association CPC Caribbean Press Council DCSJ Department of Correctional Services of Jamaica DEA Drug Enforcement Agency DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid DPP Director of Public Prosecutions DUI Driving Under the Influence DWB Driving While Black ECSC Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court ELN National Liberation Army (Spanish Acronym) FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Spanish Acronym) FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations GAWU Guyana Agricultural Workers Union GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product HIV Human Immuno-deficiency Virus IACHR Inter-American Commission of Human Rights IAPA Inter-American Press Association ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ILO International Labour Organisation

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IMF International Monetary Fund INIM Nicaraguan Women’s Institute INSSBI Social Security Institute INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organisation IOM International Organisation for Migration IPEC International Program on the Elimination of Child Labour IT Information Technology JCF Jamaica Constabulary Force JDF Jamaica Defence Force JLP Jamaican Labour Party KMA Kingston Metropolitan Area LACSI Law on Adjudication and Conditional Suspension of Imprisonment LDC Lesser Developed Countries MED Masters in Education MLAT Mutual-Legal-Assistance-Treaty MOE Ministry of Education MVQ Maudsley Violence Questionnaire NAA Netherlands Antilles and Aruba NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NAR National Alliance for Reconstruction NGOs Non Governmental Organisations NHA National Housing Authority (now HDC – Housing Development Corporation) NIJ National Institute of Justice NJM New Jewel Movement NNP New National Party NWICO New World Information and Communication Order OAS Organisation of American States OB Home for Older Boys OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States ONCD Office of National Drug Control Policy OPF Family Orientation and Protection PATHS Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies PCA Police Complaints Authority PERF Police Executive Research Foundation PI Preliminary Inquiry PICTS Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles PNC People’s National Congress PNM People’s National Movement PNP People’s National Party POM Privately-Owned Media

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PPP People’s Progressive Party PRG People’s Revolutionary Government RSS Regional Security System SEMP Secondary Education Modernisation Programme Servol Service Volunteer for All SET Students Expressing Truth SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences UF United Force UK United Kingdom ULF United Labour Front UN United Nations UNC United National Congress UNESCO United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNHCHR The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights UNHCR The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICA The Association of Caribbean Universities and Research Institutes UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UPI United Press International URP Unemployment Relief Programme US United States USVI US Virgin Islands UTEP University of Texas at el Paso UVLM United Vendors Liberation Movement UWI University of the West Indies VAWA Violence Against Women Act WHO World Health Organisation WSU Wright State University YB Home for Young Boys YG Home for Young Girls YOT Youth Offending Team YRBS Youth Risk Behaviour Survey YTEPP Youth Training and Employment Partnership Programme

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caribbean criminology Theoretical Directions

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Towards a INTRODUCTION Caribbean The scientific study of crime and deviant behaviour in the Caribbean as an 1 Criminology independent field of inquiry in its own right is long overdue. This absence in the Kenneth Pryce Caribbean of an intellectual tradition concerned with systematic investigation into the forces of law, disorder and social control is conspicuous in view of the fact that apparent in the Caribbean for a long time now, have been all the anomic features of the universally increasing crime rate, now regarded as a world phenomenon, rather than a problem peculiar only to more developed metropolitan societies. As Dudley Allen, Commissioner of the Jamaica Department of Correctional Services has put it:

‘Crime and the fear of crime affect the quality of life for millions of people in the world. In a great many countries, rich and poor, north and south, criminality is influencing where people live, how they behave and what bonds of……… community and personal interdependence they decide to establish…… the disproportionate crime of today and the ways in which it begins to distort the patterns of national and community life makes it a distinct threat to the social structure from which it has emerged’2.

THE CONCERN WITH CRIME IN THE CARIBBEAN

The neglect of the study of crime is particularly hard to justify in the Third World

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context of the Caribbean where it is generally recognised that a relationship exits between ‘modernisation’ and crime; and where, particularly in some of the Anglophone Caribbean territories, the rapid intensification of violence, lawlessness and ‘white collar’ corruption in the contemporary period, has brought in its wake instability, economic ruin and mass fear and nervousness. These developments should not be taken for granted nor condoned as the inevitable price we pay for modernisation and development. On the contrary, there are issues that cry out for analysis and interpretation as part and parcel of capitalist underdevelopment and dependency in the region and should be the concern not only of the politician, the jurist and the policymaker, but the sociologist and other social scientists as well. One response to the increasing problems of crime and lawlessness in the Caribbean is the growing recognition in official circles of the need to understand our crime problems scientifically. Evidence for this lies in the fact that in 1975 a Caribbean Crime Conference was held at The University of the West Indies (UWI), Mona, to discuss issues relating to the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and, as late as January, 1976 the Association of Caribbean Universities and Research Institutes (UNICA) sponsored a ‘workshop’ of Caribbean professionals and academics who met at Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, to look into the whole business of the escalation of crime and violence in the Caribbean and to consider the possibility of an exchange of information on the subject by the different territories. The French, Dutch, Spanish and English-speaking countries of the region were all represented at the workshop whose participants included professionals from, Jamaica, Guyana, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana, the Virgin Islands and Suriname. All participants at the conference underscored the singular lack of material on the historical and sociological aspects of crime in Caribbean societies and the need to study and evaluate the problems associated with the incidents of crime from a Caribbean perspective.

THE IDEA OF CARIBBEAN CRIMINOLOGY

In view of the many worsening problems now facing us in our streets, in our police stations, in our courts and in our corridors of power, such moves at an official level are more than welcome. However, this burgeoning of intellectual curiosity into the conditions of criminality and lawlessness should not be allowed to develop in a purely policy oriented, pragmatic ad hoc fashion, divorced from the emerging indigenous scholarship of Caribbean intellectual now developing and dedicated to radically uncovering the vexed problems of power, poverty and underdevelopment that plague the Antilles. What is needed then is a Criminology that is pan-Caribbean in scope, a Caribbean Criminology grounded in the bedrock of conditions peculiar to the region that attempts to illuminate the nature and

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causation of crime and deviancy within a totality of our historical and contemporary experiences. A Caribbean Criminology will not in any way be a theoretically unique criminology, since even in respect of the nature and types of deviance and illegality Caribbean societies share much with other class-stratified capitalist and neo- capitalist societies in the contemporary world. Nonetheless, a Caribbean Criminology would need to examine the reality of crime from a critical standpoint in the context of the region’s history of capitalist repression and exploitation, and in terms of the Caribbean’s cultural heritage of black working class styles of protest and modes of response to oppression, through slavery down to the present stage of neo-colonialism. Above all, it would be Criminology viewing criminal acts from the standpoint of local conditions and not in terms of the frames of reference and purely bourgeois assumptions of the establishment of the local metropolitan-oriented ruling elite.

TRADITIONAL CRIMINOLOGY VS. THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY

I would like now to suggest in a preliminary fashion the lines along which a Caribbean Criminology could develop as a sub field of academic sociology as well as some of the technical insights that could be explored as a foundation for the development of such a field of study. A theoretical foundation for a Caribbean Criminology can be found in the perspective of the New Criminology which is now a feature of modern criminological thought in Sociology (Taylor, Walton, Young, 1973). To explain what the New Criminology is, it is necessary to contrast it briefly with Traditional Criminology, its theoretical opposite. Traditional criminology concentrates on the deviant as an individual and seeks to correct his behaviour to bring him back in line with society as it exists. The deviant is seen as ‘sick,’ ‘evil,’ or ‘bad,’ while the existing rules of society and the status quo are, on the whole, taken for granted and regarded as being basically good and sound. Because of the emphasis on ‘correcting’ the behaviour of the individual, within the ideology of the traditional approach, institutions such as prisons, borstals and approved schools, are regarded as ‘houses of correction’. The entire traditional perspective then can be said to be based on the philosophy of correctionalism. And since the emphasis is so much on the individual; there is a strong psychiatric-medical bias and the major concern is with the psychology of individual deviants. Among traditionalists there is also a tendency towards the interpretation of crime and deviancy in purely quantitative and statistical terms, because of the need to appear ‘scientific’ in the presentation of evidence. In contrast, the point of view of the New Criminology is based on a total and structuralist approach to the study of crime in society. Arising as a reaction to the conservative biases in traditional criminology, the quest here is to illuminate crime and all other forms of rule-breaking in terms of a critical and radical

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interpretation of society. The consequence of this is that critical criminologists prefer to work with the more all-embracing perspective of Deviance, which encompasses a wider range of deviant phenomena, including for example, suicide, industrial sabotage, corruption, bureaucratic mismanagement, etc., in addition to deviations from the Criminal Law which represent just one among other systems of rules or forms of social control in society. It is also recognised that deviance can also point to repression or injustice in society, so that groups may consciously choose the deviant path, as a solution to the problems posed by existence in a contradictory society — for example, Hustling (rejection of work and their resulting search for ‘kicks’), homosexuality (the Gay Liberation Movement), Women’s Liberation (burning bras), Black Power Movement (burning cities), students’ demonstration (drug use), Rastafarianism (racial rebellion), the Hippie solution (rejection of the work ethic), etc. Within the new criminology approach, the meaning of deviance is wide and it means more than just ‘crime’ narrowly defined by the Criminal Law. In this expanded conception of deviance, deviance can also mean to alter course, to change, to revolutionise, to diversify, to dodge, to step aside, etc. Furthermore, whereas the ideology of conventional criminology is that of correctionalism, the attitude of deviance theorists is one of appreciation: the situation of the deviant should first be appreciated in its own right, preferably through direct observation (as opposed to a purely statistical approach) before judgement is passed on him. The major tenet of the radical school is that crime (or the criminal) is not treatable apart from society, for crime is as much an expression of individual false consciousness (greed, selfishness) as it is a product of society (poverty, injustice). We have therefore to look more closely at the existing arrangements of society or the type of society in which criminal action is taking place. Such an approach must necessarily involve a study of the class struggle and class interests to determine how these affect criminal behaviour. For crime to be properly illuminated therefore, society has to be studied structurally and theoretically, and not in a piecemeal fashion, along legalistic and pragmatic lines, this more fully social approach has been adopted over purely psychological approach, because radicals believe that only by radically changing society can we ever hope to change behaviour (i.e. criminal or deviant behaviour). Changing society here invariably means changing capitalist society. The assumption is not that socialism would completely abolish crime rather that in socialist society its occurrence would be considerably reduced and the types of crime committed would be quantitatively different. For example, in socialist Cuba where work is compulsory, crimes such as pick-pocketing and larceny are considerably reduced, but ‘loafing’ (or shrinking work) is regarded as a major crime (Loney 1973). Very importantly too, the New Criminology highlights the fact that the individual criminal or deviant is not necessarily ‘sick,’ for deviance and criminality is a matter of social definition. Criminality and the label ‘criminal’ arise out of conflict in society. The conflict is between powerless and politically unorganised

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persons and groups, on the one hand, and powerful, relatively organised propertied social interests, on the other (e.g. the unemployed and weak minorities versus business interests represented by the state). Powerful interests are in the competition with weaker groups and express their will through the state and the laws they enact to protect their interests. Who wins in such conflicts are generally those on the side of those who have the power and that means to stigmatise, to label and to successfully criminalise behaviour as deviant. The losers are those without power to enforce rules and so end up being the victim of the labels and the whole criminalisation and stigmatisation process determined by elite interests. Criminality and deviance are not, therefore, determined by any intrinsic qualities of the individual or of groups (e.g. blackness) but by their relative power in the overall situation in which they interact and struggle. It is evident from the delineation of the above two perspectives that the macroscopic vision of the New Criminology has superior theoretical advantages and that, as a basis for the development of a framework for the sociology of crime, deviance and social control in the Caribbean, it is to be preferred to the largely psychological, legalistic and positivistic orientation of the traditional approach, for it argues for a theoretical understanding of man and criminal action in which the meaning of crime and deviancy is depicted as arising out of the broader context of society generally.

SOME ‘KEY ISSUES’ FOR A CARIBBEAN CRIMINOLOGY

Within this structuralist perspective on crime, a number of problems affecting criminality in the political economy of the Caribbean societies can now be sharply defined as ‘key issues’ or substantive areas requiring investigation and research.

1. ORIGINS OF SOCIO-LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE CARIBBEAN

During the long years of slavery, the control of the slave population was secured through the brutality of the Slave Code. The very plantation system itself was like a ‘prison,’ a ‘total institution’, in which each and every slave was viewed as a potential criminal. According to one source, under the regime of slavery: ‘There were...laws which characterized the slaves as a chattel, to be mortgaged, sold and protected against injury like any other chattel. There were laws which required the slave to wear particular garments which identified him. There were laws that forbade assemblies generally and on particular occasions such as funerals…Such laws also had the effect of preventing the slave from going to church and being infected with the ideas of liberty and equality. There were...laws forbidding slaves from carrying weapons and permitting the homes of slaves to be searched. There were laws which differentiated between the types of punishment which followed similar injuries to whites and non-whites respectively.

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These laws…tended to sharpen the distinction between black and white and to foster the notion of race as a determinant of status in West Indian society’ (Connell 1971). Now despite the legal abolition of race-slavery in the Caribbean, the economic and social status of blacks in the post emancipation period remained substantially the same (Girvan 1975) and abolition brought with it no economic transformation — only a change in the basis of exploiting black labour. The ex-slave population now experienced dispossession through taxation and harassment which forced them into a new situation where they were exploited as landless and wage-earning labourers in a colonial economy still linked to the then industrialising world of the capitalist North Atlantic countries. And once again, the laws governing the masses reflected the economic interests of the colonial ruling class among whom politico-economic power remained highly concentrated. In the social economy of exploitation thus established, racism became further institutionalised and continued to play an important function, not only in ideologically legitimising the politico-economic hegemony of the whites and fragmenting the labour force in the service of capitalist accumulation, but also in stigmatising the genetic. Within this scenario, blacks were viewed as innately criminal3 and their lower class institutions vilified as ‘deviant’ and illegal, even though, in some instances, as in the case of obeah and ganja use, such practices were, (and still are) ‘reinforced by a great deal of positive ethical and religious sentiment’ (Thwaites 1971). For instance, Lowenthal has commented with some alarm that: ‘What distinguishes Caribbean legal systems is that those discriminated against constitute the great majority’.3 Lowenthal further observed that:

The [West Indian] masses see formal law as an elite weapon and the police as their natural enemies: the elite expect and get preferential treatment. When the ... offender against the law is black the police approach as rude; if he is white the police approach, if they do at all, with trepidation and respect, and at times, even with apology. Lower class blacks charged with an offence are assumed to be lying; only white people do not lie.3

Viewing the law as an elite weapon, the poor in the Caribbean sometimes react by not cooperating with the police, by seldom invoking legal processes and by according prestige to individual members of their own working class communities for their continuous success in circumventing the law also by mythicizing them as “folk-heroes”.

Today, the socio-legal disabilities of the masses are also reflected in the many laws (Public Order Acts, Labour Laws, Emergency Acts, Sedition Laws, Dangerous Drugs Laws, etc.) designed to restrain the working class and coerce it into disobedience. The current tendency of Caribbean governments to resort to provisions in the law to restrain and crush popular discontent in the name of “law and order,” is

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an expansion of their failure to radically restructure their economies and improve the lot of the broad mass of the people. This is an area of concern in the Caribbean experience which would fall within the scope of analysis of a Caribbean sociology of crime and social control.

Also requiring the urgent attention of criminologists is the undermining of justice in the administratively anachronistic criminal justice system of the territories of the region through which our ‘deviants’ and litigants pass, most of whom are of working-class origin. The problems here include such matters as poor accommodation in courts, unduly lengthy trials, corruption, lack of adequate legal aid facilities for poor litigants, the high cost of legal fees, and the unspeakably dehumanising and substandard conditions in our prisons etc.

‘MODERNISATION’ AND CRIME

The orthodox view point is that crime in developing countries is the product of ‘social change’, the manifestation in these societies of the transition from a traditional to a modern stage of development (Clinard and Abbott 1973). In this view modernisation is a disruptive, transforming experience involving urbanisation, industrialisation and depopulation of the country side, which in turn engenders imbalances such as overcrowding, alienation and anomie in the city. In these conditions of ‘social disorganisation’, individuals become prey to crime, vice and illegality, because the restraining effects of traditional social bonds have been broken. The city especially, is presumed to have a corrupting and demoralising effect on individuals. This is a romantic view of crime and development which obscures and mystifies the process of becoming deviant. Against the position stated above, I would like to advance a contrary view, that in the Third World the rising crime rate is not a product of modernisation per se, but a symptom of a particular type of development based on exploitation and the ‘development of under-development’ such as has been in evidence in the capitalist societies of the Caribbean for the past quarter century (with the exception of Cuba). Our profit centred pattern of economic development enriches the few (through corruption and privilege) and disposes the many (through unemployment) which in turn leads to a diversity of survival strategies based on pimping, hustling, pushing, scrunting, prostitution, violence and wretchedness. The table below states the level of unemployment, official and unofficial, in a number of Caribbean territories where in recent years, the general rate of unemployment has been around 20–50 per cent.

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TABLE 1.1 UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN4

Antigua - official (1973) 45% Aruba - official (1971) 16% Barbados - official (1973) 13-15% Bermuda - unofficial (1974) 10-12% Cayenne - official (1974) 60% Curacao - official (1971) 20% - official (1974) 30% Dominica - unofficial (1974) 50% Dominican - official (Balaguer 1971) 33% Republic - unofficial (1973) 45% Grenada - unofficial (1974) 50% Guyana - unofficial (1974) 25% -official (1974) 18% Jamaica -unofficial (1974) 25-30% Martinique - official (1970) 50% - official (1973) 11% Puerto Rico - unofficial (1973) 30-40% St. Vincent - unofficial (1973) 40% - official (1974) 30% Suriname - unofficial (1974) 30% - official (1974) 15% Trinidad - unofficial (1974) 20-25%

The magnitude of the problem here is easily appreciated when it is understood that in the advanced capitalist societies, a mere seven per cent unemployment is regarded as a state of economic crisis. The main victims of unemployment in the Caribbean are the young, and mostly males, that is, the major categories are unemployed, underemployed, and overrepresented in the criminal statistics, in Jamaica for example, 42 per cent of young people in the under 34 age groups are unemployed (Stone and Brown 1976, 113). In Trinidad and Tobago 20–25 per cent of the labour force are unemployed and 60 per cent of them are in the 15–25 age bracket (Lowhar 1976, 8). In a piece by Naipaul he speaks of the men in the West Indies, just as ‘drifting through their twenties,’ because of the absence of jobs and meaningful employment. The vulnerability of the position of young people in relation to unemployment and crime needs therefore to be carefully studied, particularly so since the population of the Caribbean, like the population in all Third World countries is a predominantly young one. In Trinidad and Tobago 70 per cent of the entire population is under 35 years of age (Lowhar 1976, 8). The essential point is that the political economy (or the material conditions) is the primary determinant of the social reality of crime which is itself the outcome of inequalities in the distribution of property. Statistics tend to support this

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contention. For example, in all the ‘modernising’ or industrialising territories of the region — that is, the bigger territories, excluding Cuba — crimes against property show the highest rates of increase, and this is true despite the sensationalism surrounding sexual offences (e.g. Trinidad) and violence (e.g. Jamaica). Crime figures for Guyana2 for instance, reveal that homicide increased from 18.2 per cent of the national total of crimes reported in 1970 to 20 per cent in 1972. However, robbery in the same period rose from 62.1 per cent to 69.8 per cent and fraud increased from 57.3 per cent to 60.8 per cent. In Trinidad the police jubilantly announced that the crime figure showed a reduction in serious crimes for 19765. But interestingly enough, within the overall downward direction of the Trinidad crime rate, property offences, particularly robbery and breaking and entering, showed the highest rates for 1976. The 1976 figures for Tobago show the same trend (Forrester 1976). Figures for Jamaica also show the same pattern of higher rates for property offences6. For instance, in 1963–64 the total cases of burglary, larceny and robbery reported in Kingston and St Andrew were 1,573,483 and 581 respectively. For instance, in 1973–74, the number of larceny cases reported dropped to 2,868, but the number of reported cases of burglary had increased to 3,737 and reported cases of robbery went up to 2,522. The pattern for Puerto Rico is similar2. Between 1973 and 1974, the total Crime Index rose by 9.6 per cent. But while there was actually a decrease in the number of reported cases of murder and forcible rape, reported cases of robbery increased by +864, burglary rose by as much as +4,158 and larceny by as much as +3,527. It has to be pointed out too that in general many of the other types of offences against the person are often committed in the pursuit of property. Of course, official crime statistics are notoriously unreliable (e.g. for every crime known to the police, no doubt at least 100 got unreported). Yet despite their inadequacy, official crime figures still tell a story about the class struggle that ‘the vast bulk of offences for which working class people are imprisoned and punished… have to do with the fact that by virtue of being working class or black, they are without property’ (Taylor, Walton, Young 1973, 35). ‘Modernisation’ in the Caribbean, because it is geared to enriching a few and pauperising the majority merely perpetrated this situation.

CORRUPTION

Moreover, the criminal statistics also expose the class nature of apprehension and punishment in our criminal justice system, for even though public knowledge that graft corruption is commonplace among certain sections of the propertied classes, in practice it is mainly proletarian crimes that are singled out for punishment (as evidenced by the categories in the statistics), while middle class deviants as a rule go undetected and unpunished. And as this bias exists despite the fact that illicit gains appropriated through fraud, embezzlement and illegal business practices far exceed those attributable to burglaries, larceny and petty

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thefts. For instance, the Lockheed scandal7 — uncovering bribes of up to $22-4 m (US) stretching over three countries and involving ‘super’ dignitaries of at least eight countries, including Colombia — came at the tail end of a wider series of disclosures in 1975 which established as a fact that in general most of the US under-the-table-payments to accomplices abroad, go to the ‘middle level officials and leaders of small and developing countries where corruption is a way of life’. Colombia’s involvement in Lockheed in particular, revealed that the existence of corporate bribery often commits poor nations to exorbitant expenditures they do not really need: for Colombian air force generals, enticed by bribes, had falsified their country’s defence budget and justified their expensive purchases from Lockheed in the name of ‘national security’. Members of the bourgeois in developing countries are frequently bribed to put a US company’s interest ahead of the interests of their own country. Such corrupt practices by Third World ‘kleptocrats’ and other ‘robber barons,’ serve to facilitate penetration of US imperialism in the colonial world and illustrate that the lawmakers are often themselves the law-breakers. That such activities are tolerated and allowed to flourish without the stigma of crime attached to them should be a matter of utmost theoretical importance to the Caribbean criminologists, for a criminology that sensationalises and predicts too much proletarian crimes, while ignoring bourgeois white collar ‘rip-off’ and crookery, can have no place in a developing society sworn against imperialism.

THE LUMPENPROLETARIAT

A further area that needs to be explored in developing a relevant criminology is the growth of an ‘instutionalized lumpenproletariat’ in our cities due to massive unemployment arising from capital-intensive industrialisation (as well as indirect export of some of this problem through migration to the cities of the metropoles). Manifestations of the growth of the lumpen stratum locally can be seen in the fact that in the ranks of the urban dispossessed, the struggle for survival in recent years has assumed very ferocious and violent dimensions. The most dramatic instance of where this is happening in the Caribbean today (though not the only one) is the urban slums of Kingston, Jamaica. Moreover, recent Caribbean history has shown that the lumpenproletariat elements in our cities — our gangsters, hustlers, bad johns and petty criminals — can no longer be regarded as totally lacking in ‘political’ significance, some traditional Marxists would have it. For nowadays they provide a crucial rank and file support for parliamentary political parties and corrupt political leaders (e.g. Gairy’s mongoose gang) and, when armed, are capable of wreaking havoc and destruction. In Jamaica in 1974, for instance, ‘shooting with intent’ increased by 1,900 per cent and murders went up by almost 400 per cent. Gun Murders accounted for at least 50 per cent of all murders, while 70 per cent of all murders were committed in Kingston2. In 1968, the Walter Rodney affair triggered off looting and arson in Kingston which resulted in

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£1,000,000 damage to property and the death of three persons (Monroe 1972, 119). The urban crisis in Jamaica had become so acute that the controversial Gun Court Act was passed in March 1974 as a ‘shock technique’ to curb gun crimes and maintain ‘law and order’. The sections of the Jamaican community that are now armed include affluent middle class residents who live in constant fear of reprisals from the dispossessed and the unemployed who are also armed. Between 1965 and now, a State of Emergency has been declared twice. Bob Marley, the international famous Reggae singer, (the superstar of the Third World) was recently shot down by gunmen in Kingston and some of his tunes, one of which predicts ‘war,’ have been banned by a radio station in Jamaica. The lumpenproletariat has to be seen in the light of the controversy concerning their role in the anti-capitalist and anti-colonial struggles. Some writers, including many Marxists still fell that lumpens are little more than parasites, betraying elements of instability, self–enrichment and greed, who prey on the ‘crumbs’ from the total distribution of the social product. No doubt the actions of lumpens depend on the existing political situation — for example, whether or not a viable revolutionary organisation exists that can effectively articulate the grievances and constructively canalise their otherwise anarchic and nihilistic energies (Stone 1973, 149) after all, the experience of Cuba, Algeria and Black Power Movement in the USA has shown that the lumpenproletariat is not inherently anti- revolutionary8 (Lewis 1976, Worsely 1972). Among the writers who have been concerned with rethinking9 the role of lumpens in Third World struggles, none has been more positive and optimistic as Fanon who has gone as far as to suggest that the lumpenproletariat constitutes one of the most militant elements among the urban oppressed strata. He wrote:

It is in this mass of humanity, this people of the shanty towns, at the core of the lumpenproletariat, that the rebellion will find its urban spearhead. For the lumpenproletariat, that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe and from their clan, constitute one of the revolutionary forces of colonialized people. (9: 103)

METROPOLITAN THEORIES VS. A CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVE

Finally, in developing a theory of deviance for the Caribbean, we should be wary of the wholesale importation of the metropolitan models of explanation based, sometimes, on outdated research conducted in the USA and Britain where conditions are dissimilar to our own. In this regard, overseas theories of crime and delinquency offering a purely cultural explanation are the most suspect. Examples of these are the views on juvenile delinquency expressed by such scholars as Walter Miller (1958), Peter Wilson (1969), Wolfgang and Ferracuiti (of ‘subculture violence’ fame) (1967) and to a lesser extent Ulf Hannerz (1969) and Oscar Lewis

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who developed the ‘culture of poverty’ thesis (1976). The gist of this tradition of theorisation is that lower class delinquent boys, far from being deviant in their acts of maliciousness, vandalism, petty theft and drug use, are in fact acting in conformity with the values of their own ‘lower class struggle’ which is a ‘long established, distinctively patterned tradition with an integrity of its own’. In this view, the values of delinquent boys do not necessarily oppose them to the standards of the dominant culture; instead their behaviour is seen as normal in terms of the milieu to which they are accustomed and in which they have been reared, even though their behaviour conflicts with the official values of society. It is also argued that delinquent boys are generally from female-dominated households; therefore they are drawn to ‘street corner’ sociability which socialises them in typical ghetto values of toughness, violence, ‘kicks’, drug use, sexual prowess, smart talk, smart dress and excessive drinking, etc. Yet in maintaining these ‘delinquent’ attitudes, street corner life provides opportunities for boys to learn aspects of the male role which have been denied them by virtue of their membership of households where men are either absent or frequent only irregularly. Another writer, David Matza (1964) argues that delinquent boys merely accentuates pleasure-loving attitudes of ‘kicks’ and thrilling-seeking, etc. which are commonly held values even among the work-conscious bourgeois who however differ in that they tend to confine their subterranean activities to special occasions such as fetes and carnival etc., whereas delinquent boys practice them as a way of life. They therefore suffer from ‘bad timing’ as they are impervious to the workday rule that there is a time and place for everything. This is possible for them, Matza points out, because juvenile delinquents justify their deviance by the use of verbal techniques of neutralisation (‘I’m sick,’ ‘everybody uses drugs,’ ‘we weren’t hurting anyone’), which neutralise and weaken the moral bind of the middle class ideology on them. Such theories are obviously deficient in respect of their lack of appreciation of the structural origins of delinquency and delinquent subcultures. In contrast to these writers, Cohen (1955) and Cloward and Ohlin (1960) come closer to outlining a view of delinquency which might be applicable to the Caribbean environment, for they discuss the experience of delinquent subcultures in terms of class situation of the working class boys, with reference to their restricted life chances and the frustration attendant upon their inability to measure up to the middle class aspirations, particularly in schools, which are run by middle class teachers committed to conventional values of success and achievement. For these writers, particularly Cloward and Ohlin, the delinquent solution is a ‘collective’ response and is only possible when lower class boys attain a consciousness in which they blame the system for their failure rather than themselves. These writers also tend to portray delinquent gangs as militant opposition groups that are distinguishable by their apartness and the distinctiveness in their way of life. Yet, however successful is the approach of Cohen and Cloward and Ohlin in illuminating the problem of delinquency in

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the US, they are often of limited theoretical utility when applied to the Caribbean, because the disaffection and style of protest of the Caribbean lower class youth cannot be adequately explained without an understanding of our experience of racism and neo-colonial poverty and the situation of the ‘sufferer’ in contemporary Caribbean society. In the Caribbean (and Afro-America) ‘street life’ and delinquency are the products of a system that simultaneously deny men jobs and stigmatise them racially, thereby defining them as outsiders not only to the system as a whole but also in relation to their own families, since they are deprived of the means to discharge their obligations as breadwinners10. But this entire condition originated with race-slavery and has persisted to the present era of mass unemployment. Thus in the Caribbean the subculture of the street has not only given rise to values (delinquency) and institutions (‘groundings,’ ‘liming’ on the block) through which men and youths inarticulately try to regain their manhood lost in ‘shitwork’ or through unemployment11, it also generated politico- expressional idioms such as Calypso, Reggae, pan music and the millenarian reaction of Rastafarian and ‘dreadness’ which have been more consciously expressive of an ideology of resistance against the imperialist power structure12 (Nettleford 1970, Monroe 1972). Delinquency in the Caribbean then, is a phenomenon of some complexity intimately fused with politics and liberation struggles. To adopt foreign models, in which the phenomenon is either ‘de- racialised’ or viewed in purely cultural terms, is merely to trivialise the problem and divorce it from its structural and historical context.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, my purpose has been to show that Criminology as an academic discipline is an undeveloped field of study in the Caribbean scholarship and it has been noted that this is a curious state of affairs, given the rising crime rate in the Third World generally and the escalating problems of violence, corruption and petty criminality in territories of the Anglophone Caribbean in particular. A brief sketch of the radical perspective in modern criminological thought is given and counterposed to the traditionalist viewpoint, and it suggests that the former approach holds out greater promise for the development of a criminology of relevance to the Caribbean that can look at crime broadly, critically and theoretically in terms of the overall historical, social and economic framework of the region. In stating the case for a meaning full theory of deviance suitable to the Caribbean experience, certain key areas (though by no means the only ones) have been singled out for special attention to indicate the possible dimensions of the field and the scope of the scholarship required.

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REFERENCES

Albert, C. 1955. Delinquent Boys. Glencoe ICC: Free Press. Anonymous. 1975. ‘Unemployment and the Unemployed – Part II: Unemployment in an Appendage Economy’. Caribbean Dialogue 1, 11 (Oct.). Association of Caribbean Universities and Research Institutes (UNICA). 1976. Crime and Violence in the Caribbean. Committee Report. UNICA Social Development Project: P.O. Box 12269, University Station, Gainsville, Florida 32604. Cloward, R.A. and Ohlin, L.E. 1960. Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs. New York: The Free Press. Connell, J.1971. ‘The Law and the Solution for Sociological Problems’. In Caribbean Background III. Barbados: Centre for Multi-racial Studies. Department of Correctional Services, Kingston Jamaica – Statistical Analysis of Crime for Jamaica. Eldridge, C. On Lumpen Ideology (n.d.) Express December 29, 1976. Fanon, F. 1965. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Forrester, K. 1976. ‘Why Isn’t There a Crime Problem in Tobago?’ Course Work, Sociology Department, UWI, St Augustine. Girvan, N. 1975. Aspects of the Political Economy of Race in the Caribbean and in the Americas. Working Paper, No. 7. UWI, ISER, Mona, Jamaica. Hannerz, U. 1969. Soulside – Inquiries in Ghetto Culture and Community. Colombia University Press. Lewis, O. 1976. La Vida. Culture of Poverty Thesis. Panther Books. Loney, M.1973. ‘Social Control in Cuba’. In Politics and Deviance, Ian Taylor and Laurie Taylor. Pelican Books. Lowenthal, D. West Indian Societies. Lowhar, S.1976. ‘Youth Revolt and Williams’ Tactics’. The Caribbean Contact: 8. Marshall, B.C. and Abbott, J.D. 1973. Crime in Developing Countries – A Comparative Perspective. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Matza, D. 1964. Delinquency and Drift. New York: Wiley. Miller, W.1958. ‘Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency’. Journal of Social Issues 4, no.3. Munroe, T.1972. The Politics of Constitutional Decolonization Jamaica, 1944–1962. UWI ISER, Mona, Jamaica. Nettleford, R. 1970. ‘Mirror, Mirror – The Trinity of Race, Protest and Identity in Jamaica’. Collins Stangster (Jamaica) Ltd. Pryce, K. Forthcoming. ‘Endless Pressure – A Study of West Indian Life-styles’. In Bristol. Penguin. Richard, C. and Ohlin, L. 1960. Delinquency and Opportunity. New York: Free Press. Stone, C. 1973. Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica. UWI Mona, Jamaica: ISER. Stone, C. and Brown, A. 1976. Essays on Power and Change in Jamaica. UWI, Mona: Extra- Mural Department and the Department of Government. Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J. 1973. Critical Criminology, R.K.P. ___.1973. ‘For a Social Theory of Deviance, R.K.P’ .The New Criminology.

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Thwaites, R.1971. ‘Jamaica Dangerous Drugs Laws: In the Absence of a West Indian Jurisprudence’. Jamaica Law Journal. Time Magazine. 1973. The Big Pay Off. Lockheed Scandal: Graft around the Globe. February 23. White, G. ‘Rudie, Oh Rudie’. Caribbean Quarterly 3, no. 3. Wilson, P. 1969. ‘Reputation and Respectability: A Suggestion for Caribbean Ethnography’. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 4, no.1. Wolfgang, M. and Ferracuiti, F. 1967. Subculture of Violence. London: Tavistock. Worsely, P.1972. ‘Frantz Fanon and the Lumpenproletariat’. Socialist Register.

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Issues, Volume 2, No. 2, Extra-Mural Unit (now School of Continuing Studies), The University of the West Indies, St Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, August, 1976, p. 3–21, with permission. 2. Association of Caribbean Universities and Research Institutes (UNICA): Crime and Violence in the Caribbean. Committee Report of Workshop proceeding held Jan. 31– Feb. 2, 1976, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, UNICA, Social Development through Communication Projects. Published by UNICA Social Development Project, P.O. Box 12269, University Station, Gainsville, Florida 32604. 3. David Lowenthal: West Indian Societies. (Section on Legal Institutions). 4. Caribbean Dialogue, Vol. 1, No. 2 October 1975. “Unemployment and the Unemployed – Part II: Unemployment in an Appendage Economy” p.11 5. Express (Trinidad and Tobago), December 29, 1976. 6. Department of Correctional Services, Kingston Jamaica – Statistical Analysis of Crime for Jamaica 7. “The Big Pay Off. Lockheed Scandal: Graft Around the Globe.” Time Magazine February 23, 1973. 8. Eldridge Cleaver: On Lumpen Ideology (n.d.) 9. Fanon, Peter Worsely, Elridge Cleaver etc. 10. The point has been fully grasped by Eliot Liebow in his book, Tally’s Corner which is a study of black American ghetto males in a Washington, D.C. community. Liebow sees the problem of black street corner men as being primarily economic and was sensitive enough to include in this book a chapter entitled “Men and Jobs”. Liebow describes the effect on street corner men of inferior job roles in the following way:

The streetcorner man is under continuous assault by his job experiences and job fears. His experiences and fears feed on one another. The kind of job he can get – and frequently only after fighting for it, if then – steadily confirms his fears, depresses his self-confidence and self-esteem until finally, terrified of an opportunity even if one presents itself, he stands defeated by his experiences, his belief in his own self-worth destroyed and his fears a confirmed reality.

And the streetcorner man’s position in relation to the institution of marriage has

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been depicted by Liebow thus:

Thus, Marriage is an occasion of failure. To stay married is to live with your failure, to be confronted with it day in and day out, it is to live in a world whose standards of maleness are forever beyond one’s reach, where one is continually tested and challenged and continually found wanting. In self- defense, the husband retreats to the street corner. Here where the measure of a man is continually smaller, and where weaknesses are somehow turned upside down and almost magically transformed into strengths, he can be, once again, a man among men, (Eliot Liebow: Tally’s Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men. Little, Brown, 1967, p.71 and pp.135–36).

Liebow believes that if the problem represented by these men is to be solved; they must be given economically valuable skills and full opportunity to use them. In the appendage economies of the Caribbean (with the exception of Cuba), imperialist domination and the resultant foreign-controlled nature of the industrialisation process at present preclude any possibility of an effective amelioration of the condition of the un-employed and under-employed along the lines suggested above by Liebow — a realization which further increases the alienation of our delinquent streetcorner youths and intensifies their demand for “revolution”.

11. Kenneth Pryce: Endless Pressure — A Study of West Indian Life-styles in Bristol. Penguin (Forthcoming). 12. Garth White: “Rudie, Oh Rudie” in Caribbean Quarterly, Vol. 3. No. 3.

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By Your INTRODUCTION

Theories You In 1976, the late Ken Pryce wrote a Shall Be Known: ground breaking article in which he called Some Reflections for the development of a Caribbean criminology. In his view, the ‘intensification on Caribbean of violence, lawlessness and “white collar” 1 Criminology corruption’ urgently required, ‘[t]he scientific study of crime and deviant behaviour in the Caribbean as an Christopher Birkbeck independent field of inquiry in its own right’ (1976, 3). While applauding official concern over the growing crime problem, Pryce argued that academic research was also a necessary part of the search for solutions. Such research ‘should be the concern not only of the politician, the jurist and the policy-maker, but the sociologist and other social scientists as well’ (1976, 3). As the core of Caribbean criminology, Pryce proposed the ‘New Criminology’ (see Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973) that was attracting much attention among researchers elsewhere, because it offered ‘superior theoretical advantages...as a basis for the development of a framework for the sociology of crime, deviance and social control in the Caribbean’ (1976, 7). Twenty years later, other criminologists took up the matter of a Caribbean criminology. Richard Bennett and James Lynch (1996) identified five characteristics of Caribbean societies that, in their view, rendered existing major theories of crime inapplicable in the region. These were the timing of the development process, the small size of Caribbean nations, the salience of tourism in many Caribbean economies, the presence of the illegal drug trade, and the

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relative immaturity of political and social institutions. The authors concluded,

It may well be that with sufficient attention and thought, existing theories can be adapted to include more transparently the situations currently confronting Caribbean nations. At present, they do not. We argue that this inability to account for the five areas of uniqueness of the Caribbean constitutes a plausible argument, on intellectual grounds, for the creation of a sub-discipline of criminology: Caribbean criminology (1996, 15).

In the same year, Maureen Cain compiled a collection of essays on crime and justice in the Caribbean with the title ‘For a Caribbean Criminology’ (Caribbean Quarterly, 1996). In her introductory essay, she warned against, ‘that deferential relationship with western theory which assumes it to be right even when it does not fit local experiences, which presents it as received wisdom even when it has no relevance’ (Cain, 1996a, ii). Citing examples from the research included in her compilation, Cain argued that,

Caribbean criminologists must engage with [western criminology] instrumentally as we explore the concrete reality of Caribbean experiences: we may use it, supplement it, and let it be our springboard, as well as challenging it, transgressing it, and replacing it (1996a, i; emphasis in original).

Finally, in 1997, Ramesh Deosaran and Derek Chadee offered some brief comments on the nature of Caribbean criminology, with specific reference to the study of juvenile delinquency. Noting that the empirical status of delinquency theories developed outside the Caribbean is by no means unequivocal, Deosaran and Chadee concluded that ‘whatever form or shape a “Caribbean Criminology” eventually takes, it will not be entirely immune or so distinct from theory already developed elsewhere. It will be more likely a matter of theoretical integration, without reinventing the wheel’ (1997, 40–41). It is interesting that these authors discussed the identity of Caribbean criminology in relation to theory. Such a strategy for the examination of identity is, perhaps, not surprising. Theories represent the most general statements about the subject we are studying, capable (hopefully) of subsuming multiple and diverse sets of empirical circumstances. They also express the analytical orientation of a discipline through the explanations — or linkages between variables — that they propose. The facts of crime and criminal justice can be studied from different viewpoints — for example, the aesthetics of crimes, the budgetary procedures of criminal justice — but criminology has carved out its identity in relation to the causes of crime, and the causes of social control (Black 1983). As a discipline, criminology gains identity through its theories. It is therefore reasonable to expect that discussions about the nature and rationale for sub disciplines — whether cast in terms of a substantive or geographic

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focus (Bennett and Lynch, 1996, 8) — centre on theory. And the key question for researchers interested in Caribbean criminology concerns the appropriate content and direction of theoretical work among scholars working in and on the Caribbean. As my review of prior opinions reveals, there is no consensus regarding this question. Pryce advocated the adoption of an existing theoretical framework (critical criminology), whereas Bennett and Lynch felt that existing theories do not fit. Cain, and Deosaran and Chadee, took intermediate positions, thinking that some existing theories might be relevant and some might not. In this paper, I address the possibilities awaiting theoretical criminology in the Caribbean. In so doing, I attempt to clarify and answer some of the points raised by the authors that have gone before me, and also add a proposal for theoretical analysis that has not been mentioned by others. Beyond an ongoing interest in the development of regional criminologies (see, for example, Birkbeck, 1985, 1993) my participation in this debate, and my attempt to help move it forward, is based on two sets of circumstances. First, Caribbean citizens (see, for example, Moser and Holland 1997), scholars (e.g., Griffith 1997) and policymakers (e.g., Gentles 1988) all comment on the magnitude and urgency of the crime problem in the region. Governments and non-governmental agencies face the challenge of doing something immediately and effectively to ameliorate the problem. In the search for solutions, particularly long term solutions, our approach to the crime problem (and the criminal justice problem) will be greatly aided by understanding. And understanding is developed and advanced primarily through theories. Policymakers are likely to ask, ‘Which theories should we study?’ ‘Which theories should we apply?’ Caribbean criminology would play an extremely useful practical role in the region if it can provide both initial and ongoing answers to those questions. Second, my reading of the literature on crime and social control in the Caribbean leads me to conclude that generally, most scholars have not, so far, engaged in truly theoretical work. By ‘theoretical work’ I mean the formulation, or empirical testing, of a set of general statements that offer an explanation for a given phenomenon (see Rudner 1966, Birkbeck 1985). Almost all of the studies I consulted are arguably of significance for theory building. These range from descriptive research on crime or social control (e.g., Dodd and Parris 1977, Lieber 1981; Ramoutar 1996), through studies identifying variables associated with aspects of crime or social control (e.g., Brathwaite 1996, King 1997), to studies that refer more directly to explanation (e.g., Headley 1996) or to theories (e.g., Bennett, Shields and Daniels 1997, Deosaran and Chadee 1997, Pacheco Maldonado 1989). However, none of these studies represent theoretical work as I have just defined it, the kind of work that — to take but one example — is exemplified internationally by Braithwaite’s (1989) book on reintegrative shaming, and subsequent tests of his theory (e.g., Makkai and Braithwaite 1994, Vagg 1998).2 Indeed, Caribbean criminology could be considered to exist at a pre-theoretical level, formulating

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questions, collecting basic descriptive data, making the first contacts with established theoretical perspectives. The time is ripe for continued reflection on the possibilities for theoretical criminology in the Caribbean. In what follows, I first take up the question raised by previous authors, namely, the extent to which Caribbean criminological theory is likely to be unique. Based on my conception of theory and my understanding of geography, I do not find support for the scenarios offered by Pryce or Bennett and Lynch. Instead, I try to show why the intuitive conclusions of Cain, and Deosaran and Chadee are likely to be correct. Following that, I identify and discuss three ways in which theoretical criminology can develop in the Caribbean.

THEORIES AND PLACES: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP

Criminologists frequently think of theories as tied to places. Some US criminologists, for example, worry about the relevance to other parts of the world of theories developed by US researchers (e.g., Beirne 1983, Bennett 1980, Hartjen and Priyadarsini 1984). Other criminologists wonder if the areas of the world where criminology is less developed also require theories that take account of local specificities (e.g., Clegg and Whetton 1995, Sumner 1982). Twenty years ago, many Latin American criminologists were calling for the development of Latin American theories of crime (Birkbeck 1983); and as we have seen, the question of the relevance of existing theories is now being raised by some criminologists in the Caribbean. Underlying these concerns is an overly simplistic view of theories and their relationship with places, which is based on the following assumptions. First, the identification of the places with reference to which a theory was formulated is self evident (Assumption one). Second, theories have received substantial empirical support in the places with reference to which they were supposedly formulated (Assumption two). Third, places vary in a criminologically significant manner in accordance with the common regional terminology that we use to divide up the world (Assumption three). Each of these assumptions can be questioned. The complex formal arguments specifying the relationship of theories to places can be summarised as follows. Theories are built around concepts that represent abstractions from experience. To test a theory, researchers must develop a set of indicators that provide a valid empirical interpretation of the theory’s concepts. They must also specify the ‘scope’ of the theory, that is, the conditions under which the theory’s propositions apply (Cohen 1989). The development of indicators and the specification of scope conditions are the prerequisites for establishing the testable domain of the theory. The theory can be empirically evaluated anywhere within its testable domain, and if evaluation supports the theory’s claims, the applicable domain — that is, the parts of reality that the theory can account for — begins to take shape.3 Neither the testable nor the applicable domains can be discovered without considerable analytical reflection and empirical

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research. Moreover, these domains are not necessarily expressed in spatial terms.4 With these general principles in mind, we return to a more detailed consideration of the three assumptions outlined above. Regarding Assumption one, we must note that when criminologists develop theories, they are only partly thinking about specific places. For example, Hirschi (1969) proposed his well known control theory of crime while working in California. But although Hirschi tested his theory with data from the Richmond Youth Project, there is no way that we can conclude that he was thinking only of California youth. He may have drawn part of his theoretical inspiration from preliminary contacts with local juveniles, but his theory contains general concepts (such as ‘social bonds’, and ‘attachment’) that imply a potential testable domain that extends well beyond the boundaries of California. Where the spatial boundaries of that domain lie (if they exist) could only be specified after careful geographic sampling from different parts of the world, something that has not been done. Kempf (1993) identified 71 tests of Hirschi’s theory published between 1970 and 1991. The majority (62) were conducted in the United States, with only nine located elsewhere (seven in Canada, and one each in Australia and Sweden).5 The second assumption — that theories have received substantial empirical support in the places with reference to which they were formulated — is equally problematic. Not only is it difficult to specify the places for which a theory was formulated, but the relevance of a theory is often partial and always provisional. Continuing with the example of Hirschi’s theory, Kempf (1993, p. 164) concluded — largely, as we have seen, on the basis of tests in the United States — that ‘different, and sometimes contrary, results were found.’ Indeed, the final pages of Kempf’s review leave the reader with the strong impression that careful, systematic, testing of Hirschi’s theory has hardly begun. The control theory of crime is therefore anchored very weakly in empirical studies, even within the region to which it is supposedly most applicable. Regarding Assumption three, the use of everyday regional terminology to assess the relevance of theories is problematic. Regions are the end product of a process of classification, in which places are grouped together on the basis of their similarity to each other and their differences from other places (Grigg 1965, 1967). One problem inherent to regionalisation is the fuzziness of our classifications: it is often difficult to determine where one region ends and another begins. For example, Mintz and Price (1985) defined the Caribbean in terms of a political history of conquest and an economic system based on plantations and slavery, which (with the exceptions of Belize and Guianas) were confined mainly to the islands bordering the Caribbean Sea. However, they also recognised that, ‘In terms of topography, rainfall, soil, terrain, and the nature of post Conquest occupation...a thin coastal strip of the mainland...belongs with the islands’ (1985, 4). Therefore, how should criminologists treat, for example, crime and social control in coastal Venezuela? Are they studying part of Latin America, or part of the Caribbean?

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Another problem with regionalisation is its grouping of contiguous places in terms of supposed internal homogeneity and external differentiation from other regions. Such a classification might work reasonably well for physical phenomena, such as land forms or climate, ‘But when we turn to the regionalisation of cultural features it is not so clear that the same type of spatial logic operates, or at least that we can so readily assume that it operates’ (Grigg 1967, 485). Aerial groupings might obscure important differences within regions and important similarities between regions. For example, Headley (1996) begins his book on Jamaican crime with a description of a drug related dance hall shooting in Chicago, not Kingston, a reflection of the author’s perspective that ‘Jamaican’ crime is not only found in Jamaica. Indeed, when we examine the shifting, mobile, violence prone economic linkages that make up the drug trade, it is difficult to frame the latter within a regional perspective. But the biggest consequence of thinking in regional terms is that we almost certainly use inappropriate geographical categories for studying crime and social control. As the American geographer Whittlesey aptly noted many years ago, the region is,

an intellectual concept, an entity for the purposes of thought, created by the selection of certain features which are relevant to an aerial interest, or a problem, and by the disregard of all features which are considered to be irrelevant (1954, 30).

And Dutch geographer Hoekveld added much more recently, ‘Theory, however, and not a “problem” nor an “aerial interest”, must direct the formation of classes and the selection of relationships between attributes of areas in the same class, or in different classes’ (1990, 13). There is thus no guarantee that everyday regional terms — such as ‘the Caribbean’ — that have evolved from our perceptions of geography, history, culture, economy and politics, are valid for thinking about crime and social control. For example, if we were to think about the implications of ‘plural societies’ for the workings of criminal justice, we would have to include countries from Asia — such as Myanmar (formerly Burma) and Java, that prompted J.S. Furnivall (1948) to coin the term — as well as some from Africa (Smith 1965). If we are interested in the relationship between frustration and aggression, the level of generality in the concepts employed by psychologists appears to transcend our everyday division of the world into regions (Berkowitz 1989). Summarising the foregoing arguments, it is not clear that criminologists are thinking about a particular place when they propose a theory. Likewise, we cannot establish a priori where the theory is relevant and where it is not. That task, indeed, requires careful empirical research. Finally, even if we embark on an ambitious project of empirical tests for a theory, there is no guarantee that its testable and applicable domains will align themselves with our everyday framework for dividing up the world.

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These conclusions lead me to disagree with Bennett and Lynch’s argument that, ‘existing theories of crime do not fit the current situation of Caribbean nations very well’ (1996, 15). None of those theories have been found to have an unequivocal ‘fit’ elsewhere, and their level of ‘fit’ to the Caribbean can only be determined after careful empirical research (which Bennett and collaborators admittedly could not undertake). Moreover, even the five dimensions of ‘uniqueness’ that Bennett and Lynch identify in the Caribbean are not unique to the region — for example, tourism has a considerable impact in parts of the Mediterranean and the Pacific, the drug trade is extremely salient in parts of Asia — unless the authors are arguing that the co-presence of these factors in the Caribbean constitute its uniqueness (although such co-presence has no conceivable significance for theories of crime and social control). Likewise, we need to be careful in assessing Pryce’s recommendation to take existing theory — in his case, critical criminology — as the basis for work in the Caribbean. Such a recommendation should not assume that existing theory is relevant to the Caribbean, because (as I argued previously) the regional relevance of a theory can only be determined by careful research. Pryce was, of course, free to identify a theory that interested him, and one that he felt should be considered and used by policymakers, but the selection of such a theory should only be the starting point in the testing process, not the end point of reflections on the causes of crime and social control. Thus, my analysis of the relationship between theories and places leads me to a conclusion similar to the positions advanced by Cain, and Deosaran and Chadee. Cain’s injunction to use theory, ‘instrumentally...as well as challenging it, transgressing it, and replacing it’ (1996a, i) represents a valid method of procedure for criminologists anywhere in the world — either within the countries that have traditionally produced most of our theories, or elsewhere. Testing and refining existing theories, as well as proposing new ones, represent the bases for a Caribbean criminology. As Deosaran and Chadee forecast, Caribbean theory ‘will not be entirely immune or distinct from theory already developed elsewhere’ (1997, 40– 41). In the rest of this paper, I examine three ways in which theoretical work in the Caribbean can proceed. The first involves testing and refining existing theories. Such an enterprise may appear relatively unimaginative, but its importance for the development of the discipline is hard to overrate. The other two strategies point toward the creation of new theories. The third strategy involves the elaboration and exploration of new concepts for framing issues of crime and social control based on the Caribbean experience. The second strategy represents an intermediate approach. Based on the study of phenomena that are particularly salient in the Caribbean, existing theories can be tested, or possibilities may emerge for the proposal of new concepts and explanations.

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TESTING AND REFINING EXISTING CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES

Prior comments, and an illustrative case involving a prominent contemporary theory of crime, have already suggested the importance of this task. Theories are the principal vehicle by which we convey our scientific knowledge. Their development and testing is of central concern to any discipline. As Kempf’s (1993) review of Hirschi’s (1969) control theory reveals, even an ‘established’ theory may be lacking adequate empirical evaluation. Evaluation of any theory involves, at the least, several challenging analytical tasks. In developing acceptable empirical indicators for a theory’s key concepts, those concepts must first be examined for clarity and meaning. For example, some researchers have commented on the vagueness of Hirschi’s concept of ‘attachment’ (e.g., Cernkovich and Giordano 1987), while others have argued that ‘involvement’ is ambiguous (Minor 1977). Therefore, when undertaking the evaluation of a theory, researchers will probably devote initial attention to the formulation of the theory itself. Second, empirical indicators must be identified for each of the theory’s concepts. Once again, the reliability and validity of prior indicators must be assessed, and the researcher may find that more adequate indicators are both necessary and available. In this regard, a voluminous discussion has developed regarding the best way to measure Hirschi’s theoretical concepts (Kempf 1993).6 Third, data collection must be designed carefully, in order to provide appropriate measurements of the theory’s concepts and also to ensure that scope conditions (whether explicit or implied) are not violated. For example, most tests of Hirschi’s theory have been cross sectional, but an adequate test for causality may require longitudinal designs (e.g., Paternoster et al. 1983). Finally, the empirical findings must be assessed in terms of their degree of support for the theory and any indications they provide for refining, expanding or modifying the theory. For example, after his own initial test of the control theory, Hirschi found that involvement was of less importance than he had thought, while attachment and belief were not independent influences on behaviour, although he did not undertake a revision of the theory. Only by engaging in tasks such as these can we advance our understanding of crime or social control. If Caribbean criminology takes on the testing and refinement of existing theories, the results will be of significance both within and outside the region.7 As I have observed previously, this work has not yet begun in earnest. Where to start can only be determined by simultaneous attention to three things: the concerns of policymakers, the researcher’s own preferences, and the availability of data. The concerns of policymakers are of obvious importance because they indicate where governmental responses to crime are likely to move. Criminologists may be able to provide important research findings based on the development of local theoretically oriented research. For example, Jamaican economist Gladstone

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Bonnick (1994, 156) advocated the use of strong disincentives (including the broader application of the death penalty) ‘to make the expected cost to the perpetrators of violent crime unbearable.’ In so doing, he explicitly sidestepped the debate over ‘whether or not punishment dissuades crime’ (1994, 156). According to Jamaican criminologist Bernard Headley (1996), who was greatly concerned by Bonnick’s recommendations, the call for more severe sanctions is widespread within Jamaican society. Here is an opportunity for criminologists in Jamaica to take up the question of deterrence, either with specific reference to the death penalty or to other forms of punishment. There exists a substantial international literature on the theory and empirical validity of the deterrence hypothesis (see Cook 1980, Nagin 1998) that could be used as the point of departure for local studies. Nagin, in particular, offers some important suggestions on areas of deterrence theory that need to be explored.8 While attention to the concerns of policymakers is clearly important if criminology is to contribute to local problem solving, criminologists will usually find that the choice of theoretical perspective is also to some extent their own. Indeed, without some element of choice, criminologists are likely to be less productive, for personal interest in a research topic is one of the guarantees of a successful project. Third, the selection of theories for testing depends partly on the local availability of valid empirical indicators. Bennett and Lynch (1996) outlined the problems affecting the availability of data on crime, criminal justice, and socioeconomic characteristics in Caribbean societies, together with several recommendations for improvements. Their comments indicate that criminologists may not find the appropriate data for testing macro level theories of crime, and Bennett et al. (1997) subsequently drew back from a test of the Durkheimian and routine activity theories using data from Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. It is therefore likely that Caribbean criminologists will focus with greater success on micro level theories of crime, for example, using victimisation and self report surveys or panel studies. There is a fourth criterion by which theories might be selected for testing, and that is by focusing attention on locally salient phenomena that offer an interesting or useful context within which to assess a given theory. Because the focus on locally salient phenomena might also lead to the development of new concepts or explanations, I deal with this research strategy in a separate section.

STUDYING PHENOMENA THAT ARE SALIENT IN THE CARIBBEAN

Phenomena of potential interest to criminology are not distributed evenly around the world. Racial conflict, State sponsored executions, or computer crime are much more prevalent in some places than others. Studying those phenomena where their presence is substantial could lead to the modification of existing theories or to the development of new concepts and explanations. Bennett and

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Lynch (1996) identified five features that, if not unique to the Caribbean, are undoubtedly salient there. By focusing on these phenomena, Caribbean criminologists could make potentially important theoretical contributions. I use tourism as an illustration, while reminding readers that any of the other four features mentioned by Bennett and Lynch could be similarly examined for their theoretical potential. Tourism is undoubtedly of great importance in Caribbean nations, and King (1998) noted that in recent years it has become the most important source of revenue for the region. As a research topic in criminology, tourism has been confined to a few articles scattered in the literature (e.g., Chesney-Lind and Lind 1986, Jud 1975, Pelfrey 1998, Stangeland 1998), plus a recent compilation of essays that include some initial theoretical forays into the area (Pizam and Mansfeld 1996).9 There is room for much more to be done, and Caribbean criminology is in a position to make an important contribution. Tourism can be studied from many different angles by criminologists, each of which may connect to an existing theoretical perspective. For example, the marked commercial and political concern regarding tourist safety leads directly into the area of tourist victimisation and, thereby, to theories of victimisation. The most widely cited of these theories are the lifestyle exposure perspective (Garofalo 1987, Hindelang et al. 1978) and the routine activities approach (Cohen and Felson 1979, Cohen et al. 1981), both of which employ a similar situational model of the criminal event (Meier and Miethe 1993). Key concepts in this theoretical approach are the ‘exposure’ of potential victims to motivated offenders, the ‘attractiveness’ of potential targets, and the ‘guardianship’ (or protection) possessed by potential targets. It is hypothesised that victimisation rates are greatest among victims (or targets) that are most exposed to potential offenders, most attractive to them, and least well guarded. These theories of victimisation have been rapidly integrated within mainstream criminology, partly because most of the initial empirical tests were largely supportive. However, more recent tests with more refined measures of the main concepts indicate that we still have much to learn about the situational dynamics of crime (Birkbeck and LaFree 1993). Tests of the theory with data on tourists might prove particularly useful.10 Tourism frequently carries people into exotic environments. Some of those environments are exotic in an exclusively physical sense, involving things like white sand, golden sun, crystal blue sea and gently swaying palm trees (as the promotional literature on the Caribbean never ceases to remind us). Other environments are also socially exotic for tourists, because they involve the people and social arrangements that belong to another culture or way of life. When tourism promotes physically exotic experiences, while largely eliminating the socially exotic, as when, for example, it carries people to enclave ‘facilities’ (see Felson 1987) and keeps them carefully segregated from the local population, we might expect almost no victimisation of tourists (except from other tourists) — at least for common street crimes. However, when tourism carries

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people into socially exotic environments, especially those characterised by marked poverty, theories of victimisation would predict that the prevalence of victimisation is much greater, because relatively attractive targets for crime may become highly exposed to local offenders. Studies that examine levels of tourist victimisation under both kinds of arrangement would provide interesting tests of theories of victimisation.11 But the study of tourism might also lead into new areas of criminological theory. By definition, people who insert themselves temporarily into socially exotic environments are outsiders, and as outsiders they may be unfamiliar with local types and locations of crime. They may know what constitute cues to danger (Warr 1990) in their home town or country, but be ripe for education about crime through bitter experience in the place they have chosen for their travels. Their unfamiliarity with types of crime (for example, local forms of conning or property snatching) and with hot spots for criminal activity (Sherman, Garkin and Buerger 1989) may lead them to experience victimisations at a higher frequency than if they had spent their time in already familiar places, and also at a higher frequency than many locals in tourist destinations.12 Although victimisation theorists might argue that such experiences are entirely congruent with their predictions about exposure, target attractiveness and guardianship, it is ironic that in this case high rates of victimisation (if they exist) may be the result of non routine activities on the part of victims. The idea that victimisation is more likely when people are not engaging in routine activities opens up an interesting line of inquiry for criminologists. It suggests, for example, the common sense idea that personal safety is learned. Such learning could occur through direct experience (i.e., when the individual is victimised), by hearing about the experiences of others (e.g., through conversations or media accounts), or by being ‘trained’ in prevention (e.g., by reading safety brochures). Learning will involve the acquisition of knowledge about the techniques, situational dynamics and places of crime. It will help the individual assess the likelihood that, in any given situation, a crime is the likely next step, and thereby help in avoiding or changing the character of situations that have the potential for crime. A learning perspective on victimisation suggests a number of hypotheses. For example, other things being equal, we would expect young people to have higher rates of victimisation than older people, because young people have learned less about criminal events. We would also expect that, at any given location, outsiders will have higher rates of victimisation than locals. Finally, we would expect that people with more experience of criminal events have lower rates of victimisation.13 Put somewhat more colloquially within the realm of tourism, this third hypothesis speculates that the well travelled are less likely to be victims than the little travelled. The concept of ‘learned personal safety,’ if it were to prosper in criminological research, 14 would undoubtedly be compatible with existing victimisation theory, because it has direct implications for the exposure of potential victims to potential

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offenders. However, it would also provide some additional insights that have not, so far, been explored by victimisation theorists. For example, since learning takes place over time, such a perspective would encourage longitudinal studies of victimisation, in contrast to the overwhelmingly cross sectional approach taken in existing research on patterns and rates of victimisation.15 Similarly, the idea that people learn about criminal events, and perhaps how to control them, suggests that the situational elements necessary for a crime to occur are more complex than in current theories of victimisation. For example, many crimes involving contact between the offender and the victim require not only mutual exposure but also a sequence of events that the offender must engineer (e.g., Luckenbill, 1981). If the potential victim is successful in recognising the onset of a criminal event and takes action to abort it, the crime will not occur, as when a woman does not accept a ride from a lone male driver, or when a tourist shows no interest in supposedly valuable gems. The competition that may ensue over the manipulation and outcome of the situation is not well captured by the existing theoretical concepts of exposure and guardianship.

DEVELOPING THEORETICAL CONCEPTS THAT REFLECT A CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVE

As we have seen, testing existing theories, or developing new ones based on phenomena that are studied in the Caribbean, both represent directions for theoretical development that are already implicit or explicit in the comments of Caribbean criminologists. However, there exists a third possibility for theoretical development that has not so far been recognised: the formulation of concepts that reflect a Caribbean perspective on crime and social control. The central components of theory are concepts, and all concepts ‘are constructs that have been developed out of experience’ (McKinney 1966, 9). Concept development involves abstraction, and abstraction involves selection. Thus, concepts are heuristic devices that reflect the perspective on reality of those who formulate them (McKinney 1966, 11). Culture, understood as the ‘values, ideas and behaviours which may be associated with one or more than one social or national group’ (Seymour-Smith 1986, 65), is one source of concepts.16 For example, Latin American sociologists reflected their concern for the exclusionary nature of social institutions in the development of ‘marginality’ as an explanation of crime (see Birkbeck 1993); socialist criminologists in the former Soviet Union expressed their concern for the moral development of the individual in the concept of ‘law consciousness’ (Kudriatzev 1990). Because of their level of generality, concepts formulated in one culture are often applicable elsewhere. The current flow of concepts is — with some exceptions17 — largely from North America and Western Europe to other parts of the world (del Olmo 1981), but it is possible that researchers in the Caribbean propose a concept that subsequently arouses interest outside the region. This

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task is important because one aid to theory development is the comparative examination of several concepts. And a concept proposed by a Caribbean criminologist may turn out to be more fecund than similar concepts proposed elsewhere. My interest here is not in the genesis of new concepts based only on the revision or critique of existing theories, but in the articulation of a Caribbean perspective that reflects local concerns and local ways of seeing the world. As an example of such a possibility, I use the concept of ‘creolisation.’ The term ‘creole’ has, of course, been around for a long time in the Americas, originating with the process of European conquest and colonisation (Smith 1965). However, while the word has existed for hundreds of years with somewhat varied meanings in popular discourse, it began to attract the attention of scholars in the post Independence Caribbean, most of whom were interested in the question of identity (see, for example, Brathwaite 1971, Glissant 1992, Nettleford 1978, cited in Bolland 1998). ‘Creolisation’ has been proposed as a model of Caribbean society and Bolland (1998) contends that it is intellectually superior to two prior competing models: plantation society (Smith 1967) and the plural society (Smith 1965).18 I examine the concepts of ‘creole’ and ‘creolisation’ here because they represent the most recent attempts by Caribbean intellectuals to understand Caribbean history and contemporary social life. In his thoughtful review of the area, Bolland (1998, 4) suggests that the terms creole and creolisation have not been, ‘adequately defined or clearly located within a broader theoretical model of culture change.’ Of course, there is a general sense of what they mean. Thus, ‘creole’ indicates a ‘local product which is the result of a mixture or blending of various ingredients that originated in the ‘Old World’ (1998, 1-2), while ‘creolisation’ ‘refers to those processes of cultural change that give rise to such distinctiveness’ (1998, 1). Bolland, however, went on to stress two features of creolisation that he felt to be important. First, creolisation affected every culture that was transplanted to the Caribbean, or to express this idea in Rex Nettleford’s words, ‘The Africanisation of the European was no less important to the creolisation process than the Europeanisation of the African’ (1978, cited in Bolland, 1998, 14). Second, creolisation must be understood as a dialectical process, involving inherent tension between conflicting cultures. Referring to the work of French scholar Michel de Certeau (1984) on the ‘practice of everyday life,’ Bolland suggested that the dialectic of creolisation is best approached by asking, ‘how the dominated people in a society can shape their own culture and make their own history’ (1998, 20). Creolisation therefore describes a process of social change based on the tension between one or more cultures. The end product — a creole product — incorporates elements drawn from the different cultures that are in conflict, and will not look exactly like any of the original prototypes. This process, to the extent that it exists, has important consequences for the nature of social institutions. In the words of Smith (1965, 5),

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in their Creole contexts, these institutional forms diverge from their metropolitan models in greater or lesser degree to fit local conditions. This local adaptation produces a Creole institutional complex which differs from the metropolitan model. Similar institutions function differently in Creole and metropolitan areas.

The notion of creolisation has not, as far as I know, been applied within Caribbean criminology, but as a local intellectual product it surely merits attention. It is possible that there are diverse applications of the concept to our understanding of crime and justice in the region, 19 but I here focus on a relatively obvious line of inquiry: the nature of Caribbean criminal justice institutions. If the creolisation concept has an empirical basis, then — as Smith (1965) suggests — Caribbean criminal justice should be creole criminal justice, that is, it should reveal processes of cultural conflict and possess a distinctive character when compared to both abstract models of criminal justice, and criminal justice agencies in other regions. The concept of creolisation stimulates both historical research on the evolution of criminal justice institutions and contemporary research on the nature of criminal justice in the region. It highlights the role of culture in the workings of social control. Such research is still lacking in the Caribbean. While several studies deal with criminal justice agencies in the region, 20 they have not begun to look at the organisational culture of control, that is, the typical patterns of roles, interactions and consequences generated through organisational activity. For example, Cain and Birju (1992) and Hagley (1993) looked at the dramatic rise in prison population in Trinidad and Tobago since the mid-1980s, focusing subsequently on the doubtful performance of prisons as institutions for preventing crime. While their findings and arguments are useful, we know almost nothing about the internal workings of the Trinidad and Tobago prisons. What patterns of intra and extra mural segregation/inter-relation are revealed in daily activities? What role do prison officials and guards play in the institution? What cooperative and conflictive relationships exist between prison personnel and prisoners? How do prison personnel and prisoners understand the nature and consequences of imprisonment? These and other questions must be addressed if we are to unearth the local character of prisons.21 The conclusion that they do not rehabilitate the prisoner or prevent crime tells us little about what prisons are actually like or what social functions they perform. That the legal and administrative blueprints for criminal justice institutions frequently generate conflict, with subsequent partial or wholesale modification, is hinted at in studies in regions contiguous to the Caribbean. In a fascinating account of nineteenth century prison reform in Lima, the Peruvian historian Carlos Aguirre (1996) described how the lawyer and former judge, Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, was appointed to design a new penitentiary for the city. Returning from a study mission to the United States, Paz Soldán proposed, and oversaw the

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construction of, a prison based on the Auburn model that opened in 1862. But four years were sufficient to show that the penitentiary would not be at all as Paz Soldán had planned. The building soon became overcrowded, sanitation was a problem, and there was a lack of adequate clothing. Prisoners could not be subordinated by even the most severe penalties, and in 1866 attempted a massive escape. The Costa Rican penitentiary, opened in 1909, appears to have suffered similar if not quite so dramatic problems (Palmer, 1996). Both cases involve North American models coming up against ‘criollo’ conditions in Latin America. Turning to the contemporary period, Díaz-Cotto (1996) provides an extraordinarily detailed account of latino (mainly Puerto Rican) prisoners’ organisation in New York’s prisons between 1971 and 1986. Latino and latina prisoners formed a myriad of groups during this period that pressed for changes in the terms and conditions of confinement. For example, the Latin Think Tank Concept proposed the creation of a ‘collaborative institution’ whose ultimate goal was the, ‘significant modification of institutional programs and practices’ (Díaz-Cotto 1996, 188). Its successor, the Puente de Unidad Latina, was able to organise the first San Juan Feast Day event, whose cultural significance was clear to its participants,

[It was] important in that [it] gave you a day of Latinos and you could hear bands and, you know, it was all Latino families and....everybody shared and you could see your culture because all these people [were] coming from the street, you know, men, women, and children. And you’d hear of the... things that were happening in the community and what the street looked like (Díaz-Cotto 1996, 198).

Thus, latino prisoners were able to weaken the physical isolation from society that was and is a central tenet of US prison philosophy. While Díaz-Cotto does not provide an analytical framework for her study, it provides an important example of the cultural struggle to shape institutions that is at the heart of the process of creolisation. The facts of diversity in criminal justice institutions, even within one country, have not been lost on other scholars. For example, in his critique of prevailing conceptions of criminal justice in the United States, Duffee (1990, 103) notes that, ‘criminal justice operations vary widely across the country.’ Citing classics of criminal justice research, for example the work by Banton (1964) and Wilson (1968), Duffee identified variables such as the level of normative homogeneity and the type of local sociopolitical context as possible determinants of the functions fulfilled by criminal justice agencies. In addition, he noted the evidence produced by many studies that criminal justice agencies are quite resistant to change. Focusing on the stated objective of criminal justice (control) is, argued Duffee, misguided because it leads scholars to focus on what criminal agencies should supposedly do, rather than on what they actually do.22 In examining what criminal justice agencies do, the concept of creolisation

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could be useful. It would suggest that we be particularly attentive to conflicts over roles, meanings and activities in criminal justice agencies in multicultural jurisdictions, and also that we study carefully the diffusion, or attempted diffusion, of national and international models for action. It would lead us to focus on the character and timing of change in criminal justice agencies, and on the pattern and inter-relation of cultural groups in those processes of change. However, as yet the concept of creolisation merely provides a perspective for examining the workings of criminal justice, not an explanatory framework. We have no general model of cultural conflict or cultural change within institutions that could be applied and modified in criminal justice research. If Caribbean criminologists are interested in studying the creolisation of criminal justice agencies, the search for such a model will be very important.

CONCLUSION

Caribbean criminology will, I have argued, be defined by its theoretical development. That development has yet to begin in earnest, but when it does, there are three different — but not mutually exclusive — ways by which it might proceed. Researchers could undertake the systematic testing of existing criminological theories; they could study phenomena that are salient in the Caribbean; or they could propose new concepts for understanding crime and social control that reflect a Caribbean perspective. For each of these strategies, I have given an example, and each is little more than a preliminary sketch of what might be accomplished. These examples are the product of personal interest and in no way exhaust the possibilities for theoretically oriented research. Furthermore, it is quite possible that my ideas for developing a new theory of victimisation based on the study of tourism, or for studying criminal justice institutions from the perspective of creolisation, turn out to be theoretically unfruitful. But such a conclusion could only be reached after careful inquiry, which obviously escapes the possibilities imposed in a general essay such as the present one. At any rate, if readers object to my examples, or are unconvinced by them, I hope that they will still see merit in pursuing the strategies I have outlined. It is difficult to accept the notion that criminological theories in the Caribbean will be unique, in the sense that they apply only to the geographical and cultural area we commonly call the Caribbean. Theories do not have any easy match with our everyday regional vocabulary. However, it is possible that Caribbean criminological theory be unique, in the sense of having originated in the Caribbean and subsequently spreading to criminological research in other societies. To borrow from one of the concepts that captured my interest in the present article, Caribbean criminological theory is likely to be ‘creole’ theory — but springing from a peaceful rather than a conflictual dialectic.23

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REFERENCES

Agnew, R.1992. ‘Foundation for a general strain theory of crime and delinquency’. Criminology 30, no.1: 47–88. Aguirre, C. 1996. ‘The Lima penitentiary and the modernisation of criminal justice in nineteenth century Peru’. In The birth of the penitentiary in Latin America, ed. R.D. Salvatore and C. Aguirre, 44–77. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Anonymous. 1995. ‘Symposium on repeat Victimisation’. British Journal of Criminology 35 no.3: 327–99. ___. 1996. ‘For a Caribbean Criminology’. Caribbean Quarterly. 42 nos. 2-3: I-173. Banton, M. 1964. The policeman in the community. New York: Basic Books. Beirne, P. 1983. ‘Cultural relativism and comparative criminology’. Contemporary Crises 7: 371–91. Bennett, R. 1997. ‘Excessive force: A comparative study of police in the Caribbean’. Justice Quarterly 14, no. 4: 651–86. ___. 1997. ‘Job satisfaction among police constables: A comparative study in three developing nations’. Justice Quarterly 14, no. 2: 295–323. Bennett, R. and Lynch, J.1996. ‘Towards a Caribbean criminology: Problems and prospects’. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology 1, no.1: 8–37. Bennett, R., Shields, W.P. and Daniels, B. 1997.‘Crime and development in the Caribbean: An investigation of traditional explanatory models’. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology 2, no.2: 1–35. Bennett, R.1980. ‘Constructing cross-cultural theories in criminology: Application of the generative approach’. Criminology 18, no.2: 252–68. Berkowitz, L.1989. ‘Frustration-aggression hypothesis: Examination and reformulation’. Psychological Bulletin 106, no.1: 59–73. Birkbeck, C. 1983.‘La Criminología Comparada y las Perspectivas para el Desarrollo de una Teoría Latinoamericana’. Cenipec. Revista (Mérida, Venezuela) 8: 7–32. ___. 1985.‘Understanding crime and social control elsewhere: A geographical perspective on theory in criminology’. Research in Law, Deviance and Social Control 7: 215–46. ___. 1993. ‘Against ethnocentrism: A cross-cultural perspective on criminal justice theories and policies’. Journal of Criminal Justice Education 4, no.2: 307–24. Birkbeck, C. and LaFree, G. 1993. ‘The situational analysis of crime and deviance’. Annual Review of Sociology, no.19: 113–37. Black, D.1983. ‘Crime as Social Control’. American Sociological Review, no.48: 34–45. Bolland, O.N.1998. ‘Creolisation and Creole societies: A cultural nationalist view of Caribbean Social History’. Caribbean Quarterly 44,nos.1–2: 1–32. Bonnick, G.1994. ‘Crime and violence: Its implications for economic expansion’. In Jamaica: Preparing for the twenty-first Century, ed. P. Lewis, 148–60. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. Bottoms, A.E. 1994. ‘Environmental Criminology’. In The Oxford Handbook of Criminology ed. M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner, 585–656. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Braithwaite, J. 1989. Crime, Shame and Reintegration. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Brathwaite, F.1996. ‘Some aspects of Sentencing in the Criminal Justice System of Barbados’. Caribbean Quarterly 42, nos. 2-3: 113–30.

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Brathwaite, K.E.1971. The development of Creole Society in Jamaica: 1770-1820. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cain, M. and Birju, A.1992. ‘Crime and Structural Adjustment in Trinidad and Tobago’. Caribbean Affairs 5, no.2: 141–53. Cain, M. ‘Developing a Juvenile Justice Policy: Anomalies of Theory and Practice in Trinidad and Tobago’. Caribbean Quarterly 42,nos. 2–3: 99–112. ———. 1995 ‘Labouring, Loving and Living: On the Policing of Culture in Trinidad and Tobago’. In Contemporary Issues in Criminology, ed. L. Noaks, M. Levi and M. Maguire, 84–107. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press. ———. 1996.‘Introduction: For a Caribbean Criminology’. Caribbean Quarterly 42,nos. 2– 3: i–xvii. Cardoso, E. and Falletto, E.1969. Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina. Mexico City: Siglo XXI. Cernkovich, S.A. and Giordano, P.G.1987. ‘Family Relationships and Delinquency’. Sociological Quarterly 20, no.2: 131–45. Chesney-Lind, M. and Lind, I.1986. ‘Visitors as Victims: Crimes against Tourists in Hawaii’. Annals of Tourism Research 13, no.2: 167–91. Chevigny, P.1995. ‘Edge of the knife: Police Violence in the Americas’. New York: The New Press. Clegg, I. and Whetton, J.1995. ‘In search of Third World Criminology’. In Contemporary Issues in Criminology, ed. L. Noaks, M. Levi and M. Maguire, 26–51. Cardiff, UK: University of Wales Press. Cohen, A.K. 1955. Delinquent boys: The Culture of the Gang. New York: The Free Press. Cohen, B.P.1989. Developing Sociological Knowledge: Theory and Method. Chicago, IL: Nelson Hall. Cohen, E.1996. ‘Touting Tourists in Thailand: Tourist-oriented Crime and Social Structure’. In Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues, ed. A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld, 77–90. New York: Wiley. Cohen, L.E., and Felson, M.1979. ‘Social Change and Crime rate trends: A routine Activity Approach’. American Journal of Sociology, no.44: 588–608. Cohen, L.E., Kluegel, J.R., and Land, K.C.1981. ‘Social Inequality and Predatory Criminal Victimization: An exposition and test of a formal theory’. American Sociological Review, no.46: 505–24. Cook, P.1980. ‘Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade’. Crime and Justice, no.2: 211–268. ‘Criminalization’. Caribbean Quarterly 42, nos.2–3: 1–29. deCerteau, M.1984. The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. DeFleur, L.B.1970. Delinquency in Argentina: A study of Córdoba’s youth. Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press. delOlmo, R.1981. América Latina y Su Criminología. Mexico City: Siglo XXI. Deosaran, R. and Chadee, D.1997. ‘Juvenile delinquency in Trinidad and Tobago: Challenges for Social Policy and Caribbean Criminology’. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology 2, no.2: 36–83. Dependencia y Desarrollo en América Latina. Latin American Research Review17, no.1: 131–51. Deviance. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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Díaz-Cotto, J. ed. Gender, ethnicity and the state: Latina and Latino prison politics. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Dodd, D.J. 1976.‘The wellsprings of Violence: Some historical notes on East Indian Criminality in Guyana’. Caribbean Issues 2, no.3: 3–16. Dodd, D.J. and Parris, M.1977. ‘An Urban Plantation: Socio-cultural aspects of Crime and Delinquency in Georgetown, Guyana’. International Journal of Criminology and Penology, no.5: 31–61. Duffee, D.1990. Explaining Criminal Justice: Community Theory and Criminal Justice Reform. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. Farrell, G.1995. ‘ Preventing repeat Victimization’. Crime and Justice, no.19: 469–534. Felson, M.1987. ‘Routine Activities and Crime Prevention in the Developing Metropolis’. Criminology 25, no.4: 911–31. Furnivall, J.S.1948. Colonial Practice: Burma and Netherlands India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Garofalo, J.1987. ‘Reassessing the lifestyle Model of Criminal Victimization’. In Positive Criminology, ed. M.R. Gottfredson and T. Hirschi, 23-42. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Gentles, E.1988. ‘Law-environment Perspective on Crime and Violence in Jamaica’. In Crime and Violence in Jamaica: Causes and Solutions, ed. P. D. Phillips and J. Wedderburn, 49–55. Mona, Jamaica: University of the West Indies. Glissant, E.1992. Caribbean Discourse. Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia. Goffman, E.1968. Asylums. London: Penguin. Griffith, I.1997. Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Siege. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Grigg, D.1965. ‘The Logic of Regional Systems’. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 55. ———.1967. ‘Regions, Models and Classes’. In Models in Geography, ed. R. Chorley and P. Haggett. London, UK: Methuen. Hagley, L.1993. ‘Crime and Structural Adjustment in Trinidad and Tobago: On the Exercise of Judicial Discretion’. Caribbean Affairs 6, no.1: 147–54. Hartjen, C.A. and Priyadarsini, S.1984. Delinquency in India: A Comparative Analysis. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Headley, B.1996. The Jamaican Crime Scene: A Perspective. Washington, DC: Howard University Press. Henry, P.1997. ‘Rex Nettleford and Afro-Caribbean Philosophy’. Caribbean Quarterly 43, no.2: 31–53. Hindelang, M.S., Gottfredson, M. and Garofalo, J.1978. Victims of Personal Crime. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. Hirschi, T.1969. Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hoekveld, G.A.1990. ‘Regional Geography must adjust to New Realities’. In Regional Geography: Current Developments and Future Prospects, ed. R.J. Johnston, J. Hauer and G.A. Hoekveld, 11–31. London, UK: Routledge. Jones, H.1981. Crime, Race and Culture: A Study in a Developing Country. London: Wiley. Jud, G.D.1975. ‘Tourism and Crime in Mexico’. Social Science Quarterly 56, no.2: 324–30. Kempf, K.L.1993. ‘The Empirical Status of Hirschi’s Control Theory’. Advances in Criminological Theory 4: 143–86.

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King, J.W. 1998. The impact of Crime on Tourism: The case of Jamaica. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Washington, DC. ———1997. ‘Crime in the Caribbean: A comparison of Barbados and Jamaica’. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology 2, no.1: 30–44. Kudriatzev, V.N.1990. ‘Mechanisms of Deviant Behaviour’. In Soviet Criminology Update, ed.V.N. Kudriatzev, 87–118. Rome: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. Lieber, M.1981. Street life: Afro-American Culture in Urban Trinidad. Boston, MA: G.K. Hall/ Schenkman Publishing. Luckenbill, D.F.1981. ‘Generating Compliance: The Case of Robbery’. Urban Life 10: 25– 46. Mahabir, C.1988. ‘Crime in the Caribbean: Robbers, Hustlers and Warriors’. International Journal of the Sociology of the Law 16, no.3: 315–38. Makkai, T., and Braithwaite, J.1994. ‘Reintegrative Shaming and Compliance with Regulatory Standards’. Criminology 32, no.3: 361–86. McCree, R.1996. ‘The Chinese game of Whe Whe in Trinidad: From Criminalization to Criminalization’. Caribbean Quarterly 42, nos. 2–3: 1–29. McKinney, J.C.1966. Constructive Typology and Social Theory. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts. Meier, R.F. and Miethe, T.D.1993. ‘Understanding Theories of Criminal Victimisation’. Crime and Justice 17: 459–99. Minor, W.W.1977. ‘A Deterrence Control Theory of Crime’. In Theory in Criminology: Contemporary Views, ed. R.F. Meier, 117–38. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Mintz, S.W. & Price, S. 1985. ‘Introduction’. In Caribbean Contours, ed. S.W. Mintz and S. Price, 3–11. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Moser, C. and Holland J.1997. Urban Poverty and Violence in Jamaica. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Nagin, D.S. 1998. ‘Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the twenty-first Century’. Crime and Justice 23: 1–42. Nettleford, R.1996. Caribbean Cultural Identity. Kingston: Institute of Jamaica. Osborn, D.R., Ellingsworth, D., Hope, T., and others. 1996. ‘Are Repeatedly Victimised Households Different?’ Journal of Quantitative Criminology 12, no.2: 223–45. Pacheco Maldonado, A.M.1989. Violencia y Criminalidad. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial Librotex. Packenham, R.A. 1982. ‘Plus Ca Change...’ The English edition of Cardoso and Falletto’s Dependencia y Desarrollo en America Latina. Latin American Research Review 17, no. 1: 131–51. Palmer, S.1996. ‘Confinement, Policing and the Emergence of Social Policy in Costa Rica, 1880–1935’. In The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin America, ed. R.D. Salvatore and C. Aguirre, 224–54. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Paternoster, R., Saltzman, L.E., Waldo, G.P. and Chiricos, T.G.1983. ‘Perceived Risk and Social Control: Do sanctions really deter?’ Law and Society 17, no.3: 425–56. Pease, K. 1998. Repeat Victimisation: Taking Stock. London, UK: Home Office. Pelfrey, W.V.1998. ‘Tourism and Crime: A Preliminary Assessment of the Relationship of Crime to the number of Visitors at Selected Sites’. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice22, no.2: 293–304.

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Pizam, A. and Mansfeld, Y. 1996. Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues. New York: Wiley. Pryce, K.1976. ‘Towards a Caribbean Criminology’. Caribbean Issues 2, no.2: 3–21. Ramoutar, K.1996. ‘Is female Criminality Changing in Barbados? An investigation using Self-report and Official Data’. Caribbean Quarterly 42, nos. 2-3: 42–60. Rudner, R.S.1966. Philosophy of Social Science. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Ryan, C. and Kinder, R.1996. ‘The Deviant Tourist and the Criminogenic Place – The Case of the Tourist and the New Zealand Prostitute’. In Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues, ed. A. Pizam and Y. Mansfeld, 23–36. New York: Wiley. Schiebler, S.A., Crotts, J.C. and Hollinger, R.C. 1996. ‘Florida Tourists’ Vulnerability to Crime’. In Tourism, Crime and International Security Issues, ed. A. Pizam and Y. Mansfield, 37-50. New York: Wiley. Seymour-Smith, C.1986. Macmillan dictionary of Anthropology. London: Macmillan. Sherman, L.W., Gartin, P.R. and Buerger, M.E.1989. ‘Hot spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place’. Criminology 27, no.1: 27–55 Smith, M.G.1965. The plural society in the British West Indies. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Smith, R.T.1967. ‘Social Stratification, Cultural Pluralism and Integration in West Indian Societies’. In Caribbean Integration: Papers on Social, Political and Economic Integration, ed. S.Lewis and T. Matthew. Rio Piedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies. Stangeland, P.1998. ‘Other targets or other locations? An Analysis of Opportunity Structures’. British Journal of Criminology38, no.1: 61–77. Sumner, C.1982. ‘Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment: Beyond modernisation theory’. In Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment, ed. C. Sumner, 1–39. London, UK: Heinemann. Sykes, G. & Matza, D.1957. ‘Techniques of neutralization: A theory of delinquency’. American Sociological Review 22: 664–70. Taylor, I., Walton, P. and Young, J.1973. ‘The new Criminology: For a Social Theory of Vagg, J.1998. ‘Delinquency and Shame: Data from Hong Kong’. British Journal of Criminology38, no. 2: 247–64. Warr, M.1990. ‘Dangerous situations: Social Context and Fear of Victimisation’. Social Forces 68: 891–907. Wellford, C.F.1997. ‘Victimisation Rates for Domestic Travellers’. Journal of Criminal Justice 25,no. 3: 205–10. Whittlesey, D.1954. ‘The Regional Concept and the Regional Method’. In American Geography, Inventory and Prospect, ed. E.P. James and C.F. Jones, 19–68. New York, NY: Syracuse University Press. Willis, C.L., Evans, T.D. and LaGrange, R.1999. ‘‘‘Down Home’’ Criminology: The place of Indigenous Theories of Crime’. Journal of Criminal Justice 27, no. 3: 227–38. Wilson, J.Q.1968. Varieties of Police Behaviour. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wittebrood, K. and Nieuwbeerta, P.1997. Criminal Victimization during one’s life course in the Netherlands: The effects of Routine Activity Patterns and Previous Victimization. Leiden, NETH: Netherlands Institute for the Study of Criminality.

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, Volume 4 Numbers 1-2,

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Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies, St Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, 1999, pp 1–31, with permission. 2. Headley (1996) proposes a historical explanation for Jamaican criminality focusing on the deleterious social effects of dependent capitalism (see, also, Mahabir 1988). However, this explanation is not offered as a theory, nor linked to existing theories of crime, such as strain theory (Agnew 1992). Bennett and collaborators (Bennett and Lynch 1996, Bennett et al. 1997) refer explicitly to major theories of crime but provide no strict tests of their predictions, mainly because the requisite data are not available (Bennett and Lynch 1996, 27). Deosaran and Chadee (1997) find that their sample of juvenile delinquents did not use techniques of neutralisation (Sykes and Matza 1957), but no careful test of Sykes and Matza´s propositions was undertaken. 3. We often speak of a theory’s ‘applicability’ without defining it. In our everyday discourse, the applicability of a theory could refer either to its testable domain, or to the domain that it can adequately account for (which I have here called its applicable domain). I prefer to use the term ‘relevance’ to indicate that a theory is testable in and/or applicable to a given domain. 4. A classic piece of research in Latin America may help to illustrate these points. DeFleur (1970) undertook the evaluation of Cohen’s (1955) subcultural theory of delinquency, using data on 63 juvenile delinquents in the city of Córdoba, Argentina. DeFleur found that the Argentine groups of delinquents did not have the same characteristics as the US gangs described by Cohen (i.e., there were no empirical indicators of a subculture), and that they did not report negative experiences at schools (one of the scope conditions implied in Cohen’s theory). Thus, Cohen’s theory could not be tested in the city of Córdoba, and was not relevant to the study of juvenile delinquency there. However, DeFleur wondered (1970, 156–161) whether Cohen’s theory might be relevant (i.e., testable and applicable) in larger cities such as Buenos Aires, but additional research would obviously have been necessary to determine this. 5. Some might argue that Hirschi’s theory of crime reflects an American perspective (a preoccupation with control) but that is an entirely different matter. As we shall see later, theories may reflect local points of view, but they are nonetheless general in their scope and potential applicability. 6. The review of a theory’s concepts and the designation of reliable and valid empirical indicators for those concepts are also important steps in establishing the testable domain of a theory. 7. To continue with the example of control theory, Kempf (1993, 167) observes that it is ‘perhaps the most heralded theory of delinquency,’ but that ‘Criminology has not yet determined the capacity of this theory.’ She lists (1993, 165) eight recommendations from the literature regarding future tests, that provide an ample agenda for important research. 8. Note, however, that there may be substantial difficulties in tying the research and political agendas (Deosaran and Chadee 1997). 9. The tourist industry and scholars studying tourism have shown more interest in crime than have criminologists in tourism. 10. Schiebler et al. (1996) report a preliminary test of routine activities theory with data

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on tourism in Florida, but the authors point out that deficiencies in the data precluded a systematic test of the theory. 11. There are other ways in which studies of tourism could lead to tests of existing criminological theories. For example, one can examine the tourist as deviant, looking for evidence of ways in which travel might free inhibitions (Ryan and Kinder 1996, 26), promoting deviant behavior and thereby providing a test for control theories of crime. Alternatively, one could examine tourist victims’ reactions to crime, and the responses of the local criminal justice system, within the framework of Black’s (1976) hypotheses about the behavior of law, paying special reference to the tourist’s simultaneous social location in terms of “rank” and ‘marginality.’ For example, Cohen (1996) provides an interesting description of the responses to conning in Thailand that reveal the marginal social position of tourists. 12. In an almost unique study, Stangeland examined victimisation rates among tourists (the majority of whom were British) in the Costa del Sol, concluding - albeit cautiously – that “a middle class British resident is more likely to suffer a crime during a two-week vacation abroad than during the rest of the year back home” (1998, 67). He also found that the rates of victimisation among tourists (median stay, two weeks) were often similar to, and sometimes greater than, the rates reported by residents of Málaga and the Costa del Sol during a whole year. Wellford (1997) found that victimisation rates in the United States were lower among domestic travellers than the rest of the population. However, domestic travel is by definition less likely to place the traveller in socially exotic environments. 13. This hypothesis contradicts the findings of much research on repeat victimisation which reports that an initial victimisation is a strong predictor of subsequent victimisations (e.g., Osborn et al. 1996, Pease 1998). However, before dismissing the hypothesis as unfounded, additional specifications should be considered, involving, for example, the type of crime, the temporal frame of reference, and the individual’s interest in preventing future victimisations. 14. Bottoms (1994, 606) proposed a somewhat similar notion when he coined the term ‘self-policing.’ 15. Research on repeat victimisation (Farrell 1995, British Journal of Criminology, 1995) has involved a longitudinal perspective on victimisation, although the temporal span has been quite short (e.g., one to six years). Moreover, greater attention has been paid to the role of the offender than to the behaviour of the victim. Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta (1997) examined routine activity patterns and victimisation over the life course for seven types of common crime. Interestingly, they found that prior victimisations only had some effect on the risk of subsequent victimisation for the crimes of threat, burglary and bike theft. 16. This idea was originally proposed in Birkbeck (1993). See Willis et al. (1999) for additional elaboration. 17. For example, the concept of dependency was proposed first in Latin America by Cardoso and Falletto (1969), and subsequently exerted a significant influence on development theorists in North America (Packenham 1982). 18. It is interesting to note that Dodd (1976) and Dodd and Parris (1977) make explicit reference to the plantation in their descriptions of crime in Guyana. However, they do not attempt to develop a theory of crime or social control based on the

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concept of the ‘plantation society.’ Jones’s (1981) study of Guyanese crime is informed by the concept of a ‘plural society’ (Furnivall 1948, Smith 1965), but likewise offers no theory. 19. For example, one could examine the role of social control in the process of creolisation, looking at ways in which criminal justice agencies have been used to identify, control, mediate and resolve cultural conflicts in institutional development. Among Caribbean criminologists, Cain has come closest to this approach with her concept of the ‘policing of culture’ (1995), although she emphasises resistance (Cain 1996) more than creolisation. Mahabir (1988) and McCree (1996) provide case studies that are relevant to the study of both cultural conflict and creolisation. 20. On the police, see Chevigny (1995), Headley (1996), Bennett (1997a, 1997b). On the prisons, see Cain and Birju (1992), Hagley (1993, 1996). On the courts, see Cain and Birju (1992), Brathwaite (1996); and on juvenile justice see Cain (1996b). 21. Hagley (1996) provides an account of some aspects of imprisonment as narrated by 33 ex-prisoners. However, the account is organised within the framework of general studies of imprisonment, notably Goffman’s (1968) essay on asylums, thereby largely ignoring the search for local specificities in the prison institution. Hagley was refused permission to conduct an ethnographic study of prison life, that might have illuminated the nature of imprisonment in Trinidad and Tobago. Cain and Birju (1992, 150) commented that the Caribbean prison lacks its ethnographer. 22. Duffee’s solution to this problem is the proposal of a functionalist theory that specifies the role of criminal justice agencies in the community. 23. On the creolisation of another discipline — Caribbean philosophy – see Henry (1997).

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Towards a INTRODUCTION

Caribbean There is a growing trend in social science, Criminology: and specifically in criminology, of Prospects and establishing sub disciplines that focus on a particular substantive area or research Problems1 question. As a result, there is an increase in the number of journals and scholarly Richard R. Bennett and associations whose purpose is to highlight James P. Lynch and report research findings in narrowly defined sub areas within a discipline (e.g. Division of Women and Crime, the Division of International Criminology, and the Division on Critical Criminology of the American Society of Criminology). Often these sub disciplines seem to be formed more to provide a focal point for scholars and to provide visibility for their concerns than for any compelling intellectual reason. It is not clear that these groups have contributed to theory in any meaningful way. Indeed, this ‘ghetto-isation’ of likeminded people could retard theory development by reducing the scrutiny to which their arguments and research findings are subjected. The counter argument, of course, is that without this separation minority voices would not be heard in the discourse of the discipline. Thus, the sociological importance of such specialisation and its importance for building theory, directing research, and forming social policy are matters currently under debate. The purpose of this paper is to examine the need for a sub discipline that focuses on the Caribbean as a unique area of study in criminology. We will briefly review the major theories of crime, and then assess whether the uniqueness of the Caribbean renders our

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current theories inappropriate or incapable of explaining and predicting crime in the region and whether a sub discipline of Caribbean criminology is intellectually necessary. Finally, we will discuss some issues of crime in the Caribbean, what further knowledge is required, and what the prospects of accessing and collecting the necessary data in the region are.

MAJOR THEORIES

Major theories in criminology can be usefully grouped as being macro social theories or micro social theories (Nettler 1984). The former, attempts to explain changes in the level and the distribution of crime, across groups in society, while the latter attempts to explain the occurrence of specific crimes or the distribution of criminal motivation. In keeping with this focus, macro theories examine the attributes of societies and their change over time while micro theories explore the attributes of small groups and individuals. Within these two major groupings, theories can be subdivided into conflict theories and consensus theories. Conflict theories assume that law is largely a tool of elites used to maintain their advantage (Quinney 1980, Young 1989, Young and Mathews, 1992). In contrast, consensus theories assume that the law expresses the moral consensus in society (Nettler 1984). Consistent with these assumptions, conflict theories focus on the process of marginalisation and how marginalisation contributes to the criminalisation of activity and the use of coercion in response to crime (Chiricos and DeLeon 1992). This coercion, of course, maintains the advantage of the elites. Consensus theories, on the other hand, emphasise the socialisation process, since criminal activity is the result of imperfect internalisation of societal norms. Within these categories of theory a great deal of useful work has been done to specify the unique conditions that result in marginalisation and coercion or in more or less perfect socialisation. One of the greatest problems in building an integrated theory of crime, however, is the limited amount of work that has been done to link micro and macro theories in either the conflict or consensus schools. Usually, scholars who take a micro focus assume certain macro social conditions and vice versa. There are a few notable exceptions where macro social theories have been linked with micro social processes to provide a cogent picture of how society influences crime. One of these exceptions is the human ecology theories of crime formulated by the Chicago School of Sociology. The other is development theories. The human ecology theories of crime mainly examine the influence of urbanisation and immigration on the level and distribution of crime in areas (Shaw and McKay 1969, Park et al. 1967, Bursik and Webb 1982). They link these macro social factors to the process of socialisation through the concept of disorganisation. Immigrants and migrants are drawn to the city by the promise of jobs in industry. Since these recent arrivals are without resources, they gravitate to the inexpensive and least desirable residential areas which are usually at the

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fringe of commercial development. The heterogeneity of these areas and the transience of the population make the negotiation and maintenance of social order extremely difficult. As a result, there are high levels of crime. High crime rates are unique to these ‘disorganised’ communities, and endure even when the ethnic or racial composition of the populations in the transitional areas changes. Development theories are similar to the human ecology theories in that they explicitly link macro and micro processes. The macro social processes attendant to industrialisation affects the social organisation of societies in a manner that disrupts socialisation. The transition from an agrarian to an industrial society transforms the social bonds in society from those based upon primordial ties to those based upon more tenuous commitments (Shelley 1981, LaFree and Kick 1986, Bennett 1991a). Durkhiem’s (1954) characterisation of the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity is often used to describe this process. This transition results in both a temporary and a permanent change with regard to crime. The transition from agrarian to industrial economies causes an immediate anomic condition for migrants until they adjust to the new basis of social relations in the urban centre. This adjustment period is accompanied by high crime rates similar to those posited by the human ecologists. Even after this transition is complete, however, the change in the basis of social interaction from rural to urban settings results in permanent increases in the volume of property crime (as things worth stealing become ‘available,’ for instance) and a decrease in violent crimes. The transition from kinship to economic groupings as the basis of social organisation reduces the amount of interpersonal violence, since attachments that become conflictual can be easily abandoned for others. At the same time, this social mobility coupled with the greater availability of goods makes it more difficult to guard one’s property, hence the increase in theft (Bennett 1991b). Conflict theorists have a somewhat different view of the development process. They agree with their consensual colleagues that industrialisation destroys the primordial basis of agrarian society and replaces it with economic relations. These relations result in the creation of two classes — those who own the means of production and those who sell their labour. The relationship between these two classes is conflictual rather than interdependent. Law is seen by these theorists as not intended to promote the interdependence of the economically defined groups, but to ensure the exploitation of the masses by the elites. Conflict theorists predict that industrialisation will lead to the concentration of crime in the labouring classes. Moreover, what is legally defined as crime will oscillate according to the need of the power holders to discipline the labourers (Piven and Cloward 1993). Thus, crime (and coercion) will increase in periods of high unemployment and decrease in periods of full employment.

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IS THE CARIBBEAN UNIQUE?

The human ecology and development theories described briefly above are powerful. They have been shown to fit the level and distribution of crime in some societies (Bennett 1991a, LaFree and Kick 1986, Bennett and Shelley 1985, Messner 1982, Krohn 1978). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it would be wise to assume that these theories would be useful in explaining and understanding crime in the Caribbean. Is there, in fact, any evidence or argument that these theories are not applicable to the Caribbean? One of the most often heard arguments against the applicability of development theory in nations currently undergoing development is that industrialisation in the nineteenth century is not a good model for industrialisation in the late twentieth and the twenty-first century. The most substantial difference between the epochs is that nations currently undergoing development must contend with developed nations while those which developed in the past did not. Presumably the presence of developed nations will slow development of the developing countries because investors (in both settings) will anticipate higher returns from the former. Moreover, the developed nations have an interest in limiting the industrialisation of others to ensure the provision of cheap raw materials for their own industries. In addition, both local elites and developed nations have interests in limiting the broad based political participation that accompanied industrialisation in the nineteenth century. Limiting political participation ensures the position of local elites and simplifies negotiations regarding raw materials for developed nations. All of these factors would weaken applicability of consensual development models in Caribbean nations in favour of conflict models. A second and perhaps more telling feature of Caribbean societies, that makes existing criminological theory less pertinent is their scale. Most Caribbean nations are small islands or federations of islands and the distance between urban centres and rural areas is not great. Hence the process of urbanisation may not have the meaning that it did in the large nations that developed previously where urban job opportunities forced rural jobseekers to move. Most of the social disruption attendant to industrialisation and urbanisation has not or will not occur in most Caribbean nations. Primordial attachments can be maintained while working in an industrial job. The dual statuses should stall the transition to a modern industrial society posited by human ecology models as well as development models of both stripes. It is similar to what Clinard (1978) noted in Switzerland when trying to explain why a nation with a high level of industrial development has a low level of crime. A third feature of Caribbean nations that makes them different from nations modernising in the nineteenth century is the importance of tourism. This industry barely existed in the nineteenth century. For most Caribbean nations, tourism has transformed their economic base away from traditional agriculture. Tourism

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involves largely service or retail sales and not the production of durable goods. The demands of a service and retail economy are quite different from that of an industrial economy. The former require large hierarchical organisations that are consistent with a two tier class system of the type posited by conflict theorists. The latter requires decentralisation, small businesses and entrepreneurship, all of which are consistent with a more complex social stratification system and a more consensual development model. The role of tourism in social stratification and the social organisation of society could depend to a large extent on the manner in which tourism is organised. If tourism is integrated into the society, then the role of tourism in the society will take a very different form than it would in a nation where tourists are hermetically sealed in self contained resorts. The former situation would lead to a more complex stratification system while the latter would promote a two tiered system. The important point here is how tourism affects society and thereby crime, but criminological theories must take account of service as well as industrial economies. More specifically, criminological theories applicable to the Caribbean must take tourism into account explicitly. Existing theories of crime do not address this important influence. The fourth unique feature of the Caribbean is the effect of the current illegal drug trade. The drug trade has two implications for the Caribbean. First, the islands, for good or ill, happen to be between drug suppliers in South America and drug consumers in North America. This is another industry that can affect social stratification and the social organisation of Caribbean nations profoundly. Larger nations may be able to absorb this type of commerce without extensive repercussions, but small nations cannot. The fact that this industry is also illegal complicates its accommodation in Caribbean society. The keen interest of the United States in interdiction and the pressure that it can put on Caribbean nations to respond to drug trafficking must also be considered. As we have seen in the United States, drug enforcement and the absence of enforcement can both lead to high levels of violence around the drug trade (Blumstein, 1996). Pressure from the US to engage interdiction can create crime problems that otherwise might not occur. Granted, the uncertainty surrounding the drug trade will pass while other features of Caribbean societies will endure. Nonetheless, the handling of the trade now will shape crime and the society’s response to it for years to come. This historical episode must be accommodated in an integrated theory of crime in the Caribbean. Secondly, and more importantly, the residual and unintended effects of transhipment can have a dramatic effect on local criminality. Some drugs destined for transhipment can be redirected into the society itself as either payment to local transshippers or to expand existing drug markets. The sale and usage of these drugs in the island societies fosters both violent and property crimes. As found in other nations, violence is deeply intertwined with the sale of illegal

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drugs (Blumstein, 1996). Criminal violence is commonly used to control the marketing and social organisation of drug sales. The fifth factor that differentiates the Caribbean from those nations in which most current theories of crime were developed is the relative immaturity of political and social institutions and the legacy of recent colonialism. Although the independence movement of the British colonies in the 1960s saw the emergence of new commonwealth nations and a republic, there are still islands in the Caribbean that are under the direct colonial rule of European nations. These colonial powers have left their mark on these societies both in terms of the nature and distribution of crime and their response to criminality. Nations with closer ties may be more stable economically and politically than those without such ties and stimulate foreign investment and other activities that affect the robustness of the economy and subsequently the level of crime. The foregoing discussion is not an indictment of criminological theory. Existing theory is extremely useful for identifying those factors that should be considered in understanding the level, change in level, and the distribution of crime in society. In some cases, these theories even indicate the relative importance of these factors and enable prediction. However, existing theories of crime do not fit the current situation of Caribbean nations very well. They omit a number of factors that are unique to these countries and that should be taken into account in building theories relevant to them. It may well be that with sufficient attention and thought; existing theories can be adapted to include more transparently the situations currently confronting Caribbean nations. At present, they do not. We argue that this inability to account for the five areas of uniqueness of the Caribbean constitutes a plausible argument, on intellectual grounds, for the creation of a sub discipline of criminology: Caribbean criminology. In developing a Caribbean criminology one should avoid the problems and pitfalls of past attempts to understand crime in developing nations. Rather than employing the evaluative approach to criminal theorising (i.e. simply import theories created to explain criminality in developed nations of the West as has been the trend), scholars should employ the generative approach to theory building in the Caribbean (Bennett 1980). The generative approach maintains that theory should evolve from a paradigm and include concepts that relate directly to explanatory power of the model in the nation or region of interest through an iterative process. This process involves the inclusion of relevant concepts such as the effects of tourism and colonialism, the determination of scope conditions such as size, insularity of the nation, and crime type, and the extraction of irrelevant concepts upon the iterative, cumulative explanatory power of the model (see Bennett, 1980 for a more detailed description of the process). In addition, considerable attention should be devoted to the creation of a multilevel generative model that specifically addresses the interstial linkages between the aggregated social structural level concepts and individual level

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determinants (e.g. the effect of tourism upon the routine activities of the nation’s individuals and other variables discussed later in this paper). Models that only address social structural determinants of crime rates present an incomplete (even misleading) picture of crime causation. The process by which macro social forces affect micro social factors (and thereby crime) will remain unknown. In the specific case of Caribbean criminology, single level models will mask the process by which unique features of the region (e.g. scale or tourism) interact with micro social factors (e.g. family structure) to influence the level and distribution of crime.

CRIME IN THE CARIBBEAN

Currently, we know very little about the causes of crime in the Caribbean. The vast majority of research on crime in the Caribbean is descriptive rather than analytic and focuses mainly upon the larger nations of the English speaking Caribbean (Mahabir 1988, Ellis 1991, DeAlbuquerque 1994, 1995). Thus, we know something about the levels of reported crime in the region, but we know very little about the correlates of these differences and nothing about the linkages between macro social factors and individual offending patterns. This body of literature, however, suggests three things: that crime rates differ from Caribbean nation to nation, that crime rates vary over time, and that crime rates vary over time across Caribbean nations. As an example, Figure 3.1 shows that reported homicide rates over a 17 year period are consistently higher in Jamaica and Guyana than in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago by a factor greater than two.2

FIGURE 3.1 HOMICIDE IN SELECTED CARIBBEAN NATIONS AND THE US, 1977–93

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Figure 3.2 also shows that Jamaica and Guyana have significantly higher rates of assault than do either Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago. In fact, the rates differ by a factor greater than eight in 1977 and evidence a reduction of difference to a factor of greater than four in 1993. However, comparing the data in Figure 3.1 and 3.2, the difference in rates for homicide are not as great as those for assault among the nations. This is especially important in that both crimes are considered interpersonal and violent in nature. It must be noted that these reported crime data do not speak in any way to why these rates differ by nation nor do they suggest what factors determine the observed differences. An effective criminology must be able to account for differences in rates among the nations of the region as well as differences among criminal patterns thought to be similar.

FIGURE 3.2 ASSAULT IN SELECTED CARIBBEAN NATIONS AND THE US, 1977–93

Second, crime rate data for the region suggest that crime rates vary over time. Figure 3.3 indicates that the burglary rate3 in Jamaica has been decreasing in the last 17 years while Trinidad and Tobago’s rate has been decreasing since 1988. In contrast, however, Barbados’ rate has increased approximately 225 per cent in the last 17 years. Although indicating interesting crime rate patterns, these data do not help us understand changes in nations’ crime rate across time. Why is it that Barbados is experiencing such a dramatic increase in this form of criminality while the other Caribbean nations’ data reported in Figure 3.3 are experiencing a decrease or erratic changes in burglary? Again, an effective criminology must be able to account for differences in rates across time within nations of the region.

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Traditional constructs such as development fail to account for these differences in that the nations pictured here exhibit somewhat similar levels of development over the 17 years reported.

FIGURE 3.3 BURGLARY IN SELECTED CARIBBEAN NATIONS AND THE US, 1977–93

Finally, the current data indicate that crime rates vary within nations across time. The most striking example of this phenomenon can be found in Figure 3.4. The data presented in this figure show that over time the per cent of violent crime (homicide, assault, and rape) to property crime (burglary, break-in, and larceny) has decreased in Barbados while at the same time it has increased in Trinidad and Tobago. What makes these trends so interesting is that the nations dramatically differed in 1977 (Barbados having a violent to property ration twice that of Trinidad and Tobago) yet both converge in 1991. Again, traditional constructs used to explain criminality in developing nations do not explain the observed differences in reported rates presented here. Aggregated measures of the constructs of development such as gross domestic product per capita and industrialisation are not efficacious explanation for the Caribbean.4

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FIGURE 3.4 PERCENTAGE OF VIOLENT TO PROPERTY CRIME IN TWO NATIONS, 1977–93 Per cent Violent Crime

Our understanding of the determinants of crime in the Caribbean is stymied by the current approach to model construction employing traditional, aggregated, structural level concepts. If a Caribbean criminology is to be realised, we must move away from our traditional frameworks and employ concepts and measures that reflect features unique to the region. It is equally important that data used to measure these concepts are collected in a manner which permits the testing of multilevel models (i.e. linking micro and macro level variables).

MEASURES AND PROTOCOLS

The building of a Caribbean criminology requires empirical testing of theories and propositions. By and large, current scholarly research on crime in the Caribbean has used crime data reported to and compiled by the police that are limited solely to counts of various offences and crimes (c.f. Ellis 1991, DeAlbuquerque 1994, 1995 and the data reported here). These crime data do not reflect the nature of the incident, the social situation in which the incident took place, the characteristics of the victim, or the characteristics of the offender. If a viable Caribbean criminology is to be realised, it will depend on systematically collecting information on people and things relevant to an emerging theory. Statistical systems must be put in place to gather these data. Here more than with criminological theory the experience of developed nations may be more relevant. Nonetheless, the unique features of the Caribbean also demand that certain unique data be collected.

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The development of criminological theory and supporting statistical data bases in developed nations like the United States suggest certain features that any useful data base on crime should include. For example, data should be available for the nation, jurisdictions within the nation, communities, neighbourhoods, households, offenders, victims, bystanders and incidents. Moreover, data on these various levels should be linked such that information on the crime incident can be associated with the victim, the offender, and the area in which it occurred. In this way, these data can be used to test multilevel models of crime that have proven to be much more powerful than single level models. Second, as much information as possible should be collected on each of the units mentioned above. The specific information that would be collected is described in greater detail below. Third, data on these various units of analysis should be collected in a manner that permits disaggregation by attributes of the event. For example, crimes should be classified by attributes of the victim or offender (e.g. stranger to stranger crime) and by attributes of the act (e.g. assault). Fourth, different mediums should be used to collect relevant data. Police data are useful for some purposes, but not for others. The same is true of household victimisation surveys and other data collection methods. Using only one of these data collection systems will necessarily provide a very partial and biased test of theory. Employing several of these data systems will reveal the extent and nature of these biases. Caribbean nations are in a particularly good position to take advantage of the experience of more developed nations in building appropriate statistical systems. One of the greatest problems faced by the latter is the encrusted nature of existing systems. These systems were developed in periods when computer and information technologies did not allow for great flexibility. These largely pencil and paper systems included very little information in very highly aggregated form because the burden on participants would be too great otherwise (Biderman and Lynch, 1991, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1985).

LESSONS FROM MORE DEVELOPED NATIONS: CONTENT

There are a number of data elements that criminologists and criminal justice professionals in more developed nations have found to be useful for testing theory and informing policy. These elements are identified in Appendix A. In keeping with our insistence that a viable Caribbean criminology must be able to build and test models that link the macro social structural with the micro individual level determinants, this Appendix identifies measures on the national, community, individual and incident levels. It is necessary not only to collect these data, but collect them in such a way that linkages among them can be directly made. That is, given a specific criminal incident, the data concerning that incident can be linked to data about the specific offender and victim as well as the community in which both the victim and the offender reside and the community in which the offence took place. In addition, national level data must be able to be linked to

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the specific offence. Without these linkages, fruitful scientific models of Caribbean crime cannot be devised and subsequently analysed.

FEATURES UNIQUE TO THE CARIBBEAN

In addition to the data elements found to be useful for building theory outside of the Caribbean there are others unique to the region. These data pertain specifically to the aspects of the Caribbean that make this region unique: scale, tourism, drug trade, and the vestiges of colonialism. Scale

Since most Caribbean nations are small, we have assumed that the effects of urbanisation have been different here than in larger industrialised nations. We have assumed that persons in the Caribbean will be able to work in the city, yet still commute back to their towns and villages to live. This, in turn, will preserve the primordial attachments that reduce criminal activity. These assumptions must be tested. Moreover, if they prove to be the case, these effects of scale must be monitored for any change. This would mean that data must be collected on town of residence as well as jurisdiction in which people work or attend school. Information on tenure in the current residence and the presence of family and extended family would also be useful for testing our assumptions about the effects of scale. Some of these data are collected on the general population in other nations as part of the census or supplements to the census and this may be possible in many Caribbean nations. Again, this information should be routinely collected in police, court and correction statistics so that specific offending or victimisation rates can be computed for testing theories. Tourism

Tourism can have a great effect on the social organisation of Caribbean nations and therefore any useful statistical system must monitor the changes in that industry and their implications for social control. Tourism affects social control in three ways. First, the industry provides targets for crime as well as potential offenders. Second, it affects the nature of social marginality in the society and thereby the motivation to crime. Third, it constitutes an interest group in the political process that determines the extent and nature of social control. Certainly, then, changes in the size of the industry must be monitored as a macro social feature of Caribbean nations. Increases in the proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) coming from tourism will change the volume of targets for crime as well as determine who will become members of marginalised groups in society. If, for example, extraction industries are replaced by tourism, then the less educated will see a decline in their job prospects, while the more educated and

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entrepreneurial may see an increase in theirs. This would be similar to the effects of ‘de-industrialisation’ observed in nations like the US (Wilson 1978, Sampson 1986, Lynch and Sabol 1996). Social marginality has been shown to have a positive effect on crime rates. Changes in the nature of the industry must also be recorded. For example, shifts in the composition of tourists from cruise ship day trippers to longer term visitors affect the opportunity for crime as well as those for legitimate business. Similarly, the spatial segregation of tourism from permanent residents can influence both criminal opportunity and demands for social control. Nations in which tourism is kept largely separate from permanent residents may have a very different crime problem than those in which tourist freely mingle with residents. While it is difficult to speculate a priori how these various arrangements will affect the level and distribution of crime, it is reasonably safe to say that these attributes of the social organisation of the tourist industry should be monitored. In addition to these more macro social data on the tourist industry, incident and person level data must be collected in a manner that allows for associating individuals and events with these macro social arrangements. It is important, for example, to know that a victim or offender is a tourist and whether they are day trippers or longer term vacationers. It may also be important to know where this individual is from. This type of linking information is important, not only for the tourist industry but for other industries and social groups as well. It would, for example, be useful to know if the suspect is an offender, is unemployed and if he were previously employed in say the oil industry. This type of linkage would permit testing of theories of macro level changes such as the shrinkage of the oil industry with social marginality and crime. Linkage with tourism is highlighted here because of its unique position in the Caribbean. In building statistical systems to support a Caribbean criminology some attention must be given to the importance of denominators for crime and risk rates. This means that data collected in police or court records must match data collected on non-criminals and non-victims in data systems outside of the criminal justice system. In the US, for example, it is virtually impossible to compute meaningful crime rates for tourists and other non-residents because we do not have data on these populations. The number of border inspections will be a substantial overestimate of the sojourning foreigner population because a large number of these inspections are for persons who cross the border daily for work or shopping. Visas granted will exclude these day trippers and result in an underestimate. Moreover, there are no data on the length of time that foreigners entering the country actually spend in the country. Time in the country is important for assessing victimisation risk. With data on tourist admissions and average stay, it would be possible to compute risk rates for tourists. It is important to build data systems on relevant populations to produce denominators for these rates.

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The Drug Trade

The participation of Caribbean nations in the drug trade can affect the level and nature of crime as well as the legitimacy of law enforcement agencies. Consequently, the volume and nature of the drug trade should also be monitored in information systems designed to support a Caribbean criminology. As we noted above, the unique geographical position of Caribbean nations makes them ideal as a transhipment point for drugs sent from South America to the US. This role in the drug trade can lead, under certain conditions to increases in drug use and perhaps drug related violence. Under other conditions, it is conceivable that participation in the drug trade could reduce crime levels in Caribbean nations. If Caribbean transshippers are paid in drugs and not cash, then they must sell these drugs locally to obtain the money they need. This would lead to an increase of drug sales and use in Caribbean nations and to related crime problems. To the extent that these new drug markets are not regulated, then widespread violence could result from competition among drug sellers. If, however, Caribbean transshippers are paid in cash and do not engage in selling drugs domestically, it is conceivable that the drug trade would simply be a source of revenue to the island that might cushion the blow of economic down turns or shifts in the economic base, for example, from manufacturing to service. Persons displaced from legitimate employment could obtain jobs in the drug industry or related businesses. Domestic drug use need not increase and neither would drug-related violence. Whatever the outcome of the involvement of Caribbean nations in the international drug trade, it is important that this involvement be monitored. Data should be maintained that indicates the nature and volume of drug use in Caribbean nations. Information on ‘drug-related’ crime should also be recorded. Collecting these data will not be easy. Drug use and sale are illegal and people engaged in this activity have an interest in keeping their activity secret. Nonetheless, some means of tracking the volume of drug use and sales are crucial to building a Caribbean criminology.

VESTIGES OF COLONIALISM

Most of the nations in the region have been colonies of some larger nation such as Britain, or France or the Netherlands. These colonial powers have left their mark on these societies. History influences the nature and distribution of crime but especially society’s response to crime. Moreover, some former mother countries maintain greater or lesser influence over activities in their former colonies through defence arrangements and economic agreements. It is important to include data on this macro social feature of Caribbean nations. Specifically, nations can be arrayed in terms of the closeness of the relationship between the former colonial power and the former colony. Nations with closer ties may be more stable economically than those without such ties. Stability can be related to the

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availability of foreign investment which, in turn, affects the robustness of the economy, the level of absolute deprivation and thereby crime. Another scenario would have nations with close ties as less stable because old elites that rose under colonial dominion would persist even though they had little indigenous support. These ‘old elites’ will monopolise all of the wealth, thereby increasing inequality and as a result crime. It is difficult to say which of these scenarios (or some other) is more apt, but vestiges of colonial rule figure in them and the influence of these factors is worth examining. Symbolic activity may be particularly relevant here as in the case where the police in former colonies adopt the dress and regalia of the former colonisers. The persistence of political institutions in the former colony that are similar in form to those of the former mother country would also be of interest. These institutions legitimise the use of coercive force in society. Appeals to these symbols and institutions may provide a source of political stability that nations without such symbols cannot draw upon. Without these symbols, the level of coercive force required to maintain social order may be much greater. Conversely, nations that rely upon symbols of past masters may do so because they have no indigenous symbols that can be used to legitimatise the use of coercion. As a result these symbols do not have the power to legitimise policies and so naked coercion must be used in its stead. There are ways to characterise the relationship between former colonies and former colonisers other than those described here. Current economic ties and borrowed political (broadly construed) institutions, however, have a plausible role in shaping both the nature of crime and the societal response to same. They may be useful for understanding differences among Caribbean nations in crime and criminal justice policy.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF CREATING A CARIBBEAN CRIMINOLOGY

There are four major impediments to developing a viable Caribbean criminology. Each impediment focuses upon the identification and collection of measures addressed above which link aggregated structural level indicators with individual level behaviours. First, there is a need to convince governments and funding agencies of the necessity of developing a scientific approach to the understanding of crime and criminality. Unlike many developed nations, the nations of the Caribbean region do not have a tradition of using scientific research to direct social policy. Few studies have been undertaken concerning the causes of crime in the Caribbean and the ones that have been published address the issue at such a high level of aggregation that the findings, by and large, are of little use in generating policy. Governmental efforts to understand the crime problem and how the justice system might impact the problem have been undertaken in the form of governmental commissions, but the results appear to

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be more a product of the predilections of the commission’s staff than a product of rigorous scientific study (c.f. National Task Force 1993, O’Dowd 1991, Hirst 1991). Because of this situation, current crime policy is driven by fear of crime and political expediency rather than an understanding resulting from scientific inquiry. This impediment to the development of a Caribbean criminology must be addressed by educating and persuading governments and non-governmental funding agencies for the need for a scientific base upon which to develop policy. These entities must be persuaded through public pressure and other means that the crime problem can only be successfully addressed through a realistic programme of scientific inquiry tied to efficient public policy formulation. Without governmental and private foundation support, through adequate funding, the scientific study of crime in the Caribbean is doomed from the start: just creating and maintaining the data systems proposed here are very costly. Second, there is a problem in readily gaining access to crime data from the nations’ criminal justice organisations. This problem manifests itself in three ways in the public sector:

(1) the current lack, on the part of criminal justice organisations, to collect theoretically relevant data concerning crime, (2) the current decentralisation of crime data and its lack of collection in machine readable form, and (3) resistance of criminal justice organisations to divulging their data to non- governmental individuals or organisations. It also manifests itself one major way in the private sector: through tourism and private security firms.

As we noted in previous sections, criminal justice organisations, especially the police, do not currently collect data which is amenable to building explanatory models. The data routinely collected by the police are amassed solely for the identification and possible prosecution of an offender. In the best of situations, these data are of limited scientific importance and if a suspect is not arrested the data collected are limited to only the type of crime, nature of the loss, and the victim’s name and address. Little is collected that would aid in understanding the crime in terms of its correlates such as the economic and social conditions surrounding the offence, the social relationship between offender and victim, and the employment, educational, and lifestyle characteristics of both the offender(s) and the victim(s) (see Appendix A for specific data elements concerning these correlates). Currently, records are seen as post hoc ‘papering’ of incidents. This mindset must be changed to an appreciation of the potential of these data to predict and to understand crime and the police response to same. The police will collect information described above only when they see that it can be used to devise strategies for improving service and making their job easier. Demonstrating the strategic and tactical use of these data is the challenge to those of us who would have the police collect it.

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Even when the police collect data that would be advantageous to crime analysis, these data are rarely centralised and stored in a machine readable form that would make them amenable to scientific inquiry. In most nations of the Caribbean, the police Daily Diary (police log) contains limited, albeit important, information concerning crimes (e.g. type of offence, time, location, victim), but unless there is a continuing investigation and a suspect is arrested there is no incentive to collect theoretically important, but supplemental, information on the incident. Police currently do collect some limited theoretically relevant items during the investigation of a crime, but this information rarely leaves the station house responsible for the investigation. If it does leave the station, it does so in the form of a case file for prosecution. Once the prosecution is terminated, the file then returns to the original station for storage. Criminologically relevant data contained in the file are never captured or centralised for future analysis.5 It is a common practice in the Caribbean for the police to centralise only the number of crimes reported and crimes solved through arrest by crime category. They do not compile or centralise any of the data found in the Daily Diaries nor do they centralise any of the data found in case files. Police agencies throughout the world, and the Caribbean is no exception, are suspicious of outsiders and threatened by governmental commissions that tend to use police generated data to embarrass the police. Such has been the tradition in the Caribbean (c.f. National Task Force 1993, O’Dowd 1991, Hirst 1991). These commission reports usually find fault with the police administration, management, training of constables, organisational structure and operating procedures. They usually call for sweeping changes in the police, but in almost all cases, the commissions do not present viable means by which the police could implement these changes even if the police administration was so inclined. This criticism combined with a lack of meaningful avenues for change rightfully leads to cynicism on the part of the police. This is not to say that such commissions are not important and needed to highlight inadequacies in the criminal justice systems, but if they just criticise without mandating resources for change, their actions have an isolating and retrenching effect on the police. A we/they mentality is formed within the police which has a decidedly negative effect on the organisation, the morale of its personnel, and openness to future change in and accessibility of organisational and crime data. In the private sector, building data systems that take account of the link between tourism and crime may be aided or impeded by the industry itself. The tourism industry may invest a substantial amount in private security both for preventing crime and responding to it (this aspect of the industry must be monitored). Depending upon the nature of these private security arrangements in specific nations, a large proportion of the crime in the nation could be excluded from police record systems. Private security firms may handle a large proportion of property crimes occurring on their property without notifying the police. If

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this is the case, then public statistics may vary substantially across nations when the crime problems are actually the same. Efforts must be made to include data from the private security firms serving the tourist industry in data systems on crime. This may not be an easy task, since tourist businesses have an interest in controlling knowledge of crimes by and against tourists. Third, earlier in this paper we advocated the use of different mediums for collecting data essential for building a Caribbean criminology. Official statistics are certainly one important source of data. Victimisation surveys are another. In the US and Great Britain victim surveys indicate that approximately one half of the crimes committed are not reported. Although little is known about crime reporting in less developed nations (as compared to developed nations), Bennett and Wiegand (1994) indicate that for one developing nation, the crime reporting practices are similar to developed nations.6 They found that only 45 per cent of the households that experienced a crime in the reporting year reported the crime to the police. Without more complete reporting of crime and knowledge about the circumstances surrounding the criminal act, a Caribbean criminology will not become a viable enterprise. To eliminate this gaping void in our knowledge about victims and crimes, it is recommended that funding be immediately made available to conduct ongoing victim surveys. Victim surveys in less developed nations, however, are not without their logistical problems. First, such surveys require a sizable amount of funding, especially if they have to be undertaken through personal interview instead of telephone. As is the case in many developing nations, telephone service is not universal and face to face interviews are the only viable means of collecting unbiased data from the nation’s population. In addition to funding, enumeration of the population so that a legitimate sample can be drawn is very problematic. The use of households as a sampling frame like in the US and British victim surveys would tend to underestimate a large proportion of the underclass due to the fact that many are squatting on government property which are not designated as housing units in census tracts. This underestimation of the underclass would be especially troubling in that crime by and against the underclass makes up a large proportion of the actual crime committed if not reported. The use of alternative sampling frames is also prone to underestimating critical segments of the population (c.f. Bennett and Wiegand 1994). Finally, the inaccessibility of social and economic data in a disaggregated form confounds any analysis of how these structural arrangements in society can be linked to individual behaviour and the incidence of crime. Currently, this economic and social data are aggregated on the national level in the Caribbean and important neighbourhood and community level data does not exist or if accessible, not in a usable form. Data such as employment figures, educational attainment levels, and poverty figures, etc. are collected on a national basis and cannot be easily disaggregated to a community or neighbourhood level for interstial analysis so important to viable criminological analysis. Attempting to

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analyse crime incidents, which by their very nature linked inseparably to neighbourhood social and economic conditions with national level social statistics leads to findings that invariably commit an ecological fallacy. That is, the correlation of national figures with crime says nothing about the factors predisposing an individual to commit a crime (e.g. because there are high levels of unemployment in a nation does not, in any way, mean that those who are unemployed are committing the crimes). If a Caribbean criminology is to emerge as a viable enterprise, the way in which social and economic data are collected and coded must change. This proposal is not without problems, however. Statistical organisations, like all organisations, are resistant to change, especially if that change means a major revamping of the ways in which they collect, code, analyse, and disseminate their data. The difficulty centres around not only resistance to change, but also the finances to realise change. Statistical organisations are funded based upon their mandate to collect and organise data determined by government to be of importance. Without a change in governmental mandate, the organisation will not receive the necessary funding to enable them to take on additional data collection activities nor will it allow them to reorganise the data they currently collect.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper was to examine the need for a Caribbean criminology. In addressing this issue, we examined the intellectual reasons for creating a sub discipline within mainstream criminology. In particular, we briefly reviewed some of the major theories of mainstream criminology and assessed the ability of these theories to explain and predict crime in the region. We then discussed what is currently known about crime in the Caribbean, and what further knowledge is required to address this problem. Finally, we addressed the four major impediments to the creation of a data driven scientific inquiry into crime and the prospects of realising a viable Caribbean criminology. Currently, we know very little about the causes of crime in the Caribbean. We do know from past research that crime rates differ from nation to Caribbean nation, within Caribbean nations across time, and among Caribbean nations across time. But we currently have neither the data nor the conceptual models to effectively address the explanation of these observed differences. If we are to develop a generative approach to the construction of a Caribbean criminology with special attention to linkages across levels of analysis, we must begin to collect data which is appropriate to such analysis. This means that we must begin to conceptualise and measure what we hypothesise as unique to the Caribbean such as scale, tourism, drug trade, and the vestiges of colonialism and link these measures to indicators of national, community, individual, and incident level data which have been identified in Appendix A.

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Four impediments to the collection of the necessary data were identified. There are two commonalities among these impediments. The first commonality is the resistance of organisations to change: from governments changing the mode by which they make social engineering policy, to changing the way that police and the criminal justice system approach the collection and centralisation of crime and crime incident data, to changing the fashion by which governmental statistical organisations collect, code and analyse data. The second commonality among the impediments is the funding needed to mount such a data collection effort. In addition, the fielding of a victim survey, especially a face to face survey requires considerable resources. However, as the fear of crime increases within the nations of the Caribbean and the public clamours for governmental action, we hope that governments will act responsibly and begin to fund the data collection activities that we have identified here. Unless there is a concerted effort on the part of governments and others to collect data that link the social structural with individual behavioural determinants of criminality, we can’t begin to develop a Caribbean criminology.

REFERENCES

Bennett, R. 1991a. ‘Development and Crime: A Cross-National, Time Series Analysis of Competing Models’. Sociological Quarterly 32, 343–63. ___. 1991b. ‘Routine Activities: A Cross-National Assessment of a Criminological Perspective’. Social Forces 70, 147–63. ___. 1980. ‘Constructing Cross-National Theories in Criminology: Application of the Generative Approach’. Criminology 18, 252–68. Bennett, R.R. and Shelley, L. 1985. ‘Crime and Economic Development: A Longitudinal Cross-National Analysis’. Annales de Vaucresson 22, 13–32. Bennett, R.R. and Wiegand, B. 1994. ‘Observations on Crime Reporting in a Developing Nation’. Criminology 32, 135–48. Biderman, A. and Lynch, L. 1991. Understanding Crime Incidence Statistics: Why the UCR Diverges from the NCS. New York: Springer-Verlag. Blumstein, A. Forthcoming, 1996. ‘Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-drug Industry’. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1985. Blueprint for the Future of the Uniform Crime Reporting System. Washington. D.C.:US. Department of Justice. Bursik, Robert J., Jr. and Webb, J. 1982. ‘Community Change and Patterns of Delinquency’. American Journal of Sociology 88, 2442. Chiricos, T.G. and DeLeon, M. 1992. ‘Labor Surplus and Punishment: A Review and an Assessment of Theory and Evidence’. Social Problems 39, 421–46. Clinard, M. 1978. Cities with Little Crime: The Case of Switzerland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DeAlbuquerque, K. 1995. ‘How Bad is Crime in the Caribbean?’ Caribbean Week 6, no.19: 1–7.

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___. 1994. ‘A Comparative Analysis of Violent Crime in the Caribbean’. Social and Economic Studies 33, 93–142. Durkheim, E. 1954. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: The Free Press. Hirst, M.J. 1991. Review of the Jamaica Constabulary Force. (Report to Minister of National Security). Kingston, Jamaica: Ministry of National Security. Krohn, M.D. 1978. ‘A Durkheimian Analysis of International Crime Rates’. Social Forces 57, 654–70. LaFree, G. and Kick, E.L. 1986. ‘Cross-National Effects of Development, Distributional and Demographic Variables on Crime: A Review and Analysis’. International Annals of Criminology 24, 213–36. Lynch, J.P. and William, A.S. 1996. ‘The Use of Coercive Social Control and Changes in the Race and Class Composition of the US Prison Population’. The Howard Journal. Mahabir, C. 1988. ‘Crime in the Caribbean: Robbers, Hustlers and Warriors’. International Journal of the Sociology of Law 16, 315–88. Messner, S.F. 1982. ‘Societal Development, Social Equality, and Homicide: A Cross-National Test of the Durkheimian Model’. Social Forces 61, 597–611. National Task Force on Crime. 1993. Report of the National Task Force on Crime. Kingston, Jamaica: Office of the Prime Minister. O’Dowd, D.J. 1991. Review of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. (Report). Trinidad: Government of Trinidad and Tobago. Piven, F.F and Cloward R.A. 1993. Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare. New York: Vintage Books. Quinney, R. 1980. Class, State and Crime. New York: Longman. Robert E.P., Burgess, E.W. and McKenzie, R.D. 1967. The City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sampson, R.J. 1986. ‘The Effects of Socio-economic Context on Official Reactions to Juvenile Delinquency’. American Sociological Review 51, 876–85. Shaw, C and McKay, H.D. 1969. Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas: A Study of Rates of Delinquency in Relation to Differential Characteristics of Local Communities in American Cities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Shelley, L. 1981. Crime and Modernization. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Wilson, W.J. 1978. The Declining Significance of Race. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Young, J. 1989. Realist Criminology. London: Sage Publications. Young, J and Mathews, R. 1992. Issues in Realist Criminology. London: Sage Publication. Zvekic, U. and Alvazzi del Frate, A. 1995. Criminal Victimization in the Developing World. Rome: UNICRI.

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APPENDIX A

Theoretically Important Data Elements for a Caribbean Criminology

NATION-LEVEL DATA 1. Unemployment rates 2. Unemployment rates by economic sector 3. Gross-national product 4. Gross domestic product 5. Immigration levels by reason and country of origin 6. Urbanisation 7. Income inequality 8. Educational attainment 9. Arrest rates by offence and age, race and class groups 10. Imprisonment rates by age, race and class groups 11. Admissions to prison by offence, age, race and class groups 12. Residential mobility rates COMMUNITY-LEVEL DATA 1. Income level 2. Average housing price 3. Land usage (commercial, residential) 4. Per cent single-parent households 5. Per cent children under five years old 6. Per cent male residents between 15 and 25 7. Average tenure 8. Per cent owner occupied units 9. Variation in income 10. Racial and ethnic homogeneity 11. Urban or rural 12. Distance from major city INCIDENT-LEVEL 1. Location 2. Time 3. Victims 4. Offenders 5. Injury 6. Loss 7. Forcible entry 8. Weapon 9. Reported to police 10. Day of week 11. Type of threat 12. Victim/offender interaction 13. Activity of victim at time of incident 14. Reported to authorities other than the police

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INDIVIDUAL LEVEL DATA

1.0 Offenders 2.0 Victims (and non-victims)1 1.1 Age 2.1 Age 1.2 Race 2.2 Race 1.3 Sex 2.3 Sex 1.4 Ethnicity 2.4 Ethnicity 1.5 Citizenship status 2.5 Citizenship 1.6 Marital status 2.6 Marital Status 1.7 Children 2.7 Children 1.8 Living arrangement 2.8 Living arrangement 1.9 Employment status 2.9 Employment status, school, major activity 1.10 Duration of unemployment 2.10 Income 1.11 Income 2.11 Education 1.12 Educational attainment 2.12 Urban residence 1.13 Home ownership 2.13 Activity at time of incident 1.14 Time in residence 2.14 Time in residence 1.15 Prior offences by type 2.15 Prior relationship 1.16 Prior incarcerations by type 2.16 Commercial enterprise 1.17 Address 2.17 Location of residence 2.18 Location of work or school 2.19 Type of work 2.20 Routine activities and duration with offender

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies, St Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, January 1996 1(1) pp. 8–45, with permission. 2. Data for the United States is included in the figures only to show how levels of crime rates in the Caribbean compare to the rate of crime in a developed nation. 3. For this figure, burglary rates include both crime categories of break-ins and burglaries for the Caribbean nations (the definitional difference between these two crime categories is only time of day and not behaviour) so as to make them comparable to US crime categories. 4. Although past comparative research indicates that industrialisation is an important factor in understanding crime rates, especially property crime rates (c.f. Bennett 1991a), analyses employing Caribbean data, not presented here, indicate that traditional measures of development are not associated with the rate of crime. This finding, again, demonstrates the uniqueness of the Caribbean and further justifies the need for a Caribbean criminology. 5. This is not to say that data are not centralised concerning prosecutions of crimes, but that which is centralised within the court and police systems is arrest and conviction data that simply identifies the victim, offender and the type of offence. These data, other than for enumerating the level of crime and convictions are useless to scientific purposes. 6. More extensive victimisation data have become available in developing nations recently. See Zvekic and Alvazzi del Frate (1995).

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Constructing INTRODUCTION: THE STRUCTURE OF the Crime SOCIAL PROBLEMS Problem A well established perspective in through the sociology views social problems (including the problem of crime) as socially constructed Media: (Spector and Kitsuse 1973). For readers not Melodrama in familiar with this perspective, ‘construction’ Venezuela, 1950-991 should not be taken to mean causes: the social constructionist perspective does not involve the study of the social processes that Christopher Birkbeck lead to social problems (as, for example, when we look for the social causes of crime). Rather, construction refers to the constitution of the problem itself. Both natural life and social life are filled with an immense range of phenomena and conditions, but none of them would be problematic from the viewpoint of a hypothetical impersonal observer because problems involve negative evaluations, and evaluation is a human — fundamentally social — process. Social problems exist, therefore, because at least some social actors have developed a negative evaluation of a particular set of circumstances or conditions.2 With regard to crime, the constructionist perspective does not see the ‘crime problem’ in the pictures painted by official crime statistics or more ‘valid’ indicators of criminality such as victimisation surveys or self-report data, but in assertions that crime is a problem for society. As constructionists point out, crime (or some types of crime) may be seen as a problem at some times and places but not at others (e.g., Fishman 1978, McCorkle and Miethe 1998).3

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‘Construction’ is also a useful term because it implies the notion of structure, that is, of constituent components that are organised and related in some identifiable way. In turn, structure invites inquiry and may facilitate understanding — in this case, the focus of attention being the discursive elements and practices that give the problem its existence and character rather than the empirical condition designated as a problem. Within the constructionist perspective, the first researcher to explore the structure of social problems was Gusfield (1981) in his study of the drinking-driving problem in the United States (US). Gusfield postulated that social problems contain both a moral and a cognitive dimension. The moral dimension represents the evaluative process already alluded to; it is ‘that which enables the situation to be viewed as painful, ignoble, immoral’ (1981, 9). The cognitive dimension

consists in beliefs about the facticity of the situation and events comprising the problem…[For example, c]rime may be seen as a result of broken homes, poverty, genetics, community disorganization, or any number and type of variables (1981, 9).

In addition, the cognitive dimension also includes a belief about the alterability of phenomena, for if phenomena are perceived as unalterable they will not be considered to be a problem.4 In fact, social problems require both a moral judgement about the undesirability of a situation and a cognitive judgement about its alterability, for if either is missing the problem ceases to exist. Gusfield also distinguished between the attribution of two types of responsibility by those who engage in debate and discussion regarding any social problem. Causal responsibility refers to the conditions identified as producing the problem (as, for example, when inequality is purported to cause crime), while political responsibility identifies the person or institution that should do something about the problem (for example, when the police are urged to crack down on gang activities).

The first answers the question, How come? The second answers the question, What is to be done? The first – causal responsibility – is a matter of belief or cognition, an assertion about the sequence that factually accounts for the existence of the problem. The second – political responsibility – is a matter of policy. It asserts that somebody or some office is obligated to do something about the problem, to eradicate or alleviate the harmful situation. (Gusfield 1981, 13-14)

Subsequently, other researchers have offered somewhat similar analyses of the structure of social problems. For example, in their study of the nuclear power ‘issue’ in the US, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) proposed that media discourse can be thought of as ‘…a set of interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue. A package has an internal structure. At its core is a central organizing idea, or frame, for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue.’ (1989, 3)

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These authors distinguished between ‘framing devices’ (such as catchphrases and metaphors) which are employed to denote the central idea, and ‘reasoning devices,’ which justify what should be done about it. The latter are of three kinds: ‘(1) roots (i.e., a causal analysis), (2) consequences (i.e., a particular type of effect), and (3) appeals to principle (i.e., a set of moral claims)’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3-4). Of the reasoning devices, at least two (roots and appeals to principle) resonate with structural elements identified by Gusfield (causal responsibility and the moral dimension, respectively). More recently, Benford and Snow (2000) identified three ‘core framing tasks’ undertaken by the social movements that often mobilise around social problems: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing involves identification of the social problem itself (akin to Gusfield’s moral dimension) and attributions of causality (Gusfield’s causal responsibility). Prognostic framing involves ‘…the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan. In short, it addresses the Leninesque question of what is to be done…’ (Benford and Snow 2000, 616) Here, the reference to ‘what is to be done’ resonates with Gusfield’s category of political responsibility. Finally, motivational framing ‘provides a “call to arms” or rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive’ (Benford and Snow 2000, 617). It may overlap with Gamson and Modigliani’s ‘appeals to principle.’ Each of these approximations to the structure of social problems reflects the subject matter, source materials, and particular analytical style of its author(s). A systematic comparison of their similarities and differences is beyond the scope of this paper, but the models are cited here, first, to establish that this kind of inquiry already exists in the social sciences and, second, to provide some conceptual antecedents that will be used in the present study. Drawing on elements that emerge from these prior analyses, I would like to suggest that social problems discourse can be usefully classified into three broad categories: moral, cognitive, and pragmatic. The moral dimension involves the evaluation of a phenomenon or process as undesirable; it is what signals the existence of a problem. The cognitive dimension refers to what is known (or purported to be known) about the problem (its characteristics, causes and consequences), whether expressed as facts and figures, or hypotheses, theories and other types of speculation. The pragmatic dimension refers to what is to be done to alleviate the problem. These dimensions may be quite highly interrelated as, for example, when scientific studies (the cognitive dimension) are used to evaluate the results of a putative solution to a social problem (the pragmatic dimension), or when social inquiry (the cognitive dimension) is criticised for failing to address important social problems (the moral dimension). Nevertheless, they arguably represent quite different types of intellectual activity, each with its own traditions and methods: the moral

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dimension leads back to ethics, cognition to science, and pragmatics to social engineering. This three-dimensional analysis may not only have heuristic value in helping to study and understand social problems discourse, it may also have normative value in the sense of offering a broad blueprint for addressing social problems. For example, without a negative evaluation of the situation (ethics) there would not be a problem; without knowledge (science) we would have no information about the characteristics, causes or consequences of the problem; and without practical intervention (social engineering) nothing would be done to solve it. Therefore, social problems may be best handled by a judicious and intelligent combination of all three dimensions. The following case study makes this normative argument indirectly by describing a social problem that is structured in a very imbalanced way.

THE STUDY AT HAND

Crime, in varying forms, has been a public problem in Venezuela for a very long time.5 How has that problem been structured? Using the conceptual model presented in the introduction, I analyse public discourse on crime during the second half of the twentieth century (1950–99). Two sources of material are used and a separate section is devoted to each. The first is a sample of pieces published in the leading national daily newspaper; the second is a survey of criminological writings which were published as texts, monographs or reports during this period. In each case, simple content analysis is employed to assess the relative emphasis given to the moral, cognitive and pragmatic dimensions of the crime problem, and in both the findings point to the predominance of moral discourse over cognitive and pragmatic elements. This discourse is then explored in terms of its style (melodramatic) and function (status enhancement), thereby providing an implicit evaluation of the structure of the crime problem in the country (deficient). The paper concludes with some considerations on the significance of these findings for future research.

POLITICIANS AND PROFESSIONALS CONSTRUCT THE CRIME PROBLEM: FIFTY YEARS OF NEWSPRINT

Venezuela experienced considerable change during the second half of the twentieth century. Between 1950 and 1999, the population increased from five million to nearly 24 million (OCEI 2000), while its distribution became increasingly and definitively urban. The country began the period under military dictatorship, transitioning to a democratic system in 1958 which had atrophied by the 1990s, leading to the installation of a constituent assembly in 1999 that would hopefully ‘re-found the Republic.’ Amid all this, one of the constants was the role of oil as the mainstay of the economy; while another — as we shall see — was the discursive style through which the crime problem was constituted.

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The following data were collected from El Nacional, Venezuela’s leading national daily newspaper throughout the period under study.6 El Nacional published, and continues to publish, a diverse range of pieces concerning crime, including opinion columns, letters, articles, and statements by public figures. For a piece to be included in the current study, it had to contain statements referring to crime in Venezuela, because it is through these statements that the crime problem is constructed. Consequently, reports that focused only on specific crimes and said nothing about crime in general (and which are usually located on the back page of the newspaper) were excluded from analysis. Because El Nacional only began to keep a digital archive from 1996 onwards, the search for relevant texts had to be undertaken manually, which was a time-consuming task. Therefore, in order to reduce the amount of time required for data collection, a simple sampling system was adopted by which one month of newspapers from each year (1950–99) was randomly selected and studied. This procedure produced 401 pieces of interest, each of which was described and summarised on a simple data coding form. Where possible, the pieces were photocopied for additional content analysis; where not, relevant textual fragments were copied verbatim on the coding form.7 Over the years included in the study, different types of crime — such as violence, terrorism, juvenile delinquency, drug trafficking and corruption — figured as the objects of attention. Additionally, the level of interest in the crime problem also fluctuated quite heavily, as revealed by the varying number of pieces retrieved for each month in the sample.8 These variations reflect the natural flow and ebb of public interest in crime, as particular events trigger concern (for example, the political violence of the 1960s or the corruption scandals of the 1990s), which later subsides as crime is crowded out of the public agenda by other events on the national or international scene. Although the identification of those who wrote (or were reported) in the newspaper was not always clear, the largest group of people (approximately 43 per cent) belonged to the political system (as politicians, bureaucrats or political party members), followed by journalists (approximately 31 per cent). Representatives of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), unions, and other interest groups accounted for only seven per cent of those writing or being reported, while professionals (mainly the liberal professions, and a few academics) accounted for 18 per cent. As we shall see, the relative scarcity of professionals among those writing or being reported reflected the weak development of the scientific dimension of the crime problem. As a way into the analysis of newspaper discourse on crime, it is useful to distinguish between technical and literary styles of exposition. The former pays greater attention to semantic precision and careful reasoning; the latter pays greater attention to poetry, understood as ‘the expression or embodiment of beautiful or elevated thought, imagination, or feeling, in language adapted to stir the imagination and emotions’ (Oxford English Dictionary 2006) — and, it might be added where the press is concerned, to stir the interest of the reader.9 The technical

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expressions of morality are found in ethics; of cognition in science; and of pragmatics in social engineering. The corresponding literary forms are the moral essay, the documentary and the recipe.10 Moral essays often have a dramatic quality, while documentaries and recipes almost always take the form of narrative. In the sample of pieces studied here, it is perhaps not surprising that the technical treatment of the crime problem was infrequent, for technical matters tend to be the preserve of intellectuals, who write in specialised books and journals. Technical discourse is unlikely to sell many newspapers. No piece in this sample offered an ethical analysis of the crime problem, while only 26 (6.5 per cent) provided relatively systematic (scientifically based) information about crime and 24 (six per cent) offered relatively detailed proposals for dealing with the crime problem.11 The following is an example of technical discourse based on science:

Recent studies indicate the existence of a social group whose norms and behaviours differ markedly from those accepted by the rest of society. This group is considered to look at life on a short term basis…[I]t seeks immediate satisfactions, spending all its money and using its time according to a pleasure, rather than a utility, principle. That same impatience for enjoyment is what explains…its marked inclination for violence and the commission of crimes to resolve the anxieties of a tormented life. 12 (02/03/82, A-4, Adán Febres Cordero, ‘El Hampa Desbocada’ [The Runaway Underworld])13

An example of a relatively technical pragmatic piece of writing comes from a document on crime policy prepared by the Venezuelan Chamber of Business (Fedecámaras) in 1964 and handed to the Minister of Justice. This contained 15 specific proposals for dealing with the crime problem, among them:

In the Legal Domain: … a) Strict application of the Penal Code and the Vagrancy Law, b) Reactivation of Penal Code Reform … e) Application of the legal disposition making parents legally responsible for the delinquent acts of their children….In the Administrative and Organizational Domains: a) Increase the number of criminal judges in the Metropolitan Area … c) Recommend the centralisation of state agencies dealing with information, personnel and criminal justice matters … e) Improve prison and arrest services, so as to avoid escapes, overcrowding and promiscuity among heterogeneous antisocials…. Regarding policing: a) Relocation and unification of the Police Forces under one technical management structure … d) Effective professionalisation, dignification and economic improvement of the police. (19/12/64, D-2, Fedecámaras, ‘Reubicación y Unificación de Cuerpos Policiales Propone Fedecámaras en un Plan Contra Delincuencia’ [Relocation and Unification of Police Force Proposed by Fedecámaras in Crime Plan])

It is not surprising that the popularisation of the technical treatment of the crime problem was mainly undertaken by professionals — the group best placed to bridge the technical and popular domains. While professionals represented

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only 18 per cent of those writing or being reported about crime, this group accounted for 60 per cent of the systematic descriptions of the crime problem and 39 per cent of the relatively detailed proposals for dealing with crime. The great majority of pieces (90 per cent) in the sample used a literary style to talk about crime - mostly in moral, rather than cognitive or pragmatic, terms. Of course, the words used to describe the phenomenon of concern, such as ‘crime,’ ‘corruption,’ ‘violence’ and ‘drug trafficking,’ in themselves imply moral censure, but beyond that more than two thirds of the literary pieces (68.5 per cent) also included additional negative epithets for crimes or criminals,14 and more than three quarters (83 per cent) tinted their descriptions of the crime problem with moral terms, as in the following two examples: ‘It is necessary to visit our towns and rural areas in order to appreciate the tragedy….In the interior, the matter is alarming. On Saturdays and Sundays, the little bars and businesses sell jugs and jugs of rum and after that come the immediate consequences: beatings with their resulting injuries; machetes and stab wounds snuffing out lives.’ (02/04/50, 18, Juan Cabrices, ‘Voces de la Provincia. El Alcoholismo Tragedia Nacional’ [Voices from the Provinces. Alcoholism: A National Tragedy])

A lot of things happened in Recadi,15 from the abuse of influence by those who had the rank and position to do so, and the venality of the staff, to the thousand dodges set up for the painful distortion of the stated objective of holding down the increase in costs and prices through a multiple exchange control system. (01/ 06/89, A-4, Luis Piñerúa Ordaz, ‘Criterios. Recadi sin Paradojas’ [Opinion. Recadi without Paradoxes])

Only five per cent of the non-technical (i.e., literary) pieces contained descriptions of the crime problem that were devoid of moralistic terms. In terms of the pragmatic dimension, 82 per cent of the literary pieces included a general call to do something, but this was usually an appeal to principle or a call to arms for moral cleansing, not a recipe for action:

We have to do battle against them all. We have to show them that integrity has not died, that dignity has not gone to the cemetery but flutters on the masts of untiring courage, that the plague of their tarnished stolen monies is extinguished by the light of our intact morals, that the spittle of their pecuniary indigestion will not be the wave that crushes us…. (10/06/89, A-4, Carlos Canache Mata, ‘Un Expedicionario Contra la Corrupción,’ [A Crusader Against Corruption])16

More than an indication of how the crime problem might be handled or solved, this type of text sees action only as a moral struggle in which virtue overcomes vice. It is complemented by the virtuous character attributed to those who would attack the crime problem,17 and confirms the importance of the moral dimension in the construction of the crime problem. When placed alongside the

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moralism that infuses most of the descriptions of the crime problem, we realise that we are in the terrain of melodrama. Melodrama is a literary form that employs relatively crude and categorical distinctions between good and bad characters and focuses on the conflict between them, a conflict in which the good always win and the bad get what they deserve. In line with its moral role, melodrama plays heavily on the audience’s emotions and does little to explore the character of its protagonists or to analyse their behaviour and its context (i.e., it downplays the cognitive dimension). We usually think of melodrama in relation to fiction (i.e., certain kinds of novel, or stage and cinematic productions), but melodrama may also be found in other domains including those of the news and public affairs.18 It was certainly the preferred type of discourse for constructing the crime problem in Venezuela during the years included in this study. While the foregoing content analysis suggests that the elements of melodramatic style were present in the majority of literary pieces sampled from El Nacional, in some there was nothing but melodrama. As an example, we may take an article published in 1991,19 in which the author used a contemporary corruption scandal (concerning the refitting of some of the Venezuelan navy’s frigates) as the backdrop for a reflection on the moral state of the nation:

What is happening to us? Did we become a corrupt people? There is not a radio or television news programme that does not lay bare the ugly aspect of the social body. Nor is there a newspaper edition that does not emphasise the profound affliction of the ruling class, which is notable for its incompetence and ethical weakness.

To be noted here is the use of metaphor: society as a physical organism ‘afflicted’ by illness. The subsequent description of that ‘illness’ is extensive:

Statistics show the decline on all fronts. People work less and less is produced in Venezuela. There is less study and less research. There is little, very little, writing or reflection. Investment is made with no rush to industry. Justice is poor, unjust, mediocre and materialist. A people without justice is unfit, uncivilised, debased. The family threatens to explode and smash society to smithereens….A vice-ridden and aberrant climate of tolerance undermines responsibility. The inscrutable or compliant judiciary lets things happens, let things go. A kind of moral safe-conduct is issued to partners, friends and family members. We all lie and we are understood, and the exercise of discipline annoys, mainly because it is so unusual. The impoverishment is general…. There is no intelligence, no thought, no path.

While the foregoing includes vague references to corruption (‘the judiciary lets things happen,’ ‘we all lie’), there are also allusions to many other problems (increasing laziness, decreasing study, the family about to ‘explode,’ and so on). In this way, corruption would be one among many symptoms of social illness.

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The description is also infused with urgency: the family ‘threatens to explode;’ ‘our democracy is adrift’ (and therefore in danger of sinking). And against this apocalyptic vision of national destiny, ‘Heroes are scarce….The courageous appear as “Quixotes” perhaps accompanied by a hundred “Sanchos,”20 gullible lances aimed at the oligarchic windmills of the institutional establishment.’ However, there is still an opportunity to right the situation:

Can we change things? Let us set ourselves to a general overhaul. Let us raise the profile of virtue. Let us return to a patriotic honour that is something more than an alibi for bureaucrats and soldiers…let us refit ourselves deeply, profoundly, to the bottom; because there is still time.

CRIMINOLOGISTS AND THE CRIME PROBLEM: THE ‘UGLY HISTORY’ AND THE ‘BITTER MEMORANDUM’21

If the press was given to melodrama in dealing with the crime problem, what about criminology? One might expect that the treatment of crime by academia would have been more technical; and to some extent it was — at least the treatment of crime in general. However, when it came to the crime problem in Venezuela, the authors tended to adopt some of the characteristics already seen in newspaper discourse. This occurred irrespective of whether the author was a trained criminologist or merely an intellectual aficionado.22 And on a few occasions, criminologists almost self-consciously adopted the melodramatic idiom. In order to examine the structuring of the crime problem by academics and professionals, a systematic search was conducted for articles, reports, monographs and books published up to 199523 that dealt with crime in Venezuela. This yielded a total of 25 documents that were, like the newspaper pieces, subjected to a simple content analysis.24 Six characteristics of that literature revealed the relatively weak development of the cognitive and pragmatic dimensions of the crime problem and the strong presence of moral discourse. Four of the six characteristics indicated a weakly developed cognitive (i.e., scientific) framework. First, almost all authors referred to ‘factors’ that were associated with crime, rather than causes. This semantic strategy allowed them considerable analytical flexibility by releasing them from the more demanding task of establishing theoretically derived, or theoretically relevant, causes for crime, and they could concentrate instead on phenomena that were of particular concern, phenomena whose problematic nature was confirmed by the existence of crime. In a couple of cases, the authors even argued explicitly in favour of adopting this kind of strategy: ‘…in all countries and all latitudes, crime has the causes that are normally studied by criminologists, but…there are times when crime is reactivated by special factors, as is the case in Venezuela’ (Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Penales y Criminológicas 1968, 188). ‘To admit the importance of a group of

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factors, maybe even one factor, at one time or for certain crimes, does not imply that we abandon the thesis or unitary conception which we adhere to.’ (Mayorca, 1968, 410) The typical approach was to distinguish between ‘exogenous’ (i.e., social) and ‘endogenous’ (i.e., individual) factors associated with crime, but most attention was paid to exogenous factors.25 The particular phenomena identified and discussed were subject to change over the years (for example, alcohol consumption in the 1950s (Cova García 1951), family breakdown in the 1960s (Gómez Grillo 1969), marginality in the 1970s (Molina Blanchard 1976) and ethical decomposition in the 1980s (Vethencourt 1980) but the focus on exogenous variables allowed the authors to develop their own depiction of what was wrong with the country.26 Congruent with this first characteristic was the absence of almost any mention of theory when discussing crime in the country. Indeed, one text (Mendoza Troconis 1970) made the divorce very explicit by presenting criminological theories in several chapters at the beginning of the book and the ‘factors’ associated with crime in Venezuela in a completely different section towards the end. In this latter section, no mention at all was made of theory. A third characteristic that reflected a relatively weakly developed scientific posture was the absence of a critical approach to empirical foundations and data. Quite simply, empirical assertions were presented as unproblematic, while supporting data were absent. Some examples:

We now know that crime is a type of learned behaviour and that the person who commits crime does so, initially, in spite of himself. (Gómez Grillo’ 1969b, 379; my emphasis). It is a certain, objective and very concrete fact – that there exists a sequence of very strong links that go from the current economic structure…to the criminal behaviour of a marginal population (Molina Blanchard 1976, 238; my emphasis)

We will not now address the impact of the contradictions and socioeconomic antagonisms of capitalist society in the genesis of crime. No one disputes that. (Vethencourt 1980, 101; my emphasis).

A fourth and final characteristic congruent with the foregoing was the near total absence of argument or polemics between different authors, as one normally expects when scientists present their own findings and scrutinise the work of others.27 As already noted, there was quite a lot of similarity regarding the factors cited as associated with crime during each decade; however, there was also sufficient variation in individual expositions to suggest that this was an arena of discourse characterised by monologues rather than dialogue. In terms of the pragmatic dimension, a fifth characteristic of this material was the relative lack of attention to solutions to the crime problem. Fourteen of

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the 26 studies paid some attention to strategies for managing the problem and nine of these devoted more than 20 per cent of their text to this topic. However, in most cases the discussion of crime policy was superficial and often represented little more than a call to attend to the ‘factors’ associated with crime that had been mentioned by the author. For example, after devoting 23 pages of his monograph to a low level of culture and family disintegration as factors associated with crime, Romero Briceño (1959, 84–85) merely recommended the expansion of literacy and cultural programmes and an increase in the budget of the (then) Venezuelan Children’s Council. Similarly, after two pages on the causes of juvenile delinquency Buroz Arismendi (1977, 171) confined his proposal to ‘the strict application of the laws relating to minors, with a view to punishing irresponsible parenthood, the neglect of infants and the violation of minors’ rights to adequate alimentation.’ The notable generality of these and other proposals, along with a near total absence of detailed observations on governmental crime policies existing at the time of writing, make them similar to the calls to action found among those writing, or reported, in the newspapers. As we have seen, calls to action are on the borderline between the pragmatic and moral dimensions of social problems discourse. It should not, therefore, be surprising to discover that many of these texts also contain condemnatory language which reveals a moral indignation that smouldered under the surface. For example: ‘On the one hand, alcoholism is an illness that is one of the most dangerous for maintaining our strength as healthy and robust citizens. (Cova García 1951, 691; my emphasis)

In terms of the family, the Venezuelan situation is equally horrifying (Gómez Grillo 1969b, 380; my emphasis).

There exists, then, a beautiful and admirable contagion of crime techniques against man’s cause; the violence of money and all the horrendous machinations of the power groups that are legitimised by law are no longer the privilege of the elites (Vethencourt 1980 97; my emphasis).

As one considers these six characteristics together and rereads the texts in which they are found, it becomes apparent that Venezuelan criminologists had a predilection for moral discourse in structuring the crime problem. While their writings showed varying levels of attention to moralism, on at least two occasions they moved into the melodramatic form that I have already identified in newspaper text. For example, in a speech on crime in Venezuela given to a distinguished audience of congressional representatives, members of the judiciary, and representatives of national academic life, Gómez Grillo (1969) explicitly likened his presentation to a ‘drama,’ with ‘choreography and backdrop’ (p. 377), which underscored ‘Venezuelan criminal cinematography’ (p. 387). The distance between

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this literary approach to his subject and that which usually characterises the scientific approach to crime was heightened by the presentation of a bare minimum of figures to describe the problem: ‘I would not wish to tire you with the repetition of figures and more figures on this phenomenon which, anyway, is well known’ (p. 378). In this drama, the causes of crime were described in the tones of moral condemnation with which we are now familiar:

And to the spectre of unemployment there was added the problem of housing, of family breakdown, of sexual and alcoholic degradation, and of ignorance… (p. 378) The educational panorama is no less devastating. (p. 381) The archetype of the law…has started into decadence, in an acute crisis of respectability, the same as the archetype of the father, the teacher, the State or authority. (p. 381; emphasis in original) What kind of criminal can result, therefore, in Venezuela, from all this multiple and explosive combination of poverty, ignorance, abandon, illness, anxiety, frustration, defeat, skepticism, indifference, subjection, colonialism? (p. 382)

The author continues with some general descriptions of the quantitative and qualitative evolution of crime in Venezuela, the ‘criminological geography’ of the country and the participation of different social classes in criminal behaviour. Here, he also emphasises the dramatic nature of the problem:

the alarming thing about our current situation with regard to crime does not, perhaps, reside so much in the number of cases, which do not appear to have increased greatly…The alarm has risen, and rightly, because of the seriousness of those cases. (p. 387) The frequencies of both ‘‘white collar crime’’ and ‘‘gentleman’s crimes’’ are very, very high in Venezuela. (p. 392)

No solutions to the crime problem were offered or discussed in this speech, for Gómez Grillo was of the opinion that ‘Those of us who study criminology, like psychiatrists or Latin American novelists, work on social carrion’ (p. 392). Rather, he ended on a moral high note:

the study of a country’s criminality cannot exactly be a hymn to that country. But nor does it necessarily have to be a prayer for the dead. Even less so in the case of Venezuela. She has many other noble and honourable stories, which dignify her past and present. (p. 393)28

Gómez Grillo may have used the melodramatic form to a greater extent than most of his colleagues, but the moral role of academia was widely endorsed by others:

The University should teach everything that tends to make evident to the eyes of youth the tragedy of our intolerance, of our lack of urbanity and discipline, of the breakdown of family traditions and the deliberate distortion of rationality,

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which are precipitating our society towards the crossroads of abuse, animalization, and the perfidies of might without right. (Villalba Villalba 1965, 7)29

THE FUNCTION OF MELODRAMA

In literary circles, the term melodrama often serves as a critical dismissal of a piece of work. Likewise, in social circles, to label someone as being melodramatic is to accuse them of exaggeration and emotionality, when calm analysis and reasoning are called for. Although melodrama, well written and intelligently used, could serve as a vehicle for raising moral awareness and encouraging individual or social mobilisation, several characteristics of the journalistic and criminological writings studied here belie such an instrumental function. First, those who wrote did not employ a single (shared) lens with which to focus on the phenomena of concern. In the newspaper pieces, crime was variously treated as bad in itself, as a cause of other social ills, or as a symptom of them. The objects of censure and the direction of calls for action were therefore varied. Even in the criminology texts, where the focus was always on crime as a symptom of deeper societal malaise, individual authors varied in their selection of the factors chosen for commentary. Second, the absence of argument and polemics, which has already been described for the criminological texts, could also be observed in the newspaper pieces. In vain, one searches these writings for evidence of disagreements between the authors or of the emergence of contested strands of opinion. This discourse was not related to the development of interest groups who were actively working to impose a particular definition of the problem and pressure for a given solution; it was not the discourse of social movements (cfr. Spector and Kitsuse 1973, Stone 1989), it was simply the participation by a variety of individuals in a given style of expression. And although style was arguably more important than content, the quality of writing often left much to be desired – particularly among those who were published in the newspapers. Here, the metaphors were often crudely developed (and not infrequently mixed), while many authors evidently hoped that a florid text would conjure up the moral indignation they apparently sought so desperately. Consider only the following example:

Currently, the main enemy of liberty is corruption; that monster which is the fruit of a satanic union between injustice and immorality. That hydra of innumerable heads, such as drug trafficking, embezzlement, crime, etc., which propagates the fatal virus of the moral AIDS that irreparably damages the ethical immune system of the country. (21/06/91, D-4, Carlos J. Peñaloza Zambrano, ‘Si No Hay un Pronto Renacimiento Moral en Venezuela Puede Pasar Cualquier Cosa’ [If There is not a Moral Rebirth Soon Anything Could Happen in Venezuela]).

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It is difficult to see how writing of this calibre could make a clear or convincing case regarding the nature of the purported problem.30 Finally, the foregoing analyses have made it abundantly clear that authors were not mainly or greatly preoccupied with solutions to the problems that they were denouncing. In most of these texts, the call to action was either vague or absent. Their purpose was not to mobilise readers to seek, or work towards, particular types of crime policy or broader social engineering. The melodrama was not implicitly justified as a motivational tool. One perceptive writer summed up the criticisms of the melodramatic style as early as 1958:

Frankly, neither today nor yesterday do we sympathise with the chimera of scandal. We do not like it for a multitude of reasons. Because it tends to consume itself in the merely accidental or anecdotic. Because it avoids the principled focus on which the education of peoples must rest. Because nothing positive can be inferred from the tendency to set up, with urgent tones, problems that cannot be resolved by the stroke of a pen. (11/04/58, 4, Antonio Stempel Paris, ‘Amarillismo y Machetismo’ [Scandal-mongering and Force])

Thus, if the instrumental function of these texts was weak, one can only conclude that their role was much more expressive — that they were designed to communicate something about the writers rather than the subject they were writing about. In this regard, Ball (1970) made the important point that the exercise of moral censure almost always confers respectability on the censor. It demonstrates their commitment to morality and invites a positive evaluation from the social audience. In his study of the Prohibitionist Movement in the US, Gusfield (1975) also recognised the importance of the expressive functions of moral discourse. In this case, Gusfield argued that the passing of prohibitionist legislation served as much, or more, to confirm the moral superiority of its supporters as it did to control the use of alcohol. At least one of the writers among the many who fell into the sample of newspaper pieces studied here was well aware of the expressive possibilities of moralistic discourse:

When one knows oneself to be clean, one does not refer to corruption with anaesthetized language….Nothing cheers the spirit and heart more than to be able to speak loudly….Nothing is more satisfactory than…to feel the authority to speak softly or loudly and bang on the table…so that administrative honesty is not dethroned from the altar before which we have prostrated ourselves to pay homage to it. Nothing gives more authenticity to a man than to urge for probity when one is honest. (09/11/85, A-4, Carlos Canache Mata, ‘Los Políticos y la Corrupción’ [Politicians and Corruption])

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Stempel Paris, cited earlier, saw a cynical side to this moralistic discourse:

we find this repugnant because behind this scandal-mongering we see not only sterile superficiality but also a cunning bad faith that tries to raise smoke screens in order to hide inadmissible aims. Perhaps the popular saying is perfectly applicable here: “he who shouts the most is he who pays the least.” (11/04/58, 4, Antonio Stempel Paris, ‘Amarillismo y Machetismo’ [Scandal-mongering and Force])

He was perhaps correct when it came to the politicians,31 but the melodramatic style was not confined to them and it would be hard to attribute such cynical aims to others who wrote in the papers, or to the more academic criminologists. Rather, it seems as if moral indignation was a widely employed resource in the presentation of the self in public life; it was a strategy to seek respectability. It is perhaps no accident that the two most melodramatic discourses produced by criminologists were both delivered initially in public forums — one as a speech and the other as a conference.32 These settings are much more potent arenas for the presentation of self than the relatively impersonal texts that make up the published word. But whatever the setting, or the writer, the discourse analysed here suggests that the structure of the crime problem was largely a corollary of the social construction of the public persona among Venezuela’s middle and upper classes.

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that studies on the structure of social problems are still few in number, the present paper is premised on their usefulness. My objective has been to show how, among other things, attention to the structure of a social problem raises interesting sociological questions. In the present case, a three dimensional analytical framework (morality, cognition, pragmatism) was used to examine the structure of the crime problem as found in Venezuelan newspapers and criminology texts. A simple content analysis revealed that the relevant discourse has a strong moral component, while the cognitive and pragmatic dimensions are relatively weakly developed. In addition, the moral dimension frequently materialised in a melodramatic style of writing, not only in the newspapers but even in some criminological texts. An obvious line of future analysis that could be developed from the current research is to explore the structuring of the crime problem in other societies. Using the classificatory typology that has been presented here (moral, cognitive, pragmatic; technical, literary), it would be interesting to examine discourse about crime in other social and cultural contexts. For example, it is possible that, in comparison to Venezuela, technical cognitive (i.e., scientific) or technical pragmatic (i.e., policy oriented) discourse is much more strongly developed in

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other countries. This would logically give the crime problem a different structure and perhaps affect the responses to it.33 In particular, given the marked social and cultural variations around the Caribbean region, we should not expect the findings from Venezuela to be reproduced elsewhere. The case study presented here also has normative implications for the management of the crime problem. For example, the relatively weak development of the cognitive dimension of the crime problem in Venezuela means that knowledge about its characteristics is quite scant. Assessments about the seriousness of crime, the number of crimes committed and the trend in crime rates over time may therefore be absent, vague or incorrect. Similarly, the lack of attention to the pragmatic dimension possibly means that less is being done to confront the crime problem, and certainly means that crime control is subject to less scrutiny and inquiry. As stated in the introduction to this paper, the crime problem may be best handled by a judicious and intelligent combination of all three dimensions. Finally, lest the reader should perhaps conclude that Venezuelan commentators on the crime problem at least cannot be faulted for their attention to morality, it is important to recognise the limits to melodrama. As a literary form, melodrama has the potential to function as an instrument of moral education and mobilisation, but in order to be successful it must combine a clear ethical vision with a good narrative style. Much of the melodramatic idiom found in the case materials failed to do this; from a literary perspective it often failed to pass muster. Melodrama was most likely employed as a strategy to gain public respectability rather than as a precursor to social action. There is still the need, therefore, to develop a careful evaluative analysis of crime, to determine in what ways and for which reasons it is a problem, and to assess — from an ethical standpoint — the responses that individuals, organisations and governments make to crimes, before and after the fact. Of course, this is a task that is urgently required in many countries, not only in Venezuela.

REFERENCES

Álvarez Bernée, S. 1980. ‘Lineamiento Sobre el Auge Delictivo’. Boletín de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, Separata, nos. 58–59. Aniyar de Castro, L. 1977. ‘Investigación Criminológica en Venezuela: Problemas y Perspectivas’. Capítulo Criminológico 5, 10–22. Anker, E. 2005. ‘Villains, Victims and Heroes: Melodrama, Media and September 11’. Journal of Communication 55, no.1 :22–37. Ball, D.W. 1970. ‘The Problematics of Respectability’. In Deviance and Respectability: The Social Construction of Moral Meanings, ed. J.D. Douglas. New York: Basic Books. Benford, R.D. and Snow D.A. 2000. ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’. Annual Review of Sociology 26, 611–39. Betancourt Moreno, R. 1983. ‘Prevención del Delito’. Relación Criminológica 13, no.23: 87– 96, (1981-83)

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Birkbeck, C. 1996. ‘La Criminología como Discurso Moral: Los Planteamientos Sobre las Causas de la Delincuencia en Venezuela, 1950–90’. In Control Social y Justicia Penal en Venezuela. Ensayos en Homenaje a Héctor Febres Cordero, 37-68 Mérida: Universidad de Los Andes. ———. 2005. ‘The Market for Scientific Crime Prevention: A Comparative Study of Canada and Venezuela’. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 11 nos.3–4:321–46. Blumer, H. 1971. ‘Social Problems as Collective Behaviour’. Social Problems 18, 298–306. Burke, K. 1989. On Symbols and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Buroz Arismendi, R. 1977. ‘La Violencia en Venezuela. La Criminalidad Violenta en Venezuela’. In Los Rostros de la Violencia, ed. L. Aniyar de Castro, Vol. 2, 127–71. Maracaibo: Universidad del Zulia. Cervantes, M. de. 2003. Don Quixote. London: Penguin. Cova García, L. 1951. ‘Tasas de Mortalidad por Homicidio en Venezuela’. Criminalia 17, no.12:691-92. Echeverría, J.M. 1976. La Criminalidad en Venezuela. Caracas: Policía Técnica Judicial. Feijóo Colomine, S. 1968. ‘La Desadaptación Social del Menor en Venezuela.’ Relación Criminológica 1, no.1:101–07. Fishman, M. 1978. ‘Crime Waves as Ideology’. Social Problems 25,531–43. Gamson, W. and Modigliani, A. 1989. ‘Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach’. American Journal of Sociology 95, no.1:1–37. García Iturbe, A. 1973. La Delincuencia y el Delincuente. Caracas: Monte Ávila. García Sucre, V. et al. 1980. ‘Tendencias del Delito y Estrategias para su Prevención’. In VI Congreso de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Prevención del Delito y el Tratamiento del Delincuente, Ponencias de Venezuela, 7–26. Caracas: Producciones Gráficas Prográfica C.A. Gómez Grillo, E. 1966. Introducción a la Criminología. 2nd edn. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela. ———. 1969a. ‘La Delicuencia en Caracas’. Relación Criminológica 2, no.2–3:133–44. ———.1969b. ‘La Delincuencia en Venezuela’. Anuario del Instituto de Ciencias Penales y Criminológicas 3, 377–93. ———. 1982. La Historia Fea de Caracas y Otras Historias Criminológicas. Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia. Gusfield, J. 1975. ‘Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance’. In The Collective Definition of Deviance, ed. F.J. Davis and R. Stivers. New York: The Free Press. ———. 1981. The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mantellini, P.J. et al. 1980. ‘Delincuencia y Abuso de Poder: Delitos y Delincuentes Fuera del Alcance de la Ley’. In VI Congreso de las Naciones Unidas sobre la Prevención del Delito y el Tratamiento del Delincuente, Ponencias de Venezuela, 43–55. Caracas: Producciones Gráficas Prográfica C.A. Mayorca, J.M.1968. ‘Criminalidad Venezolana (1954–1967)’. Anuario del Instituto de Ciencias Penales y Criminológicas 2,405-20. McCorkle, R.C. and Miethe. T.D. 1998. ‘The Political and Organizational Response to Gangs: An Examination of a “Moral Panic” in Nevada’. Justice Quarterly 15 no.1:41–64.

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Mendoza Troconis, J.R. 1958. ‘Alcohol y Delincuencia’. Revista del Ministerio de Justicia 7, nos. 24–25:11–32. ———. 1970. Curso de Criminología. 2nd edn.Caracas: Empresa El Cojo. Ministerio de Justicia. 1956. ‘Necesidad de la Creación de la Oficina de Antecedentes Penales y Servicios que la Integran’. Revista del Ministerio de Justicia 5, no.16–17:235–68. Molina Blanchard, A. 1976. ‘Hipótesis Sobre Delincuencia en Venezuela. Marginalidad y Delito’. Capítulo Criminológico 4, 209–58. OCEI (Oficina Central de Estadística e Informática). 2000. Venezuela: Estimaciones y Proyecciones de Población 1950–2035. Caracas: OCEI. Pérez Perozo, L.A. 1958. ‘El Problema Social de la Prostitución en Venezuela’. Internacional Review of Criminal Policy 13,39–42. Romero Briceño, M. 1959. La Delincuencia en Venezuela. Sus Principales Causas. Caracas: Ministerio de Justicia, Comisión de Prevención de la Delincuencia. Santos Alvis, T. 1982. Apuntes para una Explicación Estructural de la Criminalidad. Maracaibo: Universidad del Zulia. ———. 1985. ‘Algunas Notas Exploratorias Entre la Delincuencia y la Crisis Actual Venezolana’. Capítulo Criminológico 13, 29–48. Spector, M. and Kitsuse, J.I. 1973. ‘Social Problems: A Reformulation’. Social Problems 20, 145–59. Stone, D.A. 1989. ‘Causal Stories and the Formation of Policy Agendas’. Political Science Quarterly 104, no.2:281–300. Vethencourt, J.L. 1980. ‘Tendencias Cualitativas Actuales del Delito’. Relación Criminológica 12, no.22: 87–111. Villalba Villalba, L. 1965. Hechos Antisociales del Menor. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.

NOTES

1. Financial support from the Universidad de Los Andes Consejo de Desarrollo Científico Humanístico y Tecnológico (Project D-97-95-09-B) for some of the research reported here is gratefully acknowledged. 2. Thus, Blumer (1971, 298) defined social problems as ‘products of a process of “collective definition” rather than “objective conditions” and social arrangements.’ 3. An important quality of social problems as public problems must be borne in mind here. Most criminal events are considered problematic by their victims because of the harm they cause (for example, the harm to personal property caused by thefts, or the harm to physical well being caused by crimes of violence). But these are private problems, suffered by the victims and their immediate social group. Crime becomes a public problem when someone or some group asserts that crimes in general (or certain types of crime) are a problem for society. 4 . For example, Gusfield points out that aging is considered to be physically painful, but it is not (currently) seen as being alterable; therefore aging is not a social problem. By contrast inequality between races is seen to be both unwelcome and alterable and has therefore emerged as a social problem.

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5. For example, Gómez Grillo (1982) quotes published opinion from the early nineteenth century about the extent of the crime problem in Caracas. 6. It is important to recognise that discourse on social problems is found not only in newspapers but also in other domains, such as television and radio, public meetings and even private conversation. Newspapers were used in the present study because they offered a historical register of public opinion during the period under study. 7. Two assistants worked with the author in the selection and coding of pieces for this study. When a minimum level of agreement of 80 per cent was reached between the author and each assistant – both in terms of the pieces selected from the newspaper and the coding of their content – these assistants continued working independently. 8. During the months selected for 1951, 1965 and 1967, no pieces on the crime problem were detected. By contrast, the months selected for 1989 and 1991 each yielded 46 articles of interest. 9. These categories are somewhat similar to Burke’s (1989) well known distinction between semantic and poetic meanings. 10. Examples of recipes for the crime problem would be pieces with titles like ‘The Five Steps for Preventing Violence,’ or ‘How to Stop Your Child Becoming a Drug Addict.’ 11. In total, technical discussion of the crime problem was found in 42 pieces (10.5 per cent of the sample), because some combined both cognitive and pragmatic elements. 12. In order to highlight different types of discourse in the newspaper texts quoted, the following conventions are used: moral discourse appears in bold, cognitive discourse appears in italics, and pragmatic discourse is underlined. Content analysis also revealed sections of text that combined one or more dimensions, and these are reproduced as follows: discourse with both moral and cognitive content is in bold italics; discourse with cognitive and pragmatic dimensions is in italics and underlined; discourse with moral and pragmatic content is underlined in bold. Finally, any discourse combining all three dimensions – moral, cognitive and pragmatic - is typed in bold italics and underlined. (The reader is hereby invited to assess the quality of my content analysis.) 13. All pieces cited from El Nacional are referenced in terms of the date of publication, the page on which they appeared, the author, the title in Spanish and a translation of that title. 14. For example, a piece on political violence in the 1960s referred to insurgents as ‘anarchists, easily led without any revolutionary morality, …and even common criminals…who suddenly felt themselves justified in their misdeeds and murders…’ (19/12/64, A-4, Juan Liscano, “Una Vez Más” [Once More]). Similarly, a piece on corruption in the 1980s had the following to say: ‘Venezuela…is going through the biggest, the most unjustified, criminal and unpardonable crisis of its history. That crisis and the present chaos…are the consequence of inept, corrupt and irresponsible governments….’ (19/07/84, A-4, Ana Teresa Arismendi, ‘La Maraña y el Marasmo’ [Tangle and Paralysis]). 15. Recadi was a government office created in 1983 following the floating of the national currency and its immediate devaluation. Its role was to provide dollars at a preferential rate for public agencies and registered businesses. Corruption was always

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a possibility if preferential dollars were used for unauthorised transactions or diverted to private hands. 16. Another example of the call to action: ‘We join with the thousands of Venezuelans who believe in the democratic system and, along with the majority of the people, we desire and hope that the protagonists of all the acts of corruption are punished and forced to return the money that they have appropriated from the people. We hope that the struggle will be impartial and just and, even more, in earnest, without demagogy and with firsthand knowledge.’ 17. Small proportions of the literary pieces included evaluative statements referring to programmes for dealing with crime (16 per cent), to those whose task it is to deal with crime (22 per cent), or to those who expressed an opinion about the crime problem (15 per cent). Such statements were invariably positive, as in the following example: ‘There is a great concern among superiors to make sure that the police officer is the daily object of dignification. He is observed and analysed, and if any unusual circumstance is pointed out at a specific moment, the police chiefs act with all energy and in compliance with the law if one of their functionaries goes astray…’ (17/09/90, D-14, Pedro Torres Agudo, ‘El Hampa Llegó a Niveles Inadmisibles’ [The Underworld Has Reached Unacceptable Levels]). 18. ‘Melodrama is a mode of popular culture narrative that employs emotionality to provide an unambiguous distinction between good and evil through clear designations of victimisation, heroism and villainy.’ (Anker 2005, 23) 19. 12/06/91, A-4, Nelson Chitty La Roche, ‘¿Podemos Repotenciar el Alma?’ [Can we Refit the Soul?]. 20. A reference to the characters Don Quixote and Sancho Panza from Cervantes’s classic seventeenth century novel (see Cervantes 2003). The adjective ‘quixotic,’ derived from this novel, is often used to designate the impractical pursuit of visionary ideals. 21. The ‘Ugly History’ was the title of well known criminologist Gómez Grillo’s (1982) essay on crime in Caracas. The ‘Bitter Memorandum’ was the title of a document on the problems of political crime and violence published by the National Women’s Commission for the Pacification of the Country (see Villalba Villalba 1965). Both titles reveal the tone of many academic treatments of the crime problem. 22. The first programme in the country that paid some attention to criminology was the Centre for Penal Studies, set up in the 1940s at the Universidad Central de Venezuela. In the mid-1960s, criminology research institutes were set up at the Universidad Central and at two other large public universities (Birkbeck 2005). These gave a big push to the development of criminological research and teaching. Before that time, the study and practice of criminology had been confined to a handful of other professionals, mainly lawyers, for whom the discipline was a kind of intellectual hobby. 23. This phase of the research was conducted in 1996, prior to the study of the newspaper pieces in El Nacional (completed in 2000). 24. The documents were the following: Cova García (1951); Ministerio de Justicia (1956); Mendoza Troconis (1958); Pérez Perozo (1958); Romero Briceño (1959); Villalba Villalba (1965); Gómez Grillo (1966); Feijóo Colomine (1968); Instituto de Ciencias Penales y Criminológicas (1968); Mayorca (1968); Gómez Grillo (1969a); Gómez Grillo (1969b); Mendoza Troconis (1970); García Iturbe (1973); Echeverría (1976);

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Molina Blanchard (1976); Aniyar de Castro (1977); Buroz Arismendi (1977); Álvarez Bernée (1980); García Sucre et al. (1980); Mantellini et al. (1980); Vethencourt (1980); Santos Alvis (1982); Betancourt Moreno (1983); Santos Alvis (1985). 25. For example, Romero Briceño ((1959) devoted 52 pages to the discussion of exogenous factors, but only seven to endogenous factors; the Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Penales y Criminológicas (1968) devoted 33 pages to exogenous factors and 19 to endogenous factors; and Gómez Grillo devoted six pages to exogenous factors and scarcely a page to endogenous factors. 26. Elsewhere (see Birkbeck, 1996), I have analysed the factors that criminologists most commonly associated with crime and their links to broader visions of societal problems in Venezuela. Between 1950 and approximately 1970, the prevailing conceptual framework was positivist and viewed crime as a product of cultural primitivism. After 1970, the conceptual framework changed to functionalism and interpreted crime as a by-product of distorted modernisation and institutional decline. 27. Only four expressions of disagreement were found in the sections of the texts dealing with crime in Venezuela. Gómez Grillo (1969b, 383) questioned the prior tendency to see crime as a mainly rural phenomenon; García Iturbe (1973, 219) disagreed with Gómez Grillo about the average duration of marriages; Buroz Arismendi (1977, 148) questioned the link between race and crime posited by Mendoza Troconis (1970, 424); and Santos (1985, 39) argued that social ‘factors’ associated with crime, such as unemployment, should be forgotten and attention focused on a ‘society worn out by crisis’. 28. The other extensive use of the melodramatic style in criminological writing on crime in Venezuela can be found in Vethencourt (1980). 29. In other words, and to return to the title used for this section of the paper, Villalba Villalba is advocating the writing of ‘ugly histories’ and ‘bitter memoranda.’ 30. If criminological writing was generally better, it was because its authors were somewhat better educated and because academia was a reasonable training ground for the literary style. 31. Canache Mata, for example, he who ‘knew himself to be clean,’ was a leading member of Acción Democrática, the foremost political party between 1958 and 1999 that was involved in many corruption scandals. Canache Mata was subsequently accused of corruption by the current President (Hugo Chávez) after Acción Democrática was severely weakened by its electoral defeat in 1998. 32. These are Gómez Grillo (1969b) and Vethencourt (1980), respectively. 33. For example, it is possible that science plays a much more important role in structuring the crime problem in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States where criminology is much more strongly developed than in Venezuela.

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JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND PUBLIC POLICY

The Caribbean Experience

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chap5.pmd 88 12/8/2006, 11:08 AM S CHOOL VIOLENCE AND DELINQUENCY Five

In seeking to fill a serious gap in School criminological research in the Caribbean, Violence and this paper provides data and examines the interrelationships on five major factors Delinquency: relating to violence and delinquency in The Dynamics of different types of secondary schools in the Race, Gender, Caribbean state of Trinidad and Tobago. (We Class, Age and henceforth use the term ‘delinquency’ for both Parenting in the violence and delinquency, except where the distinction is necessary). These factors are: 1 Caribbean students’ gender, race, social class, age and parental structure. The results from this Ramesh Deosaran study may help develop more refined theorising and research, especially with the insertion of social psychological mediating variables between social structure and delinquency. This paper will first provide a very brief overview of the relevant research literature, secondly a description of the present study, then thirdly, the results and discussion. The search for relationships between students’ socio-demographic background and the level and kinds of school violence and delinquency has been a substantial one, filled with a wide range of research reports and fairly consistent findings during the last 25 years (see, for example, Binder l988, Binder et al. 1997, Jensen and Rojek 1992, Seigel and Senna 1981, Weis et al. 1996 for a variety of relevant research studies). These relationships are important for developing certain theoretical perspectives in criminology, for example, if social class is found to be significantly related to delinquency, then conflict theory in criminology would be strengthened. Or at least, it will initiate a further search for the cultural and psychological processes which

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energise such relationships, thereby attracting support for social psychological theories in criminology.

GENDER

If gender makes a significant difference with crime or delinquency, then it will affect the feminists’ argument over the role which differential association makes with gender. That is, for example, the risk-taking values and expectations imposed on male adolescents contribute to higher male delinquency. But, before proceeding to such finer theorising, it is necessary to see whether, in fact, a relationship does exist between these three major factors — race, gender and social class — and delinquency. Liu and Kaplan (1999) concluded that there is a gender difference and that this difference has been observed using self-report methods as well as arrest statistics (p. 195). The general findings from both self-report studies and official records were that male students commit more serious acts of delinquency than females, especially in violent and property offences. Females do commit serious offences, but less often than males (see, for example, the early study by Hindelang 1971). Attacking the ‘male dominated focus’ on delinquency, Heimer and DeCoster (1999) more recently argued that from self-report studies, the ratio of female to male violence is higher than commonly perceived. They further argued that the concepts driving the study of violence and delinquency is itself gender biased, and so the results flow accordingly. They wrote:

These ratios show that although there is a substantial gender gap, girls do engage in a significant amount of violent delinquency. A better understanding of youth violence, therefore, requires moving the traditional focus on males to examine also the causes of violence among females and the sources of the gender gap in violence (p. 278).

After studying a national United States (US) sample of 1,725 11 to 17 year- olds, they concluded: ‘Boys are more violent than girls largely because they are taught more definitions favouring such behaviour, girls are less violent than boys because they are controlled through subtle mechanisms, which include learning that violence is incompatible with the meaning of gender for them and being restrained by emotional bonds to family’ (Heimer and DeCoster 1999, 306). Using Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) data for a 22-year period to examine ‘the convergence hypothesis,’ Austin (1993) revealed that indeed, there is convergence in delinquency between male and female offenders (p. 52). That is, males do commit more offences but over the years, females seem to be committing similar offences in growing numbers. A consistent finding for delinquents is that the older students, especially males, commit more serious delinquency than younger ones. Such results suggest an

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escalation from early delinquent versatility to later specialisation. Summarising the results of 25 longitudinal studies on youth violence from several industrialised countries, David Farrington (1998) concluded:

Youths who commit one type of violent offense tend to commit others; they also tend to commit non-violent offenses and have co-occurring problems such as substance abuse and sexual promiscuity. There is considerable continuity from childhood aggression to youth violence (p. 421).

Even so, this research on the incidence of delinquency presents a mixed picture. That is, while younger boys commit less serious offences, they often commit these much more frequently than older boys. This distinction between prevalence and incidence is quite important for examining juvenile delinquency (for example, see Tracy, Jnr. 1990). The distinction is important not merely for categorising the various types of delinquency, but also to indicate the pathway, from minor to serious, which young males are likely to take. The delinquency progression factor is important to note.

SOCIAL CLASS

Some complexities arise with the data for social class (also termed socioeconomic status) and delinquency. For example, after reviewing a set of relevant studies in his paper, Social Class and Crime, Weis (l987) noted:

There is a very weak, insignificant relationship with SES when one controls for level of measurement and compares individual-level data on both variables. It seems that no matter how one measures, scores or scales the data there are small, typically negative relations between social class and juvenile crime, whether official or self-reported.

He further concluded:

In short, there is not the kind of robust relationship between social class and either self-reported or official juvenile crime that most contemporary theories of crime propose should exist (Weis 1987, 71–74).

The most common measure of social class in this line of research is parental occupation, sometimes combined with parental education and income levels. But, as is commonly noted, no matter how measured, the direct connection between the social class background of youths and delinquency has been surprisingly but consistently rather weak. As Tittle and Meier (1990) noted, even when the measure of social class is compressed so as to include only an ‘underclass’ vs. the rest, the conclusion is that there is ‘no firm evidence that social class, no matter how it is measured, is a salient factor in generating delinquency involvement.’ After reviewing a number

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of relevant studies, they added: ‘The circumstances under which social class plays a role in delinquency production remains elusive’ (pp. 185–203). This is a critical conclusion since many classical and structural theories in criminology rest their reputation on such a relationship. In fact, in the Caribbean, the view that ‘poverty is a cause of crime’ has been quite a ubiquitous political mantra. Labour movements across the Caribbean depend largely on working class membership for support and feel strongly obliged to ‘fight for the poor and lower class’ to obtain not only social justice, but to prevent working class deviance. In the public discourse, and for historical reasons, poverty gets equated with working class deprivations which, at least implicitly, lead to resentment and deviance. Such thinking was rooted in the plantation system of slavery and indentureship from which Caribbean societies emerged (Beckford 1972, Harriott 2003, Mahabir 1985, Pryce 1976, Thomas 1987, Trotman, 1986). This poverty-delinquency-crime thesis also gains extensive expression in the region’s legislatures as well as during election campaigns. For the Caribbean, the relevance of the social class-crime relationship goes much beyond classical theorising. It has implications for political survival and mobilisation (Deosaran 1993, Ryan 1991). Social conflict and strain are passionately expressed by lower class activists, including folklorists, artistes, calypsonians and Reggae singers (see, for example, Deosaran 2000a, Rohlehr l990). Of course, the upper class and business sector in the Caribbean, with equal insistence, argue that with rapid expansion in the educational sectors, there are enough opportunities for socioeconomic mobility, and fuller utilisation should be made of these opportunities as well as of government social programmes. They claim that poverty is merely an over-used excuse to commit crime and delinquency, especially when youth crimes are also committed against the lower class. Theories of strain do not matter to the upper social classes. The substance of such conflict, ideological differences really, is not new. They are already embedded in the ‘new’ criminology, the ‘conflict’ perspective (Chambliss and Seidman 1971, Taylor and Young 1973). In his book Class, State and Crime, Quinney (l977) put it this way:

Modern civilization, as epitomized in capitalist societies, is founded on the exploitation of one class by another….The coercive force of the state, embodied in law and legal oppression, is the traditional means of maintaining the social and economic order. Crime control becomes the coercive means of checking threats to the existing social and economic order, threats that result from a system of oppression and exploitation (pp. 32–33).

He concluded:

Crime is essentially a product of the contradictions of capitalism. Crime is sometimes a force in social development: when it becomes a part of the class struggle, increasing political consciousness (Quinney 1977, 62).

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Though this ‘crime as rebellion’ view has been criticised for having an abundance of passion and a range of concepts which are difficult to operationalise and measure, it does have a reputable place in criminological theorising. It has helped to broaden critical thought in criminology, even for the escalation of delinquency into adult crimes. Quite often, this social class-delinquency-crime debate is ‘softened’ by the view that it is not ‘poverty per se’ that ‘causes’ crime but the tensions emerging from the ‘rich-poor’ gap. And that such tensions - frustrations really - manifest themselves in incivility, crime and delinquency. This, however, merely moves the issue from a sociological to a social psychological one, with social class tensions swirling but not yet firmly connected to crime and delinquency. While this contention requires a fuller discussion, it is important here merely to note that the social class-crime issue in the Caribbean has implications much beyond theory building. The intuitive drive to establish a social class-delinquency link has led to a series of disaggregations and modifications. In one such work, Wright et al. (1999) used a social psychological approach to insert a set of mediating variables to show that for at least some in low social class and some in high social class, these social psychological variables will help explain some delinquency. Measuring youths at different ages, they did not find any significant relationship between social class itself (occupation, education and income) and delinquency. However, for the high SES group, for example, they did find a significant inverse relationship between ‘commitment to conventional values’ and delinquency and a positive relationship between ‘a taste for risk’ and delinquency. These mediating variables are social psychological (Wright et al. 1999, 184–85). For low SES, ‘financial strain’ showed a positive relationship with delinquency, ‘self-control’ showed an inverse relationship, ‘educational aspirations’ an inverse relationship but ‘vocational aspirations’ a positive relationship. A 2006 study (Felson and Staff 2006, 306–10) showed a weak relationship between social class and delinquency (-.08), but when a mediating social psychological variable was inserted, this variable, that is, ‘student effort,’ showed a much stronger relationship with delinquency (-.33). What such studies suggest is that explanations of delinquency may more likely emerge from social psychological studies than from purely sociological ones. However, the methodological dilemma is this: the more disaggregated the variables become, the less theoretical viability the results will have. It is the old story of searching for the ‘truth.’ You need to see the forest without losing sight of the trees. You need to count the trees without losing sight of the forest. If we define delinquency into 30 different acts, and significant relationships are found between a particular demographic (for example, race) and only one or two of these 30 acts, the theorising will be accordingly limited. While the work

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by Wright et al. (l999) and the more recent one (Felson and Staff 2006) have shed some light on the correlates of delinquency, it also reduced the direct impact of social class, and as such undercuts a wide range of criminological theorising, at least for now. We say for now because, apart from vested ideological interests and popular rhetoric supporting the class-delinquency-crime connection, several leading researchers themselves insist in pursuing the relationship by reconceptualising the social class factor and inserting a series of mediating variables. Furthermore, as John Hagan suggested in his 1991 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology, we need to recognise that delinquency is not necessarily a stable condition. Many delinquents move on to become law-abiding and quite successful in marriage and careers. Depending on what this study reveals regarding the social class-delinquency relationship, we too will have to take up some of these research and policy challenges to strengthen ‘Caribbean’ criminology.

RACE

There is a substantial body of literature dealing with race, ethnicity and crime (see, for example, Hawkins 1995 for some international research; also Schwartz et al., 1996). In particular, the overall picture with the race-delinquency connection is mixed. It seems to depend on the groups and measures used. Generally, blacks and Hispanics show higher involvement in serious crimes than Whites, but when urban-rural, educational or occupational background is considered, the relationship becomes blurred. For example, in examining a cohort of White, Black and Hispanic youths who were 11–21 years of age, Huizinga and Elliot (l987) concluded: ‘Few of the differences between racial groups are statistically significant. There is no consistency across years such that any one racial group reports statistically higher rates in a majority of years’ (p. 208). Contrast this with the earlier conclusion by Wolfgang et al. (1972) that race is a predominant factor in delinquency and, further, in predicting official contact by police and court agencies. They went on to conclude from their longitudinal study in Pennsylvania that race is the strongest factor in determining the probability of a delinquent career. Apart from the well-known phenomenon of unreported crimes (that is, the ‘dark figure of crime’), the police processing of juvenile offenders also contributes to the deficiencies in the official data used for such studies. Huizinga and Elliot (1987) concluded:

Although studies that control for arrest history commonly find little evidence of racial bias in juvenile justice system processing, the information presented suggest that bias may exist in the nature of the offense charged at the time of arrest, a factor related to justice agency decision making minorities appear at greater risk

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for being charged with more serious offences than whites involved in comparable levels of delinquent behaviour, a factor that may eventually result in higher incarceration rates among minorities (p. 222).

While it is important to examine official police data, many researchers prefer self-report data to obtain an assessment of delinquency, especially when they find that the self-report data also contains what the official police records show (Hindelang et al. l981, 75–84). Earlier work, however, discovered some discrepancies between official records and self-report studies (see, for example, Erickson and Empey 1966, Gold 1966, Short and Nye, 1958). These methodological and measurement issues are useful to note and compare since they do have implications for the resulting relationships with gender, race and social class.

CARIBBEAN RESEARCH

At this point, two questions immediately arise:

(1) Will the relationships between race, gender and social class, respectively, on one hand and delinquency on the other hand in the Caribbean follow a similar pattern as those found in the metropolitan studies? (2) Is there a viable amount of Caribbean research from which to draw any conclusions?

The answer to the second question will help answer the first question. Unfortunately, there is a serious deficiency of systematic research on youth violence and delinquency in the Caribbean. There is indeed widespread and growing government and public concern across the Caribbean over the ‘apparent escalation,’ especially with school violence, delinquency and gang violence involving an inordinate amount of youths. But a very large part of such concerns remain embedded in media debates, official alarm, public lectures and seminars, conflicting interest-driven explanations and the sporadic collection of gross data. Such, perhaps, are the teething problems which a discipline like Criminology faces in trying to find its scientific roots in a new land. At the same time, however, and almost as a palliative to such public concerns, is the expanding implementation of a range of costly ‘rehabilitative and restorative justice programmes’ misguided by vague targeting, loose assumptions and whose success remains far from being reliably evaluated.

FROM RHETORIC TO RESEARCH

Faced with mounting public concerns in the eighties and nineties, the government set up several committees and conferences to assess and control the

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level of school violence and delinquency (see, for example, Ministry of Education 1989, Ministry of Social Development 1994). Indeed, these reports did contain a series of concerns over the problem, but remained hampered by a lack of primary data. Their recommendations failed to materialise. However, data-based proposals were still lacking as a grounded strategy to deal with the problem. Driven by a debate in the country’s Parliament in 19882, the government commissioned a study in 1992 on the placement patterns and practices in the secondary school population (see report by the Centre for Ethnic Studies 1994). While that study examined the social composition of the secondary school population and speculated about subsequent youth deviance, it was not designed to examine school violence and delinquency, neither in itself, nor in relation to social composition. This present study seeks to make that connection. More recently, there have been a few seminal publications on crime and policing in some Caribbean countries, in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago particularly (see, for example, Deosaran 2000b, 2002, 2006, Headley 1996, Harriott 2003, Mars, 2001). Other published work fits between good journalism and polemics. But there is an obvious gap in systematic research on youth violence and delinquency. Of course, there are many ‘position’ papers done by an array of civic and non-governmental organisations, but mainly for reasons of funding and expertise, these generally remain as ‘opinion’ or crusading pieces. As a discipline within the social sciences in the Caribbean, criminology is a rather young sibling. The bulk of teaching and delinquency-reduction programmes are typically and inevitably taken from the metropolis — ‘lock, stock and barrel.’ The cultural sensitivities and the social complexities of the formerly slave and indentured societies of the Caribbean will do well to generate some indigenous research, not out of parochialism, but for cultural comparisons and grounded theoretical development. In terms of institutional research, The University of the West Indies (UWI) (Trinidad and Tobago Campus) established a Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice in 1997, followed by two research units at the Jamaican and Barbadian campuses. Between l998 and 2006, the three campuses at different times, held four international conferences on Crime and Justice in the Caribbean. The fourth one, held on the Trinidad Campus in February 2006, had a special emphasis on youth crime and delinquency.

VIOLENCE AND DELINQUENCY

There have been a few studies in the Caribbean touching on different aspects of child violence, for example, children witnessing and experiencing violence, violence at home, and school violence (Fernald and Meeks-Gardner 2003 on aggression in Jamaican children; Sacco and Twemlow, 1997 on violence reduction). Soyibo and Lee (2000) found a relationship between domestic and school violence for secondary school students in Jamaica.

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Another paper provides some qualitative data on reports of violence at home and at school by a Jamaican sample of 123 eight to ten year-old poor youths (Fernald et al. 2003). The authors wrote: ‘In Jamaica, children across a wide range of social and economic backgrounds are exposed to violence. However, this is most acute among children from the inner-city who live in the areas with the highest levels of violent crimes’ (p.122). In that study, when asked what parents or teachers do to them when they ‘cause trouble,’ most of the children (91 per cent) showed a quick propensity to give ‘answers relating to punishment, violence or aggression.’ Though admitting that the study was not designed ‘to generate data about violence,’ the authors concluded: ‘These children seem to be learning that violence is an appropriate way to deal with problems, from their teachers, parents, and from their peers’ (p.136). The violent nature of Jamaican society, especially spawned from its ‘garrison areas,’ has become quite notorious, placing Jamaica as having one of the highest rates of murders and gun violence in the world (Harriott 2003). Also noteworthy in the context of Caribbean research is the journal, Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, now almost ten years old, and which contains a few papers on delinquency. One relevant one provides data on, among other things, the gender, race, social class, educational and parental background of youths incarcerated in juvenile homes in Trinidad and Tobago (Deosaran and Chadee 1997). This study examined the social, racial and educational background of 456 youths (112 females, 344 males) in three juvenile homes and the kind of offence they committed. Over 40 per cent were put there for ‘running away from home’ or ‘being beyond control’ at home. Drug and robbery offences amounted to 44 per cent, assault three per cent, possession of arms three per cent, murder or attempted murder two per cent. The serious offences were committed much, much more by older males (16 to 18 years of age) as compared to females or younger males. More precisely, 60 per cent of the older males were there for robbery, and 17 per cent for arms and drugs. Over 80 per cent of the girls were placed in the juvenile home for ‘being beyond control’ (61 per cent) or ‘running away from home’ (21 per cent). In these three juvenile homes, only 24 per cent of the youths came from two- parent homes, 27 per cent from mother only, ten per cent from father only, 39 per cent from ‘homes with a guardian,’ and the rest from different living arrangements. This ‘single-parent’ or ‘no parent’ home condition is instructive but not conclusive since the sample contains youths already incarcerated. The overall result from this study was that youths incarcerated in juvenile homes are likely to come from poor, single-parent homes, of African descent and have low academic achievement (Deosaran and Chadee 1997, 54–64). Single- parent homes do raise serious policy concerns. Regoli and Hewitt (2006), summarising the relevant research in the US, noted:

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Single-parent families are not evenly distributed across racial and ethnic groups. Today, approximately 23 per cent of white children, 30 per cent of Latino children and 53 per cent of African American children are being raised by a single-parent. Single parents are also disproportionally at or near the poverty level.

They added: ‘The poverty rate for single-parent families is approximately five times higher than for two-parent families. Teenage mothers are three times more likely than other teenagers to drop out of school’ (pp. 299-301). The evidence shows that indeed children coming from such single-parent homes are more likely to become delinquents. In particular, Thornberry et al. (2000) found evidence to show that teenage fathers are quite likely to become involved in serious crimes, especially drug dealing (pp. 5-10). Teenage boys who are repeat offenders are also more likely to father children than non-delinquents (Mazza 2002, 681–94, Wei et al. 2002, 83–90). But that is the US. What about the Caribbean? In 2002, a study was undertaken by this author to examine the ‘apparent increase in school violence and delinquency in the secondary schools and make recommendations.’ This paper draws its data from this work. We hope that the baseline data and relationships discovered in our analyses will help create a pathway towards a fuller understanding of the relationship between family life and delinquency in the Caribbean.

FURTHER INQUIRY

The challenge for systematic research and data-based policy action to control, reduce and prevent school violence and delinquency is a particularly urgent one for the Caribbean. While the cost may seem prohibitive at first, the implications and long-term consequences are much more costly. Summarising the results of an international survey of school violence, Ohsako (1997) concluded:

Despite the importance attached to the issue of school violence, placing a high priority on violence management in developing countries is a difficult educational policy option – due mainly to the fact that other educational priorities such as literacy and basic education, occupy much of their efforts. Nonetheless, it is also clear from the results of the present studies that the issue of violence is also their major enemy, affecting the qualitative improvement of their schools (p. 8).

Linked to this overall research and policy challenge is the question: How should a research programme begin? This study seeks to establish a socio- demographic database from which the finer elements of causes and correlates of school violence and delinquency may be pursued. In the area of school violence and delinquency, the research soil in the Caribbean is quite virgin, quite lacking in basic start-up issues. For example, we

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do not have a clear, basic notion of whether the social class relationships and their variations with delinquency — as found in other places — also occur among Caribbean youth. The same is true for the relationships between race, gender and delinquency. Ideologically-driven or intuitive commentaries are not enough. The attachment of youths to their parents is seen as a critical factor as to whether or not they adopt a path of juvenile delinquency. Hirschi (1969) put it this way: ‘The fact that delinquents are less likely than non-delinquents to be closely tied to their parents is one of the best documented findings of delinquency research’ (p. 87). The issue of parenting, however, heats up when the focus is put on single-parenting, or moreso on single mothers. Morality gets confused with sociology. The claim that single-parent families contribute to delinquency and social disorganisation has been a troublesome matter for both researchers and policymakers (see, for example, Cashmore l987, Haralambos and Holborn l995, McLanahan and Booth l991). In a Tennessee study, it was concluded: ‘Juveniles referred to the court are twice as likely to come from single-parent households as the population as a whole’ (Jensen and Rojek l992, 267). In a review of 50 studies, Wells and Rankin (1991) concluded: ‘For most of the studies, broken homes has a consistent and reliable association with juvenile delinquency’ (p. 73). In a local study (Deosaran and Chadee 1997, 66), it was found that indeed, only 24 per cent of the delinquents came from two-parent homes, 33 per cent came from single-parent homes. The rest came from homes with grand-parents, guardians, etc. In all this, the authors advised caution on two related issues. The first is the number of youths from two-parent homes, especially of middle or upper class background, who do not get caught. Secondly, some attention should be given to ‘any possible social bias in either police detection or administrative process that might lead to such concentration of single-parent delinquents.’ The authors further noted: ‘Family structure and delinquency is a matter of protracted debate in the Caribbean, a debate no doubt inspired by the changing roles of women, multi-fatherhood (one man fathering children in several homes) and even migration’ (Deosaran and Chadee 1997, 71–2).

THIS STUDY

This study seeks to establish a database for understanding the extent to which the following five variables are related to school violence and delinquency, and as well, the further research required for clarifying these relationships and pursuing theoretical development in Criminology:

(1) Race (2) Gender (3) Social Class

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(4) Age (5) Parental Structure

Data for this Trinidad and Tobago study is drawn from an ongoing longitudinal project on benchmarking school violence and delinquency.

SAMPLE

This study is based on data drawn from a sample of 1,800 students from ten secondary schools across the country (that is, eight Government secondary schools and two Government-Assisted secondary schools).3 The data was collected in November 2002. Field interviewers visited each school at a scheduled time, explained, administered, collected and checked the questionnaires on the same day. All questionnaires were collected and verified as completed. There are six different types of secondary schools in Trinidad and Tobago, with varying social class (parental occupation) and academic configurations (academic entrance and final national examinations). For example, at the national 11-plus examination, those who place high on the pass list are allowed to enter their ‘first or second choice school,’ which inexorably means entering the ‘prestige’ secondary schools, mainly those few Denominational and Government Secondary schools which have gained a notable amount of passes and scholarships at Advanced level examinations. In other words, this latter set of schools — Government-Assisted (Denominational) ones — are widely recognised as ‘elite high performing schools.’ The former set, the Government schools, are not usually chosen as ‘first choice’ schools. In addition, for the Government-Assisted schools, the principal has the discretion to choose 20 per cent of the places available in his or her school and such selections usually depend on whether the child’s religion is the same as that practised by the school. In other words, the meritocracy offered by the national 11-plus examination may be slightly adjusted by the right of the Denominational school principal to choose from the pass list on a mixture of religion and academic performance. Such discretionary selection may well be reflected in our race by school results. What the above essentially means is that all schools in this country are not equal, and depending on which school a student enters, his or her life chances are almost already determined. There is need, however, for an accumulation of precise data to illustrate these differences. A set of sociological and psychological filters walk alongside the student, and depending on their nature, these generally turn to deficits or assets.

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SCHOOL TYPE

The Junior Secondary caters for students up to age 14, after which they usually go on to another type of secondary school. The Government Senior Comprehensive caters only for Form 5 students. The following cater for Form 1 up to Form 5:

• Government Secondary Comprehensive • Government Composite • Government (Five Year) Secondary, and • Government-Assisted

From these ten schools, a random sample of 1,800 students from three Forms (Form 1= 49 per cent, Form 3= 11 per cent, and Form 5= 40 per cent) was selected. In this study, Form is used as a proxy for age, that is, ages 11–12 are usually in Form 1, age 14 in Form 3, and ages 16–18 in Form 5. All of the above schools are co-educational, except for the two Government- Assisted schools: one, Catholic, is male exclusively, the other, Presbyterian, is female exclusively. These two schools are quite equal in prestige and academic performance. These ten schools were paired into five groups on the basis of similarity, and on the basis that one generally contains urban and the other rural students. The number of students in each of the five groups is indicated below:

(1) Government Junior Secondary (359 students) (2) Government Composite (404 students) (3) Government Comprehensive (268 students) (4) Government Secondary (417 students) (5) Government-Assisted (351 students)

This study seeks to answer three basic questions:

(1) To what extent do the Government schools differ among themselves and with the Government-Assisted (Denominational) schools with respect to students’ race, social class, gender and parental structure? (2) How do the Government schools differ among themselves and with the Government-Assisted (Denominational) schools with respect to student violence and delinquency? (3) How do such violence and delinquency differ, more specifically, by race, social class, age, gender and parenting structure respectively?

Social class was measured by the occupation of the student’s parental head of household or guardian. For race, students were given a list of seven categories and

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asked to choose which one ‘best describes’ them: African descent (that is, Afro- Trinidadian), East Indian descent (that is, Indo-Trinidadian), White, Mixed, Chinese, Syrian/Lebanese or Other. For parental structure, students were given a 12-item list and asked to state ‘With whom do you live?’ The list ranged from ‘both parents, father only, mother only, mother and stepfather, father and stepmother, stepmother only, stepfather only and grandparents to aunt or uncle, guardian, brother or sister and other person.’ The Center for the Prevention of School Violence (2000) provides a widely used definition for school violence: ‘Any behaviour that violates a school’s educational mission or climate of respect or jeopardizes the intent of the school to be free of aggression against persons or property, drugs, weapons, disruptions and disorder’ (p. 1). That definition, however, seems to include both delinquency and violence. For our purpose, violence is described as any act which brings harm, physical injury, torture or intense psychological distress to another person. Delinquency is described as any act which violates the school or classroom rules, violates the norms of the social environment, or breaks the law. This includes threatening others, scarring or damaging property, alcohol and drug abuse, running away from home or unduly missing classes and homework, obscene language, disorderly behaviour and carrying weapons. For violence and delinquency, students were asked to state if they committed any of the 21 listed items of violence and delinquency, and if so, ‘how many times for the term’ (September–November 2002). They were assured that their answers would be anonymous. These acts of violence and delinquency (henceforth called delinquency except where the distinction is necessary) ranged from skipping classes, using obscene language, answering back teachers, vandalism to stealing, gang involvement, alcohol and drug abuse, threatening or bullying, and fighting with or without a weapon.

VIOLENCE AND DELINQUENCY

The 21 items of violence and delinquency were divided into six categories. A major difficulty faced in such method is how to compress such a list of delinquency into a few categories which are entirely discrete from one another. The overlap is sometimes almost inevitable. Nevertheless, the categories here are framed so as to reflect degrees of seriousness and, as far as possible, the similarity between the various offences. These are:

(1) Physical violence – Hit or fought another student with a weapon, used force to take something from another student, been in a fist-fight, threatened to hit another student.

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(2) Substance abuse – Used illegal drugs, smoked cigarettes, drank alcohol. (3) High risk behaviour – Got into trouble with the police, hung out by the block with a gang, ran away from home, skipped school/class. (4) Stealing – Took something from a store worth more than $25 without paying for it, took something from a store worth less than $25 without paying for it, stole something from school. (5) Disorder and incivility – Suspended from school, damaged school property, cheated in a test, got into trouble for not doing homework. (6) Verbal aggression – Used obscene language/cursed, disobeyed or answered back teachers, disobeyed or answered back parents, been loud and unruly in a public place.

RESULTS Race, Gender and Social Class

In this sample of 1,800 students, the distribution is: 29 per cent African descent, 36 per cent East Indian descent, 33 per cent Mixed and two per cent Others.4 The social class distribution is: lower/working class 51 per cent, middle class 38 per cent, upper class 11 per cent. The distribution by gender in the sample is 44 per cent males and 56 per cent females. The distribution by parental structure is 64 per cent living with both parents, 17 per cent mother only, seven per cent mother and stepfather, father only four per cent. Other types of parental structure (for example, with grandparents, guardian, etc., account for eight per cent). Race and Social Class

The race by social class distribution for the sample is seen in Figure 5.1. In terms of the population in these different secondary schools, the distribution of social class among the three racial groups looks quite similar, except for the small spike of 13 per cent upper class for students of East Indian descent (vs. seven per cent and ten per cent for students of African descent and Mixed students respectively). The proportions for the ‘lower class’ are similar. The results show that male and female students have very similar social class background: for example, males lower class 53 per cent vs. females 54 per cent, males upper class ten per cent vs. females 11 per cent.

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FIGURE 5.1 STUDENTS’ RACE BY SOCIAL CLASS DISTRIBUTION (%)

60% 56% 54% 53%

50%

40% 37% 37% 33%

30% Social Class % 20%

13% 10% 10% 7%

0% African Descent East Indian Descent Mixed Race

Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class

School Type and Race

What does the distribution of students’ race look like in these five different types of secondary schools? Figure 5.2 shows that 19 per cent of the total sample are in the two Government-Assisted schools. However, while over 30 per cent of the students of East Indian descent are in these two schools, only nine per cent of the students of African descent and 14 per cent of the Mixed group are in these schools. With respect to the Junior Secondary schools, the presence of all three racial groups is quite similar, around 20 per cent each. Students of African descent are over-represented in the Government Composite and Comprehensive schools but significantly under-represented in the two Government-Assisted schools.

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FIGURE 5.2 SCHOOL TYPE BY RACE (%)

35%

31%

30% 28% 27%

25% 25% 24% 23% 23% 23%

21% 21% 20% 20% 19% 19% 19%

16%

Race % 15% 15% 14% 13%

10% 10% 9%

0% Junior Secondary Government Government Government Government Assisted Composite Comprehensive Secondary School Type

African Descent East Indian Descent Mixed Total

School Type x Social Class

How is the social class background of students distributed among these different types of secondary schools? Figure 5.3 shows that as we move down the lower social class column, we find that the proportion of lower class students is steadily diminishing. That is, the Junior Secondary group has almost 75 per cent of its students as lower class, while the Government Secondary and particularly the Government-Assisted (Denominational) schools have only 47 per cent and 18 per cent of its students from the lower class respectively. The converse is observed for the upper social class column. While the Government-Assisted (Denominational) group has 31 per cent of its students as upper social class, the Junior Secondary, Composite and Comprehensive each has around four per cent of its students from the upper class. The Government Secondary group, it must be noted, has ten per cent (10%) of its students from the upper class, way above that of the other Government schools.

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FIGURE 5.3 SCHOOL TYPE BY SOCIAL CLASS (%)

80%

72% 70% 69% 64%

60% 54% 51% % 50% 47% 43%

40% 36%

31% 31%

Social Class Social 30% 28% 24%

20% 18%

10% 10% 10% 4% 5% 3%

0% Government Junior Government Government Government Government Total Secondary Composite Comprehensive Secondary Assisted School Type

Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class

Clearly, the secondary school system seems to be catering to and breeding an entrenched social stratification cycle. It further appears that the vehicle of meritocracy is not yet effectively working to improve social equity since academic performance at the 11-plus level seems tightly connected to the primary school level and the accompanying social class pressures. Race x Parental Structure

Getting more deeply into social structure, we now look at the relationship between students’ race and their parental structure. Figure 5.4 shows that while 84 per cent of the students of East Indian descent have two-parent homes, only 49 per cent of the students of African descent have two-parent homes. Fifty-five per cent (55%) of the students from the Mixed group have two-parent homes.

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FIGURE 5.4 PARENTAL STRUCTURE BY RACE (%)

90% 84%

80%

70% 63%

60% 55%

49% 50% %

Race 40%

30% 25%

19% 20% 16% 14% 10% 11% 10% 10% 7% 8% 7% 4% 5% 4% 4% 2% 3% 0% Both Parents Father Only Mother Only Mother and Other Stepfather Parental Structure

African Descent East Indian Descent Mixed Total

Figure 5.4 shows that while only seven per cent of students of East Indian descent live in mother-only homes, 25 per cent of the students of African descent and 19 per cent of the Mixed group respectively live in mother-only homes. About ten per cent (10%) of the students of African descent and the Mixed group live with mother and step-father. Clearly, the family structure of the students of East Indian descent here is quite different from that of both the African descent and the Mixed groups. Social Class x Parental Structure

Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between social class and parental structure. The data suggest that the higher the social class, the more likely the student will be living with both parents, and less likely will be living with a ‘mother-only.’ It now appears that both race and social class each have a relationship with parental structure, with race showing a stronger relationship.

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FIGURE 5.5 PARENTAL STRUCTURE BY SOCIAL CLASS (%)

90%

79% 80%

70% 67% 64% 60% 60% %

50%

40% Social Class Class Social 30%

20% 18% 15% 16% 11% 11% 9% 10% 7% 7% 7% 8% 4% 4% 5% 3% 2% 3% 0% Both Parents Father Only Mother Only Mother and Other Stepfather Parental Structure

Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class Total

School Type x Parental Structure

Does parental structure differ with respect to the type of school? Table 5.1 shows that while 85 per cent of the students in the Denominational schools are from two-parent homes, only 49 per cent and 54 per cent of the students in the Government Comprehensive and Junior Secondary schools are from two-parent homes. As Table 5.1 shows, the Government Composite has 59 per cent with 68 per cent from the Government Secondary.

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TABLE 5.1 PARENTAL STRUCTURE BY SCHOOL TYPE (%)

PARENTAL STRUCTURE (%) SCHOOL Mother Father Both Father Mother Grand- Other Total TYPE And And Parents Only Only Parents Persons (N) Stepfather Stepmother Government 100% Junior 54 4 18 10 2 7 5 (360) Secondary Government 100% 59 4 19 7 1 3 7 Composite (403) Government 100% 49 5 24 8 3 3 8 Comprehensive (267) Government 100% 68 5 14 6 2 2 3 Secondary (417) Government 100% 85 2 9 3 0.3 0.6 0.3 Assisted (351) 100% TOTAL 64 4 16 7 2 3 4 (1,798)

What the above results indicate is that firstly, all schools are certainly not equal in social structure and as such their products will not all come out equally. More precisely, it appears that there is a very strong relationship between the sociology of family life and entrance and success in secondary schools in the country. Social stratification perpetuates itself through the secondary school system. Having provided results on the demographic and social structure of the different secondary schools, we now move on to test the significance of the relationships between these factors and violence and delinquency. Let us now see the extent to which the six categories of delinquency are related to one another. Table 5.2 shows the correlations and the significant levels. Each category of delinquency is indeed significantly (p< .01) related to the other. This implies that once a student engages in any one type of delinquency, the probability that he or she will commit another type of delinquency is high. This is particularly so for students who engage in ‘high risk’ behaviours such as running away from home and skipping classes. The relatively high correlation between high risk behaviour and drug abuse (.58) is quite instructive. Students who hang out with gangs or run away from home are also very likely use drugs and drink alcohol.

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TABLE 5.2 CORRELATION MATRIX FOR SIX CATEGORIES OF DEVIANCE

Disorder Physical Substance High Risk Verbal Stealing and Violence Abuse Behaviour Aggression Incivility Physical 1.00 Violence Substance .42** 1.00 Abuse High Risk .58** .58** 1.00 Behaviour Stealing .39** .38** .51** 1.00 Disorder and .45** .40** .51** .46** 1.00 Incivility Verbal .39** .42** .41** .33** .52** 1.00 Aggression ** All correlations are significant at p<0.01 (2-tailed). Pearson’s r.

RACE AND DELINQUENCY

Does student race make a difference with violence and delinquency? Table 5.3 shows in detail the Means, Standard Deviations and whether or not the comparisons between the racial groups provide statistically significant differences (Tukey test used). (For this and some of the other results, we provide more than the normal amount of analysis. This is especially for students to assess the various ways of examining such data). First of all, when we examine the Means in Table 5.3, we see a consistent trend. Students of East Indian descent commit the least amount of delinquency in all six categories. Students of African descent have the highest average delinquency in four of the six categories. As Table 5.3 shows, in all six categories of delinquency the African descent and Mixed groups are statistically similar. There is no difference between them. More precisely, as Table 5.3 further shows, students of African descent commit physical violence significantly more than students of East Indian descent, but not more than the Mixed group (p<.01). The Mixed group, however, commit significantly more acts of physical violence than students of East Indian descent (p<.01). In fact, for each of the six categories of delinquency, from physical violence to verbal aggression, the students or African descent commit significantly more such acts than students of East Indian descent. In four of the six categories, the Mixed group scored higher than the East Indian descent group. The exception is for substance abuse.

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TABLE 5.3 RACE AND DELINQUENCY (MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES) (TUKEY HSD USED)

St. Mean Sig. Dependent Var. Independent Var. N Mean Significant Dev Difference Level A-E 0.63 0.000 9 African Descent 516 1.18 1.873 A-M 0.15 0.237 8 E-M -0.47 0.000 9 Physical Violence East Indian Descent 648 0.56 1.182

Mixed 589 1.03 1.645

A-E 0.22 0.045 9 African Descent 514 0.76 1.634 A-M 0.04 0.918 8 E-M -0.18 0.098 9 Substance Abuse East Indian Descent 644 0.55 1.399

Mixed 588 0.73 1.607

A-E 0.72 0.000 9 African Descent 514 1.31 2.136 A-M 0.25 0.063 8 High Risk E-M -0.47 0.000 9 East Indian Descent 647 0.59 1.460 Behaviour

Mixed 588 1.03 1.969

A-E 0.16 0.016 9 African Descent 516 0.35 1.003 A-M -0.01 0.986 8 E-M -0.17 0.007 9 Stealing East Indian Descent 648 0.20 0.877

Mixed 588 0.36 1.056

A-E 0.58 0.000 9 African Descent 516 1.83 2.008 A-M 0.15 0.396 8 Disorder & E-M -0.43 0.000 9 East Indian Descent 648 1.25 1.726 Incivility

Mixed 589 1.68 1.994

A-E 0.79 0.000 9 African Descent 513 3.39 2.863 A-M -0.06 0.933 8 Verbal E-M -0.85 0.000 9 East Indian Descent 647 2.60 2.700 Aggression

Mixed 587 3.45 3.259

Note: The ‘Mean’ in column four refers to the average number of times the offence was committed for the three-month period. This will apply to similar tables throughout in this paper.

SOCIAL CLASS AND DELINQUENCY

Is social class related to violence and delinquency? Given our earlier discussion and the theoretical importance of this relationship, we examined the data in three ways for the reader. Firstly, we looked at the extent to which each of the three social class levels was either over or under-represented in the commission of delinquency in the six categories. In the sample, the lower social class group comprised 51 per cent, middle class 38 per cent and the upper social class group 11 per cent. There was no significant departure for the proportions committing delinquency. For example,

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with physical violence, 50 per cent of the students from the lower class commit physical violence, 40 per cent middle class commit physical violence and ten per cent from the upper class commit physical violence. These proportions are obviously quite representative of the sample. The other route applied the Pearson’s correlation test for social class and the six categories. Two categories — disorder and incivility and verbal aggression showed significant but quite weak correlations - .05 and .06 respectively (p<.05). The other four relationships between social class and physical violence, substance abuse, high risk behaviour and stealing respectively are all non-significant. The third route applied the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), then the post-hoc Tukey multiple comparison test. With ANOVA, there are significant social class group differences (p<.05) for three of the delinquency categories – substance abuse (F=3.49), disorder and incivility F= 6.27) and verbal aggression (F=5.02). Table 5.4 shows in detail the Means, Standard Deviations and the significant levels. Here we find of the 18 possible group by group relationships, only three significant ones. That is, for substance abuse, the middle class group committed significantly more than the lower class; for disorder and incivility, the middle class again committed more such offences than the lower class; for verbal aggression, the middle class committed more such offences than the lower class. There was no significant difference between the lower and upper social class for any of the six categories of delinquency. Clearly, at the risk of appearing redundant, all three data examinations generally show insignificant relationships: except for the three mentioned above. In particular, it is interesting to note that for physical violence, high risk behaviours and stealing, there are no social class differences at all. Furthermore, it is also interesting to note the apparent curvilinear nature of the Means for these three social class groups. For five of the six categories, the middle class peaks between the lower and upper class. Such a trend would obviously depress the overall correlation result. Hence the option to examine the relationships by pairs, rather than just by Pearson’s r and ANOVA.

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TABLE 5.4 SOCIAL CLASS AND DELINQUENCY (MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES) (TUKEY HSD USED)

St. Mean Sig. Dependent Var. Independent Var. N Mean Significant Dev Difference Level L-M -0.08 0.558 X Lower Class 939 0.88 1.518 L-U 0.11 0.679 X M-U 0.19 0.322 X Physical Violence Middle Class 621 0.96 1.652

Upper Class 181 0.77 1.584

L-M -0.21 0.023 9 Lower Class 934 0.59 1.436 L-U -0.08 0.821 X M-U -0.14 0.551 X Substance Abuse Middle Class 618 0.80 1.696

Upper Class 180 0.66 1.586

L-M -0.04 0.912 X Lower Class 936 0.95 1.836 L-U 0.09 0.816 X High Risk M-U 0.13 0.681 X Middle Class 620 0.99 1.859 Behaviour

Upper Class 180 0.86 1.989

L-M -0.02 0.883 X Lower Class 939 0.29 0.963 L-U -0.03 0.905 X M-U -0.01 0.992 X Stealing Middle Class 620 0.32 0.958

Upper Class 181 0.33 1.197

L-M -0.35 0.001 9 Lower Class 939 1.44 1.846 L-U -0.08 0.877 X Disorder & M-U 0.27 0.211 X Middle Class 621 1.79 2.077 Incivility

Upper Class 181 1.52 1.818

L-M -0.49 0.004 9 Lower Class 936 2.94 2.778 L-U -0.23 0.609 X Verbal M-U 0.26 0.559 X Middle Class 618 3.43 3.232 Aggression

Upper Class 181 3.17 3.107

GENDER AND DELINQUENCY

Does student gender make a difference with violence and delinquency? Table 5.5 shows, with one exception, the clear difference between the two genders.

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TABLE 5.5 GENDER AND DELINQUENCY

Dependent Independent St. Sig N Mean T Value Significant Var Var Dev Level Male 797 1.41 1.935 Physical Value 12.622 0.000 9 Female 1002 0.5 1.089 Substance Male 789 0.81 1.771 3.259 0.000 9 Abuse Female 1001 0.57 1.329 High Risk Male 792 1.37 2.295 8.592 0.001 9 Behaviour Female 1005 0.63 1.345 Male 797 0.43 1.182 Stealing 5.026 0.000 9 Female 1001 0.2 0.753 Disorder and Male 797 1.93 2.189 7.079 0.000 9 Incivility Female 1002 1.29 1.662 Verbal Male 796 3.25 2.973 1.422 0.078 x Aggression Female 997 3.05 2.998

Compared to female students, males commit significantly more physical violence, more substance abuse, more high risk behaviour, more stealing and more disorder and incivility (all at p<.01). However, as Table 5.5 shows, there is no statistical difference between male and female students when it comes to verbal aggression — both have high scores but are equally verbally aggressive. Figure 5.6 illustrates these results more clearly.

FIGURE 5.6 SIX CATEGORIES OF VIOLENCE AND DELINQUENCY BY GENDER (MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS)

3.50 3.25

3.05 3.00

2.50

2.00 1.93 Mean 1.50 1.41 1.37 1.29

1.00 0.81 0.63 0.57 0.50 0.50 0.43

0.20

0.00 Physical Violence Substance Abuse High Risk Behaviour Stealing (Std. Dev. Disorder and Incivility Verbal Aggression (Std. Dev. 1.93 vs. (Std. Dev. 1.77 vs. (Std. Dev. 2.29 vs. 1.18 vs. 0.75) (Std. Dev. 2.19 vs. (Std. Dev. 2.97 vs. 1.09) 1.33) 1.35) 1.67) 2.99) Category of Violence and Delinquency

Male Female

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PARENTAL STRUCTURE AND DELINQUENCY

Does living with both parents at home as against living with one or no biological parent make a difference in student violence and delinquency? Given the relatively small percentages in eight of the 12 parenting groups, we use only four of them for the ANOVA analysis. Table 5.6 shows the differences (ANOVA) between these four parenting types and each of the six categories of violence and delinquency. There are significant between-group differences for physical violence, substance abuse, high risk behaviour and disorder and incivility (all at p<.01). This suggests that parenting type does make a significant difference for these four categories of delinquency. Stealing is borderline (p<.058).

TABLE 5.6 STUDENT PARENTAL STRUCTURE BY SIX CATEGORIES OF DELINQUENCY (ANOVA)

Sum Mean df F Sig of squares Square Between Groups 42.312 3 14.104 5.910 .001 Physical Violence Within Groups 3880.516 1626 2.387 Total 3922.828 1629 Between Groups 38.891 3 12.964 5.513 .001 Substance Abuse Within Groups 3804.932 1618 2.352 Total 3843.823 1621 Between Groups 63.518 3 21.173 6.262 .000 High Risk Within Groups 5480.597 1621 3.381 Behaviour Total 5544.114 1624 Between Groups 7.343 3 2.448 2.504 .058 Stealing Within Groups 1589.307 1626 .977 Total 1596.650 1629 Between Groups 114.408 3 38.136 10.284 .000 Disorder and Within Groups 6029.555 1626 3.708 Incivility Total 6143.963 1629 Between Groups 65.099 3 21.700 2.445 .062 Verbal Agression Within Groups 14393.465 1622 8.874 Total 14458.564 1625

Given the sociological importance of this home-school connection, we wished to see more exactly whether the difference is evenly spread between all groups or just between two or three of the four parenting types. Appendix A shows in detail the Means, Standard Deviations and group by group comparisons. For physical violence, we find a significant relationship between students living with ‘both parents’ and living with ‘mother only.’ In fact, for five of the six categories of delinquency, we found that students living with ‘mother only’ consistently committed more acts of violence and delinquency than those living with ‘both parents.’ For disorder and incivility,

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there is a significant difference between students ‘living with both parents’ and ‘living with mother only’ as well as ‘living with father only.’

AGE AND DELINQUENCY

The ANOVA revealed that for each of the six categories of delinquency, age does make a difference. That is, the older the student, the more likely the student will commit violence and delinquency of all types. To emphasise and illustrate these trends, we provide the ANOVA results in Table 5.7, all at p<.01. The consistency of the relationship is further demonstrated by the fact that of the 18 possible group by group comparisons, 16 showed significant differences, with almost all again at p<.01 (Tukey test).

TABLE 5.7 AGE BY SIX CATEGORIES OF DELINQUENCY (ANOVA) Sum Mean df F Sig of squares Square Between Groups 21.151 2 10.576 4.209 .015 Physical Violence Within Groups 4515.640 1797 2.513 Total 4536.791 1799 Between Groups 207.562 2 103.781 45.723 .000 Substance Abuse Within Groups 4058.357 1788 2.270 Total 4265.920 1790 Between Groups 387.166 2 193.583 59.447 .000 High Risk Within Groups 5835.445 1792 3.256 Behaviour Total 6222.611 1794 Between Groups 25.865 2 12.932 13.837 .000 Stealing Within Groups 1678.438 1796 .935 Total 1704.302 1798 Between Groups 355.395 2 177.697 49.841 .000 Disorder and Within Groups 6406.778 1797 3.565 Incivility Total 6762.173 1799 Between Groups 655.433 2 327.717 38.234 .000 Verbal Aggression Within Groups 15351.463 1791 8.571 Total 16006.896 1793

SCHOOL TYPE BY DELINQUENCY

Given our earlier discussion on the sociology of the different school types, a fundamental research and policy question is the extent to which violence and delinquency differ from one school type to another. The ANOVA results in Table 5.8 reveal a significant relationship between these five different types of secondary schools and the six categories of delinquency. For all six categories of delinquency, school type does make a difference: all at p<.01. (Note: The F test, while revealing group differences and different patterns of these differences, does not tell us precisely which two groups are significant or which two are not in the overall pattern. We therefore have to search for the specific differences elsewhere).

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TABLE 5.8 SCHOOL TYPE BY SIX CATEGORIES OF DELINQUENCY (ANOVA)

Sum Mean df F Sig of squares Square Between Groups 88.600 4 22.150 8.933 .000 Physical Violence Within Groups 4448.182 1794 2.479 Total 4536.782 1798 Between Groups 40.577 4 10.144 4.286 .002 Substance Abuse Within Groups 4224.889 1785 2.367 Total 4265.466 1789 Between Groups 192.315 4 48.079 14.266 .000 High Risk Within Groups 6029.380 1789 3.370 Behaviour Total 6221.695 1793 Between Groups 16.641 4 4.160 4.420 .001 Stealing Within Groups 1687.573 1793 0.941 Total 1704.214 1797 Between Groups 61.247 4 15.312 4.100 .003 Disorder and Within Groups 6700.596 1794 3.735 Incivility Total 6761.843 1798 Between Groups 184.521 4 46.130 5.213 .000 Verbal Aggression Within Groups 15821.066 1788 8.848 Total 16005.587 1792

Again, given the great civic and sociological importance of this school- delinquency connection, we publish in addition Appendix B with Means and Standard Deviations to show more precisely, the school-type by school-type differences. The first observation is the general trend for physical violence with all the Government schools. They appear similar to one another but significantly different from the Assisted schools for physical violence. However, except for the Government Composites, these Assisted schools are not different from the Government schools in committing substance abuse, stealing, being disorderly and uncivil, or even in being verbally aggressive. The Government Secondary schools appear quite the same with the other schools (except the Composites) when it comes to physical violence.

DISCUSSION

These results on the differential social structure surrounding secondary school students are similar to those found in the Centre for Ethnic Studies’ 1994 study on the social composition of secondary school students. In fact, that study concluded: ‘When all the pieces are put together one can say that the system is not user friendly to young people of African descent, especially females, nor to the poor, nor to those from non-nuclear families.’ It added:

With respect to the two majority races, Africans and Indians, students of Indian descent in the secondary school had higher average scores. More of this group than the other was in secondary school especially the traditional schools because among the placed students their scores were better (pp. 440–41).

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Our results as well confront researchers and policymakers especially, with very serious challenges. In the first place, the social structure in which these young people find themselves seems to predict a large part of their social, academic and occupational destiny. For example, if a student is from the lower social class and not living with both parents, then the chances of going to a ‘prestige’ school are quite low indeed. There is no significant relationship between race and social class in the sample. It is therefore interesting to note that the proportion of students of African descent in the ‘prestige’ schools (Government-Assisted schools) is much lower than that for students of East Indian descent (nine per cent vs. 31 per cent). Possibly the religious base of the Presbyterian prestige school might have contributed to this difference. Notwithstanding, other research found a similar trend from a larger sample (Centre for Ethnic Studies 1994). The results show a very strong trend for social class and the type of secondary school a student attends. The trend starts with 72 per cent lower social class in the Junior Secondary, over 60 per cent in the Composite and Comprehensive each, to 47 per cent in the Government Secondary and a very low 18 per cent in the Government-Assisted schools. The converse is also quite revealing. The upper social class moves from having a mere four per cent (4%) in the Junior Secondary, three per cent (3%) in the Composite to ten per cent (10%) in the Government Secondary and 31 per cent in the Government-Assisted type. This five-year Government Secondary school type presents an optimistic profile as far as ‘Government schools’ go. That is, though these two ‘Government schools’ are managed entirely by the Ministry of Education, they do show relatively high academic performance and also attract a high proportion of ‘first’ and ‘second’ choices. So in addition to examining what is being ‘done right’ in the Government- Assisted school type, this Government Secondary type can also be examined for ‘best practice.’ Of course, while we speak about the differentials in the social composition and academic achievement of students in the secondary school system, we certainly cannot ignore the fact that these differentials emanate from primary schools in different parts of the country and under different jurisdictions as well. So the question which should also be asked when dealing with the secondary school population as we did in this study, is why are our primary schools also so different in their output? The secondary school is indeed affected by what the primary schools produce. This connection is quite important especially since we have primary schools managed exclusively by the Government, others managed jointly by Government and Denominational Boards and, of course, some owned and managed exclusively by private interests. It is therefore not surprising that educational elitism is bred at the primary school level and more so even at the kindergarten school levels now. Not all acts of delinquency are the same. With our correlations, we did find a modest but significant relationship among these six (r=.33–.58) different categories

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of delinquency which implies that once a student commits one type, it is likely that he or she will commit another type of delinquency. But we should be careful not to ignore those outliers who fall on the extreme ends of the correlations. They may well help with the answer to some of the anomalies or mixed results we often face in criminological research on social structure-delinquency relationships. It is important to note that we use self-reported data, that is, the students themselves anonymously provided the information with guarantees of privacy and confidentiality. In other words, while such data do have some disadvantages (for example, recall), they do not suffer the serious defects of official records or police statistics where the initiation of inquiries, charges and arrests are known to possess a range of biases and inefficiencies (see, for example, Hindelang, Hirschi and Weiss 1981). The habit of labelling as a ‘delinquent’ a child who steals a small amount once or twice, or a child who runs away from home once, may be conversationally convenient, but it is also quite counter-productive. Delinquency can include a wide range of acts, such as the 21-item list we provided in this study. So by precipitously labelling a child as ‘delinquent’ we may well be loading the child with much more than he or she should bear. Our six different categories of delinquency has helped us move towards a more specific understanding of who or what is related to what specific kind of delinquency, and as such, we avoid presuming more than there is. This study used a number of items commonly used in delinquency research (for example, cheating on a test, skipping classes, etc.). But we do face a challenging question today: Have we widened the delinquency net too wide? We will treat this dilemma more fully in our later work, taking into account the teachers’ views. The term ‘delinquency’ has become quite a pejorative one, quite often embracing much more than it intends to. And as such, it pushes many a child into a stereotyped corner from where there is almost no return. We find all this necessary to say because, as we review the data collected here, we find that many students commit one offence but not others within the list. On the other hand, some commit the same offence repeatedly. It might very well be impossible to avoid using the cognitively convenient concept, delinquency, but we must note that, as with most such categorical labels, they tend to create stereotypes after which the self-fulfilling prophesy comes alive. The propensity for social science research to press for typologies and categories may well be unwittingly fuelling stereotypes.

GENDER

In five categories of violence and delinquency, males commit significantly more acts than females. The differences are striking (all at p <.01). The exceptional category is for verbal aggression where the Means are males = 3.25 and females =

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3.05, which is not significantly different. The biggest difference is for physical violence where the Means are males = 1.41 and females = 0.50 (p<.05). The common view that ‘girls are now fighting as much as boys’ is not supported here. For substance abuse, their Means are closer but still not significant (males = .81, females = .57). The evidence therefore does not support the view that ‘girls are drinking, smoking and using illegal drugs as much as boys.’ The Means for girls for physical violence and substance abuse do seem high in themselves and are some cause for concern, without having to make the comparison with boys. It will be interesting to conduct a tracer study in three or five years time to see how these gender differences stand. Evidence from other countries suggests the ‘convergence phenomenon,’ that is, the rate of female delinquency is moving closer to the boys.

RACE

There are two striking trends in the results on race. First, the students of African descent and the Mixed group appear quite similar in the extent to which they commit violence and delinquency. That is, they are equally violent, smoke, drink and use illegal drugs similarly, engage in high risk behaviours similarly, steal similarly, are similarly disorderly and uncivil and similarly verbally aggressive. Secondly, the group who commits the least amount of violence and delinquency — in all six categories — are the students of East Indian descent. Even the Standard Deviations of the East Indian group is consistently smaller than either of the two other racial groups. This group is significantly different from both the African descent and Mixed groups with respect to violence and delinquency. This racial difference is a much sharper, clear-cut one than usually found in Caribbean research on race and delinquency. Such results attract an interesting inference. That is, the presumed inexorable levelling effects of school type do not seem to work equally for all racial groups. Though in the same school, the racial groups do not commit similar amounts of violence and delinquency. Our further work should therefore be more of a social psychological and phenomenological approach where cultural processes and the ‘meaning of things’ play a more dominant role than the purely structuralist approach. From our race-delinquency analysis, we see a growing need to apply a sharper research focus on the Mixed group, popularly called ‘Dougla.’ There is now a need to examine the psychological and cultural processes which shape the thinking and behaviour of this ‘Dougla’ population (now almost 20% of the national population). In fact, with particular reference to violence, delinquency and ethnic values, such a social psychological approach should focus on the relationships among all ethnic groups here.

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SOCIAL CLASS

The very weak or at least mixed relationships we found between social class and delinquency are consistent with research outside the Caribbean. For us, the social class-delinquency connection did not provide the kind of empirical evidence to support popular opinion. That is, that low social class, and its proxy, poverty, is ‘a cause of delinquency and crime.’ In the face of such weak evidence, however, we must note the curvilinear nature of the social class-delinquency relationship. That is, the middle social class group tends to peak between the lower and upper class groups, thus dampening the linear Pearson’s correlation. Apart from the statistical implication, this suggests that more attention should now be given to ‘middle class delinquency,’ a call which is gaining more and more resonance in the research literature. Apart from seemingly committing a bit more delinquency than lower or upper class youths, it is theoretically appealing to find out if these middle class youths possess the same kind of motivations as lower class youths — even when the delinquent acts are similar. Our results for the middle class are somewhat contrary to what Reckless (1967, 112) found in an early study. He found that the middle class youth committed less delinquency than either the lower or upper class youth. Furthermore, it is quite reasonable to search for differences between social groups such as race, gender and social class. But at the same time, it is extremely important to keep a sharp eye on the level of total delinquency committed by all groups, in this case, youths. The total amount of violence and delinquency by the total sample is a serious cause for research and especially policy concern. The group by group difference, whether significant or not, should not obscure the more fundamental problem of youth violence and delinquency in schools.

PARENTAL STRUCTURE

As we also noted earlier, several studies used different measures for social class (for example, income, welfare and unemployment, education), and still the relationship with delinquency has been weak or insignificant. But the social structure-delinquency bond is still breathing. The relationship between parental structure and delinquency, for example, is rather strong and consistent. In particular, there is a significant difference between students living with both parents and ‘living with a mother only.’ The results show that for five of the six categories of delinquency, including physical violence, students living with ‘mother only’ commit more violence than those living with ‘both parents.’ The relevant literature has argued that it is not the ‘single parenting’ itself that breeds delinquency, but the quality of the parent-child bond. The data did show a slight difference between social class and parental structure which suggests that the lack of resources may also be a challenge in caring for and guiding students

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in single-parent homes. Nevertheless, this single mother-delinquency connection, as a form of social structure, needs serious policy considerations. How are these young people treated in the different kinds of parental structure mentioned above? Why is it that ‘both-parent’ homes seem to provide a different behavioural outcome than ‘mother-only’ homes? There is an urgent need to find out what kinds of psychological and social relationships exist in such different homes, what kinds of support are needed, and how the schools can be more effectively linked to the home to help correct any deficits adversely affecting the student. It is certainly not enough to label homes as ‘mother-only’ if only because such labelling creates the impression that one, the mother alone is responsible for the child’s welfare, and two, that the father has no kind of responsibility whatever. The fact that the ‘single-mother’ has to stand alone and be responsible for the one or more children puts her in ‘double jeopardy.’ She is left behind without a ‘husbanding’ coverage and she has to ‘father’ the child as well as ‘mother’ the child. Whatever the reason for the ‘mother-only’ condition, outside research has also revealed that this family condition is indeed related to delinquency. The relationships between family structure, education and occupation in the multicultural Caribbean is a critical theme for research now, especially since there seems to be, among other things, a number of social and educational implications for students. Furthermore, it is also important to find out the various reasons why a ‘mother-only’ condition for the student has arisen. Is it through death of the father? Through spousal abuse or divorce? Rape? Through careless sexual practices? Through economic insufficiency? There is a need to inquire into such reasons if only to help prevent the ‘mother-only’ home from becoming unduly burdened with yet another stigma, and so suffer ‘triple jeopardy.’ It is pre-emptive to describe a ‘single-parent’ home as a ‘broken home’ without knowing the circumstances. In fact, like school type and social class, this factor of parental structure needs a further examination not only in itself but also of the characteristics which non-delinquent youths in such homes possess.

AGE

One of the strongest relationships we found with violence and delinquency is with age. As the student moves from ten to 18, he or she seems to significantly commit more violence and delinquency. For example, for physical violence the Mean for the ten-12 year olds is .77 while the Mean for the 16-18 year olds is .99 (p<.01). With substance abuse, there is much more drinking alcohol, smoking and using illegal drugs at 16–18 than at 10–12 years old (Mean 1.12 vs. .30, p<.01). The other implication, as our other research suggests, is that a lot of the bullying is committed by the older ones against the younger ones in the same school. In both cases, drug abuse and bullying, it is urgent to develop sustainable reduction

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and prevention programmes. We need to keep a sharp eye on the increase in gang formation and female delinquency in schools.

SCHOOL TYPE

What about school type? Does the type of secondary school make a difference with violence and delinquency? Are the Government-Assisted schools, the Denominational schools, different from the Government schools? It is well known that they do differ very much in academic performance and as the evidence above shows, they also differ in their social class composition. They also differ quite remarkably in the parental structure of students. For example, while 49 per cent and 54 per cent of the students in the Government Comprehensive and Junior Secondary live with both parents, 85 per cent of the students in the Assisted schools live with both parents — a big difference. There is an extremely urgent need to break this vicious cycle between social structure and academic performance now existing within the ‘Government type’ schools. The cycle carries all the ugly attributes of a ‘tracking’ system, most of all stigmatising, stereotyping and self-fulfilling prophesy. So, do they differ in violence and delinquency? The results, quite surprisingly, are mixed. Certainly, for physical violence, which attracts quick media and public attention, students in the Assisted schools commit significantly less than all other schools, even less than its ‘first cousin,’ the Government five-year secondary schools. But for the rest of delinquency (for example, stealing, substance abuse), it is surprising to find that the Assisted schools are not much different, if at all, from the Government schools. As we continue this research project, we will be disaggregating the data into more refined relationships. Furthermore, while the data in this study are largely student-driven, it is important to have a larger picture of the correlates or context of school violence and delinquency. For example, it is important to examine school management styles, teacher attitudes and performance as well as the domestic relationships experienced by students. Such a research framework will be driven by social psychological methods, an interactionist perspective, especially since such variables can be strategically treated as independent as well as mediating variables.5 Figure 5.7 illustrates:

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FIGURE 5.7 THE PENTAGON MODEL: CONFIGURING STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

Ministry of Education

Student Teacher/School REDUCING VIOLENCE AND DELINQUENCY

Parent/Home Community

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS – A 13-POINT COMPASS FOR THEORY, RESEARCH AND POLICYMAKING

Following the procedure for theory-building, we hereby derive from this paper a set of propositions which can form the basis for further research and theoretical development in youth violence and delinquency:

(1) The lower the social class of students, the more likely they will be in a Junior Secondary, Composite, or Comprehensive school and the less likely they will be in a Government-Assisted (Denominational) School. (2) Students from homes with two parents are more likely than those from single-parent homes to be in a Government-Assisted school than in a Government school. (3) Students of East Indian descent are more likely to have higher marks than students of African descent in the secondary school entrance examination, and so are more likely to enter Government-Assisted secondary schools. (4) Students in Government schools are more likely to commit physical violence than students in Government-Assisted schools. (5) There is little or no difference in the amount of delinquency (non-violent) committed by students in Government schools compared to those in Government-Assisted schools.

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(6) The social class background of students seems to make little or no difference in committing violence and delinquency. (7) Students living in ‘mother-only’ homes are more likely to commit violence and delinquency than those living in two-parent homes. (8) The older the student the more likely he or she will commit violence and delinquency. (9) Boys are more likely to commit violence and delinquency than girls. (10) Students of African descent are more likely to commit violence and delinquency than students of East Indian descent in secondary school. Students of Mixed and African descent commit similar amounts of violence and delinquency. (11) Mixed (Dougla) students commit more violence and delinquency than students of East Indian descent, but a similar amount as that committed by students of African descent. (12) Students’ race and gender make a much bigger difference than social class in the relationship with violence and delinquency. (13) Students who commit high-risk behaviour (for example, missing classes, running away from home, involvement in gangs) are quite likely to commit other forms of delinquency including violence (for example, drug abuse, fighting).

CONCLUSION

When all the demographic and sociological factors and their relationships with delinquency are taken into account, there arises a pressing need to search for intervening variables which could help refine and explain the causes and implications of youth violence and delinquency. For example, it is becoming increasingly important to examine the lifestyles of middle and upper social class students who may be bright but deviant, especially in drug abuse. ‘Frustration with school’ is another important intervening variable between social class and delinquency. Relative deprivation also appears as a more refined variable than social class or strain. Even if in varying degrees, relative deprivation cuts across all social classes and so may help to divest criminological theory from much of its low social class obsessions. All of this brings us back to the question: To what extent can the values or ideology of the researcher be divorced from the subject of criminological inquiry? It is quite appropriate to put this question early on the agenda of ‘Caribbean’ criminology. In the Caribbean, especially in the more culturally plural countries, results from criminological research carry high political stakes and controversy. For example, much of the political contestations are based on racial groupings and preferences. Therefore evidence suggesting that one racial group is more delinquent or criminal than another does raise public controversy, not so much on the

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proportions but on the reasons for the difference. Is it the individual, group or the system to be blamed? The same claim could be made for single-parent or poor homes. While such sensitivities impose a serious responsibility upon criminologists, it is a challenge which should not intimidate. In fact the clash of public opinions, be they based on race, social class or gender, should be seen as a natural companion to the fact that criminology itself is a rather young sibling in Caribbean social science. As such, systematic, step by step research could help bring some light into the heated public debates which currently surround not only youth crimes and delinquency but as well, policing, prisons, and the administration of justice across the Caribbean. Enlightened debates are good for democracy.

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Ministry of Education. 1989. Report of a National Consultation of Violence and Indiscipline in Schools (Vol. 1). Trinidad: Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Ministry of Education. Ministry of Social Development. 1994. Report of the Cabinet-appointed Committee to Examine the Juvenile Delinquency and the Youth Crime Situation in Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad: Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Ministry of Social Development. Ohsako, T. Ed. 1997. Violence at School: Global Issues and Interventions. Paris: UNESCO, International Bureau of Education. Olweus, D. 1993. Bullying in School. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Pryce, K. 1976. ‘Towards a Caribbean Criminology’. Caribbean Issues 2, no. 2: 3–21. Quinney, R. 1977. Class, State and Crime. New York: Longman Publishing Co. Reckless, W.C. 1967. The Crime Problem. 4th edn. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Regoli, R.M. and Hewitt, J.D. 2006. Delinquency in Society. 6th edn. New York: McGraw Hill. Rohlehr, G. 1990. Calypso and Society in Pre-Independence Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad: G. Rohlehr. Ryan, S. 1991. The Muslimeen Grab for Power. Trinidad: Imprint Caribbean Limited. Sacco, F.C. and Twemlow, S.W. 1997. ‘School Violence Reduction: A Model Jamaican Sunday School Program’. Community Mental Health Journal 33, no. 3: 229–34. Schwartz, M.D. and Milovanovic, D. 1996. Race, Gender and Class in Criminology. London: Garland Publishing Co. Seigel, L.J. and Senna, J.J. 1981. Juvenile Delinquency. St Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing. Short, J. and Nye, I.F. 1958. ‘Extent of Unrecorded Delinquency: Tentative Conclusions’. Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 49: 296–302. Soyibo, K. and Lee, M.G. 2000. ‘Domestic and School Violence Among High School Students in Jamaica’. West Indian Medical Journal 49, no. 3: 232–62. Taylor, I. and Young, J. 1973. The New Criminology: For a Social Theory of Deviance. New York, NY: Harper & Row. Thomas, R. 1987. The Trinidad Labour Riots of 1937: 50 Years Later. Trinidad: The University of the West Indies, Extra Mural Studies Unit. Thornberry, T., Wei, E., Stouthamer-Loeber, M. and Van Dyke, J. 2000. Teenage Fatherhood and Delinquent Behaviour. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Tittle, C.R. and Meier, R.F. 1990. ‘Specifying the SES/Delinquency Relationship’. Criminology 28, 183–206. Tracy, Jnr., P. 1990. ‘Prevalence, Incidence, Rates and Other Descriptive Measures’. In Measurement Issues in Criminology, ed. K. Kempf, 51–77. New York: Springer-Verlag. Trotman, D.V. 1986. Crime in Trinidad: Conflict and Control in a Plantation Society (1838– 1900). Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Walker, S.P., Grentham-McGregor, S.M., Himes, J.H., Williams, S. and Duff, E.M. 1998. ‘School Performance in Adolescent Jamaican Girls, Associations with Health, Social and Behavioural Characteristics and Risk Factors for Dropout’. Journal of Adolescent Health 21, no. 1: 109–22. Wei, E., Loeber, R. and Stouthamer-Loeber, M. 2002. ‘How Many of the Offspring Born to Teenage Fathers Are Produced by Repeat Serious Offenders?’ Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health 12, 83–98.

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Weis, J. 1987. ‘Social Class and Crime’. In Positive Criminology, ed. M. Gottfredson and T. Hirschi. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications. Weis, W.G., Crutchfield, R.D. and Bridges, G.S. ed. 1996. Juvenile Delinquency (Volume 2). Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press. Wells, E. and Rankin, J. 1991. ‘Families and Delinquency: A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Broken Homes’. Social Problems 38, 71–90. Wolfgang, M., Figlio, R. and Sellin, T. 1972. Delinquency in a Birth Cohort. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. Wright, P.B., Ashvalom, C., Moffitt, T.E., Miech, R.A. and Silva, P.A. 1999. ‘Reconciling the Relationship Between SES and Delinquency: Causation but Not Correlation’. Criminology 37, 175–84.

NOTES

1. For their research assistance, I wish to express my appreciation to Ian Ramdhanie, Vidya Lall, Kathy-Ann Belmar-Thomas and Toni Hinds. I also wish to extend to my colleagues Professor Jack Quarter, Professor Christopher Birkbeck and Professor Jason Ditton my heartfelt thanks for their helpful comments on this paper. 2. The motion moved in May 1988 by Independent Senator Dr Ramesh Deosaran and seconded by Mr Allan Alexander, S.C., in the Senate, Parliament of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, noted the ethnic and social class imbalances in secondary school entrants and called for a systematic study on the subject so as to inspire the required reforms for social equity on the secondary school system. Both Government and Opposition supported the motion which was unanimously passed and acted upon by the commissioning of a study in 1992. 3. Government schools are totally financed and managed by the Government. Government-Assisted schools are financed by the Government but share a joint management structure with the Denominational Boards through a 1962 Concordat. 4. Since this ‘Other’ group is so small, it will be left out of the analysis. 5. In our continuing work, we are examining, for example, the different ways in which teachers and parents/guardians manage, control or punish the violence and delinquency committed by students at both school and at home.

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APPENDIX A PARENTAL STRUCTURE AND DELINQUENCY (MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES) (TUKEY HSD USED)

Dependent St. Mean Sig. Independent Var. N Mean Significant Var. Dev Difference Level MF-F -0.36 0.238 X Mother and Father 1147 0.76 1,402 MF-M -0.36 0.002 9 MF-MS -0.34 0.105 X F-M 0.01 1.000 X Physical Father Only 67 1.12 1,692 Violence F-MS 0.03 0.999 X M-MS 0.02 0.999 X Mother Only 296 1.11 1,927

Mother and 120 1.09 1,700 Stepfather MF-F -0.49 0.052 X Mother and Father 1142 0.57 1,403 MF-M -0.34 0.004 9 MF-MS -0.16 0.681 X F-M 0.15 0.878 X Substance Father Only 67 1.06 1,890 Abuse F-MS 0.33 0.498 X M-MS 0.17 0.725 X Mother Only 294 0.90 1,808

Mother and 119 0.73 1,760 Stepfather MF-F -0.24 0.739 X Mother and Father 1144 0.79 1.687 MF-M -0.49 0.000 9 MF-MS -0.34 0.220 X F-M -0.25 0.735 X High Risk Father Only 67 1.03 1.586 F-MS -0.10 0.982 X Behaviour M-MS 0.15 X Mother Only 295 1.28 2.331

Mother and 119 1.13 1.983 Stepfather MF-F -0.22 0.269 X Mother and Father 1147 0.25 0.920 MF-M -0.14 0.152 X MF-MS -0.11 0.682 X F-M 0.09 0.910 X Father Only 67 0.48 1.092 Stealing F-MS 0.12 0.859 X M-MS 0.03 0.991 X Mother Only 296 0.39 1.071

Mother and 120 0.36 1.302 Stepfather MF-F -0.64 0.042 9 Mother and Father 1147 1.39 1,802 MF-M -0.63 0.000 9 MF-MS -0.36 0.211 X F-M 0.01 1.000 X Disorder and Father Only 67 2.03 2,160 F-MS 0.28 0.776 X Incivility M-MS 0.27 0.565 X Mother Only 296 2.02 2,314

Mother and 120 1.75 1,875 Stepfather MF-F -0.14 0.982 X Mother and Father 1143 3.01 2,986 MF-M -0.53 0.035 9 MF-MS -0.11 0.981 X F-M -0.38 0.775 X Verbal Father Only 67 3.15 2,670 F-MS 0.03 1.000 X Aggression M-MS 0.42 0.567 X Mother Only 296 3.53 3,122

Mother and 120 3.12 2,879 Stepfather

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APPENDIX B SCHOOL TYPE AND DELINQUENCY (MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND MEAN DIFFERENCES) (TUKEY HSD USED)

Dependent St. Mean Sig. Independent Var. N Mean Significant Var. Dev Difference Level JS-GC1 -0.28 0.107 X JS-GC2 -0.01 1.000 X Junior Secondary 360 0.88 1.324 JS-GS -0.13 0.788 X JS-GA 0.38 0.011 9 GC1-GC2 0.27 0.192 X Government 404 1.16 1.942 GC1-GS 0.15 0.657 X Composite (GC1) GC1-GA 0.66 0.000 9 Physical GC2-GS -0.12 0.866 X Government Violence 267 0.89 1.643 GC2-GA 0.39 0.020 9 Comprehensive (GC2)

GS-GA 0.51 0.000 9 Government 417 1.01 1.672 Secondary

Government-Assisted 351 0.50 1.093

JS-GC1 -0.22 0.268 X JS-GC2 -0.11 0.910 X Junior Secondary 358 0.66 1.484 JS-GS 0.07 0.973 X JS-GA 0.21 0.355 X GC1-GC2 0.12 0.879 X Government 402 0.89 1.749 GC1-GS 0.29 0.054 X Composite (GC1) GC1-GA 0.44 0.001 9 Substance GC2-GS 0.18 0.594 X Government Abuse 264 0.77 1.698 GC2-GA 0.32 0.080 X Comprehensive (GC2)

GS-GA 0.14 0.695 X Government 417 0.60 1.359 Secondary

Government-Assisted 349 0.45 1.404

JS-GC1 -0.53 0.001 9 JS-GC2 -0.22 0.563 X Junior Secondary 359 0.93 1.696 JS-GS 0.19 0.608 X JS-GA 0.39 0.034 9 GC1-GC2 0.30 0.225 X Government 401 1.45 2.336 GC1-GS 0.72 0.000 9 Composite (GC1) GC1-GA 0.92 0.000 9 High Risk GC2-GS 0.41 0.035 9 Government Behaviour 266 1.15 2.004 GC2-GA 0.62 0.000 9 Comprehensive (GC2)

GS-GA 0.21 0.531 X Government 417 0.74 1.763 Secondary

Government-Assisted 351 0.53 1.146

Stealing JS-GC1 -0.23 0.008 9 JS-GC2 -0.06 0.953 X Junior Secondary 360 0.24 0.788 JS-GS 0.02 0.98 X JS-GA -0.03 0.993 X GC1-GC2 0.18 0.136 X Government 404 0.47 1.115 GC1-GS 0.26 0.002 9 Composite (GC1) GC1-GA 0.20 0.035 9 Government 267 0.29 1.078 GC2-GS 0.08 0.843 X

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APPENDIX B (CONT’D)

Dependent St. Mean Sig. Independent Var. N Mean Significant Var. Dev Difference Level GC2-GA 0.02 0.998 X

GS-GA -0.05 0.940 X Government 416 0.21 1.015 Stealing Secondary

Government-Assisted 351 0.27 0.805

JS-GC1 -0.38 0.053 X JS-GC2 -0.25 0.505 X Junior Secondary 360 1.40 1.900 JS-GS -0.30 0.189 X JS-GA 0.09 0.969 X GC1-GC2 0.13 0.910 X Government 404 1.78 1.980 GC1-GS 0.08 0.979 X Composite (GC1) GC1-GA 0.47 0.007 9 Disorder GC2-GS -0.05 0.996 X and Government 267 1.65 2.118 GC2-GA 0.34 0.192 Incivility Comprehensive (GC2)

GS-GA 0.39 0.039 9 Government 417 1.70 2.053 Secondary

Government-Assisted 351 1.31 1.585

JS-GC1 -0.78 0.003 9 JS-GC2 -0.45 0.327 X Junior Secondary 359 2.63 2.646 JS-GS -0.87 0.000 9 JS-GA -0.36 0.476 X GC1-GC2 0.33 0.638 X Government 401 3.41 3.019 GC1-GS -0.09 0.993 X Composite (GC1) GC1-GA 0.41 0.314 X Verbal GC2-GS -0.42 0.386 X Government Aggression 265 3.08 3.030 GC2-GA 0.09 0.996 X Comprehensive (GC2)

GS-GA 0.50 0.132 X Government 417 3.50 3.117 Secondary

Government-Assisted 351 2.99 3.025

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Thinking Violent INTRODUCTION Thoughts: High rates of student indiscipline and Students’ Attitudes school violence are growing problems to Violence within internationally (Debarbieux 2003). Secondary Schools Despite the importance of education in in Trinidad and the region, the Caribbean has not been Tobago immune to this growing plague of school violence and in several schools and Jerome de Lisle1 (Noreen communities; violence is an increasing Ramkhelawan, Carol Joseph, concern (Chevannes 2004, UNICEF 2005). Sean Annisette, Indra Maraj, The sharp rise in reported incidents of Anna Singh, Kameel Ali, school and community violence within Teckler Thomas, Lyn Murray, & Joy-Ann Walcott)2 the Caribbean has forced a response from several Ministries of Education and various stakeholders. In Jamaica, for example, the Ministry of Education recently launched an assessment and intervention programme designed in part to uncover the causes of violence and aggression, especially among adolescent males (Cardien 2004). Community violence and especially student indiscipline and violence have also become a source of concern for key education stakeholders in Trinidad and Tobago, with the Ministry of Education launching a series of costly integrated programmes aimed at reducing school violence. Recent high profile acts of violence in schools in the United States (US) and elsewhere suggest notable deficiencies in the capacity of schools to prevent school violence. Thus, critical to current school reform initiatives is the implementation of whole-school programmes designed to reduce or prevent violence. School-wide

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intervention programmes should make schools safer places for learning (Howard, Flora and Griffin 1999). Schools are often a focal point of the community, and so violence reduction programmes might have a much wider impact on neighbourhoods and the school’s external environment. Of course, it is also possible that school violence is not really on the increase at all and instead it is the media which is increasingly prone to reporting it. For example, in the US, the National Youth Risk Behaviour Survey (YRBS), which focused upon violence-related behaviours among high school students for the period 1991-2003, found the incidence of major violent acts such as weapon-carrying and physical fighting had declined significantly (Brener, Lowry and Barios 2004). While some violent acts such as threatening or injury with a weapon were up, this would still not account for the increased safety concerns and fears by students. Likewise, locally, it may be that the increased incidence of reporting has distorted perceptions of school violence and safety.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Violence prevention programmes often use a broad definition of violence and are likely to include under the rubric of violent acts: delinquency, antisocial behaviour, verbal abuse, the threat of the use of weapons, vandalism, and property crimes (Howard, Flora and Griffin 1999). Thus, the North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention defined school violence as ‘any behaviour that violates a school’s educational mission or climate of respect or jeopardises the intent of the school to be free of aggression against persons or property, drugs, weapons, disruptions, and disorder’ (Centre for the Prevention of School Violence 2002). This definition therefore includes precursors to overtly violent acts such as ‘put downs’ and ‘trash talk,’ which are relatively common in the school environment. From another perspective, Henry (2000) has offered an even more expansive and integrated definition of school violence: ‘The exercise of power over others in school related settings, by some individual, agency, or social process, that denies those subject to it their humanity to make a difference, either by reducing them from what they are or by limiting them from becoming what they might be’ (p. 21). Such a definition extends the meaning of school violence to include aspects of workplace violence and institutional inequity, which might also be related to overt behavioural acts by individuals. Thus, Henry (2000) went further to identify five levels of violence dependent upon the position of the perpetrator. In Level one, the perpetrator is the student; in Level two, it is the teacher or administrator; in Level three it is the school board or education district; in Level four it is national or state policies; and in Level five it is social processes. Clearly, some social processes such as tracking students to different schools, and internal school policies, such as teacher and resource allocation, might themselves lead to violence on the part of teachers or students (Evans 2001).

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High rates of school violence are clearly inimical to quality schooling. Indeed, early school effectiveness studies clearly identified a safe and orderly school environment as one of the correlates of effective schools (Twemlow et al. 2001). Certainly, a low rate of school violence is an important indicator of educational quality. In Trinidad and Tobago, there are a number of current approaches to implementing interventions designed to reduce or prevent violence. In 2003–04, these approaches came under the title ‘Project Peace,’ which is managed under the School Intervention Strategies unit, and includes interventions such as: an out of school suspension programme, training in peer mediation, counselling, and conflict resolution. Additionally, the Ministry of Education (MOE) has labelled 17 selected schools as ‘at risk’, employing safety officers for crisis intervention and exposure to activities that promote positive behavioural patterns (MOE 2004). Another approach to dealing with high rates of school violence might be to encourage individual schools to set up and implement whole school discipline policies. Such systemic reform will provide opportunities for teacher training in classroom management and conflict resolution as well as ensure the implementation of an institution wide policy and vision for the school in terms of non-violence. Indeed, effective solutions to school violence must be multifaceted and ecological, extending across schools and neighbourhoods (Reinke and Herman 2002). Such a comprehensive school-wide approach requires effective school leadership. Whole school policies or programmes are more likely to be effective because they fulfil the criteria for successful deep level institutional change by ensuring school-wide consensus and involvement on approaches and goals rather than being externally driven. Specific concerns within high-risk schools may also be dealt with by implementing school-wide violence prevention programmes. Violence prevention may target cognitive, attitudinal, or behavioural outcomes in either the elementary or secondary school (Howard, Flora and Griffin 1999). In contrast to problem- focused strategies that attempt to reduce undesirable behaviours through dress codes, suspensions, or increased security guards, the emphasis must be on edifying and building alternative prosocial skills, attitudes, and behaviours (Smith and Sandhu 2004). While most interventions have modest or mixed effects, the effectiveness of programmes can be improved by integrating them with broader community efforts. An especially useful component of some interventions is the enhancement of emotional literacy or emotional and social intelligences (D’Andrea 2004). Interventions which seek to build emotional and social competence and health must tackle thinking patterns that perpetuate violent behaviour and intentions. These include normative beliefs about the legitimacy of violence, attributions as to the causes of violence, and emotive and social information processes related to reasoning about violence and violent acts. These aspects of the school violence problem may well be a significant problem in Caribbean societies, where attitudes

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towards different aspects of violence are associated with different masculinities and femininities (Connell 1995). For example, popular societal metaphors include statements such as ‘Avoid being a Good Friday “bobolee” and “Don’t be a soft man.”’ Living up to these portrayed images and associated ways of thinking will result in students being prone to acts of violence, as they attempt to defend against intrusions, perceived or otherwise. Thus, if popular violent prevention interventions fail to deal with dysfunctional ways of thinking among adolescents in the school population, the impact of such programmes will be limited, even when specific violent acts and behaviours are targeted. Our purpose in studying the way adolescent students perceive, think, and rationalise violence was to eventually develop curriculum materials emphasising alternative ways of thinking with higher emotional literacy a key indicator and target of change. Such an intervention might be patterned after the Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS) programme (Kelly, Longbottom, Potts and Williamson 2004). Violence related cognitions were defined as ways of thinking that include normative beliefs, hostile attributions, and outcome expectancies. Normative beliefs are personal standards of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour that are specific to (i.e., normative for) each individual. For example, a male adolescent might believe that it is legitimate to retaliate by hitting someone, even those who are considered friends. Likewise, a cognitive bias of attributing aggressive intent to others might result in a youth misreading social cues and attributing malice even to instrumental provocation situations (‘He stepped on my shoe intentionally, so I hit him’). Both of these factors might operate through social information processing to accentuate violent behaviour. For example, a youth who misreads motives or threats might be prone to react with violence given a normative perspective, which makes it acceptable to respond to a threat in that way. There is evidence of an association between violent cognitions, aggressive attitudes, and violent behaviours. For example, Brockenbrough, Cornell and Loper (2002) studied aggressive attitudes among victims of violence in school. They found an association between aggressive attitudes, victimisation, and reported incidents of violence. However they used two items to measure aggression in the 45-item self-report school survey, ‘If someone threatens you it is ok to hit that person’ and ‘it feels good when I hit someone.’ Boxer and Tisak (2003) measured another aspect of cognition, adolescents’ beliefs about the causes of violence, including attributions and reasons for aggression, using two stimulus vignettes describing the relationship between affect and behaviour. The instrument was designed to measure attributions related to both proactive and reactive aggression. However, although there was variability in responses, adolescents reacted similarly to both types of violence. In another recent study, Werner and Nixon (2005) explored the cognitive bases of adolescents’ aggressive behaviour. They refined an instrument for measuring normative beliefs about violence that included such items as ‘If you’re angry, it is OK to spread rumours about a kid’ and ‘In general,

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it is wrong to ignore someone, even if you don’t want him/her to be a part of your group.’ They found that specific associations between beliefs about aggression and adolescent aggressive behaviour using both co relational and multiple regression analyses. Currently, a number of instruments measuring beliefs and thinking associated with aggression and violence are available. However, many of these instruments have been developed specifically for select populations prone to violence. One of the more popular of these is the Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles (PICTS) which is a 64-item designed for offenders measuring criminal attitudes and beliefs (Walters 2002). Items used to measure criminal thinking include statements such as ‘the more I got away with crime the more I thought there was no way the police or authorities would catch up with me’ and ‘I rarely question the consequences of my actions when I was in the community.’ Clearly, this measure might not be appropriate for assessing students in a general school population. Minogue, Kingery, and Murphy (1999) also listed a number of self- report measures that can be used separately or as part of an overall survey instrument when studying violence in school populations. A recently published scale designed specifically to assess cognitions and belief patterns in normal populations is the Maudsley Violence Questionnaire (MVQ) (Walker 2005, Walker and Gudjonsson 2006). The MVQ assesses rules or dysfunctional assumptions by statements such as ‘it is ok to hit someone if they make you look stupid’ and ‘if you are not willing to fight it means you are weak and pathetic.’ It also measures core beliefs by statements such as ‘I see myself as a violent person’ and ‘violence is second nature to me’ and related cognitions. The instrument includes 56 items (42 measuring machismo and 14 measuring acceptance of violence). Walker (2005) used the scale on a population of 785 students and found that total scores correlated with scores from a self-reported measure of delinquency. Interestingly, for men, both the machismo and acceptance subscales predicted violent and non-violent delinquent behaviours, while for women only acceptance predicted non-violent delinquency. This scale, then, may be especially useful in the local context because of the conceptualisation of machismo as subscale, allowing measurement of some normative beliefs connected with violent masculinities and femininities. The acceptance subscale may also be relevant as the society evolves and western influences continue through the media. The current study was designed to provide an initial assessment of the MVQ as an instrument for measuring violence related thinking patterns among the local school population. We hypothesised that males and students from urban communities, high-risk schools, and ‘low prestige’ school types might be prone to cognitions related to violence. We theorised that schools with higher incidences of violence as reported by teachers would likely also report high rates of dysfunctional thinking. The four research questions guiding the study were:

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1. What are students’ overall performance on the scale and subscales by grade and gender? 2. What is the construct validity of the scale in the local context? 3. What are the differences on the subscales between school types, geographic location, and home communities? 4. What is the relationship with the frequency and seriousness of indiscipline as reported in the school and scores on each subscale?

THIS STUDY

Schools participating in the survey were volunteers from a pool of about 20 possible secondary schools. These were schools of administrators enrolled in the Secondary Education Modernisation Programme (SEMP) Educational Leadership M.Ed. Of the eight schools finally volunteering to take part in the study, three were denominational, two comprehensive and three Government secondary. Since students in forms 4–6 were targeted, no Junior Secondary schools were included. Seven of the schools were cited in urban and semi-urban areas. One school was located in a traditional rural community. Three schools were situated in the West, one in the East, two in the South, and one in Tobago. Only one school required a formal letter requesting permission in order to gain access; in the other schools, the SEMP administrator-researcher informally negotiated access with the site administrator. In each school, three classes were randomly chosen from the list of form 4s, 5s, and 6s. Students were required to indicate the location of their home communities, since many schools, especially those in urban areas drew their clientele from a range of localities. In each school, four–20 teachers completed the inventory and scores were averaged from each school. Seventy-eight teacher inventories were returned and 874 completed student questionnaires were returned and processed from the eight schools. The sample consisted of 470 males and 358 females. These students were primarily distributed among three form classes (Form 4 = 259; Form 5 = 468; Form 6 = 114]).

INSTRUMENTATION AND ANALYSES

The two instruments used were the MVQ completed by students and the Problem Behaviour Inventory completed by teachers. The MVQ consisted of 52 items. The original scale was obtained directly from the author. Two scoring schemes were used, a four-point scale from ‘mostly true’ to ‘mostly false’ and the original true-false dichotomy used by Walker (2005). Only scores from the latter are reported on in this paper. The problem inventory listed 25 frequent acts of school violence ranging from common minor acts to extreme acts of violence. The list also included menacing language and gender-related violence items. Teachers were asked to rate the frequency and intensity of each problem. The

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frequency scale provided ranged from ‘once a day’ to ‘never’, with a maximum score of 150. The seriousness scale ranged from ‘does not occur’ to ‘very serious’ for a maximum score of 100. It was important to measure both frequency and seriousness because these aspects of violent behaviour are sometimes disconnected. For example, while a school might report many incidents only a few might be considered as at a serious level. Data was analysed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 12 and Microsoft EXCEL. Descriptive statistics such as Means and Standard Deviations were generated along with Cohen’s d and eta-squared as measures of effective size. One-way analysis of variance was conducted using the different school types and gender. Following Walker (2005), a factor analysis using principal axis factoring with a direct oblimin procedure was employed. This procedure allowed latent variables contributing to common variance to be identified and assumed that the variables were correlated (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black 1998).

RESULTS What are students’ overall performance on the scale and subscales?

Table 6.1 provides subscale and total scores for males and females on the MVQ. As shown, males scored higher on both subscales and on total scores for males and females were significantly higher than those reported in the UK for

males (Machismo: Mean Male = 16.24; Mean Female = 12.35; Acceptance: Mean Male =

8.13; Mean Female = 8.76). The effect size measures indicated that the gap between males and females was comparatively greater for acceptance scores (Cohen’s d [Machismo] =-0.493]; Cohen’s d [Acceptance] =-0.801]. Machismo scores for males

were significantly higher than for the UK sample (Machismo: Mean UK Male = 9.23;

Mean UK Female = 5.37). By comparison, acceptance scores were comparatively lower

for both males and females (Acceptance: Mean UK Male = 10.33; Mean UK Female = 6.39). Therefore, in this sample, students were more likely to consider statements related to machismo and acceptance as true. Table 6.2 shows the scores for the three form classes surveyed in the study. As shown, while machismo and acceptance scores were similar for forms four and five, they were lower for students in form six. The Standard Deviation of the scores was also highest at Form five. This suggests that students who do well enough to enter sixth form were less likely to legitimise violence or have normative beliefs that allow violent acts.

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TABLE 6.1 SUBSCALE AND TOTAL SCORES ON THE MVQ FOR MALES AND FEMALES

Cohen’s Male Female p- total Scale d SDR value mean Mean SD No. Mean SD No. Machismo 16.243 8.222 470 12.349 7.547 358 -0.493 0.918 0.000 14.559 Acceptance 8.130 2.799 470 5.765 3.095 358 -0.801 1.106 0.000 7.108 Total 24.372 10.085 470 18.115 9.890 358 -0.627 0.981 21.667

TABLE 6.2 SUBSCALE AND TOTAL SCORES ON THE MVQ FOR FORMS 4 - 6

Form 4 Form 5 Form 6 p- Form Class Eta2 Mean SD No. Mean SD No. Mean SD No. value Machismo 14.73 7.54 259 15.22 8.50 468 10.86 6.98 114 .034 0.000 Acceptance 7.23 2.92 259 7.34 3.23 468 5.96 3.22 114 .021 0.000 Total 21.96 9.56 259 22.56 10.85 468 16.82 9.44 114 .032 0.000

TABLE 6.3 TEN HIGHEST SCORING MACHISMO QUESTIONS

Factor Factor Rank Machismo Questions Mean S.E. S.D. No. 1 2 1 Q10. If you don’t stick up for 0.721 0.015 0.449 .354 .064 873 yourself physically, you will get trodden on. 2 Q26. Men who are gentle get 0.689 0.016 0.463 .234 -.102 869 walked on. 3 Q51. It is normal for men to 0.684 0.016 0.465 .267 .048 860 want to fight. 4 Q41. Some people only 0.679 0.016 0.467 .398 -.088 866 understand when you show them through physical strength. 5 Q43. Fear is a sign of weakness. 0.637 0.016 0.481 .254 -.153 860 6 Q35. If I don’t show that I’m 0.594 0.017 0.491 .386 -.085 869 tough and strong, people will think I’m weak and pathetic. 7 Q46. If I were in a potentially 0.591 0.017 0.492 .419 -.061 863 violent situation, I would automatically confront the person threatening me. 8 Q5. Most people won’t learn 0.530 0.017 0.499 .367 -.139 872 unless you physically hurt them. 9 Q13. Sometimes you have to 0.524 0.017 0.500 .434 .088 869 use violence to get what you want. 10 Q44. It is OK to be violent if 0.507 0.017 0.500 .544 .038 864 someone threatens to damage your property.

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What is the construct validity of the scale in the local context?

The scale performed somewhat differently in the local context. Using similar criteria to Walker (2005), the first two factors explained just 22.6 per cent of the variance. Only three items clearly loaded on factor two, the acceptance subscale. These were questions 6, 27, and 40. Forty-three items loaded on factor one, the machismo subscale, and eight items did not clearly load on either of the first two subscales. These were items 2, 4, 12, 26, 33, 38, 43, and 52. Table 6.3 provides statistics on the ten highest scoring items on the machismo scale, including the loadings on factors one and two. As shown, the statements, ‘men who are gentle get walked on’ and the man as violent statement ‘it is normal for men to want to fight’ were ranked two and four respectively.

TABLE 6.4 SCHOOL TYPE, LOCATION, AND PERFORMANCE ON THE MVQ

S c Mean h Location School Type PBI PBI o Frequency Seriousness Acceptance Machismo Total o /150 /100 l Semi-Urban A 66.91 (11) 51.000 5.312 12.571 17.883 (77) Comprehensive Urban/ Semi- B Semi-Urban 74.25 (4) 27.500 8.307 15.597 23.903 (107) urban Denominational West Urban C 69.80 (10) 66.200 7.064 15.000 22.064 (141) Government Urban/ Semi- Semi-Urban D 81.81 (11) 34.546 8.336 16.195 24.531 (113) Urban Government East Urban/ Urban E 103.58 (12) 43.417 6.383 11.851 18.234 (107) Semi- Government urban Semi-Urban F 77.58 (12) 53.00 (12) 7.96 15.059 23.01 (101) South Denominational G Rural/ Comprehensive 79.95 (20) 49.500 6.415 16.915 23.329 (82) H Tobago Denominational 70.30 (10) 34.800 6.519 13.346 19.865 (133)

What is the relationship with the frequency and seriousness of indiscipline as reported in the school and scores one each subscale?

Table 6.4 shows the eight schools, school type, geographic location, and scores on the problem behaviour inventory filled out by teachers. As shown, machismo and acceptance Mean scores varied significantly across the schools (Machismo Range = 16.915–11.851; Acceptance Range = 8.307–5.312). There also appeared to be an association between mean machismo scores and the overall frequency of

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problem behaviours in the school as reported by teachers. With the exception of school E, all schools reporting high Means on teachers’ rating of the frequency of problem behaviours also reported high Means for the students’ scores on machismo. This suggests that there might be some association between violent thinking and reported acts of violence. What are the differences on the subscales between school types and geographic locations of schools and home communities?

Table 6.5 summarises the data from an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) conducted using the three classifications of school type, rurality, and geographic location. As shown, the differences between acceptance scores for all three classifications were statistically significant. Acceptance scores were highest for the denominational schools in this sample, perhaps reflecting greater access or exposure to media violence. Schools in the east and in semi-urban areas were also more likely to report higher acceptance scores.

TABLE 6.5 MEAN SCORES, P-VALUES, AND EFFECT SIZES FOR SUBSCALE AND TOTAL SCORES USING THREE SCHOOL CLASSIFICATIONS

p- Classification Mean (SD) for Groups Sub-scale/ Eta2 value School Type Comprehensive Denominational Government Sec 14.81 (8.99) 14.61 (7.98) 14.44 (7.91) Machismo .000 .887 5.88(3.27) 7.54 (2.98) 7.26 (3.14) Acceptance .036 .000 20.69 (11.54) 22.15 (10.14) 21.70 (10.19) Total .002 .339 Urban/Rural Urban Semi-urban Rural 13.641(7.45) 15.068(8.235) 14.707 (8.617) Machismo .006 .088 6.77 (3.02) 7.675(3.17) 6.479 (3.12) Acceptance .028 .000 20.411(9.62) 22.742(10.54) 21.186 (10.94) Total .010 .014 Geographic East South Tobago West Location 16.195(8.61) 14.40 (8.17) 13.35 (8.16) 14.67 (7.86) Machismo .009 .052 8.34 (3.14) 6.94 (3.07) 6.52 (3.23) 7.12 (3.11) Acceptance .026 .000 24.53(10.87) 21.34 (10.34) 19.87 (10.68) 21.79 (10.10) Total .015 .005

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TABLE 6.6 RANK OF STUDENTS FROM DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES ON MACHISMO AND ACCEPTANCE SCORES

Machismo Acceptance Rank Students Location Rank Students Location Mean No. SD Mean No. SD 1 Siparia 19.800 10 8.456 1 POS & Environs 8.160 25 2.135 2 POS & Environs 17.520 25 8.931 2 Arima & Environs 8.116 43 2.771 3 Penal & Environs 16.672 58 8.422 3 Caroni-Central 7.849 33 2.917 4 Morvant/ Laventile 16.286 42 9.115 4 Diego & Environs 7.698 96 2.707 5 Princes Town 15.421 19 9.868 5 Siparia 7.600 10 2.875 Point Fortin & 6 Caroni-Central 15.364 33 8.444 6 7.238 21 2.809 Environs 7 Arima & Environs 14.767 43 6.928 7 Tunapuna & Environs 7.235 51 3.380 Diego Martin & 8 14.333 96 6.963 8 San Fernando 7.146 41 3.190 Environs Tunapuna & 9 13.922 51 8.820 9 Morvant/ Laventile 7.024 42 3.544 Environs Point Fortin & 10 13.810 21 8.010 10 Marabella & Environs 6.843 83 3.362 Environs San Juan & Champs Fleur & 11 13.653 75 7.696 11 6.583 12 4.461 Environs Environs 13 12 Tobago 13.346 133 8.162 12 Tobago 6.519 3.228 3 13 San Fernando 13.098 41 8.027 13 Penal & Environs 6.483 58 2.957 Marabella & 14 12.337 83 6.658 14 Princes Town 6.421 19 3.237 Environs Champs Fleur & 15 11.500 12 7.574 15 San Juan & Environs 6.320 75 3.418 Environs p- p- 0.016 0.028 value value

Table 6.6 provides the Mean scores and ranking of students from 15 different communities. This data is important in the local context because most secondary schools in Trinidad and Tobago are not truly community schools and instead draw their population from a wide range of communities. This is especially true for students of the less prestigious urban institutions. The data suggests that students in both relatively rural and urban areas tended to report high machismo scores with students from Siparia and Penal and environs ranked one and three respectively. Students from traditionally labelled ‘high–risk’ communities, like Morvant, also scored highly on the machismo scale; however, students from East- West corridor communities such as San Juan and environs did not report high scores. Students from Tobago, who were treated as one large community, had low scores on both subscales. This suggests that there might be no fixed pattern of violent thinking in media stereotyped areas such as the East-West Corridor; however, problems appear to relate to specific communities and areas scattered throughout the country.

DISCUSSION

This study was designed to investigate the use of the MVQ to measure cognitions related to violence among adolescent schoolchildren in a sample of

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schools in Trinidad and Tobago. A sample of 858 form four to six students in eight schools were used. Four to 20 teachers in each school also filled out a problem behaviour inventory in order to evaluate the frequency and seriousness of violence related problems in the school. Scores on the machismo and acceptance subscales were much higher than on the UK sample and the factor analytic structure of the scale also differed. Machismo items loaded as did the UK sample; however, the acceptance items did not perform the same. Machismo appears to be a very useful subscale measuring a number of local normative beliefs. The machismo subscale was also being broadly associated with differences in school location, geographical communities and reported frequency of misbehaviour as rated by teachers. While males scored highly on the machismo subscale, notably so did many females using the scores on the UK sample as a reference. Therefore, the issue of violence-centred beliefs may be a problem for both males and females. This is a critical point because some of the work on masculinity in the Caribbean tends to suggest that violence prone attitudes and aggression are linked only with male identities (Parry 2000, Nurse 2004). Indeed, while the term masculinity is used to describe men’s lives, experiences, discourses, and concepts, the normative beliefs associated may also be found in modern feminine identities (Muncer, Campbell, Jervis and Lewis 2001). This necessitates a better understanding of how feminine identities are defined in relation to aggression within the local context. Interestingly, one explanation for the constellation of attitudes known as hypermasculinity, in which violence is conceptualised as manly, is parenting practices. Specifically, it has been argued that when parents use contempt and humiliation to socialise the emotions of fear and distress they can create an exaggerated masculine style (Mosher and Sirkin 1984). Thus, one explanation for the high scores found on the machismo subscale locally is that traditional child rearing practices in society encourage parents to teach and reinforce some maladaptive beliefs and attitudes concerning violence. For example, parents may teach and reinforce from early, social rules such as ‘Be brave, be tough, and be contemptuous of cowards.’ Therefore, if schools are to influence these patterns of thinking, they must also reach out to parents and neighbourhoods through community outreach and parenting programmes. An explanation for these findings may also be found in the subculture thesis, one version of which argues that a ‘code of the street subculture’ is pervasive in some communities (Anderson 1994, Brezina, Piquero and Mazerolle 2001). This code of the street might encourage individuals to cultivate a ‘tough’ reputation for the purpose of self-protection, with the reasoning that all transgressions against self must be avenged. More than that, students may believe that they must demonstrate a taste for violent counterattack otherwise they would be taken advantage of (Brezina et al. 2004). Such negative attitudes are reinforced in disorganised neighbourhoods and schools, where rules are absent or inconsistent. If this hypothesis is true, reform will require more than paying attention to the

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development of adolescents’ emotions and cognitions. Since wrong ideas may be reinforced in disorganised environments, the solution might be to improve the current justice and fairness climate within schools and neighbourhoods. In schools, such a goal can be achieved by paying greater attention to structural and administrative issues related to procedural and distributive justice. Rule clarity and fairness are thus appropriate targets when implementing whole school discipline policies. Although some have suggested that a subculture of violence exists only for specific communities, likely located in the East-Corridor, the data in this study indicate that dysfunctional norms and beliefs about violence are widely distributed across a number of communities, both rural and urban (Felson, Liska, South and McNulty 1994). Therefore, while hot spots may exist with students at risk for developing violent attitudes and beliefs, they may not exclusively be located in urban regions such as the East-West Corridor. Consequently, it may not be appropriate to focus interventions only in such areas. Instead, each school should assess their situation by measuring cognitions, attitudes, and behaviours associated with aggression and violence and consider these in developing and evaluating whole school interventions. The MVQ certainly appears useful in the context of Trinidad and Tobago and the problem of violent cognitions among school-aged students appears to be a significant one. It may be that many items in the MVQ tapped local cultural beliefs and feelings about how people (and especially the way in which men) should act in regards to violence. Developing school-specific programmes to redress these issues will be difficult if these deeply held beliefs are prevalent. However, for violence prevention programmes to be successful, such cognitions must be addressed explicitly, most notably in interventions designed to build social competence and emotional literacy. One broad approach might be to place a greater focus on interventions that build problem-solving, cognitions, and emotions, as part of whole-school emotional literacy programmes. The ability to regulate emotions is essential to any such programme because emotions arouse, motivate, and organise decisional processes (Fraser et al. 2005). Also critical would be helping adolescent students on their current belief patterns and scripts used in social interaction. We believe that programmes geared to developing emotionally literate, socially competent students will contribute to the overall quality of the school climate and lead to improvement in academic achievement as well. Such programmes will require schools to collaborate and build partnerships with external agencies. Appropriate targets at this level would involve helping students understand their patterns of thinking and beliefs, manage their emotions, and build communication and rapport skills (Farrell and Flannery 2006).

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REFERENCES

Anderson, E. 1994. ‘The code of the streets’. Atlantic Monthly, 81–94. Boxer, P., and Tisak, M. S. 2003. ‘Adolescents’ attributions about aggression: An initial investigation’. Journal of Adolescence, 26(5), 561–75. Brockenbrough, K. K., Cornell, D. G., and Loper, A. B. 2002. ‘Aggressive attitudes among victims of violence at school’. Education & Treatment of Children, 25(3), 273–87. Brezina, T., Piquero, A. R., and Mazerolle, P. 2001. ‘Student anger and aggressive behaviour in school: aninitial test of Agnew’s macro-level strain theory’. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 38(4), 362–86. Brener, N., Lowry, R., and Barios, L. 2004. ‘Violence-related behaviours among high school students-United States, 1991-2003’. Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report, 53(29), 651–55. Brezina, T, Agnew, R., Cullen, F. T., and Wright, J. P. 2004. ‘The code of the street: A quantitative analysis of Elijah Anderson’s subculture of violence thesis and its contribution to youth violence research’. Youth Violence & Juvenile Justice, 2(4), 303–28. Cardien, Karen. 2004. Project to reduce violence in schools now underway. Ministry of Education, Jamaica Information Service, Government of Jamaica. Available on the worldwideweb@http://www.jis.gov.jm/education/html/20040712T1200000500_3138m _JIS_PROJECT_TO_REDUCE_VIOLENCE_IN_SCHOOLS_NOW_UNDERWAY.asp. Downloaded January 22, 2006. Centre for the Prevention of School Violence (2002, May). [Newsbrief] Just what is school violence? Raleigh, NC: North Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Chevannes, P. 2004. Preliminary study in violence in Caribbean schools. Unpublished report: Change from within project, UWI and UNESCO. Connell, R. W. 1995. Masculinities. Cambridge: Polity Press. D’Andrea, M. 2004. ‘Comprehensive school-based violence prevention training: A developmental-ecological training model’. Journal of Counselling & Development, 82, 277– 86. Debarbieux, E. 2003. ‘School violence and globalisation’. Journal of Educational Administration, 4(6), 562–602. Evans, H. 2001. Inside Jamaican Schools. University of the West Indies Press: Mona. Farrell, A. D. and Flannery, D. J. 2006. ‘Youth violence: Are we there yet?’. Aggression & ViolentBehaviour, 11, 138–50. Felson, R. B., Liska, A. E., South, S. J., and McNulty, T. L. 1994. ‘The subculture of violence anddelinquency: Individual vs. school context effects’. Social Forces, 73(1), 155–73. Fraser, M. W., Galinsky, M. J., Smokowski, P. R., Day, S. H., Terzian, M. A., Rose, R. A., and Guo, S. 2005. ‘Social information-processing skills training to promote social competence and prevent aggressive behaviour in third grade’. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 6, 1,045–55. Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., and Black, W. L. 1998. Multivariate data analysis 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall International. Henry, S. 2000. ‘What is school violence? An integrated definition’. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 567: 16–29. Howard, K. A., Flora, J., and Griffin, M. 1999. ‘Violence-prevention programs in schools:

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State of thescience and implications for further research’. Applied & Preventive Psychology, 8, 197–212. Kelly, B., Longbottom, J., Potts, F., and Williamson, J. 2004. ‘Applying Emotional Intelligence: Exploring the Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies curriculum’. Educational Psychology in Practice, 20(3), 221–41. MOE, T and T 2004. National report on the development of education in Trinidad and Tobago 2004:Quality education for all young people: Challenges, trends, priorities. Port of Spain: Author. Minogue, N., Kingery, P., and Murphy, L. 1999. ‘Approaches to assessing violence among youth’. Rosslyn, VA: The Hamilton Fish National Institute on School and Community Violence’. Available on the worldwide web @ http://www.hamfish.org/pub/vio_app.pdf Downloaded March 31, 2005 Mosher, D.L., and Sirkin, M. 1984. ‘Measuring a macho personality constellation’. Journal of Research in Personality, 18, 150–63. Muncer, S., Campbell, A., Jervis, V., and Lewis, R. 2001. ‘Ladettes, social representations, and Aggression’. Sex Roles, 44, 33–44. Nurse, K. 2004. ‘Masculinities in transition: Gender and the global problématique’, in R. Reddock, ed., Interrogating Caribbean Masculinities: Theoretical and Empirical Analyses. Kingston: UWI Press, 3–37. Parry, O. 2000. Male Underachievement in high school education in Jamaica, Barbados and St.Vincent and the Grenadines. Canoe Press, UWI, Mona. Reinke, W.M., & Herman, K.C. 2002. ‘Creating school environments that deter antisocial behavioursin youth’. Psychology in the Schools, 39, 549–60. Smith, D.C., and Sandhu, D.S. 2004. ‘Toward a positive perspective on violence prevention in schools:Building connections’. Journal of Counselling & Development, 82(3), 287–93. Twemlow, S.W., Fonagy, P., Sacco, F.C., Gies, M., Evans, R., and Ewbank, R. 2001, ‘Creating a peaceful school learning environment: a controlled study of an elementary school intervention to reduce violence’. American Journal of Psychiatry, 158(5), 808–10. UNICEF 2005. Voices of Caribbean Youth: Report on the Youth Forum and on the Caribbean Regional Consultation on the UN Secretary General Study on Violence against Children. Trinidad and Tobago March 9–11, 2005. Available on the worldwide web @ www.unicef.org/ barbados/UNICEF_report_Caribbean_youth_perspectives_on_violence.doc. Downloaded January 22, 2006. Walker, J. 2005. ‘The Maudsley Violence Questionnaire: initial validation and reliability’. Personality& Individual Differences, 38, 187–201. Walker, J. and Gudjonsson, G. H. 2006. ‘The Maudsley Violence Questionnaire: Relationship to personality and self-reported offending’. Personality & Individual Differences, 40, 795– 806. Walters, G. D. 2002. ‘Current and historical content scales for the Psychological Inventory of Criminal thinking Styles (PICTS)’. Legal & Criminology Psychology, 7, 73–84. Weare, K. 2003. Developing the emotionally literate school. London: Paul Chapman. Werner, N.E., Nixon, C.L. 2005. ‘Normative Beliefs and Relational Aggression: An Investigation of the Cognitive Bases of Adolescent Aggressive Behaviour’. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 34(3), 229–43.

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NOTES

1. Jerome De Lisle, Lecturer, Measurement & Evaluation, Centre for Medical Sciences Education, Faculty of Medical Sciences, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago. 2. Graduate students in Educational Leadership.

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Juvenile There has been great concern in Trinidad and Tobago in recent years about the level of Delinquency, juvenile delinquency and the increased Juvenile Justice number of young persons within the criminal justice system on very serious and Legal criminal or capital charges. In order to Reform: determine how the legal system can best A Case for an address this phenomenon, this paper firstly Evidence-Based presents an overview of the current statutory framework for juvenile justice in Trinidad Approach and Tobago. It then posits that evidence- Betsy Ann Lambert Peterson based research should be used to inform policy for an adequate and effective juvenile justice system in Trinidad and Tobago. In support of this hypothesis, the paper focuses on the process followed in England and Wales before the final warning scheme was implemented there. The final warning scheme was chosen as an illustration because it is a well-documented example of theory and empirical evidence being utilised to inform decision-making, leading to changes in legislation and legal processes. Since our society is markedly different from that of England and Wales any changes ultimately made to our juvenile justice legislation and legal processes must take into consideration the societal reality of Trinidad and Tobago.

CURRENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE

Section 12 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act1 provides that the Common Law, Doctrines of Equity and Statutes that were in force in England on March 1, 1848 shall be deemed to have been in force in Trinidad as from that date, and in Tobago as

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from January 1, 1889. Since the nineteenth century therefore, the law provided that children and young persons were to be treated differently from adults within the criminal justice system in Trinidad and in Tobago. The need to balance issues of a young offender’s welfare against considerations of justice for the wider society accounts for the difference in treatment. The main statute that deals with juvenile justice in Trinidad and Tobago is the Children Act2. This statute defines a child as a person under the age of 14 years and a young person as a person 14 years or upwards and under the age of 16 years, a juvenile, therefore, is someone under the age of 16 years3. The term ‘juvenile’ is not expressly defined in the Children Act, but it provides that a Court in which a Magistrate hears charges against or applications relating to children and young persons shall be referred to as a Juvenile Court4. Such a Court should either occupy a different building or room from that in which the usual sittings of the District Court are held. The usual practice is that sittings of juvenile courts take place either on specific days of the week or at specific times of day, which are different from those at which the regular sitting of the courts are held. The Juvenile Court is not open to the general public, only persons directly concerned with a matter may attend5. The media may attend, unless specifically excluded by the Magistrate. They may not publish anything, which may serve to identify the juvenile, except with the permission of the Court6. Juvenile Courts are of summary jurisdiction and as such their sittings take place in each of the 13 magisterial districts of Trinidad and Tobago. The Community Service Orders Act7 introduced a system for community-based sanctions as alternatives to custody for certain first time offenders or perpetrators of petty crimes who attained age 16 years. This legislation was influenced by theoretical insights offered by criminologists. There was concern that imprisonment of first time offenders for petty offences that involved no violence or injury to any person may expose that offender to hardened criminals and lead to a cycle of criminal activity upon the release of the first time offender - posing a greater danger to society. This is particularly true of juvenile offenders. Magistrates openly embrace this alternative to incarceration since we had long sought a wider choice of sentencing options. The Children (Amendment) Act 20008 (which is yet to be proclaimed) proposes that the definitions for ‘child’ and ‘young person’ be amended to allow conformity with the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. When the Children (Amendment) Act becomes law, Juvenile Courts in Trinidad and Tobago will be able to hear cases concerning persons between the ages of 16 and 18 years. Juvenile Courts will be able to utilise the Community Services Orders Act so that juvenile offenders can maintain their family ties during their period of rehabilitation and can be seamlessly re-integrated into society at the successful conclusion of the rehabilitation period. The minimum standards for juvenile justice can be found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 that was ratified by Trinidad and Tobago on December

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5, 1991 and came into force on January 4, 1992. The Convention operates as an umbrella for the United Nations Guidelines for the Administration of Juvenile Delinquency (‘the Riyadh Guidelines’), the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Protection of Juvenile Justice (‘the Beijing Rules’) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty9. The Beijing Rules provides that the lowest age of criminal responsibility ‘shall not be fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.’10 The doli incapax rule is an irrebuttable presumption that a child of less than seven years old is innocent of criminal intent; cannot be held legally responsible for its actions and so cannot be charged with a criminal offence. There is also a rebuttable presumption that a child between the ages of seven and 14 is not capable of committing a criminal offence, unless evidence establishes that such a child had sufficient intelligence and experience to know the nature and consequences of the conduct and to appreciate that it was wrong. In Trinidad and Tobago, the English common law, (incorporating the doli incapax rule), still applies and the lowest age of criminal responsibility remains at seven years.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Delinquent behaviour does not necessarily involve, but may include, criminal behaviour. Decisions made by adults in homes and at school impact the lives of juveniles, yet juveniles are seldom consulted. The resulting feeling of helplessness and marginalisation may provoke acts of delinquency such as ‘acting out’ at home and school, truancy, promiscuity and running away from home. In addition, an increasing number of young persons in Trinidad and Tobago socialise outside of, rather than within, their family or home circle. As a result, their peers (or the ‘gang’) hold greater sway with them than their parents or family members. It is among their peers that they manage to assuage the feelings of helplessness and marginalisation.

ENGLAND AND WALES

There was a well-established practice11 that children and young offenders were diverted from the criminal justice system by the use of informal police warnings and cautions rather than formal prosecutions. The use of informal police warnings had advantages, such as the ability to deal expeditiously with less serious offenders, to divert such offenders from the formal justice process, to reduce their likelihood of re-offending and to ensure that they had no criminal record. In England and Wales in the early 1990s there was societal concern about persistent young offenders against whom the courts and the police seemed powerless. In 1992, the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee set up an Inquiry into issues affecting juvenile offenders.12 The societal concern turned

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to outrage in 1993 at the murder of two-year-old James Bulger by two ten-year- old children. Notwithstanding the public outcry and media frenzy, there was no rush to make hasty legislative amendments. In 1994, the Home Office issued a circular13 recommending that a person should be afforded a maximum of one informal police caution only, unless the offences were trivial and/or there had been a significant lapse of time between offences. The circular had the objective of discouraging the use of police cautions in inappropriate cases, discouraging the use of repeat cautioning and increasing consistency in the use of cautioning between police forces. The Audit Commission for Local Authorities and the National Health Service in England and Wales ‘oversees the external audit of local authorities, probation services, police forces (except the Metropolitan Police Force) and National Health Service agencies. As part of this function, the Commission is required to undertake studies to enable it to make recommendations for improving the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of services provided by these bodies; and it is required to comment on the effects of statutory provisions or guidance by central government on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of these agencies.’14 In 1996, it published a national report,15 the objective of which was to make recommendations for improving the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the agencies that deal with young offenders. At the core of its recommendations were multi-agency crime prevention initiatives to be undertaken by the local government authorities. It recommended that savings made from the efficient processing of young offenders could finance such preventative services.16 This was borne out by its assessment of the financial cost of prosecuting young offenders. In 1997, the Home Office published a consultation paper entitled ‘Tackling Youth Crime.’17 This consultation paper identified early involvement in the formal criminal justice system as a strong indicator that youngsters would emerge as serious and persistent young offenders. The paper stressed the effectiveness of early intervention in the lives of children and young persons whose behaviour shows them at risk of becoming criminals. Such early intervention was expected to prevent involvement of juveniles in the formal criminal justice system. The reprimand and final warning scheme was outlined as a means of timely and effective intervention to be followed, where necessary, by ‘significant punishment.’ The ‘No More Excuses’18 White Paper, that followed two months after, relied on the research findings from the ‘Misspent Youth’19 report in coming to the conclusion that the great majority of young offenders commit offences only once or twice. In those cases, a warning by the police was often the most effective way of preventing young offenders from further re-offending. It advocated appropriate early intervention. Research and analysis formed the basis for the legislative reform that saw the eventual introduction of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This statute placed an

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early intervention programme for young offenders at the heart of the reform of the juvenile justice system in England and Wales.

THE CRIME AND DISORDER ACT 199820

The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 defined a new statutory arrangement for pre- court diversion for young offenders, known as the final warning scheme. It is a structured programme of early intervention by means of police reprimands and final warnings, intended to put an end to repeat police cautioning and, ultimately, repeat offending. The early intervention is based on risk assessments related to known criminogenic factors, the systematic use of evidence-based practice, the needs of victims and the promotion of crime prevention measures. The underlying presumption of the final warning scheme is that a rehabilitation or change programme will be appropriate in cases where a young person had previously been given a warning. The intention of the change programme is to confront young persons who receive a final warning with the consequence of their offending behaviour as a precondition to their effecting a change from that behaviour. Prior to the coming into force of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the Home Office established nine youth justice pilot projects. The Youth Justice Board21 is responsible for monitoring the operation of the youth justice system and the work of the multi-agency Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) in England and Wales. National Standards to Youth Justice (National Standards) was introduced as the required standard of practice to which all agencies, engaged in youth justice work, but especially YOTs, were expected to adhere. A YOT comprises such agencies as police, probation and social services, in addition to education and health authorities. These are agencies identified for effective community-based intervention when children or young people first offend. The YOT is the focus of inter-agency work between all youth justice agencies, individuals and professional groups. The Home Office and the Youth Justice Board continually revise the guidance on the operation of the final warning scheme22 in order to address the issues that arose during the pilot project phase and to take into consideration legislation that had been passed subsequent to the Crime and Disorder Act.

THE FINAL WARNING SCHEME

In England and Wales, when a young person is arrested the police decide whether to proceed informally or formally. The young person can be reprimanded, given a final warning or prosecuted. The police can make this decision with or without a prior assessment of the young offender by the local YOT. If the police request a prior assessment, National Standards requires that the YOT must provide the police with a report within ten working days of the referral23. The primary purpose of the prior assessment is to enable the YOT to explore the likelihood of the young person engaging with a rehabilitation programme. During the prior

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assessment, the YOT is also encouraged to consider restorative processes as well as the nature and content of an appropriate rehabilitation programme.

FORMAL ACTION

Pursuant to the Crime and Disorder Act, a young offender is eligible to receive a reprimand for a first offence, if that offence is assessed as being within a prescribed range of gravity. This is followed by a final warning in the event that he or she re- offends.24 The gravity assessment of some offences may result in a young offender, in some instances, being finally warned for a first offence.25 In order for the police to consider a reprimand or final warning, the evidence against the young person must be sufficient to give a realistic prospect of conviction if he or she were charged. The young person must admit guilt and must not have previously been convicted of an offence. In addition, the police must have reached a decision that prosecution of the young person is not in the public interest.26 The police may make a decision to prosecute a young person depending on that youngster’s history of offending, the seriousness of the offence and whether a warning is sufficient to prevent re-offending. A gravity assessment of the offence must be undertaken by a police officer in accordance with the gravity assessment instrument.27 This is comprised of an assessment profile, a risk of serious harm form and a self-assessment form. The primary reason for the introduction of the gravity assessment instrument was the need to ensure consistency in the assessment of young persons at each stage of the youth justice system. The police are then required to state the gravity score on the referral form, which is sent to the YOT. The National Standards28 requires the police to refer a young offender to a YOT within one day of issuing the final warning, in order that he or she is assessed with respect to the appropriateness of a rehabilitation programme of intervention. Unless a member of a YOT was present at the time the final warning was issued, the YOT is required to contact young persons who have been warned within five working days of a final warning.29 The YOT is required to provide an intervention programme to address the young person’s offending behaviour and prevent future re-offending in each case.30 To develop a programme for every offender is a huge task. To assist YOTs in their assessment of a young offender, the Youth Justice Board developed an assessment profile named ASSET. The YOT is required by the National Standards for Youth Justice to complete the Core ASSET after interviewing the young person, his or her family and, if necessary, the victim. The Core ASSET comprises the core profile, a risk of serious harm form and a self-assessment form. This promotes consistent assessment of the needs of young people and the degree of risk they pose to themselves and others when they enter and leave the youth justice system, no matter which part of the country they live.

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INFORMAL ACTION

In ‘exceptional circumstances’ (such as minor offences or antisocial behaviour that falls short of criminal activity) the police may exercise their discretion to take informal action such as giving firm advice to a young person and his or her parents.

WHAT WORKS IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Research in England and Wales identified six key components to an effective juvenile justice system. These are a statutory mechanism for making a targeted intervention once a young person has begun to offend, confronting young offenders with the consequences of their offending behaviour, delivering swift justice, effecting punishment on the young offender that is proportionate to the offence, ensuring that the offender provides reparation to victim and re- enforcement of parental responsibility for the actions of their children or charges. The present statutory framework for juvenile justice in Trinidad and Tobago does not reflect these components. Research will have to be undertaken in Trinidad and Tobago, to determine the key components necessary to make our juvenile justice system effective and to prevent juveniles who have committed criminal offences from committing further offences. The key objectives, once identified, should be included in our legislation in order to emphasise their importance to all the agencies and individuals working within the juvenile justice system. The Trinidad and Tobago economy is based on the high-income earners of the petrochemical and natural gas industries, yet issues such as poverty, unemployment, crime and violence are a part of day-to-day existence for many people. Juvenile offenders are drawn disproportionately from the most marginalised members of society. One of the central tenets of evidence-based practice is the inclusion of service users and/or service user views since benefit to service-users is its raison d’etre. In the context of juvenile justice, inclusion of service users would involve treating young people as part of the solution not part of the problem. In order to include and respond to the needs of juvenile offenders in Trinidad and Tobago issues of social justice must be addressed and, where possible, be incorporated into legislation. Social justice in this context refers to reducing poor education and health outcomes, the reduction of drug misuse, ensuring that juvenile offenders have somewhere to live on release from the Youth Training Centre and the ability to gain employment notwithstanding a criminal record. As noted above,31 the Audit Commission assessed the financial cost of prosecuting young offenders and recommended that savings made from efficient processing of young offenders could finance preventative services. A 1995 UNICEF-sponsored survey in Trinidad and Tobago revealed that the estimated cost of a single offender

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spending six months in prison including the costs of arrest by police, five court appearances and loss of income totalled TT $42,216 (US$7,179)32. In England and Wales, consultation papers, white papers, national reports, national standards and guidelines are all readily available online. In Trinidad and Tobago, there is need for a similar structured and open approach to commissioning, undertaking and disseminating research on all aspects of the juvenile justice system. To that end, the research must be well designed, well performed and relevant. The framing of the research question is key so that the objective of the study is not ambiguous. The agency or agencies chosen to undertake the research must provide dispassionate evaluation of the data and present their findings in such a way that members of the general public can readily understand the issues and the proposed solutions. Without this, there may be a difficulty in implementing a particular approach or agenda.

CONCLUSION

The juvenile justice system has the unenviable position of being located at the intersection of the social welfare/social services system and the criminal justice system. One of the most difficult areas of criminal justice policy lies in providing appropriate legal mechanisms to reflect the transition from the age of innocence through to maturity and full responsibility under the criminal law. This paper does not advocate the introduction of the Final Warning Scheme in Trinidad and Tobago. The Final Warning Scheme has very laudable objectives, but it is highly regulated and has been the subject of much criticism. Even before the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 received Royal Assent, it was suggested that giving young people an opportunity to change and take responsibility for their action is a task that often takes more than the one intervention that is afforded by the Crime and Disorder Act..33 Bell et al. (1999) argued that offending takes a variety of paths and the Final Warning Scheme appeared too inflexible a response to the wide range of offenders. Their criticism was borne out by the evaluation of the Pilot Projects where a number of young offenders were assessed to have needs that extended well beyond the parameters of a change programme. Holdaway et al. (2001).34 noted that because the change programme focussed on offending behaviour, there was no opportunity to provide assistance to any other needs of the offender. In such circumstances, failure to complete a change programme was almost inevitable. Although failure to complete a change programme is not an offence, it can be cited in court in the event of a young offender’s prosecution for a subsequent offence. While there is no official policy of diversion of young offenders from court in Trinidad and Tobago, this nevertheless takes place by way of informal police warnings. Before most ‘beyond control’35 applications are brought before the Magistrates’ Courts, the guardian or parent would usually have taken the young person to the police station in his or her district. There, the police would, in the

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exercise of their discretion, give advice to the young person and his or her parents, where necessary. The existing juvenile justice system requires re-examination. Each task that must be performed to ensure that the system works for the victim and the community, as well as the juvenile who has offended or is alleged to have offended, should be identified. Only those tasks that work should be retained in a revamped juvenile justice system. All juvenile justice agencies, individuals, professional groups and policymakers need to be aware of and rely on research findings to determine what causes juveniles to start to offend. The National Youth Policy36 proposes the establishment of a public service organisation called the Youth Crime and Violence Unit. It is intended that this Unit will research and analyse the causes and extent of youth crime and violence; develop solutions for youth crime and violence; provide counselling and rehabilitation for young offenders and victims of youth crime and violence and assist young people in alternatives to crime and violence. In order to improve the juvenile justice system, problems within that system must first be identified. Decisions about how to address those problems should then be based on sound theory supported by empirical evidence. Are crime and delinquency data collected, recorded and stored in ways to facilitate their analysis for problem-solving purposes? Has research been conducted to determine what works in the juvenile justice system in Trinidad and Tobago? Is there research literature that identifies the factors that facilitate re-offending? What causes young offenders to desist from offending? Can research done regionally and internationally about young people and crime be applied to any aspect of the Trinidad and Tobago situation? These few questions serve to show that, initially, when embarking upon evidence-based research, there are more questions than answers.

NOTES

1. The Revised Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, Chapter 4:01 2. The Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, Children Act Chapter 46:01 3. The Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, Children Act Chapter 46:01 section 2 4. The Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, Children Act Chapter 46:01 section 87(1) 5. The Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, Children Act chapter 46:01 section 98 6. The Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, Children Act chapter 46:01 section 87(4) 7. Act number 19 of 1997 8. Act number 68 of 2000 9. G. Van Bueren, United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, Defence for Children International, 1995 p. 1 10. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Protection of Juvenile Justice, Resolution 40/33, November 29, 1985 Rule 4.1 11. Home Office, The Cautioning of Offenders, circular14/1985 and Home Office, The Cautioning of Offenders, circular 59/1990

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12. J. Graham and B. Bowling, Young People and Crime, Home Office Research and Planning Unit, Home Office, 1995 p. 1 13. Home Office, The Cautioning of Offenders, circular18/1994 14. Audit Commission, Misspent Youth…Young People and Crime London, Audit Commission, 1997 15. Ibid., Misspent Youth…Young People and Crime London, Audit Commission, 1997 16. Ibid., Misspent Youth…Young People and Crime London, Audit Commission, 1997 17. Home Office, Tackling Youth Crime: A Consultation Paper, London HMSO 1997 18. Home Office, No More Excuses – A New Approach to Tackling Crime in England and Wales (Cm 3809) London HMSO 1997 19. supra, n. 14 p. 8 20. www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980037.htm 21. www.youth-justice-board.gov.u k/YouthJusticeBoard/ 22. www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/final-warning-scheme.pdf?view=Binary www.police.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-publications/publication/operational- policing/final_warning.pdf?view=Binary 23. Home Office, Final Warning Scheme: Guidance for the Police, London, Home Office, 2000 24. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Chapter 37 HMSO section 65(3)(5) 25. Ibid.,(4) 26. Ibid.,(1) 27. Home Office, Final Warning Scheme: Guidance for the Police, London, Home Office, 2000 28. Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, National Standards for Youth Justice, London, Youth Justice Board, 2000 29. Ibid. 30. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 Chapter 37 HMSO section 66(2) 31. supra. n.14 32. H. Thompson-Ahye, Juvenile Justice: An Oxymoron in the Caribbean? In C. Barrow, Children’s Rights Caribbean Realities, Ian Randle Publishers, Jamaica, 2001, p. 46 33. A. Bell, M. Hodgson and S. Pragnell, Diverting Children and Young People from Crime and the Criminal Justice System in B. Goldson, Youth Justice: Contemporary Policy and Practice, Aldershot, Ashgate, 1999, p.104 34. S. Holdaway, N. Davidson, J. Dignan, R. Hammersley, J. Hine and P Marsh, New Strategies to Address Youth Offending: The National Evaluation of the Pilot Youth Offending Teams, Home Office Research Development and Statistics Occasional Paper 69, London, Home Office, 2001 www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/occ69-newstrat.pdf 35. The Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, Children Act Chapter 46:01 section 44(4)(a) 36. National Youth Policy Task Force, National Youth Policy, The Government Printery, 2005, p.62

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Juvenile INTRODUCTION Delinquency in This paper on juvenile delinquency arises Trinidad and from an ongoing research project2 in Trinidad and Tobago3 entitled ‘Juvenile Tobago: Justice, Research and Policy’ conducted by Challenges for the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Social Policy Justice, University of the West Indies (St and Caribbean Augustine Campus). As a discipline, criminology has a relatively young existence Criminology1 at the University and the region as a whole.4 Ramesh Deosaran and There is deep, widespread concern over Derek Chadee crime and its attendant problems across the Caribbean. However, attempts at systematic, sustained research in criminology have only recently begun. While there is an abundant literature on delinquency in North America and other parts of the world (e.g., Binder et al. l997, Jensen and Rojek l992, Weis et al. l996), this paper is not geared to provide a review of such literature. Rather, the paper seeks, as an initial part of an ongoing project, to find out what kinds of youths are placed in the juvenile homes of a Caribbean country (Trinidad and Tobago) and what promise these youths hold for rehabilitation. It is hoped that with such data, and apart from practical applications, some theory construction and cross-cultural comparisons on juvenile delinquency could subsequently emerge. Further, while no systematic data has been collected on the relationship, it is felt that many of the delinquents in these juvenile homes continue to become ‘hardened’ criminals later on and quite often end up in the adult prison (Pryce 1976, Sampson 1994). Notwithstanding the

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relatively modest objective of this paper, some brief comments on pertinent literature in the Caribbean are useful for contextualising this particular paper.

CARIBBEAN CRIMINOLOGY: A BRIEF LOOK

There have been some work on the historical (e.g., Trotman l986), institutional (e.g., Chadee l996, Deosaran l985) and socio-political (e.g., Headley l996, King l997, Mahabir l985) aspects of crime in the Caribbean. The illegal drug trade has also received recent attention (Griffith l997). Other researchers in several Caribbean countries have begun basic research in police performance and crime (e.g., Bennett and Lynch l996, Harriott l997) and poverty and crime (Deosaran l998, World Bank l997). Circumscribing much of this work has been a repeated quest for a ‘Caribbean Criminology’ (Bennett and Lynch l996, Cain l996, Pryce l976). Such quest, however, as persuasive as it is, has generally been at a rather macro-level, or largely polemical (e.g., Pryce l976) still requiring specific lines of sustained research. The pioneering work by Bennett et al. is providing a cumulative understanding of the macro social and economic conditions which may affect the rate of particular crimes in some Caribbean territories. Their own appeal for micro analyses is also noteworthy. However, delinquency has not been identified as a priority area, except in the case of Cain’s exploratory analysis which focused on the administrative anomalies within the juvenile justice system in Trinidad and Tobago (1996). Indeed, in their paper entitled, ‘Towards a Caribbean Criminology,’ Bennett and Lynch (l996, 31) wrote: ‘If we are to develop a generative approach to the construction of a Caribbean Criminology with special attention to linkages across levels of analysis, we must begin to collect data which is appropriate to such analysis.’ Touching on methodology, Arthur and Marenin (l995) proposed several reasons why approaches to criminological explanations in developing countries should be different from those used in developed countries. They emphasised the ‘case study’ approach as most useful for examining crime in the Caribbean. Attacking the relevance of ‘traditional’ criminology to the Caribbean, Pryce (1976, 5) stated:

The neglect of the study of crime is particularly hard to justify in the Third World context of the Caribbean where it is generally recognised that a relationship exists between modernisation and crime...A theoretical foundation for a Caribbean Criminology can be found in the perspective of the New Criminology...Among traditionalists, there is also the tendency towards the interpretation of crime and delinquency in purely quantitative and statistical terms, because of the need to appear “scientific” in the presentation of evidence.

It seems that a conceptual and empirical grip on ‘crime in the Caribbean’ generally is indeed considered a priority, but with the implicit assumption that

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more focused attention would flow down to delinquency and youth crimes. This may be a mixed blessing. We may learn from the shortcomings of others. The picture of theory and research as it has developed elsewhere does have its grey areas, especially in the area of delinquency and youth crimes. For example, in their attempt to find some order into the existing research on family and delinquency, Wells and Rankin (l991,71) felt compelled to state: ‘Although the empirical evidence on broken homes and delinquency is large and diverse, it is surprisingly incomplete and disappointingly inconclusive.’ As the theoretical perspective fluctuates from the micro to the macro, from the radical to the conservative, from the sociological to the psychological, policy makers and indeed young researchers experience some discomfort with the range of competing theories of crime. Theories of delinquency in particular range from a structural, social conflict premise to the self-restraint model posed by Gottfredson and Hirschi (l990) with a number of in-between ones - social psychological in essence - such as differential association and strain theories. The self-restraint model, essentially a very parsimonious expression of moral individualism, has recently achieved surprising popularity given the prominence of opposing, more widely-framed structural theories. In assessing the relative value of development and general theories of crime and delinquency, Paternoster and Brame (l997, 49) concluded:

We find that the evidence is not faithful to either a pure/static model of or a pure developmental model of crime. Our findings appeal to a theoretical middle ground that assumes that pathways to crime are more similar than different and that allows for a causal effect of past offending and life experiences on future criminality.

These shifts are worthy of note by Caribbean researchers not only for framing a Caribbean Criminology but also for seeking cross-cultural comparisons. Regarding cross-cultural research, Cohen and Short (1958, 22), many years ago, made the point:

It is probable that delinquent subcultures have distinct emphases in different societies and these can be related to differences in the respective social systems of which they are the products. Comparative research in the sociology of delinquent subcultures is to be most strongly encouraged for it is bound to highlight aspects of delinquent behaviour in the American scene which we are prone to overlook and to make them to be object of theoretical concern.

This paper is a preliminary attempt to help heal this cross-cultural gap. There is a related issue of which Caribbean researchers should take note. Some existing theories in criminology are not so distinct from one another. For example, some brands of ‘radical criminology’ themselves are not without functionalist underpinnings. Others have some room for theoretical integration. For example,

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differential association has not made as much use as it should of ‘opportunity.’ If it did, the theory would have entered the realm of social psychology by more fully mixing individual or group dispositions with a situational variable (Merton 1997, 522). The thrust towards synthesis is also notable. For example, in linking differential association and anomie theories of crime, Merton (l997, 524) recently said:

Sutherland had himself moved towards a convergence between the two theories and partly anticipated in undeveloped sociological form the clear-cut Cloward and Ohlin theoretical advance of supplementing the concept of differential access to the legitimate opportunity structure with the concept of differential access to the illegitimate opportunity structure.

As it enters the murky waters of criminological theorising, Caribbean research should therefore be quite cautious in its quest for quick success. Of course, given the complex, multi-faceted nature of crime and delinquency, it is possible, as it has been in other places, for different types of crime to be governed to some extent by different theories, even in the Caribbean. There is, of course, a current debate over general theory versus multiple pathways towards delinquency (e.g., Paternoster and Brame l997). In any case, we believe that whatever form or shape a ‘Caribbean Criminology’ eventually takes, it will not be entirely immune or so distinct from theory already developed elsewhere. It will be more likely a matter of theoretical integration, without re-inventing the wheel. The challenge will, however, be the extent and the direction to which Caribbean data drives such integration. Indeed, in the absence of local research, much American literature/research work has been used over the years for popular interpretation of ‘delinquent subcultures’ in the Caribbean. The value of the present work on delinquency may therefore be helpful in providing a localised lens. It is, however, useful to emphasise at this stage that while the quest for a ‘Caribbean Criminology’ may be quite commendable and welcome, the ambitious journey must be travelled with patience and sustained effort. It will be counter-productive to rush into an embracing ‘Caribbean’ theory or theories on a platform of polemics without patiently gathering and letting the cumulative data speak as eloquently as they could. This is especially so when the link between development (and modernisation) is still so tenuous (Arthur and Marenin l995). In fact, Caribbean Criminology may not be as distinctly ‘Caribbean’ as currently expected. For example, it may bear a strong resemblance to crime phenomena in other developing countries (Arthur and Marenin l995). The Caribbean itself may have to face the situation that crime is a multi-dimensional social phenomenon and as such, one embracing theory cannot suffice without the risks of ignoring many of its contributing tributaries.

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THE POLITICS OF RESEARCH

The thrust towards a Caribbean Criminology faces practical problems other than professional research interest and theoretical interpretation. The very debilitating scarcity of research-funding agencies and the almost exclusive reliance on Government funds (mixed with favour and political patronage) in the Caribbean have produced serious difficulties for initiating and sustaining research programmes in crime, delinquency and other sensitive social issues (e.g., Deosaran l998). This pressing, unpalatable circumstance (that is, the politics of funding), though quite critical, has not received any treatment so far in the literature on Caribbean Criminology. Its mention here is to help broaden the evolving picture of Caribbean research in crime and delinquency. Political expediency and the government’s proclivity for short-term, action- oriented research on crime have aggravated and continue to aggravate the difficulties facing Caribbean researchers who are bent on implementing sustained research programmes which may not necessarily produce ‘quick-fix’ policies. Naturally, the empirical growth and theoretical integrity of Caribbean Criminology will be affected by the uneasy tension now existing between pure and applied research, the latter being in high favour by the political directorates who are now, directly or indirectly, the chief funders of crime and delinquency research projects in the Caribbean. The research programmes at the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice at the University of the West Indies (St Augustine Campus) seek to incorporate an applied, policymaking component.5 But even so, the political accommodation is not as facilitating as it should be. In an overview of this problem, Barlow notes in his book, Crime and Public Policy (l995, 18–19):

Pouring enormous resources into policing and penal institutions, especially at the expense of early intervention prevention programs, amounts to trying to cap a flooding water pipe without turning off the valve. Instead of trying to find ways to improve reactive individual-centred programmes, policy research is aimed at identifying the structural sources of crime and criminalisation – which means also identifying the political obstacles to change...The story of criminal justice reformism is one of experience ignored, fragmented experimentation, and avoidance of strategic planning. For example, long after learning how hopeless the rehabilitation ideal becomes when prisons are massive and overcrowded warehouses, policy-makers persist in building and filling more big prisons...Despite the many impressive “commissions” set up to address all facets of “the crime problem” no overall strategy has ever resulted - especially not one that goes beyond lamenting racism, poverty, and other “social factors.”

This summary is quite pertinent to the Caribbean. In short, the extent to which Caribbean research on crime and delinquency continues to be politically- driven and vastly under-funded will tend to have prohibitive effects on theory

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development. This is an issue closely related to, but not identical with, the well- known tension which exists between academic research and policymakers. Without completely disbanding the need for short-term research output, the challenge for Caribbean researchers is to persuade the political directorates that sustained, long-term research can also produce ‘action-oriented’ policies and as such with greater viability in the end. In fact, in Trinidad during the last general election campaign in l995, the political party (United National Congress) now in government had made ‘fighting crime’ its number one platform pledge. Even so, it has not established any particular research fund to support this priority anti-crime pledge. Crime continues to be a highly politicised and controversial issue in the many small states of the Caribbean. This situation no doubt contributes to the fact that even the private sector, itself closely dependent on government policies, is quite reluctant to lend financial support to crime or delinquency research projects except where these carry a large charity component, and free from any controversy. Caribbean Criminology is therefore faced with some practical problems which naturally adversely affect the professional research agenda and the quest for patient theoretical development.

GOVERNMENT REPORTS

Given the widespread concern over youth crimes and delinquency across the region, the political directorate has felt compelled to show some policy interest in juvenile delinquency (e.g., Ministry of Social Development 1994, 1997). In the last five years, however, in the midst of widespread public concern over the ‘problems of youth,’ the Government appointed a committee to examine and report on the plight of situationally-distressed youths (Ministry of Social Development l994). In l996, the Government appointed another committee to examine the role of the country’s children homes (Ministry of Social Development l997). While the former report generally examined delinquency rates, treatment of delinquents and the kinds of generic programmes available, there was no systematic attempt to produce a sharpened, sociological or social psychological profile of each youth so as to facilitate a viable means of either institutional reform or youth rehabilitation. The second report dealt mainly with the management problems of children homes and again without providing any social or psychological data on the youthful inmates at these homes. What these reports did, and quite usefully, was to highlight in a general way the myriad of problems which these children homes and their inmates face. It is also useful to note that while, 18 years ago, an attempt was made to obtain a data profile of adult prisoners (Abdullah Report l980), there is no comparable published data on the population within the juvenile homes. Overall then, no data-based theory of delinquency, however tentative, is available in the Caribbean. However,

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newspaper commentaries and political statements on youth crime and delinquency are abundant, quite often far ahead of the actual delinquency rate itself. In other words, it seems that whatever policies the public agencies intend to pursue in delinquency control, prevention or rehabilitation, they do not as yet have a sufficiently viable, analytical basis for strategic implementation whereby systematic monitoring, evaluation and accountability can be maintained. The following summary by Weis et al. (l996, 23) is quite pertinent to the Caribbean:

If you ask people whether juvenile delinquency is a growing menace to society, most will offer the opinion that it is a bigger and worse problem than it used to be. If you ask them who is responsible for the apparent increases in juvenile crime, they will most likely describe juvenile offenders who live in the city and are poor, minority group members of gangs who deal in drugs and violence.

Those public perceptions of the magnitude and characteristics of juvenile delinquency are often wrong, simply because they are usually based on unreliable and inaccurate information, collected unsystematically from a variety of unofficial sources, including personal experiences, the media, conversations with friends, the sound bites of politicians, and other sources of impressions. Criminology cannot rely on such subjective “measures” of the volume and nature of juvenile offences or offenders. The scientific study of juvenile delinquency requires rigorous, objective, systematic and accurate observation or measurement. To develop more valid explanations of delinquent behaviour and more effective control and prevention efforts, we need to identify and describe the facts about juvenile delinquency as precisely as possible.

THE STUDY

This paper seeks to provide some basic sociological and social psychological data on the population of inmates at three juvenile homes in one Caribbean country, Trinidad and Tobago. The paper also looks at the practical implications of these results and offers some policy recommendations. The paper seeks a ‘ground-up’ theory construction, that is, by first gathering the raw social and social psychological data on these youths. The present study therefore is a modest attempt to help fill a gap in delinquency theory and research in the Caribbean, and as well, to help contextualise such data into the wider social, economic and political conditions of the society. This paper therefore pursues two related issues:

(1) What kind of youths are more likely to enter these juvenile homes? and, (2) What possibilities are there for rehabilitation?

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THE COUNTRY AND THE DELINQUENCY SAMPLE

Trinidad and Tobago has a multi-ethnic population of approximately 1.2 million, including 20 per cent between the ages of ten and 19.6 Persons of African descent comprise 39.6 per cent, East Indians 40.3 per cent, Mixed 18.4 per cent, White 0.6 per cent and others about one per cent (Census Data l990). While the overall unemployment rate is now about 15 per cent (down from 21 per cent in l995), there is a 40 per cent unemployment rate among the 15-24 age group. In fact, several relief and trade programmes have been developed over the years to respond or at least mitigate the effects of this youth unemployment rate. As an indication of delinquency trends in the country, the official records show that while the number of juvenile offences (for persons under 16 years of age) was 322 in 1986, the number in 1995 decreased to 287.7 In fact, for the ten- year period 1986-95, this total number of juvenile offences was 2,989, an average of 300 per year. The records show that ‘destitution’ (that is, no parent or other fit person to provide for youth) comprised over 30 per cent of such juvenile ‘offences.’8 Further, 680 of the 2,989 offences for this ten-year period was ‘beyond control.’ It is noteworthy that while the average ‘beyond control’ figure for the ten-year period was 68 per year, in 1995 alone it was 147. The placing of youths in these juvenile homes is subject to law (e.g., Children Act, 46:01) and usually is part of a judicial process in which a probation report sometimes is expected to play a part. Youths are generally sent to these homes through ‘orders’ (e.g., for safety) or through what is in effect a sentence. For example, the Children Act (46:01) states:

Where a youthful offender is charged before the High Court or before a Magistrate with an offence punishable in the case of an adult by imprisonment, and in the opinion of the Court...such youthful offender is ten years of age or upwards but less than sixteen years of age, the Court, if satisfied on enquiry that it is expedient so to deal with the youthful offender, may order him to be sent to a certified Industrial School. (Section 43)

Section (83) states:

Where a child or young person charged with any offence is tried by any court, and the court is satisfied of his guilt, the court shall take into consideration the manner in which, under the provisions of this or any other Act enabling the court to deal with the case, the case should be dealt with, namely, whether – (a) by dismissing the charge; (b) by discharging the offender on his entering into a recognisance; (c) by so discharging the offender and placing him under the supervision of a welfare officer (probation); (d) by committing the offender to the care of a relative or other fit person; (e) by sending the offender to an Industrial School;

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(f) by sending the offender to an Orphanage; (g) by ordering the offender to be whipped; (h) by ordering the offender to pay a fine, damages, or costs; (i) by ordering the parent or guardian of the offender to pay a fine, damages, or costs; (j) by ordering the parent or guardian of the offender to give security for his good behaviour; (k) by committing the offender to custody in a place of detention provided under this Part; (l) where the offender is a young person, by sentencing him to imprisonment; or (m) by dealing with the case in any other manner in which it may legally dealt with.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorising the court to deal with any case in any manner in which it could not deal with the case apart from this section.

For the older youths particularly (16-18 years), the following laws (Chapter 13:05, Section 7) apply:

(1) Where a person is convicted before the High Court on indictment of any offence other than murder, or before a Court of Summary Jurisdiction of any offence for which he is liable to be sentenced to imprisonment, and it appears to such Court – (a) that the person is not less than sixteen nor more than eighteen years of age, and (b) that by reason of his antecedents or mode of life it is expedient that he should be subject to detention for such term and under such instruction and discipline as appears most conducive to his reformation and the repression of crime, the Court may, in lieu of sentencing him to the punishment provided by law for the offence for which he was convicted, pass a sentence of detention under penal discipline in the Institution for a term of not less than three years nor more than four years. (2) Before passing such sentence the Court shall be satisfied that the character, state of health, and mental condition of the offender, and the other circumstances of the case, are such that the offender is likely to profit by such instruction and discipline as aforesaid. (3) No such sentence passed by a Court of Summary Jurisdiction shall be carried into effect until it has been approved by the Minister, for the period fixed by such Court or for some shorter period, and if such sentence is not so approved, the Court may sentence the offender to any punishment provided by law for the offence of which he was convicted. (4) Where a Court has convicted a person or any offence to which subsection (1) applies, the Court may before passing a sentence of detention as therein provided,

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in addition to any other powers conferred upon it by any other law, commit the person convicted to prison or to such other safe custody as it thinks fit for such period not exceeding one month as it may deem necessary for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is expedient to pass such a sentence of detention. (5) Where a Court has committed a person in the manner herein provided, the Court may cause the person so committed to be brought before it at any time prior to the expiration of the period for which he was committed and thereupon to pass sentence according to law.

DELINQUENCY

The youths at these homes were already officially identified and processed as being either already convicted, delinquent, abused or distressed in some way or charged for an offence. Of course, delinquency reflects some kind of deviant behaviour, officially prescribed or socially labelled. But the term ‘delinquency’ has itself become quite a confusing one both in common usage and in the research literature as well. For example, a delinquent youth is commonly seen as one who has committed a wrong as defined in law, be it a serious crime or a minor offence. The emphasis is on the age (e.g., under 14 or 16) of the offender not so much on the offending act itself. But, as another example, even when the youth is over 16, commits a serious crime and is put in a ‘juvenile home’ as is the case in this country, he is still seen as a ‘delinquent’ and not so much as a criminal. The picture is confounded when the same juvenile home contains youths who commit crimes and offences of varying seriousness and even some who are youths-at- risk. The place of residence usually determines the label, not the reason for being there. All youths inside suffer the same labelling fate, for better or for worse. Such ambiguities no doubt compelled Savitz (1967, 15–16) to note:

If crime and criminal seem tortuous concepts, they assume pristine clarity next to the extraordinarily elusive terms delinquency and delinquent. Delinquencies are all actions legally proscribed for a child above the age of culpability and below a certain maximum age (16, 17 or 18). If a child engages in proscribed behaviour, the state, acting in place of the parent (in loco parentis), is obliged to treat (not punish) the child. Thus all crimes for which adults are liable, plus many other acts which are prohibited only to juveniles until they reach adulthood, are subsumed under “delinquency.” Purely juvenile delinquencies (as opposed to juvenile crime) include such offences as truancy, incorrigibility, and running away from home, as well as some rather trivial offences...such as use of obscene language, street-corner lounging, visiting “gaming places” and smoking cigarettes.

The definition of delinquency as initially used in this paper is one that is officially-driven, that is, detention in a juvenile home. The distinctions among the youths will be empirically worked out, that is, after the juvenile home data is

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collected. Whatever the reason for their detention in these homes, these youths are labelled by the larger society as ‘delinquents.’ While the administrative diversions and the entire process of delinquency-identification and institutionalisation are certainly matters for inquiry, this paper focuses on those youths already detained at these homes. In other words, the criterion of delinquency is based on an ‘objective’ measure. Notwithstanding this, the study will subsequently seek to separate those youths who commit serious crimes and minor offences from those who are there for misdemeanours or as an escape from abuse.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

The three homes which are the subject of this study are the ones generally used to house youths (male and female) found guilty of crimes and other offences. Two of the three homes house young males only - one accommodating males 16 and under, the other 16–18. The third home houses females under 16. The offences range from, for example, misdemeanours and beyond parental control to serious crimes such as rape and murder. A few girls have been victims of physical or sexual abuse. In order to protect the identity of these juvenile homes, they will henceforth be called YB (the home for young boys), OB (home for older boys) and YG (home for young girls) respectively. In all homes, however, few youths are found who fall outside these prescribed age ranges. For example, there were youths over 16 who were still at YB and YG. There were also youths over 18 at OB. These, however, are quite small in number. All youths present at each home were interviewed: OB = 232 boys, YB = 134 boys, YG = 120 girls. Data collection at these homes took place in July, l997. Total number of youths interviewed = 486, that is, 94 per cent of the youth population at these three homes (there was some variation in the actual number of youths who answered particular questions). In effect, the entire population at these three juvenile homes was interviewed. The following stages were used in arriving at the final interview schedule:

(1) Roundtable discussions were held with the managers of these three juvenile homes and the chief probation officer to help shape the interview items. (2) Official records were used to guide framing the interview items. (3) A pilot study was then conducted to test the fitness and relevance of the interview schedule. (4) A questionnaire (open and closed-ended) was used to interview the youths. A team of 21 interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews at the juvenile homes.

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Five related sets of questions were asked: (1) Offence Committed The official records were checked to ascertain what specific offence these youths committed, or for what other reason they were placed in these juvenile homes. (2) Social and Demographic Background Sex Race Religion Educational Attainment Occupational Background Of Parents (or Guardian) Family Type Household Size (3) Social Psychological What will make you happy now? Your most important goal in life? What worries you most? What do you need most to improve your life? What do you admire most in your friends? (4) Remorse, Self-Responsibility and Rehabilitation Potential Do you think you have anything so wrong to be here? Whom do you blame most for being here? What do you usually do when you get angry? What is the best way to deal with someone who did something wrong? What do you plan to do on leaving the institution? (5) Delinquency-Related Factors Do you think that it is poverty which leads many youths to commit crimes? How many of your friends have gotten into trouble with the police or law? Why did your friend(s) get in trouble with the police or law? How many times did your friend(s) get in trouble with the police or law? How many of your relatives have gotten in trouble with the police or the law? Why did your relative(s) get in trouble with the police or law? How many times did your relative(s) get in trouble with the police or the law?

The first measure is on the specific offence(s) committed by each youth, or the reason for their being placed in the home. The official records were used. This information was also taken from the youths themselves and then cross-checked with the official records at the home. The attempt to have the youths themselves identify their offence (or reason for the offence) was to ensure that they actually

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do know why they were there. Such self-reports were also used to see the extent to which they matched the official records. The second set of questions seeks to capture the demographic and sociological background of these incarcerated youths. These questions will help tell us what kinds of youths are placed in these homes and, tentatively, what kind of social backgrounds they come from. Such information will help construct a sociology of delinquency, taking account as well of possible biases in the institutionalisation of these youths. Such sociological data will also help us make comparisons with pertinent data from other places. The third set of questions seeks to measure the social and psychological dispositions of these youths, their post-institution aspirations and as well their dispositions towards negotiated rehabilitation. Such questions will help provide a basis for a social psychological mode of rehabilitation and theorising. The fourth set seeks to measure their degree of remorsefulness, self- responsibility and temperament. These are considered key elements not merely for rehabilitation but also for assessing the extent to which these youths recognise, or do not recognise, their ‘normative transgressions.’ Considering that they have generally committed some kind of offence or another, these measures seek to capture the degree of subsequent ‘shame’ seemingly experienced by these youths. Braithwaite (l993, 1-2) wrote:

‘Reintegrative shaming is disapproval dispensed within an ongoing relationship with the offender based on respect, shaming which focuses on the evil of the deed rather than on the offender as an irremediably evil person, where degradation ceremonies are followed by ceremonies to decertify deviance, where forgiveness, apology, and repentance are culturally important. The key contention is that societies where shaming of criminal conduct is both potent and reintegrative are societies with low crime rates.’

These measures therefore seek to operationalise the concept of shame and show the possibilities for their reintegration into normative conduct. The fifth set seeks to capture a picture of the delinquency-conducive environment which surrounded their delinquency, that is, the actions of their friends and relatives in the area of crime and delinquency. They were asked not only the number of times their friends or relatives had trouble with the police or law but also for what reasons.

RESULTS (1) Offences Committed

The crosscheck between the official records and the youths’ own disclosures revealed a 94 per cent match. Overall, 38 per cent were there for robbery or robbery-related crimes/offences. In fact, 61 per cent of the youths at the

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OB alone were there for robbery with 31 per cent for robbery from YB and only two per cent from YG (see Table 8.1). Overall, 27 per cent were there for being beyond control at home. The highest single percentage for this beyond control category came from YG (61 per cent) with 32 per cent from YB and seven per cent from the OB.

TABLE 8.1 OFFENCES COMMITTED BY YOUTHS IN THE THREE HOMES

OFFENCE YB1 OB2 YG3 TOTAL Beyond control 32.0* (41)** 6.9 (15) 60.7 (68) 27.3 (124) Attempted suicide 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.9 (1) 0.2 (1) Ran away from home 24.1 (31) 3.7 (8) 20.5 (23) 13.6 (62) Drugs 3.9 (5) 10.2 (22) 0.9 (1) 6.1 (28) Robbery 31.3 (40) 60.7 (131) 1.8 (2) 37.9 (173) Fight (Assault) 2.3 (3) 3.7 (8) 1.8 (2) 2.9 (13) Murder/attempted murder/ 1.6 (2) 2.8 (6) 0 (0) 1.9 (8) manslaughter Promiscuity 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.9 (1) 0.2 (1) Victim of abuse 1.6 (2) 0 (0) 8.9 (10) 2.6 (12) Possession of arms/ 0 (0) 6.9 (15) 0 (0) 3.3 (15) ammunition Rape 0 (0) 0.9 (2) 0 (0) 0.4 (2) Vandalism 0 (0) 0.5 (1) 0 (0) 0.2 (1) Kidnapping 0 (0) 0.9 (2) 0 (0) 0.4 (2) Abscond 0 (0) 0.9 (2) 0.9 (1) 0.7 (3) Larceny 1.6 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0.4 (2) No one willing to take care of 0.8 (1) 0 (0) 0.9 (1) 0.4 (2) Carnal knowledge 0 (0) 0.5 (1) 0 (0) 0.2 (1) Other 0.8 (1) 1.4 (3) 1.8 (2) 1.3 (6) TOTAL 100 (128) 100 (216) 100 (112) 100 (456)***

YB1 - Home for Young Boys OB2 - Home for Older Boys YG3 - Home for Young Girls * - Figures outside brackets are column percentages ** - Figures within brackets are raw numbers *** - Records for 30 youths not available at the time of data collection

For using or trafficking in illicit drugs, the overall percentage was six per cent. In fact, ten per cent of the youths at OB were there for such offences with four per cent from YB and one per cent from YG. Over two per cent (2.6 per cent) of the youths from these three homes were victims of abuse. In YG alone, nine per cent of the young girls were victims of abuse. Seven per cent of the youths from OB were guilty of possession of arms and ammunitions. There were no youths from either YG or YB for this particular offence. Fourteen per cent (13.6 per cent) altogether ‘ran way from home.’ Of the youths at YB alone, 24 per cent committed such a misdemeanour with 21 per cent from YG and four per cent from the OB (see Table 8.1). Some of the other offences, very few in number, included assault (2.9 per cent), murder/manslaughter

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(1.9 per cent), rape (0.4 per cent), kidnapping (0.4 per cent), vandalism (0.2 per cent) and promiscuity (0.2 per cent). In terms of the number of repeat offenders (two or more offences) at these three homes, the total number was 106, that is, 23 per cent of the institutions’ population. Twenty-five (25) youths (5.4 per cent) admitted to more than two offences. Furthermore, and even more importantly, it must be noted that about 40 per cent of these youths were on remand at these three homes. A finer analysis of this entire situation is therefore quite necessary in terms of separating those already sentenced from those on remand, charged for certain offences. (2) Social and Demographic Background

Gender Differences

At this point, the data suggest some significant differences in the offences reported between male and female youths. At YG alone, 61 per cent of these girls were there for beyond control with 32 per cent from YB having a similar misdemeanour. When it comes to running away from home, the YG (21 per cent) and YB (24 per cent) showed a similar tendency. OB had 3.7 per cent - no doubt due to their age. In terms of robbery, less than two per cent (1.8 per cent) of the girls committed such a crime while on the other hand 61 per cent from OB and 31 per cent from YB had such an offence.

Race

Almost 70 per cent of the youths at these three homes were of African descent, 13 per cent were East Indian and 18 per cent Mixed. Of all the African youths in these three homes, OB contained the highest proportion (43 per cent) with 35 per cent at YB and 22 per cent at YG. Of all the East Indian youths in these three homes, OB had the highest proportion (58 per cent), with 33 per cent at YG and eight per cent at YB. Taking the population of each home, YB contained the highest proportion (84 per cent) of African youths, with proportions of 64 per cent and 62 per cent at OB and YG respectively.

Religion

Thirty five percent of these youths were Catholic, 15 per cent Baptist, 11 per cent Pentecostal, ten per cent Seventh Day Adventist, nine per cent Anglican, six per cent Hindu, four per cent Muslim, three per cent ‘other’ and seven per cent said they had ‘no religion.’

Educational Attainment

Which was the last school they attended before entering these homes? Over 50 per cent reached up to primary school, 21 per cent a Junior Secondary School,

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11 per cent a Senior Comprehensive School, four per cent a Government Secondary School, with over three per cent from Servol, YTEPP or a trade school. About two per cent said they went to no school at all. Less than two per cent went to a Convent or College (Seven-Year) before entering the custodial institution. In terms of the specific institutions, YB had the largest proportion (64.4 per cent) who reached only up to primary school. Thirty-one percent of them went beyond primary school. However, even though the girls at YG were of similar age to those at YB, much more of them (45 per cent) went beyond primary school. [Note: The age criteria for each home should be taken into account]. The data at OB deserves a critical eye. At OB, 45 per cent of these young males went only up to primary school, 19 per cent up to Junior Secondary School and over 18 per cent Senior Secondary School. Over four per cent of the OB youths went to vocational schools such as Servol, YTEPP or a trade school.

Occupation of Parent/Guardian

Sixty per cent of these youths lived with parents or guardians who had lower class occupations (e.g., unskilled labour, maids, vendors, etc.). Twenty per cent lived with parents or guardians who had middle class occupations (e.g., civil servants, teachers, clerks) and less than two per cent had professional status (e.g., doctors, engineers, etc.). Over 11 per cent of these youths lived with parents or guardians who were chronically unemployed (over one year), and about two per cent with pensioners or retired persons.

Family Type

Overall, 24 per cent of these youths lived with both mother and father before coming to the institution; ten per cent with father only, 32 per cent with mother only, 29 per cent with one guardian only, three per cent by ‘themselves’ and two per cent either with friends or in a home/orphanage. At YG, in particular, 19 per cent of the girls lived with both parents, compared with 30 per cent at YB and 24 per cent at OB. Again, at YG, 40 per cent lived with a guardian, compared with 22 per cent at YB and 28 per cent at OB. Over 16 per cent of the boys at YB lived with ‘father only,’ while ten per cent of the girls and six per cent of the boys at OB lived with their ‘father only’ (see Table 8.2).

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TABLE 8.2 PARENTAL BACKGROUND OF YOUTHS IN HOMES

PARENTAL YB1 OB2 YG3 TOTAL BACKGROUND Both parents 29.9* (40)** 24.1 (53) 18.6 (22) 24.4 (115) Father only 16.4 (22) 5.9 (13) 10.2 (12) 10.0 (47) Mother only 29.1 (39) 36.4 (80) 27.1 (32) 32.0 (151) Guardian 21.6 (29) 27.7 (61) 39.8 (47) 29.0 (137) Living alone (self) 0.7 (1) 5.5 (12) 0 (0) 2.8 (13) With friends 0 (0) 0.5 (1) 1.7 (2) 0.6 (3) In home / orphanage 2.2 (3) 0 (0) 2.5 (3) 1.3 (6) TOTAL 100 (134) 100 (220) 100 (118) 100 (472)

YB1 - Home for Young Boys OB2 - Home for Older Boys YG3 - Home for Young Girls * - Figures outside brackets are column percentages ** - Figures within brackets are raw numbers

Household Size

Overall, over 31 per cent of these youths lived with six or more other persons in the same house. The majority (51.3 per cent) lived with three to five other persons and about 17 per cent of them lived with two or less persons in the same home. (3) Social and Psychological Factors

Things to make them happy now

When asked what will make them happy now, 32 per cent of all these youths said as a first choice they will like to be with their family or friends. As their first choice, 37 per cent said they will like to be ‘free’ once again or leave the institution. Almost ten per cent said as their first choice they will like ‘further education’ and another seven per cent said they will like ‘employment.’ OB had the highest proportion of youths who as a first choice wished for their ‘freedom’ or to ‘leave’ the institution – 58 per cent as against 14 per cent at YB and 23 per cent at YG. As their second choice, almost 30 per cent of all these youths wished for further education or employment.

Most important goal in life

As their most important goal in life, over 55 per cent of all these youths said ‘to get a job.’ In fact, 42 per cent of them went on to specify the kind of job they looked forward to. This tendency was especially so for the girls, a disposition

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which showed a sharper career orientation. Overall, 13 per cent said sports or recreation and over 12 per cent further education.

What worries them most?

Over 50 per cent of these youths said they worry most about their family and friends. Twenty-two per cent said they worry most about how they are treated at the institution, over seven per cent said their future, over five per cent their deviant behaviour, with six per cent saying ‘nothing’ really worries them. Two per cent said their health and society’s problems, respectively.

What they need most to improve their lives?

Quite significantly, over 25 per cent of all these youths said more than anything else, they need ‘discipline’ in their lives with the highest single proportion (38 per cent) coming from YG (YB 15 per cent, OB 24 per cent). Overall again, 31 per cent said further education, 11 per cent employment, three per cent love, five per cent religion, four per cent to leave the institution and four per cent ‘nothing.’ As to their second choice, over 26 per cent said they need ‘discipline,’ 17 per cent ‘education,’ 15 per cent ‘employment,’ nine per cent ‘their family and friends,’ six per cent ‘religion,’ five per cent ‘to leave the institution’ and three per cent ‘nothing.’

What do they admire most in their friends?

Twenty-eight percent said what they admire most in their friends are their positive attitudes and behaviours (generally). In addition and more specifically, over 12 per cent said ‘loyalty,’ nine per cent ‘friendship,’ 22 per cent ‘kindness and helpfulness,’ nine per cent ‘their intelligence and leadership,’ with over six per cent saying ‘nothing.’ Over seven per cent of these youths said they have ‘no friends,’ with the largest single proportion coming from OB (11.3 per cent). This means that 14 per cent of all these youths either had no friends or admired nothing in those that they had. (4) Remorse, Self-Responsibility and Rehabilitation Potential

Did these youths think they did anything so wrong to be institutionalised?

When asked if they thought they did anything so wrong to be placed in the institution, 60 per cent said ‘yes’ and 40 per cent ‘no.’ The ‘yes’ category was lowest for the YG (40 per cent) and highest for the OB boys (67 per cent).

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Whom do they blame most for being in the institution?

Almost 70 per cent of these youths said they blamed ‘themselves’ for being in the institution, seven per cent blamed their mothers, five per cent their fathers, five per cent grandparents, three per cent both parents and another three per cent friends. About two per cent blamed their guardians and police (1.5 per cent). More specifically, the highest proportion of youths who blamed their mothers came from YG (13.8 per cent) as compared to 7.5 per cent from YB and 3.2 per cent from OB. In terms of blaming themselves, the highest proportion of youths came from the OB (77.2 per cent), with 60 per cent from YG and 56 per cent from YB in this same category. Of the girls who blamed themselves for being in the institution, 46 per cent said they ‘did not do anything wrong’ to be there while 26 per cent of the boys in both institutions said they ‘did not do anything wrong.’

What do they usually do when they get angry?

Overall, 33 per cent of the residents at the three institutions said they usually ‘detach themselves emotionally from the situation’ when they get angry, 30 per cent said they ‘retaliate towards people,’ nine per cent said they ‘physically remove themselves from the situation,’ approximately seven per cent said they do ‘cheerful things’ and just over six per cent (6.2 per cent) said they ‘usually pray.’ Other ways that these youths deal with their anger include ‘taking it out’ on things (4.1 per cent), inflicting ‘anger on self’ (2.1 per cent) and wanting to do ‘very bad things’ (1.9 per cent).

What do they see as the best way to deal with someone who did something wrong?

Altogether, 20 per cent said that ‘talking to the person’ is the best way to deal with someone who did something wrong, 14 per cent said ‘punish the person,’ six per cent said ‘report it’ and four per cent said ‘forgive the person.’ More specifically, 75 per cent of the young girls at YG said that ‘talking to the person’ is the best way to deal with someone who did something wrong as compared to 69 per cent of the boys at OB and 62 per cent of boys at YB. Eight per cent of the youths at the OB said ‘to forgive someone’ who did something wrong was the best way to deal with it as compared to two per cent at YG and one per cent at YB. A higher percentage of boys at YB (15.3 per cent) said ‘reporting a wrong’ that someone did was the best way to deal with such persona as compared to 2.3 per cent of OB and 3.5 per cent of YG who gave a similar response.

What do they plan to do on leaving the institution?

As to the first thing they look forward to doing after leaving the institution, 45 per cent of them said ‘to find employment,’ 24 per cent ‘further education,’ 13 per cent ‘to be with their family and friends,’ and six per cent ‘travel or leisure.’

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Less than one per cent cited some kind of negative activity for example, selling drugs. In other words, and considering their previous responses, a significant amount of these youths wish to be reunited with their friends and families but with some self-sustaining conditions for themselves, for example, employment, education, etc. (5) Delinquency-related Factors

Do they think that it is poverty which leads many youths to commit crimes?

A total of 52 per cent said poverty leads many youths to commit crimes whereas 46 per cent said poverty does not lead many youths to commit crimes. The proportion answering this way was fairly consistent across the three homes.

Number of friends who got in trouble with the law or police

In the first place, 63 per cent of all these youths said they had at least one friend who got into trouble with the law or police. More specifically, 33 per cent of these youths had between one to three friends who got in trouble with the police or the law. Another ten per cent had between four to six friends in such a situation. In fact, quite a few boys said they had over 12 friends who got in trouble with the law or police. Three per cent said they had ‘plenty’ such friends. This data also suggest that generally the girls at YG have less friends who get in trouble with the police or law - as compared to the boys at either YB or OB. In terms of specific homes, 65 per cent of the young girls at YG said they had no friends who got in trouble with the police or law. The comparative proportion for YB and OB were 41 per cent and 21 per cent respectively. Overall from the three institutions, the estimated total number of their friends who got in trouble with the police or law is 1,431.

Reasons for their friends getting into trouble with the police or law

Altogether, 54 per cent said their friends got in trouble for robbery, 14 per cent said for drugs, six per cent said for disobedience, six per cent for fighting/ assault, four per cent for wounding, four per cent for murder, four per cent for arms and ammunition and three per cent for ‘running away.’ Other reported offences (very few) committed by these friends ranged from arson and rape to kidnapping.

Number of times their friends got in trouble with the police or law

Altogether, 38 per cent of these youths said their friends committed one or two crimes or offences. Over 50 per cent said one to six crimes. Over eight per cent of them said ‘several times.’ Over ten per cent admitted that some of their

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friends committed more than ten (10) crimes/offences. In fact, quite a few youths, especially those at the OB said their friends committed over 20 crimes/offences. Overall from the three institutions, the estimated total number of times that their friends got into trouble with the police or law is 1,620.

Number of their relatives who got in trouble with the police or law

Altogether, over 50 per cent of these youths said they had one to three relatives who got in trouble with the police or law. Slightly over two per cent said they had nine (9) such relatives. From the three institutions, the estimated total number of relatives who got in trouble with the police or law is 653. Almost 40 per cent of these youths said they have no relatives who ever got in trouble with the police or law. More specifically, almost 50 per cent of the girls at YG said they had no such relatives. The comparative percentages for YB and OB were (38.3 per cent) and (35.3 per cent), respectively.

Reasons for their relatives getting into trouble with the police or law

Altogether about 31 per cent said their relatives got in trouble with the police or law for robbery, 27 per cent for drugs, ten per cent for being uncontrollable, seven per cent for wounding, six per cent for murder, four per cent for abuse, three per cent for arms and ammunition and about one per cent for failure to pay maintenance.

Number or times their relatives got in trouble with the police or law

Over 50 per cent of these youths said they had relatives who got in trouble either once or twice with the law or police. Twenty-one per cent said they had relatives who got in trouble three to seven times with the law or police. Overall, from the three institutions, the estimated total number of times that relatives got into trouble with the police or law is 794.

REPRESENTATIVENESS

The demographic and social characteristics of these delinquents are helpful in a number of ways; for example, in responding to their training and rehabilitation needs. However, in terms of seeking a better understanding of the social and institutional processes or bias which may contribute to their incarceration, an important step is to see the extent to which these youths are ‘representative’ of, or deviate from, the larger population from which they come. For example, are the youths of one race over or under-represented in these homes? What about the youths from two-parent homes? Are they over or under-represented in these homes? Two major data sources are used here to help answer such questions - national census data and data gathered from ongoing studies on poverty,

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community and crime. (Note: The data from the three juvenile homes are for youths in the 10–19 age group).

RACE

Whether the overall national population or the 10–19 age group is considered, youths of African descent are quite over-represented in these homes. For example, while the 10–19 year age group in the general population contained 38 per cent African, 40 per cent East Indian, 21 per cent Mixed, the population at these juvenile homes comprised 70 per cent African, 13 per cent East Indian, and 18 per cent Mixed. East Indians were significantly under-represented (see Figure 8.1). Such ethnic distributions will no doubt filter into the public ‘fear of crime’ as far as certain groups of youths are concerned (see e.g., Wilson 1992).

FIGURE 8.1 ETHNIC BACKGROUND (%) OF YOUTHS IN JUNVENILE HOMES AND GENERAL POPULATION IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (10–19 YEARS)

50 t

40 Per cen 30

0 African East Indian Mixed Other

General Population Juvenile Homes

EDUCATION

How is the national trend in educational achievement reflected in these juvenile homes? For the age group 10–19 in the general population (census data), the configuration is 35 per cent at primary school, 64 per cent at secondary school,

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0.2 per cent university, 0.6 per cent no schooling, 0.3 per cent ‘other.’ Of the inmate population, 51 per cent reached primary school, 39 per cent secondary school, three per cent trade or vocational school, with two percent no schooling at all. Of course, within this trend, many at primary school in the general population will likely be moving up to secondary school, etc. The comparative proportions for the youths at these juvenile homes merely suggest the educational level at which their detention began in these homes. Tentatively, these trends suggest an inverse relationship between level of educational attainment and juvenile delinquency, at least as far as institutionalisation is concerned. That is, it is much more likely for a youth with a primary educational level to enter a juvenile home than it is for a youth with a secondary education (see Figure 8.2).

FIGURE 8.2 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (%) OF YOUTHS IN JUVENILE HOMES AND GENERAL POPULATION IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (10–19 YEARS)

t 40 Per cen 30

0 Primary Secondary None Other Educational Attainment

General Population Juvenile Homes

RELIGION

Some religions are over-represented while others are under-represented in the inmate population. For example, while there are 30 per cent Catholics, eight per cent Pentecostals, four per cent Seventh Day Adventists and two per cent Baptists in the national population (age group 10–19), the proportion of each

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religion in these three juvenile homes are 35 per cent Catholics, 11 per cent Pentecostals, ten per cent Seventh Day Adventists and ten per cent Baptists, respectively. The religion most significantly under-represented in these homes is Hindu, that is, six per cent of the youths in the homes are Hindu versus 25 per cent in the national population. There was only one youth (0.2 per cent) of the Presbyterian faith in these homes, while in the national population, this religion comprised a little over three per cent persons (10–19) — (see Figure 8.3).

FIGURE 8.3 RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND (%) OF YOUTHS IN JUVENILE HOMES AND GENERAL POPULATION OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (10–19 YEARS)

20 Per cent

0 R. Catholic Anglican Baptist Hindu Pentecostal Muslim SDA Other & None

General Population Juvenile Home

PARENTAL BACKGROUND

This is a more problematic issue. While Table 8.2 indicates the proportion of juvenile inmates who come from different parental (or guardian) backgrounds, there is no clearly appropriate census data to make comparisons. The available census data can afford only tentative inferences. However, as indicated above, there is comparable data from ongoing research on family structure and poverty which provides a good estimate of family structure in the population and how it relates to the family structure from which these incarcerated youths come (e.g., Deosaran 1998). The data for the juvenile homes studied indicate that 24 per cent of the youths came from homes with two parents in residence, 32 per cent

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from single female-headed homes, ten per cent from single male-headed homes and 29 per cent from homes with a guardian only. About five per cent of them came from an orphanage or lived with friends or by themselves. In other words, while 24 per cent of these youths came from two-parent homes, the rest (75.7 per cent) came from other types of parenting structures. From a related nationwide survey based on a random sample of 1,600 households in the general population, it was found that of all those homes with children, 57 per cent of them had both parents living together, with the other 43 per cent of homes having a single parent or guardian.9 This preliminary comparison suggests that there is a greater likelihood for an incarcerated youth (delinquent) to come from a single-parent home than from a two-parent home. Given the importance of family process variables in contributing to delinquency (Jensen and Rojek l992, 264–80, Hengeller 1989, Sampson and Laub l988, 380), this finding on family structure is interesting for local researchers. A study of delinquents in Tennessee (Jensen and Rojek l992, 267) led to the conclusion: ‘Juveniles referred to the court are twice as likely to come from single-parent households as the population as a whole.’ In their review of 50 studies on family structure and delinquency, Wells and Rankin (1991, 73) concluded: ‘For most of the studies, broken homes has a consistent and reliable association with juvenile delinquency.’ It is important for further local research that some attention be also given to any possible social bias in either police detection or administrative process that might lead to such concentration of single-parent delinquents.

OCCUPATIONAL BACKGROUND

Sixty per cent of these youths came from homes with the parent or guardian having a lower (working) class background; 20 per cent and two per cent came from middle and upper class backgrounds respectively. Those youths who came from homes with pensioners/retired persons and chronically-unemployed heads comprised two per cent and 11 per cent respectively. From census data, 55 per cent of the working population have lower (working) class backgrounds. In our related nationwide survey, 61 per cent of the household heads have lower class occupations, 14 per cent middle class and 2.4 per cent upper class occupations. Retired persons/pensioners and the chronically-unemployed amounted to 13.2 per cent; housewives 18.5 per cent. These occupational trends tentatively suggest that the working class background of these incarcerated youths tends to reflect their proportional presence in the general population. In other words, while the proportion of lower class youths in these juvenile homes is quite high (that is, 60 per cent), the proportion of the lower class in the general population is quite similar. Table 8.1 shows the range of offences as admitted by the youths in these three juvenile homes. While the overall picture of these crimes/offences offers some indication of the extent and nature of delinquency, officially defined, there

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are important gender and qualitative differences that merit further, more specific analysis. For example, it is important to note that the highest proportion of crimes at the OB was robbery (60.7 per cent) while the highest proportion of offences for YG was ‘beyond control’(also 60.7 per cent). The highest proportion for YB was robbery (31.3 per cent) and ‘beyond control’ (32 per cent). The social circumstances surrounding these particular trends are being subjected to further examination through other data sources, for example, probation reports and further interviews.

A TENTATIVE OBSERVATION

Figure 8.4 shows that from 1980 to 1990 there was a sharp rise in the number of minor crimes/offences, but a decrease from 1990 to 1996. Though much less than minor crimes and offences, the number of serious crimes steadily increased from 1980 to 1996 (Central Statistical Office and official police statistics). The number of minor crimes/offences in 1980 was 22,809 while in 1990 this number had spiralled to 49,656 — an increase of 117.7 per cent.

FIGURE 8.4 SERIOUS CRIMES, MINOR CRIMES & OFFENCES REPORTED IN 1980, 1985, 1990, 1996 60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000 Reports

20,000

10,000

0 1980 1985 1990 1996 Period

Serious Crimes Minor Crimes/Offences

Between 1990 and 1996, minor crimes/offences fell by 15.4 per cent with 42,033 minor crimes/offences reported in 1996. For the period 1980–96, serious crimes increased by 48 per cent with 12,227 serious crimes reported in 1980 and

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18,093 in 1996. The fact that many youths commit crimes, or at least delinquent acts — and are not caught — presents one of the most serious problems in delinquency theorising. In fact, this is a problem which pervades crime research generally. Self-reports and participant observation are two methods frequently used to supplement official records. A glimpse of the possible extent of undiscovered delinquents can be had from a preliminary comparison of the national crime reports, conviction trends and the proportion of detained youths in this study (see Figure 8.5). On average, between 1987 and 1996, 46,892 minor crimes/offences were reported, 11,997 were prosecuted and 5,023 had convictions secured. An average of 25.6 per cent of all minor crimes/offences was prosecuted, with 10.7 per cent of convictions secured for this period. The average number of serious crimes reported between 1987 and 1996 was 17,645 of which 4,763 were prosecuted and 989 had convictions. For this period, an average of 27 per cent and 5.6 per cent of serious crimes were prosecuted and had convictions respectively.

FIGURE 8.5 CRIME REPORTS, PROSECUTIONS & CONVICTIONS AVERAGE FIGURES FOR 1987–96 (TEN YEAR PERIOD)

50,000

45,000

40,000

35,000

r 30,000

25,000 Numbe 20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0 Reports Prosecutions Convictions Crimes

Compiled from Official Police Reports Serious Crimes Minor Crimes/Offences and Central Statistical Office

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We note: (1) The very low rate of prosecution and conviction compared to the number of reports for serious crimes and minor crimes/offences over a ten-year period, 1987–96. (2) Robbery and robbery-related crimes comprise the largest single proportion of crimes (police records). (3) Robbery and robbery-related crimes comprise the highest proportion of crimes committed by the youths in the present study.

Even when the required qualifications are made (e.g., adults committing such offences), it is plausible that a substantial number (reported) of such robbery- related crimes in the country were committed by youths who remained undetected, far less convicted. The dark figure of crime gets even darker when crimes are reported but without any offenders charged. This proportion of undiscovered offenders is the ‘darker’ figure of criminal justice. And, with this cursory look, it is conceivable that many delinquent youths survive across the country in the shadow of non-detection.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

When the list of committed current offences/breaches was categorised, it was found that for all three juvenile homes, 54 per cent of the youths committed crimes or offences which can be generally deemed harmful to others (e.g., murder, robbery, rape, kidnapping, drugs, arms possession). The other 36 per cent were there for such acts as ‘beyond control,’ ‘running away from home’ or victims of abuse. This distinction gets even more sharpened when we compare one home with another, implicitly a comparison with age and sex. In terms of harmful crimes, 87 per cent of the older boys (OB), 40 per cent of the younger boys (YB) and five per cent of the young girls (YG) committed such crimes. More specifically, almost 40 per cent (38.3 per cent) of all the offences in the three homes were robbery, with the highest proportion of robberies committed by the older boys (61 per cent). Only two per cent of the girls (YG) and 33 per cent of the young boys (YB) committed robbery. On the other hand, over 80 per cent of the girls (81.2 per cent) were there for ‘running away from home’ or ‘beyond control.’ The comparative proportions for the young boys and older boys were 56 per cent and 10.6 per cent respectively. What all this means is that as far as serious crime or delinquency is concerned, it is a problem more particularly so for males than for females, and even so, with the majority for robbery or robbery-related crimes. The related fact that almost 70 per cent of the more serious offenders are of African descent presents another specific dimension to the overall problem. As such, any emerging theory of delinquency or social policy must take these important distinctions into account.

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The data suggest that age, sex and race are important variables in the overall process of delinquency and institutionalisation in this country. The results show that three-quarters (76 per cent) of these incarcerated youths lived without both parents and came from homes where the household head had working class or blue collar occupations (60 per cent). As much as 50 per cent of them had some part of or reached up to primary school, 21 per cent junior secondary school, two per cent ‘no school at all,’ and the rest at various kinds of secondary or trade schools. It is noteworthy that less than two per cent went to a prestigious convent or college before entering the juvenile home. Over 30 per cent of these youths lived in homes with six or more persons in the same home. Over 50 per cent lived with three to five other persons with 17 per cent with two or less other persons. All in all, these results on the social background of incarcerated youths seem to compare well with the findings in other places, at least in three respects. That is, such youths are largely from working class backgrounds, from relatively large families, and with low educational attainment. One early Caribbean study on delinquency in another multi-racial country, Guyana, showed a similar predominance of lower-class, African youths (Dodd and Parris l976). However, in addition to the socio-cultural determinants of delinquency, there are two related issues pertinent to this present study and which require further examination. One, the social composition of these youthful inmates has to be examined in the context of how representative or not they are of the general population, at least in the variables of interest here. Two, while there are anecdotal evidence and prevailing suspicions, there is as yet no systematic data on the extent to which the social class or ethnic background of delinquent youths operate as points of discrimination within the local administrative or judicial stream (e.g., Vaz 1967). In other words, is the system actively biased so as to contribute to the social composition of current inmates? Given the scope of this paper, only the first issue was examined here. Family structure and delinquency is a matter of protracted debate in this country, a debate no doubt inspired by the changing roles of women, multi- fatherhood (one man fathering children in several homes) and even migration. Given its migrant-labour history (slavery and indentureship), the country has found itself quite ambivalent over what is the ‘correct’ family structure. Under migration and plantation circumstances, Africans largely experienced a matriarchal family structure, even when it was nuclear. East Indians largely experienced an extended family structure, largely patriarchal. In such local context, the concept of a ‘broken’ home may very well carry a connotation that has no real meaning to either a single mother or her child in this country. She was always single to begin with; and further, the child him/ herself would have been naturally living in a home which, in his (or her) experience, was never ‘broken’ but was the only parenting structure known all

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along. Even in the case of an extended family, what does ‘broken’ practically mean? In such cases, the absence of a mother or father will not necessarily mean a broken, dysfunctional family organisation, for example, with the death of either parent. Some studies suggest that for self-reported delinquency, it was the level of happiness in the home, rather than it being broken or unbroken that mattered more (e.g., Nye l958, Farrington et al. l996). In this context, the related issues of education, parental gender and type, ethnicity and poverty are indeed subjects of further inquiry here.10

CHILDREN OF HOPE: THE SEARCH FOR POSITIVE ADAPTATION

Whatever the specific reasons for their crimes or delinquent actions, a significant proportion of these youths appears to harbour ameliorative dispositions towards their future. In other words, while much can be said, or at least speculated, about their deviance, it is noteworthy that they at least recognise the social norms, that is, what is the expected way to behave. Perhaps more importantly, they express some willingness to be helped out of their plight. Of course, some doubts can be expressed about the authenticity or veracity of such responses. For example, when asked what they plan to do when they leave these homes, 45 per cent said ‘find employment,’ 24 per cent ‘further education,’ 13 per cent to be with their ‘family and friends,’ six per cent ‘sports or leisure.’ Less than one per cent cited some kind of negative activity, for example, ‘sell drugs.’ When asked another related question, that is, what they need most to improve their lives, over 25 per cent said more than anything else they need ‘discipline.’ In addition, 60 per cent said they agreed that they did something wrong enough to be placed in these homes. When asked whom do they blame most for being in the institution, almost 70 per cent said they blame themselves. Such remorse and self-responsibility on one hand, and their expressed yearning for social and economic opportunity on the other hand, do provide a viable basis for their reintegration into normative living. The youths themselves are extending an open invitation to be de-stigmatised and put on the path towards self-efficacy. Their self-confessed delinquency should not hold them back. Rather, their expressed hope and seeming optimism should be used to carry them forward.

NEUTRALISATION CHALLENGED

There seem to be further theoretical implications. For example, Matza (l964, 5-7) posits that while youth behaviour is guided by external social conditions, there still exists elements of free will and individual responsibility, such mixture providing periodic ‘drifts’ in and out of delinquency. The evidence in this present study suggests that the delinquents still possess substantial degrees of free will and self-responsibility. While it can be assumed that it is the fact of institutionalisation which engenders such qualities, it is still an important result

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to consider in further in-depth research and theory construction. In earlier work by Sykes and Matza (l957), five techniques of neutralisation were proposed. These are denial of responsibility, denial of harm in the crime itself, denial of harm to others, condemning the condemners and appeal to a higher authority. It is generally argued that delinquents utilise one or more of such techniques to absolve themselves from direct responsibility. The results from this study show that the vast majority of the delinquents accept the blame and express a full knowledge that what they did was indeed wrong. In fact, the highest proportions for such admissions came from those who committed serious offences (e.g., those older boys with 60 per cent and 67 per cent respectively). It might very well be that such delinquents, already caught and incarcerated, were acting out of bravado, with no instrumental need to shift blame or neutralise their misdeeds. The opposite may also be true, that is, while there may be a need to ‘excuse’ themselves, they now prefer to live up to their misdeeds and open a clean slate for the future. Given the other related data and the underlying assumptions of rehabilitation, the latter explanation is accepted as more plausible. Seventy per cent said the best way to deal with someone who did something as wrong as they did is ‘to talk with the person’ as a corrective device rather than ‘physical punishment’ (13.7 per cent), ‘reporting it to an authority’ (6.3 per cent) or ‘forgiving’ (4.4 per cent). As an indication of the quality of their inter-personal relationships, over 60 per cent said other persons recognised the good qualities they, the youths, had before entering the institution: 33 per cent said other persons did not recognise their good qualities. Do such responses from these delinquents provide a meaningful basis for their rehabilitation? For example, their emphasis on ‘discipline’ may merely reflect the institutional emphasis on discipline and order in the homes. A major doubt will naturally linger over their truthfulness. Do they really mean what they say with such socially desirable answers? Are they trying to fool the interviewer and seek sympathy with superficial posturing? Possibly yes. But if we say yes, then surely a lot of question-answer research in social science and in criminology in particular will have to bear a similar burden of scepticism. If we doubt them, then how can we begin to construct a paradigm of rehabilitation for these youths? But there is another possibility. Rehabilitation is not merely psychological reengineering, even when there is a concomitant amount of resources or material support (e.g., jobs). The fundamental basis of rehabilitation of delinquent youths is faith in these youths, faith that they could and should be helped. Whenever these youths themselves express some faith and conviction to improve, such faith could cumulatively operate as a platform for behavioural and attitudinal change. Rehabilitation attempts without such a conviction will likely lack the sustained commitment needed on both sides. If these youths actually mean what they said, they are in effect providing us

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with a first-order rehabilitation mode in that they already have the desire to change. And our faith will mix richly and effectively with their own expressed hope for change. This should make the rehabilitation exercise easier. In this context, let us recall that 60 per cent of them admitted they really did something wrong enough to be sent to these homes, and at the same time 70 per cent said they had only themselves to blame for it. Such admission and remorse, if genuine, are key psychological conditions for rehabilitation. But what if their responses are superficial, designed to fool and gain sympathy? This will be considered not a lost cause or an irretrievable situation. Instead, their responses will be seen as a second-order rehabilitation mode in that we will treat them in the first instance as if they were really authentic responses. We will put faith where it is lacking and in such a way that will eventually shape them into believing that their responses are worthy of being valid and meaningful. In other words by our own interactions, we shall try to convert the superficial nature of their responses into authentic ones. Essentially, this two-step approach will draw upon the principles of the self-fulfilling prophecy, the Pygmalion effect, an interactionist phenomenon with a rather reputable theoretical and empirical history (e.g., Merton l948, Miller and Turnbull l986, Rosenthal l969) and the related perspective of the looking glass self (Cooley l956, Mead l934, Shrauger and Schoeneman l979). If the principles of the self-fulfilling prophecy can work to establish negative stigma and outcomes, as the research evidence suggests, then these same expectancy principles should work to create positive outcomes. In a paper, ‘Positive Illusions and Coping with Adversity,’ Taylor and Armor (1996, 875) stated:

We coined the term “positive illusions” to capture the essence of this phenomenon, namely, the emergence of positively distorted beliefs in the face of threatening information. We argued that when people experienced personal tragedies or setbacks, they respond with cognitively adaptive efforts that may enable them to return to or exceed their previous level of psychological functioning.

In other words, the youths’ admission of wrong-doing and remorse will be treated as their search for positive adaptation, as a catalytic resource, and eventually given a credibility and validity beyond what they themselves originally intended. And we should talk with and behave towards them as if what they said is true. We should in the first instance take these youths at their word, as it were and, with reinforcing contingencies, transform into reality what for them appears as illusion. In this sense, there is the possibility of a fruitful linkage between the self-fulfilling prophecy and positive illusions, using their initial shame, where it exists, as a socially-reintegrating mechanism. In the latter case, much depends on the extent to which ‘shame’ itself operates as a cultural value in the wider society. Of course, there are other measures that could be used to identify those who are disposed towards rehabilitation at these institutions. For example, observable

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good behaviour such as helpfulness, respect, cooperation and self-responsibility. Indeed, future work will involve such measures and more complex data analyses. However, it is not always that these behaviours arise or are given the opportunity to arise in these homes. In any case, such measures, demonstrative as they may be, will likely pertain only to those already with the genuine will towards positive change. The challenge is to give the delinquent the benefit of the doubt, at least initially. With a mixture of interview (youth responses) and behavioural (observed) measures, the possibility of rehabilitation will be maximised, even with the targeted group who superficially but openly admit wrongdoing, profess remorse and accept the personal responsibility to change. Of course, as indicated earlier, such a rehabilitation process should be actively supported by appropriate social and economic opportunities. The preliminary results in this study suggest that there is much hope for these youths. The responsibility for their sustained reformation also rests upon the sensitivity and progressive thinking now expected of the authorities, especially at a time when alternatives to juvenile imprisonment are seen as enlightened objectives.

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Jensen, G.F. and Rojek, D.G. 1992. Delinquency and Youth Crime. 2nd Ed. Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc. King, J.W. 1997. ‘Paradise Lost? Crime in the Caribbean: A Comparison of Barbados and Jamaica’. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, 2(1):30–44. Laws of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. 1980. Children Act (Chap. 46:01). Laws of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. 1980. Young Offenders Detention Act (Chap. 13:05). Mahabir, C. 1985. Crime and Nation Building in the Caribbean: The Legacy of Legal Barriers. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc. Matza, D. 1964. Delinquency and Drift. New York: Wiley. Mead, G.H. 1934. Mind, Self and Society. C. Morris (Ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Merton, R.K. 1948. ‘The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy’. Antioch Review, 8:193–210. ___. 1997. ‘On the Evolving Synthesis of Differential Association and Anomie Theory: A Perspective from the Sociology of Science’. Criminology, 45(3):517–25. Miller, D.T. and Turnbull, W. 1986. ‘Expectancies and Interpersonal Processes’. In Annual Review of Psychology, M.R. Rosenweig & L.W. Porter (Eds.), 37:233–56. Moser, C. and Holland, J. 1997. Urban Poverty and Violence in Jamaica. World Bank Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Nye, F.I. 1958. Family Relationships and Delinquent Behaviour. New York: John Wiley. Paternoster, R. and Brame, R. 1997. ‘Multiple Routes to Delinquency? A Test of Developmental and General Theories of Crime’. Criminology, 35(1):49–84. Pryce, K. 1976. ‘Towards a Caribbean Criminology’. Caribbean Issues, 2(2):3–21. Rosenthal, R. and Jacobson, L. 1968. Pygmalion in the Classroom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Rosenthal, R. 1969. Self-Fulfilling Prophecy. California: Ziff Davis Publishing Company. Ryan, S. and LaGuerre, J. (Eds.). 1993. A Study of the Secondary School Population in Trinidad and Tobago: Placement Patterns and Practices. A Research Report. St. Augustine: ISER, UWI. Sampson, R. and Laub, J. 1988. ‘Unraveling Families and Delinquency: A Reanalysis of the Gluecks’ Data’. Criminology, 26:355–80. Savitz, L. 1967. Dilemmas in Criminology. New York: McGraw- Hill Book Company. Sharpe, J. and Bishop, J. 1993. Situation Analysis of Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances in Trinidad and Tobago. Barbados: UNICEF. Shrauger, J.S. and Schoeneman, T.J. 1979. ‘Symbolic Interactionist View of Self-Concept: Through the Looking Glass Darkly’. Psychological Bulletin, 86:549–73. Sykes, G. and Matza, D. 1957. ‘Techniques of Neutralisation: A Theory of Delinquency’. American Sociological Review, 22(Dec):664–70. Taylor, S.E. and Armor, D.A. 1996. ‘Positive Illusions and Coping with Adversity’. Journal of Personality, 64:873–98. Trinidad and Tobago. Central Statistical Office. 1990. Population and Housing Census. Vol. 11. Port-of-Spain: CSO. ___. 1997. Annual Statistical Digest, No. 41, 1994/95. Port-of-Spain: CSO. Trinidad and Tobago. Ministry of Social Development. 1994. Report of the Cabinet-Appointed Committee to Examine the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime Situation in Trinidad and Tobago. Port-of-Spain: Ministry of Social Development.

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___. 1996. The Determination and Measurement of Poverty in Trinidad and Tobago: Indications from the 1992 Survey of Living Conditions. Port-of-Spain: Ministry of Social Development. ___. 1997. Report of the Cabinet-Appointed Task Force to Review the Operations of Childrens’ Homes and Institutions in Trinidad and Tobago. Port-of-Spain: Ministry of Social Development. Trojanowicz, R.C. and Morash, M. 1987. Juvenile Delinquency: Concepts and Control. (4th Ed.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. Trotman, D.V. 1986. Crime in Trinidad: Conflict and Control in a Plantation Society (1838- 1900). Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. van der Hoeven, R. and Anker, R. 1994. Poverty Monitoring: An International Concern. New York: St Martin’s Press, Inc. Vaz, E.W. (Ed.). 1967. Middle-Class Juvenile Delinquency. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. Weis, J.G., Crutchfield, R.D. and Bridges, G.S. (Eds.). 1996. Readings in Juvenile Delinquency. California: Pine Forge Press. Wells, E. and Rankin, J. 1991. ‘Families and Delinquency: A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of Broken Homes’. Social Problems, 38:71-90. Wilson, J.Q. and Petersilia, J. (Eds.). 1995. Crime. California: ICS Press. Wilson, J.Q. 1992. ‘To Prevent Riots, Reduce Black Crime’. The Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1992. Dow Jones and Company, Inc. Winters, P.A. 1995. Crime and Criminals: Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, Inc.

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, July 1997, 2(2). St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago: Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies, pp. 36–83 with permission. 2. This study was funded by a modest UWI-CIDA (Canadian Institutional Development Agency) research grant. We wish to extend our gratitude to Professor Compton Bourne, Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Campus Principal (St. Augustine) for his assistance in obtaining this research grant. We also extend a special note of appreciation to the Managers and staff of the three institutions studied for their cooperation and to Mr Ian Ramdhanie for his generous assistance in data management. 3. Trinidad and Tobago, a twin island state of almost 1.2 million persons, has an area of 1,980 square miles and is the southern most island of the Commonwealth Caribbean in a region of 13 nations. Trinidad and Tobago gained political independence in August, 1962 with a Westminster form of parliamentary democracy. 4. For example, on February 24, 1997, a Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice was established at the St. Augustine Campus of the University of the West Indies. The journal, Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, was started in 1995 to inspire and facilitate (refereed) publication of research work in the Caribbean. The journal is also expected to provide researchers outside the Caribbean with some ideas as to the nature of Caribbean research in both Criminology and Social

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Psychology. The Cave Hill Campus of the UWI also has a Crime and Criminal Justice Research Centre (opened in 1997). 5. On January 22, 1996, through work done by the UWI-based Working Group in Caribbean Criminology, (the main author as chairman), a National Action Plan Against Crime (NAPAC) was formally presented to the Trinidad and Tobago prime minister and his Cabinet. The research programmes expected from this Plan have not as yet materialised for effective policymaking. As another example of the search for research-policy collaboration, the author presented the Government in 1994 with a proposal for mediation for young offenders (Mediation as a Community Alternative to Litigation for Young Offenders). The then Government accepted this proposal which is now in the form of a Mediation Bill awaiting final passage into law. A research project on juvenile homes (Juvenile Homes: An Analytical Basis for Reform, Intervention and Rehabilitation) in Trinidad and Tobago was presented by the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice to Government on October 15, 1997. So far we have had no clear assurance that due consideration will be given to implementing these far-ranging recommendations. The relevant Government agencies, the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of National Security have so far given no favourable response to funding this crime prevention project. 6. Government of Trinidad and Tobago. Census Report. 1990. 7. Annual Statistical Digest. 1994/95. No. 41 8. It is a rather peculiar situation to have destitution listed as a ‘juvenile offence.’ 9. Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice (UWI, St. Augustine) research project on Poverty, Crime and Community (1997). While it is a separate project from this project on juvenile homes, it contains a number of living condition measures relevant to the project on juvenile homes. 10. This study has in fact emerged from a motion by the main author which was debated and passed in the nation’s Parliament in 1988. The motion essentially dealt with the sociology of secondary school placement in the context of equality of opportunity (see Motion #2, February 29, 1988, Senate of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago). There is some nationwide data on ethnicity and secondary schooling (see Ryan and LaGuerre, 1993). The data on family structure and the secondary school population (83,315) were as follows: Students living in two-parent families: East Indian students 82 per cent, Chinese 80 per cent, White 77 per cent, Mixed 60 per cent, African 53 per cent, Syrian/Lebanese 50 per cent. The other respective groups lived in one-parent homes, with a relative or guardian generally. The overall student secondary school population living with both parents was 66 per cent, the rest living with one-parent or guardians generally. The report concluded: ‘When all the pieces are put together, one can say that the educational system is not user-friendly to young people of African descent especially females, nor to the poor, nor to those of non-nuclear families.’ (p. 440)

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Domestic Violence and the law in the caribbean

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Provocation: INTRODUCTION The Difficulty The crime rate, more specifically the murder Encountered by rate in the Caribbean, especially in the the Courts and islands of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago the Defence’s has shown a steady increase. At the time of Impact on writing this paper, the murder rate in ‘Battered Woman’s Trinidad and Tobago is approximately one Syndrome’1 to two murders per day. State authorities and members of society are naturally concerned Satnarine Sharma about finding effective measures to curb the increase. This paper proposes to examine findings from legal decisions by analysing the more common defences criminal offenders have put forward to the court to excuse their crime of murder (specifically provocation, and to a lesser extent diminished responsibility-inclusive of battered woman’s syndrome), and the factual circumstances surrounding these cases. From this information, insight can be gained into the social, psychological and emotional problems that both victims and offenders face which will prove instructive in developing rehabilitation prison programmes or counselling programmes as may be needed. Provocation may be defined simply as a mitigatory defence to murder, which alleges a total loss of self-control in response to another’s provocative conduct sufficient to convert what would otherwise have been murder into manslaughter. The defence of provocation is often rationalised, like duress and self-defence, as involving a reaction, which is within striking distance of what might be expected of reasonable people.

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However, no provocation whatever can render murder acceptable, or even excusable; but it may reduce the offence to manslaughter. At the heart of the provocation defence lies the assumption that the excusatory focus should be the all-too-human and supposedly characteristic tendency to act in a spontaneously retaliatory fashion, when provocation has led to great fear. The law of provocation continues to evolve; it is a criminal defence that is fraught with much complexity and continues to be the subject of much discussion in the legal fraternity.

PROVOCATION AT COMMON LAW

The defence of provocation has its genesis in the common law, which is that part of the law of England formulated, developed and administered by the common law courts, based originally on the common customs of the country. The common law rule was stated by Devlin J. in the case of R v Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932n. in what has been described by the Court of Criminal Appeal as a ‘classic direction’. He remarked:

‘Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused, which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind.’

I think it prudent at this point to set out some case law to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the operation of the defence of provocation at common law; moreover some key elements of this defence can be garnered from these cases.

1. If a man kills another suddenly, without any, or indeed without a considerable provocation, malice may be implied and the act amount to murder: R v Noon 6 Coz 137; R v Welsh 11 Cox 336 but if the provocation were great, and as such as must have greatly excited him, the killing is manslaughter only: R v Mawgridge 17 St. Tr. 57. 2. In considering, however, whether the killing upon provocation amounts to murder or manslaughter, the instrument with which the act was effected must also be taken into consideration; for if it were effected with a deadly weapon, the provocation must be great indeed to reduce the offence to one of manslaughter; if with a weapon or other means not likely to produce death, a less degree of provocation will be sufficient; in fact, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable proportion to the provocation, to reduce the offence to manslaughter: Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions 28 Cr.App.R.65. By way of example where a park-keeper, having found a boy stealing wood, tied him to a horse’s tail, and dragged him along the park, and the boy died of the injuries he thereby received, this was held to be

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murder: R v Holloway, Cro. Car. 131. An order by a police officer for example to move on, given to a person playing music in the street, followed by a push to give effect to the remonstrance, is not a provocation excusing use of a dangerous weapon: R v Hagan, 8 C. & P. 167. 3. The essence of the defence of provocation is a sudden and temporary lack of self-control. Where therefore, the provocation inspires an actual intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm, only one special exception has been recognised as reducing murder to manslaughter - namely, where one spouse actually finds the other in the act of adultery: Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] A.C.588. However, a sudden confession of adultery without more can never constitute provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter. 4. In all cases, to reduce homicide upon provocation to manslaughter, it is essential that the battery, wounding, etc., should have been inflicted immediately upon the provocation being given; for if there is a sufficient cooling time for passion to subside and reason to interpose, and the person so provoked afterwards kills the other, this is deliberate revenge, and not heat of blood, and accordingly amounts to murder: R v Thomas, 7 C. & P. 817. 5. In no case can words alone, save in circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional character, so reduce the crime, when words alone are relied on as extenuation, it is the duty of the Judge to consider whether they are of this violently provocative character, and if he is satisfied that they are of this violently provocative character, and if he is satisfied that they cannot reasonably be so regarded, to direct the jury accordingly: Holmes v Director of Public Prosecutions (supra).

THE HOMICIDE ACT (UK) 1957 (‘THE ACT’)

On the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949–53) (Cmd. 8932), paras. 151–52, the common law was modified by section three of the Act which is identical to section four B of the Offences against the Person Act, Chap 11:08 of the Laws of Trinidad and Tobago. It provides:

Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man.

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Smith (1999) comments that section 3 of the Act does not create or codify the common law defence of provocation; instead it makes an assumption of its existence and amends the common law defence. It does not state the effect of a successful defence; hence one must assume that it is by virtue of the common law that the offence is reduced to manslaughter. It is apparent that the section presupposes dual tests. Firstly, a subjective test — was the defendant provoked to lose his self-control? This is coupled with an objective inquiry — was the provocation enough to make a reasonable man do as the defendant did?

THE SUBJECTIVE TEST OR FACTUAL LIMB

The jury in deciding this question of fact is naturally entitled to take into account all the relevant circumstances, the nature of the provocative act and all the relevant conditions in which it took place, the sensitivity or otherwise of the defendant, and the time, if any, which elapsed between the provocation and the act which caused death.

THE OBJECTIVE OR REASONABLE PERSON TEST

From the nineteenth century and during the twentieth, the law of provocation expanded beyond the subjective condition to include this objective condition. See Reg. v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox 336. This objective or evaluative ingredient, involves the question ‘whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did… [taking] into account everything both done and said according to the effect… it would have on a reasonable man.’ This objective ingredient is comprised of two elements; firstly it requires an assessment of the gravity of the provocation and secondly, it calls for an application of an external standard of self-control, ‘whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did.’

THE IMPACT OF SECTION THREE OF THE HOMICIDE ACT 1957 ON THE LAW OF PROVOCATION

Some notable changes in the law brought about by the Act are:

1. If there was evidence that the defendant was provoked to lose his self- control (the subjective element) then the question of whether the objective element was satisfied had to be left to the jury. The judge was not entitled, as he could at common law, to withdraw the issue from the jury if he thought there was no evidence upon which the jury could reasonably assess whether the objective element might have been satisfied. 2. The jury could for this purpose take into account ‘everything both said and done’, thus removing any legal restriction on the types of acts that could qualify as provocation.

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3. It took away the power of the judge to dictate to the jury what the characteristics of the reasonable man were.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF PROVOCATION

The case law on provocation indicates a state of tension between the purist and pragmatic views of the structure the defence should take. Oliver Quick and Celia Wells (2006) aptly describe the tension thus:

Provocation’s concession to human frailty sits comfortably in a criminal law, which is premised on the denial of explanations based on individual circumstances. Provocation therefore never knows quite where to place itself in the turmoil of competing realities and tensions and tends to function as a distorting echo of contemporary fears and concerns.

The seminal cases on the law that illustrate the operation of the defence will now be set out for full comprehension of the state of flux which arose from its application. R v Camplin [1978] A.C. 705(H.L) (‘Camplin’)

This is the leading case on the modern law of provocation. D aged 15 killed K by splitting his skull with a chapatti pan. At D’s trial for murder, he claimed provocation on the ground that K had buggered him in spite of his resistance and then laughed at him. Counsel for the defence addressed the jury contending that the test for provocation was not the reaction of a reasonable man. Nevertheless D was convicted of murder. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed, and a verdict of manslaughter substituted. The Court of Appeal held that the test for provocation was the effect of the provocation on a boy of 15; the rationale being that youth and its accompanying immaturity are not deviations from the norm, but norms through which all persons must pass. On appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to the House of Lords, it was held, dismissing the appeal that the trial judge had erred in instructing the jury to pay no attention to D’s age. They should have taken into consideration those factors, including D’s age and physical characteristics, which in their opinion would have affected the gravity of the provocation offered. The conviction for murder had been rightly quashed. The crux of the House of Lords’s decision is that when considering, on a charge of murder, whether a reasonable man would have been provoked to lose his self- control under section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, the jury should be told that the reasonable man in question is a person having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the accused, but in other respects sharing such of the accused’s characteristics as they think would affect the gravity of the provocation to him. [1978] C.L.Y. 558

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R v Morhall [1995] 3All ER 659 (H.L.) (‘Morhall’)

M was a glue-sniffing addict who stabbed and killed his friend D during a fight that took place after D and others had taunted M for several hours about his addiction. At M’s trial for murder, the judge directed the jury that M’s addiction was something they should take into account because M contended that it was the topic on which provocative words were uttered. M was convicted of murder; his appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. On appeal to the House of Lords, it was held allowing M’s appeal and substituting a verdict of manslaughter, that for the purposes of the test of provocation contained in section three of the Homicide Act 1957, the jury should be directed by reference to a hypothetical person having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the age and sex of the defendant, but in other respects sharing such of the defendant’s characteristics as they think would affect the gravity of the provocation to him. The mere fact that a characteristic of the defendant is discreditable did not exclude it from consideration (Camplin was applied). In the case of glue sniffing, drug addiction or alcoholism, a distinction must be drawn between, on the one hand, situations where the defendant is taunted with his addiction in which case it may be relevant to take the addiction into account as going to the gravity of the provocation and, on the other, the simple fact of the defendant being intoxicated, which is excluded as a matter of policy. In cases where a defendant’s addiction is the subject of taunts said to constitute provocation, a jury should be directed to take into account the defendant’s addiction as a matter going to the gravity of the alleged provocation. [1995] C.L.Y 1281 Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1996] 2 All ER 1033 (P.C.) (‘Luc Thiet’)

L appealed against conviction of murder of his girlfriend. He stated at trial that he had lost control when she had taunted him about his sexual inadequacy and her new boyfriend. Two medical experts called by L testified that he suffered organic brain damage of a kind, which often results in difficulty in controlling an impulse. L pleaded the defences of provocation and diminished responsibility. The judge did not refer to the medical evidence when directing the jury on provocation and L was convicted. L argued on appeal that the Hong Kong Homicide Ordinance section four, which was the same as the Homicide Act 1957 section three, required the judge to direct the jury to have regard to whether a reasonable man having the characteristics of the defendant would have reacted to the provocation in the same way. L contended that the judge had erred by failing to mention his brain damage. The Privy Council (Lord Steyn dissenting) held that both the Ordinance and the Act provided the defence of diminished responsibility for those who suffered from mental abnormality, impairing or reducing his powers of self-control. Unless the mental abnormality was the subject of taunts, it was not a factor to be attributed to the ordinary person for the purpose

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of deciding whether an ordinary person with the defendant’s characteristics would have acted as he did. Individual peculiarities should not be taken into account for that test. [1996] C.L.Y. 1456 R v Smith (Morgan James) [2001] 1 A.C 146. (H.L) (‘Morgan Smith’)

S was convicted of murder after he stabbed M during a violent row one evening when both men had been drinking heavily. S successfully appealed, reducing the conviction to manslaughter, on the basis of provocation since he had many unresolved grievances against M, and his anger had been inflamed by M’s repeated denial in the face of allegations that M had stolen the tools of S’s trade. The trial judge had directed the jury not to take account of factors personal to S, such as his clinical depression, when deciding whether a reasonable man would have acted as S had done under the same circumstances. On appeal it was contended that the judge had erred in his direction to the jury and that characteristics personal to S were relevant in deciding whether the objective element of the provocation test had been satisfied. The Court of Appeal held that a depressive illness, not amounting to diminished responsibility but which might have reduced S’s threshold for erupting into violence, was a relevant characteristic and gave leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The Crown appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal, contending that the Homicide Act 1957 section three had not changed the previous common law position established in Camplin and Luc Thiet whereby the only personal characteristics relevant to the objective test were the age and sex of the accused. According to authorities these were only relevant to the gravity of the provocation and not matters affecting the powers of self-control of the accused. The House held (Lord Hobhouse and Lord Millet dissenting) that the trial judge had erred in his direction to the jury in telling them to disregard personal characteristics of the defendant when considering whether the provocation was such that it would have made a reasonable man lose his self- control and act in the way S had done. The defence of provocation involved two tests: the subjective test which questioned whether the person provoked had temporarily been deprived of the power of self-control resulting in the unlawful act causing death, and the objective test where the jury had to consider whether the provocation was such that a reasonable man would have lost his self-control and acted in such a way. The common law position had been modified by the Homicide Act 1957 section three which provided for the objective element to be a matter for the jury and, in making their decision, they could take into account everything both done or said, thus widening the circumstances which could amount to provocation. Though in Camplin, it was decided that the age and sex of the defendant could be taken into account, the majority decision in Luc Thiet had been followed by the trial judge, in holding that S’s brain damage, which diminished his ability to control his actions, was irrelevant. The House of Lords

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however concluded that the judge had erred in telling the jury that the depressive illness, making S less inhibited and adversely affecting his self-control, was not something to which they should have regard. Such a direction being contrary to section three of the Act although it was still necessary for the jury to apply an objective standard of behaviour which society was entitled to expect. [2000] C.L.Y 986 Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] 3 W.L.R. 29 (P.C.) (‘Holley’)

This is another Privy Council case that supports the decision in Luc Thiet to apply a uniform standard of the reasonable man to the objective limb of the test of provocation. The appellant Attorney General for Jersey appealed against the decision of the Court of Appeal of Jersey to substitute a conviction for manslaughter for a conviction for murder in the case of the respondent (H). H was a chronic alcoholic who admitted killing his long-standing girlfriend with an axe while under the influence of alcohol. The deceased was also an alcoholic. When drunk they had rows and the deceased was given to derogatory comments affecting H’s self-esteem. Both had been drinking on the day she died. The deceased returned to the flat they shared and said to H, who was holding an axe, ‘You haven’t got the guts.’ H struck and killed her. The issue was whether the jury should have been directed that H’s chronic alcoholism was a matter to be taken into account by the jury when considering whether, having regard to the actual provocation and their view of its gravity, a person having ordinary powers of self-control would have done what H did. The Privy Council held allowing the appeal (Lords Bingham, Hoffman and Carswell dissenting), that the issue for the jury under the Homicide Act (UK) 1957 section three and the Homicide (Jersey) Law 1986 Art.4 was whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as the defendant had done. Further, it was well established that a ‘reasonable man’ meant a person of ordinary powers of self-control. Camplin was applied. That meant that there was a risk under the statute of an individual defendant being temperamentally unable to achieve that standard. If the defendant suffered from an abnormality of the mind the defence of diminished responsibility was available under section two of the 1957 Act. The jury could take account of the defendant’s characteristics when considering the gravity of the provocation. Therefore the statutory reasonable man had the powers of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of like sex and age and in other respects shared such of the characteristics, as the jury thought would affect the gravity of the provocation. The standard of self-control was uniform and objective and was not to be judged by the self-control, which the defendant was able to exercise in the view of the jury. A more flexible test was inconsistent with the statute. Luc Thiet applied and Morgan Smith not followed. If a defendant was taunted on account of his intoxication, that might be a relevant matter for the jury to take into account

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when assessing the gravity of the taunt to the defendant. But the defendant’s intoxicated state was not a matter to be taken into account by the jury when considering whether the defendant exercised ordinary self-control. Therefore the appeal was allowed, but in the particular circumstances of the instant case H’s murder conviction would not be reinstated. [2005] C.L.Y 807

THE CONFLICTING VIEWS IN A NUTSHELL

THE PURIST POSITION

The view of the Privy Council expressed in Luc Thiet Thuan v R and AG for Jersey v Holley, the minority in R v Morgan Smith and by the House of Lords in Morhall is that the defendant ought to be judged by the standard of a person having ordinary powers of self-control.

THE PRAGMATIC VIEW

In the Morgan Smith case the majority view of the House of Lords rejected the approach of the Privy Council. It is the view therein that the standard of self- control required at common law and by the statute is not the constant standard of a person having and exercising ordinary self-control. The required standard is more adaptable. The jury should apply the standard of control to be expected of the particular individual. Lord Slynn in Morgan Smith [2001] 1 A.C. 146 at 155 commented that the jury must ask themselves whether the defendant ‘exercised the degree of self-control to be expected of someone in his situation.’ Lord Clyde similarly said that,

‘the standard of reasonableness in this context should refer to a person exercising the ordinary power of self-control over his passions, which someone in his position is able to exercise, and is expected by society to exercise. By position I mean to include all the characteristics which the particular individual possesses and which may in the circumstances bear on his power of control other than those influences which have been self-induced.’

BINDING LAW IN THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN

The pivotal question that arises in cases where a person puts forward the defence of provocation is the manner in which the Court is to treat with an accused who is suffering from serious mental abnormality, as in the Morgan Smith case where the defendant suffered from severe clinical depression. Is he for the purposes of the defence of provocation, to be judged by the standard of a person having ordinary powers of self-control?

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The ambit of the defence of provocation is settled at least for the present time in Trinidad and Tobago. This is so because of the binding or compulsory nature of decisions emanating from the Privy Council, our final appellate court. Decisions of the House of Lords and English Court of Appeal are highly persuasive and persuasive respectively in nature but need not be followed by the local courts. As such, the decisions of Holley and Luc Thiet must be followed in our jurisdiction. The law as obtains in this jurisdiction accords with the minority view in Morgan Smith, and is aptly summed up in the dicta of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in AG for Jersey v Holley as follows:

‘The standard is a constant, objective standard in all cases. The jury should assess the gravity of the provocation to the defendant. In that respect, as when considering the subjective ingredient of provocation (did the defendant lose his self-control?); the jury must take the defendant as they find him ‘warts and all’, as Lord Millet observed. But having assessed the gravity of the provocation to the defendant, the standard of self-control by which his conduct is to be evaluated for the purpose of the defence of provocation is the external standard of a person having and exercising ordinary powers of self-control. That is the standard the jury should apply when considering whether or not the provocation should be regarded as sufficient to bring about the defendant’s response to it’.

THE CONUNDRUM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Unlike the Commonwealth Caribbean, the United Kingdom does not retain the Privy Council as its final appellate court so that decisions of that Court are not binding on English courts. In fact the Court of Appeal has declined to follow Luc Thiet Thuan. The decision of Morgan Smith, which emanated from the House of Lords, was the binding law in the United Kingdom for about five years until the law was settled in the cases of R v James (Leslie) and R v Karimi (Jamal) [2006] Crim. L.R. 629. Uneasiness appeared to persist among the Law Lords, some of whom sat in both the House of Lords and the Privy Council, as to the correct approach to the law of provocation between the period of time from the Morgan Smith case to R v James (Leslie) and R v Karimi (Jamal). In the light of this I will undertake a critique of the decision in Morgan Smith to illustrate the fallacies therein and to illustrate that, reliance is placed in this jurisdiction on the decisions of Luc Thiet Thuan and Holley not simply because of their binding nature but because of the logic of the law expressed by the majority ruling in each case.

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COMMENTARY ON THE DECISION IN MORGAN SMITH 1. The interpretation of Camplin

Lord Slynn in his judgment in Morgan Smith discusses the intention of section 3 of the Homicide Act (UK) 1957. He remarked:

‘Obviously if the only possible interpretation of section 3 were that the ‘reactions of the reasonable man’ test was wholly objective, one would be bound to accept it whatever the consequences in particular cases. I am however satisfied that it is not the only possible construction of section 3; itself intended to ‘mitigate in some degree the harshness of the common law of provocation as it had been developed by recent decisions of this House’ Camplin [1978] A.C. 705, p.716B per Lord Diplock… Judges must avoid imposing a fetter on the right and duty of the jury which the Act accords to them to act upon their own opinion on the matter’. Camplin p. 718 per Lord Diplock.

Lord Slynn felt that the jury must ask whether the defendant exercised the degree of self-control to be expected of someone in his situation, in keeping with the principle agreed by the House in Camplin per dicta of Lord Diplock at p.717, that a reasonable man

means an ordinary person of either sex, not exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, but possessed of such powers of self-control as everyone is entitled to expect that his fellow citizens will exercise in society as it is today…It would stultify much of the mitigation of the previous harshness of the common law in ruling out verbal provocation as capable of reducing murder to manslaughter if the jury could not take into consideration all those factors which in their opinion would affect the gravity of taunts or insults when applied to the person whom they are addressed. So to this extent at any rate the unqualified proposition accepted by this House in Bedder v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1119 that for the purposes of the ‘reasonable man’ test any unusual physical characteristics if the accused must be ignored requires revision as a result of the passing of the Act of 1957.

Lord Slynn in Morgan Smith remarked that it appeared to him from the passages quoted above that personal characteristics may be something the jury could take into account. He felt that Lord Diplock in Camplin was certainly not limiting the characteristics which can be taken into account to age or sex, this he gathered from Lord Diplock’s comment ‘That he was only 15 years of age at the time of the killing is the relevant characteristic of the accused in the instant case.’ I am of the view that the majority decision as seen in the judgement of Lord Slynn in Morgan Smith is a misinterpretation of the words of Lord Diplock in Camplin. It is agreed for the purposes of assessing the gravity of provocation that unusual physical characteristics and mental characteristics must be taken into

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consideration. But the passage does not speak to mental characteristics affecting powers of self-restraint, which were the sole issue in the appeal in Morgan Smith. Therefore, the wholesale reliance on Camplin to justify the use of personal characteristics in the objective question of whether a reasonable man would act as the defendant did is without merit. The use of personal characteristics should be limited to evaluating the gravity of the provocation on the defendant. This view is supported by Professor Glanville Williams (1983) who discussed the case of R v Raney (1942) 29 Cr. App. R 14; a case decided when words were generally regarded as incapable of amounting to provocation. The deceased therein, had knocked away the crutch of the defendant, a one-legged man. Professor Williams commented at p. 540

although the defendant has only one leg, he can (or should be able) to control his temper as well as the next man; but his handicap may determine the circumstances that infuriate him. This leads to the conclusion that the characteristic must relate to the provocation … “characteristics” do not include matters that bear simply on the general capacity for self-control.

Further, the approach suggested by the majority in Morgan Smith would eliminate altogether the objective element and remove the only external standard to the accused by which the jury may judge the sufficiency of provocation relied on, therefore leading to a result contrary to the intention of the Homicide Act 1957. 2. Misguided statutory construction of section 3 of the Homicide Act

The opinion of the majority of the Privy Council given in Holley is that the Homicide Act 1957 at section 3 altered the law of provocation at common law and furthermore that parliament through the enactment of the Homicide Act 1957 settled what the law on provocation should be, therefore it is not open to any judges to modify the common law and therefore depart from the law as decreed by parliament. Under the Homicide Act 1957, the sufficiency of the provocation (that is whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as the defendant did) is to be judged by one standard, not a standard that varies from defendant to defendant. The statute does not leave each jury free to set whatever standard they consider appropriate in the circumstances by which to judge whether the defendant’s conduct is pardonable. This point of view is augmented by the dicta of Lord Diplock in R v Camplin at p. 717, where in remarking on the meaning of the term ‘reasonable man’ for the purposes of the law of provocation, he said ‘it means an ordinary person of either sex, not exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, but possessed of such powers of self-control as everyone is entitled to expect that his fellow citizens will exercise

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in society as it is today.’ Similarly, Lord Goff of Chieveley, in R v Morhall [1996] AC 90 at p. 98 commented that despite the express words of section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 (UK), to speak of the degree of self-control attributable to the ordinary person is ‘certainly less likely to mislead’ than to do so with reference to the reasonable person, it is clear that statute made no reference to personal characteristics but simply to that which is expected of an ordinary person. Similarly, in the opinion of Lord Goff of Chieveley, in Luc Thiet, section 3 should be interpreted as requiring the standard of self-control of an ordinary person not that of a person who had an abnormal and deficient capacity for self- control. There is clearly a preponderance of authority in consonance with the natural, unambiguous meaning of section three that there is to be a set standard for the reasonable man utilised in the objective test in the law of provocation, so that he does not become the ‘unreasonable’ reasonable man if the personal characteristics of a defendant are attributed to him. 3. Need to construe the Homicide Act of 1957 in its context: diminished responsibility

Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 or section 4A of the Offences against the Person Act describes the defence of diminished responsibility. It occurs:

Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such an abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.

There is a definite inter-relation between sections two and three of the Homicide Act. They both deal with factors, which may affect the total culpability of the defendant for the killing. The premise upon which they both proceed is that the defendant has killed or been a party to the killing and has had the mens rea requisite to the crime of murder. It would appear that it is felt by some judges and practitioners alike that perhaps section two does not adequately address the scenario of a defendant who has an abnormality of the mind, but who killed in response to provocation. However, it is clear from reading sections two and three together that where a defendant possesses an abnormality of the mind, deemed of sufficient severity in the opinion of the jury to impair significantly his mental responsibility for killing his provoker, he will be found guilty of manslaughter and not murder, even if his action was not that to be expected of a reasonable man. Therefore there is no need to try to fit this mental abnormality uncomfortably into the defence of provocation. A person who merely has a personality disorder, for example, a violent tendency, will not be able to rely on diminished responsibility nor on the defence

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of provocation if his response to the provocation was incommensurate. Similarly, where the defendant suffered from an abnormality of the mind but the jury does not find it sufficient to significantly impair his responsibility, he will not have a defence under section two (diminished responsibility). This reflects the policy of the Homicide Act 1957 and it would be contrary to this policy to extend the defence of provocation under section 3 to give the defendant the defence denied him by section two. Lord Hobhouse dissenting in Morgan Smith fittingly remarked:

One of the errors that has bedeviled some of the recent judicial statements in this part of the English law of homicide is the failure to take account of the interaction of sections 2 and 3 and appreciate that they not only show that the strained construction (of section 3) is wrong but also that the perceived injustice which the strained construction is designed to avoid is in fact covered by an application of section 2 in accordance with its ordinary meaning.

An illustration of this principle arises in R v Byrne [1960] 2 Q.B.396, 402, where Lord Parker C.J, in giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal noted that a sexual psychopath with violent perverted sexual desires, which he finds difficult or impossible to control, can only rely on the defence of diminished responsibility under section two as he as does not fit the criteria required under provocation of the reasonable man — a man with a normal mind. Therefore, it is manifestly apparent that there is adequate provision for a defendant with an abnormality of mind under section two of the Homicide Act 1957, which the courts will in the appropriate case enforce. Therefore there is no need to stretch the defence of provocation to consider his abnormality in assessing whether a reasonable person would have done as the defendant did. Perhaps the conflicting views are best described by Lord Hobhouse in Morgan Smith in which he remarked:

The striking thing about the present and similar cases is that the defendant is unwilling to rely on section 2, or having done so, fails to satisfy the jury and wished then to adopt a strained construction of section 3 in order to escape the burden of proof and introduce vaguer concepts not contemplated by either section… there seems in some quarters to be an implicit assumption that the assessment by a jury under section 2 is inadequate properly to allow for the defendant’s abnormality of mind in relation to any killing which was contributed to by provocation. There is no reason to make this assumption … This simply reflects the policy of the statute and it would be contrary to that policy to extend section 3 to give him the defence advisedly denied him by section 2.

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ENGLISH LAW OF PROVOCATION

There have been a few cases that reflect a change in the views of the English Law Lords in relation to the defence of provocation. In R v Faqir Mohammed (2005) EWCA Crim 1880 a devout Moslem returning from the mosque caught a young man leaving his daughter’s bedroom window. He immediately killed his daughter by repeatedly stabbing her with a knife. The evidence showed that following the death of his wife five years earlier he suffered from depression, and there was creditable evidence that he had a violent temperament and repeatedly had been violent towards his daughters and his wife. Despite the fact that a Privy Council ratio decidendi is only persuasive authority, the Court of Appeal applied the law as established in Holley thus reinstating the law before Morgan Smith. Scott Baker L.J. said:

Properly directed, the jury therefore have applied a narrow and strict test of a man with ordinary powers of self-control rather than the wider test of excusability that was put to them by the judge. The jury having convicted on the basis of the wider test, we cannot see any unsafety in the conviction. The same result would have been inevitable if the provocation direction had been on the basis of Holley.

In the cases of R v James (Leslie) and R v Karimi (Jamal) [2006] Crim. L.R. 629, the appellants (J and K) appealed their convictions of murder. Each appealed on the ground that, in considering their defences of provocation, the trial judge erred in the identification of the applicable law. The success of each appeal depended upon whether the court should follow the decision of the House of Lords in Morgan Smith rather than the subsequent decision of the Privy Council in Holley. In both appeals, on the application of the approach taken in Morgan Smith, the defence of provocation might have succeeded. J and K argued that it was not open to the Court of Appeal to prefer the decision in Holley to that in Morgan Smith. They argued that to do so would be to throw the law into uncertainty, leaving the lower courts with no clear principle as to when they could follow a decision of the Privy Council rather than a decision of the Court of Appeal. The Crown argued that although decisions of the Privy Council were generally no more than persuasive, Holley was exceptional and it had clearly been the intention of the Privy Council to declare the law on the issue of provocation, it argued that Holley should accordingly be followed. It was held dismissing the appeals that a majority of the Law Lords had, in the case of Holley decided that a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could overrule a decision of the House of Lords. Once it was postulated that there were circumstances in which that could be done, then the Court of Appeal was bound, in those circumstances to prefer the decision of the Privy Council to the prior decision of the House of Lords. The exceptional features that justify preference being given to the decision of the Privy Council to the prior decision of the House of Lords’s decision in Morgan Smith are:

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1. all nine of the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary sitting in Holley had agreed that the result reached by majority clarified definitively English law on the issue of provocation; 2. that the result reached in Holley had constituted half the Appellant Committee of the House of Lords; 3. that in the circumstances, the result of any appeal on the issue to the House of Lords was a foregone conclusion. Accordingly, the individual appeals were to be approached on the premise that the relevant law was to be found in the majority decision of the Privy Council in Holley and not the majority decision of the House of Lords in Morgan Smith.

The Privy Council, a Court of only persuasive nature in the UK, has surprisingly definitively stated the UK law on the defence of provocation. Nevertheless the impact of this on the law in our jurisdiction and the Commonwealth is profound, there is a reassurance that past decisions made on the basis of the ratio decidendi in Privy Council decisions were not erroneously made and a realistic hope that the law will be settled at least for a while. Notwithstanding, the apparent settled state of the law in both the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth Caribbean, there are still some questions of academic importance that must be addressed.

PROVOCATION, DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY: TIME FOR REFORM OF THE DEFENCES?

Before the decision in R v James (Leslie) much debate arose in the UK as to whether the defence of provocation should be reformed. It is submitted that the law in this area is for now happily settled. However it may still be interesting to look at the suggestions for reform. The UK Law Commission’s options for reform are grounded on the view that the problems of provocation go beyond moral, theoretical and practical problems, and that the defects are not curable by judicial development. In its Consultation Paper, the Law Commission of the UK (2003) gave arguments against the Morgan Smith position of merged defences as follows:

1. Diminished responsibility and provocation are fundamentally different defences with different rationales and different essential elements. 2. Combining the two partial defences into a single partial defence would not reflect the ethical difference between them. The ethical distinction is that provocation is a partial excuse for wrongdoing while diminished responsibility consists of a partial denial of responsibility. 3. The fact that a defendant, as a matter of law, may be convicted of manslaughter on grounds both of diminished responsibility and of

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provocation, while demonstrating that they are not mutually exclusive, is not in itself reason for combining them into a single partial defence. It merely demonstrates that a person with diminished responsibility may be provoked to lose his self-control and react in the same way as any one else. 4. The view of the majority in Morgan Smith is flawed because it accords insufficient recognition to the differences, as identified above, between the two partial defences. 5. A single defence of the kind suggested would lack a clear boundary and would be unacceptably wide.

Writers such as Susan M. Edwards (2004) have argued for a complete abolition of the provocation defence altogether, with moral indignation or temper only being properly considered in the mitigation of sentence. If the killing were committed in circumstances where there is a loss of self-control then loss should be a matter for diminished responsibility. Other writers such as Mackay and Mitchell (2003) have emphasised the link between provocation and diminished responsibility in light of abnormalities of mind. They argue that the distinction between the two pleas is no longer practical and that it would therefore be expeditious to merge them into one defence which recognises that both extreme emotional disturbance and unsoundness of mind can influence the accused’s behaviour at the time of the killing. Criticisms of provocation defence

1. Offenders are allowed to escape the full punishment for their crime in cases where they killed by reacting to petty forms of provocations. In some jurisdictions, like in Scotland, the plea of provocation has been restricted to serious cases where the accused has been provoked by violence or infidelity. It has become the norm in the Commonwealth Caribbean for defences of provocation to succeed in cases ranging from petty provocative arguments concerning ownership of belongings (a parakeet) in The State v Bridgelal (unreported) to provocative statements — The State v Cudjoe (unreported) (argument relating to the accused’s girlfriend suffering from AIDS), to serious provocation by an adulterous act of the offender’s wife - The State v Bhim Harriram [C.A. Crim. 46/1994]. It is inimical to a society’s criminal justice system for a pervading ‘societal norm or culture of tolerance’ with respect to aggressive responses by male offenders to exist. Israel Khan (1993) sums up the Caribbean social culture aptly remarking that it rests firmly within our contemplation of a reasonable man in the Caribbean, that he, on hearing of a confession of adultery by his wife, would ‘lose his self-control and thus react by slapping, cuffing or if he has something in his hand by striking his wife.’

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When the definitive norm as to what is acceptable behaviour shifts downward, there is little incentive for men to develop their character and to value qualities of self-control. Increased societal acceptance and positive endorsement of aggressive, impulsive and machismo behaviour of men will only assist in shaping the aggressive personalities of men. This could result in the abuse of the ‘provocation’ defence where offenders who have low tolerance toward minor provocations are able to have their murder charges readily downgraded into charges of manslaughter. In some cases where offenders have benefited from the provocation plea, the sentence does not even reflect the gravity of the crime of taking a person’s life. The Coalition Council Against Domestic Violence: see Trinidad Guardian (June 5, 1998), has criticised the inconsistency in the sentencing practices of the judiciary, for instance ten years sentence for manslaughter committed by a police officer towards his fiancée as opposed to 15 years sentence for an offender who committed rape of a minor.

2. Battered women are excluded from the masculinist formulae of provocation’s objective and subjective tests as they are from the objective and subjective pre-requisites of self-defence especially with regard to the application of the requirements of ‘proportionality’ and ‘immediacy’. The UK Law Commission acknowledged that,

The defence of provocation elevates the emotion of sudden anger above emotions of fear, despair, compassion or empathy, either where man is compelled to act because of the need to preserve “honour” or, as is more recently the case, impelled to act because of an inner pathological drive or impulse of anger.

BATTERED WOMAN’S SYNDROME IS THE BATTERED WOMAN ‘PROVOKED’ OR ‘MENTALLY ABNORMAL’?

Much debate has also arisen as to whether the law should be reformed to properly recategorise the legal position on the plea of ‘battered woman’s syndrome, As discussed before, it is obvious that some battered women will not be able to avail themselves of the plea of provocation. For the defence of provocation to be successfully invoked in a murder trial it is necessary to show that the actions were the result of a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, and although the murderous act need not follow on immediately from the provocation, the longer the gap between the incidents, the less likely the defence of provocation is to succeed. The ‘reasonable man’ test of provocation or loss of self-control has become more tightly prescribed for legal purposes: see the Privy Council’s decision of

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Holley and the House of Lords’s decision of James (Leslie). It is acknowledged that the purport of Morgan Smith the former UK position would have been of greater assistance to battered women as they would more readily fall within a wide definition of a ‘reasonable person’ (where their mental state at the time of the killing would be taken into account). But to have retained this position indefinitely would have been sacrificed the consistency in the law and clear boundary lines of the defences. Ashworth (2005) notes the difficulty that battered woman’s syndrome finds itself in. He makes reference to Lord Nicholls in Holley who has argued that a condition of battered woman’s syndrome would be relevant in assessing the gravity of the provocation for the woman i.e. the subjective element and then the jury would then decide whether in their opinion having regard to the actual provocation and their view of its gravity for the defendant a woman of her age having ordinary powers of self control would have done as she did. He however concedes that the best opportunity for reducing the offence to manslaughter would be diminished responsibility because of the relative inflexibility of the second element in the objective test of provocation. With respect to the subjective test, Lord Taylor of Gosforth C.J. in R v Ahluwahlia, [1992] 4 All. E. R at p. 896 c–d stated:

We accept that the subjective element in the defence of provocation would not as a matter of law be negatived simply because of the delayed reaction in such cases, provided that there was at the time of the killing a “sudden and temporary loss of self control” caused by the alleged provocation. However, the longer the delay and the stronger the evidence of deliberation on the part of the defendant, the more likely it will be that the prosecution will negative provocation.

Nicholson states that this clearly relegates a time delay from being a legal bar to provocation to simply evidence as to whether in fact self-control was suddenly lost. Though the decision in Ahluwahlia allows battered women who kill their sleeping or comatose batterers following a ‘slow burn’ of anger to put provocation to the jury, battered women may find themselves unlikely to succeed depending on the timing and circumstances of the homicide. In the Commonwealth Caribbean, however, battered women have a wider avenue for success in reducing their murder conviction to one of manslaughter under the defence of diminished responsibility, since evidence of battered woman syndrome has been categorised as conducive to a plea of diminished responsibility.

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE AUTHORITIES ON BATTERED WOMAN’S SYNDROME

To understand the authorities on battered woman’s syndrome it will be helpful

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to trace firstly the development of the concept. Nicholson (1993) at p. 733, describes the development of battered woman’s syndrome as follows,

BWS was developed by the American psychologist Lenore Walker in order to dispel myths and misconceptions about domestic violence and to help establish the reasonableness of homicide by battered women. It consists of two elements. The “cycle theory” postulates that male violence against women partners typically follows a three-phase pattern. The first involves a period of heightening tension caused by the man’s argumentativeness, during which the woman attempts various unsuccessful pacifying strategies. This “tension building” phase ends when the man erupts into a rage at some small trigger and acutely batters the woman. This is followed by the “loving contrite” or “honeymoon” phase, in which the guilt– ridden batterer pleads for forgiveness, is affectionate and swears off violence. But he breaks his promise and the cycle is repeated. The second element of BWS involves the theory of “learned helplessness”.… According to Walker, the randomness and apparent unavoidability of their beatings produce similar reactions in battered women. They also develop a number of common characteristics, such as low self-esteem, self-blame for the violence, anxiety, depression, fear, general suspiciousness, and the belief that only they can change their predicament.

R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All. E.R. 889, C.A, (1993) C.L.Y 966

A, an Asian woman who had, over a period of years suffered abuse from her husband, killed him by setting fire to a bedroom in which he was asleep. A was convicted of murder. On appeal she pleaded that she had been provoked by his repeated violence towards her. The prosecution contended that her actions were too far removed in time from any violence by her husband to be considered as a response to provocation. It was held by the Court of Appeal allowing the appeal and ordering a retrial, that (1) the defence of provocation is only available when there has been a sudden and temporary loss of self-control; (2) this loss of self-control need not be immediate; (3) A’s mental state at the time of the incident may be taken into account when determining whether the actions were the result of a loss of self- control. The Court of Appeal held that only killings undertaken in ‘hot blood’ could form the basis for a successful plea of provocation and that a person, whose normative response had been subverted by years of cumulative violence at the hands of her deceased husband, was entitled only to raise the defence of diminished responsibility. Evidence that the defendant’s loss of self-control was attributable to constitutional susceptibility rather than the objective gravity of the provocation should also be considered by the jury in deciding whether the defendant’s reaction was reasonably to be expected.

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Indravani Ramjattan v State C.A.Crim. 59 of 1995

Indravani Ramjattan was convicted at trial of murder as a party to a joint enterprise to kill her husband Jordan or cause him serious harm and she automatically received a death sentence on May 29, 1995. On appeal to the Court of Appeal on the issue that the trial judge failed to direct the jury on the alternative verdict of manslaughter, this appeal was dismissed on March 10, 1997. She petitioned the Privy Council on the grounds that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the defence of lawful force used in the prevention of crime, on self- defence and defence of another and on the issue of provocation. This petition failed. The Privy Council found that her case did not fit the statutory definition of provocation or unlawful force. Lord Browne Wilkinson described her case as tragic. The Coalition against Domestic Violence and other groups lobbied on her behalf that she was a battered wife. She petitioned again for leave to appeal to introduce fresh evidence to support the partial defence of diminished responsibility along with other defences. She was granted leave on March 3, 1999 and the case was remitted to the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago. The court had to decide whether fresh evidence should be accepted and if it were, whether it justified quashing the murder conviction for one of manslaughter or the ordering of a retrial. On October 7, 1999, the Court of Appeal accepted the mitigating defence of diminished responsibility based on battered women’s syndrome and the conviction of murder was replaced with one of manslaughter and Ramjattan was sentenced to an additional five years in prison.

GENDERED DEFENCES?

The fact that Ramjattan’s evidence of being a battered woman was only accepted to support a plea of diminished responsibility and not self-defence or provocation has raised some concern among feminist circles that this implicitly negatively depicts women as psychiatrically or psychologically troubled and weak- minded. They argue that such a categorisation of these women who have survived various forms of abuse, unfairly and narrow-mindedly pathologies such women. It also denies the strong, complex, proactive and independent aspects of their characters that dealt with their abusers when no assistance from the society was forthcoming. In parenthesis, one wonders why the obsessive, possessive, jealous emotions of men who kill their unfaithful or deserter wives are not characterised as a ‘syndrome’ or why are men not stigmatised as having ‘battering husband’s syndrome?’ Loss of self-control or the uncontrollable anger/rage of men reflected by an immediate response is more readily excused by society as a normal reaction to a provoking act, and is not regarded as falling within the category of diminished responsibility. If one were to analyse the instances in the Caribbean where females are murdered, in most instances the cases involve men who can’t control their

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anger or emotions after a break-up or when they suspect their wives of being unfaithful. Tracey Robinson (2000) comments that the Ramjattan case does little to engender optimism or to signal radically new ways of understanding women’s experiences in the criminal justice system. She emphasises the need to confront cultural norms about men administering violence to women and attitudes about appropriate behaviour for women. She further encourages a more expansive vision of issues of gender equality within the criminal justice system, one which comes to terms with women’s realities. She voices her concerns about the Ramjattan case as follows:

We are still left wondering what other defences might have been available at the trial stage. Like some other feminists, I dislike diminished responsibility not just because it focuses attention away from the domestic violence as a constituent element of the offence, but because I fear it will be used to characterize women as synonymous with irrationality and psychiatric ailments.

She argues that it is common ground that the defences to murder reflect male- centred images of life and has not readily accommodated women defendants, especially those who kill an abusive male partner and that this is a form of gender discrimination. She adds a further slant to the issue of gendered defences and justice as regards sentencing in the criminal justice system, in that if appropriate defences to murder are not available to women defendants, then this must put the integrity of the sentence for that crime, generally death, in question and that this may very well present ‘ethical and moral reasons’ why certainly some women should not be hanged. In light of the statistics that in 2002 five of the six women on death row were there due to domestic violence related killings, it becomes evident that further analysis and research on this issue is necessary.

IDEAS FOR REFORM

In light of the clear purist trends of the common law as to a constricted definition of the defences of provocation: Holley and James (Leslie), and self-defence (for further reference with respect to self-defence see by Juliette Casey (2003) in Scots Law Times 2003, 31, 247–52), should battered woman’s syndrome be accorded its own category as a defence to murder rather than being pigeon holed into the category of diminished responsibility? An argument for establishing battered woman’s syndrome as a separate defence is the unfair stigmatisation of women who can only use evidence of their condition of being abused under a plea of diminished responsibility. Rewording of the defence may also need to be considered, as the word ‘syndrome’ has the effect of stigmatising the condition of being abused, in that the public may perceive the condition of being battered as an inherent characteristic or character disorder of

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the abused woman. There is however the danger that the new defence may experience similar problems that the defence of provocation is experiencing with respect to the extreme normalisation of retaliatory behaviour. Other ideas for reform include the redefinition of the defence of self-defence, which would acknowledge the fear of being killed that battered women face on a daily basis with the immediacy of attack requirement in self-defence being redefined to include a threat of attack.

REHABILITATION OF OFFENDERS UNDER THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE CONCEPT

Restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence — victim, offender and community come together to resolve collectively how best to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future. The offender assumes responsibility and takes action to repair harm and is seen as a capable person to make reparation instead of a deficient criminal lacking potential to change his life around. As pertains to crimes of murder, the restorative justice concept can be of great assistance with regard to the rehabilitation of offenders. Retributive justice, which is the colonial legacy of the Caribbean criminal justice system, is characterised by ascribing blame on the offender and imposing the threat of punishment and pain on the offender (whether it be court ordered whippings or the death penalty). The response focuses on the offender’s past behaviour and is generally ineffective to change the offender’s future behaviour, to reduce the recidivism rate, which at present is about 56 per cent or ultimately to prevent crime. The goal of rehabilitation is to allow prisoners to live in dignity and realise their full potential. State or privately funded rehabilitation programmes for prisoners and ex-prisoners are based on this fundamental human right tenet; that all persons, by virtue of their human character are to be treated with dignity. The negative correlative of not upholding this basic human right is that persons deprived from adequate material, emotional or spiritual resources early in life — those who have been physically, sexually or emotionally abused, the mentally ill and those who have suffered discrimination turn to lives of crime in desperation or out of anger or mental confusion. Prison reform initiatives (including the proper organisation and rehabilitation of prisoner) ensure that prisons do not become universities of crime, by virtue of the unhealthy interactions of petty criminals with those convicted of more serious crimes, with the result that petty criminals graduate more seasoned in crime than before they entered the penal system. This is of crucial importance especially where young offenders are concerned.

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FOCUS OF REHABILITATION PROGRAMMES

The focus of most programmes has been on personal acceptance of responsibility for commission of the crime, emotional support in transforming lives and education in life skills, which provides hope for the future and reintegration into the wider community on completion of sentence. Trained personnel can adequately assess the needs of prisoners in rehabilitation programmes. For instance persons who are easily provoked may be rehabilitated by participation in self-esteem and anger management programmes. Research shows that men who kill their adulterous wives suffer a disastrous loss of self- esteem in the absence of other mechanisms for expressing anger: Brereton, (1979) at p.183. It is submitted that battered women who have killed their husbands should not be unfairly constricted to a future life where society narrowly regards them as victims or criminals. Rehabilitation programmes should seek to nurture trust, self-confidence and esteem in such women and to empower them to be independent in all aspects whether educational, financial, emotional or otherwise. The State and society should acknowledge the evil that these women have been subjected to, and acknowledge that state organs and social services are partly to blame, that they failed in their duty to assist such women, whether by not responding promptly to their calls for assistance to prevent the abuse or by showing a lack of support whether intentionally or rather inadvertently by promoting paternalistic attitudes towards them. In Ramjattan’s case, it is noteworthy that she felt unable to seek assistance from the police, as they were the friends of her abuser husband.

CONCLUSION

The criminal justice system should be sensitive to life conditions, personalities, psychology, and context in assessing a person’s responsibility for what he does and the appropriate penal response, more so in the context where murder defences of provocation, diminished responsibility and battered women’s syndrome are raised. Notwithstanding this concession, the law on provocation is settled and the court is not at liberty to redefine it. Therefore, in seeking to be sensitive to human frailty, the Court must be guided by the strict confines of the existing law. Perhaps what is needed is an overhaul of the law of provocation; a statutory code which simplifies the law to avoid complex directions by trial judges to juries. The difficulty experienced by lay persons and in my experience by attorneys-at- law in grasping the law on this defence is further exacerbated when it is coupled with the defence of diminished responsibility. What is required is not the mere adoption of foreign statute but a statute that would take into consideration, the local conditions and peculiarities of our society and our lifestyle.

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REFERENCES

Ashworth, A.J. 2005. Murder Provocation – Homicide Act 1957 s.3, Criminal Law Review, December, p. 970 ——— 2006. Case Comment on R v James (Leslie) [2006] 2 W.L.R. 887, Attorney General of Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 A.C. 580 (P.C.) and R v Smith (Morgan James) [2001] A.C. 146(HL) Crim. L.R. 2006, Jul 629–31 Brereton, B., Race Relations in Colonial Trinidad, 1870–1900. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Butler, T.R. and Garsia, M. 1949. Archbold’s Pleading Evidence & Practice in Criminal Cases. 32nd Edn. Sweet and Maxwell Limited Casey, J. 2003. Legal Defences and Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome: A Focus on Self Defence Scots Law Times, 31, 247–52 Edwards, Susan (2004) Criminal Evidence; Family law Abolishing provocation and reframing self defence Crim. L.R. 2004, Mar, 181–97 Halsbury’s., Laws of England, 4th Edn. Reissue Vol. 11(1), Butterworths Horder, Jeremy. 2005. Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence 25 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 123. Khan, I. 1993. Scales of Justice, Trinidad: Legal Books Ltd. Law Commission. 2003. Partial Defences to Murder: A Consultation Paper, Consultation Paper No. 173, London, para. 12.77 Mackay and Mitchell. 2003. Provoking Diminished Responsibility: Two pleas merging into one Criminal Law Review, Nov 745–59 Nicholson, D. 1993. Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of R. v. Ahluwalia, Criminal Law Review, and p. 728 Offences against the Person Act, s. 4, Laws of Trinidad and Tobago 1980 Quick, O. and Wells, C. 2006. Getting Tough With Defences, Criminal Law Review, June 514–25 p.9 Robinson, Tracy. 2000. Serious offences, Gender and Criminal justice: A Plea for Reasoning Equality, Commonwealth Caribbean Human Rights Seminar (September 12–14, 2000, Belize City) p. 9 Roscoe, H., Roscoe’s Criminal Evidence. 16th Edn, Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1952 Smith, John. 1999. Criminal Law, 9th Edn. London: Butterworths. Trinidad Guardian (June 5, 1998) Turner, J.W Cecil., Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law. 16th Edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1952. U.K. Homicide Act 1957 Walker, L.E. 1984. The Battered Woman Syndrome, New York: Springer Publishing Co. Williams, Glanville. Textbook of Criminal Law. 2nd Edn. Stevens & Sons 1983. Wilson, William. 2005. The Structure of Criminal Defences Crim. L.R 2005, Feb, 108–21.

NOTE

1. I am indebted to Judicial Research Assistant, Avion Gill who assisted tremendously in the preparation of the paper and also to Judicial Research, Assistant Renessa Tang Pack.

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Innovative Domestic violence is widely recognised as a Community serious public health problem with grave implications for a woman’s physical and Approach to psychological well being (Ellsberg, Caldera, Ending Herrera, Winkvist and Kullgren 1999). Statistics show that women all over the world Domestic are being abused and killed by their intimate Violence partners (husbands, ex-husbands, common- law husbands, ex-common-law husbands, boyfriends, and ex-boyfriends) (Ellsberg et Jo-Ann Della-Giustina al. 1999, United Nations 1995, United Nations 1996). It affects the lives of women regardless of race, ethnicity, class, educational status, or geographic location. Since the social, economic, and political structure of a society is crucial in establishing and perpetuating the social order, a societal, system-wide paradigm is necessary to fully understand domestic violence. Woman battering is a systemic form of domination and social control of women by men. The most common policy approach is through the criminal justice system. This paper presents an alternative approach to using the criminal justice system as the first responder to domestic violence situations. After discussing the history of criminalisation of domestic violence, the policy approaches of various Caribbean nations and Nicaragua are examined. Finally, a broad-based holistic paradigm, including possible programmes, is suggested. Historically, in societies all over the world, domestic violence was a private family matter. No one intervened. Women were told to not air their ‘dirty linen’ in

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public. In recent decades, however, domestic violence has been criminalised in numerous countries around the world because governments have been pressured into enacting new domestic violence laws. In the United States (US), policymakers began to focus on domestic violence as a national problem in the 1980s. This led to police responsiveness, domestic violence legislation, and public health responses to intimate partner violence against women. In 1978, the United States Commission on Civil Rights held a two-day ‘Consultation on Battered Women,’ which was organised in anticipation of the passage of a national Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act. Ultimately, the bill did not pass, but in the interim, President Jimmy Carter established an Office of Domestic Violence in the Department of Justice, which has since been closed (Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence 1984). Government awareness of the seriousness of domestic violence grew under President Ronald Reagan. Law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges, victim assistance advocates, health providers, and educators testified before the Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence, which made several recommendations, including treating assaults within the family as seriously as assaults between strangers and coordinating efforts between the criminal justice system, victim assistance agencies, and the entire community (Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence 1984). Almost every state had some type of domestic violence law by 1980, and by 1990, 12 states mandated arrests based on probable cause of domestic violence (International Women’s News 2003). In 1994, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (Crowell and Burgess 1996). VAWA has been important for a myriad of reasons that include its support for law enforcement interventions and funding to develop programmes that respond to violence against women, including intimate partner violence. Today, mandatory arrest and pro-arrest policies are commonplace (O’Connor 1996, Sherman 1984, Sherman 1992, Berk 1993, Maxwell, Garner and Fagan 2002). Also important in changing consciousness was the influence of international women who argued that violence against women is a violation of basic human rights. A dialogue between international women concerned with violence against women and women from the US began at the 1975 United Nations Conference on International Women’s Year, the first of its kind. The International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women met in Brussels, Belgium, the following year. At that conference, over 2,000 women from 33 countries heard testimony by women who had been battered by intimate partners. A resolution calling for the establishment of battered women shelters, economic aid, and legal protection for battered women was sent to governments in every country (Russell 1983). International organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) have made violence against women a focal concern. The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence

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Against Women, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1993, recognises violence against women as an unacceptable violation of basic human rights. It declares that violence against women (in society and in the family) is an obstacle to achieving equality, development, and peace. It states, in part: ‘violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and women…and…is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate position compared to men (UN 1993).’

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

There have been rising rates of domestic violence and intimate partner homicide in Trinidad and Tobago. Recent figures show that domestic violence occurs every 10–20 minutes (Richards 1998, 2000). Within six months in 1997, there were 1,700 reports of spousal abuse. That may be a low number, however, because authorities state that only between 10–15 per cent of domestic violence cases are reported to police. This occurs because some women report that they never called the police or even knew they had a right to call the police for domestic violence (Richards 1998). In addition, at least 114 women were murdered between 1990 and 1999 (Chouthi 2000). Trinidad and Tobago is using a criminal justice model. A national debate began in the 1990s when Independent Senator Diana Mahabir-Wyatt suggested that there was an epidemic of spousal abuse. Eventually, the government, police, social and civic organisations got involved in debate (Richards 1998). The earliest domestic violence legislation was passed in Trinidad and Tobago in 1991 (Richards 1998, 2000). Five years later, a community policing concept was developed as part of the response against domestic violence, but there were many problems, including that the community police were not available on weekends (Richards 1998). A new domestic violence law, the Amended Domestic Violence Act, was enacted in 1999. It expanded the definition of domestic violence to include sexual, emotional, psychological and financial abuse. Further, the persons who can apply for a protection order on behalf of the victim now include police officers, probation officers, and social workers. Moreover, the court can provide financial relief to victims and children, including ordering the abuser to continue paying the rent or mortgage payments (Chouthi 2000). A shelter for battered women and their children opened in 1986. The basic needs of the women, who can stay up to six months, are met: food, clothes, counselling, and a restraining order (if necessary). Board members advise the women about opening a bank account, joining a credit union, and understanding the Domestic Violence Act. The shelter has received an annual budget from the government, a $22,000 donation in 1999 from the J.B. Fernandes Trust (through the Rockefeller Foundation), and small private donations. When the woman leaves,

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the board members monitor her progress and help her get new job and housing (Chouthi 2000).

BARBADOS

Barbados also uses the criminal justice model. A recent study found that 30 per cent of women were battered by their intimate partner at some time. In addition, 50 per cent of men and women reported that their mothers had been abused (Spooner 2001). In the 1980s, the Barbados Bureau of Women’s Affairs commissioned a study of men’s physical violence against women. This study led to the 1992 Domestic Violence (Protection Orders) Act, which enables married and cohabitating women and other household members to get protection orders that forbid their abusers from repeating the abuse. Protection orders have had limited success in deterring repeat abuse in Barbados when compared to St. Kitts and Nevis, which do not have protection orders (Spooner 2001). There are domestic violence services for women in Barbados. The Barbados Business and Professional Women’s Club runs a crisis line that provides counselling for abused women. In 1998, there was an attempt to open the first formal shelter for battered women with assistance from the Barbados government. Despite those efforts, little has been done to educate the public about the ills of domestic violence or to promote a societal disdain for domestic violence (Spooner 2001). In addition, the Royal Barbados Police Force established a domestic violence unit, which offers counselling services to battered women through a victim support group. Nevertheless, police insensitivity is still reported by women (Spooner 2001).

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

Unlike Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, there are no specific domestic violence laws in St. Kitts and Nevis. Instead, the regular criminal laws are used. In an effort to deal with domestic violence, the government appointed a Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which was given a broad mandate to address the problem. Unfortunately, there has been no aggressive follow-up or attempts by lawmakers to highlight domestic violence (Spooner 2001). Spooner (2001) interviewed 19 battered women in St. Kitts and Nevis and 19 battered women in Barbados. She found that battered women stayed in the abusive relationships due to shame, fear, and a commitment to their marriage vows. She also found that battered women are severely ostracised by the public when they speak out and are blamed for the failure of the relationship when the man was abusive. Counselling and support groups do exist, but women in St. Kitts and Nevis are hesitant to bring legal action against their abuser. They see the courts as a place for criminals, are resistant to swearing oaths (especially members of

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fundamental religions), have a fatalistic view of the world, may choose to stay in relationship where father of children helps her financially, and may lose support if they bring him to court (Spooner 2001).

NICARAGUA

Domestic violence, like violence in general, is increasing (Anonymous, 1992). Estimates of domestic abuse go as high as 52 per cent of women in Nicaragua having been abused at least once in their lifetime (Ellsberg et al. 1999). Seventy per cent of those assaults are committed by the women’s husbands and ex- husbands (‘En ocasión de International Women’s Day’ 1998). According to the Inter-American Development Bank, 33 per cent of women between the ages of 16 and 49 have been victims of serious physical violence; 45 per cent of women have been threatened, yelled at, insulted, or forced to witness the destruction of their personal belongings; and 14 per cent of women have been bruised as a result of beatings by their partners (Inter-American Development Bank 1997). A study by the Women’s Legal Office and the Office on Family Orientation and Protection (OPF) of Social Security Institute (INSSBI) found that 44 per cent of a random sample of women between 25 and 34 years of age were victims of domestic violence (Collinson 1990). The abuse included beatings, bondage, cuts with knives or machetes, threats with firearms, repeated sexual violations, sometimes including beatings and threats, threats to take the children or the house away, threats to sell the household goods, insults, and humiliation (AMNLAE 1986c). In a study by Umeå University of Umeå, Sweden, and Autonomous University of Nicaragua in León, Nicaragua, 52 per cent of the ever- married women (either legal marriages or common-law marriages) sampled in León, Nicaragua, reported physical abuse by a spouse or an intimate partner at least once in their lives while 27 per cent reported violence within the previous 12 months. Of the women who had experienced violence, 70 per cent experienced severe violence, including kicks, punches, being beaten, blows with an object, and threats or use of a weapon (Ellsberg et al. 1999). Strategies to reduce male violence against women have followed a two-prong approach:

(1) There have been attempts to strengthen the laws against domestic violence and to stiffen penalties; and (2) There has been a public campaign to educate the public about violence against women. Issues of particular interest to women have been accepted into the agenda of social change and are discussed regularly in the newspapers and in public (Soroptimist International of the Americas 1998).

Since 1987, domestic violence has been identified as a key national issue affecting women. That year, the National Assembly enacted a new Constitution.

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Article 36 laid the basis for laws aimed at preventing violence against women. It guarantees every citizen the right to physical, psychological, and moral integrity and specifies that cruel, inhuman, or degrading behaviour is a crime punishable by law (Soroptimist International of the Americas 1998). Following the enactment of the Constitution, Nicaragua’s Civil and Criminal Codes were rewritten. Many discriminatory laws have been replaced with provisions favourable to women. There are specific criminal provisions on domestic violence, including legislation against marital rape. The rape law prohibits assault, rape, including marital rape, and murder, and applies to both legal marriages and common-law marriages. Prior to the new law, rape was considered a private matter rather than a public crime (Soroptimist International of the Americas 1998). Official policy is that the police regard domestic violence as a social problem, not as a private matter. The police can arrest a batterer and keep him in custody for 24 hours, then bring him before a tribunal if the woman wants to proceed further (Collinson 1990). There is little information available about police responses to specific domestic violence cases, but local human rights groups have reported that police rarely charge the offenders even though they sometimes intervene to prevent injury in cases of domestic violence. There is still a problem with police officers who consider domestic violence a private crime, for which the victim, not the state, must press charges (Soroptimist International of the Americas 1998). Another problem is that most domestic violence cases go unreported because of the difficulty of prosecution, the victim’s fears of spousal reprisal, and social stigma (Soroptimist International of the Americas 1998). A study by the Women’s Legal Office found that some women had suffered abuse for as long as ten years before daring to report the abuse to the police. Their inability to support their children, difficulty in finding housing, guilt feelings, and fear of reprisal were the most common reasons for women failing to seek help (Collinson 1990). There are many grassroots efforts outside the criminal justice system. For instance, the Matagalpa Division of the Union of Professional Workers (CONAPRO) has focused on education and propaganda, with the goal of bringing the weight of public disapproval onto potential abusers. It has published a magazine, produced and aired feminist radio programmes, set up a women’s centre, and published a comprehensive paper on domestic violence, which included outlines for educational workshops, proposals for more severe punishments for domestic violence, a project to give legal and psychological help to battered women in Matagalpa, and popular educational programmes against domestic violence (Collinson 1990). A group of women in Matagalpa formed the theatre group, Cihuatlampa, which has performed throughout Nicaragua. They expanded their space to include a centre for women’s culture, with performance space, living quarters, a café, and a resource centre with books, journals, and videos. The group has held conferences

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for women on a wide variety of issues and has written and performed a play about domestic violence (Collinson 1990). In January 1992, a national conference of more than 800 women from different social strata and professions and with different ideologies was held to discuss and propose common actions around gender-specific interests. The conference goals included promoting an exchange of experiences about women’s problems between the diverse groups, analysing the impact of the government’s economic policies on the situation of women, and taking common actions. Women came from several women’s organisations (Anonymous 1992). Violence against women was one of the most controversial themes with 110 women attending the workshop. The media and several educational programmes were criticised for distorting the values of women and making them appear as sexual objects. Also discussed was the lack of a legal structure that condemns violence and allows crimes against women to go unpunished. The women agreed on 33 actions to combat violence against women, including the formation of a women’s network against violence (Anonymous 1992). Following the conference, the Women’s Network Against Violence was created as a network of 170 national groups and hundreds of unaffiliated women to fight against violence against women. Local networks have been formed in various areas of the country, such as Matagalpa, León, and Masaya (Red de Mujeres Contra la Violencia 1996). The network has become the driving force behind the antiviolence movement in Nicaragua. It carries out yearly public awareness campaigns against domestic violence and has organised other activities such as a national conference on violence and educational materials for women living in violent situations. Largely as a result of the efforts of these groups, domestic violence has been identified as a key issue affecting women in Nicaragua (Ellsberg et al.1999). In 1992, the police created the Comisarías de la Mujer and Niñez, or the Police Stations for Women and Children, in response to the growing evidence of the prevalence of domestic violence against women. The Comisarías are a joint effort between the government agency, the Nicaraguan Women’s Institute (INIM), the National Police, and women activists to improve the access of women to the justice system (Ellsberg et al. 1999). The centres, which are annexed to local police stations and are staffed by women police officers, provide social and legal help to women victims and mediate spousal conflicts. There are now Comisarías in several cities (Soroptimist International of the Americas 1998). In August 1996, the National Assembly passed the Law Against Aggression Against Women, which was designed to establish a basis for prosecuting crimes against women. The Law to Prevent and Punish Domestic Violence, or Article 230, was enacted on October 9, 1996, as a result of a strategic alliance between politicians, government officials, community leaders, researchers, and legal and health professionals, who campaigned to draft, lobby, and mobilise support for

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the law (Ellsberg et al. 1999). The domestic violence law has 11 provisions to protect domestic violence victims even in situations where the acts would not constitute a felony crime. A judge can order the following:

(1) Prohibit or restrict the presence of the accused person from the victim’s home and within a minimum radius of 100 metres; (2) Order that the victim return to the home if she or he has been forced to leave because of violence or intimidation; (3) Prohibit or limit the presence of the accused person at or within 100 metres of the victim’s place of work; (4) Offer the victim medical, psychological or psychiatric assistance if necessary; equal attention is to be given to the accused person for rehabilitation and to prevent recidivism; (5) Order the biological, psychological, and social examination of any children involved in intrafamily violent acts and offer proper attention; (6) Order compensation for any possible damages; (7) Seize any weapons in the aggressor’s possession; (8) Entrust the victim to a suitable person for protection if the victim is a child or a handicapped person; and (9) prohibit all forms of harassment that disturb the victim’s tranquillity, including electronic means.

Further, the law provides that (1) in the Atlantic Coast communities, the laws will be applied by a judge knowledgeable about the applicable procedures of that area; and (2) legal action, including ordering police action, must be taken immediately by the judge the moment he or she becomes aware of the acts, even if they do not constitute a crime (Red de Mujeres Contra la Violencia 1996). In addition to the legislation, there are now battered women’s shelters, called Women’s Houses, in nearly every major city in Nicaragua. They provide women with legal, health, and psychological assistance (Ellsberg et al. 1999). Women in the neighbourhoods now talk about how helpful women’s shelters have been to women who have been beaten or raped (Anonymous 1992). At least once, women activists used a local radio broadcast to publicly shame a man for beating his wife (Interview with Marvis Jirón, Managua, August 28, 1986). Many other organisations carry out educational activities, such as legal literacy courses for women in order to provide better support for women living with violence and violence-prevention activities for men (Ellsberg et al. 1999). Another example of grassroots organising is that women in neighbourhoods around the Carreterra Norte (northern highway) formed a self-help group, which visited women who had been attacked by their husbands and the husbands themselves. Not only did 40 women attend their weekly meetings, but the group also formed a theatre group called Dynamite (Collinson 1990).

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WOMAN BATTERING AS A COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITY

The focus of many countries confronting domestic violence has been on the criminal justice system and the individual batterer. Those who focus on arrest as the method of ending domestic violence argue that the fundamental cause of woman battering comes from within the individual batterer’s inherent violent nature, not from the social conditions under which those men live. Instead of focusing on the imprisonment of individual men as the solution, societies need to recognise widespread gender inequality as the underlying cause of domestic violence. For every batterer imprisoned, there are others created by societal conditions to take his place. A broad community response focusing on community control, not the criminal justice system oriented toward the police and courts, is necessary if there is any hope of ending domestic violence against women. Battering is a crime against the community, not just against the individual woman. While the police can play an important role, especially in the most serious cases of domestic violence, the community must be the front line of action. Domestic violence is a quality of life issue, not only for the woman and man involved, but also for their family, friends, and neighbours. A neighbour’s domestic violence incident in close proximity to one’s home can be very unsettling. It can disturb a neighbourhood’s peace and quiet. Nevertheless, an individual rights/privacy paradigm leads community members to feel as if they should not get involved in the couple’s private life even if they want to intervene in the domestic violence situation. Even calling the police may be shunned in many communities, especially those that have a negative relationship with law enforcement. An important way to eliminate domestic violence is to develop a healthy, stable, resourceful environment where cooperation norms are transmitted and communication about women in need is provided. Neighbourhoods that are rich in collective efficacy are places where informal social controls, mutual trust, and cohesion lead to neighbours being able to depend on each other for help in times of crisis. Community building, which values community, liberty, control, and kindness, takes energy, care, and attention (DeLeon-Granados 1999).

PROGRAMME PROPOSAL

Domestic violence is a general community problem, but it involves individual incidents and/or patterns with individual community members. Every abusive relationship is different; every batterer has his own motivations; and every battered woman is unique. Since there are differences in the causes of the violence and the risk of recidivism, every domestic violence situation must be approached individually, with care, within the context of a broad based holistic approach. The following are several proposals that can be integrated into a new paradigm. These suggestions are not meant to be exhaustive, but to stimulate discussion.

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Obviously, not all programmes would work in all communities. Most importantly, successful programmes will come from the community members themselves. They are the ones who know the community’s needs and can anticipate how their community will respond to various approaches. Community members need to be involved at every level of planning and implementation so that the programmes will be an integral part of the community. An integrated community response would include general community education and awareness, community protection for battered women and their children, community sanctioning of batterers, and a coordinated effort with the police for severe or persistent cases of domestic violence. The most important institutions in this proposal would be a community-controlled domestic violence centre to coordinate the community’s response, a specially-trained neighbourhood support group, a neighbourhood watch group, and a residential shelter for batterers. The centre would be the first place where a battered woman could go for help. Community programmes would consist of community awareness projects, including broad-based educational programmes, a special hotline, block meetings, incentives for neighbours to get involved, candlelight marches, senior care centres, child care centres, support groups, and training programmes for neighbours on how to intervene in domestic violence situations. In addition, domestic violence learning circles could be organised in the community centre, in churches, in the schools as early as kindergarten, and in teen centres. These learning circles could provide a safe environment where community members can be truthful, caring, trusting, and open to change (Garfield, et al. 1998). Finally, the centre would be the community liaison with the police when necessary. Victim services are an important part of the paradigm since the community has the responsibility to provide a safe environment for the victim. It would be important for victims to feel like they have a place to go for help. In order for such a programme to be successful, victims have to be involved in the development of any victim awareness or victim services programme. Central to this approach would be an immediate community response during and after a domestic violence incident, when the woman is most likely to accept help and the batterer to admit responsibility for his wrongful behaviour. Neighbours could intervene when they hear a violent altercation by contacting a trained neighbourhood support group, which could stop the incident and take charge. Depending on the severity of the domestic violence, various actions could be taken. For example, if the violence were minimal, the first incident, and with no injuries, members of the neighbourhood support group could visit the man and woman separately, encourage separate counselling, maybe couple counselling, and get involved in delivering support services, such as economic assistance, job training, educational opportunities, or childcare. A safety plan could be developed

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with the woman, who would be given a cell phone or panic button connected to the neighbourhood support group. Volunteers would be immediately available to escort the woman to and from work, school, the store, or anywhere else she needs to go. If the incident were more serious or part of a pattern, the man could be escorted from the home and given the option to find his own alternative housing or go to the neighbourhood residential facility for batterers. If injuries were inflicted against the woman, the neighbourhood support group could involve the police and/or call an ambulance if needed. A community-run neighbourhood residential facility for batterers would be established as an alternative to jail and prison (Rosenfeld 1999). It could combine successful features of batterer intervention programmes with housing detention much like a therapeutic half-way house. Batterers would enter the facility either voluntarily, following an arrest for domestic violence, or following a conviction for domestic violence. If the batterer were not living in the residential facility on a voluntary basis, the facility could be used for pre-trial confinement or confinement following a conviction. In the context of a conviction, the facility could evaluate whether the batterer would benefit from living in the residential facility or be incarcerated in a prison or jail. Although the batterer would have limited freedom of movement, he would be allowed to work so that he could support his family. To be successful, vigilant monitoring of the batterer would include electronic monitoring, phone check-in systems, and restricted transportation. It would also require the involvement of the batterer’s employer (Rosenfeld 1999). In addition, the facility could offer numerous programmes for batterers developed by community members in consultation with victims, batterers, researchers, and advocates. Its goal would be to guide the batterer through a process of change while the victim remains safe. This residential facility programme fulfils four goals. First, it would shift the responsibility for leaving the abusive situation from the woman to the batterer. Second, it would provide a place where the batterer could live while making important changes in his life. Third, it would involve the community in monitoring the domestic violence situation. Most importantly, the woman could consider her options in a safe environment at home without the threat of the batterer’s harassment. Another programme would be family or community conferencing under certain circumstances, but only after the abuser has left the house and maintained his residence elsewhere. This option would have to be considered very carefully since conferencing is inappropriate when the parties have grossly disparate bargaining power (Truss 1995), which is often true in domestic violence situations. An initial evaluation of the extent of the abuse and causal pattern would be necessary to determine whether conferencing were an option. One possible scenario for the use of conferencing would be a one-time incident with little or

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no injury within a relationship that does not include ongoing power and control problems. An example of community conferencing in domestic violence cases is the saalishi, or people’s court, in India (Sadasivam 2000). It is the traditional village institution that brings together community members who have disputes before they go to the police and courts. After the grievances are aired, community wisdom prevails and ensures public shaming of the guilty party (Sadasivam 2000). One case in a West Bengal saalishi was that of a Muslim woman whose husband and in-laws taunted and tortured her for the three years of her marriage because they were not satisfied with her small dowry. She went to the saalishi for an intervention. Fifty people attended, including family, friends, two members of the panchayat, or village council, and a few village members who were sympathetic to the woman. For two hours, skilled negotiators led the process, which ended with the woman’s parents agreeing to pay the husband’s family $575 in exchange for the woman agreeing to a divorce and to withdrawing her complaint against her husband (Sadasivam 2000). The session was organised and negotiated by Shramajibee Mahila Samiti, or Working Women’s Organisation, which is an organisation of women agricultural workers that is part of Maitree (‘friendship’ in Bengali), an alliance of women’s organisations. To combat domestic violence, Mahila Samiti relies on the community’s belief that it has the right to intervene into family affairs in order to restore a collective peace (Sadasivam 2000).

CONCLUSION

After observing the various criminal justice approaches of various countries, it appears imperative that a new community justice paradigm be developed. Even with new programmes and approaches, however, some of the current approaches should be expanded, not abandoned. One important institution is a special domestic violence court with court advocates, where a woman could get an order of protection, cell phone, and a personal alarm. The advocate would not only appear in court with the woman, but would also go home with her to ensure her safety, conduct a safety assessment with the woman, guide her through every step of the litigation process, and help her obtain any needed social services. In addition, the number of battered women’s shelters should be expanded. These are only some suggestions for community programmes to address the community problem of domestic violence. They are intended to be a catalyst for more discussion. It is important that community members have a voice during every phase of the programme’s planning and intervention. They know better than any outsider, no matter how educated, experienced, and well-meaning that outsider might be, what is best for their community.

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REFERENCES

AMNLAE. 1986. Women’s Legal Office — What services does the WLO offer? The laws and me: A brief analysis [Brochure]. Managua: Author Anonymous. 1992. ‘Nicaraguan women’s conference seeking unity in diversity’. Barricada Internacional, (March 29). Attorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence. 1984. Final Report. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. Berk, R.A. 1993. ‘What the Scientific Evidence Shows’. In Current Controversies on Family Violence. Eds. R. J. Gelles and D. R. Loseke. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. Chouthi, S. ’Till Death Do Us Part’. Populi. 27, (1) (2000): 12. Collinson, H., Ed. 1990. Women and Revolution in Nicaragua. London and New York: Zed Books Ltd. Crowell, N. A. and Burgess, A. W., eds. 1996. Understanding Violence Against Women. Panel on Research on Violence Against Women. Washington, DC.: National Academy Press. De Leon-Granados, William. 1999. Travels Through Crime and Place: Community Building as Crime Control. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press. Ellsberg, M., Caldera, T., Herrera, A., Winkvist, A., and Kullgren, G. 1999. ‘Domestic Violence and Emotional Distress Among Nicaraguan Women: Results from a population-based study’. American Psychologist, vol. 54 no.1: 30–36. La Tribuna. 1998. En ocasión de International Women’s Day [On the occasion of International Women’s Day]. March 7. Available http: Hostname: latribuna.com.ni. Garfield, Charles, Spring, Cindy, Cahill and Sedonia. 1998. Wisdom circles: A guide to self- discovery and community building in small groups. New York: Hyperion. Inter-American Development Bank. The Cost of Domestic Violence. IDB América. Available http: Hostname: iadb.org. 1997. International Women’s News. vol.19 no.1 (2003):3. Maxwell, C. D., Garner, J. H. and Fagan, J.A. 2002. ‘The Preventive Effects of Arrest on Intimate Partner Violence: Research policy and theory’. Criminology and Public Policy, vol.2, no.1: 51–81. O’Connor, M. 1996. ‘From arrest avoidance to mandatory arrest: Some historical, social and legal forces that have shaped police spouse abuse policies in the United States’. In Women and justice: Development of International policy. Ed. R. Muraskin. Australia: Gordon and Breach Publishers. Red de Mujeres Contra la Violencia. Texto y explicacion de la ley No. 230: Reformas y adiciones al codigo penal para prevenir y sancionar la violencia intrafamiliar [Text and commentaries on Law No. 230: Reforms and additions to the penal code for the prevention and sanction of family violence]. Managua, Nicaragua: Author. 1996. Richards, P. 1998. ‘Trinidad and Tobago: Domestic violence charges reach high places’. Interpress Service. November 2. ———. 2000 ‘Trinidad and Tobago: Leading the fight against domestic violence’. Interpress Service. March 1. Rosenfeld, Diana L. 1999. ‘Why doesn’t he leave? The creation of batterer intervention facilities’. Domestic Violence Report. August/September. pp. 82–93. Russell, D. 1983. Introduction. In Battered Wives, D. Martin. New York, New York: Pocket Books.

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Sadasivam, Bharati. 2000. Community justice: West Bengal’s women draw on village tradition to stop domestic violence. Ford Foundation Report. Winter 6–9. Sherman, L. 1984. The Minneapolis domestic violence experiment. Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation. Sherman, L. 1992. ‘Symposium on domestic violence studies: The variable effects of arrest on criminal careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment’. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.

83 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 137. Soroptimist International of the Americas. 1998. Legislative guide: Domestic violence against women, Reports on 17 Soroptimist countries. Philadelphia: Author. Spooner, M. ’Women under subjection of the law: A study of the legal responses to women’s abuse in the English-speaking Carribbean’. Dissertation. University of Massachusetts, Boston. 2001 Truss, James Martin. 1995. ‘The subjection of women…Still: unfulfilled promises of protection for women victims of domestic violence’. 26 St. Mary’s Law J. 1149. United Nations. 1993. Resolution A/RES/48/104. Adopted December 20, New York, NY: United Nations. ———.1995. Report on the world’s women 1995: Trends and statistics. New York: Author. ———.1996. The Beijing Declaration and the platform for action. New York: Author.

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Community policing, policing styles and use of force in the caribbean

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A Caribbean INTRODUCTION

Portrait of This paper highlights some of the major Crime, Justice issues in crime and justice now sharply and Community confronting the Caribbean and which are likely to increase in severity in the coming Policing years if the appropriate conceptual, operational and accounting strategies are not Ramesh Deosaran quickly put in place. It then briefly describes the caution echoed by several prominent Caribbean Commissioners of Police regarding the importation of ‘foreign practices’ into Caribbean policing. Though admitting a range of bureaucratic and cultural obstacles, this paper seeks to provide some optimism and forward thinking for community policing in the Caribbean.1 A three-pronged ‘way forward’ formula for capacity building is provided but pessimism strikes again when the paper provides some evidence to suggest that the fate of community policing in the Caribbean is and will be stifled by the pressures for rugged law enforcement and ‘quick government action.’ Community policing, as this paper notes, does carry a package of seductive concepts and language but its successful implementation has not always been as convincing as promised. A lot more work and commitment are needed. As is now being asked in the United States (US) itself, we too now ask for the Caribbean: Is community policing more fiction than fact?

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KEY REGIONAL ISSUES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE

This first part will provide a quick overview of the key issues now affecting the Caribbean region and which, apart from ‘traditional’ crimes, show strong signs of becoming much more serious in the years ahead. Here we will also argue the case for treating the Caribbean as its own region and not be subsumed within or along with Latin America in reports dealing with crime, social or economic data. We will present a brief for the way forward in treating with crime and justice in the Caribbean. Far too often, data on social and economic indicators in the Caribbean falls under the broad category, ‘Latin American and the Caribbean.’ The Caribbean is, however, a far different place from Latin America in terms of, for example, culture, political and legal systems, and even trading patterns. Therefore, when data is grossly subsumed under the general category of ‘Latin American and the Caribbean,’ it gives a distorted profile of regional trends, the causes for such trends and in particular, the targeted solutions required for needy areas. All in all, the Caribbean region carries about 20 votes at the United Nations (UN). The time has come for international bodies such as the World Bank and the agencies of the UN in particular, to treat the Caribbean as its own category for social, economic and crime data. Even so, however, a determination will have to be made about which part or parts of the Caribbean will comprise ‘the Caribbean’ for such data compilation. For such a purpose, it is quite convenient to count the data from those states which comprise the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), that is, the 15 Caribbean countries, most with British traditions. This will include Jamaica starting from the north, through Barbados and The Bahamas, to Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana in the south of the Caribbean Sea. Among the key issues now affecting this region are:

(1) Their trans-shipment location. Increasingly, the data show that some of these Caribbean states are being used as trans-shipment points for illegal drugs (cocaine) shipped to North America and Europe. There has been a very significant increase from l990 to 2002 (for example, UNODC reports). At the same time, illegal arms are being shipped into these countries at increasing rates. In June 2002, Trinidad and Tobago’s prime minister publicly stated that the rise in the entry of illegal arms from South America to Trinidad and Tobago was contributing to the rise in serious crimes in this country. All in all, therefore, it is in the mutual interest of the Caribbean, the United States and Europe, to work out mutually beneficial agreements and security treaties to reduce these illegal drugs-arms flow. Such flows and their consequences make all connected regions vulnerable. In this sense, the Caribbean occupies a very strategic location. This matter is now high on

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the agenda of the various regional bodies dealing with Caribbean security: for example, the Regional Security System, the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police, the Caribbean Task Force on Money Laundering and the Caricom Task Force on Crime and Security. (2) Since the majority of these Caribbean states depend heavily on the tourist trade for their economic development, any incidents of serious crime, especially crimes against tourists, produce very adverse consequences. On several recent occasions, special delegations from some of these states have had cause to work hard at reversing or modifying ‘travel safety advisories’ from the developed countries which warn visitors about travelling to the Caribbean. Special visitor safety systems and training programmes for security staff are needed so as to help prevent the adverse effects of serious crimes upon the tourist industry. Of course, apart from its tourist connection, the rate of serious crimes in itself in these Caribbean countries has been a matter of grave concern in recent years. The crime fluctuates very much from one state to another. For example, in 2002, the serious crime rate in St Kitts-Nevis was 44 per 1,000 persons, in St Lucia 82 per 1,000 and in Trinidad and Tobago 13 per 1,000 persons (see, for example, Deosaran 2002a, 2006a, forthcoming 2007). The need for citizen participation and support for the police in the fight against crime has been repeatedly emphasised. (3) The vulnerability of the United States is again implicated in the new announcement by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to lay down pipes to convey gas from Trinidad and Tobago to the United States. At present, Trinidad and Tobago is the largest single supplier of natural gas to the eastern US (80 per cent). There are also several large scale oil and energy investments by US firms in Trinidad. The security threats to these industries and their consequences for the US are becoming increasingly apparent and crucial. The Caribbean region has already had a fair share of political violence and insurrections. Subversive groups reside in Jamaica, multi-cultural Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and many of the smaller Caribbean states, all prepared to strike when the opportunity arises. There is growing animosity against the foreign policies of both the United States and Britain, especially by members of the Islamic faith. With strident complaints against social and economic inequities, some of these grieved elements are now embedded in the political life of some Caribbean countries. (4) Many of the smaller states (for example, the Eastern Caribbean states) have been providing off-shore banking services to customers in the developed world. In fact, such services contributed much to the treasury of these states. This recently became a very controversial issue in the area of white collar crime. Allegations were made as to the vulnerability of such off-shore banking facilities to money-laundering practices. The European-based Organisation for Electronic Co-operation and Development (OECD) placed these

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Caribbean states on a ‘black list’ to which several protests were made by Caribbean states. While there has been easing up on the black list, the matter occupies an ominous position in the link between crime and business in the Caribbean. In fact, off-shore banking and its reputed implications for money-laundering will be an increasingly serious matter in the Caribbean in the years ahead. (5) A related issue is the role of ‘election financing’ in the government of Caribbean states. It is well known and, in fact, often admitted, that financial donations are provided from business and other private sources to the election campaigns of political parties in the Caribbean. While in principle such support helps to serve the purpose of democratic elections, the influence over the policies and decisions of elected governments in the Caribbean seems to be unduly tied to the source of such campaign donations, thereby attracting great public unease. This is a key issue for another related reason. In some Caribbean states, strong suspicions exist over the connections between such election donation and drug trafficking and money-laundering. The burning question remains: Can a government whose election victory is helped by such donations really make laws or implement policies that will affect the business of such donors? All this suggests that while street crimes (for example, robberies, assault) attract widespread public attention, such ‘higher-up’ crimes are very serious for proper governance and do subvert respect for the rule of law. (6) Political corruption and the entire issue of integrity in public life are now gaining sharper focus from Caribbean citizens and some legislatures in the Caribbean. Numerous allegations, and quite a few court cases, are now in motion against politicians in some Caribbean states. This issue is sometimes related to campaign financing. (7) There is a significant increase in the number of gambling houses across the Caribbean. Such increase is no doubt connected to accommodate the tourist industry, but more and more local residents are being attracted to these gambling casinos. The current concern is that such gambling industry will soon become heavily hooked to drug and prostitution trafficking. (8) The use of force by police is fast becoming another key issue in the Caribbean. In the face of rising fears over serious crimes, and as the accompanying public pressure for law enforcement mounts, and as the various governments struggle to respond to such public pressure, the use of force by the police is not only increasing but apparently more tolerated by the public. In one country in 2002, Jamaica, 140 deaths resulted from shootouts with the police. Across the Caribbean, 40 officers were killed in the first six months of 2003 (see, for example, Birkbeck and Gabaldon 1998, Blumberg 1994, Deosaran 2000b 2002d, 2003b, 2006a, forthcoming 2007, Harriott 1998, Mars 2001). In several high-profile instances of the excessive police force

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in Trinidad and Tobago, citizens have mounted a number of public protests against the police and government. The issue for citizens and policymakers is this: When the authorities initially delay effective action against serious crimes, and when such crimes eventually escalate in both numbers and seriousness, the public mood becomes hungry for quick repressive action ‘against the criminals.’ And as such, the use of force becomes not only a convenient option but one that pleases the public. Two fundamental issues remain: Why was the crime situation allowed to remain and grow in seriousness in the first place? And how effective will such repressive law enforcement measures be in the long run? (9) Deportees convicted for crimes in North America, especially in the United States, is now a matter of great worry to Caribbean states. These deportees are now being returned from the US to the Caribbean at an estimated rate of 1,000 per year and rising. Many of these deportees, according to the authorities, get involved in serious crimes once they return to their native lands in the Caribbean. Several attempts have been made by Caribbean states to have the return of such criminals stopped, or have the policy supported by some financial aid, or at least be properly monitored with the required documentation supplied on a timely manner. In all cases, such negotiations so far have met with little or no success. The US Embassy in Trinidad and Tobago, however, has termed the deportee controversy as ‘much ado about nothing’ since they claim that there is no strong evidence that such deportees commit more crimes than other citizens. (10) Kidnapping for ransom has now struck some Caribbean states, especially Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana, with fearsome force. In Trinidad and Tobago, there has been a 300 per cent increase in kidnapping from l995 to 2002. In Guyana, in the first six months of 2003, 20 kidnappings have occurred – an unprecedented rate. It is now believed that kidnapping will be the serious crime of the future, partly replacing bank-hold-ups and large- scale robberies, especially since the large ransoms demanded are now paid and the arrest rate relatively low. The police have set up special squads and US-led training programmes. (11) In all Caribbean states, the rate of school violence and delinquency is causing great concern to citizens and public officials. The use of illegal drugs is also significant in schools. This rate seems all set to rise in the years ahead, with the female rate converging with the male, and with grave consequences for the serious crime rate across the Caribbean. It is known that many of these school delinquents go on to commit serious crimes in adult life and even after placement in juvenile homes, the rate of recidivism is 50–60 per cent (see, for example, Deosaran 2002a, 2006b, Deosaran and Chadee 1997). Given the existing pressures for law enforcement and incarceration policies

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across the Caribbean, the options for crime prevention and alternatives to incarceration are usually shoved out of the way or put lower on the legislative agenda. (12) While both police reform and prison reform are now widely seen by civil groups and citizens at large as being of urgent importance, the pace of such reforms either through the Caribbean legislatures or through the public service bureaucracy is rather slow. Among the reasons for such delays is the lack of political consensus and once again, the pressures for rigid law enforcement and imprisonment. Protests by prisoners are now becoming more frequent across the Caribbean. Even in the midst of such pressures, however, in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, significant moves have been made towards both police and prison reforms but still with a long way to go in actual implementation of policies. (13) The police and the prison sit at extreme ends of the administration of justice. In the middle is the judicial system. Overall, all these institutions comprise the administration of justice. Across the Caribbean, the conviction rate for serious crimes reported is around ten per cent. The rate of recidivism is around 60 per cent (Deosaran 2003c). Judicial sentencing is another area which attracts grave public concern. The need for sentencing guidelines is slow in being fulfilled. Case backlogs are huge and very prohibitive for swift justice, effective witness presentations, etc. Case adjournments day after day is the rule rather than the exception in the Magistrates’ Courts. While in St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago, concerted attempts are made, especially through case management systems, the backlog has been so horrific — some cases as old as 12 years — that such systems will take some time to establish their effectiveness. (14) Crime data across the Caribbean are in a very untidy and inefficient state, to say the least. There are no systematic ways of reporting crime data across the Caribbean. In addition, the same offence (for example, robbery) is described differently from one state to another. The compilation, reporting and dissemination procedures need quick improvements. Reflecting its colonial past, the police on the whole do not see it as a duty to disclose the crime figures regularly and publicly. A similar situation exists for prison figures and other crime-related data. The Caribbean now needs very urgently a fresh, modernised understanding of the role of crime data for civil society and good governance. Given the increasing thrust towards community policing across the Caribbean, the use of detailed crime data will be of increasing importance. Such data will help serve as a magnet for attracting and sustaining public support for community policing in the Caribbean.

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THE WAY FORWARD: SELECTED ISSUES

There are five key areas in which urgent attention and sustained remedies are required as priorities. The first is on police reform and re-visiting the objectives and operations of police work. The second pertains to the administration of justice, that is, the processing and determination of cases. The third key area is politics and public policy. The fourth is the need for a more sophisticated and responsive crime reporting, data collection and retrieval system. The fifth is penal reform and sentencing. Brief comments will be provided on these five key areas. Policing in the Caribbean remains stuck with a conceptual and operational dilemma. Spawned by the narrow security needs of the plantation system and supported by the British tradition of imperial control, Caribbean policing has been largely confined to functions of social control of the working classes. While social control is a typical function of the police across the world, because of the plantation labour and race antagonisms in the Caribbean, there has been a very hostile divide between the police and the mass of citizens. In recent times, however, the serious attempts to introduce a more socially-oriented, community-based form of policing have been met with little or no success. The main reason for such failure is the growing and highly visible need for law enforcement measures. On the face of widespread public and government concerns over the serious crime rate, from Jamaica to Guyana, the rhetoric for community policing is shoved in the shadows with the pressures for heavy law enforcement in great public demand. While in the long run, and as a crime prevention and information-gathering device, community policing will certainly be of great help to these Caribbean countries, the public mood and political expediency make it a dim prospect, at least in the near future.2 In terms of decision-making theory, a person is likely to commit a crime if he knows the odds of detection and conviction are relatively low. The rate of crime detection across the Caribbean remains around 30 per cent with the conviction rate for reported serious crimes at approximately ten per cent. Added to this is the well-known heavy case backlog in the Supreme Courts and especially in the Magistrates’ Courts across the Caribbean. Such inefficiencies and blockages within the administration of justice attract further criminality. Public policy on crime has been driven largely by the fluctuating moods of electoral and political expediency. For example, even though the death penalty is almost now impossible to carry out in the Caribbean, and though the murder rate still climbs, no Caricom government sees any political virtue in abolishing the death penalty. Further, in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, there have been several Crime Committees and Crime Commissions appointed between 1990 and 2002 to examine the problem of crime and violence. What the political directorates select for implementation are usually the very short-term recommendations with public appeal such as longer sentences and more legislation. Other long-term

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recommendations such as alternatives to incarceration or community strengthening, etc., are left on the shelves. The fourth key area — crime statistics — remains a very neglected aspect of policing. In order to drive effective policing on the basis of strategic intelligence, and especially for crimes such as kidnapping and terrorism, a sophisticated system of crime reporting, compilation, retrieval and dissemination is an imperative. The traditional methods of bookkeeping and storage still persist in many Caricom states. The problem is not only the methods of compilation and retrieval. The fact is that, even with available computers, such information is usually stored in such global fashion, thereby making it impossible at any required moment to find out exactly what the crime trends are at any particular police station district. The related deficiency is the lack of victimisation surveys across the Caribbean as a means of supplementing the official police records. With a prisoner recidivism rate of around 60 per cent across the Caribbean, one would think that Caribbean governments would be in a haste to seek alternatives to such imprisonment. Indeed, some countries, for example, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago are looking this way, but still too slowly given the enormity of the problem. While the recommended ratio is four prisoners to a cell, in almost all Caribbean countries the ratio is around eight prisoners per cell. Apart from prisons being heavily overcrowded, the need to rehabilitate prisoners remains a burning issue in order to reduce the rather high rate of recidivism across the Caribbean. These matters therefore range from institutional strengthening to process management and public confidence. Such matters as outlined above need urgent attention by the Governments in order to deal effectively with the serious and escalating problems of crime in the Caribbean.

FROM CONCEPTS TO PRACTICE: THE CARIBBEAN CHALLENGE IN COMMUNITY POLICING

On May 16, 2003, at the Eighth Meeting of the Caricom Task Force on Crime and Security, Guyana’s Commissioner of Police, Floyd McDonald, explained:

We have to be a bit more thoughtful about how we introduce community policing in our Caribbean countries. We have to consider carefully matters of cultural differences within these countries, we have to take time to build public support, we cannot rush as if there is a fixed formula…It is wise for us to take it a bit easy as we apply the concept.

Now anybody who has observed Commissioner McDonald long enough will readily admit that he is a man of few words, especially at formal meetings. As I sat across from him at this meeting in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, I was impressed by his response since we were faced with several previous comments which gave the

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impression that community policing was a packaged formula, pre-designed for all peoples and for all places. And as such, everybody must follow without much grumbling or caveats. Of course, from the stated policy of the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) and that of its respective constituent members, it is generally agreed that community policing, as a concept, is now an acceptable form of policing. But while a concept can be universally accepted, the actual implementation of this concept, that is the practice, has to take into account some of what Commissioner McDonald wisely identified. And I am afraid that not enough attention has been or is being given to the peculiar characteristics of Caribbean society; in fact, to the peculiar characteristics of both the various communities and the police agencies in the implementing of community policing. We will soon find, as the more vigilant amongst us have already found, that the shoe will not necessarily fit without some thoughtful modifications. But the Guyanese Commissioner is not alone. At a crime conference in 2002 in Barbados, Police Commissioner Watson of Barbados pointed out some examples where ‘people brought in from outside’ gave advice to the Barbadian police which proved to be not only inappropriate, but eventually counterproductive. These people did not know the role of police outposts in relation to community life in Barbados. I have also heard Commissioner Forbes from Jamaica explain the special challenges which official and public demands for law enforcement put upon the development of community policing in Jamaica. At present, in Jamaica, it would appear that there are risks if some of the essentials of community policing are placed above law enforcement responses. While delivering one of my police training programmes, I heard Commissioner Hilton Guy from Trinidad and Tobago speak of the crucial need for ‘the mental and cultural transformation within the police service’ as an antecedent — or at least, a parallel condition for effective community policing. This is a point he repeatedly makes and in so doing identifies some of the peculiar characteristics of Caribbean policing. In the same way, I have heard Commissioners from St. Lucia, St. Kitts, Grenada, Bermuda, The Bahamas and other states, at one time or another, point to some of the peculiar characteristics — institutional, developmental and operational - which challenge their respective police agencies. All this amounts to the fact that while some community policing principles may be universal, the special social, political and even legal characteristics of the Caribbean states must be taken into substantial account if community policing should be the product of an evolutionary process rather than a hurried imposition. After all, the Japanese ‘koban’ or its ‘chusai-san’ (that is, block by block and rural policing) are renowned for their effectiveness: they both evolved within Japanese culture. This I believe is the major point Commissioner McDonald was making. Not that anybody wishes to re-invent the wheel. It is just that the wheel should suit the ground on which it seeks to roll. Figure 11.1 illustrates the four themes raised by Commissioners McDonald, Guy, Forbes and Watson:

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FIGURE 11.1 CHALLENGES FOR COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE CARIBBEAN

Mental and Cultural Transformation – Guy

Ground-Up Community The Law Policy Making Enforcement Policing – Watson Pressures - Forbes

The Evolutionary Alternative - McDonald

But it is not only at the leadership level where such differentiations are noticed. At another training session in St. Kitts recently, I heard many junior and middle level officers pointing out that their ‘tourist-economy’ state has some special characteristics which must be considered when community policing is being implemented. I have also heard the same remarks from such ranks in St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago during my training programmes with them. This is not the time to list all these cultural differences or peculiar community characteristics which should guide the ground swell of community policing. But let me repeat that while there are some standardised elements within the definition of community policing, it is also imperative that within each of these conceptual elements, the special features of each community should be listed so as to guide the operational aspects of the community policing programme. For example, while in the definition of community policing, we have such standard concepts as ‘forming community partnerships,’ ‘serving community needs,’ ‘decentralised authority,’ etc., these headings are just that — conceptual headings. In Guyana, at least in some parts of it, we cannot set out to form community partnerships in the same way it is done in Los Angeles or in Toronto. Guyana has very few high rise complexes. The connections between crime and politics, with community groups in the middle, present a special challenge for the police there.

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In Jamaica, we cannot accept a survey of ‘community needs’ as the total guide for policing. Given the circumstances of extreme violence in some parts of Jamaica or in Trinidad and Tobago for that matter, the police themselves will have, quite swiftly, to set an anti-violence agenda and all that goes with it, at least in the short term. As one researcher indicated, there are several risks in implementing community policing (Moore 1992). Some examples of such risks are getting the police entangled in community politics, or providing deep community cover for hardened criminals. These risks have to be recognised and discussed within the police service, especially in criminogenic locations. The trick is how to use such crisis-ridden situations to generate and build a community policing programme. As Commissioner McDonald said: ‘We have to be very thoughtful.’ This note of caution is timely since the impression usually given is that community policing is some kind of manufactured drug that must be imported and taken quickly for immediate relief. I am making these remarks not to dampen anybody’s enthusiasm or entrepreneurial enterprise; but as a Caribbean professional, and noting the substantive relationship between the social sciences and community policing, we here have to take care to shape community policing into a practice that evolves from the ground up, with some patient civic cultivation (Deosaran, 2000b). This matter of civic connection, however, is one part of the story. The other, equally serious part, as Commissioner Guy indicated, is the police organisation itself. As I listen to many junior police officers, I get the impression that they are suffering from culture shock: that is, they are commanded to carry out community policing and yet they still retain quite profoundly, the ‘military’ type training which they had undergone. This particular point has always bothered Commissioner Guy. In a book entitled Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing, the authors put it this way:

Probably the biggest obstacle facing anyone who would implement a new strategy of policing is the difficulty of changing the ongoing culture of policing. That culture is deeply entrenched in the minds and souls of people now doing the work (Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy l990).

Such mental resistance by officers will be compounded when a community policing ‘model’ is almost arbitrarily placed on them for implementation. Given the strong sociological and psychological components of community policing, it is essential to have officers feel that they have a direct role in shaping the programme from ground-up, rather than having it applied from top-down. The same applies to the community (see Deosaran 2002, ‘Benchmarking in Community Policing’ for an example of motivating a crime-affected district into police partnerships). Certainly, the human resource issue, that is mental transformation, is vital. But there are other challenges, as we have gathered from research in St Kitts, St Lucia and especially in Trinidad and Tobago. Two major ones are: (1) the differences

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in administrative structures and (2) the political-legal environment in which some police agencies have to operate. David Bayley (1992) has made this point quite well in a paper entitled ‘Comparative Organisation of the Police in English-Speaking Countries.’ What then is the way forward for community policing in the Caribbean? There are three opportunities which can be triangulated in helping the ACCP to shape the way forward. The first will be the continuation of the work begun by the Regional Task Force in Community Policing set up by the ACCP in 2002. In order to help make an assessment of the current status of community policing in the Caribbean, a questionnaire was sent to all jurisdictions. The ACCP Secretariat received less than a 50 per cent response rate. This exercise should be continued and an assessment paper with recommendations presented at the next ACCP conference. Alongside this exercise, and perhaps more importantly, is the need for a well-organised roundtable discussion on community policing with Commissioners Guy, McDonald, Forbes, and Watson leading off with a brief presentation on the points indicated above. Room should be made for at least two other Caribbean Commissioners to present their own wisdom and experiences. What will this roundtable do? It will do three things. One, it will provide a community policing framework based on experiences seen from the top but gathered from the ground up. Two, it will bring Caribbean experiences into a more productive synergy with community policing concepts now considered universal. And three, the results from this roundtable discussion will be integrated with the assessment paper to help form a working blueprint for Caribbean policing under the auspices of the ACCP. The third point in the triangle (see Figure 11.2) is a summary of some results from a research/evaluation project in community policing conducted in 2002 in Trinidad and Tobago under the auspices of the Police Commissioner Guy’s office. Among the five major objectives of this project were: (1) To use a citizen-needs database for creating a community policing response at three selected police stations; (2) To see what kinds of operational, manpower or team efforts will be developed at each station to respond to citizens’ concerns; (3) To assess the quality and appropriateness of the responses at each station. This was hands-on research (Deosaran 2002e). After a community policing training programme (3 days), an essay on certain aspects of community policing was given to the 300 officers who completed the programme. Three of the best performing officers (a Sergeant, a Corporal and a Constable) were then selected, and given further training in framing a community policing project in data collection, in organising community group meetings, etc. In other words, these three selected officers knew a lot about community policing; they showed the spirit to implement the project, they knew the basic methodology to be employed, etc. Success for the project therefore depended a lot on police management at the station, especially since the initiative for this

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community policing project was originating from the relatively low ranks. After detailed examination of the results and interviews with senior personnel, etc., we found several reasons why the project did not meet the success expected. Four of the major reasons for this were:

(1) The heavy pressures and fixed administrative structures at each station for law enforcement rather than a more integrated community policing approach. (2) The lack of support and encouragement by senior officers (middle management) for the community policing approach. (3) The continued reliance on and practice of a pure ‘command leadership’ style. (4) A discernible lack of concern by the station’s leadership for citizens’ expressed needs, or at least an inability to respond effectively to such needs.

With the scientific approach taken, we are now in a position to repair these deficiencies for the future. The fact is that the Commissioner’s Office had issued several documents imploring all officers, especially senior ones, to shape their respective stations into a community policing mode so as to avoid the above deficiencies. He apparently needs to do some more work. What we now have, however, is a database, evidence from a well-targeted research project which can be used to show each station where and why it did not meet the community policing standards; and what could be done for a better community policing future. The next stage for us is to set up some feedback consultations through the Commissioner’s Office so that these results and their implications can be profitably shared with all concerned. Applied research will then be put at the service of policy. In sum, we now have three related opportunities for directing and strengthening community policing in the Caribbean: (1) A community policing assessment paper; (2) A roundtable discussion on selected community policing themes headed by at least the four Commissioners from Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana and (3) A research/evaluative project done in each of the ACCP states, funded by corporate or international donors (see Figure 11.2). The results from all three can then be integrated so as to contribute to the evolution of community policing in the Caribbean. And as such, the dream of Commissioner McDonald and his Caribbean colleagues will very likely come true.

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FIGURE 11.2 THE WAY FORWARD FOR COMMUNITY POLICING

Community Policing Assessment Paper

Commissioners’ Research/Evaluation Round-Table Project in each via ACCP Country

COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE CARIBBEAN: FACT OR FICTION?

As the excitement grew over community policing as a crime reduction and crime prevention strategy, there gradually arose periodic expressions of scepticism over these promises. Briefly, community policing is expected to establish effective partnerships with the community, gather and respond to community needs and concerns, facilitate civic mechanisms for sustainable crime prevention and deal more with the crime situation rather than the crime alone. Community policing was therefore seen as a paradigm shift, a more sociologically and psychologically- driven form of policing rather than the traditional law enforcement approach. It was more sociological because of its need to understand the nature and structure of community (for example, poverty, schools, etc.). It was psychological because of the clear challenges for behavioural change (for example, bureaucratic resistance, team spirit, civic fragmentation, etc.) in both residents and the police themselves. The drift, at least conceptually, from thick bureaucratic and centralised policing into a more diffused and ground-up policing was becoming apparent. However, as the momentum for community policing grew from the 1970s and through the 1980s, serious questions about its efficacy and success also grew. ‘Rhetoric or reality?’ asked two authors (Greene and Mastrofski l988). Sheer sloganeering and public relations, charged another reputable researcher (Bayley l998). A research team also sought to separate the myths from the realities of community policing (Cardarelli, McDevitt and Baum l998).

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Today, at least in the Caribbean, it would appear that policing as a whole is at the crossroads, both conceptually and operationally. Conceptually, because it is not clear to officers, especially junior officers, where law enforcement ends and community policing begins, or should begin, or if there is such a line at all. Operationally, and in spite of community policing rhetoric, officers are daily under heavy pressure to deliver law enforcement services as a priority in the face of the serious crime rate and public fears. And even when you explain that modern policing means the judicious inclusion of both law enforcement and community policing (problem-oriented policing), the initial challenge becomes one of role conflict and cognitive dissonance. Apart from its democratic appeal, the thrust for community policing largely emerged from deep dissatisfactions with traditional law enforcement. Such dissatisfactions ranged from slow police response, low public confidence in the police, citizen alienation, to low detection and conviction rates – and all this while public fear over crime was bringing severe pressures upon the politicians. In fact, it was claimed that community policing also aimed at reducing public fear of crime. Some proponents went further to bring citizens into the decision- making process of police work, at least for crime prevention and oversight. So with all this, it appeared some 30 years ago that community policing would have not only repaired some of the damage done by traditional law enforcement but also add value to policing, especially in the various forms of civic engagement. How successful has community policing been? There have been many claims that it has been and is successful in North America (for example, see Alpert and Piquero 1998, Stevens 2001). In addition, there have been several specific studies which demonstrate that indeed, with a problem-solving approach, community policing can work (for example, Eck and Spelman l987). But really, the reviews are quite mixed. Two reviewers, referring to the proposals by the President’s Crime Commission (l967) felt compelled to write:

Police managers and researchers are still making attempts to implement the types of changes recommended by the Commission. Some of these changes have been encompassed in the current trend in policing, known as “community policing.” The question remains, however, whether community policing will be successful or whether it will fail to be implemented, as have many of the innovative programs that preceded it (Riechers and Roberg 2000, 341).

Having eagerly adopted community policing as their front line policy in the nineties (for example, ACCP, all Caribbean governments), Caribbean countries have now been caught in the twilight zone with the operational aspects of the policy. There are five possible reasons for this:

(1) Lack of attention to the law enforcement details which should form a platform for community policing.

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(2) Bureaucratic resistance or indifference, at least at the middle management levels. (3) Lack of commitment to implement community-citizen contacts. (4) Public fear over crime and widespread (official and community) pressures for law enforcement. (5) The greater public impact obtained with law enforcement actions.

Let us very briefly deal with the fourth reason. From Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago to Guyana, the police and the governments have felt compelled to apply heavier and heavier law enforcement tactics in dealing with the crime problems and public fear in these Caribbean states.3 In Guyana, there are mounting allegations of a ‘killer squad’ set up by one particular ministry and the police. In the last two years particularly, the Jamaican police have been repeatedly accused of police brutality and even murders. In both Jamaica and Guyana, the count of murdered police officers keeps rising in recent years. Since 1999, 640 persons have been killed by the police and 23 officers charged with murder or manslaughter. None has so far been convicted. In the last three years, 50 officers have been killed on duty. There have been several calls for a state of emergency. The Chief Justice himself noted: ‘Jamaica as a people has become an ungovernable country.’ In Trinidad and Tobago, the Government felt compelled to establish a Special Anti-Crime Unit under an army Brigadier, and with a mix of army and police personnel. This unit was established in the midst of widespread complaints against a steep rise in kidnapping and murder, and police corruption and inefficiency in dealing with crime. Underlying these hard- line measures, all of which are not immediately connected to community policing, is the rather pervasive cry from the business sector and several other Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) for harsh and rapid police response to the ‘criminal elements.’ In Trinidad and Tobago, a Cabinet-appointed Crime Committee and many prominent citizens have also called for a state of emergency, harsher crime penalties and the swift application of the death penalty. Several prominent groups have called for armed police in schools. There too, several persons accused of murder have been recently freed because of bungling officials and lower court errors. Such trends have incensed a public already filled with fear of crime. In other words, the climate across the Caribbean is for stricter law enforcement and while this may be seen as a short-term response, it does present some difficulties for the police to speak about such things as citizens supporting the police, mediation and restorative justice and leniency for young or first offenders. The irony in all this is that in such situations community policing may be the best long-term measure, but how do you tell a frightened, disenchanted population that? In particular, public confidence in the police presents a chicken and egg dilemma. Earlier in this paper, we cited a community policing project which failed because

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of four major reasons, two being the lack of support by senior officers and a lack of genuine concern for citizens’ concerns by the police. We now provide another case study of the failure of community policing.

CASE STUDY: WHEN THE LAW LOST

This case study will be used not only for examining the strengths and weaknesses of community policing as a research exercise but also for training officers who wish to improve their skills in community policing. It deals with the first reason advanced above, that is, the ‘lack of attention to the law enforcement details which should form a platform for community policing.’ We begin by recalling the community policing policy as enunciated by the then Police Commissioner: ‘This new focus, community policing, is grounded in a philosophy which is intended to place the responsibility for quality service delivery in the hands of officers who have the most frequent contact with members of the public’ (Hilton Guy, December 23, l999). The mission statement of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service reads: ‘To engender a feeling of safety and security in the community while upholding the laws firmly.’ All in all, it was propounded that community policing was meant to deal firmly with lawlessness and disorder, reduce crime and violence, respond to citizens’ concerns and needs, and all this in partnership with the community and other agencies. But while the rhetoric of community policing was being spread high and low by various police spokesmen in the last ten years, it made little or no difference to the crime rate, public fear and the state of disorderliness across the country. In fact, there was no visible evidence that community policing was at work, especially in reducing public disorder. There were hundreds of disorderly and lawless situations across the country, especially in the urban centres. We therefore examined one such situation of public disorder, one which drew constant public outcry. This situation existed at a busy corner with narrow streets near the entrance to The University of the West Indies (popularly known as the ‘UWI corner,’ and where a number of small vending shacks went up, one by one, causing great traffic congestion and delays. Because of the tight traffic and pedestrian congestion at this corner, a number of accidents and inter-personal confrontations resulted over the years between 1995 and 2003, the period during which we kept that situation and police response under study. The public temper ran high and the police retreated. The law lost to disorder. Senior police officers themselves admitted that the situation contained a range of illegal acts, was very disorderly and needed police attention. Two other agencies, the Town and Country Department and the Health Department of the Regional Corporation, also admitted that they have ‘inspected the place’ and found a number of laws being broken apart from the traffic congestion and public inconvenience. And all this while the police kept boasting about community

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policing as a method of responding to public concerns. Seven key questions were asked with the answer next to each:

(1) Q: Was the police aware of this disorderly situation? A: Yes, they inspected and publicly acknowledged the disorderliness. (2) Q: Did the police receive numerous complaints from citizens about this situation? A: Yes. (3) Q: Was the situation very hazardous to physical and health safety of citizens? A: Yes, several accidents were caused, in addition to the presence of a very unsanitary drain flowing near the vendors’ stalls. (4) Q: Did the police in that district receive any appropriate training in community policing and was that disorderly situation pointed out then? A: Yes, especially in responding to community needs and concerns. (5) Q: Did the police attempt to deal with the situation? A: Yes, several times, but their own parking signs were pushed aside by the vendors and customers. Even the police sometimes parked and purchased foodstuffs there, ignoring their own ‘no parking’ signs. The food sold was deemed unsafe by the health inspector. (6) Q: Did this illegal presence of stalls and vending booths grow in number and size? A: Yes, for example, a small wooden shack has now grown into a concrete residential structure without any required permission, and aggravating the traffic congestion. Time and time again the police would appear and attempt to direct traffic. As soon as they left, the traffic congestion grew and tempers flared once again. (7) Q: Was any viable attempt made between l995 and 2003 to relocate the vendors so that their attempt ‘to earn a living’ will not be impaired? A: Yes, but was stalled in l995 by the intervention of a lawyer who, according to the health inspector, stalled further action. So for eight years, the situation was allowed to remain so, lawless, disorderly and dangerous to citizens — all subjects for effective community policing.

Community policing was designed and waved about as the method to deal with such situations — reducing public disorder, collaboration with other agencies, sustainable crime prevention measures, etc. All this failed in this case. In fact, the law lost. And the most significant factor in such failure from the explanations received was the lack of concerted support by senior officers. These senior officers, middle management really, appeared indifferent to the situation for many years.

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Late in 2003, the matter reached intense confrontation between the nearby university campus, the vendors and their supportive politicians. The university got permission from the Regional Corporation to establish a parking lot but the vendors went to the media and complained of broken promises and of their plight of having nowhere else to go. The affected vendors and squatters threatened litigation. This was degenerative lawlessness: the police and other agencies allowed things to go from bad to worse, a situation very similar to what led to the l990 Muslimeen Insurrection over a land dispute. Lawlessness fed upon itself. Part of an amicable remedy, however, was to find an alternative, suitable place for these vendors. Of course, the unruly vending did serve a social need, like ‘PH’ taxis (that is, private cars working as taxis illegally) and squatting. And as such, public policy must respond accordingly, one way or another, but certainly not letting illegal acts continue to thrive. Confusion will reign and a culture of lawlessness will be bred (see Deosaran, A Society Under Siege, l993, for a discussion on illegality serving social needs).

Photograph 1 Photograph 2

Photos above and at left show the disorder and congestion which accompany the various vending activities at the ‘UWI corner.’ Notice Photo 2 above which shows that despite the ‘No Parking’ sign which is in clear view, dozens of cars are still parked along the street.

Photograph 3

In the last few years, hundreds of such congested areas with illegal structures and vending have grown up. In fact, a situation that could have been remedied with mutual satisfaction several years ago was allowed to grow in disorder, in flagrant violation of the laws and exposing the hardships which common folk endure in trying to make a living. Community policing failed. And all this while

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there were several attractively printed booklets and reports from the police service about their ‘community policing plans’ and their commitment to its implementation (for example, Community Policing Plan 1996-1999, Community Policing Section: Progress Report l996-l997, Vision 2000 and Beyond by Trinidad and Tobago Police Service). More than this, the police and government spokesmen repeatedly promised the public ‘zero tolerance’ against all forms of lawlessness. The ‘broken windows’ approach was also widely proclaimed at official anti-crime presentations. The pictures above suggest we are a long way off. In fact, the trend in Trinidad now is that if a vendor or squatter breaks the law long enough, he will eventually be regularised by being allowed to stay there or moved to another suitable state- owned location. But even so, the pathway towards regularisation gets wrapped with bitter controversy and threatening litigation. This was the cradle that nurtured the Muslimeen Insurrection in l990. As recorded in a book on the Muslimeen Insurrection, degenerative lawlessness is a product of adversarial diffusiveness and lawlessness by approximations (Deosaran 1993, 171). As two reviewers said:

‘The concept of community policing is rather nebulous, and in the field, it assumes many forms, including foot patrol, ministrations and community organising. Both internal and external factors have limited the success of its implementation, and so far, it has never become fully operational on a large scale’ (Rosenbaum and Lurigio l994, 1).

CONCLUSION

There are several persistent operational and organisational weaknesses in community policing. The overall policing situation seems worsened when put in the context of strong dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of traditional law enforcement. If traditional law enforcement is not seen as an effective policy and community policing is embarrassingly stumbling here and there, then what does the future hold for Caribbean policing? Or is it time to declare that community policing will have to sit in the back burner while a more effective, transformed form of law enforcement ‘cleans up the place?’ In fact, it already seems throughout the Caribbean, from Jamaica to Trinidad and Tobago to Guyana, given the high levels of public fear and serious crimes, community policing will be lying low for a while. At best, therefore, Caribbean policing is at the crossroads; at worst, the future does not look too bright unless some radical overhauls take place in terms of organisational reform, accountability and programming. These are some of the serious challenges facing policymakers, researchers and in fact the frightened taxpayers across the Caribbean.

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Riechers, L.M. and Roberg, R.R. 2000. ‘Community Policing: A Critical Review of Underlying Assumptions’. Journal of Police Science and Administration 17, no. 2: 105–14. Rosenbaum, D.P. 1994. The Challenge of Community Policing. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications. Rosenbaum, D.P. and Lurigio, A.J. 1994. ‘An Inside Look at Community Policing Reforms’. Crime and Delinquency 40, no. 3: 299–314. Sparrow, M., Moore, M. and Kennedy, D. 1990. Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing. New York: Basic Books. Stevens, D.V. 2001. Case Studies in Community Policing. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Trojanowicz, R., Kappler, V., Gaines, L. and Bucqueroux, B. 1998. Community Policing: Contemporary Perspectives. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co. Trotman, D.V. 1986. Crime in Trinidad: Conflict and Control in a Plantation Society, 1838– 1900. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

NOTES

1. This paper is an edited combination of three presentations made in 2003 and 2004. The first entitled ‘From Concepts to Practice: The Caribbean Challenge in Community Policing’ was presented at the 18th Annual General Meeting and Conference of the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police, May 22, 2003, Bermuda. The second entitled ‘Key Regional Issues in Crime and Justice in the Caribbean’ was presented on June 27, 2003 at a Meeting of Experts sponsored by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Institute, Turin, Italy in preparation for the 2004/ 05 UN World Crime and Justice Report. The third entitled ‘Community Policing in the Caribbean: Fact or Fiction?’ was presented on February 12, 2004 at the 3rd International Conference on Crime and Justice, The University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, Jamaica. 2. In the last 25 years, several crime reduction and crime prevention proposals were made to some governments in the region by this author. These have met with some success at implementation. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago, a 12-Point National Action Plan Against Crime (NAPAC) was submitted in 1996. A similar plan was developed and also submitted to the Government of Grenada in 1996. In 1997, a proposal for the implementation of a National Crime Commission was made. At the 2002 CARICOM Heads of Government Summit, this proposal for implementing a National Crime Commission in each Caricom state was accepted as policy for implementation. In 1995, an Implementation Plan on Mediation Centres as a Community Alternative to Litigation for Young First Time Offenders was submitted and accepted as policy by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. This proposal was also used in the drafting of legislation approved by Parliament and now known as the Community Mediation Act, Act No. 13 of 1998. A proposal for a National Commission on Crime was submitted and accepted by the Government of St. Lucia in 2001. This was followed by the formal launch of this country’s National Crime Commission in January 2003. During 2002–06 in Trinidad and Tobago, several policy proposals were made on community policing and organisational readiness, juvenile delinquency and prison recidivism and penal reform (for example, A Human Resource Survey of Community:

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Policing and Organisational Readiness in the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service; Quality Benchmarking and Police Performance: Readiness for Community Policing; Prison Recidivism: Towards Reduction, Rehabilitation and Reform and Benchmarking Violence and Delinquency in the Secondary School: Towards a Culture of Peace and Civility). 3. We must note the evolution of the Caribbean police from the slave and plantation system. That is, primarily for maintaining law and order among the slave and indentured populations (see Mahabir 1985 and Trotman 1986). This and the other factors of growing citizen disenchantment and even alienation over the rise of socioeconomic inequalities tend to create some psychological distance between members of the status quo (for example, police, politicians, etc.), and the ordinary citizen whose support is critically needed for effective community policing. The rise of illegal squatting and vending across the Caribbean is also a measure of the socioeconomic dislocations which pervade the region. It is a ‘social need’ vs. the law dilemma in many cases. The works by Headley (1996) and Harriott (1998) in Jamaica, and Mars (2001) in Guyana discuss the dilemmas more fully.

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Rough Justice: INTRODUCTION Political Understanding the enduring consequences Policing and of colonialism in the shaping of every aspect Colonial Self- of Caribbean society, including the state’s Rule in Guyana1 coercive apparatus, is arguably the most important factor in explaining police behaviour in the region. In this regard, the Joan R. Mars pervasive role of politics in the policing of plantation societies, differentiated along both class and racial lines, is of special significance in explaining not only the tactical decisions made by police in the daily performance of their duties, but also the enduring characteristics of police culture and behaviour that continue to generate recurring crises in police-community relations.2 The political and social turmoil that prevailed during the efforts of British colonial authorities to ‘decolonise’ its dependency known as British Guiana provides a unique example of political policing in the region, that remains largely unexplored. Although some attention has been paid to the involvement of the police in containing racial and industrial conflicts (Campbell 1987, Danns 1982), the techniques used by the metropolitan power in the crafting of a political police for the maintenance of control during the period of colonial self-rule (1953–66) have not been investigated. The governance of British Guiana during this period reflected a fundamental disjuncture between local attempts at nation-building and the perceived interests

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of the British colonial authorities. Despite the primary responsibility of the police to maintain public safety, public disorder was intentionally allowed to escalate into inter-ethnic violence, murder and arson, thereby providing a unique example of political policing in the region. This paper analyses police history to discuss the crafting of a political police force in British Guiana. The significance of the political policing of public disorder, and the role of the police in the production of the events that occurred during this period of colonial self-rule (1953-66) is discussed, as well as the lasting effects of politics on police behaviour and police- community relations in Guyana.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Many attempts have been made to describe the role of politics in policing ranging from the assertion that ‘all policing is political’ (Huggins 1998, 9, Turk 1982, 115); to the recognition that politics can play a calculated role in the creation and operations of police forces (Bayley 1971, 1977, Chevigny 1995). A distinction should, however, be made between the recognition of the inherently political character of the policing function to the extent that it helps to fulfil the requirements of the social contract in the Kantian sense, and the capability of the police to be used overtly or covertly for expressly political purposes. In the first instance, the recognition of an inherently political function for the police lies in the expectation that it would play a role in fulfilling the state’s duty to maintain a well-ordered society. In this context, the police enable the state to protect its citizens from acts of injustice, to keep the people’s peace and along with civil society, ‘to be a “cooperative association for the prevention of crime”’ (Alderson 1998, 28). The covert or overt use of the police for expressly political purposes, on the other hand, involves harnessing the coercive capacities of the state primarily for the furtherance of statist goals. Such goals may include the suppression of political dissent, protecting and promoting the interests of the dominant classes, and keeping ‘dangerous’ individuals, groups and classes in their place. Among the array of countries that currently engage in covert political policing from time to time are the United States, Britain3 and Canada which provide some colourful examples (Chevigny 1995, Enloe 1980, Turk 1982). In these cases, political policing is conducted under the guise of traditional law enforcement functions in order to deal with perceived or actual threats to the hegemony of the dominant social order. These threats may take the form of individuals, classes or groups that disturb or challenge the status quo, and can range from an innocent influx of immigrants (Brown and Warner 1995), to civil rights activists involved in legitimate protest activities, or suspected terrorists and insurgents (Chevigny 1995, Enloe 1980, Turk 1982). Police forces that are wholly or partially designed and employed for overt political purposes proliferate in Latin America and the English-speaking Caribbean

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and operate as a political weapon in the hands of the holders of state power (Enloe 1980, Huggins 1991, 1998, Jeffries 1952). This form of policing usually requires a disproportionate investment of resources and manpower in population control and is often achieved through varying degrees of militarisation of the force. A significant characteristic of overt political policing that has been overlooked in the literature, and for which Guyana provides a classic example, is that it not only involves politically motivated coercive actions taken by police, acts of commission, but also the failure to act in the public interest when action is required, acts of omission. Our argument is that police behaviour during the decolonisation period under review provides examples of politically motivated acts of commission as well as omission, resulting in ‘rough justice’ for the duly elected representatives of the people. Political policing involved not only the repression of legitimate resistance to oppression, but also the deliberate dereliction of duty in furtherance of the national security interests of the British Empire and its allies. This type of policing was facilitated by three significant factors in the crafting of the police force: (a) constitutional control of the police force; (b) the militarisation of the force; and (c) the use of race and ethnicity to ensure loyalty of the force to the colonial administration.

THE CRAFTING OF THE GUYANA POLICE FORCE (a) Constitutional Control of the Police Force

From its inception shortly after the end of the Emancipation period in British Guiana, the police force was directly answerable to the executive. Under Ordinance 13 of 1838 which provided for the establishment of the force, county inspectors reported to their respective county sheriffs who received instructions directly from the governor. The following year, when the administration of the force was centralised under a single inspector general of police for the colony (by Ordinance 9 of 1839 as amended), he was required to report directly to the governor. The implementation of universal adult suffrage4 signalled the beginning of an earnest struggle, led by locally-born middle class elites, for control of the state under Britain’s decolonisation policy on the road to full political independence. Foremost among them was Cheddi Jagan, the leader of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP). The PPP was victorious at national elections held under the Waddington Constitution of 1953 which provided for wider participation of the elected representatives of the people in the governance of the country.5 However, none of the constitutional arrangements permitting self-government relinquished control of the police force to the local representatives of the people. In fact, provisions were made to ensure the exact opposite. The Waddington Constitution had increased popular participation in the legislature from 14 elected members under the Crown Colony Constitution as

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reformed in 1943, to 24 elected members; dispensed with property qualifications for membership of the legislature, and abolished property and literacy qualifications for the exercise of the franchise. However, the governor’s power to enforce the will of the colonial authorities remained substantially unchanged. His power to pass essential legislation for the well-being of the colony was retained, as well as his power to veto legislation (Sections 77, 78(2)). He could also reserve any bill for ‘signification of Her Majesty’s pleasure,’ and could not assent to certain bills without the permission of the secretary of state for the colonies. He did not have to consult with the executive council in respect of powers which the governor was directed or empowered by the Constitution to exercise, nor did he have to consult with the executive council in cases involving urgent matters or matters in which such consultation would prejudice Her Majesty’s services. In any event, he did not have to accept the advice of the executive council if he considered that it was inimical to the good and orderly government of the colony, or the furtherance of the interests of the British Empire (Shahabuddeen 1978, 517). Most importantly, the Constitution placed ultimate responsibility for defence, the police force, and information in the hands of the chief (colonial) secretary. The Waddington Constitution was suspended shortly after the PPP took office and replaced by an interim Constitution, but no changes were made in the arrangements relating to the police until the promulgation of a new Constitution which took effect in 1961. In the meantime, Jagan’s PPP was victorious at national elections held again in 1957 and 1961. A proposal by the PPP that a minister in the government should assume full constitutional control of the police was rejected, and the new Constitution allowed for only a transfer of limited responsibility for the maintenance and administration of the force to the council of ministers (which the executive council had been renamed). The power to exercise disciplinary control or to appoint or dismiss senior members of the force remained vested in the governor, who was expected to act on the recommendation of the police service commission which had been established in 1956. The likelihood that the commission would make recommendations in accordance with the wishes of the governor was secured by the fact that it consisted of the chairman of the public service commission, the commissioner of police, and not more than three other members all of whom were appointed by the governor. An attempt was subsequently made by the PPP government, by virtue of the Miscellaneous Enactments Bill, No. 10 of 1963, to transfer operational control of the force to the Minister of Home Affairs, but this bill was reserved by the governor for the signification of ‘Her Majesty’s pleasure’ under Article 74(3), proviso (a) of the new Constitution and never became law (Shahabuddeen 1978). The governor retained his power (subject to the overriding powers of the colonial authorities)6 to refuse to assent, inter alia, to any bill affecting the maintenance of law and order or the terms or conditions of service of public officers, including the police.

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Constitutionally, therefore, the commissioner of police, the governor, and ultimately, the British authorities, retained operational control of the police force until the independence constitution was promulgated in 1966. (b) The Militarisation of the Police Force

Although military influences have played a role in the organisation and training of civilian police forces worldwide (Enloe 1980, Fogelson 1977, Manning 1977), British colonial style ‘militarised’ policing shared more features with the troop contingents they were intended to replace, than with the traditional civilian model that had been implemented at home.7 Military tactics and methods were not localised in particular specialised units but penetrated the structure, organisation, and training of the entire force, which was fully expected and equipped to perform the role of an occupying army on behalf of the government, when directed to do so. These militarised forces can also be distinguished from the relatively recent rise in paramilitary policing in traditionally civilian forces through the increase of police paramilitary units, such as the state and local police ‘swat’ teams in the United States (Kraska and Kappeler 1997), and Britain’s paramilitary specialist public order squads (Enloe 1980). Though also engaging in crime-fighting functions, colonial militarised police forces, like the state’s army, were primarily concerned with suppressing challenges to the social and political order and maintaining the authority of the state (Enloe 1980, Jeffries 1952). Close examination of militarised colonial police forces reveals several distinguishing characteristics: (a) military command, organisational structure and weaponry, (b) emphasis on military tactics, training, intelligence- gathering and the show of force and (c) social distancing of police from the public. Police forces that are intended to provide internal security tend to be centralised forces, directly responsible to the state, operating under a hierarchical chain of command, with the trappings of a military force, such as designations, uniforms, etc. Absolute and unquestioning obedience to orders given by superior officers is demanded. Divisions are woven together under a central command, with or without specialised units. The force is heavily armed with the most sophisticated hardware available and especially anti-riot and crowd-control tools. Training is not focused on the ‘cop-on-the-beat’ type of policing, but intelligence gathering, proficiency in the use of weapons and field operations. Regular displays of their capacity for coercion take the form of ‘battalion drills’ and other displays at public functions. The members of the force are usually divided into the elite ‘officer’ ranks and the lower ranks, and are housed in special residences and barracks away from the rest of the population. The ‘officer’ rank of the force usually consists almost exclusively of expatriates who are provided with a variety of privileges and ‘free’ household and personal services by the lower ranks. Among the lower ranks, ethnic divisions are exploited to enhance the divide and rule policies of the British.

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The Royal Irish Constabulary, a highly militarised force established by the British in Ireland, was considered to be the appropriate model for the constabularies established in the British Caribbean colonies (Jeffries 1952). In the case of Guyana, however, despite the arguments advanced by Danns (1982) to the contrary, the ‘usual West Indian pattern’ was not initially followed and instead the force was established in 1839 as a civilian force under the advice of the commissioners of the London Metropolitan Police (Jeffries 1952, 64). The newly-freed slaves were respectful and law-abiding,8 and in any event, the British West India Regiment and the local militia, which had replaced the Dutch Burgher Militia, were available to deal with any threats to public order. The centralisation of the force under the control of an inspector-general for the entire country, instead of under the local control of county sheriffs, seems to have been the only military influence at that time. In the decades that followed, however, the force became increasingly relied upon to deal with constant resistance to British oppression, mainly in the form of riots and other public disturbances. The process of militarisation of the force was evident as early as 1884, when three members of the Royal Irish Constabulary, a highly militarised police force, were enlisted. In 1889, a military officer assumed full command of the force, and permitted the issue of weapons to non- commissioned officers and constables (Campbell 1987). When the British troops (the first West India Regiment) withdrew from the colony in 1891, the police force was officially reorganised with every member being armed to undertake responsibility for defence, as well as the suppression of internal disturbances (Ordinance 7 of 1891). The police and the militia formed the defence forces of the colony, and from time to time thereafter, whenever the militia was disbanded for lack of funding, the police was the only line of defence. Organisationally, the force was brought in line with those already in existence in the other territories of the British West Indies. The colony was divided into territorial divisions by county, and an inspector and sergeant major were appointed for each county. The inspector general (now renamed commissioner), who was also appointed commandant of the British Guiana Militia, was at the top of the hierarchical chain of command, followed by the new post of deputy inspector- general. In addition, other military-type positions such as adjutant, and pay and quarter master were added. Considerable attention was placed on discipline and obedience to orders given by higher ranks, proficiency in the use of advanced weaponry, and the show of force. Martini Henri rifles were replaced with the more powerful Martin Enfield. Emphasis was placed on ‘skill in arms,’ ‘daily drill with arms’ and ‘squad, company and baton drill,’ snap shooting and musketry. The force quickly became the most heavily armed in the British West Indies. By 1902, according to Campbell (1987), the force drilled as a battalion regularly, and ‘on several occasions in brigade with the Militia’ (p. 91).

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In 1905, a mounted police branch, particularly useful in crowd dispersal, was formed and open rifle competitions were held. A section of the officer corp (non- commissioned officers) was trained in field defences ‘including hasty entrenchment, shelter trenches, gun pits, obstacles, etc.’ (Campbell 1987, 96). In addition, the police were trained and equipped by White officers to maintain surveillance of the majority, non-White population comprised mainly of disaffected East Indian immigrant contract labourers and local creoles.9 Social distancing was achieved both by ethnically-based selection of ordinary and gazetted members (officers) and the compulsory housing of the former in barracks, and the latter in special residences within a compound kept separate from the rest of the population. Officers were almost exclusively foreign-born, without any local connections or family ties. Non-commissioned officers were rarely allowed to work in police stations in their own villages or home towns. The force remained a semi-military undertaking throughout the colonial period and thereafter. In 1948, a special branch/constabulary was formed to provide a reserve force that would be on call if needed for the preservation of good order. It was the urban counterpart to the rural constabulary that had been formed for the same reason during the early years of the post-emancipation period (1849). Despite various primarily cosmetic changes over the years, the military capabilities of the force were affirmed by the Police Act, 1957. The Act provides for the employment of the force as a military force, by virtue of proclamation in the event of war or other emergency, whereupon members of the force would hold their police ranks as well as ‘such military ranks as may be determined...’ (Section 13(2) as amended). Following the upsurge of industrial unrest, political violence and racial conflict between the two major ethnic groups (East Indians and Blacks) during period under review, a special services unit was set up by the governor consisting of subordinate officers and constables from the force (B.G. Special Services Unit Order, 11/64). The special service unit was a highly-trained, disciplined, and heavily- armed police unit as well as a miniature army, and was mandated to repress internal disturbances as well as perform military duties as may be authorised by the governor. It later became the nucleus of the country’s first full-time army, the Guyana Defence Force, which came into existence on November 1, 1965. (c) The Use of Race and Ethnicity to Ensure Loyalty of the Force to the Colonial Administration

The British have always relied upon the skilful use of ethnicity in its divide and rule policies to maintain control over the culturally diverse polities it helped to create (Enloe 1980). In this context, the police and military institutions have received special attention and Guyana was no exception. According to Enloe (1980), recruitment formulas are purposefully designed to ‘...make the police (1) a more reliable agent of the State and (2) a more effective deterrent against challenges to the existing political structure’ (p. 135). From the time the force

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was established in 1839, the racial composition mirrored the concerns of the colonial government in maintaining social distance from the local population. The force was particularly known for its ‘international character’ including men from ‘England, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, the United States, Madeira, Africa, India, China and various West Indian islands’ (Jeffries 1952, 64). The racial composition of the force has never reflected the racial composition of the population. Initially, the officer corps (both commissioned and non-commissioned) were White and the rank and file consisted of Whites, Mulattoes,10 also called ‘Coloureds,’ and Blacks, mainly from foreign countries. In 1887, the majority of the constables (48.1 per cent) were non-locals, consisting of 249 Barbadians and 52 West Indians from other countries (Moore 1987). Locally born Blacks gradually replaced foreign-born constables and non-commissioned officers in far greater numbers than East Indians. Census data records 66 East Indian police in 1891, 24 in 1911 and 20 in 1921, but their numbers remained overwhelmingly disproportionate to their representation in the population, and formed the basis for allegations of racial discrimination that surfaced during the Jagan years (International Commission of Jurists 1965). As political instability in the colony increased, so did the numerical strength of the police and the expenditure of the colonial government for their maintenance, but little gains were made in the numbers of East Indians recruited. The composition of the force also reflected expectations of loyalty and reliability based on racial ascriptions that started to evolve as far back as the slavery period. With reference to the Mulatto population, their dependability corresponded with the creation of special accommodations, life opportunities and social roles based on lightness of skin colour (Smith 1980, 27). They were counted as Whites for the purpose of fulfilling the security requirement of the Crown that a ratio of one White to every 50 slaves be maintained on the plantation (Demerara Ordinance of 1784). They served in the regular slave patrols that existed during the slavery period and from around 1822, they were allowed to take up commissions in the militia (Shahabuddeen 1978, Smith 1980). The dependability and loyalty of the Mulattoes or ‘Coloureds’ was unquestioned and they were favoured for supervisory positions throughout the colonial administration, including the force. The situation was not so clear-cut in the case of Black and East Indian recruits, however, but over time, a certain degree of confidence developed with respect to expectations for obedience of the Black rank and file in preference to East Indians. African slaves had been used for the policing of other slaves during the slavery period, but they were not allowed to take up commissions in the militia. There is evidence of the formation of a Negro corp. by the colonial government in 1796. ‘The South American Rangers’ as they were called, were required with the promise of freedom for good conduct, to assist the troops in expeditions against settlements

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of ‘bush Negroes’ (Rodway 1891). After emancipation, in a society where social mobility was determined by a colour-class system of social stratification, the Blacks quickly became assimilated to British culture and values. East Indian contract labourers and their descendants, on the other hand, remained a culturally distinct sector of the population for a much longer period. There was also an initial language barrier in the case of the latter, most of whom spoke Hindustani upon their arrival, whereas Blacks by that time had become for the most part, fluent in English. Occupational specialisation among the racial groups also played a role. Blacks who were practically driven off the land which they tried to farm independently after emancipation, tended to seek positions in the civil service, while East Indian contract labourers were initially given their own plots of land to farm and were encouraged to remain on the estates after the end of their period of indenture (Moore 1987). Additionally, entrance requirements for the police force, such as those for height and chest measurements, and unmarried status operated to exclude East Indians, who tended to be more diminutive in stature than Blacks, and married at an earlier age (International Commission of Jurists 1965). Hence, a complex array of factors may have influenced what emerged as a preference for Blacks rather than East Indians for the rank and file of the police force. In January, 1958, a cadet officer scheme was established which permitted locally born Guyanese to enter the officer ranks of the force directly, but most of the early appointees were light-skinned descendants of the Coloured class. The rank and file were kept in line under a severe disciplinary code that imposed strict penalties, including dismissal from the force, for failure to obey orders or the dereliction of duty. By Force Order 12 of 1957 the disciplinary procedures were revamped to place the responsibility for imposing discipline on the rank and file, from inspectors to constables, in the hands of the commissioner, with the governor being the final arbiter in all appeals from the decision of the former. Accused ranks could no longer retain counsel for their representation either in the magistrate’s court or during internal disciplinary proceedings. The ethnic composition of the force, and the measures in place for ensuring loyalty and punishing disobedience all combined to produce a force that could be relied upon to safeguard the security interests of the metropolitan power. White expatriate officers, whose loyalties were with the British, maintained command of the force. It was not until 1967, after Independence was achieved, that the first locally born commissioner was appointed. Ethnic imbalances in the force resulted in allegations of racial discrimination during the period under review, and remain a serious impediment to the improvement of police-community relations.

POLITICAL POLICING AND COLONIAL SELF-RULE: 1953-66

Three instances of political policing during the period of colonial self-rule in Guyana (1953-66) resulted in what could be described as ‘rough justice’ for the

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duly elected representatives of the people, in this case the government of the PPP. In these cases, the police openly participated in acts and omissions that were clearly intended to further the political aims and objectives of the British Empire and its allies. In so doing, they failed to fulfil their duty to enforce the law without fear or favour, and to maintain public order and safety, for which the PPP government and the entire country paid a high price. The three events to be discussed are: (a) the policing of the members of the PPP who were suspected of being ‘communists,’ after the suspension of the Constitution in 1953 (acts of commission); (b) the policing of public order during labour disturbances that took place during the 1962-63 period under the PPP government (acts of omission) and (c) the policing of the 1964 race riots (acts of omission as well as commission). (a) Policing the ‘Communists’

Jagan’s PPP was victorious at national elections under varying degrees of colonial self-government in 1953, 1957 and 1961 and remained in office until the 1964 general election. At that time, a coalition of two opposition parties, the People’s National Congress (PNC) and the United Force (UF), produced a legislative majority in the national assembly and constituted the new government. During their tenure in office, the PPP’s ideological commitment to a combination of nationalist and Marxist strategies for the improvement of the society was anathema to the political interest of the British government and its allies, especially the United States. In fact, the British government had already pledged itself to the defeat of all communist movements in the British Commonwealth (Shahabuddeen 1978, 527). After a mere 133 days in office, Cheddi Jagan’s PPP was considered a formidable threat to British political interests in the region and on October 4, 1953, the Waddington Constitution was suspended. On October 8, 1953, the governor declared a state of emergency, and made emergency regulations enabling the removal of the portfolios of the elected ministers. A commission was appointed to recommend changes for a new Constitution, and an interim government was constituted. The colonial government then turned its attention to the police, the first line of defence against any resistance from the PPP and its supporters. Despite assurances from the governor of the loyalty and reliability of the police force, the colonial government was concerned about the presence of PPP supporters in the force, and the negative effect this could have on its dependability should there be public resistance to the course of events (St. Pierre 1999). British troops were considered necessary in order to ensure internal security and on October 8, 1953 a battalion of British troops landed in the colony to assist in the maintenance of law and order in the event that there was violent resistance to the course of events. Under emergency orders giving the police expanded powers of arrest, detention, and searches, the police were openly deployed for purely political purposes, designed to neutralise and contain the Marxist revolutionary

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potential and the popularity of the PPP. Political meetings throughout the country were banned. PPP violators of the emergency regulations banning public meetings and demonstrations were arrested by police and imprisoned. The headquarters of the PPP and the homes of PPP leaders were constantly raided by police in search of communist materials (Chase 1964, Jagan 1997). A total of 13 PPP leaders identified as potential ‘troublemakers’ were arrested and detained without trial. After they were eventually released, they and many other PPP leaders, including Cheddi Jagan, were placed under constant surveillance and their mobility was restricted to the districts in which they lived. Some of them were required to report daily to the police, upon pain of imprisonment. Cheddi Jagan was arrested by police for travelling 35 miles out of his restricted area (Georgetown) to work at his branch dental surgery which he operated in Mahaicony. He was later imprisoned for five months on this charge. The restrictions on his mobility lasted for three years (HMSO 1954, Jagan 1997, Reno 1964, Smith 1962). The police cast a wide net that included not only the PPP leaders but also their supporters, and as a result many innocent people were unjustly arrested and imprisoned. Cheddi Jagan characterised the country during this period as a ‘police state,’ and even the anti-communist media were loud in their condemnation of police tactics during this period (Jagan 1997, 149–52). (b) The Policing of Public Order: 1962–63

The British government attempted to alleviate the constitutional and political crisis created by the suspension of the Waddington Constitution by the holding of national elections under a new Constitution in 1957 which resulted in a resounding victory for the PPP. Cheddi Jagan was, however, labouring under significant constitutional limitations which restricted the ability of his government to make and implement national policy. During the interim period, a split had taken place in the PPP and the party was now divided along ideological and racial lines with the African-dominated section becoming the main opposition force in the country. That segment of the PPP eventually changed its name to the PNC and contested the 1961 elections which were again won by the East-Indian- dominated PPP. Another opposition party, the UF had also emerged on the political landscape and together with the PNC, challenged the policies of the PPP. Cheddi Jagan was given the title of ‘premier’ under the most liberal version of constitutional self-governance, and was expected to lead the country to independence, a matter that troubled the British authorities greatly. The PPP was now forced to contend with both the colonial government as well as the very contentious leaders of PNC and the UF. The 1962 anti-government riots erupted as a result of orchestrated, public opposition to the socialist-oriented economic policies of the PPP, and in particular, the taxation provisions of the first budget put forth by the newly re-elected PPP government. Public demonstrations started on February 11, 1962, and intensified

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when the Trade Union Council called its members out on strike against the provisions of the budget. The Civil Service Association joined the strike, thereby crippling both the private and public sectors of the economy. The leaders of the two opposition political parties (PNC and UF), and their supporters, took to the streets and called for the resignation of the government (HMSO 1962). On the morning of February 15, the government issued a proclamation under Section 6 of the Public Order Act (1955) banning public meetings and assemblies in designated areas around the capital, Georgetown, where the public protests were taking place. The decisions taken by the governor and the commissioner of police regarding the deployment of the force during this period stands in sharp contrast to those made to enforce the emergency regulations during the period of the suspension of the Constitution and the removal of Jagan from office in 1953. On the same day that the proclamation came into effect, the leader of the PNC, Mr L F S Burnham, and the leader of the UF, Mr Peter D’aguiar openly defied the law and led processions through the restricted areas in the city. Despite the warning of Assistant Commissioner Phoenix, the two opposition processions met outside the public buildings, ignoring the riot squad and other senior officers. No attempt was made by the police to arrest the opposition leaders or to enforce the law. On one occasion the leader of the UF and some of his followers were allowed to make their way through members of the riot squad who were guarding the power station (HMSO 1962). It soon became clear that the police were in sympathy with the strikers and were not likely to take punitive action against them. The ambivalence of the governor and the commissioner of police in managing the disorder that had gripped the city reflected a political decision not to intervene in what was clearly a deliberate attempt by the opposition to oust the Jagan government from office through undemocratic means. There is no question that this heavily armed, militarised police were capable of enforcing the proclamation. Instead of directing the police to enforce the law and clear the streets, the governor resorted to appeals to the two opposition leaders, Burnham and D’aguiar, to ‘use (their) influence and advise the people to desist from acts of violence and to ask the people to leave the streets.’ Both of the opposition leaders replied that they could not comply with this request (HMSO 1962). Predictably, the ‘restraint’ and ‘calm’ exercised by the police emboldened the demonstrators who became more assertive in their defiance of the police. On February 16, which came to be known as ‘Black Friday,’ crowds were allowed to gather outside the electricity power plant where scabs were suspected to be working, and were joined by a group who had attended a meeting at the Parade Ground held by one of the opposition leaders, Peter D’aguiar. They stoned the building and jeered the riot squad who came on the scene. The crowd disrupted attempts by an officer to effect the arrest of a stone-thrower, who was promptly set free. The police, apparently cowed by crowd, resorted to the use of tear gas as their vehicles were pelted with bricks and bottles (HMSO 1962). The crowd became

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more incensed when a rumour was circulated that a child had died from inhalation of the tear gas. In fact, the child had been only slightly injured and had been rushed to the hospital by police. Angry crowds converged on the headquarters of the PPP, shattering windows with bottles, stones and other missiles. Police reinforcements were called out under the command of a superintendent and assistant commissioner but no serious attempt was made to subdue what had now become a riotous crowd. Missiles were thrown at the police while the crowd chanted ‘We are going to murder you, we are going to eat you, we are not going to disperse’ (HMSO 1962, 38). Tear gas shells from the police brought forth automatic rifle fire from snipers in the crowd. The police exchanged shots with the snipers but no definitive attempt was made to restore order. Six police officers were wounded at the scene and one died of his injuries (HMSO 1962). The crowds quickly realised that they had the upper hand and surged forward, overturning cars, extracting gasoline and setting stores and businesses on fire. The disorder spread throughout the business centre of the city, as looters emptied stores. Police who attempted to drive them away were shot. Firemen were attacked, fired upon in some instances, and some of their hoses were cut as they attempted to put out fires (HMSO 1962). The violence spread and soon threatened to engulf the entire city. British troops had to be brought in to restore public order. At the end of the unfortunate episode, one superintendent of police and four demonstrators were dead, 39 members of the force and 41 persons had been injured, several vehicles belonging to the police and members of the public had been damaged in the melee, and property damage caused by arson and looting totalled in excess of $11 million (HMSO 1962, Reno 1964). There is little doubt that the initial failure of the police to enforce the emergency regulations and laws relating to the holding of meetings and processions around designated areas of the city had emboldened the demonstrators and their leaders. Subsequent inaction in the face of open breaches of the law gave impetus to the acts of violence and lawlessness that followed, for which, the police is at least partially responsible. The commissioner of police justified the tactical decisions made, by the need to avoid clashes between the police and the public, because of the small size of the force compared to the large numbers of demonstrators. The commission of inquiry into the disturbances, reluctantly acknowledged the ineffectiveness of the police on February 16, and also sought to excuse their behaviour on the basis of their inadequate numbers (HMSO 1962). It was clearly apparent however, that on several occasions, they had failed to fulfil their duty to maintain law and order. On April 18, 1963 the Trades Unions Council again called a general strike, this time to protest the introduction of a Labour Relations Bill by the PPP Government. The Civil Service Association joined the strike which lasted 80 days and was supported by the opposition political parties. During the strike, workers

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engaged in various protest activities, conducted demonstrations, and squatted in front of government offices and homes of government officials. A state of emergency was again declared and the police resorted to using tear gas grenades which were sometimes promptly hurled back at them by crowds (Campbell 1987). Jagan (1997) records many instances where he prevailed upon the commissioner of police to disperse riotous crowds, and implement the proclamation, all to no avail. Several requests were made for the assistance of the British army in restoring order, but were rebuffed by the governor who suggested that the withdrawal of the Labour Relations Bill was the only way that the disturbances would end. Crowds repeatedly assembled around the structure known as the Public Buildings where the office of Premier Jagan was located, and on several occasions, despite Jagan’s pleas, the commissioner of police was unable to disperse them. During one incident, a government minister was savagely beaten and Jagan, along with the police and bodyguards escorting him from his office, were stoned by angry mobs (Jagan 1997). The colonial authorities, with the support of the police, clearly intended to permit the disorder to continue in the hope of forcing Cheddi Jagan’s resignation. Under the watchful eyes of the police, demonstrators armed themselves with weapons (galvanized pipe, sticks with nails embedded in them, and motorcycle chains) and defied the emergency regulations prohibiting public processions and meetings (Jagan 1997). Incidents of rioting, beatings, looting, arson and even bombings became commonplace. When the strike was eventually called off on July 6, 1963, the police reported that nine murders, a total of 43 bomb incidents, 46 cases of arson and 17 cases of attempted arson had taken place (Campbell, 1987; Jagan, 1997). In addition, many strike-breakers, East Indian citizens and government officials had suffered beatings at the hands of the protesters (Jagan 1997). Instead of enforcing public order and protecting public safety, the police, through their omission to act when action was clearly required, had become nothing more than a political tool in the hands of the colonial authorities. (c) Policing of the 1964 Race Riots

In 1964, the Guyana Agricultural Workers Union (GAWU) called a strike in pursuance of union recognition for workers at Plantation Leonora. Several other sugar estates joined the strike and the sugar planters recruited mainly Africans from Georgetown to replace the striking East Indian workers. The predominantly African police were used to transport the African scabs to and from the sugar estates and they allegedly ‘cooperated with the African vigilantes in terrorizing the strikers who squatted at strategic points’ (Jagan 1997, 306). East Indians had long distrusted the predominantly African police. Persistent race-baiting which had taken place between the leaders of the PPP and the opposition PNC throughout

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the period of protest against Jagan’s economic policies, had fuelled ethnic rivalry between the supporters of the East Indian-dominated PPP and the African- dominated PNC. What started as an industrial dispute soon took a violent turn when a bomb was thrown in a bus transporting scabs to Plantation Albion (where workers were also on strike), and two labourers were killed. Racial tensions exploded into open racial warfare between Blacks and East Indians, which started on the West Coast of Demerara and spread throughout the country. Homes and businesses were bombed and Blacks and East Indians beaten, raped, tortured and murdered openly in attacks and counter-attacks. In spite of the chaos that prevailed in the country, there is no evidence of any concerted action by the police to restore order. An attempt was made, however, to reduce the quantity of weapons in circulation with the enforcement of emergency regulations requiring the surrender of all arms. Searches were conducted on the homes of both PPP and PNC activists, and in the case of the latter, one such search resulted in the seizure of a large quantity of arms and ammunition (Campbell 1987, Jagan 1997). With reference to maintenance of public safety, East Indian strikers who were picketing the estates where they worked were constantly targeted by police. Jagan (1997) cites examples of the East Indian squatters and striking workers being tear- gassed, beaten, arrested, and even shot, while little attention was being paid to developing a strategy to neutralise rioters engaged in reprisal attacks. Nor was any assistance forthcoming from the colonial governor who constantly resisted the government’s requests for the assistance of British troops to restore order and instead advised Jagan to resign. One of the worst incidents of discriminatory treatment of the public by police occurred in the Mackenzie/Wismar area, a predominantly Black mining town where almost all of the businesses were owned and operated by East Indians. A packed motor launch, the ‘Sun Chapman,’ was bombed a few miles from its destination on its journey from Georgetown to Wismar, resulting in the death of over 40 persons, most of whom were of African descent. In the angry reprisal attacks which followed, all the East Indians (about 1,800 persons) were violently driven out of Wismar by Blacks. Their homes and businesses were looted and burnt, while the predominantly African police stood by and witnessed the murderous rampage, largely refusing to intervene. It was the most blatant case of police apathy and racially motivated dereliction of duty during the disturbances. The Minister of Home Affairs laid the blame for the tragic course of events squarely on the shoulder of the commissioner of police. Despite her repeated requests, he had refused to send reinforcements to Wismar even after she informed him that the situation ‘had gone beyond control, that a large number of buildings were burning, and that people were being attacked, raped and murdered’ (Jagan 1997, 309). Without operational control of the Force, the minister could do nothing, and she subsequently resigned in protest.

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Race-based reprisals continued after the Wismar tragedy, and when the disturbances finally ended after more than three months of ethnic violence, a total of 176 people had been killed and 920 injured. An estimated 15,000 persons had been forced to move from their homes and resettle in ethnic communities of their own kind, and damage to property was estimated at $4.3 million dollars (Jagan 1997). In addition to the carnage that resulted from police betrayal and dereliction of duty, irreparable damage had been done to the relations between the police and the East Indian community. Political policing through acts of omission, or the failure to act when action was required, had exacted a high price.

CONCLUSION

Political policing during colonial self-rule in Guyana resulted in the deliberate neglect of one of the basic functions of the police, the maintenance of public order and safety, in order to force a democratically elected government out of office. Cheddi Jagan fully understood that the colonial office was responsible for his government’s inability to exercise operational control over the security forces in the country, but he clearly underestimated the likely consequences of decades of politicisation of the police force. Even if the PPP had been given operational control of the force, a command may not have been sufficient to reverse the effect of decades of loyalty to the metropolitan power, and the consequences of racial cleavages that were fostered by racial imbalances in the force. In order to be effective with the police, the PPP would have had to find strategies to overcome the allegiances of a White commissioner and deputy commissioner of police, and White and Coloured officers, whose loyalties would most likely have been with the colonial office. With reference to the rank and file, there is little evidence that the government would have fared any better. During the 1962 disturbances, the police had threatened to join the strike against the government’s budget proposals. In addition, several members of the predominantly African police force had refused to take up arms against the demonstrators in Georgetown, (who were mostly of African descent), when ordered to so by senior ranks, and were subsequently subjected to disciplinary action (Campbell 1987, HMSO 1962, Jagan 1997). Similarly, it is extremely unlikely that the predominantly African rank and file would not have felt sympathy for their kith and kin, who were being attacked and murdered by East Indians during the race riots of 1964. It was only after the riots ended that a commission of inquiry was appointed to investigate racial problems in the public service, including the police force, and by the time its report was released in 1965, the PPP was already out of office. Political policing in Guyana did not end with the termination of the PPP’s tenure in office as a result of the 1964 general elections. It continued during the entire

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period of post-independence governance under the PNC led by Forbes Burnham who, in effect, transformed the force into a private arm of his political party. The force will remain a potential political weapon to be used primarily in pursuance of unpopular statist goals unless fundamental changes are made in the definition of the role of the police, and the return to traditional civilian policing practices and methods. Decades of politicisation cannot be easily reversed, but attention should be paid to resolving the current crisis in police-community relations11, especially relations with the East Indian community.

REFERENCES

Alderson, J. 1998. Principled policing: Protecting the public with integrity. Winchester: Waterside Press. Bayley, D.M. Ed. 1977. Police and society. Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage. Campbell, J. 1987. History of policing in Guyana. Georgetown, Guyana: Guyana Police Force. Chase, A. 1964. A history of trade unionism in Guyana. Georgetown, Guyana: New Guyana Company Ltd. Chevigny, P. 1995. Edge of the knife: Police violence in the Americas. New York: The Free Press. Danns, G.K. 1982. Domination and power in Guyana: A study of the police in a Third World context. New Jersey: Transaction, Inc. Enloe, C.H. 1980. Police, military and ethnicity: Foundations of State power. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Inc. Fogelson, R.M. 1977. Big city police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Guyana Human Rights Association. 1994. Press release: Police encourage shootings. Georgetown, Guyana: Guyana Human Rights Association. ___.1999. Press release: Community policing must be politically impartial. Georgetown, Guyana: Guyana Human Rights Association. Huggins, M.K. 1991. Vigilantism and the State in modern Latin America: Essays on extra-legal violence. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. ___. 1998. Political policing: The United States and Latin America. London: Duke University Press. Jagan, C. 1997. The West on trial: My fight for Guyana’s freedom. St. John’s, Antigua: Hansib Caribbean. Jeffries, Sir C. 1952. The colonial police. London: Max Parrish & Co. Kraska, P.B. and Kappeler, V.E. 1997. ‘Militarizing American police the rise and normalization of paramilitary units’. Social Problems, 44 (1), 1–18. Manning, P.K. 1977. Police work: The social organisation of policing. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Moore, B. 1987. Race, power and social segmentation in colonial society: Guyana after slavery, 1838-1891. New York: Gordon and Breach Science Pub. Ltd. Reno, P. 1964. The ordeal of British Guiana. New York: Monthly Review Press. Report of the British Guiana Commission of Inquiry, Racial Problems in the Public Service. 1965. Geneva, Switzerland: International Commission of Jurists.

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Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Commission. 1951. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. (The Waddington Report). ___. 1954. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. (The Robertson Report). Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1962 Disturbances. 1962. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Rodney, W. 1981. A history of the Guyanese working people, 1881–1905. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Rodway, J.A. 1891. A history of British Guiana from the year 1668 to the present time (3 Vols.) Georgetown: J. Thompson. Shahabuddeen, M. 1978. Constitutional developments in Guyana: 1621–1978. Georgetown, Guyana: Guyana Printers Ltd. Smith, P.T. 1985. Policing Victorian London: Political policing, public order, and the London Metropolitan Police. Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press. Smith, R.T. 1980. British Guiana. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. St. Pierre, M. 1999. Anatomy of resistance. London: Macmillan Education Ltd. Turk, A. 1982. Political criminality: The defiance and defence of authority. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Pub. Ltd.

NOTES

1 From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, January and July 2001, Volume 6, Numbers 1 and 2. St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago: Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies, pp. 1–25. with permission. 2 Both before and after Independence, police and community relations in Guyana have always been problematic, often resulting in deadly confrontations between the police and the public (Campbell 1987, Guyana Human Rights Reports 1980– 2000, HMSO 1962, Jagan 1997 and local newspapers such as The Stabroek News and the Guyana Chronicle). 3 For examples of political policing in England during the nineteenth century see Philip Thurmond Smith. 1985, Policing Victorian London: Political Policing, Public Order, and the London Metropolitan Police. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 4 Upon the recommendation of the Waddington Commission (1951), universal adult suffrage was implemented by an Ordinance dated March 8, 1952. 5 The Constitution provided for a bi-cameral legislature, consisting of a State Council and a House of Assembly. The House of Assembly consisted of three ex-officio members (the Colonial Secretary, who had been renamed the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary), together with 24 elected members. The State Council consisted of nine members, six of whom were appointed by the Governor acting in his discretion. Of the remaining three, two were appointed by the Governor based on the recommendation of six Ministers elected by the House of Assembly, and the remaining member was to be appointed by the Governor acting in his discretion, after consultation with the minority members in the House of Assembly. The Constitution also provided for an Executive Council which consisted of the Governor as President, the same three ex-officio members in the

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House of Assembly, and seven Ministers, six of whom were to be elected by the House of Assembly, and one to be elected by the State Council (HMSO 1954). 6 The Secretary of State for the colony, and ultimately, Her Majesty the Queen of England, whose power to legislate for the colony by virtue of an Order in Council under the British Guiana Act, 1928, was continued by Order in Council under the 1961 Constitution. 7 The London Metropolitan Police. 8 See Campbell (1987) for more detail on the reports given by Governor Carmichael- Smyth. 9 The descendants of slaves. 10 This group came into existence mainly by forced unions between African slaves and their European masters. They were also described as ‘coloured’ or ‘mixed,’ and comprised about 11 per cent of the population at the time of emancipation of the slaves. They were put upon an equal legal footing as Whites by a Demerara ordinance in 1816 and by proclamation issued by the Governor in 1822. 11 See Guyana Human Rights Reports, 1994-2000; and Guyana Human Rights Association Press Releases: Police Encourage Shootings, 1994, and Community Policing Must be Politically Impartial, 1999.

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Policing Styles INTRODUCTION

in the In this article, the nature of the style of the Commonwealth Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), its Caribbean: structural underpinning, its impact on police-citizen relations and on the 1 The Jamaican Case effectiveness of the JCF are analysed. By mapping this little studied area of police- Anthony Harriott citizen relations in the Caribbean, the study perhaps contributes to building a case for police reform. Such work hardly needs justification. The literature on policing in the Caribbean is very limited. In these works, the discussion centres on the abuse of power by the police, particularly the excessive use of lethal violence (c.f. Chevagny 1995, Bennett 1997). This theme of police repression is also explored by Danns (1982), but as part of a broader discourse on the character of the Guyanese state in which he examines aspects of the style of the Guyana Police Force. However, this author remains unaware of any work specifically devoted to examining the styles of the police forces of the Caribbean. Here it is argued that the style of the JCF — which emphasises State protection over citizen protection, order maintenance over crime control and ‘crime-fighting’ over respect for citizens’ rights — is both an adaptation to, and source of, its legitimacy deficit and is cultivated by structures of power originating in the colonial period, that treat the policed like subjects rather than citizens. This style reflects a power imbalance between police and citizen that is not

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consistent with a democratic ethos. More effective crime control and democratic stability requires a redefinition of police-citizen relations, a prerequisite of which is a more service-oriented style of police work. The data for this study was collected over a two year period as part of a wider study of the recent efforts (1994–present) to reform the JCF. A probability survey of the opinions of the 1,036 members (19 per cent) of the Force — designed among other things, to capture the fundamentals of their political values and attitudes to the existing style of policing and possible alternate styles. Although much of this data is not reported here, it certainly informs the analysis. In addition, it draws on a number of in-depth interviews with senior officers and official documentation which are particularly useful as they were not written with the gloss that is usually put on documents intended for public perusal. For the remainder of the article, first the concept of style is explicated, then the essential features of the style of the JCF are identified and analysed by an examination of one of the core activities of the police — its special anti-crime operations. Wilson (1968, Varieties of Police Behaviour, Cambridge: Harvard University Press) identified three styles of policing — the legalistic, service, and watchman, each being associated with the three types of police-citizen encounters, that is, law enforcement, service situations and order maintenance respectively. Elements of each style may coexist in particular police forces but the defining style can be identified by the predominant type of encounter. The legalistic style adopts a narrow law enforcement perspective on the varied problems of crime control and public order. While this approach is clearly inadequate for dealing with the organisationally more sophisticated and socially embedded criminal networks of today, ideally it equalises the treatment of all.2 The service style purports to treat all citizens and types of demands seriously if not equally. It is more given to problem-solving, and thus tends to encourage the exploration of wider options (beyond reactive law enforcement) and the adoption of more inclusionary problem-solving methodologies (involving non-police agencies and local stakeholders). It best facilitates the fashioning of community and offence specific solutions. With the watchman style, order maintenance is central and prior to crime management. Watchman type police forces tend to be highly politicised, sensitive to the locus of social power, biased against the least powerful social groups (both in the treatment of their demands for police services and in the character of police-citizen interaction) and closed and evasive of public accountability. Their operating norms are characterised by ritualised unresponsiveness to the public, work avoidance and the tolerance of many types of legal infractions. This is usually coupled with a high degree of aggressiveness or ‘hard policing’ which forms part of the police routine designed to demonstrate control and may be intensified in the form of campaigns whenever this control appears to be weakening. Individual and institutional styles tend to be highly congruent. The individual

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officer enjoys considerable discretion (see Sykes, Fox and Clarke 1985, Goldstein 1987), but is constrained by the institutional and social structures within which (s)he operates and is forced to adapt to these structures of control. The modal individual style thus tends to reflect the institutional style. There are multiple determinants of style: organisational variables (degree of bureaucracy, size); environmental variables (class structure, crime rates); and situational variables (visibility of the encounter, characteristics of the suspect), (see Brooks 1989,121, Erickson 1982, Wilson 1968). Generally, institutional style is largely determined by the nature of the social structure and of the power relations between state and citizen. In Jamaica as in most of the former colonies, the police still tend to be very responsive to political and social power. And as law may be seen as a foil to the arbitrariness of power, these police forces do not as a general rule enjoy a legalistic tradition. By a similar logic, a consequence of the grossly uneven distribution of power in these societies (where civil society is usually weak and there are small and relatively powerful elites), is it that the police does not have a tradition of treating people equally? State-protectiveness, disregard for the law and socially discriminating treatment of suspects and citizens who make claims for police services are therefore typical features of policing in many former colonial countries. The predominant mode of policing in the ex-colonial countries is watchman-like (c.f. Cain 1996, Ahire 1991, Danns 1982). In the Caribbean context, this mode of policing is characterised by work avoidance, paramilitarism, poor accountability to the citizenry, and class differential policing. As the latter two features are discussed elsewhere (Harriott 1997), in what immediately follows; only the first two are discussed.

WORK AVOIDANCE

The priority accorded public order management over crime control is reflected in the structures which shape the behaviour of the police. Among these are the nature of government control of the Force and the judicial-constitutional framework. As Brogden (1987) notes, where the primary function of the police is public order management, the level of police autonomy of the government tends to be low, since much of their activity is explicitly political thus falling within the field of competence of the political administration. A corollary to this is that where law enforcement or crime management is primary, the justification for an independent professional space is more evident and greater police autonomy more likely. The Jamaican or Caribbean variety of the watchman style is consistent with the historically given role of the JCF, the consequent tradition of politicisation and low levels of autonomy. The primacy of public order is similarly reflected in the laws, most of all the constitution which virtually nullifies all individual rights by subjecting them to vaguely defined public order concerns (see Fraser 1979).3 Invested in the police

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are considerable powers to control political action, subject to Executive rather than judicial review. Without special measures, the national security pretext may thus be easily used to suppress opposition political movements. Consistent with this primacy of the State-protective function, these forces tend to be unresponsive to the priorities of the ordinary citizens, profoundly reactive, and given to work avoidance and plain indolence. The ‘watchman’ is always constrained in his ability to act, by the imbalances in social power in the society, the politicisation of crime and his limited autonomy. For example, attempts to impartially enforce the traffic laws and to confront socially influential offenders have led to career disasters for many police officers in the late colonial (see Harriott 1994) as well as the contemporary periods (Personal interviews. DSP 1995, SSP 1995].4 This is also true of more serious infractions, as in the not too distant past the prosecution of politically influential street criminals has produced similar results. Avoidance is not to be equated with indolence (although it is associated with it); it is more deliberate and politically calculating. At the level of the individual constable, there is a reluctance to prosecute ‘normal’ crimes, particularly if they do not have a high visibility or excitement quotient. Only a small proportion of police personnel are involved in active ‘crime fighting.’ In Western Kingston which is currently the Police Division with the highest rate of violent crimes, of the 197 constables in the division, ten per cent (20) account for 95 per cent of all arrests in 1994 (Statistics Unit, JCF). These are mainly detectives keen on establishing themselves as ‘crime fighters.’5 This trend predates Independence. As early as 1910-11, one per cent of detectives (i.e. some 0.1 per cent of the Force) accounted for 40 per cent of all arrests (Harriott 1997, 146). These data reflect the happy coexistence of somnolence and accommodation to criminality among the majority with an aggressive anti-criminal crusading by a minority of constables. Both tendencies represent deviant work norms. The data counter-intuitively suggests intensification rather than a weakening of this historical trend. Perhaps the sources of this problem lie in the tendency of the ‘avoiders’ in the uniformed sections of the Force (particularly in these volatile areas with high rates of violent crime) to direct most reported incidents to the Criminal Investigations Bureau (CIB) for investigation. This has had the unhappy consequence of burdening detectives with impossible caseloads and thereby reducing their ineffectiveness, while many uniformed constables are by this design left with rather light duties. If major offences are neglected, minor violations tend to be completely ignored and the priorities of complainant citizens disregarded. The JCF, like most State institutions, has no tradition of service. This is evident from even a perfunctory analysis of the complaints from citizens. In 1994, some eight per cent (65) of all formal complaints to the JCF were against police misconduct (Police Complaints Division, JCF) and 35 per cent of the reports to

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the Police-Citizens Complaints Authority were occasioned by police negligence or other service related failures (Draft Report of the Police-Citizens Complaints Authority 1994/95). This is very conservative since most of this type of complaint is not usually recorded, but rather is informally directed to officers known to the complainant. The watchman style of policing relies on the informal mechanisms of social control as the first line of social defence (Wilson 1968, 180). With each dramatic crime event and ‘crime wave,’ the perception of a progressively deeper failing of these informal mechanisms is confirmed, resulting in an aggressive response of crack-downs, indiscriminate arrests, liberal use of violence and disregard for due process. This is a disastrous spiral whereby neglect of the problem is followed by public panics and an extreme response of crack-downs and special operations involving the Army. With each spiral, each phase seems to gain intensity with the cycle becoming shorter.6 This approach of avoidance and aggression is consistent with the paramilitary design of the Force.

PARAMILITARISM

In the ex-colonial variant of the watchman style, order maintenance is prior to crime-management, which is in turn prior to the service functions of the Force. Paramilitarism is thus an appropriate form given these priorities and the freedom from legal constraints on the means available for their accomplishment that tends to accompany this perspective. The colonial authorities provided the police force with various instruments such as the Riot Act which when invoked effectively suspends the rule of law thereby allowing the unconstrained use of State violence. Paramilitarism may be defined as a mode of organisation (Auten 1976), a tactic (Waddington 1987), or a relation (of the police to the military) (Hills 1995). It is essentially a complex set of relationships: a mode of organisation and control of its members typified by a high degree of centralisation; a mode of interface with and control of the mass public typified by the targeting of threatening sub- populations (usually at the bottom of the social structure), and relatively indiscriminate subjection of individuals within these groups to interrogation at will and generally aggressive policing techniques. It is based on political values that favour the primacy of order over freedom and justice, and as Auten (1976, 125) notes, assumes that (as is the case with citizens who are subject to its authority), people in the internal police work environment must also be coerced, controlled and directed in order to achieve the goals of the organisation. As a set of controlling relationships it is both directed outward and inward. As an organisational model, paramilitarism was adopted by modern police forces, as it was the only available model of complex organisations in the nineteenth century when most of these Forces were formed (Auten 1985, 122). Auten records the organisational characteristics of the paramilitary model, the features it exhibits and elicits. These include a centralised command structure

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with a rigidly adhered to chain of command, initiative at the supervisory and operational levels neither sought, encouraged, nor expected, emphasis on the maintenance of the status quo, a highly structured system of sanctions and discipline procedures to deal with nonconformists within the organisation, lack of flexibility when confronted with problems and situations not covered by existing directives, general orders, or policy and procedure (Auten 1985, 123–24). Not all of these characteristics are necessary features of paramilitarism. The JCF, however, displays all of them. Within the JCF, paramilitarism is valued for its capacity to ensure internal discipline (Harriott 1994). As late as the end of the first decade after Independence, the level of control exercised over police personnel remained similar to that in the military. Internal control rested on leveraging physical, material and symbolic- normative means. It was a cartelised institution with constant surveillance of and great control over its operatives. The recruit was subjected to intensive institutional re-socialisation designed to produce primarily a disciplined and loyal constable. This of course resulted in a lack of initiative and over-dependence on the superior ranks. There is, however, a growing recognition of the dysfunctions associated with the paramilitary model.7 The basic structural principles of the model are hierarchy and centralisation. Constabularies thus tend to have a large number of centralised units. This reduces the capacity of the Divisions since they are consequently starved of already scarce resources and made heavily dependent on the central structures. Effectiveness is reduced as the local units are often dependent on central operational support for any significant action, at times involving more than one central unit, and must endure the communications confusion, the demoralisation and sense of powerlessness associated with these problems. In a context of scarce resources and interdepartmental rivalry, this dependence further reduces effectiveness. A consequence of the high degree of centralisation typical of paramilitary organisations is the evasion of responsibility. It ensures that little is accomplished. This evasion of responsibility is particularly comprehensible in the context of a politicised Force, where the informal rules are primary but unclear and the basis of decision-making appears arbitrary. In this setting, to take responsibility and initiative without being connected to the sources of power is to put one’s career at risk. Over-centralisation here is unnecessarily exclusionary and puts distance between the police and the community as key decision-making is removed from the point of contact with the community (the locus of the problem and best site for preventative measures). This is incompatible with creative problem-solving and suggests the need for some structural reforms if the planned thrust of the JCF in the direction of building partnerships with communities in order to achieve more effective crime prevention and control is to be achieved (see JCF 1998, 6).

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As has been argued above, the principles of paramilitarism (as they structure internal relations) fail to ensure effectiveness and even internal control; this is even truer of paramilitarism as a tactic. Its most salient tactical features are aggressiveness and the use of indiscriminate methods of control and law enforcement. Jamaica has a history of episodic political violence, but an even longer history of paramilitarism. The JCF developed in the context of the harsh post- emancipation period, the popular rebellion of 1865, and a retrogression to crown colony government (see Harriott 1994). It thus carried the baggage of being originally fashioned as an instrument of domination. A distinction must be made between police violence as a necessary means for successfully accomplishing a legitimate duty and its use as punishment, often based on ‘factual’ or intuitively established guilt. Procedural notions of democracy find a ready parallel in procedural law (just outcomes being linked to rights- protecting, power-checking procedures). On this perspective, police interventions, especially in its reactive mode, ought to be essentially procedural. Yet the JCF has had an abiding indifference to procedural law and due process. Justice is associated with desert. Police interventions have thus become less procedural and more substantively concerned with punishment. Police forces with this kind of punitive tradition tend to exhibit high levels of violence. Punishment is often summarily meted out to suspects who may spend long periods in police jails, suffer loss of income and even loss of life. A survey of prisoners in the jails conducted by the author in March, 1995 confirmed the prevalent use of arrest as an investigative tool and as punishment.8 Police ‘excesses’ and punishment take both violent and non-violent forms - harassment, degrading treatment and the excessive use of violence. Harassment involves overt intensive surveillance and the use of non-violent punishment and control techniques, and may be targeted at groups or individuals. It may have different sources and motivations, such as social control of deviant groups, the intimidation of the community activists of an opposing political party, corrupt intent (it may be a particularly persistent way of soliciting a payoff) and personal vendettas. It is usually associated with over-policing and an exceeding of the scope of the legal authority of the police. For this reason it usually encounters resistance from its targets. This resistance often results in police resorting to the use of degradation rituals designed to keep these target populations in their ‘place’ and may involve the use of verbal and physical abuse to humiliate and to dramatise the low status of the subject in the universe of the police and their subjection-submission to the will and power of the police. Unjustifiable police violence has a special dynamic to it. It is used for asserting police power in a quest for greater authority, punishing its subjects and as an interrogative-investigative tool. With this style of policing, brutality is not simply

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aberrant and deviant behaviour, but a work norm. It is an acceptable means of attaining police goals and a valued part of their tactical repertoire. This is evident from the pervasiveness of these practices and the taken-for-granted ways in which the transmission of these techniques to new police initiates occur. From the above mentioned survey of prisoners in police jails, a significant minority reported being subjected to violent interrogations and few others to violent punishment. The most acute expression of brutality is of course unjustifiable homicide. Few are unintended outcomes of brutality; most are acts of social cleansing targeted at violent criminals. Unjustifiable extra-judicial killings are the extreme end of a continuum of brutality based on an indifference to means and a loss of perspective due to pressures for quick low-cost solutions. This approach is partially rooted in the notion of the criminal as a dehumanised enemy and a military approach to problem-solving that focuses on neutralising ‘the enemy’ rather than the problem. This has been a major issue since the late 1960s (see Chevagny 1991, Lacey 1977) and the practice has since become more widely accepted within the JCF (see Harriott 1994). The high frequency of homicides committed by the police is not a chance outcome. It is the product of the institutionalisation of this practice within the JCF. However, recent reforms and deliberate efforts by the High Command to discourage this practice have contributed to a decline in police killings. These have decreased from some 200 per year during the 1980s, to 132 per year during the 1990s, and from a high of 37 per cent of all homicides in 1982 to a low of 13 per cent in 1994 (see Table 13.1). Of these killings, for the period 1990-94, only two to three per cent was ruled unjustifiable by the Director of Public Prosecutions and the offenders charged with murder.9

TABLE 13.1 POLICE KILLINGS, 1977–96

As % of All Year Number of Number Rate Homicides Ratio Killings Killed 1996 148 5.9 16 10 1:15 1995 132 5.3 17 4 1:33 1994 100 4.0 13 6 1:16 1993 123 5.0 16 10 1:12 1992 145 5.9 19 1991 156 6.4 22 13 1:12 1990 135 5.6 20 11 1:12 1988 181 7.7 30 6 1:45 1986 179 7.7 29 10 1:26 1984 355 15.6 42 19 1:20 1982 236 10.9 37 10 1:24 1980 234 10.9 21 28 1:10 1978 167 8.0 30 18 1:09

Source: Police Statistics Unit. JCF.

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The excessive use of deadly force and police vigilantism finds considerable support within the Force. These data suggest that on this issue, the attitudes of the police are no different from the rest of the population. They are simply better empowered to act on their beliefs. In surveys conducted in 1991, Stone reported 56 per cent support for vigilantism among the adult population (Stone 1991, 30), and the author found 54 per cent support for police vigilantism among JCF officers (Harriott 1994, 324). This level of support within the society, including its elites, provides a powerful basis for resistance within the JCF to any efforts to curb it.

SELECTIVITY

This excessive use of violence is made even more problematic as it is often seen as too loosely directed. The JCF is often criticised for arbitrary arrests and the disruption of life in whole communities by its adoption of stop-and-search tactics, raids on public places, curfews, cordons and search, and the use of similar ‘net-fishing’ techniques in search of guns and criminals. Police attention is not just fixed on the criminally suspect behaviour of individuals, but to attributes, places, and events. These attributes and the routines that lead to encounters with the police are often shared by whole groups and even the majority of some sub-populations, such as young, inner-city males who tend to dress in distinctively norm violating styles from which their rejection of authority and exclusion from the labour market is often inferred by the police. This indiscriminate approach is applied not just with regard to the public order function (e.g. pacification of communities where intense gang warfare keep recurring) but also to routine crime control, and occurs at every stage of the process — contact, apprehension, detention, and investigation. For example, much police contact is initiated as ‘stop and search’ and arrest ‘on suspicion’ as opposed to ‘on warrant’ and ‘on information.’ In 1986/7, 35 per cent of all arrests were made on an ‘on suspicion’ or stop and search basis, but this has since declined to 20 per cent in 1991 (see Jamaica Constabulary Force Annual Report 1986, 1991). Ninety per cent of arrests ‘on suspicion’ are done by mobile patrols and are really on the intuition of members of the police party in the hope that on processing the suspect after arrest, their judgements (often based on stereotypes) will be confirmed. This activity is therefore often correctly perceived as police harassment. These methods are ineffective and alienating and are seen as such by many of its practitioners. According to the members of the Mobile Reserve who rely heavily on these tactics, while they usually yield large finds of knives, they rarely result in the apprehension of criminals (Personal Interviews Mobile Reserve. 1994). They are considered (within the military and police) as most useful for pacifying or ‘quieting’ an area or as psychological operations to assuage the fears of the middle strata. This reflects the primacy of order over law and justice.

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In summary, among the features of paramilitarism as a tactic, we may list the following:

(1) A heavy reliance on indiscriminate ‘net-fishing’ tactical forms such as roadblocks and raids. (2) Indifference to means. (3) The use of guns as the main tactical weapon. (4) Excessive use of violence. Paramilitarism feeds and facilitates the pursuit of action, excitement and glory via violence as valued ends-in-themselves. (5) Use of huge personnel resources. (6) The group as the basic operational unit. Often a coordinated network of groupings. (7) Military approaches to problem-solving. This focuses on the physical neutralisation of the enemy, not the social aspects of the problem. In this approach the main factors to be manipulated are space and time not social variables. (8) The people are treated as passive onlookers rather than active participants with some responsibility for their own security.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

In this section, the style of the JCF and the problems associated with this style are illustrated by examining one aspect of police work-special operations. These issues are also evident in its public order management and criminal investigations which are the other two key aspects of policing, but are most sharply expressed in special operations. Special operations are paradigm cases of paramilitary policing. Usually, these involve intensive policing activity targeted at a small urban area, with the invocation of special legal instruments which extend police powers and the involvement of the army. Unlike the earlier post-independence period of the 1960s into the 1970s, when they were more associated with public order problems involving violent political competition and rioting, currently special operations are usually policing responses to ordinary crime when it is perceived that the threshold of acceptable violence has been exceeded. Operation Quick Draw which was designed to pacify Western Kingston and which culminated in the state of emergency of 1967 is an example of this type of operation in the earlier period (O’Gilvie 1984, 44), while Operation Ardent typifies the special operations of the current period. The more recent ‘crime waves’ are usually triggered by incidents which transgress the boundaries of ‘acceptable’ criminal behaviour and depict a loss of control by the police. These boundaries are defined less by the frequency of violent crimes than by the type of victim or victim-offender relation. Violent inter-class and inter-race victimisation violates this boundary. In a setting where there is a

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steady accretion of fear, one such event may occur that dramatises the transgressions. The sharp class segmentation and the attendant social insecurities of the upper classes and racial minorities tend to result in an amplification of these fears. Moreover, the press vigilantly patrols these boundaries, orchestrates these panics, and demands exemplary punitive action of the criminal justice system. Operation Ardent was precipitated by three boundary breaching events all of which occurred in quick succession and in the context of an already developing crime wave. These were the shooting of the 80 year old mother of the prominent businessman Sam Mafood on October 6, 1992 (Daily Gleaner October 7, 1992, 1), the killing of a German tourist in the quiet resort town of Oracabessa on October 16, 1992 (Daily Gleaner October 16, 1992, 14), and the murder of Victor Higgs, a businessman engaged in the promotion of tourism through sports, on October 17, 1992 (Daily Gleaner October 23, 1992, 1).10 All of these victims were white persons. Two were local members of the business elite and two were associated with the delicate tourist industry. All of these trip-wire events demonstrated a disregard for the established boundaries. They thus set in motion the various lobbies, particularly the powerful tourism lobby. Gordon Stewart, owner of the Sandals chain of hotels, called on the Government to seek international help to police the country (Daily Gleaner October 9, 1992, 1), and Dennis Lalor, a leading businessman, for ‘an all out attack on crime’ (Daily Gleaner October 8, 1992, 19). The threat level was amplified by characterising the violence as ‘motiveless’ thus implying that the victims were being randomly chosen and hence the entire population was equally threatened; and by targeting the criminals deported from the United States of America (US) as the source of this new threat (c.f. Daily Gleaner October 8, 1992, 19, October 18, 1992, 1). Against the background of a press campaign and growing panic, the government was put under great pressure to act in a disciplinary manner designed to demonstrate control. The response, Operation Ardent, a joint police-military operation, was initiated in late October 1992 and was concluded in February 1993. As officially stated, its aims were: to restore confidence in the ability of the security forces to control crime; to pacify the communities engaged in violent group conflicts either between gangs or political parties; to apprehend criminals; to seize illegal firearms; and to reduce the fear of crime. This was captured in the slogan ‘attrition, deterrence and reassurance’ (JCF 1992). Generally its aims were short term and restorative, to deconstruct the crime wave and to restore the status quo ante. The operation began at the planning stage with an ‘appreciation’ or military approach to analysing the problem-situation involving ‘mission analysis, factors and plan’. The important factors are usually viewed from a military perspective, and include the enemy, physical features of the area in question, time, space and options open to ‘the enemy’ and self (JCF 1992c). The enemy and self are the

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only actors in a profoundly dyadic construction of the agencies involved. The citizens are excluded and treated in a manner similar to that of non-combatants in conditions of warfare. Yet they, their associations and leaders must become key actors if viable solutions to the problems are to be found. At best they are treated as a support force for the Security Forces (although there is no supporting evidence of this in the plan and other available documentation on Ardent) rather than as independent actors in their own right with useful analyses of the problem and their own solutions. These types of operations require considerable resources. For this reason they are difficult to sustain. In the case of Ardent, the personnel requirements were: five task forces consisting of seven rifle companies of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF); a small group of female soldiers; and the JDF coast guard - in all a total of 850-900 soldiers (one third of the regular army). The police commitment involved the Mobile Reserve, most of regular personnel in the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA), and full mobilisation of all reserves. Vehicles of all types, including military and police armoured vehicles and helicopters, were engaged. It was thus estimated that this level of commitment was not sustainable for more than six to eight months (JCF 1992). Operational activity was intense. Some 955 motorised and foot patrols, 35 flag marches, 398 roadblocks, 108 cordon and searches and 90 raids were conducted. These activities resulted in (13) guns, (114) rounds of ammunition, (32) cocaine pipes, (17) motor vehicles and an aircraft seized, and (572) persons being detained. Most of these persons were simply detained for processing, as only (15) ‘were found’ to be wanted men and only (281) were charged (JCF 1992b). These outcomes may be taken as measures of the extent to which the goal of attrition was achieved. Understandably no mention was made of the number of suspects killed. But the neutralisation (elimination) of ‘hard core criminals’ (the enemy) was a clear aim of the operation. Special structures were proposed and were in fact erected for this purpose. In the coded language of the operational planners ‘personnel will be dedicated to specific criminal and law enforcement situations which require swift decisive response actions using the principles of high mobility, flexibility, deception and surprise’ (JCF 1992c). This has been a lasting feature of JCF and special operations, not just Operation Ardent (JCF, Operation Crest-A Review Presentation). Consistent with its aims, ‘a quieting’ of the target area was achieved and the population given some psychological reassurance. As with most special operations, the target area was the Kingston inner-city, particularly Western Kingston, which is correctly regarded as the locus of the problem of criminal and political violence. This success was, as always, only temporary and quickly faded as within months after the conclusion of Operation Ardent — the area was plunged into a major political ‘war’ between the communities of Wilton Gardens and Tivoli Gardens in 1994.

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A cyclical process — from one operation to the next — may now be observed, with the periods between special operations steadily decreasing, and the criminals learning to adapt to the modus operandi of the security forces (by becoming more mobile, suspending and shifting their operations in international space until after these special operations). The fact that these operations have to be repeated so frequently and are usually focused on the same areas is an indicator that they at best only provide some short-term relief for the society but are certainly not able to solve or manage the source problems. This approach may even be counter-productive. By making the crime problem seem more intractable than it really is, it highlights the ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system, the limits of the coercive power of the State and the social embeddedness of the criminals. For example, one of Jamaica’s more notorious criminal organisations, the ‘Natty Morgan’ gang, was made to seem invincible when hundreds of soldiers and police were unable to apprehend him despite their best efforts over a period of almost one year (see Daily Gleaner June 2, 1991). Even these short-term successes are often at a great cost to police-citizen relations, particularly among the urban poor. This is best depicted in the Constant Spring Case. During Operation Ardent, on October 22, 1992, in a routine raid, (47) young men from the poor Kingston community of Grants Pen were detained by the police. Two days later, three of the detainees (Agana Barrett, Ian Forbes and Vassell Brown) died in police custody at the Constant Spring Jail. They had been put in a cell with (19) others and had expired from asphyxiation after suffering beatings. It seems that they had been detained for processing as part of an intelligence gathering procedure which was one of the aims of the operation. Their deaths were then not chance outcomes but consistent with the aims of the exercise, which were to make them maximally uncomfortable and thus willing to cooperate in return for their freedom. They were deliberately interrogated by the harsh conditions. According to the evidence of some of the prisoners, on Friday morning they were given five minutes outside the cell, fed at 7:00 a.m., and then were left locked in the cell behind closed steel doors (not bars) until Sunday. Consistent with police objectives, their cries for attention were ignored. Having lost the weekend, suffered the heat, hunger and overcrowding, powerless as all efforts to have them released would have so far failed, and fearful of losing their jobs (if they had one) for failing to turn up for work on the Monday, the men would have been more cooperative and ready for processing. This was only complicated by police miscalculation of the endurable physical limits of some of the prisoners. All five police persons charged were acquitted, despite an earlier finding by a coroner’s inquest that the police were responsible for the deaths of the men (see Daily Gleaner March 24, 1996). The following day (March 23, 1996) demonstrations were mounted against the verdict. The police were now enveloped in a partisan

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political controversy as it was claimed (with some credibility regardless of its truth worthiness) that the men were detained because of their political affiliation (see Daily Gleaner March 25, 1996). The events thus served to aggravate social and political tensions and hostility towards the police and courts, which were (correctly) seen as unjustly favouring the police and biased against the poor. The Constant Spring case was extreme only in its outcomes. It is, however, typical of the police techniques adopted and the expressions of the power relationship between police and citizen - group treatment and the absence of any specific crime as the trigger for police action. This is a style that emphasises order over justice. Ardent may have been a turning point in the thinking of some senior officers and for the society. Some elements of learning and change have been evident since then. This is reflected in aspects of the design of Operation Crest, the current special operation which began in February 1995 under the new commissioner, to confront the old problems of political and ordinary criminal violence. These changes included:

(1) Police operations to be more targeted and less disruptive of normal life in the target areas. Ardent, in contrast, made life difficult in the target communities and was disruptive of normal life in the entire city with road blocks etc. on main roads - for all to see (i.e. to reassure). (2) Community relations as part of the operation. (3) Non-policing aspects of situational crime prevention (clearing of ‘open lands’ and derelict buildings, removal of garbage, opening the streets) were introduced. (4) Inter-agency coordination on the delivery of situational crime- preventative services such as the demolition of derelict buildings. (5) A recognition of the need to pursue more long-term aims ‘preparing for the next generation’ by tackling the social and political problems at the source of much of the violent criminality in the area [Operation Crest-Review Presentation 1995].

The elements two to four are, however, secondary. Much of the old remains. These cases reveal a routinised disregard for procedural law, excessive use of force, abuse of the poor, and a differential responsiveness in favour of the rich. Just as strong diffused support or institutional legitimacy may cushion the negative effects of specific policing events which may incur public disapproval, so too if diffused support is weak and institutional legitimacy low, then mass disapproval of and resistance to specific policing events will tap into this diffused dissatisfaction and continue to create these kinds of crises.

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CONCLUSION

Policing is not just about security and crime control; it is also about justice and improving the quality of life of the people. A more advanced style of policing ought to seek to achieve crime control with justice and public order with the rule of law. The JCF has recognised the need for reform and to alter its style of work. Indeed its new Corporate Strategy (JCF 1998) and Five year Plan (JCF 1998b) requires of it a change in style to a more service-oriented organisation with a greater sensitivity to issues of justice. This assumed a new model of police-citizen relations of which there are two real and contending options:

(1) A market model in which the place of the citizen is that of a client. This assumes greater responsiveness to the citizen but as the market is viewed as a self-correcting mechanism, it does not necessarily entail greater accountability and changes in the power relationships between police and citizen. Loss of ‘market share’ to the private security companies need not stimulate greater effectiveness. This approach would nevertheless represent an advance on the present situation but it undervalues the place of the citizen in crime control. (2) A citizen-participatory model which is more consistent with democratic policing. This recognises that citizen participation is key to better crime control. The major difficulty with it is that it implies a radical change in power relations between the police and citizen.

Either approach involves profound changes in philosophy and organisation. This would entail shifts in the main thrust of policing from a repressive to protective relationship with the people, reactive to preventative mode of crime control, centralised to decentralised structures and so forth. The implications of these changes for structural changes internally, for negotiating a new power relationship with the citizenry and an overhauling of the value system of the institution and its members is not yet recognised by all. Police reform is an extended and difficult process. These will remain major challenges in the next century.

REFERENCES

Ahire, P. 1991. Imperial Policing. London: Open University Press. Auten, J. 1976. The Paramilitary Model of Police and Police Professionalism. In A. Blumberg, A and E. Niederhoffer Eds. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Bennett, R. 1997. ‘Excessive Force: A Comparative Study of Police in the Caribbean’. Justice Quarterly, 14(4). Brogden, M. 1987. ‘The Emergence of Police – The Colonial Dimension’. British Journal of Criminology, 27(1).

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Brooks, K. 1989. ‘Police Discretionary Behavior: A Study in Style’. In Critical Issues in Policing, Eds. R. Dunham, and G. Alpert. Prospect Heights: Waveland Press. Inc. Cain, M. 1996. Forthcoming ‘Policing There and Here: Reflections on an International Comparison’. International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 24. Chevagny, P. 1995. Edge of the Knife Police: Violence in the Americas. New York: The New Press. ———. 1991. ‘Police Deadly Force as Social Control: Jamaica, Argentina, and Brazil’. Criminal Law Review, 1(3). Danns, G. 1982. Domination and Power in Guyana: A Study of the Police in a Third World Context. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. Erickson, R. 1982. Reproducing Order: A Study of Police Patrol Work. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Fraser, R. 1979. ‘Public Order in the Commonwealth Caribbean’. West Indian Law Journal. Goldstein, H. 1987. ‘Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic Requirements, and Threshold Questions’. Crime and Delinquency, 33(1). ———. 1977. Policing a Free Society. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co. Harriott, A. 1997. ‘Police and Crime Control in Jamaica: Problems of Reforming Ex-colonial Constabularies’. Unpublished Report. ———. 1994. ‘Race, Class and the Political Behaviour of the Jamaican Security Forces’. PhD Thesis, UWI, Mona. Hills, A. 1995. ‘Militant Tendencies: Paramilitarism in the British Police’. British Journal of Criminology, 35(3). Jamaica Constabulary Force. 1998. Corporate Strategy: Taking the Jamaica Constabulary Force into the New Millennium. ———. 1998b. Draft Five Year Plan. Unpublished. ———. 1992. Intelligence Brief for Prime Minister. Unpublished document. ———. 1992b. Intelligence Brief for Commissioner. Unpublished document. ———. 1992c. Operation Ardent: A Review. ———. undated. Operation Crest: A Review Presentation. Jefferson, T. 1993. ‘Pondering Paramilitarism: A Question of Standpoints’. British Journal of Criminology, 33(3). ———. 1987. ‘Beyond Paramilitarism’. British Journal of Criminology, 27(1). Lacey, T. 1977. Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960–1970. London: Frank Cass and Co. Publishers. MacMillan, T. 1995. Speech to the Montego Bay Chamber of Commerce and Industry. O’Conner, F. 1992. Crime, Violence and the Criminal Justice System. Paper presented at the Symposium Grassroots Development and the State of the Nation in Honour of Professor Carl Stone. Faculty of Social Sciences, UWI, Mona Campus. November 16–17. O’Gilvie, N. 1984. Getting Ready 21 Years of Preparation. Alert, 11. Potts, L. 1983. Responsible Police Administration: Issues and Approaches. Alabama: University of Alabama Press. Stone, C. 1991. Survey of Public Opinion on the Jamaican Justice System. Unpublished report. Sykes, R., Fox, J. and Clarke, J. 1985. ‘A Socio-Legal Theory of Police Discretion’. In The Ambivalent Force-Perspectives on the Police. (Eds.). Blumberg, A. and Niederhoffer, E. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

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Waddington, P. 1987. ‘Toward Paramilitarism? Dilemmas in Policing Civil Disorder’. British Journal of Criminology, 27(1). ———. 1982. ‘Conservatism, Dogmatism and Authoritarianism in the Police: A Comment’. Sociology, 16.

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, the Ansa McAl Psychological Research Centre, The University of the West Indies, St Augustine Campus, Trinidad, W.I. January/July 1998. 3(1/2) ISSN 1025 5591, 60-82. with permission. 2. Of course, the exercise of police discretion quickly removes any semblance of equal treatment of all. 3. The revisions of the Constitution now being debated are likely to give a less qualified recognition of individual rights. 4. During the course of the fieldwork, in more informal settings, a number of police persons of different ranks have related personal experiences of this sort to me. 5. This figure not only depicts the general trend in work norms but accentuates it. As a general procedure uniformed officers are required to hand over cases of violent victimisation to detectives. Arrests by uniformed officers are thus often attributed to them. 6. The duration between each major joint Police-Military operation may be taken as a measure of the cycle. In the last three years, with the exception of Operation Boucaneer, an anti-narcotics operation which has been in progress for more than 20 years, there have been four such operations - Ardent, Shining Armour, Crest and Operation Dovetail, while in the previous six years there were fewer such operations. 7. This is evident from an analysis of data from a survey of the attitudes of members of the JCF which was conducted by this researcher in 1994. These data are more fully analysed in a report entitled Reforming Ex-colonial Constabularies: The Case of the Jamaica Constabulary Force that has been submitted for publication. 8. Respondents from representative sample of 141 prisoners in police lock-ups in the City of Kingston were interviewed as part of a pilot study of the arrest practices of the police. 9. These include killings committed while off duty. The investigative process is usually less constrained in dealing with these. 10. Operation Shining Path was similarly occasioned by the murder of an American tourist, Norris Rayham, in June 1994. [See DG 23/10/94 p.1]

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chap13.pmd 300 12/8/2006, 11:13 AM U SE OF FORCE BY POLICE IN THE CARIBBEAN Fourteen

Use of Force by THE CONTEXT

Police in the The use of force by the police is well Caribbean: recognised as an exceedingly problematic Towards a Social one for citizens, the courts, the government and the police themselves. As necessary as Psychological it may sometimes be, police use of force, 1 Analysis especially deadly force, has serious Ramesh Deosaran implications for the rights and freedoms of citizens. And as has been evident in recent times in the Caribbean, it can cause very severe stress upon police-community relations. Officers in the Caribbean are usually allowed to bear arms while on patrol. Of course, deadly force is the lightening rod, but we cannot ignore the range of other instances where force is used, justifiably or not. These, too, cause great public distress and several other serious consequences. With particular reference to deadly force, Mark Blumberg (1994) said:

Because law enforcement officers possess the ultimate power that any society can grant, the power to take life, and because this power is exercised without any judicial determination of guilt and without appellate review, it is clear that police use of deadly force raises a number of critical issue. The reputation of the department may be tarnished and its relationship with the community can suffer irreparable harm. Finally, in some instances, the killing may trigger marches, protests, or even riots. (p. 201)

As we will illustrate later, while the public across the Caribbean has grown quite

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concerned over the police use of force, there has as yet been no systematic study done on the subject here. This is the first such study, as exploratory as it is. We will first take a quick overview of use of force incidents and consequent public reaction in selected Caribbean states, then briefly deal with the problems in conceptualising and applying force, throughout which we will seek to tease out those aspects which help justify a social psychological analysis of the overall issue. Selecting Trinidad and Tobago for more detailed focus, we will examine the legal framework and the several pieces of data which are pertinent to the use of force in this jurisdiction. Of special interest is the range of ‘use of force’ instances which help put the ultimate question of excessive force in perspective. Finally, we provide an outline of the social psychological approach we intend to take in continuing this line of research. In these ways, we seek to help fill an obvious gap in research on Caribbean policing.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: POLICE, RULES AND THE CHALLENGES

The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service has 6,000 officers, serving a population of 1.3 million people in the formerly British but now an ethnically-diverse, independent state which is itself located about eight miles north of Venezuela (Africans 40 per cent, East Indians 40 per cent, Mixed 18 per cent, Others (e.g., Chinese, Syrians, etc.) two per cent. Administratively, the Service is divided into nine police divisions headed by the commissioner of police whose office and central administration staff are located in the capital city of Port-of-Spain. Each division is headed by a senior superintendent. Briefly, the Service falls under the civilian authority of the Ministry of National Security and Cabinet, with a Police Service Commission responsible for finalising matters such as promotions and discipline. A similar, very centralised line of authority exists in all Caribbean states, except that in some states, there is no statutory, independent Police Service Commission. This makes the line of authority much more direct between the Cabinet and the Police Service in such jurisdictions. In Trinidad and Tobago, expansions in such areas as housing developments, secondary schools, illegal practices of squatting, vending and PH-taxis, have all became focal points for sharpened citizen-police confrontations. As the leading industrial and manufacturing country within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Trinidad and Tobago experiences an estimated poverty rate of 30 per cent (households), a per capita income around US$5,000, marked socioeconomic inequalities and an unemployment rate which has fluctuated between 20 and 12 per cent over the last 20 years. For the year 2000, the number of serious crimes in this country stood at 17,132; minor crimes and minor offences at 15,640 and 20,872 respectively. These crime figures are quite similar to those of the past five years.

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A particular squatting incident culminated in a violent insurrection in l990 when an armed group of the Jamaat al Muslimeen attacked the nation’s Parliament and held the prime minister and several other parliamentarians and citizens hostage. Without going into the juridical aspects of such criminogenic conditions, the relevant point is that the rise in certain visible forms of lawlessness and youth crime in particular helped arouse public concerns over crime and their accompanying appeals for police action. At the same time, questions were and still are being raised over the use of police force and the kind of training and disciplinary controls which govern the police. Apart from the juridical implications of use of force incidents, the public at large seems to endure a kind of love-hate relationship with the police use of force. This is the classical convergence of conflicting public demands on the one hand, and use of force by police on the other hand. As public and political pressures for the police ‘to do something’ about crime increased, it is quite possible that a psychological climate of ‘hard policing,’ if not direct force, has been created in recent years. But while these pressures were built up, we have had as a policy declaration in l995, that community policing for the Service is a top priority for policing in the country. This means, among other things, problem-solving policing, community partnerships to prevent crime and build public confidence, and in effect, a friendlier police face. In Trinidad and Tobago, there is a Police Complaints Authority headed by a retired judge and governed by an Act of Parliament (Act No. 17 of l993) which has so far produced four annual reports - l997, l998, l999 and 2000. There is also a Police Complaints Division which is part of the police administration, serving to receive and process public complaints for eventual submission to the Complaints Authority. Then there is the Police Service Commission which looks after matters of discipline and promotions. With regard to the Complaints Division, there are several administrative and procedural problems here; a major one, as pointed out by the Complaints authority, being the fairness of the Division’s investigations into the allegations against the police. There is as yet no dedicated manual on the use of force in this jurisdiction. References to use of force do appear in several places, for example, in the Standing Orders, Beat and Patrol, (1960) where it is stated: ‘Arrest only when a warning or proceedings by summons will not meet the case and, if an arrest is necessary, use no more force than is required to apprehend the prisoner or in self-defence’ (p. 30). It is very interesting to note, however, that in the new Standing Orders, Beat and Patrol, (2001) no such condition about the ‘use of force’ is stated. It has been omitted. What we do have in the new Standing Orders are such ‘guidelines’ as: ‘If it becomes necessary to use force when entering a building to arrest a person for whom a First Instance Warrant has been issued, the arresting officer must have the warrant in his possession’ (p. 98). In terms of strict statute, the Criminal Law Act (Chap 10:04, Section 4, l979) also states:

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(1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. (2) Subsection (1) shall replace the rules of the common law on the question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that purpose.

But all these boil down to the role of discretion and the post-hoc adjudication over the level of force actually used by the officer. It is then we get to know, however, especially from retrospection, the extent to which the force has been excessive. We may also know the extent to which the use of force has not been effectively used, and with the result that the officer has been injured or killed. The dispute over the police use of force usually arises when protest is made by the affected civilian or his relatives, when the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) or the media pursue the incident, and, or when, the matter reaches the court. The Police Service is at present trying to beef up its internal auditing and management of use of force, that is, in circumstances where public protest is not necessarily made. (Some other Caribbean states, however, e.g., Jamaica, have issued a Code of Conduct for Police-Citizen Relations). What all this means is at present there are no reliable internal police records categorised so as to indicate the quantity, quality, and variations in the police use of force. The two major sources are now: media reports and the data from the PCA. From the civilian point of view, media reports with photographs usually provide situational details which lead to tentative judgements about the unjustified use of force. Very rarely, do the police, facing such media reports, provide contemporaneous accounts of their own. Their public response usually comes when called upon to do so by either the PCA or the courts. Related to the insufficiency of internal investigations is the following comment by the body empowered ‘to exercise disciplinary control over the police,’ the Police Service Commission (1999):

It is not unusual for an Investigating Officer to be appointed long after the alleged commission of an act of police misconduct. When an Investigating Officer is appointed his report is frequently submitted outside the regulatory time frame of thirty (30) days. The failure of Investigating Officers to complete their investigations within the prescribed time has resulted in the discontinuation of such matters. (p. 13)

Notwithstanding this, the Police Service Commission in its l999 report expressed regret that 18 officers who have been found convicted for a range of serious harmful and violent acts were allowed to remain working in the Service. Among such offences are: manslaughter, causing grievous bodily harm, attempted murder and malicious damage (1999, 16). The Commission noted, however, that after a conviction in court, the matter will still have to go through ‘the disciplinary

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process of tribunals.’ An amendment has been proposed so that the guilty officer will be dismissed without a further tribunal.

USE OF FORCE: CARIBBEAN ENCOUNTERS

In 2000, 140 persons were shot dead by the police in Jamaica, causing one Jamaican newspaper to editorialise:

Rapid action is taken for police theft but police shootings are virtually condoned at the highest level; human life is shown as entirely undervalued. This message goes out not only to a police force that sent 140 citizens to the morgue last year, but also to citizens who sent 885 other citizens to the morgue in that same period. (Daily Observer February 14, 2001, 7).

In early 2001, Amnesty International issued this statement:

On March 14, 2001, the Jamaican Constabulary Force killed seven young men, three of them under the age of 18, during an alleged arrest attempt. We believe that the circumstances surrounding the shootings strongly suggest the deaths amounted to extra-judicial executions (Trinidad Express March 21, 2001, 43).

Up to June 2001, Jamaica, with a population of 2.6 million, experienced 440 murders. In a one-week period alone (June), 31 murders occurred, five of them linked to police shootings. In l998, 145 civilians were killed by the Jamaican police. In l999, 151 were killed by police there. Up to June 2001, 82 were killed by the police. Pressed by public protests, one newspaper wrote:

A fatal police shooting this month (June 2001) in Jamaica has renewed tensions between the public and the police force and has once again led to the police being depicted as trigger-happy maniacs bent on trampling the rights of the Jamaica people (Trinidad Guardian June 28, 2001,11).

Of course, in Jamaica, as the police point out, there is another side. For example, in the first six months of June 2001, six police officers were allegedly killed by gunmen in Jamaica. In early 2001, in St. Lucia, a corporal was charged for causing unlawful harm to a 16-year old boy. The report alleged that the boy was dealt several blows all over his body, then locked in a cell before being taken to the hospital. The incident arose when the boy was taking the officer to a friend who was suspected of stealing a car. When the suspect was not found, the officer allegedly became violent (St. Lucia Voice February 22, 2001, 12). In Guyana, the Opposition has called upon the Government for an inquiry into policing killings. In July 2001, the police killed three men during an altercation at a road block. The Opposition claimed that up to July in 2001, the Guyanese police ‘have killed eight suspects’ (Trinidad Express July 28, 2001, 24).

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TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO INCIDENTS

In February 2001, two police officers in Trinidad were charged with manslaughter in connection with the shooting death of a 38-year old labourer. As reported, eyewitnesses said that the man was shot as he tried to evade the police who then, with brandished guns, prevented fellow residents from going to his assistance (Newsday February 8, 2001, 64). This incident produced persistent tensions between residents and the police. In Trinidad and Tobago again, in March 2001, the court awarded a labourer US$10,000 as a result of being beaten (kicked and cuffed) by two police officers while he was watching residents’ protest against the vehicular death of youth. In evidence, the man said the police asked him to move but he did not since, as he explained, he ‘was living there.’ The officer got angry, pushed him, handcuffed and arrested him, then took him to the police station where two officers ‘kicked and cuffed him.’ Another citizen who suffered a similar beating on that same day was also awarded US$7,000 (Trinidad Express March 24, 2001, 24). Early in 2000, an officer in Trinidad shot and killed a young woman who the police claimed had entered the station cursing and threatening the officer as a result of the police arresting a relative. An inquest has been ordered into this death (Trinidad Express April 7, 2001, 8). In April 2001, five students complained that the police ‘ran them down and beat them up’ as they were fleeing from the scene where two groups of students were fighting. Two of the boys received fractures and cuts. Their father further claimed that when he went to make a complaint at the station, he was ‘chased away and threatened by the police’ (Trinidad Guardian April 7, 2001, 3). Around that same time, (April 28, 2001), a mother complained to the Commissioner of Police that an officer had badly beaten her 21-year old son who ‘was just liming’ when the officer suddenly came up and started to ‘search his pockets.’ The mother added that when the boy questioned the officer, the officer retaliated violently. The police gave no official response to these claims. A labourer in Trinidad was awarded US$22,000 in April this year after he was unlawfully arrested and shot by a police officer. In evidence, the man claimed that the officer, without properly identifying himself, had falsely accused him of having a weapon and assaulting the officer. The man further claimed that the officer had previously threatened to shoot him (Trinidad Express April 27, 2001, 10). Like Jamaica, the police in Trinidad and Tobago have suggested that the public look at ‘the other side’ as well. By ‘this other side,’ they usually mean that their lives are sometimes also in danger. Among the instances they cite is this one. In April 2001, they had a shoot-out with three strongly-armed men, all wanted for several robberies and shootings. In the police confrontation, the three men were

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killed (Trinidad Express April 7, 2001, 3). The police defended its actions by saying that they had to shoot in order ‘to defend themselves.’ Such instances of police force have attracted strong protests from some sections of the community. Apart from the inherent dangers in such use of force, and whatever justification the police provide, such instances have helped to undermine the level of public confidence which the police in Trinidad and Tobago, and the rest of the Caribbean, now urgently need for implementing community policing programmes (see for example, Guy 2000, Trinidad and Tobago Police Service 2001). Referring to the police killing of the three wanted men, one newspaper editorial said:

The shoot-out between police and bandits in south Trinidad which has left three men dead, has precipitated some suggestions that this was an execution by the police rather than a response to armed provocation. No matter how bad the crime situation in the country, the road to extra-judicial killings by the law enforcement authorities, or vigilantism of any kind, is not one we should contemplate. The Service is attempting to “clean up” its public profile and has enough problems with reports of “rogue officers” and an overworked Police Complaints Authority. (Trinidad Express April 10, 2001, 10)

In a more general way, the Secretary of the Trinidad and Tobago Prisons Association called upon the Government and Police Service ‘to state their policy regarding the use of force by police officers.’ He added: ‘We are seeing more and more people here being killed by the police during police actions’ (Trinidad Express June 6, 2001, 12). This call was repeated by several other non-governmental organisations and citizens’ letters to newspaper editors. Indeed, during the last two years, there has been a piling up of such charges of undue use of force by the Trinidad and Tobago police against citizens. As indicated above, many of them are taken to the courts where the victims have been compensated. What seems to be lacking, however, is a systematic independent study of the exact circumstances under which such police force has been exercised. That is, apart from the judicial aspects, we need a fuller understanding of the kind of perceptions and motivations which the police apply in such instances.

USE OF FORCE COMPLAINTS

To provide a further context for understanding the prevalence and range of ‘use of force’ incidents, we will review the data compiled by the PCA, and then refer to selected media reports as a means of providing a basis for further research. In terms of the police use of force, three related circumstances are important to note in the jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago, especially since these bear strong similarity with other Commonwealth Caribbean countries, for example, Jamaica. The first circumstance is the high public fear of crime which lends itself to a

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relatively high tolerance of the police use of force against fleeing or suspected offenders. Repeated nationwide surveys have revealed that 60 per cent of the population have a high fear of crime and victimisation. That is, for example, a high fear of being physically attacked in their homes, or in the streets. Related to this fear, is the widespread public concern over ‘the escalating rise in serious crime and violent robberies,’ a concern underlined and often instigated by graphic media reports. The second circumstance is the use of deadly force, that is, fatal shootings by the police. In 2000, there were seven allegations of fatal shootings by the police. Up to October 2001, there were six such allegations. The third circumstance is that the PCA collects data on a wide range of other complaints against the police, that is, excluding fatal shootings. The total of such complaints for May l999–April 2000 is 1,488. Among these complaints are charges of battery, criminal damage, having a gun drawn, and harassment. Given the definition of ‘use of force’ adopted earlier in this paper, we are obliged to examine force not only in the context of deadly force but in the context of the range of such other forceful police responses. Now what does this triangulation of circumstances mean for the use of police force, especially for incidents of excessive police force? In the last two years (1999- 2000), there have been 16 widely publicised incidents of excessive use of force which aroused widespread condemnation. Among these are alleged police attacks against journalists, ‘police brutality’ against businessmen and prisoners, and against crime suspects. There were also some media stories about fatal shootings by the police. All this is apart from the numerous official complaints filed with the PCA. Reacting to the 1996-97 report of the PCA, the Trinidad Guardian put out this forceful editorial:

Trinidad and Tobago is not a police state. At least not yet. But the report of the Police Complaints Authority which was laid in Parliament on Friday seems to suggest that too many police officers seem to think it is one. The report reads like a commentary on the concentration camp activities of Nazi Germany or the situation in South Africa at the height of apartheid when human rights were denied sections of the citizenry. (June 1, 1998, 8)

The editorial added: ‘This Government has responded by giving crime a high place on its agenda. Indeed it could be argued that Mr Panday’s party won the last general election largely because of its promise to deal with the crime spiral.’ In a court case of January 2000 over allegations of police brutality, the high court judge awarded the applicant US$2,000 for damages. The State agreed that three police officers had indeed beat the 42-year old man with a gun butt, then ‘tied him to a railing, and kicked him on his chest.’ The three officers had wrongly identified him as a crime suspect. In evidence, the beaten 42 year old man said one of three officers pulled out his gun and threatened him saying ‘If you only breathe too hard, I will pull the trigger.’ The man was charged for ‘resisting arrest

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and using obscene language.’ However, in court, he said that he had never been told why he was arrested nor was he informed of his right to communicate with a lawyer. In February 2001, three youths showed scars to illustrate police beatings when they were questioned for a crime which they claimed they did not commit (TnT Mirror February 16, 2001, 9). Around that same time, a 14-year old boy also showed bruises which he alleged came from the police who unlawfully snatched him from his grandfather’s home. In December 2000, an 18-year old youth was rushed to the hospital suffering from wounds allegedly inflicted by several police officers. In his subsequent statement to the media and the police station, the youth said that one officer ‘aimed his loaded gun in my face, while another burst both sides of my head with his gun butt.’ The boy told the media: ‘At first, the officer at the station did not want to take the complaint. He told me to come back. Eventually, at my persistence, he jotted down something in the station’s diary.’ The police had been called to quell a confrontation between two groups of boys. The battered youth and his mother filed a complaint with the PCA. Such regular accounts of police beatings do suggest, on their own, a disturbing tendency of undue use of force by the police. The police have the implicit practice of not publicly telling ‘their side of the story,’ a practice no doubt inspired by the victims’ stated intention to ‘take the matter to court.’ But it will certainly help if some explanation or some form of internal adjudication or review can be quickly and publicly announced by the police to help convince the public that such matters deserve serious and quick attention by a Service whose stated mission is ‘to serve and protect.’ What about the peculiar but disturbing situation where police officers just stand by and allow other officers to inflict physical abuse upon civilians? That is, police tolerance of excessive physical force. On the second day of the country’s two-day Carnival celebrations in February 2001, a member of a wrecking crew accompanied by a police officer allegedly jumped out of his vehicle and cuffed a doctor who was taking pictures of an altercation between another citizen and the wrecking crew. According to the newspaper report, the police officer just looked on even while the wrecking crew member allegedly had a knife. But whatever the merits of the allegation, the relevant point here is the quick and ready manner in which the senior police authorities subsequently defended both the wrecking crew and the police officer on the scene. They were just doing their job, the senior officer said, since that was a ‘no-parking zone.’ In an angry editorial the next day, the Trinidad Express newspaper asked: ‘Are members of wrecking crews being encouraged in such attitude by the police officers who accompany them? How could the police do nothing about a civilian actually brandishing a weapon?’ (March 1, 2001, 6). This brings up a related issue in police force. That is, the level of tolerance

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within the Police Service and the officers’ ready disposition to defend such force by their peers. This point is important because while allegations of excessive police force may be made, a lot depends upon witnesses for judicial conclusions. And if, as is often the case, the only witnesses are other police officers, then the implications are both clear and serious and should also be a subject for research.

FURTHER DATA

The PCA, in its annual reports, publishes the number of complaints received from the public against the police and provides a reasonable estimate of the use of force. The Authority uses 24 different categories for complaints against the police. Our treatment of the use of force by the police includes not only excessive physical or deadly force, but also threats, related acts of intimidation, and the illegal use of authority. This broadened categorisation is useful for two purposes. Firstly, it provides an extended range of police behaviour which can be amenable to a social psychological model as outlined above. Secondly, while the use of deadly force, no matter how infrequent, is a severe violation of civil rights and the very right to life without due process, it is a relatively narrow range of police behaviour. As such, it does not provide a full landscape of police-civilian encounters which on one side reveal the range of public concerns, and on the other hand, also reveal the range of instances of police misconduct which may well be a stone’s throw from deadly force. This second point is extremely relevant to the kind of public confidence and civilian partnerships which the Police Service is now striving to build for implementing its community policing programmes. These broadened instances of police misconduct, including the use of excessive force, cannot be discounted. The use of deadly force is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for assessing the democratic, protective, and service-oriented role of the Police Service. In fact, for such reasons, the police use of psychological force is quite important to count, though physical and deadly force is the more compelling consideration. In this context, we selected nine of the 24 categories used by the PCA with ‘gun drawn without cause’ as the most serious. (While the CPA has no data on fatal shootings by the police, we estimate from media reports that there were seven such alleged shootings in 2000 and six for the first ten months in 2001). Table 14.1 shows these nine categories for the four year period, 1997–2000. Battery, criminal damage and drawing a gun by officers — three severe forms of force — comprise 34 per cent of the nine categories of use of force. When we add ‘harassment’ as another type of force, that is, psychological force, these four categories comprise 64 per cent of the nine categories used in Table 14.1. But the story does not end here. The Police Complaints Division within the Police Service has expressed significant differences with the categories and decisions of the Complaints

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TABLE 14.1 COMPLAINTS RECEIVED ON POLICE USE OF FORCE: POLICE–CIVILIAN ENCOUNTERS (1997–2000)

No Category Definition 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total % Gun Drawn Drawing gun 1 Without 50 39 40 34 163 5 unnecessarily Cause Criminal Damaging / 2 39 33 30 40 142 Damage destroying property Any use of force which can range 3 Battery 249 235 199 201 884 25 from a mere jostling to severe beating Threatening Using abusive or 4 153 216 196 191 756 22 Behaviour obscene language Repeated verbal 5 Harassment attacks and threats to 273 277 251 225 1,026 29 incarcerate or shoot Entering premises 6 Illegal Entry 65 67 47 55 234 7 without any warrant False Illegally incarcerating 7 11 11 20 33 75 2 Imprisonment persons Obtaining money / 8 Extortion benefits through 9 6 5 9 29 1 force or threats Unlawful 9 Wrongful arrest 31 33 38 79 181 5 Arrest TOTAL (9) 880 917 826 867 3,490 100 TOTAL FOR ALL 1,405 1,663 1,286 1,488 5,842 - COMPLAINTS (24) Source: Police Complaints Authority. (2000). Fourth Annual Report. Port of Spain: Government Printery Police Complaints Authority. (1999). Third Annual Report. Port of Spain: Government Printery Police Complaints Authority. (1998). Second Annual Report. Port of Spain: Government Printery Police Complaints Authority. (1997). First Annual Report. Port of Spain: Government Printery

Authority. For example, the Division does not take too kindly to the practice of filing ‘cross-charges’ by citizens. In fact, the Division has alleged that many of the complaints about ‘police brutality’ were unfounded. This is especially so, it claimed, when many citizens decided ‘not to pursue the complaint.’ On the other hand, the Authority has expressed concern over the apparent tendency for a system which has officers unduly defending other officers. Several modifications are being considered for a ‘more co-ordinated approach’ between the Authority and the Division.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE USE OF FORCE SITUATION

In the much cited case, Tennessee v Garner (105 S. Ct. l694 (l985), the issue of use of force, at least in its motivational stage, was still left somewhat unresolved. The Court (6-3) ruled that a police officer may use deadly force to prevent the escape of a suspect when there is probable cause to believe that the individual would present a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to the public. The term ‘probable cause’ invokes the role of the officer’s own instantaneous perceptions and sense of threat, no matter what the review may uncover afterwards through the regulations. The psychology of the situation and the officer’s subjective assessment all become key elements towards the degree of force felt to be required. These things become incrementally clearer in the dissenting view by Justice O’Connor. Within the judicial parameters, she said: ‘That the individual has an interest in his own life is contradicted by the facts of the case.’ She noted that the officer fired only after the suspect disregarded his order to stop. She then argued: ‘The suspect would still be alive today because to avoid the use of deadly force and the consequent risk to his life, the suspect need merely to obey the valid order to halt.’ The interaction between the ‘psychology of the situation’ and the more concrete circumstances is then brought out in Justice O’Connor’s other words: ‘The officer pursued a suspect in the darkened backyard of a house that from all indications had just been burglarized. The police officer was not certain whether the suspect was alone or unarmed, nor did he know what had transpired inside the house. He ordered the suspect to halt, and when the suspect refused to obey and attempted to flee into the night, the officer fired his weapon to prevent escape. The reasonableness of this action for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is not determined by the unfortunate nature of this particular case; instead the question is whether it is constitutionally impermissible for police officers, as a last resort, to shoot a burglary suspect fleeing the scene of the crime.’ Several elements of uncertainty faced the officer, and quite plausibly became linked to his perceptions, level of arousal and fear for his safety in the situation. Of course, the Garner case led to a narrowing of the conditions for the use of deadly force in the US. Police officers can now shoot suspects only if the criminal poses a ‘direct and immediate threat’ to the officer or to the safety of others. However, as William Doerner (1992) noted: ‘Some observers might contend that this formulation still leaves too many grey areas open to further discretion’ (p. 324). But this is exactly the point. How much discretion can we fairly take away from an officer ensnarled in such fluid, conflict situations?

THE DILEMMA OF DISCRETION: PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS

Discretion will be necessary. But the application of such discretion will also always be determined by the perceptions, experience and sense of threat

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experienced by the officer involved. These are social psychological variables. And as such, we need to find out more about how these psychological elements actually operate in police-civilian encounters. Doerner himself felt compelled to note further: ‘Split-second decisions require the officer to anticipate what could happen rather than take a wait-and-see attitude. For instance, a suspect who reaches into a pocket might be pulling out a gun’ (l992, 331). He also may not. ‘In the darkened backyard of a house,’ how long should an officer wait? Deadly force is, however, a special case. The range of other kinds of force, lower-level force, should also be taken into serious account. Such lower-level force has become quite worrisome in the Caribbean. In this latter case, the issue of ‘excessive force,’ not necessarily deadly force, still remains an important matter for research and policy consideration. Excessive force has to be judged in the particular context in which it is applied. To put it another way, an officer’s response may be excessive in one context, but not excessive in another context.

NEW RESEARCH AREAS: TOWARDS PSYCHOLOGY

A study by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) (1999) stated:

We focused on the measurement of the amount of force, with the expectation that this information would inform issues surrounding the use of excessive force. Our findings are that most arrests involve no force, excessive or otherwise. When force is used, it typically involves less severe forms of tactics and weapons. These findings provide a context for understanding excessive force, which we know can involve low-level acts of force (such as verbal threats or cursing against compliant suspects) as well as the acts of force that result in physical injury or death of a civilian. (p. 30)

This NIJ pointed out two areas in which research is now definitely needed: (1) the situational characteristics of the police-civilian encounter and, (2) the transactional nature of the encounter, that is, ‘the transactional, step by step unfolding of police-public encounters’ (1999, ix). Both areas, especially the second one, can be fruitfully examined through a social psychological approach. In fact, the second area is quite plausibly related to the psychological characteristics of the officer. By pointing to the ‘transactional step by step’ unfolding of the encounter, the NIJ itself was seeking to move from the traditional legalistic approach to a more realistic, interactionist one in order to get a fuller understanding of the use of force phenomenon. We agree. Some attempt has been made to relate officers’ characteristics to the use of force (e.g., Blumberg l981, Fyfe l981, Journal of Criminal Justice 9(4); Sherman and Blumberg, l981). The results are quite mixed. But even so, such studies examined social characteristics such as race and education and not psychological characteristics as motivation, perceptions, sense of threat or even emotional levels

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of officers. There is a need to examine how such psychological characteristics of officers interact with the use of force within the police-civilian encounter. Neither structure nor rules should ignore cognition. The very definition of the word ‘force’ signals the problem involved. It is defined as ‘power; exerted strength or impetus; intense effort; coercion or compulsion, esp. with the use of threat or violence’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, Ninth Ed.). Force, therefore, becomes a method of social control, the exercise of power, and in situations which presumably require it. Though many attempts have been made to specify situations and create procedures for the legitimate application of police force, there will always be that grey area where the role of discretion will remain enigmatic. Firstly, there will always be some extreme situations where the use of force is clearly justified. For example, where a police officer is cornered and frontally threatened with violence by two or more armed gunmen and the officer draws his own gun and shoots at the gunmen. The officer’s response with his own gun will be an act of self-defence and as such, justifiable. Secondly, there will be some situations where a suspect or civilian quickly follows the officer’s instructions. Here there will be no clear cause for the use of police force. And if force were to be used, then it would be clearly unjustified. The third situation, the grey area, is where the use of force typically comes into dispute. This is where the suspect or other civilian produces an act or expression which, in the officer’s view, deserves the use of a certain degree of force. Such civilian actions may vary from running away to appearing to pick up a piece of iron when facing the officer.

THAT CRITICAL GREY AREA: TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Within this grey area, the contact situation will likely produce several variables, each containing degrees of threat or need for control. But all these are not objective conditions in the encounter. For example, the officer’s own definition or perception of the conflict situation is a psychological variable. And the manner in which he interprets the civilian’s motives or actions will be a key stimulus for the officer’s response. All these social and psychological elements of the conflict encounter construct a social psychological situation especially since in the grey area particularly, the role of the officer’s perceptions, experiences and sense of vulnerability come into play. It is here that the NIJ’s call for research into the ‘transactional, step by step unfolding of the encounter’ is also relevant. Figure 14.1 illustrates schematically the relationship between the three different situations and the expected or actual application of force or no force. This, in effect, is a condensed version of the police force-civilian threat continuum proposed by Fyfe (1988, 184–91) where a rough sliding scale is used to match various civilian responses with the type of police response deemed appropriate. This model, however, in trying to distinguish non-elective shootings from elective

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shootings, constructs the officer as a purely mechanical entity, almost exclusively driven by the objective conditions of the situation. But the major point raised in Diagram 1 is that officers will apply their own perceptions and experience to the situation, and, further, such qualities may well vary from one officer to another. The analysis therefore has to go more deeply.

FIGURE 14.1 EXPECTED AND ACTUAL USE OF FORCE BY POLICE UNDER VARYING LEVELS OF DIRECT THREAT

Actual Police Expected Police Response Response

USE OF FORCE

DIRECT THREAT TO OFFICER

Briefly, it is expected that the police should use force when the threat is high. It is not expected that the police should use force when the threat is very low or totally absent. If used, then clearly, this will be unjustified force. But the doubts usually arise and resolutions become difficult at the moderate (grey) area. Assuming that the officer acted in good faith, he may well provide a plausible explanation for using force in the grey area. For example, he might have perceived the instant situation as being more threatening than it actually turned out to be under review. The low and high areas of direct threat provide certainty for review and adjudication. That is, force will certainly not be justifiable in the low area; it will certainly be justifiable in the high threat area. The moderate (grey) area, especially the shaded area, is where mitigating circumstances may well appear and where the ‘psychology of the situation’ may come into sharp focus. While the research on the relationship between personality factors and the use of force is rather tentative, it is implausible to conceive that at the time of contact, sometimes within a split second, the officer’s perceptions do not count in events within the grey area. Figure 14.2 shows a diamond model of a conflict situation and the component interactions between situational elements, the

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department’s goals, regulations and procedures, the officer’s experience, perceptions, and the criminal status of the civilian.

FIGURE 14.2 AN INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE ON USE OF FORCE

SITUATION (dark area, building crowded, etc.)

FORCE OFFICER CIVILIAN (perceptions, (law-abiding citizen, experience, sense of fleeing suspect, armed threat, etc.) bandit, threatening actions etc.) POLICE GOALS (Regulations, etc.)

This social psychological model is an elaboration of the grey area in Figure 14.1, and seeks to provide a more detailed interaction than what the mechanical sliding scale model offers. We submit it is a more authentic though complex way to explain police use of force; but it is helpful not only for clarification and adjudication, but also for training programmes. The expectation that the official rules and the suspect’s behaviour will be exclusively compelling in the grey situation is to unduly ignore the bulk of research which suggests that when faced with a fluid, challenging situation, a person’s perceptions and the way he defines the situation also contribute to the way he responds. What this social psychological model also does is for inquiries or reviews to take into account the officer’s perception of threat, his sense of the collateral dangers in the environment at the time, and the host of other imposing factors which are not clearly included in the stated rules of engagement. In other words, it makes the review process fairer to the officer on one hand, and also fairer to the suspect or civilian on the other hand. An officer’s reaction in a conflict situation depends not only on what he knows, that is, on his cognitions (e.g., suspect profile, goals, regulations, etc.) but also on how he feels, that is, his affective state (e.g., sense of threat, perceived risk, arousal level, etc.). This approach rests on the social psychological premise that as a situation becomes more structured, behaviour becomes more predictable. Drawing from Kurt Lewin’s (1951) social psychological equation, B=f(P, E), that is, behaviour is a function of both the person and the environment, we illustrate further with a

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definition of social psychology itself: ‘Social Psychology is an attempt to understand and explain how he thought, feeling, and behaviour of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others’ in a situation (Allport 1968).2 Let us emphasise that we are dealing with interactions within the grey area noted above, and not necessarily with the police use of deadly force in the extreme cases when the civilian overtly poses direct physical harm to the officer. If, however, within the grey area, the officer uses deadly force, then while such use of force may be eventually seen as unjustified in the end, there should still be some room left to clarify whether it was applied maliciously, carelessly, or will be quite likely shared by any other officer facing similar uncertain circumstances. In fact, from several media reports of police force and from unofficial police explanations of the use of such force here, we have found that much of their actions seem to rest on their perceptions of threat in situations which they defined as unclear (i.e., the grey area). For example, when asked to explain why he drew his gun on a group of unarmed youths, an officer said: ‘They appeared drunk, and were approaching me in a gang-like manner so I fired a shot in the air, then pointed the gun at them.’ ‘Appeared drunk?’ ‘Gang-like manner?’ These are the officer’s definition of the situation. When asked why he physically roughed a man who was loitering in a certain district, another officer explained:

That is an area where a lot of crimes are committed and the residents have been complaining a long time. When I approached him, he looked as if he was going to pick up a piece of wood to attack me. So what was I to do?

The officer, on his own admission, had given no warning. Such information has helped encourage us to develop a social psychological model to understand, while not ignoring guilt, the inordinate and undue use of varying degrees of force in this jurisdiction. Pursuing a thief, stopping a robbery, facing an escaped convict, being accosted by a civilian — all these ‘grey’ instances are tense, risky situations for an officer, and the demand for his response usually takes place within a split second. They do not fall exactly within, but come close to, the extreme situation where a gun is clearly drawn and about to be used against the officer. The running thief may bend down to pick up something, the robber may be pushing his hand inside his pocket, the escape convict known to be armed, turns around to face the pursuing officer. All these are specific elements within the grey area where quick action and wise discretion become compelling for the officer. How long should an officer wait, even after his warnings are ignored? His response, to use force or not, in such circumstances becomes a matter of instant discretion, a discretion guided by his perception of threat, feeling that he is leaving himself open to physical harm. The occurrence of such instantaneous responses will not necessarily

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disappear by having official regulations. They are inherent in the conflict situation and become related to the officer’s psychological dispositions. We may well say that psychological conflict is the immediate antecedent to physical conflict, that is, the use of force. Two questions arise. One, what level of perceived risk should an officer expose himself to before he applies force. Two, his use of force in such grey circumstances may eventually be found to be excessive but the mitigating circumstance would be the threat he perceived in the situation. This is one feature which makes the police-civilian interaction a social psychological one. This approach triangulates civilian behaviour, situational characteristics and officer’s goals and perceptions. This dynamic behavioural model, of course, may not fit tidily into static regulations on the use of force but it will help in training officers and providing a fuller understanding of the complexities involved in police-civilian interactions where use of force is a potential response.

TOWARDS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AGENDA

Three matters are now being considered useful for further research: (1) The definition of and specific procedures for the ‘use of force’ by the police. (2) The social context and exact circumstances in which such force is unduly used or withheld. In other words, it is also important to note the instances where undue restraint of force leads to ineffective policing and harmful consequences. As an example of social context, it is now becoming quite commonplace here for robbers to carry guns: and they do fire regularly at the police. This has helped to construct a blanket of defensiveness and ultra-caution on the part of the police, and often with the aim of ‘getting them first before they get you.’ (3) As a form of reflexive behaviour, therefore, the use of force can be analysed within a social psychological matrix, that is, taking into consideration four interactive elements: the citizen’s behaviour, the goal demands of policing, the situational characteristics, and the personality of the officer (see Figure 14.2). This allows for a continuum of applied or desired force and civilian behaviour, with each interacting with the varying social psychological characteristics of police officers and the conflict situation. That is: (1) Civilian behaviour=Stimulus Variable (A) (2) Policing Goals=Mediating Variable (B) (3) Situational Characteristics=Mediating Variable (C) (4) Use of Force=Response Variable (D)

That is, D= f{(A) +(B) +(C)} The analysis can be done, singly or in combination, through simulated experiments, closely scrutinised retrospective accounts and videotapes of the real

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encounters where possible. Therefore, apart from the juridical or administrative aspects of the problem of the use of force, proactive and training programmes can be developed by this social psychological approach. This approach is also critical in the context of the expected roles of the community policing officer in this jurisdiction.

REFERENCES

Allport, G. 1968. ‘The Historical Background of Social Psychology’. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, Eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, (Vol, 1), (p. 3). Boston, Mass: Addison- Wesley. Bandura, A. l986. Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Birkbeck, C. and Gabaldon, L.G. 1998. ‘The Effect of Citizens’ Status and Behaviour on Venezuelan Police Officers’ Decisions to Use Force’. Policing and Society, 8, 315–38. Blumberg, M. l981. ‘Race and Police Shootings: An Analysis of Two Cities’. In J.J. Fyfe, Ed. Contemporary Issues in Law Enforcement. New York, NY: Sage Publications. Blumberg, M. 1994. ‘Police Use of Deadly Force’. In T. Barker and D. Carter, Eds, Police Deviance (p. 201). Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson Publishing. Deosaran, R. 1985. Trial by Jury: Social and Psychological Dynamics. Trinidad: The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, ISER. ———. 1993. A Society Under Siege: A Study of Political Confusion and Legal Mysticism. Trinidad: The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Psychological Research Centre. ———. 2000. Crime Statistics, Analysis and Policy Action: The Way Forward. (Research/Policy Report). Trinidad: The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice. ———. 2000. Psychonomics and Poverty: Towards Governance and a Civil Society. Mona, Jamaica: The University of the West Indies Press. ———. 2000. The Dynamics of Community Policing: Theory, Practice and Evaluation. Trinidad: The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice. Doerner, W. 1992. Introduction to Law Enforcement. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Fyfe, J. l981. ‘Who Shoots? A Look at Officer Race and Police Shooting’. The Journal of Police Science and Administration, 9(4). ———. June 1988. ‘Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform’. Justice Quarterly, 5(2), l84–91. Garfinkel, I. l967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Guy, H. 2000. Community Policing – A Strategy for the Times: A Regional Perspective. Barbados: Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP). Lewin, K. 1951. Field Theory in Social Science. New York, NY: Harper and Row. National Institute of Justice. October 1999. Use of Force by Police. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. Police Complaints Authority. 1997. Annual Report. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Government Printery.

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Police Complaints Authority. 1998. Annual Report. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Government Printery. Police Complaints Authority. 1999. Annual Report. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Government Printery. Police Complaints Authority. 2000. Annual Report. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Government Printery. Sherman, L. and Blumberg, M. 1981. Higher Education and Police Use of Force Deadly Force. Journal of Criminal Justice 9(4). Stephan, C. and Stephan, W. l985. Two Social Psychologies: An Integrative Approach. Chicago, Illinois: Dorsey Press. Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. 2001. A Strategic Plan for Integrating Community Policing. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. 1960. Standing Orders. Port-of-Spain: Government Printery. Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. 2001. Standing Orders. Port-of-Spain: Government Printery.

NOTES

1 From International Perspectives on Use of Force by Police, 2003, Gerardo, L. and C. Birkbeck (eds), Ramesh Deosaran, ‘Use of Force by Police in the Caribbean: Towards a Social Psychological Analysis’. pp.81–102. Caracas: Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia/Nueva Sociedad with permission. 2 We have applied a social psychological model of analysis to several other issues: for example, poverty alleviation, jury decision-making, crimes against property and cultural conflict. See, for example, Deosaran l985 Trial by Jury, Deosaran 2000 Psychonomics and Poverty: Towards Governance and a Civil Society. For further reading on the specification and operationalising of the key variables in the social psychological interaction, see Stephan and Stephan (Eds) 1985 Two Social Psychologies; Bandura l986 Social Foundations of Thought and Action and Garfinkel l867 Studies in Ethnomethodology.

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CORRECTIONs IN THE CARIBBEAN

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chap15.pmd 322 12/8/2006, 11:14 AM C LIENT REHABILITATION OR SANITISATION OF THE PENAL LANGUAGE? Fifteen

Client INTRODUCTION

Rehabilitation To date, there has been limited academic or Sanitisation research on Jamaica’s criminal justice system of the Penal and even less focus is placed on the ‘correctional’ component of the system. The Language? result is a paucity of information on Analysis of ‘corrections.’ This study attempts to fill this gap by examining post-1975 reforms within Correctional the Department of Correctional Services of Reforms in Jamaica (DCSJ) which changed its mandate to reflect rehabilitation. The paper, by Jamaica juxtaposing official discourse of correctional Marlyn J. Jones services with the counter discourse of inmates, questions whether the mandate to rehabilitate inmates is being achieved.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, JAMAICA (DCSJ)

DCSJ, a department of the Ministry of National Security, is one of three components of Jamaica’s criminal justice system. The three core functional areas of DCSJ are: custodial services (adults and juveniles), rehabilitation and Human Resources Management, and Community Services. Within these three core areas, the department provides facilities for admission, incarceration and welfare of inmates and wards; administers the probation, parole and hostel services operating in the community, and provides the necessary reports that will assist the courts to make informed decisions in selected cases. DCSJ is also mandated to provide rehabilitation programmes for inmates, offenders and wards including

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educational programmes, individual group counselling, spiritual/religious instruction and other treatment programmes. The department is also required to develop, implement and evaluate procedures to ensure fiscal responsibility (http:/ /dcsj.net/p/dcsj2.htm). The Department operates seven adult correctional centres, one adult remand centre and four juvenile centres. Seventeen community service offices (probation offices) are also located across the island (http://dcsj.net/p/dcsj2.htm). Citing ‘an inefficient system plagued with inconsistencies and duplication’ in 1975, components of ‘Corrections’ were reorganised to form the Department of Correctional Services, Jamaica (http://dcsj.net/p/background.htm). Prior to its reorganisation, the Jamaican prison system emphasised punishment. Post-1975 reforms used updated correctional philosophy to focus on rehabilitation, adoption of rehabilitation as a mandate, and implementation or amendment of several legislation such as The Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA) and The Parole Act, and Criminal Records (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act. Reflecting the new philosophy of offender management, CJRA made provisions for new alternatives to incarceration while the Correctional Institution (Declaration) Adult Correctional Centres, Order 1991 renamed prisons as adult correctional centres. Similarly, ‘prisoners’ became ‘inmates;’ and ‘prison officers’ became ‘correctional officers.’ To ‘guide the Department of Correctional Services in managing rehabilitation as a core strategic function’ (Rehabilitation http://www.dcsj.net/dcsj/ rehabilitation.htm) in 2000, the department’s ‘philosophical and conceptual functions were revisited and restructured to reflect a twenty-first century approach to the correctional process’ http://dcsj.net/p/background.htm.

OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

The following describing the department’s current philosophy states:

The Department of Correctional Services is determined to move strategically into enhanced client supervision and public safety, thus enabling the successful achievement of its vision of a “therapeutic environment” for its clients and a “more peaceful, caring and productive society” (http://www.dcsj.net/p/background.htm).

Reflecting the changed philosophy, the vision and mission statements also echo the need to serve and empower clients. Reproduced below are the organisation’s mission and vision statements (http://www.dcsj.net/p/vision.htm):

VISION

We are serving the needs of all our clients by creating and facilitating opportunities for their empowerment and rehabilitation, resulting in a more peaceful, caring and productive society.

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MISSION

To contribute to the safety and protection of our society by keeping offenders secure and facilitating their rehabilitation and reintegration as law-abiding citizens, while developing a professional and committed staff. Correctional process:

One which provides to those in our care a relevant, structured, therapeutic environment to facilitate their empowerment and rehabilitation to become peaceful, responsible and productive members of society. The Rehabilitation Unit is guided by the philosophy that with the appropriate interventions, all clients can become peaceful, productive, law abiding citizens. When achieved, rehabilitation will impact positively on morale, discipline as well as assist in reducing crime and overcrowding within our Correctional Facilities, thereby fulfilling our mission of creating a secure, safe and healthy environment for the empowerment and rehabilitation of our clients. The National Rehabilitation Strategy is a blue print that seeks to guide the DCSJ in managing rehabilitation as a core strategic function. Rehabilitation is a potentially important strategy for reducing recidivism and thus preventing the further victimisation of society.

Source: (http://dcsj.net/p/programs.htm#REHABILITATION)

In a June 2004 speech, the Commissioner of Corrections, Richard Reece identified the following improvements to the island’s prison system:

• a 64.7 per cent reduction in violent incidents involving inmates, with the figures moving from 105 in 2002 to 37 in 2003; • a 46 per cent reduction in escapes to seven. Of that number, three were recaptured, one was shot and killed, and one surrendered; • a seven per cent reduction in overcrowding at the St Catherine Centre and five per cent at the Tower Street Centre; • the construction of a computer laboratory at the Fort Augusta Adult Correctional Centre; • the relocation and upgrading of the computer laboratory at the South Camp Adult Correctional Centre, • and the opening of a library at the Tower Street Adult Correctional Centre; • increased training of correctional officers in quick response and other areas of security as well as culinary skills, as each institution must soon prepare meals in-house; • the retraining of correctional officers returning from interdiction;

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• the introduction of a database for parole applicants which should facilitate automatic review. • phased release/reintegration programme where inmates will be moved from maximum to minimum security institutions, then to halfway houses and then back into society, • a project called ‘Unfit to Plead’ that seeks an island wide identification of relatives of inmates who are deemed mentally unstable by the court system.

DCSJ notes that the rehabilitative approach ‘is not simply a matter of doing “good” for correctional clients; it also facilitates public safety.’ (http://dcsj.net/p/ programs.htm#REHABILITATION. The transition from prisons to ‘correctional’ centre is part of what Pratt (2002) labels the disappearance of prison and the subsequent sanitisation of the penal language. He explains, ‘eventually the prison and its population would be another arena of punishment to be pushed behind the scenes of the civilized world’ (Pratt 2002, 35). Thus, with a stroke of the pen, Jamaica’s prisons disappeared to be replaced by adult ‘correctional centres’ focused on rehabilitation. According to Pratt, the sanitisation process removed ‘all the syntax of repression and deprivation that had once existed… [becoming] therapeutic institutions rather than prisons, medico-psychological penal professionals rather than guards’ (2002, 94). As a result of the sanitisation process, the formal language of punishment became diluted. ‘It was now difficult to find traces of it in a language dominated by reference to treatment and rehabilitation, therapeutic institutions and correctional services’ (Pratt 2002, 95). Official discourse represents only one version of reality of prison life. A counter discourse from prisoners construct a different reality ‘that provides a counterweight to “the truth” being told by prison authorities’ (Pratt 2002, 98). This counter discourse is evident not only in an examination of claims in official discourse, but in prisoners’ responses of their own experiences of prison life. Is DCSJ’s focus on rehabilitation symbolic or operational? What changes, if any, were achieved and are these changes defacto (in fact/actual) or dejure (by right/lawful)? If rehabilitation is taking place, what form has it taken? A subsidiary issue of concern is whether the Jamaican environment is conducive or receptive to the rehabilitative focus within the DCSJ? Two societal trends form the backdrop for these questions. First, within Jamaica, a high level of fear of crime exists among residents who increasingly call on the government to implement crime control measures to eliminate crime related problems. Secondly, a growing body of literature identifies a populist punitive trend within contemporary societies where characteristics include the trend towards mass incarceration, longer prison sentences, and penal laws that seem to abandon longstanding limits to punishment in modern societies (Pratt

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2005, Pratt 2002, Dow 2004, Beckett and Sasson 2004, Valier 2004, Parenti 2000). It is within this context of a high fear of crime, that I examine DCSJ’s philosophical changes and its focus on rehabilitation. Is reform achieved through renaming? Shakespeare wrote that a ‘Rose by any other name is still a Rose.’ Did the Department of Correctional Services, Jamaica undergo true reforms or simply sanitisation of its language? Are facilities that were simply renamed correctional centres, still prisons or something else, and if so, what? Are the occupants of these facilities prisoners, offenders, inmates, or clients? Similarly, are they housed in cells, dorms or something else? These questions may be summarised thus: is the DCSJ still in the business of operating prisons to punish offenders or does it operate adult correctional centres that empower clients through rehabilitation? DCSJ’s mandate to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders as law abiding citizens is assessed through the counter discourse of inmates.

COUNTER DISCOURSE: THE INMATE’S VIEW

For Pratt:

another of the hallmark of punishment in the civilized world relates to the way in which its formal language of punishment came to be sanitized: stripped of the emotive, pejorative force that its infliction might invoke in favor of one that spoke of punishment in a more neutral, objective, scientific terms (2002, 81).

An example of the sanitisation process, he argues, resulted in a language that ‘spoke with increasing frequency of therapeutic institutions rather than prisons, medico-psychological penal professionals rather than guards’ (2002, 94). The sanitisation process created an official discourse of penal language where prisons ‘disappeared and was subsumed under the more mellifluous sounding “Department of Corrective Services”’ (2002, 93). Pratt points out, however, that official language, represented only one version of reality, another version, he notes, evident in the counter-discourses of prisoners, contested the reality of prison life as constructed in official discourses.

METHODS

With emphasis on the National Rehabilitation Strategy and the legislative framework within which the DCSJ operates, this paper examines whether the DCSJ has achieved its goal of rehabilitating individuals placed in its charge. To make this assessment, requires a focus on whether there has been a fundamental change in the delivery of custodial services and/or programme availability? Specifically, what, if any changes have been made to the physical facilities and programmes or, are they the same as those available/offered under the old paradigm? Have programmes been implemented that focus on rehabilitation?

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What is the availability of programmes? What types of programmes are available and what is the nature of these programmes. Has the recidivism rate changed? Are there human resources recruitment and retention issues? What is the perception of staff and inmates with respect to these changes and how do these views compare with that of the administration? Is there a national commitment to offender rehabilitation? A consideration of societal support for rehabilitation leads one to question whether it is even fair to expect high rehabilitative results from the current ‘adult correctional centres’. Using Pratt’s (2002) discussion of sanitisation of the penal language, I examine the question of rehabilitation by juxtaposing official versus inmates’ discourses on the mandate and practices of DCSJ. The data for this paper come from two primary sources. First is a survey instrument administered over a one week period in January 2005 to a convenience sampling of prison inmates (N = 125) at two of Jamaica’s adult male correctional facilities - South Camp Adult Correctional Centre (aka) Gun Court and Tower Street Adult Correctional Centre (formerly the General Penitentiary). Other information comes from content analysis of news, reports, legislation and qualitative analysis of documents by or on the DCSJ. A review of the intent versus outcomes of the Department’s mandate as measured by factors such as number and types of prisoner actions (such as riots, hunger strikes, break-outs), recidivism, prison disturbances, and types of personnel actions sets the context for evaluating the outcomes of DCSJ’s reforms. Information also comes from archival research of DCSJ reports, policy and procedures, legislation, statistics and news reports. The basic tenet of rehabilitation is to avoid future criminal behaviour; consequently, vocational, educational, psychological and other services are often implemented to improve skills, education and self concept of inmates. DCSJ’s mandate is best summarised by one of its statements that ‘when achieved, rehabilitation will impact positively on morale, discipline as well as assist in reducing crime and over-crowding within our Correctional Facilities’ (http:// dcsj.net/p/programs.htm#REHABILITATION.

SURVEY DATA

The survey instrument contained eight pages and 128 questions ranging from demographic information, questions about childhood and community, incarceration experiences, and post incarceration plans. Limitations arising from access necessitated that the instruments be administered to persons involved in educational programmes, thus, this is not a random sample. I visited classrooms where inmates were involved in educational programmes to explain the nature and purpose of the study and to solicit volunteers. I reiterated that participation is voluntary and that individuals wanting to participate could then come to see me. I then distributed the instruments, which were then completed and returned

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during the class period. Some of the inmates who were on lock-down, having heard about the research project, asked to participate and so instruments and consent forms were sent over to them on the block. These surveys were completed and returned to me. Like mail-in surveys that are sent to individuals’ homes requesting the extent to which instruments completed on the residential blocks were individual or communal effort, cannot be ascertained. Because the sample was limited to the classroom and individuals involved in educational programmes, it also excludes inmates without literacy and numeric skills. A total of 125 valid instruments were available for analysis. The mean age of respondents was 32 years, with the youngest respondent being 17 years old and the oldest respondent being 65 years of age. The most frequently occurring offence was murder with sentences ranging from 18 months to life. All respondents were men. Although a number of foreign nationals are incarcerated in Jamaican facilities, the sample was distinctly Jamaican. Because of the sampling technique, all respondents were fully or semi-literate. Of this group, 55 per cent did not complete high school. Most respondents were primarily employed in unskilled jobs prior to incarceration. Of the respondents, 61.6 per cent self described as having had a great relationship with mother, 51.8 per cent had no involvement with the church, 54.4 per cent had no involvement with cultural activities, and 48.4 per cent were somewhat or very available to provide help within the community prior to incarceration. An examination of information provided by inmates indicates very little rehabilitation takes place. Instead, the description they provided is more descriptive of prisons than that of corrections. Participants raised several issues including overcrowding of facilities, juveniles in adult facilities, the (un)availability of programmes, age and condition of the facilities, punishment and societal view of individuals who have been incarcerated. However, the top concerns were access to parole and lack of rehabilitation. On the survey, in correspondences and oral comments, residents consistently identified lack of rehabilitation. According to them, while there are legislative provisions for parole, despite its rehabilitative potential, it continues to be used as a carrot.

PAROLE AND ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE

For many inmates, DCSJ restricts access to the benefits provided in the Parole Act, one of the primary mechanisms of its reform era. They note:

we have over four thousand inmates in our [A]dult [P]enal [I]nstitutions and a vast number of inmates are eligible to apply for parole but many [is] shying away because it is a waste of time applying. As it stands our parole system is at the pinnacle of inefficiency and is squeaking and sputtering along with a few inmates being granted parole (personal communication, January 7, 2005).

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I need to get my parole so that I could take care of my family like my son my mother and other wonderful things I would like to do (#10)

The unfair parole system, the injustice system, lack of true rehabilitation programmes, every able-bodied mentally competent inmates should be gratefully [gainfully] employed while in prison. Those who can be trust[ed] to work outside the prison should be allowed to: thus changing the mindset of robbing etc, to survive. (36)

As a first time prisoner I would like to get parole to go and see my daughter (37)

What can the public and private sector and the church do to help inmates while in prison and when leaving prison to make sure they don’t go back to a life of crime?

And I mean meaningful help as all I see is pure lip service and no action. Check the returning rate for confirmation. When inmates leave prison no one cares if they eat or drink or where they live. And the parole system is just not working, the government and the correctional service cries for overcrowding everyday and hundreds of inmates [Is] eligible for parole yet they are not being granted parole even after meeting all the criteria. (63)

The prison condition is bad; we need parole for inmates (90)

I don’t know if there is anything that I have left out but as you are asking I was wondering if there was a chance of me getting parole or early release because of my age and my health. (106)

A newspaper report lauding a participant of DCSJ’s Rehabilitation through Music programme reiterates the lack of access to parole even after eligibility:

Jah Cure, who was transferred to the Tower Street Adult Correctional Centre from the St Catherine Adult Correctional Centre two years ago, had his application for parole turned down last year despite a passionate campaign by concerned friends, family, and entertainers. He had become eligible for parole on July 28, 2003 (It’s Jah Cure).

In addition to lack of access to parole, a concern raised by inmates is that after their application, they have no knowledge as to its status. Those who have been refused are not provided a reason for denial neither is there provision for a timely decision for those who have been adjudicated. Thus specific concerns raised by inmates include:

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• The inordinate time taken in the processing and sitting after submission of an application. • The level of refusal to granted parole where inmates meet set criteria. • The deafening silence as to the reasons for the denial of one’s application. • With the exception of inmates doing life sentence, it is customary for one to be granted parole with three months or less before the sentence is completed. Although eligibility for parole is after one- third the sentence has been served, the parole process takes up more than three quarters of a sentence. • The re-trial like setting of the Parole Board. The Parole Board is given a trial transcript and is asked to make a judgement on someone they have not met. The Board’s decision is made without proper and sufficient investigation of the maturity, rehabilitation and personal development of the applicant. A hearing convened without the applicant can negatively bias the outcome for applicants. • The rule allowing the Commissioner of Corrections or his nominee to singularly interview applicants prior to the sitting of the Board, raises concerns of impartiality since the Commissioner or his designee also sits on the Parole Board which creates the perception of the opportunity to unduly influence the Board. • The system is shrouded in secrecy; consequently there is difficulty in accessing very basic information.

Inmates were also concerned about the weight given to victim impact statements. In a situation where no mechanisms exist to assess the content of such statements, in a Jamaican environment where few victims are willing to ‘forgive,’ where human rights activists are denigrated, and where punitive outcomes such as the resumption of death penalty is advocated, inmates perceive the parole hearing as being in violation of the rules of fundamental justice. What then are the provisions for parole? The Parole Act [Acts 8 of 1978, 14 of 1992 S. 5] outlines the conditions under which an inmate may leave the adult correctional centre in which he/she is serving a sentence and spend a portion of the period of that sentence outside of the correctional centre. Section 3(1) of the Act establishes a Parole Board with the functions of the Board outlined in Section 4 (a-g). Section 5(A) provides judicial review of death sentences that have been commuted to life stating that ‘a Judge of the Court of Appeal shall determine whether the person should serve a period of more than seven years before becoming eligible for parole and if so, shall specify the period so determined.’ Eligibility for parole is outlined in Section six subsections one thru 5(b). Section 6(1) states that ‘every inmate serving a sentence of more than twelve months shall be eligible for parole after having served a period of one-third of such sentence

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or twelve months, whichever is the greater.’ Section seven, articulating conditions for the granting of parole, reads ‘an inmate eligible for parole pursuant to section six, may make written application to the Board for the grant of parole and may make such written representations in support thereof as he thinks fit.’ Subsection five creates in-camera hearings but makes provisions for granting permission to applicants to appear. Subsection six outlines the factors to be taken into account in deciding to grant parole. Section 7(7) (a–c) states the conditions that should be satisfied in the granting of parole. Section eight clearly states that the decision to grant parole should be communicated to the applicant within ten days of the date of the decision. However, the Act does not stipulate the period within which that decision should be made, neither does it make provisions to communicate the reason for refusal. Nonetheless, Section 15 makes provisions for re-application ‘after the expiration of twelve months from the date of the refusal or such lesser period as may be determined by the Board.’ With such clear articulation of the Parole process, what hinders conferring parole? First, there is no set time in which an application is processed, a sitting granted, or refusal communicated.

TABLE 15.1 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, JAMAICA PAROLE DATA, 1995–2005

Years 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Number of 180 183 150 172 221 212 201 165 164 183 286 Applications Number 65 57 45 62 71 73 71 53 38 55 Granted Parole 55 Number 69 71 53 70 62 44 38 57 53 77 89 Refused Number 07 01 04 03 01 01 01 06 00 02 01 Recalled *Number Completed 105 71 52 24 24 13 31 29 42 12 13 Successfully

*Only include closing reports that were received Source: personal communication from Richard B. Reece/ Planning and Research Unit, Department of Correctional Services. February 1, 2006.

As evidenced by inmates’ discourses, not only does parole hold potential for facilitating rehabilitation, its use could significantly reduce prison overcrowding.

OVERCROWDING

Overcrowding is another factor that fuels inmates’ advocacy for increased access to parole. For example, St Catherine Adult Correctional Centre formerly St Catherine’s District Prison and Tower Street Adult Correctional Centre formerly

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Kingston General Penitentiary, remain severely overcrowded. Having been built for 650 and 850 inmates respectively, both facilities have more than doubled their built capacity. Inmates’ concerns about overcrowding are supported by external reports. In October 1997, the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee reviewed Jamaica’s report on its implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The committee noted that serious deficiencies subsist in the administration of [Jamaica’s] prison system. Reports by several organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International 2002, 2001, 1999, 1997, 1993 and PERF 2001, have described Jamaica’s prison conditions as dismal. Amnesty International (1997) notes that the prisons and other facilities where people are deprived of their liberty remain overcrowded and in substandard conditions, fall well below international minimum standards and constitute violations of Articles ten and seven of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Amnesty International in its 1997 report writes:

Amnesty International is concerned about conditions in pre-trial detention facilities and prisons in Jamaica which, in some instances, are so poor that they amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The poor state of conditions of confinement has been the subject of both internal investigations and reports by human rights bodies and organisations over a number of years. Indeed, in a number of cases, the Human Rights Committee has concluded that the conditions of confinement in various places where people are detained and imprisoned in Jamaica violate Articles ten and seven of the ICCPR.

The overcrowded and cramped quarters can be gleaned from the shoes left outside the partition and the number of arms pushed through the bars. The government has acknowledged that there is need for new facilities with announcement of the imminent start of construction of the facility made several times. Work on the US$71.2-million maximum security facility should have started in 2001. To date, the prison has not been built and the correctional facilities remain squalid, over-crowded centres into which, on the evidence, contraband is easily smuggled. (http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/html/20050403t220000- 0500_78065_obs_of_promises_unfulfilled_and_prison_breaks.asp)

REHABILITATION: DOMESTICATED CATS OR LIONS?

Is DCSJ achieving its mandate to rehabilitate? There is incongruence between official and inmates’ discourses regarding the extent to which rehabilitation is taking place. While the department boasts of several programmes, such as the Rehabilitation through Music programme at Tower Street Adult Correctional Centre, the tailoring programme at South Camp, or the Students Expressing Truth Computer Program (SET), these programmes lacked the capacity to handle and/ or serve the majority of inmates. Also, programmes are not offered consistently

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at all facilities and sometimes, programmes that work are cancelled. For example in 2002, all external work release programmes were suspended for more than a year after an inmate, serving a life sentence for non-capital murder, had escaped while on a work site. Because of the convenience sampling, the majority of survey participants were involved in rehabilitation (education) programmes, yet there was consensus among participants that rehabilitation is minimal because very few inmates participate in rehabilitation programmes. Only a small percentage of all inmates benefit from rehabilitation programmes.

There need to be a lot more emphasis placed on rehabilitation for the inmates. Without which, take into consideration the overcrowding and violence in the prisons, the authorities are in essence locking up domesticated cats and releasing lions. (69)

Yes, there is not much rehabilitation going on inside this prison. (89)

Stagnation has taken its toll on me in this facility. I’ve never lounged around so idly before. As an industrious individual, with an eager pursuit for more and better knowledge of any capacity, I’m definitely being stifled here. And being refused a transfer to a rehabilitation centre (as a result of tardy administration) I’m unable to exercise or impart my true knowledge and potentials. Major retrogression. Rehabilitation needs to be implemented in this facility. There are too many idle hands here and you and I know what they say the devil does with that! Inmates with a minimal sentence remaining need to go out and work in assisting with gradual re-integration into society. Low risk inmates need to be properly screened and assessed and transferred to other facilities to ease overcrowding. This facility designed to house 800 inmates, has at present muster of 1750+ the entire judicial system and correctional service needs to be revamped. (101)

Factors precipitating riots are an insensitive prison administration, neglected inmate demands, violent lifestyle of prisoners carried over to prison, dehumanising prison conditions such as overcrowding and lack of individual expression and power vacuums created when changes in administration of prison creates power vacuum, a transfer of influential prisoners to other prisons and court ordered injunctions that change daily routine (From Gaines and Miller, Criminal Justice in Action: The Core, 2nd Ed.) Prison riots are indicative of prisoners’ dissatisfaction. The Deprivation Model suggests that the stressful and oppressive conditions of prison life lead to aggressive behaviour on the part of inmates. Overcrowding leads to increased levels of misconduct and violence emerges as a means to relieve tension. Harsh prison conditions can cause tension to build among inmates until it eventually explodes in the form of mass violence (Gaines and Miller, Criminal Justice in Action: The

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Core, 2nd Ed.). For example, in March 2004, with the population at Tower Street Adult Correctional Centre reaching 1,687, inmates citing poor living conditions, lack of proper rehabilitation programmes and overcrowding at the facility, went on a four-day hunger strike. Similarly, in April of 2005, there was another ‘deadly prison riot’1 in which a warder and three inmates died, and others including a visitor injured. The 1997 Condom Riot may be considered an exception to riots precipitated by the physical conditions of the detention facilities. What became known as the Condom Riots arose from a proposal to distribute condoms in the prison system to both inmates and guards as a method of halting the spread of Human Immuno- deficiency Virus (HIV), the virus that causes Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). In a society that is admittedly homophobic, this proposal was interpreted by both inmates and correctional officers as casting aspersion on their sexuality. The warders withdrew their services, demanded a public apology and the resignation of the Commissioner. An outcome of the reduction in prison staff was that 14 inmates lost their lives and 50 were seriously injured. Barnes (2004, 227) discusses the irony of the condom riot noting that the intent of the proposal was misinterpreted by both warders and inmates who felt that it connoted that all were homosexuals and ‘that inmates and warders were, together engaged in homosexual activities.’ An outcome of this riot is that inmates labelled ‘homosexuals’ currently share facilities with mentally ill inmates. In June 2006, facilities were again under riot watch, precipitated by recommendations for the introduction of condoms. Given the physical condition of the facilities and the prevalence of factors precipitating riots, the department and its residents are to be commended that there are so few riots. A fortress in Cape Coast, Ghana, West Africa which was used to warehouse individuals prior to being shipped on the Middle Passage, has written over the last door through which Africans exited the fortress and entered the ship that would take them across the Atlantic the words ‘Door of no return’. A sign on the inside main gate of one of DCJS’s adult correctional centres proclaims ‘None shall escape.’ Juxtaposed, both statements form a poignant descriptor of the warehousing conditions in Jamaica’s correctional facilities. That is, the mass of individuals warehoused in ‘correctional’ facilities in Jamaica, as elsewhere, invoked images of the conditions under which individuals were transported into slavery. The connection with slavery and the colonial period is more than ephemeral, as one or perhaps two of DCSJ facilities were slave reception centres. Concerns have consistently been raised about the physical structures that serve as correctional facilities. Fort Augusta, the island’s only adult female facility, located in the parish of St Catherine, commenced construction in 1740 and was completed in the 1750s. Built along with several forts on the island, Fort Augusta was one of eight forts built in the eighteenth century to protect Jamaica’s capital city. Named in honour of the mother of King George III, the fort fell into disrepair

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with the fall of the British Empire (http://www.jnht.com/forts/augusta.html). It was subsequently re-commissioned as a female prison. (Tortello. http://www.jamaica- gleaner.com/pages/history/story0049.htm). St Catherine Adult Correctional Facility and Tower Street Adult Correctional facilities, other maximum security institution that combined, house the majority of inmates, both predate Fort Augusta’s construction. While reports continue to bemoan abysmal conditions of Jamaica’s detention facilities, these facilities have not been decommissioned. Both the Minister with responsibility for prisons and Heads of DCSJ concur there is need for reforms such as the alleviation of overcrowding in prisons. Proposals for reform include repairing existing institutions so that there can be more habitable space; the reclassification of prisoners to allow for transfers from maximum security to low- risk facilities; and the building of a new prison. All three options for addressing the physical structures are problematic. First, repairing existing institutions to meet minimum standards would require considerable resources. Second, reclassification of low risk inmates without habitable alternatives for housing in no way ameliorates abysmal living conditions. Finally, the Jamaican government has been unable to afford to build a new prison, and has been unable to entice investors to a BOOT (build, own, operate, transfer) arrangement. For inmates, parole offers is a more realistic option for alleviating overcrowding. Gondles, J R (2003) in an Editorial for Corrections Today echoes this sentiment. Discussing correction’s role in re-entry and reintegration, Gondles (2003, 6) argues that correctional administrators have not been immune from fiscal crises that have necessitated governmental cuts. He identifies three options for managing the fiscal cuts: (1) a reduction in institutional spending which would compromise security for inmates and staff, (2) a reduction in the already ‘threadbare’ programming expenses and, (3) to more realistically manage prison populations by (a) limiting the number and length of stay of those entering and (b) removing individuals from the system. He contends that parole provides an excellent mechanism for prison population management. Of the three options advocated by DCSJ, the only realistic option is removing individuals from the system through the parole granting mechanism. While parole can facilitate re-entry and reintegration, it is not inherently rehabilitative.

RE-ENTRY AND REINTEGRATION

Visher and Travis (2003) make a distinction between re-entry and reintegration. Re-entry is defined as ‘the process of leaving prison and returning to the community’ (p. 90). Consequently, all who are released experience re-entry. Re- entry, they argue, is a fact for these individuals; it is neither a legal status nor a form of supervision (p. 90). Reintegration, defined as ‘an individual’s reconnection with the institutions of society, is both a process and a goal’ (Visher and Travis

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2003, 91). While re-entry and reintegration experiences vary by individual characteristics, family and peer relationships, community context and state policies (p. 91), reintegration does not always happen. The expansion of the prison industrial complex in many societies has resulted in greater number of individuals being incarcerated. The increased rate of incarceration produces larger numbers of individuals in need of rehabilitation, re-entry and reintegration. That is, except for the small percentage who are executed or die from natural causes, ‘they all come back’ (Travis 2005, Visher and Travis 2003) and when they do, there are political, economic and social consequences (Petersilia 2001) for families and communities (Seiter 2002). Petersilia (2001) discussing returnees in the United States (US), identifies several issues that confront prison releasees as they return to the communities. A study by the Vera Institute of Justice in New York City of 88 randomly selected inmates released from city jails in 1999, identified a number of these issues including finding housing, creating ties with family and friends, finding a job, addressing alcohol and drug abuse, continued involvement in crime, and the impact of parole supervision. Most offenders end up living with families or friends until they find a job, accumulate some money, and then find their own residences. For most releasees, their age at release, lack of employment at time of arrest, and history of substance abuse problems all make it difficult to find a good job. Release is a stressful time, and many ex-inmates relapse into drug or alcohol abuse (Seiter 2002). Seiter (2002) describing the US situation notes:

With significantly larger caseloads, parole officers have little time to focus on the offender as an individual, or provide counselling or referral to community agencies. As a result, officers have little choice but to concentrate on surveillance, and the impersonal monitoring of offenders…. Whether because of tougher parole and release supervision with minimal tolerance for mistakes or the failure of the system to prepare inmates for release, an increasing number of inmates being released are re-incarcerated as parole and release violators…. The emphasis on surveillance of community offenders results in a trend to violate releasees for minor technical violations, as administrators and parole boards do not want to risk keeping offenders in the community. If these minor violators later commit a serious crime, those deciding to allow them to continue in the community despite technical violations could face criticism or even legal action.

Do Jamaican inmates experience similar or better outcomes than their US counterparts in re-entry and reintegration? The Jamaican prison population has increased over the last decade and prisoner re-entry is a direct correlate of imprisonment trends. Releasees from Jamaican jails face the problems of re-entry into society. A report by the Police Executive Research Foundation (PERF) commissioned by the American Chamber of Commerce notes, those being released from Jamaican jails may be far less ready to re-enter society as Jamaican

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confinement does little to prepare prisoners for release. (http://www.jamaica- gleaner.com/gleaner/feature/perf/page3.html). Recidivism is one indicator of problems of re-entry and reintegration. Consequently, not all people who re-enter society experience successful reintegration. After release from institutions, prisoners will either stop committing crimes (desistance) or continue committing them (recidivism). One measure of successful reintegration would be desistance. However, a US national study indicates that within three years, seven of ten persons will have been arrested and half will be back in prison (p. 92). Within California, recidivism rate is 60 per cent. Recidivism rate in Jamaica increased from 24 per cent in 2003 to 29 per cent in 2004. See Table 15.2.

TABLE 15.2 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES JAMAICA RECIDIVISM RATE, 2001–04

YEAR 2001 2002 2003 2004 Recidivist Recidivist Recidivist Recidivist Males 436 498 550 628 Females 8 8 1 5 Total 444 506 551 633 Re-offending rate 18% 19% 24% 29%

Source: compiled from information at http://dcsj.net/p/stats.htm

It is interesting therefore that, in 2004, with an increase in the prison population, overcrowded facilities and deplorable prison facilities, the Commissioner of Corrections announced a significant financial savings within the DCSJ — the Department of Corrections saved $126m in 2004.

DISCUSSION: REFORM – DE FACTO OR DEJURE?

An examination of an inmate’s discourse contradict official discourse and leads one to conclude that despite the change in philosophy and the subsequent re-labelling of persons, roles and facilities, rehabilitation is an ideal rather than a reality. The transition from prisons to adult correctional centres should be seen as part of what Pratt (2002) characterises the sanitisation of the penal language. Similarly, Edelman (1988) labels the process mystification. Like Pratt, Edelman highlights the importance of language and notes that an analysis of politics and [policy] ‘must begin with language that highlights the controversial perspectives inherent in these terms and calls attention to the social formations they conceal’ (Edelman 1988, 120). For Edelman, [political spectacles] help to politicise the public and so keep it

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both apprehensive and hopeful. Consequently, despite the general notion of a sanitisation of the penal language, one must question whether the Department has been ‘given basket to carry water?’ That is, is the Jamaican environment conducive to the implementation of alternative sanctions? Studies considering the rehabilitative potential of various sanctions have concluded that rehabilitation is less likely in prison environments, and more feasible in community settings. Consequently where the option to avoid the criminogenic prison environment, maintain employment, enhance bonds with family members and friends, rehabilitation is more feasible and non-custodial sanctions may be more beneficial in the long run for society. The United Nations Global Report on Crime and Justice finds that ‘for serious crimes, prison is the universal sanction, applied more than any other punishment, and regardless of the legal system or level of development of a country [however] public attitudes to punishment generally conform to the actual sentencing options available’ (http://www.uncjin.org/Special/c4.html). Nonetheless, incarceration has become the epitome of punishment and individuals are often dissatisfied when the dispensation of punishment does not include this punishment option. Within the Jamaican context, populace and politicians now advocate a resumption of hanging as a crime control mechanism. Thus, rather than seeing prison, or the suspension of liberties as the punishment, the perception exists among many citizens that individuals are sent to prison to be punished. Imprisonment or the imposition of death is rationalised as representing justice for victims. Consequently, many citizens see non-custodial programmes as leniency and the absence of justice. Within a punitive environment, rehabilitation becomes constructed as leniency and the absence of just desserts. Societal responses to rule breaking is best understood in relation to general justifications for punishment. A number of researchers have examined how the public perceives and justifies sanctions. Research on public attitudes toward different sanctions has centred on an examination of how the public perceives various sentencing alternatives with questions addressing how the public perceives criminal justice sanctions, public support for the death penalty, and support for one type of punishment for certain types of offenders and support for specific alternative sanctions. Other researches have examined sanctions such as the death penalty and how members of the public justify incarceration. There has not been an examination of public justification of punishment in Jamaica, neither is there research on how members of the Jamaican public justify punitive sanctions. However, a public opinion poll conducted in 2001 found little support among Jamaicans for constructing new prisons. This opposition, however, was rationalised on the premise that priority should be placed on providing means of prevention rather than increasing allowance for incarceration. Of those who supported the construction of new prisons, 18.9 per cent did so for

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punitive reasons. Of the three reasons, 38.9 per cent supported new facilities to ease overcrowding while 22 advocated it as a crime reduction mechanism. Punishment justification research has identified five punishment philosophies: specific deterrence, general deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution (Schmallager 2005). A full understanding of these justifications promotes a better appreciation of the degree of support the public has for alternative punitive sanctions. The concept of specific deterrence has its roots in the works of Cesare Beccaria’s classic, On Crimes and Punishments (1963/1767), wherein he posits that punishment should be swift, certain and severe. Assuming a utilitarian and hedonistic calculus, Becarria posits that if sanctions just outweigh the pleasure of the crime, then offenders will be less likely to commit future criminal acts. Rational choice is the underlying tenet of specific deterrence views of punishment. However, the extent to which a person is specifically deterred is not easily assessed (Schmallager 2005). Wherein specific deterrence is supposed to prevent an individual from committing a crime, the principle of general deterrence posits that punishing offenders should prevent other members of society from offending. Deterrence arguments are most often invoked in support of the death penalty. However, both specific and general deterrence are difficult to measure. Rehabilitation is another important function of the criminal justice system. It is similar to specific deterrence in its focus on altering the future behaviour of the offender. However, where deterrence is achieved through punitive means, rehabilitation is achieved through ‘treatment’. Incapacitation, another important function of the criminal justice system, refers to the degree that crime is reduced, and society is kept safe by keeping offenders away from the general public. According to Zimring, Hawkins and Ibser (1995), support for incapacitation as a punishment justification emerged in the seventies and eighties, not because of any solid beliefs about its benefits, but out of frustration with other forms of punishment and their justifications. The fifth justification for punishment is retribution. Retribution advances the principle of lex talonis or an eye for an eye, consequently, justifications based on retribution are based on the belief that offenders deserve punishment and society has a moral obligation to punish them (Schmallager 2005). Other studies suggest that retributive ideals are more about revenge than about ‘just deserts’ (Finckenauer 1988). Although some jurisdictions have implemented correctional reforms such as non-custodial community sentences, punishment remains the central tenet underpinning societal responses to conduct norm violations. Punishing those who violate society’s rules satisfies a desire for vengeance. Thus, retribution remains the most popular punishment justification and incarceration is the most frequently used punishment option. Incarceration as the primary mode of punishment developed as a more humane way to address societal transgressions, its primary

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purpose was to replace death which was being used capriciously, often for minor violations (Pratt 2002, Foucault 1979). Pratt (2002, 15–16) notes that the end of public executions ‘proved to be the defining moment in the development of punishment in the civilised world.’ As part of the civilising process, punishment shifted from public purview to be administered in private. It also incorporated what Pratt labelled ‘a longer route towards the complete prohibition on punishments to the body in the civilised world’ (Pratt 2002, 15). As a form of punishment, incarceration was intended as a more humane way to address some of the incivilities and capricious nature of punishments meted out to individuals who had violated conduct norm violations. Incarceration is a hallmark of punishment in the civilised world but:

formal language of punishment came to be sanitised: stripped of the emotive, pejorative force that its infliction might invoke in favour of one that spoke of punishment in more neutral, objective scientific terms (p 81)…in the formal language of punishment, punishment itself had been considerably diluted. It was now difficult to find traces of it in a language dominated by references to treatment and rehabilitation, therapeutic institutions and correctional services (Pratt 2002, 95).

Garland (1990, 3) citing Douglas (1986) states ‘our taken-for-granted ways of punishing have relieved us of the need for thinking deeply about punishment and what little thinking we are left to do is guided along narrowly formulated channels.’ For Garland, (1990, 3):

we are led to discuss penal policy in ways which assume the current institutional framework, rather than question it – as when we consider how best to run prisons, organize probation, or enforce fines, rather than question why these measures are used in the first place.

So entrenched are the current taken-for-granted penological options that certain questions no longer arise. Thus, Garland advocates a sociology of punishment to explore relations between punishment and society from outside ‘penological functioning’ and by so doing, constructs and understands issues of punishment as a ‘distinctive set of social processes situated within a wider social network’ (1990, 10). Has the Department been given basket to carry water? That is, is the Jamaican environment conducive to the implementation of alternative sanctions? For Pratt (2002) civilisation has brought on a slew of incivilities, including the return to formerly extinct punitive methods as embodied in the populist punitive turn now evident in many societies. The punitive turn thesis is described as a resurgence of, or emergence in, punishment previously thought to be uncivilised. Was the

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civilising impulse weak, non-existent, broke with earlier traditions of humanity in the treatment of criminals or was there a continuity of moral captivity and barbarity that enable current debased forms of treatment in ex-slave societies? A recasting of the discussion leads one to question whether rehabilitation was ever a mandate in ex-colonial societies such as Jamaica. This requires an analysis of historical modes of punishment in ex-slave society. Paton (2001) examining the application of law, and by extension punishment, to the bodies of slaves in eighteenth century Jamaica by judicial and penal institutions, found that the Jamaican court system centred on the division of the population into free and enslaved. The dual court system was formally sanctioned by Slave Codes that explicitly declared that ‘Negroes’ were a ‘heathenish, brutish, uncertain and dangerous kind of people.’ Although slaveholders had the right to discipline slaves, the slave courts were used to present an ultimate threat rather than to sustain everyday discipline. The slave courts and the punishments privately ordered by slaveholders worked together to name slave resistance as crime, an essential requirement for the ideological reproduction of a slave society. These courts operated a severe system of trial and punishment with punishment that focused intensely on the bodies of those it convicted of crime. These punishments were brutal and violent. The slave court made frequent use of mutilatory punishments and substantial use of transportation as a punishment. Paton notes that in Jamaica, a popular association between flogging and enslaved status developed over time, and flogging was by far the most commonly used punishment. While whipping was generally carried out with the convict tied to the back of a cart and whipped along a specified route, a frequently used punishment remained to be ‘hanged by the neck until dead’. Sentences involving mutilation were presented in detailed and finely calibrated language, often moving beyond even this level of horrifying specificity to give instructions about what was to be done with the removed body parts. ‘Drawing on Spierenburg, Paton argues that [punishment] involved the public infliction of pain on the body of the convict wherein the spectacle of suffering was achieved through the permanent marking of the slaves’ bodies as well as through the scene of the punishment itself’ (Paton 2001). Using the courts entailed some risk for slaveholders, opening a space over which they did not have complete control. Thus Paton argues that since a major function of the slave laws and the slave courts was to enforce the subordination and deference of slaves to white people as a group, using the court served several purposes including to reassure neighbours that slaves’ wrongdoings were taken seriously and also to reaffirm the principle of the slaveholder’s disciplinary power over the slave. Slave law backed up and legitimated the private power of slave owners. Thus, historically, punishment in the Jamaican context was barbaric, calibrated and did not make much provision for rehabilitation. It is not unreasonable to

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assume that contemporary crime processing system inherited aspects of colonial practices including the systemic, symbolic carefully managed spectacle that implied, rather than actualised, the right of each person to be treated with dignity. In addition to the carefully managed spectacle, the Jamaican system inherited from the colonial period, three facilities currently being used as ‘adult correctional centres’.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

An examination of Department of Correctional Services, Jamaica’s mandate to rehabilitate and thereby reduce crime and overcrowding reveals there has been no fundamental changes in the delivery of custodial services and/or programme availability. While there are several programmes, very few inmates benefit. Access to many programmes such as Tailoring at South Camp, is very competitive. Programmes such as SET and the Rehabilitation through Music programmes are new, using technology to provide inmate with skills. These programmes are not the same as those available/offered under the old paradigm, nonetheless, access is limited. And even with greater access, not everyone is musically gifted or adept at computers. According to DCSJ ‘[w]hen achieved, rehab will impact positively on morale, discipline, reduce crime and overcrowding’. The wide-scale rehabilitation promised has not materialised neither has there been a reduction in overcrowding. Instead, recidivism rate and the population continue to increase. With respect to changes done to the physical facilities, damages wreaked by hurricane necessitated repair, nonetheless, the three maximum security facilities remain decrepit and there does not seem to be any imminent start date for construction of new facilities. Should Correctional services reforms be viewed simply as sanitisation of the penal language or is it a victim of wider societal concerns? DCSJ’s paradigmatic shift to rehabilitation coincided with societal environment of reduced financial resources, where high rates of homicide have spawned fear of crime leading the populace to advocate ‘tough on crime’ measures. Hence, within Jamaica, the problem can be constructed as one in which fear of crime has propelled policy changes that resulted in an increase in the number of persons incarcerated. Consequently, despite a philosophy of rehabilitation, the correctional process has de-emphasised release preparation in favour of emphasising risk management. Thus, another effect of the fear of crime is a change in release decisions and processes with shift in community supervision from helping and counselling to risk management. The Jamaican situation can thus be described as one in which rehabilitation is more symbolic rather than operational, DCSJ is an agency with rehabilitation as a stated goal, but the policy environment endorses more punitive responses that are turning domesticated cats into lions; a paradox.

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REFERENCE

After-Care Programme Licence, Hostel Placement and Statutory Supervision and Parole Act (1978) Amnesty International.2002, Annual Report – Jamaica. http://web.amnesty.org/web/ ar2002.nsf/amr/jamaica!Open 2001, Killings and Violence by Police: How Many More Victims http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR380032001 1999, Annual Report – Jamaica. http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/amr38.htm 1998, Annual Report – Jamaica. http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/amr38.htm 1997, Annual Report – Jamaica – A Summary of Concerns – Briefings for the Human Rights Committee. web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR380071997?open&of=ENG-JAM Barnes, Ann-Marie. 2004. Prison Revolts Jamaican Style: A Foucauldian Analysis. In Crime and Criminal Justice in the Caribbean. Anthony Harriott, Farley Brathwaite & Scott Wortley . eds. Kingston, Jamaica: Arawak Publications. Beccaria, Cesare. 1746. ‘On Crime and Punishments in John Muncie’, E. MacLaughlin and M. Lagnan (eds) Critical Perspectives: A Reader. London: Sage. Beckett, Katherine and Sasson, Theodore. 2004. The Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America. 2nd Edn. Thousand Oaks. Calif: Sage. Corrections Act (The). The Laws of Jamaica Acts 9 of 1985; 1 of 1995 Crime (Prevention) Act. Cap 305. Acts 42 of 1963, 9 of 1972 Sch. Crime Peace & Justice In Jamaica Beatings are the prime method for behavior modification in our prisons. www.jamaica-gleaner.com/pages/crime/crime2.html Criminal Justice (Administration) (Amendment) Act, 2005 Criminal Justice Reform Act. The Laws of Jamaica Act 7 of 1978/6 of 2001 Criminal Records (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act. The Laws of Jamaica Act 18 of 1988/24 of 1993 Dangerous Drug Act. The Laws of Jamaica (28 of 1954, 1 of 1961, 31 of 1961, Acts 10 0f 1964,9 of 1972 Sch. 16 of 1974, 12 of 1985, Sch 17 of 1987, 21 of 1987) Davis, Danny K., Released and No Place To Go, Corrections Today, 01902563, Aug 2003, Vol. 65, Issue 5. Department of correction saved $126m last year, Ann-Margaret Lim, Observer staff reporter, Thursday, June 17, 2004, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040616t220000- 0500_61339_obs_department_of_correction_saved_m_last_year.asp Department of Correctional Services. 2001. A National Rehabilitation Strategy: A Client Rehabilitation and Reintegration Strategy for the Department of Correctional Services. Kingston, Jamaica. Prepared by Planning Concepts (Management Consultants) Ontario Canada. Don Anderson Poll – Little Support for Construction of New Prison. http://www.jamaica- gleaner.com/gleaner/20010518/news/news3.html Douglas, M. 1986. How Institutions Think. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Dow, Mark. 2004. American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Drug Court (Treatment and Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act. The Laws of Jamaica. Drug Policy Alliance (nd) Barriers to Re-Entry for Convicted Drug Offender. http:// www.drugpolicy.org/library/factsheets/barriers/ Compiled by Anonymous, Drug Policy Alliance. April 2003. Earl Fearon. New Prison Boss: Too many single moms, says new prison boss. Caroline

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Turriff, Observer staff reporter – Friday, January 18, 2002. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/ news/html/20020117t210000-0500_19919_obs_earl_fearon_new_prison_boss.asp Edelman, Murray.1988. Constructing the Political Spectacle. Chicago:University of Chicago Press. Escapes and the drop in prison violence: Editorial http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/ html/20040604t210000-0500_60767_obs_escapes_and_the_drop_in_prison_violence.asp Finckenauer, J. 1988. Public support for the death penalty. Justice Quarterly, 1, 81–100. Foucault, Michel. 1979. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books Gaines, Larry K. and Miller, R. R. 2nd Edn. Criminal Justice in Action : The Core. Wadsworth Publishing Company. Garland, David. 1990. ‘Frameworks of Inquiry in the Sociology of Punishment’. British Journal of Sociology. 41(1) pp.1–15. ———. 1990. Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 2004. Concepts of Culture in the Sociology of punishment. http://research.yale.edu/ ccs/wpapers/Garland%20David%20ccsp.doc[18 Give serious thought to prison reform. Editorial. Thursday, April 15, 2004. http:// www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/html/20040414t230000-0500_58508_obs_give_serious _thought_to_prison_reform.asp Gondles, J.R. 2003. ‘Re-Entry and reintegration — What is Corections’ Role?’ Corrections Today Vol 65 (5) pp. 6. Gov’t mum on new prison site, T.K. Whyte, Observer staff reporter. Tuesday, November 04, 2003 Gov’t pushing ahead with proposed new prison: But Spanish Town businesses still opposed to location. Luke Douglas, Observer writer Monday, October 31, 2005. http:// www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20051030t230000-0500_91506_obs_gov_t_pushing _ahead_with_proposed_new_prison.asp Gun Court Act, (The). The Laws of Jamaica Act 3 of 1974 (1 of 76; 1 of 83; 6 of 1987 s.17; 14 of 1992; 9 of 1999). Homicide Continues to Drop, Glenroy Sinclair, Staff Reporter Jamaica Gleaner Online. Published Saturday, April 8, 2006 http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20060408/news/ news1.html http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20031103t230000-0500_51182_obs_gov_t_ mum_on_new_prison_site.asp Human Right Watch. Prison Projects. Prisons in Latin America and the Caribbean. http:// www.hrw.org/advocacy/prisons/americas.htm It’s Jah Cure: Music at centre of new prison rehab programme. Balford Henry, Observer writer. Friday, August 19, 2005. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/lifestyle/html/ 20050818t210000-0500_86397_obs_it_s_jah_cure.asp JAS restarting prison rehab programme. Observer Reporter Tuesday, July 23, 2002. http:// www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20020722t200000-0500_29303_obs_jas_ restarting_prison_rehab_programme.asp Lilly, J.; Cullen, Francis; Ball, Richard. 1989. Criminological Theory: Context and Consequences. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage. More released convicts turning back to crime. Arlene Martin-Wilkins, Observer staff reporter,

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Thursday, March 10, 2005. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050309t210000- 0500_76611_obs_more_released_convicts_turning_back_to_crime.asp New prison to house 5,000 males and females: Reese cagey on location, Luke Douglas Sunday Observer Reporter. Sunday, November 06, 2005. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/ news/html/20051105t210000-0500_91892_obs_new_prison_to_house _males_and_females_.asp Of promises unfulfilled and prison breaks. Editorial Monday, April 04, 2005 http:// www.jamaicaobserver.com/editorial/html/20050403t220000-0500_78065_obs_of_ promises _unfulfilled_and_prison_breaks.asp Pal, Leslie. 1997. Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times. Toronto: ITP Nelson Canada. Parenti, Christian. 2000. Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis. New York: Verso. Parole Act, (The). The Laws of Jamaica Act 8 of 1978 (14 of 1992 S. 5) Parole system under review, security minister reports. Balford Henry Observer writer Monday, May 24, 2004 http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040524t040000- 0500_60289_obs_parole_system_under_review__security_minister_reports.asp Paton, D. 2001. ‘Punishment, crime, and the bodies of slaves in eighteenth-century Jamaica’ [parish of St Andrew]. Journal of Social History v. 34 no. 4 p. 923–54 Petersilia, Joan. 2000. When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political, Economic and Social Consequences. Sentencing and Corrections. November 9. US Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. National Institute of Justice. ———. 2001. ‘Prisoner reentry: Public Safety and Reintegration Challenges’. Prison Journal. Sept 2001, Volume 81 (3) p. 360 Police Executive Research Foundation (PERF) .2001. Violent Crimes in the Corporate Area. http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/feature/perf/ Pratt, John. 2005. ‘Elias, punishment and decivilization’. In The Punitive turn: Trends, Theories, Perspectives. United Kingdon: Willan Publishing. ———. 2002. Punishment and Civilization: Penal Tolerance and Intolerance in Modern Society. London: Thousand Oaks, Calif : Sage. Prison protest lingers. T.K. Whyte, Observer staff reporter Saturday, March 20, 2004. http:/ /www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20040319t230000-0500_57411_obs_prison _protest_lingers_.asp Put convicted murderers to work, says human rights officer. Erica Virtue Sunday Observer writer. Sunday, May 21, 2006. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20060520t190000 0500_104997_obs_put _convicted_murderers_to_work_says_human_rights_officer_.asp Reiman, Jeffrey. 2005. The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice. 7th Edn. London: Allyn & Bacon. Report of the Board of Enquiry into Disturbances at the Tower Street Adult Correctional Centre and the St. Catherine Adult Correctional Centre between August 20th and 23rd, 1997. MNSJ. March 1998. Riot alert – Prison unrest looms over condom dispute. Published Tuesday, June 27, 2006 Petrina Francis, Staff Reporter, http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20060627/lead/ lead2.html. Schmallager, Frank. 2005. Criminal Justice Today: An Introductory Text for the 21st Century, 8th Edn. Prentice Hall

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Security alert at GP. Published, Thursday, March 18, 2004 http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/ gleaner/20040318/lead/lead2.html. Glenroy Sinclair, Staff Reporter. Seiter, Richard P. 2002. ‘Prisoner Reentry and the Role of Parole Officers’ Federal Probation’, Dec 2002, Vol. 66, Issue 3. Shelden, Randall. 1982. Criminal Justice in America: A Sociological Approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. Tender for new state-of-the-art prison completed – jamaicaobserver.com. http:// www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050918t200000-0500_88671_obs_ tender_for_new_ state_of_the_art_prison_completed.asp Texas judge sees pitfalls in mediation. Keril Wright, Observer Staff reporter Friday, June 02, 2006. http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20060601t230000-0500_ 105901_obs_texas_judge_sees_pitfalls_in_mediation_.asp The Corrections Act, The Laws of Jamaica (Acts 9 of 1985; 1 of 1995) http://www.moj.gov.jm/ law/view/93 The Parole Act (The Laws of Jamaica Act 8 of 1978, 14 of 1992 S.5) The Spectre of Murder. Jamaica Gleaner Online. Saturday, April 2,2005. http://www.jamaica- gleaner.com/gleaner/20050402/cleisure/cleisure.html [May 19, 2005] Tortello, Rebecca. The Story of Spanish Town. (http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/pages/ history/story0049.htm). Tower Street and St. Catherine inmates to benefit from computer training. Published Monday, April 25, 2005. http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20050425/news/news2.html Travis, Jeremy .2005. ‘But They All Come Back: Facing the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry’. Urban Institute Press. Travis, Jeremy. 2000. ‘But they All Come Back: Rethinking Prisoner Reentry’. Sentencing & Corrections. May 7. US Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. National Institute of Justice. Unfit for prison, unwanted at home: Relatives refusing newly freed prisoners unfit to plead to crimes by Erica Virtue, Sunday Observer writer Sunday, August 28, 2005. http:// www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/html/20050827t220000-0500_87065_obs_unfit _for_prison_unwanted_at_home_.asp United Nations Global Report on Crime and Justice. http://www.unjin.org/Special/c4.html United Nations Standard Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Useem, Bert and Goldstone, Jack A. Forging Social Order and its Breakdown: Riots and Reform in US Prisons’. American Sociological Review, 2002, Volume 67 pp. 499–525 Valier, Claire. 2004. Crime and Punishment in Contemporary Culture. New York: Routledge. Visher, Christy A. and Jeremy Travis. 2003. ‘Transition from Prison to Community: Understanding Individual Pathways’. Annual Review of Sociology. Vol 29 Issue 1, p.89. Warder, three inmates dead in attempted prison break http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/ 20050401/lead/lead1.html Zimring, Franklin E., Gordon Hawkins, and Hank Ibser. 1995. Estimating the Effect of Increased Incarceration on Crime in California. Berkeley: California Policy Seminar

NOTE

1. So labelled by the press.

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chap15.pmd 347 12/8/2006, 11:14 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE Sixteen

Variables INTRODUCTION

Associated Judged from a historical perspective, With Probation probation came late to Venezuela. While it Outcomes in was broadly adopted in the early 1900s, not only in common law countries, but also in Venezuela¹ many parts of Latin America (Canestri 1981), this form of penal control did not appear in Christopher Birkbeck2 Venezuela unti1 1980, following the passage of the Law on Adjudication and Conditional Suspension of Imprisonment (LACSI) (Venezuela 1979). Prior to that date, imprisonment was the norm, both for offenders undergoing adjudication and for those who had been sentenced. The LACSI signalled recognition that alternative forms of control could be used for suspects and offenders, and a grudging acknowledgement by the political system that prison conditions were less than acceptable (Bravo Dávila 1981). As its name implies, this law was designed to reduce the use of imprisonment during the two main stages of the criminal justice process. First, in certain cases the accused could apply for pre-trial release while adjudication proceeded3 thereby diminishing the critically high numbers in preventive detention. Second, some offenders could apply to have their prison sentences changed to probation. Unlike the common law criminal justice systems from which the LACSI took this second initiative, probation in Venezuela was not designed as a sentencing alternative for judges. Instead, it was a type of supervision that offenders could apply for

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once they had been convicted. Before 1979, convicted offenders could avoid at least part of their prison sentences through early release mechanisms outlined in the Penitentiary Law of 1961 (Venezuela 1961), which still exist today. Work release is available to offenders who have completed a quarter of their prison sentence; open prison for offenders who have completed a third of their sentence; and conditional release for offenders who have completed two thirds of their sentence (Venezuela 2000a). By contrast, the LACSI allowed offenders to apply for probation as soon as they had been sentenced and only required them to be in prison for as long as it took the court to make a decision4. Thus, probation made further inroads into the dominance of imprisonment in Venezuelan sentencing policy. Of the two innovations introduced in 1979, pre-trial release was undoubtedly the more radical, for it was the opening move in the assault on preventive detention. The latter is widely used in Latin America and has occasioned much criticism (Carranza 1983) that has been echoed in Venezuela by lawyers, criminologists and human rights organisations (Human Rights Watch 1997). In the 23 years since the LACSI was enacted, the fortune of probation has been closely linked to that of pre-trial release in the political battles over the role of imprisonment in penal policy. Given the lengthy tradition of classically oriented penal law and inquisitorial criminal procedure in Venezuela (of which imprisonment is an integral component), the use of alternative forms of supervision has generated social anxiety and criticism. That anxiety has been reflected, among other things, in the restrictions that were gradually placed on the use of probation. Under the LACSI, probation was available to first time offenders, convicted of crimes for which the maximum prison sentence was eight years, and who agreed to abide by the conditions imposed by the judge (at the recommendation of probation officers). Since then, the second requirement has been modified. The Anti- Corruption Law of 1982 (Venezuela 1982) only allows probation for corruption offences with maximum prison sentences no greater than two years, and the Drug Law of 1993 prohibits probation for more serious offences, such as production, trafficking or money laundering (Venezuela 1993a). The LACSI was also reformed in 1993, producing somewhat contradictory effects on probation (Venezuela 1993b). On the one hand, the scope for granting this measure was widened because the basis for defining the sentences under which probation could be granted was changed from the maximum applicable prison sentence to the prison sentence imposed. On the other, some restrictions on probation were introduced, because offenders convicted of rape, aggravated theft, aggravated robbery and kidnapping were expressly denied eligibility. The 1993 reform also streamlined the procedure for granting pre- trial release and placed the beneficiaries of this measure under the direct supervision of the court, rather than probation officers. This was a further relaxation of the rules regarding pre-trial release, but the trend toward liberalisation reached its peak in

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1998 when the new Criminal Procedure Code reversed former policy by making pre-trial release the norm and preventive, detention the exception (Venezuela 1998). This radical change met with considerable opposition from certain groups, notably the police and some politicians, who argued that the Code was soft on criminals (Poleo 2000). Fuelled by high levels of public concern over crime, the political system has recently undertaken two counter-reforms of the Code. The first reintroduced greater scope for the use of preventive detention (Venezuela 2000b), but the second represented an even greater setback for the proponents of alternatives to imprisonment (Venezuela 2001). The possibilities for ordering preventive detention were further amplified5 . Early release measures were restricted to first time offenders, and sentence reductions (or ‘good time’) only became applicable after prisoners had completed half their sentence. This reform also repealed the LACSI and created further restrictions on probation6. Currently, the latter can only be granted when the prison sentence is no greater than five years. Second, offenders must show that they have bona fide employment. Third, probation cannot be granted if the offender received a reduced sentence (greater than three years) by entering a plea bargain. The net result is that probation, which was never a common form of penal control7 is likely to become a highly exceptional one. Two concerns underlie the public criticism of alternatives to imprisonment in Venezuela. The first is that these alternatives are not punitive enough to satisfy the retributive or deterrent ideologies that are espoused by many members of society. The second is that they threaten public safety by giving offenders the chance to commit new crimes, even as they undergo adjudication or serve their sentence for a prior offence. Adequate debate of these criticisms obviously requires a comparative analysis of value systems (for example, by pitting rehabilitation against retribution), but it also needs valid and reliable information about the implementation of alternatives to imprisonment. As happens all too frequently in Venezuela (Birkbeck 1992), the recent debate and policy changes took place in an informational vacuum: almost nothing is known about the functioning and results of alternatives to imprisonment. A key issue is the extent to which they are ‘successful,’ that is, how far they are able to control offenders while under supervision and reduce recidivism rates once supervision has ceased. With regard to probation, only two prior studies have been conducted in Venezuela. In the first, Bravo Dávila (1983) examined all 178 offenders who were granted probation during the seven months following the beginning of the programme in 1980. He provided a description of the typical probationer (male, young adult, single, etc.), and also looked at the revocation rate. Only four offenders (2.2 per cent) had had their probation revoked during this period, although it should be remembered that a more valid measure of failure requires that offenders be tracked to the end of their probation terms (something that Bravo Dávila obviously could not do). In the second study, Jimenez (1988)

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examined clients on pre-trial release and probation in the Western Region8 of the country between 1981 and 1984. She found that only 0.4 per cent of clients had their pre-trial release or probation revoked by the court, but she also noted that judges often paid little attention to revocation requests from probation officers. Thus, a more telling measure of non compliance was the estimate that 4.9 per cent of clients had ceased reporting to the probation officer. Once again, however, both these figures were calculated in relation to all clients under supervision rather than those who had completed their terms.9 These modest research projects provided very limited estimates of failure rates for probation. Neither did they study the variables associated with failure, which is a subject of great relevance, not only to Venezuela, but also to comparative research on criminal justice. As the textbooks routinely report, probation was first proposed by John Augustus in the city of Boston, United States (US), and gradually became widely used in common law countries (for example, Senna and Siegel 1990). Its relative importance as a sentencing option in those countries presumably reflects a number of political conditions, such as the perceived authority of governmental institutions and the level of public trust; social conditions, such as the degree of residential stability; and operational capabilities, such as the ability to locate and monitor subjects in national or local territories. Those conditions may not necessarily hold in other regions, such as Latin America, that score low on all these variables except for residential stability and the related ability to monitor individuals in the local community. Thus, given that probation is an ‘imported’ alternative sanction in Venezuela (Canestri 1981), it is important to examine the manner in which it has functioned. Not only are we interested in failure rates, but also in the variables associated with failure, for these may reveal interesting facts about the influence of local conditions on this form of penal control (see, for example, Duffee 1990). From a comparative perspective, the benchmark for assessing the Venezuelan experience is the research on probation in the US — the country where most studies have so far been conducted. Failure rates have been one focus of interest, with widely varying findings. For example, Morgan (1993) reviewed 11 prior studies focusing on either State or Federal probationers that reported failure rates varying from 14 per cent to 52 per cent. In her own study, carried out in Tennessee, 27 per cent of probationers failed (Morgan 1994), while a North Carolina study found a failure rate of 57 per cent (Sims and Jones 1997). Part, but not all, of this variation derives from different methodological decisions regarding the definition of ‘failure’ and the period during which probationers are studied. Thus, failure may be defined as re-arrest (by either the police or a probation officer), probation revocation, or conviction for a new offence. All else equal, re-arrest is more frequent than probation revocation, which in turn is more frequent than conviction for a new offence. Similarly, the reference period may be confined to the probation term, or may include a follow-up period once probation has ended. Once again,

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the rates of re-arrest and new convictions are positively correlated with the length of the follow-up period. Given these variations, a useful figure is perhaps that prepared by the US Federal Government which, in its most recent national study of probation, found a 41 per cent failure rate, including re-incarcerations (17 per cent), absconders (three per cent) and ‘other’ unsuccessful terminations (Bonczar and Glaze 1999). Several studies have also looked at the variables associated with probation outcomes. Morgan (1994) identified eight variables in prior research that were found to be consistently linked with failure. These were: (1) gender (males have higher failure rates), (2) age (younger offenders), (3) marital status (unmarried), (4) educational attainment (fewer credentials), (5) employment (unemployed), (6) criminal history (prior arrests or convictions, (7) type of offence (property offenders) and (8) length of probation (longer probation terms). Except for age, these variables were found to be associated with failure in her own study of probationers in Tennessee. Interestingly, Morgan speculated that her findings cumulatively indicated a lower commitment to conformity among failed probationers. Basing her comments explicitly on Hirschi’s (1969) control theory of crime, Morgan argued that married and employed probationers perceive that they have much more to lose than unmarried and unemployed probationers if they are imprisoned for technical violations or for new offences. By contrast, she states, ‘With the perception that there is little to lose, many offenders are free to deviate from society’s norms and ultimately from the rules and regulations governing their conditional freedom’ (Morgan 1994, 352). Morgan’s conceptual interpretation of the variables associated with probation failure in the US represents an interesting end point for a Venezuelan case study, because it stimulates us to think about the similarities and differences between these countries in the behaviour of their probationers. En route to that end point, and using data on probation terms served in the Andean Region of Venezuela between 1980 and 2000, I provide a best estimate of the revocation rate, and follow it with a study of variables associated with probation outcomes. The results offer some useful information for the ongoing debate in Venezuela regarding imprisonment and its alternatives. They also suggest a somewhat different interpretation from Morgan’s of the conditions that generate failure on probation.

DATA AND METHODS

The data reported in this article pertain to the Andean Region of Venezuela, comprising five states. Three of the latter –— Tachira, Merida, Trujillo — cover the Andean mountain range, while the other two — Apure and Barinas — lie in the southern plains, or in Llanos10 . Two states — Tachira and Apure — border on the neighbouring country of Colombia, but only one of them (Táchira) experiences high levels of movement back and forth across the frontier. As we shall see, the

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relatively permeable nature of the frontier is of particular significance for the research findings. Information compiled by the Regional Co-ordination of the Andean probation offices indicated that 5,128 probation periods had terminated between April, 1980 and June, 2000. Terminations were classified as ‘successes’ or ‘failures,’ the latter involving new offences or technical violations (failure to comply with conditions, failure to report). Once a case was declared a failure, a report from a probation officer was submitted to the court, with a request for revocation. As found by Jimenez (1988) in her earlier study of the Western Region, the probation personnel in the Andean Region commented that in most cases these reports did not lead to any action by the court. ‘Failure’ was therefore defined in the present study as the probation officer’s assessment of non-compliance, rather than a judicial decision to revoke probation. According to figures compiled by the Regional Coordination, there had been 368 failures during the study period, representing 7.2 per cent of all probation terms. Members of the data collection team (criminology undergraduates who were specially trained for this project) visited each of the probation offices in the region and undertook a hand count of the failed cases. Discrepancies were noted in two states, where the hand count produced more cases than the Regional Coordination’s figures (11 additional cases in Barinas, 86 in Tachira); while in Trujillo some files had been lost and the hand count could not be completed. Assuming that the Regional Coordination’s figures for failures in Trujillo were correct, and adding in the 97 additional failures discovered in the hand counts in other states, I estimate that there were 465 failed probation terms in the region between 1980 and 2000, representing a failure rate of 9.1 per cent11. Just over a quarter (28.9 per cent) of the failures resulted from new offences, and two thirds (67 per cent) from failures to report. The remaining failures resulted from other technical violations. In order to collect information on variables associated with probation outcomes, data collection teams were instructed to take a random sample of ten per cent of the closed cases at each probation office. Some cases could not be collected because of lost files (in the Truijillo office), while others were subsequently dropped from the sample because of large numbers of missing variables. The final sample comprised 459 cases (8.95 per cent of all closed cases), of which 41 (8.93 per cent) were failures. Thus the proportion of failures in the sample was almost the same as the best estimate of the proportion of failures in the region. Information on probationers was compiled from two documents that appeared in each file. The first was the case evaluation report, which is a document prepared by two probation officers and submitted to the judge prior to the decision to grant or deny probation. Case evaluation reports provide a general description of the applicant’s personal and social characteristics and of the circumstances surrounding the offence. They conclude with a recommendation by the probation

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officers to grant or deny probation. Although there is no standardised model for the preparation of these reports, they typically include similar information, at least with regard to basic variables such as sex, age, educational level, employment status and so on. The second document was the registration form that is filled out by the probation officer during the probationer’s first or second visit after release from prison. The registration form is a standardised instrument with 69 items, once again covering the personal and social characteristics of the probationer together with aspects of the criminal case. Thus, the case evaluation report and the registration form provide information on offenders at a point in time that was close to the date on which they began their probation terms.12 The data collection teams used a specially designed form, with 58 items, to collect the information on each probationer in the sample (see Appendix 1 for a list of variables). Subsequent analysis revealed that some variables were not routinely collected by probation officers. For example, information regarding alcohol and drug use was only available in 37.3 per cent and 30.7 per cent of cases, respectively; only 49 per cent of the cases had information about prior periods of incarceration, and only 31.8 per cent of cases had information about physical abuse as a child. Additionally, there were many other variables for which the proportion of missing cases approached ten per cent. As we shall see, missing information placed restrictions on the multivariate modelling of probation outcomes.

RESULTS Sample Characteristics

Like other groups under penal control, both in Venezuela (Birkbeck 1996) and elsewhere (Weiss and South 1998), the probationers in this sample were predominantly poor males. Only 5.7 per cent of probationers were females. Almost half (44.7 per cent) had not completed primary education, while only 4.6 per cent had started or completed higher education. Consistent with educational level, only 5.1 per cent were business owners, professionals or administrative employees, while more than three quarters (83.5 per cent) reported low income occupations (for example, agriculture, services and unskilled work).13 Mean age at the start of supervision was 30.8 years, and one fifth (20.6 per cent) of probationers were foreigners. The most common offences were violent (45.7 per cent), followed by property crimes (38.8 per cent). Given the express exclusion of many drug offenders from the possibility of probation, it is not surprising that drug offenders represented only a small proportion (6.2 per cent) of probationers. Bivariate Analysis

Chi-square was used to detect significant associations between probation outcomes (success/failure) and other variables (p<0.05). Table 16.1 shows that 11

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variables were associated with probation failure. These can be grouped into personal characteristics (demographic and social attributes) and criminological characteristics (relating to prior criminal behaviour, the current offence and the current sentence). Taking personal characteristics first, we see that foreigners were three times more likely than Venezuelans to fail on probation. Given that most foreigners were from the neighbouring country of Colombia, it is possible that some of them simply returned home after being granted probation, presumably with the realistic expectation that there would be no legal consequences for them in their native land. Another possibility is that there was greater cultural distance between probation officers and foreign probationers, which weakened the supervisory relationship.

TABLE 16.1 VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH PROBATION FAILURE (BIVARIATE ANALYSIS)

Variable Categories X²p Failure Rate % Nationality Venezuelan 6.1% Other 18.3% .000 Living with a Single/ Living with Family Status 5.3% 12.9% .008 partner birth family No. of Children 0-2 12.9% 3 or more 3.5% .003 Residential status Home Owner 5.4% Rented/ Other 11.7% .023 Skilled/ Professional / Occupational Status Unskilled 12.9% Other Occupation/ 6.3% .028 Workman Homemaker/ Students No. Jobs Held 1-3 12.3% 4 or more 6.7% .044 Prior Arrests 0 9.1% 1 or more 22.0% .019 Offence Committed while Under the Yes 19.2% No 7.8% .047 Influence of Drugs? Prison Sentence Less than 4 years 4.8% 4 years or more 11.8% .013 Probation period Less than 2 years 1.5% 2 years or more 12.4% .019 Conditions Imposed? Yes 7.8% No 28.6% .000

In terms of living arrangements, probationers who were not living with a partner, who had fewer or no children, and who did not own a home, had higher rates of failure. These findings point to a lower level of domestic stability among failures, and presumably greater geographic mobility. Probationers who were living with partners, who had more children, and who owned or were buying their homes, were likely to be anchored much more firmly in their communities. Finally, two characteristics of employment were related with probation outcomes. Rates of failure were higher among the physical occupations (skilled/ unskilled workmen), and among those who reported fewer prior jobs. Turning to the criminological characteristics of probationers, we see that prior

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contact with the criminal justice system (in this case measured by arrests) is associated with a higher failure rate. Failure rates were also significantly higher among probationers with longer prison sentences and, accordingly, with longer probation sentences. This result could be a simple reflection of the passage of time, or it might reflect a decision by the offender that it was not worth complying with the rules of probation when the period of supervision was longer. Finally, failure rates were also higher when no conditions had been imposed on the probationer. This latter finding perhaps indicates that when conditions were not imposed, probationers were less likely to perceive that they were under effective penal supervision, thereby increasing the probability of non-compliance. Multivariate Analysis

The bivariate analyses suggest some interesting associations between personal or criminological characteristics of offenders and probation outcomes. However, multivariate analysis is also necessary if we are to examine the simultaneous effects of several variables and, more specifically, identify the best predictors of probation outcomes. Because the dependent variable in this study is dichotomous (success/ failure), I used logistic regression to test for the effects of different combinations of variables on probation outcomes. Logistic regression estimates the probability of a given outcome (in this case probation failure) for each value of an explanatory variable (Agresti and Finlay 1997). Table 16.2 shows the logit regression coefficients for probationers’ personal characteristics. Because of the large number of variables in the data set that measured personal characteristics, not all could be introduced in a given model14. Thus, analysis proceeded through an exploratory strategy that examined different combinations of variables in relation to probation outcomes. Model 1 shows the logit regression coefficients for the six personal characteristics that were found to be significantly associated with probation failure at the bivariate level. Although all of the beta coefficients have signs in the expected direction, only nationality is significantly associated with probation outcomes in this model. Thus, Venezuelans were less likely than foreigners to end probation as failures. The odds ratio indicates that the probability of failure decreased by a factor of .3205 when probationers were Venezuelans. The statistics accompanying this model indicate a very low pseudo R², or goodness of fit (.073).15 However, this is no surprise because the cases in this model include only one failure (0.42) per cent of outcomes), meaning that the dependent variable is almost a constant. A more favourable distribution of valid cases across successes and failures might have produced results that confirmed the predictive significance of at least some of the other independent variables in the model. Given the results in Model 1, subsequent analysis proceeded by taking various combinations of probationers personal characteristics and including them in the analysis (with anywhere between six and nine independent variables in a model)

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TABLE 16.2 LOGIT REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS COMPARED WITH FAILURE ON PROBATION

NOTES: Probation outcome is coded as 0=success, 1= failure Exp. (B) odds ratios are in parentheses *p<.05

in order to detect variables significantly associated with probation outcome. Seven independent variables that were significantly associated with probation failure in these exploratory analyses were then combined in a final model, which is shown as Model 2 in Table 16.2. In this model, five variables continue to be significantly associated with probation failure. Nationality once again predicts probation outcome, indicating that foreigners were more likely than Venezuelans to fail. The number of children that a probationer has, which was a significant predictor at the bivariate level and insignificant in Model 1, now becomes significant again with an effect in the expected direction. Probationers with a greater number of children were less likely to be failures. The age at which the probationer first left home is also a significant predictor of outcome: offenders who left home at an older age were more likely to fail on probation. The number of cohabiting relationships also predicted outcome: probationers who reported a larger number of such relationships were more likely to fail. Finally, a striking result is that physical illness was strongly related to probation failure. The odds ratio for that variable, by far the largest in the model, indicates that when probationers were physically ill they were 47 times more likely to fail on probation.

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Three of the five significant predictors in Model 2 point to lower levels of social obligations for failed probationers. Thus, foreigners were likely to have fewer bonds in the local community, while probationers reporting larger numbers of cohabiting relationships presumably perceived less obligations to significant others. The fact that failed probationers also had fewer or no children is also indicative of lower levels of parental obligation. A fourth predictor, the age at which the probationer left home, initially appears to contradict this interpretation, for offenders who had left home at a later age were more likely to fail on probation. However, this variable could be interpreted as an indicator of dependence on parents rather than obligations toward partners and children. The fifth predictor, physical illness, may also indicate a (temporary) relief from many social obligations, although it may simply indicate inability to comply with reporting requirements. It should be remembered that these findings derive from only 91 cases available for analysis, and the results should be treated as provisional.

TABLE 16.3 LOGIT REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR CRIMINOLOGICAL AND PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS COMPARED WITH FAILURE ON PROBATION

Model 3 Model 4 Independent Variables (Initial Variables) (Final Variables) Prior Arrests (1=yes) 1.1839 (3.2671) - Under Influence of Drugs .4876 (1.6284) - (1= with partner) Sentence (years) .0144 (1.0145) - Probation Term (years) .4234* (1.5271) - Conditions Imposed (1=yes) -2.7499* (.0639) -2.1578* (.1156) Nationality(1= Venezuelan) - -2.9527* (.0522) No. of Children - -.4389* (.6448) Age Left Home - .1762* (1.1927) No. of Cohabitation Relationships - .6359* (1.8887) No. of Jobs Held - -4989* (.6072) Constant -1.2893 -.0295 Pseudo R² -.098 .224 Overall Hit Ratio (percentage) -90.1 89.23 Model-Chi Square 17.635 37.151 Number of Cases 161 130 Number of Failures 4(2.48%) 10(7.69%) Model df 5 6

NOTES: Probation outcome is coded as 0=success, 1= failure Exp. (B) odds ratios are in parentheses *p<.05

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Turning now to the criminological characteristics of probationers, Model 3 (see Table 16.3) includes the variables that were found to be significantly associated with probation outcomes at the bivariate level. These performed relatively poorly in a multivariate analysis, for only the characteristics of the probation term continued to predict probation outcomes. Consistent with prior results, when probation terms were longer and no conditions were imposed on the probationer, failure was more likely. The pseudo R square measure indicates that the model has a very poor fit with the data. As with personal characteristics, subsequent exploratory analysis of criminological characteristics involved the selection of different combinations of up to six variables and their inclusion in a logistic regression model. Only three criminological variables showed a significant relationship with probation failure: the length of the probation term and whether or not conditions were imposed on the probationer (both of which were significant in Model 3), and prior arrests (which had also emerged as a significant predictor at the bivariate level). When these three variables were entered in a simple model (not shown here) they all remained significantly associated with probation outcome but, as in Model 3, they performed poorly (pseudo R² = .084). Thus, criminological variables only appear to play a minor role in predicting probation failure in this sample. Finally, personal and criminological characteristics were examined jointly (in varying combinations) in order to produce the best fitting integrated model of probation outcomes. The final model is shown as Model 4 in Table 16.3. This model contains six variables, all significantly associated with probation outcomes. Five variables describe the personal characteristics of probationers and four of these (nationality, number of children, age left home, number of cohabiting relationships) were significant predictors of failure in Model 2. The fifth personal variable, number of jobs held, also showed a significant bivariate association with failure (see Table 16.1). The only criminological variable in the model was conditions imposed. Consistent with the results of Model 3, failure was much less likely when conditions were imposed on probationers. Model 4 also shows that, consistent with Model 2, failure was more likely for foreigners, those with few or no children, those who had held fewer jobs, those who had left home at a later age, and those who reported a greater number of cohabiting relationships. This model included 130 cases with a failure rate of 7.69 per cent. The pseudo R2 was .224.

DISCUSSION

Prior comments in this article indicate that the foregoing results should be treated as provisional findings. The relative frequency of missing information was such as to exclude some variables from the bivariate analysis and to reduce substantially the number of cases available for multivariate analysis. If probation

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officers had been more diligent and consistent in their recording practices, the results of this study might have been different. It is also important to note that the multivariate models only show a modest fit to the data, indicating that the variables recorded by probation officers may not necessarily be the most relevant for predicting (or explaining) probation outcomes. Despite these problems, the consistencies that have been identified allow some interesting generalisations. First, it is clear that the personal characteristics of probationers were better predictors of probation outcomes than criminological characteristics. Thus, five of the six associations in the final multivariate model involved personal characteristics. Part of the explanation of this finding could be that the probationers in this sample were all first time offenders (as the LACSI required); thus, criminological variables such as the number of prior felony convictions or the number of prior probation terms (which have been found to be associated with probation outcomes in the US) were constants (zero) in the present study. The fact that prior arrests were significantly associated with probation failure in the bivariate analyses, and in some of the multivariate analyses, suggests that previous contact with the criminal justice system is a significant predictor of failure, but Venezuelan law specifically, excludes offenders who have had prior contact through convictions and sentencing. Beyond this, variables describing the probation term are of more importance in predicting outcomes than variables describing the current offence. Second, the results for this sample point to social obligations as a likely determinant of success or failure on probation. This possibility arose from the discussion of Model 2, in which nationality, living arrangements, number of children and age of leaving home were all interpreted in that framework. These variables reappear in Model 4, along with the number of jobs held and the imposition of conditions on probationers. The number of jobs held does not have an unambiguous interpretation in terms of social obligations. The fact that failure was more likely when probationers had held fewer jobs could be interpreted as an indicator of scarce contact with the labour market, and indirectly as a reflection of fewer obligations to others. However, fewer jobs could also be interpreted as an indicator of greater stability and a stronger sense of contractual obligations. Without additional information regarding the length of time spent in each job, or the reason (choice, termination) for leaving jobs, it is impossible to assess the meaning of this variable. By contrast, the imposition of conditions is entirely consistent with the notion of obligations. Under the LACSI, probationers could have been required to submit to medical or psychological treatment, attend instructional or occupational programs, undertake community work or make restitution to the victim. Any and all of these conditions represent obligations for the probationer, and Model 4 shows that failure rates were lower when such obligations were imposed. In the sample studied here, a probation ‘failure’ almost always signified the commission of a new offence that was discovered by the authorities, or a failure

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to report to the probation officer. In the first case, re-arrest and subsequent prosecution would lead to imprisonment and, therefore, almost complete physical isolation from the community. In the second case, failure to report may have occurred even as the probationer remained in the same community, but it was more probably accompanied by re-location to another community. Thus, in both cases, probation failure threatened or involved isolation from the current community. From the results, it appears that when probationers had lower levels of social obligations in their current community they were more likely to risk severing, or actually to sever, their ties there. If this interpretation of the social conditions surrounding probation failure in Venezuela is correct, it is obviously congruent with Hirschi’s (1969) control theory, which postulates a greater likelihood of criminal behaviour when bonds to the institutions of conventional society are weakened. However, it is not clear that the level of social obligations falls neatly under any of the elements of bonding - attachment, commitment, involvement, belief - outlined by Hirschi. Attachment implies sensitivity to the opinions of others; commitment, an investment in conventional behaviour; involvement, the occupation of time in conventional activities; and belief, the degree of support for the rules of conventional society. The level of social obligations may affect all of these elements of the bond, but is not identical with any of them, largely because it is a more general concept that denotes the volume of binding relations between the individual and the community.

CONCLUSION

As reported in this article, there has been much anxiety on Venezuela concerning sentences served in the community. However, the results of this study suggest that such anxiety is misplaced, at least with regard to probation. A failure rate of less than nine per cent could hardly be construed as an indicator that probation is ‘not working.’ This figure is considerably lower than failure rates found in the US, particularly when we recall that failure in this study is measured as an organisational assessment of non- compliance and not as a judicial decision leading to probation revocation or a new conviction, which is the typical measure in the US. However, it should also be remembered that probationers in Venezuela were first time offenders, whereas in the US offenders with prior convictions (who have a higher probability of failure) may be granted probation. Thus, the caution implied by restricting probation to first time offenders may well contribute to its relative success in Venezuela. Analysis of the variables associated with probation outcomes was conditioned by the availability of information in the probationers’ files, and it is possible that additional variables and fewer missing cases would produce different results. Despite these limitations, some consistency was observed in the findings, with similar variables appearing as significant predictors at both the bivariate and

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multivariate levels. Given that many of the variables in this study have not been included in US research, it is difficult to make many direct comparisons with the latter. However, the broader interpretation of the conditions leading to probation failure in Venezuela is similar, if not identical, to the conclusions reached in US studies. Thus, Morgan (1994) discusses some of her findings from Tennessee in the context of Hirschi’s concept of conformity. The data in the present study likewise suggest the relevance of Hirschi’s control theory, but the variables associated with probation failure in Venezuela point to an alternative concept: social obligations. Whether this difference reflects a different form of social bond in each country, or whether it is the result of the variables available for study there, can only be resolved by strict comparative research.

REFERENCES

Agresti, A. and Finlay, B. 1997. Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Aldrich, J. and Nelson, F. 1984. Linear probability, Logit and Probit Models. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications Araujo, R. and Garcia, A. 2001. Directorate of Custody and Rehabilitation. A Report to the Ministry of the Interior and Justice, Personal Communication. Birkbeck, C. 1992. ‘Crime and Control in Venezuela’. Crime and Control in Comparative Perspectives, ed. H.G. Heiland, L. Shelley and H. Katoh, 109–30. New York: Walter Gruyter. ———. 1996. ‘Clase, Social y Criminalizacion Diferencial: Un studioempirico referido al Area Metropolitana de Merida’. In Control Social Justicia Penal en Venezuela, ed. L.G. Gabaldon and C. Birkbeck, 153–82. Merida, Venezuela: Universidad de Los Andes. Bonczar, T. and Glaze, L. 1999. Probation and Parole in the United States. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ ascii/ppus98.text Bravo D.L. 1981. Bases para el desarrollo de un sistema de probacion en Venezuela. Caracas, Venezuela: Universidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de Ciencias Juridicas y Politicas, Instituto de Ciencias Penales y Criminologicas. ———. 1983. La ley de sometimiento a juicio y suspension condicional de la pena. Fundamentos y aplicacion del tratamiento en libertad. Caracas, Venezuela: Universidad Central de Venezuela. Canestri, F. 1981. La probacion: Metodo de tratamiento individual del delincuente. Caracas, Venezuela: Universidad Central de Venezuela, Facultad de Ciencias Juridicas y Politicas, Instituto de Ciencias Penales y Criminologicas. Carranza, E. 1983. El preso sin condena en America Latina. San Jose, Costa Rica: Instituto Latino-Americano de Naciones Unidas para la Prevencion del Delito y el Tratamiento del Delincuente (ILANUD). Duffee, D. 1990. Explaining Criminal Justice: Community Theory and Criminal Justice Reform. Prospect Heights, L: Waveland Press. Hirschi, T. 1969. Causes of delinquency. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Human Rights Watch. 1997. Punishment before Trial: Prison conditions in Venezuela. New York: Human Rights Watch.

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Jimenez, M. A.1988. La probacion: Una medida eficaz de Prevencion especial. Maracaibo: C Universidad del Zulia, lnstituto de Criminologia. Molinero, L.M. 2002. Lil regresi6n logistica (II). Asociaci6n de la Sociedad Espanola de Hipertension. www.seh-lelha.org/rlogis2.htn1. Morgan, K.1993. Factors influencing Probation Outcome: A review of the literature. Federal Probation, 57, 23–9. ———.1994. Factors associated with Probation Outcome. Criminal Justice 22, no.4: 341– 53. Oficina Central de Estadistica e Infonnatica. 1993. El Censo 90 en Venezuela. Caracas: acEI. ———. 2000. Venezuela: Estimaciones y proyecciones de poblacion, 1950–2035. Caracas: acEI. Poleo, W. 2000. Reformas del COPP y del código penal dependen ahora del congresillo. El Nacional (Caracas). Senna, J., and Siegel, L.1990. Introduction to Criminal Justice. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company. Sims, B. and Jones, M.1997. ‘Predicting Success or Failure on Probation: Factors associated with felony Probation Outcomes’. Crime and Delinquency 43, no.3: 314–27. Venezuela.1961. Ley de regimen penitenciario. Caracas: Gaceta Oficial. –——.1979. Ley de sometimiento a juicio y suspensión condicional de la pena. Caracas: Gaceta Oficial 2:529, Extraordinario. –——.1982. Ley organica de salvaguarda del patrimonio publico. Caracas: Gaceta Oficial 3:077, Extraordinario. –——. 1993. Ley organica sabre sustancias estupefacientes y psicotróP.icas. Caracas: Gaceta °licial 4:636 Extraordmano. –——. 1993. Ley de beneficios en el proceso penal. Caracas: Gaceta Oficial 4: 620, Extraordinano. –——.1998. Código organico procesal penal. Caracas: Gaceta Oficial 5:208, Extraordinario. –——. 1999. Constitución de la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela. Caracas: Gaceta Oficial 36:860. –——. 2000. Ley de refonna parcial de la ley de regimen penitenciario. Caracas: Gaceta Oficial 36:920 –——. 2000. Código organico procesal penal. Caracas: Gaceta Oficial 37:022, Extraordinario. –——. 2001. Ley de refonna parcial del código organico procesal penal. Caracas: Gaceta Oficial 5:558, Extraordinario.

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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF VARIABLES IN THE DATA FILE ON PROBATIONERS

(1) Date of application for probation (2) Date probation ordered (3) Date probation terminated (4) Type of termination (5) Reasons for revocation (6) Sex (7) Nationality (8) State where born (9) Date of birth (10) Filiation (11) Marital status (12) Religion (13) Type of housing (14) House ownership (15) Father abandoned home (16) Probationer’s age when father abandoned home (17) Mother abandoned home (18) Probationer’s age when mother abandoned home (19) Raised by (20) Reason left home (21) Age left home (22) Number of siblings (23) Position in birth order (24) Family status (25) Number of cohabiting relationships (26) Number of children (27) Educational level (28) Currently studying (29) Taken special courses (30) Main activity (31) Currently working (32) Monthly income (33) Age first started working (34) Time in current job (35) Number of jobs held (36) Mental health problems (37) Physical health problems (38) Alcohol use

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(39) Drug use (40) Physically abused as a minor (41) Sexually abused as a minor (42) Attitude toward current offence (43) Attitude toward self (44) Prior arrests (45) Prior periods in detention (46) Prior convictions (47) Zone where offence was committed (48) Participation in the offence (49) Under the influence of alcohol when committing the offence (50) Under the influence of drugs when committing the offence (51) Length of time in detention for current offence (52) Type of offence (53) Use of weapons during the offence (54) Sentence length (55) Length of probation term (56) Conditions imposed (57) General conditions imposed (58) Special conditions imposed

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, Volume 7 Nos. 1&2, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, January and July 2002, 1–26, with permission. 2. I wish to thank the following persons for their-help with the research reported in this article: Zaida Van der Dijs (formerly Regional Coordinator – Los Andes, Directorate of Custody and Rehabilitation (DCR), Ministry of the Interior and Justice); Carlina Marmolejo de Garcia (Regional Supervisor – Los Andes, DCR); and each of the co-ordinators of the Technical Prison Support Units (Probation offices) in the Andean region. Students from the fifth year (2000) at the School of Criminology, Universidad de Los Andes, collected, coded and entered the data. Marlyng Perez conducted much of the data analysis, while Solbey Morillo and Javier Rubio helped with the multivariate statistics. 3. Pre-trial release could be granted to first time offenders, accused of crimes for which the maximum prison sentence was five years, provided that they agreed to abide by any conditions laid down by probation officers. 4. Judges had 30 working days, following sentencing, to decide on applications for probation. If granted, the probation term could be no longer than the prison sentence, and could never exceed five years.

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5. For example, one of the causes that prosecutors could cite when requesting preventive detention -risk of absconding -was redefined to include ‘the behaviour of the accused prior to the offence,’ a change that allows a wide margin of judicial freedom to assert such a risk. Prosecutors were also given more time (30–45 days, instead of 20) to prepare their cases against accused who are in pre-trial detention. 6. Both of these recent (2000, 2001) reforms to the Criminal Procedure Code ran counter to the sentiment expressed in the new constitution, approved in 1999: ‘Alternatives to imprisonment shall be used in preference to imprisonment’ (Venezuela, 1999, Article 272). 7. Given the relatively restricted scope assigned to probation, it is not surprising to find that the number of probationers was quite low, even before the LACSI was repealed in November 2001. For example, figures for May 2001 indicate that there were 3,502 offenders on probation, compared to 9,368 in prison, 2,161 on work release, 3,002 in open prisons and 1,780 on conditional release (Araujo and Garcia, 2001). Probationers therefore represented 17.7 per cent of offenders under state supervision, compared to, for example, 58 per cent in the United States (Bonczar and Glaze, 1999). 8. Probation offices in Venezuela are grouped by administrative regions. The Western Region includes Falcon, Lara, Portuguesa, Yaracuy and Zulia States. 9. Unfortunately for our purposes, Jimenez does not provide a breakdown of the failure rates by type of regime (pre-trial release and probation). 10. The estimated population for each of these states in 2000 (the last year of the study) was as follows: Apure, 466,931; Barinas, 585,521; Merida, 744,986; Tachira, 1,031,158; Trujillo, 587,280 (OCEI, 2000). 11. Distribution of the failures by state was as follows: Apure, 34 (7.3 per cent of all failures); Barinas, 23 (4.9 per cent); Merida, 16 (3.4 per cent); Tachira, 335 (72 per cent); Trujillo, 26(5.6 per cent). \ 12. Once probationers were serving their term further information in their files was confined to records of contact with the probation office, probation officers’ visits to home or work, and decisions to request revocation. Thus, the timing of information gathering by probation officers allowed a predictive study, in which variables measured at the beginning of the probation term could be examined in relation to subsequent success or failure. However, the comparatively modest predictive power of the variables included in this study precluded the development of an instrument to assess the risk of failure. 13. For comparative purposes, the 1990 census (conducted approximately halfway through the study period) reveals that at national level 33 per cent of Venezuelan adults had not completed primary education, and 12.8 per cent had started or completed higher education. Sixty-one per cent of the national labour force worked in low income occupations (OCEI, 1993). 14. In multivariate analysis, cases are excluded from analysis whenever they have missing values for at least one of the variables included in a model. The relatively high frequency of missing values in the data set meant that the inclusion of many variables quickly reduced the number of valid cases from 459 to less than 100, thereby casting doubts on the reliability of the resulting models. As a rule of thumb, the number of

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variables in a multivariate model should not exceed 10 per cent of the valid cases (i.e., there should be a minimum of ten cases per variable) (Molinero, 2002). In the present study, the maximum number of independent variables introduced in the different models was nine. 15. Following Morgan (1994) and Sims and Jones (1997), the pseudo R square provides an approximate measure of the goodness of fit of logistic models. Pseudo R square is calculated as C/[C + N], where C is the model chi-square and N is the number of cases (see Aldrich and Nelson, 1984).

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Prison This research paper is derived from a baseline Recidivism in study on ‘Prison Recidivism in Trinidad and Tobago: Towards Reduction, Rehabilitation Trinidad and and Reform’ being conducted by the UWI Tobago: Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice (St. Augustine Campus) in the six adult A Baseline Study1 prisons for convicted inmates (five for males and one for females). This is the first time Ian K. Ramdhanie such a study is being undertaken in this twin- island state and more so in the wider Caribbean. Several phases comprise this pioneering project. This paper highlights some of the key findings from Phase I conducted during the period January- December 2002.

OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

There are four overall objectives of this study. These are:

(1) To gather data on the demographic, social and economic status of the prison population in the country’s adult prisons, (2) To gather data on the criminal and conviction status of such inmates, (3) To conduct risk assessments on prisoners and to examine the potential for rehabilitation and civic reintegration within society, and (4) To propose programmes and policies that can help improve the penal system and in particular reduce the rate of recidivism within the prison population.

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METHODOLOGY

To undertake this baseline research/policy study, the methodology adopted is briefly described. First, several meetings were held with the various authorities (for example, Ministry of National Security, Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service, Cabinet-Appointed Task Force on Prison Reform and Transformation, etc.). These fulfilled the primary purposes of informing the relevant personnel about the project, as well as, seeking their support for the project and gaining access to the prisons and prisoner records. Second, site visits and interviews were conducted in all six of the adult prisons for convicted inmates in Trinidad and Tobago. Third, the data collection exercise took place by our trained team of researchers in the six prisons outlined in this study. The records of all convicted inmates, a total of 4,449 inmates who were in the prisons from January 1, 2002 to May 31, 2002 were examined. This was a most challenging experience given the state of the required records at the various prisons. Fourth, most of the key stakeholders in the prison system were brought together at a special forum to discuss some of the major issues in this project - prison recidivism, reform and rehabilitation. Fifth, data analysis and the generation of results took place and finally, a comprehensive research/policy report (Deosaran and Ramdhanie 2003) with over 40 recommendations arising from our meetings, interviews, site visits, stakeholders’ forum and the data collected were submitted to the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago on March 21, 2003. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that Phase I of the study did not examine inmates in this country’s juvenile institutions, or inmates on ‘remand’ in the adult prisons. In other words, only the records of ‘convicted’ adult inmates were obtained. Inmates on ‘remand’ are those who have not been convicted by a court and therefore are presumed innocent until proven guilty. This study focused on those who were found guilty by the courts (that is, Magistrate, High and Appeal courts) and in which the sentence was imprisonment.

SELECTED OVERALL PRISON DATA FOR TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

This section provides a summary of the overall trends that emerged from the prison data for Trinidad and Tobago (for example, data on the number of persons committed to prison during the years by sex, age and type of crimes/offences is highlighted). Total Number of Persons Convicted and Sent to Prison by Sex (1988- 99)

Figure 17.1 illustrates the total number of persons convicted and sentenced to prison for the years 1988–99 by sex.

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FIGURE 17.1 NUMBER OF PERSONS CONVICTED AND SENT TO PRISON BY SEX, 1988–99

5,000

4,474 4,500 4,350

4,358 4,233 4,000 3,875 3,697 3,592

3,752 3,413 3,410 3,500 3,327 3,617 3,193 3,169 3,481 3,323 3,308 3,239 3,000 2,855 3,102 2,767 3,055

2,801 2,500 2,680

2,000

Number of Committed of Persons Number 1,500

1,000

500

114 102 123 117 116 111 54 87 91 90 88 80 0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Year

Male Female Total

Overall, there was a 26 per cent increase in the number of persons convicted and sent to prison over the 12-year period, that is, from 2,855 persons convicted in 1988 to 3,592 persons in 1999. There was, however, a peak in 1998 with 4,474 persons convicted and sent to prison. With regard to males, it followed the total distribution outlined above, that is, there was a 24 per cent increase in the number of males convicted and sentenced to prison from 2,801 in 1988 to 3,481 in 1999. However, it was much different for females in that there was a 106 per cent increase in the number of females convicted from 54 in 1988 to 111 in 1999.

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FIGURE 17.2 NUMBER OF PERSONS CONVICTED AND SENT TO PRISON BY AGE GROUP, 1991–98

2,000 1,927

1,800 1,745 1,692 1,665 1,672 1,632 1,621 1,570 1,600 1,376 17-26 years

1,400 27-36 years 1,521

1,200

1,029 1,042 37-46 1,006 years 1,120 1,000 960 957 958

800 831 805 677 621 625 600 556 Number of Persons Committed of PersonsNumber 457

400 311 47-56 years 204 189 200 128 57+ 107 113 93 84 years 51 53 29 35 43 148 21 6 0 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Year

17-26 27-36 37-46 47-56 57+

Figure 17.2 illustrates the number of inmates convicted and sent to prison for the years 1991–98 according to five age groups. For the years 1991–97, the highest number of inmates belonged to the 27–36 year age group, whilst for 1998 the highest proportion of inmates was 17–26 years old. Generally, as the ages of inmates increased, the number convicted and sent to prison decreased.

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FIGURE 17.3 NUMBER OF PERSONS CONVICTED AND SENT TO PRISON BY TPYE OF CRIME, 1990–99

1,600

1,462

1,400 1,356

1,209 Narcotic 1,200 Laws

1,023 1,023 997 966 1,000 933 910 914

919 926 796 800

669 Property 637 640 without Violence 600 562 550 505 499 498 485 475 477 520 Property 436 393 with 498 492 481 504 447 400 374 Violence

Number of Persons Committed Persons of Number 307 391 371 Persons 220 229 236 with 178 182 Violence 200 136 205 Persons 161 79 83 132 52 without 28 108 Violence 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Year

Persons with Violence Persons without Violence Property with Violence Property without Violence Narcotic Laws

Figures 17.3 and 17.4 illustrate the number of persons who were convicted and sent to prison according to type of crimes/offences committed for the years 1990-99.

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FIGURE 17.4 NUMBER OF PERSONS CONVICTED AND SENT TO PRISON BY CRIME/OFFENCE COMMITTED (1990–99)

800

766

700

604 596 600 638 618

562

529 521 500 463

445 Other Laws

400

321 314 306 305 312

300 274 264 Maint. & Aff. Number of Persons Committed Persons of Number 252 249 Arrears

208 200

157

97 91 80 Debtors 100 75 76 69 64 49 Traffic Laws 30 30 24 19 20 18 24 10 2 36 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Year Maint. & Aff. Arrears Traffic Laws Debtors Other Laws

The data revealed that for narcotic crimes/offences there was a 115 per cent increase in the number of persons who were convicted and imprisoned, that is, from 562 in 1990 to 1,209 in 1999 with a peak of 1,462 in 1998. For crimes/ offences of property without violence, there was a 16 per cent decrease in the number of persons convicted and imprisoned from 796 in 1990 to 669 in 1999. With regard to crimes/offences of property with violence there was an increase of five per cent over the period 1990–99 from 374 to 393. For crimes against persons with violence, there was a 108 per cent increase in the number of persons convicted and imprisoned from 178 in 1990 to 371 in 1999. However, the figure peaked at 520 in 1998 (see Figure 17.3).

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With regard to crimes/offences against persons without violence there was a 33 per cent decrease in the number of persons convicted and imprisoned from 161 in 1990 to 108 in 1999. It should be noted that during this ten-year period, there were several major fluctuations in the number of persons imprisoned for such acts. For instance, in 1996 and 1997, this particular offence reached a high of 926 and 914 respectively, while in 1993 and 1995 it reached a low of 79 and 83 respectively (see Figure 17.3). Figure 17.4 displays the data for crimes/offences that relate to traffic laws, debtors, maintenance and affiliate arrears, and other laws.

PRISON RECIDIVISM

According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1990), recidivism refers to the ‘tendency to relapse into a previous undesirable type of behaviour, especially crime.’ Though this definition seems uncomplicated, when it comes to its operationalisation especially in the prison context, it is not that straightforward since several competing interpretations could be made. For instance, how many additional offences should a person with a prior conviction commit to be considered a recidivist? Is it one, two, three, five, ten or more offences? In fact, can there be degrees of recidivism based on the number of times additional offences were committed? Re-offending, it should be noted, includes prison recidivism but it also includes those who commit crimes but are not incarcerated. For example, they may be fined, placed on a bond, given community service orders, etc. Further, does recidivism include the relapsing of a person with a previous conviction into committing the same type of offence previously committed or other types of offences; or does it matter what type of other offences are committed? For example, if a person with a previous conviction for a robbery offence commits rape, would this be considered recidivism or only if he commits further robbery? Then, what relapse time frame should be taken into consideration? Should a person be considered a recidivist if he/she commits another offence two years, five years, or ten years after the first offence? Three other scenarios that must be considered when deciding what recidivism measures should be used include: (1) Should recidivism consider re-arrests of persons with a prior conviction? (2) Should recidivism consider re-conviction of persons with a prior conviction? and, (3) Should recidivism consider recommitment of persons to prison with a prior conviction? As seen in the above, there is no fixed way of defining and measuring recidivism. From a perusal of the international literature on recidivism, different measures were used. For example, Baumer (1997) indicated that a review of the literature on recidivism suggested that much of the research on this phenomenon is concentrated in a few of the industrialised Western nations, for example,

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Australia, Canada, England and United States of America (US). He noted that the studies in these nations highlighted that between one-third and two-thirds of inmates when released from prison returned to criminal behaviour, and further, such studies showed that recidivism rates varied according to age and gender of offenders, type of crime for which the offender was imprisoned for, as well as, the offender’s criminal record (p. 601). According to Baumer (1997, 605–07), in the US, studies on recidivism showed that between 25 per cent and 40 per cent of persons released from prison returned to prison for committing a new crime or violating parole within three to six years following their release (e.g., Adams et al. 1994, Beck and Shipley 1989, Caulkins et al. 1996, Clark and Crum 1985, Donnelly and Bala 1994, Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1980, Gottfredson and Mitchell-Herzfeldt 1982, Griswold 1978, Hoffman and Stone-Meierhoefer 1980, Kitchener et al. 1977, Petersilia et al. 1986, Rauma and Berk 1987, Schmidt and Wite 1988, Waldron and Angelino 1977, Wallerstedt 1984). More specifically, the studies in the US indicated that one- quarter to slightly more than one-third of persons returned to prison within three to six years of their release for committing a new crime only (e.g. Glaser 1969, Martinson and Wilks 1976). With regard to reconviction rates in the US, approximately 35 per cent to 45 per cent of persons released from prison are reconvicted within three to six years of being released from prison (Baumer 1997). When recidivism among adults released from prison were considered, evidence indicated in the US, Canada and West Germany that slightly more than one- third of persons released from prison are re-imprisoned for a new crime within three to six years of their release (Gendreau and Leipciger 1978, Holoski and Carlson 1986, Ruether and Neufeind,1982). Further, in studies done in Canada and Australia which included prisoners and parole violators, there were slightly higher levels of re-imprisonment than those observed in the US (Baumer 1997). In the US, England, Canada and Australia, according to Baumer (1997), several studies were conducted which showed notable characteristics of recidivism and recidivism rates. Amongst other things, they found that: (a) recidivism rates increased with the age of the offender, (b) recidivism was more likely among males than females, (c) recidivism was more likely among persons imprisoned for property-related offences than among persons imprisoned for violent offences, (d) the likelihood recidivism increased with an offender’s number of prior arrests convictions, (e) the risk of recidivism was lower among offenders who are married, and (f) the risk of recidivism was lower among offenders who had higher education. Inconsistent findings arose from studies that examined the relationship between the length of prison confinement and recidivism. For instance, in the US and England, some studies revealed that the length of confinement has little or no effect on the likelihood of recidivism as compared to other studies which noted that persons who serve longer prison terms are more likely to recidivate. Similarly, in Australia and Canada, the results were also mixed.

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What effect can the nature of the prison environment to which offenders are exposed have on the likelihood of recidivism? A number of studies were conducted to examine this relationship. Such studies focused on the influence of offenders’ participation in a number of correctional programmes, (e.g. educational, vocational, drug treatment, life skills, etc.), and on the effects of exposure to varying levels of discipline on the likelihood of recidivism. Some evidence suggest that offenders who were incarcerated in highly disciplined environments like boot camps, maximum security institutions, closed prisons, etc., were less likely to recidivate than offenders exposed to less disciplined prison environments like minimum security, open prisons, etc. (Florida Department of Corrections 1990, Flowers, Carr and Ruback 1991). However, other research studies have indicated that exposure to more disciplined environments does not by itself reduce recidivism, and in fact, may increase the risk of recidivism (e.g. Broadhurst, Maller, Maller and Duffecy 1988, MacKenzie, Brame and McDowell 1995). All in all, there are some good predictors of recidivism, for example, age, gender, marital status, level of education, type of offence committed, etc., whilst there are some with conflicting results. Further, recidivism rates depend on what definition is used and therefore what measures are adopted.

PRISON RECIDIVISM IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

This present study on ‘Prison Recidivism in Trinidad and Tobago: Towards Reduction, Rehabilitation and Reform,’ being the first of its kind in Trinidad and Tobago and the wider Caribbean, employs the system for measuring prison recidivism which currently exists in the Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service (at least in Phase I of the study). The six adult prisons for convicted inmates in Trinidad and Tobago used in this study are: Carrera Convict Prison (males), Port-of-Spain Prison (males), Golden Grove Maximum Security Prison (males), Golden Grove Convict Prison (males), Golden Grove Women’s Prison (females) and Tobago Prison (males). Several classification systems exist for inmates in Trinidad and Tobago’s prisons. These are briefly discussed. First, an inmate can be classified as being either a ‘prisoner’ or a ‘convict.’ ‘Prisoner’ means that the inmate has been found guilty in a Magistrate’s Court (lower court) and sentenced to prison, while ‘convict’ means that the inmate was found guilty in a High Court and sentenced to prison. Second, for each of the two categories outlined above, that is, ‘prisoner’ and ‘convict,’ an inmate can be further classified into one of three other categories. If the inmate is in prison for the first time, the inmate is referred to as a Star if in prison for the second time, the inmate is referred to as a Special or if in prison for the third or more times, the inmate is referred to as an Ordinary. Combining the two classification systems outlined above for inmates, a third classification system emerges, that is, an inmate can be one of the following six

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categories: Star Prisoner, Star Convict, Special Prisoner, Special Convict, Ordinary Prisoner or Ordinary Convict. These are briefly described below: Star Prisoner

This is an inmate who is in prison for the first time (Star) as a result of a sentence by a Magistrate (Prisoner). Star Convict

This is an inmate who is in prison for the first time (Star) as a result of a sentence by a Judge (Convict). Special Prisoner

This is an inmate who is in prison for the second time (Special) as a result of a sentence by a Magistrate (Prisoner). Special Convict

This is an inmate who is in prison for the second time (Special) as a result of a sentence by a Judge (Convict). Ordinary Prisoner

This is an inmate who is in prison for the third time or more (Ordinary) as a result of a sentence by a Magistrate (Prisoner). Ordinary Convict

This is an inmate who is in prison for the third time or more (Ordinary) as a result of a sentence by a Judge (Convict). Taking into consideration the existing classification system of inmates in the Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service, in this study, a ‘recidivist’ is defined as a ‘prisoner’ or ‘convict’ who was in any of the six prisons more than once, that is, it includes both Special and Ordinary ‘prisoners’ and ‘convicts’

RESULTS

‘Prisoner’ and ‘Convict’ records for all convicted inmates housed at the six prisons during the period January 1–May 31, 2002 were collected and analysed (that is, 4,449 inmates). This analysis included: (1) All convicted inmates in the various prisons on January 1, 2002, (2) All convicted inmates sent to and discharged from the various prisons during January 1–May 31 2002 and, (3) All convicted inmates in the various prisons on May 31, 2002. In the following sections, an

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analysis of the data gathered from the 4,449 inmates’ prison records are presented. First, data on the classification of inmates are presented.

‘PRISONER-CONVICT’ CLASSIFICATION OF INMATES

From the data collected, overall, the highest proportion of all convicted inmates in the nation’s adult prisons were ‘Prisoners’ (84 per cent), while 15 per cent were ‘Convicts’ and one per cent had ‘Other’ classification status (for example, debtors, prohibited immigrants, awaiting trial, awaiting appeal and adjourned cases, etc.). In other words, the vast majority of inmates (84 per cent) committed crimes/ offences that were handled by a Magistrate’s Court (lower court).

‘STAR-SPECIAL-ORDINARY’ CLASSIFICATION OF INMATES

A deeper examination of the data revealed that almost 40 per cent (39 per cent) of the inmates were in prison for the first time (Stars), almost 20 per cent (18 per cent) were there for the second time (Specials), almost 40 per cent (38 per cent) were in prison for the third time or more (Ordinaries) and five per cent had some ‘Other’ status.

PROPORTION OF RECIDIVISTS VS. FIRST TIMERS

From our earlier definition of recidivism, and from the data obtained, over 56 per cent of the inmates (both prisoners and convicts) at the six adult prisons for convicted inmates can be deemed recidivists (Specials 18 per cent and Ordinaries 38 per cent) - that is, two and more times in prison. This compares to 39 per cent of inmates who were in prison for the first time (Stars).

FURTHER CLASSIFICATION OF INMATES

Analysis of the data according to the third scheme of classifying inmates outlined in an earlier section suggests that 30 per cent of the inmates were Star Prisoners while nine per cent were Star Convicts. Further, 16 per cent were Special Prisoners and two per cent Special Convicts, while 35 per cent were Ordinary Prisoners and three per cent Ordinary Convicts, with five per cent having some ‘Other’ status (see Figure 17.5). In other words, ‘prisoners’ who were recidivists accounted for half (51 per cent) of the prison population, while ‘convicts’ who were recidivists comprised five per cent. Additionally, ‘prisoners’ who were in prison for the first time made up 30 per cent of the prison population, while nine per cent of the prison population comprised convicts in prison for the first time.

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FIGURE 17.5 CLASSIFICATION OF INMATES (ALL PRISONS)

40%

35% 35%

30% 30%

25%

20%

16% 15% Per cent (%)

9% 10%

5% 5% 3% 2%

0% Ordinary Prisoner Star Prisoner Special Prisoner Star Convict Other Ordinary Convict Special Convict Prisoner Classification

In the following sections, demographic data on the inmates are presented. These include analysis on sex, age, ethnicity, religious background, marital status, number of children, social class, residence and place of birth.

SEX OF INMATES

The data revealed that the vast majority of adult convicted inmates in the nation’s prisons were males (98 per cent), while females comprised the remaining two per cent. A more detailed look at the data indicated that of those inmates who were males, the highest proportion was ‘prisoners’ (84 per cent) while 15 per cent were ‘convicts’ and one per cent had some ‘other’ status. However, of those inmates who were females, despite following the overall distribution as the males, the proportions were slightly different, that is, prisoners (78 per cent), convicts (17 per cent) and ‘other’ (five per cent). With regard to sex of inmates and recidivists (Specials and Ordinaries), 56 per cent of all male inmates were recidivists, while 39 per cent were in prison for the first time (Stars) and five per cent had some ‘other’ status. The picture is quite different for females. Of all female inmates, the highest proportion (71 per cent) was in prison for the first time (Stars), while 24 per cent were recidivists (Specials and Ordinaries) and five per cent had some ‘other’ status.

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AGE OF INMATES

Overall, over 80 per cent of all convicted inmates in the adult prisons were between the ages of 17and 41 years, while almost 20 per cent (19 per cent) were 42 years and older. More specifically, 11 per cent of the inmates were between the ages 17 and 21 years, 17 per cent were between 22 and 26 years, 17 per cent were between 27 and 31 years, 19 per cent were between 32 and 36 years and 17 per cent were between 37 and 41 years. Further, 11 per cent of the inmates were between 42 and 46 years, five per cent were between 47 and 51 years, two per cent were between 52 and 56 years and one per cent was 57 years and older (see Figure 17.6). A further examination of the data suggests that the age distribution according to ‘prisoners’ and, ‘convicts’ followed the overall pattern above. That is, for each classification of inmates, approximately 80 per cent were between the ages of 17 and 41 years and 20 per cent were over 41 years old. With regard to the recidivists (Specials and Ordinaries), a similar pattern emerged, that is, almost 80 per cent (78 per cent) of the recidivists were between the ages of 17 and 41 years, while 22 per cent were older than 41 years. However, a slightly higher proportion of the inmates who were in prison for the first time (Stars) were between the ages of 17 and 41 years (85 per cent) with 15 per cent being over 41 years old.

FIGURE 17.6 AGE OF INMATES (ALL PRISONS)

20% 19%

18% 17% 17% 17%

16%

14%

12% 11% 11%

10%

8% Per cent (%)

6% 5%

2% 2% 1%

0% 17-21 22-26 27-31 32-36 37-41 42-46 47-51 52-56 57+ Age Age

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The data revealed that there is a curvilinear relationship between age of inmates and proportion of recidivists. For instance, in the age group 17–26 years, 36 per cent were recidivists. This was followed by 63 per cent in the age group 27–36 years, 66 per cent in the age group 37–46 years, 58 per cent in the age group 47– 56 years, 33 per cent in the age group 57–66 years and a similar proportion (33 per cent) for those 67 years and over.

ETHNICITY OF INMATES

Overall, from the data, inmates of African descent comprised the highest proportion in the six adult prisons for convicted inmates (61 per cent), while inmates of East Indian descent followed with 26 per cent and those with Mixed ethnic background accounted for 13 per cent. Inmates with ‘other’ ethnic backgrounds made up less than one per cent (see Figure 17.7). When ‘prisoners’ and ‘convicts’ were examined individually, the overall distribution outlined above was evident for each classification of inmates. What was the ethnic breakdown of recidivists (Specials and Ordinaries)? The data revealed that it followed the overall distribution described above — 62 per cent were of African descent, 25 per cent were of East Indian descent and 13 per cent were Mixed. For those inmates who were in prison for the first time (Stars), the pattern was also similar, that is, 61 per cent were of African descent, 27 per cent were of East Indian descent, 12 per cent were Mixed and less than one per cent had ‘other’ ethnic backgrounds.

FIGURE 17.7 ETHNICITY OF INMATES (ALL PRISONS)

70%

61% 60%

50%

40%

Per cent (%) 30% 26%

20%

13%

10%

0% African East Indian Mixed Ethnicity

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INMATES’ RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND

Overall, the highest proportion of the convicted inmates reported that they were Roman Catholics (29 per cent) while 14 per cent stated they were Baptists, 13 per cent Hindus and 12 per cent Muslims. Additionally, Anglicans comprised eight per cent of inmates, Seventh Day Adventists (seven per cent), Pentecostals (six per cent), Presbyterians (one per cent) and Jehovah Witnesses (one per cent). Two per cent of the inmates stated that they were ‘Christians,’ one per cent had ‘other’ religions and six per cent were Nonconformists (see Figure 17.8).

FIGURE 17.8 RELIGION OF INMATES (ALL PRISONS)

35%

30% 29%

25%

20%

15% 14% 13%

Per cent (%) 12%

10% 8% 7% 6% 6% 5% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0%

l u n a n s im t a ian s nd sl ica ntist i tholic l e er rmist Hi v rist yt itne Other fo Baptist Mu d n Ang Ch o y A h W c a Pentecos Presb ova nC h Roman Ca e No nth D J e Sev Religion

When the data were examined with regard to the ‘prisoner-convict’ classification of inmates, it followed the overall distribution outlined above. What was the religious background of recidivists? The data suggested that it followed the overall distribution above. Those inmates who were in prison for the first time (Stars) followed the same pattern as the recidivists.

MARITAL STATUS OF INMATES

The data revealed that most of the convicted inmates in the nation’s prisons were single (84 per cent), while 15 per cent were married and one per cent in common law relationships, divorced, widowed or separated. This overall pattern was the same for ‘prisoners’ and ‘convicts’ when examined separately. Further,

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with regard to recidivists (Specials and Ordinaries), the pattern was also the same: 87 per cent were single, 12 per cent were married and one per cent had some ‘other’ marital status.

NUMBER OF CHILDREN OF INMATES

The overall data indicated that almost two-thirds of convicted inmates had a child or children. More specifically, half of the convicted inmates (49 per cent) had one to three children, ten per cent had four to six children and four per cent of the convicted inmates had seven or more children. Thirty-seven per cent of inmates had no children. A similar pattern existed for ‘prisoners’ and ‘convicts’ when examined individually, as well as, for recidivists (Specials and Ordinaries) and inmates in prison for the first time (Stars).

INMATES’ SOCIAL CLASS

The vast majority of inmates (97 per cent) belonged to the lower social class grouping, two per cent were of the middle social class grouping, less than one per cent (0.3 per cent) belonged to the upper class, with the remaining 0.7 per cent comprising some ‘other’ social status (for example, unemployed, students, housewives, retired/pensioners). Once again, the similar pattern existed for both ‘prisoners’ and ‘convicts,’ as well as, for both recidivists (Specials and Ordinaries) and inmates in prison for the first time (Stars).

RESIDENCE OF INMATES

Ninety-nine per cent of the convicted inmates in the six adult prisons came from the islands of Trinidad and Tobago, while the remaining one per cent came from other countries. Almost half of the inmates (46 per cent) resided in the northern region of the island of Trinidad, while 17 per cent came from the central region. Thirty-one per cent of inmates came from the southern region of Trinidad, while five per cent came from the island of Tobago. (See Appendix 17.1).

INMATES’ PLACE OF BIRTH

The overall data revealed that the vast majority of convicted inmates sent to prison were born in Trinidad and Tobago (97 per cent), while three per cent were born in other countries. More specifically, 93 per cent were born in the island of Trinidad, and four per cent in the island of Tobago. In the following sections, crime-related data on the inmates are presented.

TYPES OF CRIMES/OFFENCES COMMITTED BY INMATES (OVERALL)

The highest proportion of inmates in the nation’s prisons committed narcotic- related crimes/offences (35 per cent) (for example, cultivation, possession, trafficking,

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etc.). The other major category of crimes/offences that convicted inmates were in prison for related to larceny, break in and house break in (27 per cent). Robbery/ armed robbery accounted for another eight per cent of the convicted prison inmates. Person-related crimes/offences accounted for ten per cent of inmates being in prison (for instance, murder/manslaughter (four per cent), rape, incest and other sexual offences (two per cent), grievous bodily harm (two per cent) and assault/ armed assault (two per cent). Five per cent of inmates were in prison for committing minor crimes/offences such as trespassing, non-payment of arrears, traffic, escape from custody, receiving stolen items, breach of protection order, breach of immigration regulations, disorderly behaviour. This was followed by four per cent of inmates who were incarcerated for committing multiple crimes/offences. Another four per cent of inmates were imprisoned for failure to pay maintenance. Inmates incarcerated for possession of arms and ammunition accounted for three per cent of all inmates, whilst a similar proportion (three per cent) committed other crimes/offences, for example, kidnapping, attempted murder, malicious damage to property, praedial larceny and possession of weapon. This was followed by one per cent of inmates imprisoned for white-collar crimes (see Figure 17.9).

TYPE OF CRIMES/OFFENCES COMMITTED BY ‘PRISONERS’ AND ‘CONVICTS’

When the data were examined according to the ‘prisoner-convict’ classification of inmates, it is clear that different types of crimes are more prevalent for particular classification of inmates. For example, with regard to ‘prisoners,’ 41 per cent were imprisoned for narcotic-related crimes/offences, whilst the proportion of this same crime/offence for ‘convicts’ was five per cent. Further, while almost 40 per cent (39 per cent) of the ‘prisoners’ committed larceny, robbery, break in and house break in crimes/offences, 13 per cent of the ‘convicts’ committed such acts. With regard to person-related crimes/offences, for example, murder, manslaughter, rape, incest and other sexual offences, assault, grievous bodily harm, attempted murder, four per cent of ‘prisoners’ committed such crimes/offences as compared to 54 per cent of ‘convicts.’

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FIGURE 17.9 MAJOR CRIMES/OFFENCES COMMITTED BY INMATES (ALL PRISONS)

40%

35% 35%

30% 27%

25%

20%

15% Per cent (%) 10% 10% 8%

5% 4% 4% 5% 3% 3% 1% 0% g n s y s s s e r e e ics aki be c ce tion t e im b n n nc ime o fe ni e c br o ff Cr se Of lar Crime O Nar u dR intena s/ mmu l s/ Ho rme Ma ime me A n Related Cr Cr hite Co ry/ e ms & A rCri ther Minor ng & r W e rso ipl A h O aki bbe t t e Pe O Ro Mul , Br y n ce ar L Crime/Offence Committed

PROPORTION OF RECIDIVISTS VS. FIRST-TIMERS BY TYPE OF CRIMES/OFFENCES COMMITTED

The data revealed that of those inmates who committed narcotic-related crimes/offences, 59 per cent were recidivists, 40 per cent were in prison for the first time and one per cent had some ‘other’ status. Further, of those inmates who committed larceny, break in and house break in, 75 per cent were recidivists as compared to 24 per cent being in prison for the first time with one per cent having some ‘other’ status. Additionally, of those inmates who committed robbery, 53 per cent were recidivists, 45 per cent were in prison for the first time and two per cent had some ‘other’ status. Of those inmates who committed person-related crimes/offences, 31 per cent were recidivists as compared to 57 per cent who were in prison for the first time, whilst two per cent had some ‘other’ status.

LENGTH OF SENTENCE

Overall, almost two-thirds (65 per cent) of all inmates were serving sentences of five years and less. This was followed by 20 per cent serving five to ten year sentences, six per cent serving 10–20 year sentences, three per cent serving 20 years and more to life imprisonment, five per cent serving Simple Imprisonment and one per cent ‘other’ types of sentences. More specifically, of the 65 per cent who were serving sentences of five years or less, 25 per cent were serving sentences of less than one year, 11 per cent were serving one to two years sentences, 12 per cent were serving two to three year sentences and 17 per cent were serving three to five year sentences (see Figure 17.10).

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With regard to the ‘prisoner-convict’ classification of inmates, there were indeed differences in the length of sentences served. The majority of ‘prisoners’ (75 per cent) were serving sentences of five years and less, whilst 18 per cent had sentences of five to ten years. Further, one per cent was serving sentences of 10– 20 years, six per cent had terms of Simple Imprisonment and less than one per cent had sentences of 20 years and more to life imprisonment. In comparison, the highest proportion of ‘convicts’ (36 per cent) were serving sentences of 10–20 years. This was followed by 32 per cent who were serving five to ten years sentences and 21 per cent serving 20 years and more to life imprisonment. A further eight per cent of ‘convicts’ were serving sentences of five years and less, whilst two per cent were serving ‘other’ sentences such as death sentence, President’s Pleasure and one per cent Simple Imprisonment.

FIGURE 17.10 LENGTH OF SENTENCE OF INMATES (ALL PRISONS)

30%

25% 25%

20% 20%

17%

15%

12% 11%

10% Per cent (%)

5% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1%

t r s rs s rs r er ars ars a e h year year e e Ot 2 5 dov o o 10 y o 1t 2 to 3 yea 3t to 15 y 5 t Imprisonmen 10 15 to 20 ye Less than 1 yea 20 years an Single Length of Sentence

With regard to recidivists, over 70 per cent were serving sentences of five years and less (71 per cent) which was followed by those serving five to ten year sentences (20 per cent), 10–20 years sentences (five per cent), 20 years and more to life imprisonment (three per cent), and Simple Imprisonment (one per cent). Of the inmates who were in prison for the first time, almost two-thirds (65 per cent) were serving sentences of five years and less, while 21 per cent were serving five to ten year sentences. This was followed by inmates serving sentences

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of 10–20 years (eight per cent), 20 years and more to life imprisonment (four per cent), death penalty and President’s Pleasure (one per cent) and Simple Imprisonment (one per cent).

TYPES OF SENTENCES

Convicted inmates can receive a variety of sentences from Magistrates and Judges in Trinidad and Tobago that can lead to imprisonment. These sentences can include single sentences or combinations of: hard labour, fines, strokes and Simple Imprisonment (see Figure 17.11). The vast majority of inmates received sentences that involved hard labour (94 per cent), while three per cent received sentences of fine or Simple Imprisonment, two per cent were fined and given Simple Imprisonment and one per cent received ‘other’ sentences. More specifically, of the 94 per cent that received sentences of hard labour, 73 per cent were sentenced to hard labour only, 12 per cent were sentenced to hard labour or fines, six per cent were sentenced to hard labour and fines and three per cent were sentenced to hard labour and strokes. With regard to the ‘prisoner-convict’ classification of inmates, over 90 per cent each of both ‘prisoners’ (94 per cent) and ‘convicts’ (99 per cent) were sentenced to hard labour as punishment. With regard to recidivism, over 90 per cent of recidivists were sentenced to hard labour. This proportion was also similar for inmates in prison for the first time.

PROPORTIONS OF INMATES IN THE SIX PRISONS

The data revealed that for the total prison population of convicted adults in Trinidad and Tobago during the period January 1-May 31, 2002 (N=4,449), the highest proportion of inmates (37 per cent, n=l,652) was incarcerated at the Golden Grove Prison (Male Adults), while 30 per cent (n=l,323) were at the Port-of-Spain Prison (Male Adults). Almost 20 per cent (19 per cent, n=864) of the inmates were at the Golden Grove Maximum Security Prison (Male Adults) and a further ten per cent (n=462) at Carrera Convict Prison (Male Adults). Two per cent of inmates were at the Tobago Prison (Male Adults, n=76) and a similar proportion (two per cent, n=72) at the Golden Grove Prison (Women Adults).

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FIGURE 17.11 TYPE OF SENTENCE SERVED BY INMATES (ALL PRISONS)

80%

73%

70%

60%

50%

40% Per cent (%)

30%

20%

12%

10% 6% 3% 3% 2% 1% 0% Pure Hard Labour Hard Labour or Hard Labour and Hard Labour and Fine or Simple Fine and Simple Other Sentences Fines Fines Strokes Imprisonment Imprisonment

Type of Sentence

PROPORTION OF ‘PRISONERS’ AND ‘CONVICTS’ IN THE SIX PRISONS

With regard to ‘prisoners,’ (that is, sentenced by a Magistrate) in the nation’s prisons, both Golden Grove Prison (Male Adults, 96 per cent, n=1,585) and Port- of-Spain Prison (Male Adults, 91 per cent, n=1,209) had over 90 per cent of their inmates being such. These were followed by: Tobago Prison (90 per cent, n=68), Golden Grove Women’s Prison (78 per cent, n=56), Golden Grove Maximum Security Prison (68 per cent, n=591) and Carrera Convict Prison (50 per cent, n=233). Carrera Convict Prison (47 per cent, n=219) had the highest proportion of ‘convicts,’ (that is, inmates sentenced by a Judge) when all of the prisons were examined. Golden Grove Maximum Security Prison (30 per cent, n=262) followed as well as Golden Grove Women’s Prison (17 per cent, n=12), Port-of-Spain Prison (seven per cent, n=91), Tobago Prison (four per cent, n=3) and Golden Grove Prison (four per cent, n=59). Each prison had small proportions of six per cent and less with some ‘other’ status.

RECIDIVISTS VS. FIRST-TIMERS IN THE SIX PRISONS

When comparing the six prisons, Golden Grove Prison (Male Adults) had the highest proportion of recidivists (65 per cent, n= 1,080) (that is, inmates in prison for two or more times). This was followed by: Tobago Prison (55 per cent, n=42), Carrera Convict Prison (54 per cent, n=251), Golden Grove Maximum Security Prison (51 per cent, n=440), Port-of-Spain Prison (48 per cent, n=633) and Golden Grove Women’s Prison (24 per cent, n=17).

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The Golden Grove Women’s Prison had the highest proportion of inmates who came to prison for the first time that is, 71 per cent (n=51). This was followed by: Golden Grove Maximum Security Prison (48 per cent, n=413), Carrera Convict Prison (44 per cent, n=201), Port-of-Spain Prison (37 per cent, n=494), Golden Grove Prison (Males, 34 per cent, n=564) and Tobago Prison (29 per cent, n=22). Each prison had relatively small proportions of inmates with some ‘other’ status. In the following sections, some further analysis of the data is presented.

INMATES’ SEX AND MARITAL STATUS

A higher proportion of male inmates (84 per cent) as compared to female inmates (64 per cent) were single. However, a slightly higher proportion of female inmates (19 per cent) than male inmates (15 per cent) were married. Additionally, for female inmates, six per cent were in common-law relationships, four per cent each were divorced and widowed and three per cent separated. One per cent of male inmates had some ‘other’ marital status than ‘single’ and ‘married.’

INMATES’ SEX AND TYPE OF CRIMES/OFFENCES COMMITTED

While over 50 per cent (54 per cent) of female inmates committed narcotic- related crimes/offences, just over one-third (35 per cent) of male inmates committed such crimes/offences. Further, while almost 30 per cent (27 per cent) of male inmates committed crimes/offences such as larceny, break in and house break in, ten per cent of female inmates committed such crimes/offences.

FIGURE 17.12 SEX OF INMATES BY CRIME/OFFENCE COMMITTED

60%

54%

50%

40%

35%

30% 27% Per cent (%)

19% 20% 18% 17%

11% 10% 10% 8%

1% 0% Narcotic Related Larceny Robbery Person Related Other Crimes/Offences Crime/Offence

Male Female

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With regard to Person-related crimes/offences while almost 20 per cent (18 per cent) of female inmates committed such crimes/offences, 11 per cent of male inmates committed such. Eight per cent of male inmates committed robbery in comparison to one per cent of female inmates. With regard to murder/manslaughter while 13 per cent of female inmates committed such crimes, four per cent of male inmates were in prison for such. Further, with regard to white-collar crimes nine per cent of female inmates were incarcerated for such crimes/offences as compared to one per cent of the male inmates (see Figure 17.12).

INMATES’ SEX AND LENGTH OF SENTENCES

From the data, while almost 50 per cent (48 per cent) of-male inmates were serving sentences of three years and less, approximately one- third (31 per cent) of female inmates were serving such sentences. Further, almost 30 per cent (29 per cent) of female inmates were serving three to five year sentences as compared to 17 per cent of male inmates serving such sentences. An almost similar proportion of male and female inmates, 20 per cent and 22 per cent respectively, were serving five to ten year sentences, while seven per cent each of male and female inmates were serving 10–20 year sentences. While three per cent of male inmates were serving sentences of 20 years and more to life imprisonment, no female inmate was serving such.

TYPE OF CRIMES/OFFENCES COMMITTED AND INMATES’ AGES

Of those inmates who committed narcotic-related crimes/offences, the highest proportions were in the 27-36 years age group (33 per cent) and the 37-46 years age group (33 per cent). This was followed by: 17-26 years (25 per cent), 47-56 years (eight per cent) and 57 years and over (one per cent). With regard to those inmates who committed larceny, break in and house break in, the highest proportion belonged to the 27-36 years age group (39 per cent) while 29 per cent of the 37-46 years age group committed such crimes/offences. This was followed by: 17-26 years (26 per cent), 47-56 years (five per cent) and 57 years and over (one per cent). Of those inmates who committed robbery related crimes/offences 46 per cent from the 17-26 years age group committed such acts while 40 per cent of the 27- 36 years age group committed such acts. This was followed by: 37-46 years (11 per cent) and 47-56 years (three per cent). Over one-third (35 per cent) of inmates who committed person-related crimes/ offences (such as murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, other sexual offences, assault, grievous bodily harm, etc.), belonged to the 27-36 years age group. This was followed by: 17-26 years (29 per cent), 37-46 years (24 per cent), 47-56 years (ten per cent) and 57 years, and over (two per cent) (see Figure 17.13).

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FIGURE 17.13 TYPES OF CRIMES/OFFENCES COMMITTED AND INMATES’ AGES

50% 46% 45%

40% 40% 39%

35%35% 35% 33% 33%

29% 29% 30% 28% 27% 26% 25% 25% 24% Per cent (%) Percent (%) 20%

15%

10% 10% 8% 8%

5% 5% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 17-26 years 27-36 years 37-46 years 47-56 years 57 years and over Age

Narcotics Larceny Robbery Person Related Total

INMATES’ ETHNICITY AND CRIMES/OFFENCES COMMITTED

From the data, of those inmates who were of Mixed ethnic background, 41 per cent were in prison for committing narcotic-related crimes/offences, while 36 per cent of inmates of African descent and 33 per cent of inmates of East Indian descent committed such crimes/offences. With regard to larceny, break in and house break in, a similar proportion of inmates from the three major ethnic groups committed such acts: East Indian descent (30 per cent), Mixed ethnic background (29 per cent) and African descent (26 per cent). Of those inmates of African descent, ten per cent were in prison for robbery- related crimes/offences as compared to seven per cent of all inmates of Mixed ethnic background and five per cent of East Indian descent. With regard to person-related crimes/offences, 11 per cent of all inmates of East Indian descent, ten per cent of all inmates of African descent and seven per cent of all inmates of Mixed ethnic background committed such crimes/offences.

INMATES’ RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND AND RECIDIVISM

Most inmates indicated that they belonged to a particular religion. The proportion of these inmates who were recidivists were Muslims (65 per cent), Seventh Day Adventists (59 per cent), Jehovah Witnesses (58 per cent),

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Presbyterians (57 per cent), Roman Catholics (56 per cent), Baptists (55 per cent), Anglicans (55 per cent), Pentecostals (52 per cent), Hindus (50 per cent) and Nonconformists (52 per cent).

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are some of the major recommendations from Phase I of this project that arose from our analysis of the prison records, on-site visits to the six prisons, meetings with key stakeholders, consultations with prison officers and interviews with inmates. These were submitted to the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago on March 21, 2003. These recommendations are designed not only to make the work of prison officers more effective, but also to make prison conditions more amenable to prisoner rehabilitation and as such, reduce our level of crime: (1) A clearly defined national policy to deal with prison recidivism should be developed with consultation with the various stakeholders. (2) A coordinating unit should be established to monitor the implementation of the policies set out in the national policy on prison recidivism. (3) The present system of classifying inmates into the various categories of Stars, Specials and Ordinaries should be revisited, in particular, the category of Ordinaries. A more detailed system should be developed to capture the degrees of recidivism of inmates. (4) With regard to recidivists, a system whereby data on their past crimes/ offences should be collected and readily available for analysis. (5) A more reliable system of recording all information on inmates should be developed and implemented. (6) A network-computerized system should be devised and implemented for the entire prison service as a matter of urgency. (7) A system of continuous psychological assessment of inmates should be implemented to identify how likely they are to respond positively to rehabilitation programmes. (8) An increase in the number of prison officers are needed at this point in time to enable more adequate supervision of inmates, as well as, involvement in the rehabilitation of inmates. (9) Regular training sessions should be held with prison officers to upgrade their skills and abilities to be better able to participate in rehabilitation programmes for inmates. (10) Regular meetings should be held with the relevant stakeholders of the prison system to obtain information on their programmes in the prisons. (11) Further, there should be separation of inmates according to the type and/ or seriousness of crimes/offences that they committed, for example, rapists should not be allowed to mix with robbers.

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(12) In the prisons themselves, there should be physical separation of inmates according to their number of times in prison to prevent the mixing of inmates in prison for the first or second time with seasoned criminals. (13) The physical conditions (e.g., lighting, odour, ventilation, toilet facilities, bathing facilities, sleeping accommodation, etc.) of most of the prisons need to be addressed urgently. (14) Overcrowding needs to be addressed urgently as well. (15) Serious consideration should be given to the urgent introduction of a ‘parole system’ in Trinidad and Tobago. (16) The issue of medical care in the prisons needs to be examined urgently (for example, number of doctors, availability of doctors, state of the infirmary, availability of medication, etc.). (17) Policies should be developed to deal with AIDS and homosexuality in the prisons. (18) Sanitary conditions for the preparation of meals should prevail at all times. (19) Comprehensive pre-release and post-release programmes should be developed and implemented for inmates’ acceptance and survival in the wider society. (20) Development of the ‘prison industry’ should be encouraged especially in collaboration with the private sector. (21) An awareness programme should be devised and implemented so that members of the public including the youth can become knowledgeable of prison life. This can serve two main purposes - as a deterrent to committing crime and a stimulant of meaningful ways in which they can assist inmates. (22) A revision to the prison’s visitation policies, for example, with regard to mothers and children, special visits, families, etc. should be immediately undertaken. (23) A review of the Prison Act and Prison Services Act should be conducted with widespread national consultation. (24) Work gangs in the various prisons should be encouraged, expanded and rewarded. (25) Inmates should be rewarded for their achievements in the prison. (26) Increase support should be devoted to the Welfare Unit of the Prison Service in terms of financial and human resources. (27) Sporting, cultural, educational, training and religious programmes in the various prisons should be encouraged and supported. (28) With regard to the Women’s Prison, inmates between the ages of 16–18 years should not be allowed to mix with adult inmates in the same facility. Another facility should be established for these 16–18 year old inmates.

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CONCLUSION

The overall data for the six adult prisons for convicted inmates in Trinidad and Tobago revealed that a recidivist in the prisons of Trinidad and Tobago has the following general characteristics: A male ‘prisoner’ who is between 17-41 years of age, of African descent, single, a Roman Catholic, belongs to the lower social class group, committed crimes/offences such as larceny, breaking, house break in and robbery and/or narcotic-related crimes/offences and is serving a sentence of five years and less with hard labour. The critical aspects of Phase I in this prison recidivism project presented above included some of our major recommendations. Amongst other things, Phase II aims to delve more deeply into the challenges of prisoner rehabilitation by undertaking an assessment of the readiness and potential of inmates for rehabilitation. Also, a computerised database template for recording vital information on prison recidivism in Trinidad and Tobago will be developed. Such efforts are all undertaken to assist in the overall reduction, prevention and management of crime in Trinidad and Tobago.

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APPENDIX 17.1 DISTRIBUTION OF INMATES ACCORDING TO RESIDENCE IN THE NINE AREAS OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Area 9 (5%)

Area 3 (3%)

Area 1 (26%) Area 2 (17%)

Area 5 (13%) Area 4 (4%)

Area 6 (17%)

Area 7 (4%)

Area 8 (10%)

Area 1 = North West Area 2 = North Central Area 3 = North East Area 4 = Central East Area 5 = Central West Area 6 = South Central Area 7 = South East Area 8 = South West Area 9 = Tobago

REFERENCES

Abdulah, C.1980. Final Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Existing Conditions at the Prisons and to Make Recommendations for Reform in the Light of Modern Concepts of Penal Practice and Rehabilitation Measures. Rt Revd C. O. Abdulah, Chairman. Port of Spain, Trinidad: Government Printery. Baumer, E.1997. ‘Levels and Predictors of Recidivism: The Malta Experience’. Criminology 35, no.4: 601–28. Broadhurst, R.G., Maller, R.A., Maller, M.G. and Duffecy, J. 1988. ‘Aboriginal and non- Aboriginal Recidivism in Western Australia: A Failure Rate Analysis’. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 25: 83–108.

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Carcach, C. and Leverett, S. 1999. ‘Recidivism among Juvenile Offenders: An Analysis of Times to Reappearance in Court. Australia’. Institute of Criminology, Research and Public Policy Papers no. 17. Central Statistical Office. 1999. Annual Statistical Digest 1997 no. 43. Port-of- Spain, Trinidad: CSO. ___. 2002. Report on Crime Statistics 1999. Port-of- Spain, Trinidad: CSO. Coyle, A. 2002. A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management. London: International Centre for Prison Studies. Deosaran, R. and Ramdhanie, I. 2003. Prison Recidivism: Towards Reduction, Rehabilitation and Reform. Research/Policy Report. Trinidad: The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice. Florida Department of Corrections. 1990. Florida Executive Summary: Boot Camp: A 25 Month Review. Tallahassee: Florida Department of Corrections. Flowers, G.T., Carr, T.S. and Ruback, R.B. 1991. Special Alternative Incarceration Evaluation. Atlanta: Georgia Department of Corrections. Gendreau, P. and Leipciger, M. 1978. ‘The Development of a Recidivism Measure and its Application in Ontaria’. Canadian Journal of Criminology 20: 3-17. Glaser, D. 1969. The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System. New York: Bobbs- Merrill. Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Ministry of National Security and Rehabilitation. 2002. First Report of the Cabinet-Appointed Task Force on Prison Reform and Transformation. Port of Spain, Trinidad: Ministry of National Security and Rehabilitation. Holoski, M.J. and Carlson, T.M. 1986. ‘Recidivism Among Ex-offenders Residing at a CRC in St. John’s Newfoundland’. Canadian Journal of Criminology 28: 385–96. Johnson, R. 2002. Hard Time: Understanding and Reforming the Prison. California: Wadsworth/ Thomson Learning. Mackenzie, D.L., Brame, R. and McDowall, D. 1995. ‘Boot-Camp Prisons and Recidivism in Eight States’. Criminology 33: 327–57. Martinson, R. and Wilks, J. 1976. ‘Save Parole Supervision’. Federal Probation 41: 23–27. Ruether, W. and Neufeind, W. 1982. Open Prisons and Recidivism: A series of Selected Translations in Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. 1990. Administrative Report 1990. Port of Spain, Trinidad: The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. ———. 1991. Administrative Report 1991. Port of Spain, Trinidad: The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. ———. 1992. Administrative Report 1992. Port of Spain, Trinidad: The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. ———. 1993. Administrative Report 1993. Port of Spain, Trinidad: The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. ———. 1994. Administrative Report 1994. Port of Spain, Trinidad: The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. ———. 1995. Administrative Report 1995. Port of Spain, Trinidad: The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. ———.1996. Administrative Report 1996. Port of Spain, Trinidad: The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service.

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———. 1997. Administrative Report 1997. Port of Spain, Trinidad: The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. ———. 1998. Administrative Report 1998. Port of Spain, Trinidad: The Trinidad and Tobago Prison Service. Tonry, M. and Petersilia, J. 1999. Prisons: Crime and Justice Series 26. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Towl, G. 2002. ‘Working with Offenders: The Ins and Outs’. The Psychologist 15, no.5.

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, Volume 7 Numbers 1-2, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies, St Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, 2002, pp. 115–49, with permission.

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crime and development in the caribbean

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chap18.pmd 400 12/8/2006, 11:14 AM C RIME AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE CARIBBEAN Eighteen

INTRODUCTION Crime and Development in For the past quarter of a century, researchers the Caribbean: have been intrigued by the relationship An Investigation between societal development and crime. of Traditional Their research has been driven primarily by Explanatory two theoretical perspectives. The Models1 Durkheimian perspective, the oldest and most extensively investigated model, suggests a link between societal development, Richard R. Bennett, anomie caused by change, and deviance William P. Shields and and/or criminality (c.f. Durkheim 1964, Beth Daniels2 Merton 1959). The application of this approach to cross-national analysis of crime is demonstrated in the works of Krohn (1978), Messner (1982), Neuman and Berger (1988), Bennett (1991a), and Bennett and Shelley (1985), to name a few. The second and more recent perspective links opportunity or routine activities patterns with changes in levels of criminality (c.f. Cohen and Felson 1979, Maxfield 1987). Although examples of this approach abound with regard to single nation research, there are fewer current examples in the arena of cross-national development (c.f. Kick and LaFree 1985, Anderson and Bennett 1996). These two perspectives have generated a body of cross-national research findings that is surprisingly and consistently similar. First, development affects crime. Second, development affects crimes of violence and theft differently: As development increases, violent crimes decrease while crimes of theft increase (c.f. Bennett 1991a, Bennett and Shelley 1985, LaFree and Kick 1986, Krohn

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1978, Wolf 1971). Although these studies inform the scholarly community about the general relationship between development and crime, they may not distinguish among specific nations or regions of the developing world, nor these nations’ experiences with criminality. Thus, these studies may not provide an adequate knowledge base from which to construct informed crime control or prevention policy. The problem of relevancy to regional or national policy may be due to the methodologies employed in these studies. First, the current cross-national research divides the nations of the world for which data are readily available into two groups: developed and developing. As one might expect, the range of values on critical variables within each group is often greater than the range in means between the levels of development, if only at the margins. Second, notwithstanding reliable data and the availability of valid measures of the criminologist’s constructs, current analysis practices cannot resolve the problem of specificity. The aggregation of nations into groups obscures potentially important country-specific characteristics. What emerges is a statistical average that, in fact, may not be representative of any nation within the group. For example, an average could include one nation where inequality is dramatically pervasive, and another in which there is little inequality. The average would be moderate inequality, which is found in neither. This problem is further compounded by possible interactions or non-linearity among the variables within the analysis model. As a consequence, the effects of inequality could be significantly exaggerated or underestimated. Third, these empirical studies only include variables within their analysis models that are commonly measured and collected by leading world-wide organisations, including the World Bank, the United Nations (UN) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Although data from these sources are helpful to understand the relationship between development and crime, they include aggregated data which are of interest solely to the organisations’ missions. Data of greater interest to criminal justicians, derived from theoretical approaches, are not often collected. Direct measures of constructs as social stratification, opportunity structure, family structure, community cohesion, informal and formal social control, and other ‘social facts’ are not available from the international organisations. Thus, criminal justicians who employ these archival data must use them as crude surrogate measures of their more complex constructs. As an example, researchers have used the measure of women in the workforce as a surrogate measure of informal social control or guardianship (c.f. Bennett 1991b). Similarly, urbanisation is commonly used as a surrogate measure of community cohesion (c.f. LaFree and Kick 1986). This paper attempts to investigate the problems in aggregation and analysis of existing data by combining a longitudinal analysis across three seemingly similar developing nations and comparing the effects of traditional explanatory variables

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on their individual crime trends. If similarities in the findings across the three nations are observed, it would strengthen our confidence to generalise current research effects to a larger sample of apparently similar developing nations and possibly to specific nations. If similarities are not found, however, then empirical investigation of crime trends in specific developing regions or nations must consider alternative methodologies or approaches. A test of the effect of aggregation must include nations that are similar in terms of level of development, cultural and social factors, legal tradition, and regional proximity. For the purpose of this study, three developing nations - Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago — were selected. The goal of the study is not to determine which theoretical perspective better accounts for crime patterns in developing countries and then to generalise the findings to other developing nations or regions. Rather, the ultimate contribution of this research to the existing literature will be the evaluation of a methodological approach and its relevance to our understanding of development and crime.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Of the two major theoretical approaches in the investigation of the effects of societal development on crime, the more revered and frequently employed is the Durkheimian perspective (c.f. Krohn 1978, Messner 1982, Neuman and Berger 1988). It asserts that as size and density increase, societies evolve more complex divisions of labour. This complexity transforms the dominant mode of social integration from mechanical solidarity, with its form of collective conscience, to organic solidarity. Durkheim (1964) suggests that when development of normative systems attendant to organic solidarity lags behind the division of labour, an abnormal condition — anomie — exists, in which variation and innovation take place, including such activity as deviance and crime. Shelley’s modernisation hypothesis (1981) elaborates upon the Durkheimian perspective. She contends that as youth migrate from rural areas to urban centres to seek economic opportunity, they break the traditional personal, family, and community ties of a mechanical form of social integration. Social controls, both formal and especially informal, weaken — if not disappear — and deviant and criminal behaviour increases. Central to this hypothesis is the contention that the rate of increase in crime is directly proportional to that of development. The faster the society moves from mechanical to organic social integration, the greater the lag in the development of adaptive normative systems, and, consequently, the greater the level of anomie. Since crime rates hypothetically reflect anomie, the higher the anomie, the higher the crime rates. One major criticism of the Durkheimian model is its inability to predict or explain differences in crime rates by crime type. Numerous empirical studies show that development affects theft positively and homicide negatively (c.f. LaFree and Kick 1986, Bennett 1991a). To address this criticism, Kick and LaFree (1985)

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propose a second conceptual model based on opportunity or routine activities theory.3 They maintain that development generates two structural conditions that foster changes in crime rates. First, industrialisation increases the amount of material goods available for theft. Thus the theft rate, ceteris paribus, should increase proportionately with development. Second, development and industrialisation enhance urbanisation which (1) reduces the level of long-lasting interpersonal ties and (2) increases the pool of potential offenders. The former dampens interpersonal violence while the latter increases theft crimes. Bennett (1991b) extends the opportunity or routine activities approach in cross-national research by including a discussion of not only the presence of attractive and accessible targets of crime, and a pool of motivated offenders, but also the issue of guardianship of the targets. These near-axiomatic statements about the effect of development on crime need qualification. Bennett (1991a) suggests that the relationship between development and crime is more complex than current analyses demonstrate. First, he maintains that the relationships among explanatory variables are not linear but uniquely curvilinear, with the predicted effects exhibited only at specific magnitudes of a variable. As an example, Bennett notes that inequality has a strong negative effect on theft only in its low to middle range, but exhibits a positive effect on theft when its value is in the high range. Second, he suggests that many of the traditional explanatory variables employed in these analyses either do not show their predicted effects or do not have measurable impacts on crime. The Durkheimian and routine activities perspectives both employ a similar core of social and economic variables. Social indicators include inequality, size of the youth population, urban population, and unemployment. Inequality is often included as a critical explanatory variable (c.f. Bennett 1991a, Hansmann and Quigley 1982, Kick and LaFree 1985, LaFree and Kick 1986, Messner 1982). Messner (1982) argues that a measure of inequality is necessary in Durkheimian analyses because inequality influences the forging of organic solidarity bonds. Opportunity researchers consider inequality to be indicative of potential offender motivation and therefore require a well-specified model (Sampson and Wooldredge, 1987). Empirical findings are also consistent for measures of inequality. Krahn, Hartnagel, and Gartrell (1986), Avison and Loring (1986), LaFree and Kick (1986), Messner (1982), Hansmann and Quigley (1982), and Krohn (1976) report a positive relationship between levels of inequality and homicide. Although fewer studies attempt to explain the relationship between inequality and theft, LaFree and Kick (1986), Stack (1984), and Krohn (1976) found a negative relationship, which runs counter to the opportunity approach’s predictions. Bennett (1991a, 1991b) suggests that the relationship is curvilinear and confounds simple evaluation of both the Durkheimian and opportunity hypotheses. The size of the youth population in a nation is also viewed as an important variable in both perspectives (Cohen and Felson 1979, Krahn, Hartnagel, and

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Gartrell 1986). Wilson (1975) argues that crime correlates positively with the size of the youth population because youth commit most crimes; their number in society determines the crime rate. His hypothesis is expanded and formalised in Easterlin’s (1980) argument that cohort size directly relates to levels of social and economic wellbeing: The larger the cohort, the greater the competition (for limited resources), the frustration and alienation, and subsequently the higher the crime rate. The concept of urbanisation is used extensively in the development and crime literature as well (c.f. Hansmann and Quigley 1982, Kick and LaFree 1985, Bennett 1991a, Krohn 1978, LaFree and Kick 1986, Messner 1982, Quinney 1965, Wolf 1971). In the Durkheimian model, urbanisation is an indicator of ‘moral density’ that leads to increases in the division of labour and, eventually, crime. The opportunity model considers urbanisation to be an indicator of the proximity of a pool of motivated potential offenders (c.f. Lynch 1987, Sampson and Wooldredge 1987). Thus, both models predict that urbanisation and crime rates increase together, but the empirical findings show that type of crime matters. Quinney (1965), Wolf (1971), and Krohn (1978) find the relationship for homicide to be negative; Wolf (1971), Krohn (1978), and LaFree and Kick (1986) find the relationship for theft to be positive, and Messner (1982), and Hansmann and Quigley (1982) detect no relationship at all. Although unemployment can be viewed as an economic indicator, criminal justicians use it consistently as an indicator of social integration or blockage in the opportunity structure. Comparative findings show that unemployment has mixed effects on criminality. In one study, it affects men’s rates in developed nations, but does not affect either men or women’s rates in developing nations (Anderson and Bennett 1996). In another study, it affects rates in both developing and less developed nations (Forst and Bennett 1996). In the realm of economic indicators, most development research employs only gross domestic (GDP) or national product (GNP) (c.f. Messner 1982, Bennett 1991a, LaFree and Kick 1986, Hansmann and Quigley 1982). The research shows that theft is positively correlated with GDP, while its relationship with crimes of violence is ambiguous (c.f. Kick and LaFree 1985, Bennett 1991a). Although not consistently employed in the current literature, two additional variables are often added to the economic cluster: level of inflation and the amount of GDP consumed by the private sector. Inflation is not a traditional variable in the development literature, but it is an interesting measure of a population’s purchasing power and is hypothesised to correlate with crimes of theft: The higher the inflation, the higher the rate of theft. Similarly, private consumption of GDP is not a traditional variable in development models. It can be used as a measure of capitalistic — as opposed to socialistic — tendencies of a nation because it represents the proportion of GDP that is privately, not publicly, consumed: The higher the level of private consumption, the less is available for spending by the Government on social, educational, and security programmes and, subsequently,

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the less adequate is the social safety net for the citizens. Such inadequacy could therefore spur increases in crime. The analyses employed in this study incorporate seven variables used in previous attempts to understand the relationship between development and crime. No attempt will be made to test the predictions of either the Durkheimian or routine activities models concerning these variables. Instead, the relative effect of each variable within the three nations is evaluated: Do the variables behave in a similar fashion across the three nations or do they behave differently? If the latter is the case, then the common practice of grouping nations and generalising research findings in developmental research will be called into serious question.

METHODS

The national data employed in this study were collected from four sources that mimic data collection protocols for the majority of comparative developmental research. The exception is found with crime data. These were collected directly from the police agencies of the nations studied, not from International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) or the World Health Organisation (WHO), as is done in most comparative studies. Police data are somewhat problematic because citizen reporting of crimes and police recording practices are often biased, although there is evidence that this criticism is overstated for developing nations (Bennett and Wiegand 1994).4 Unlike most studies that include a diverse set of nations, the problem of non-comparability is minimised in this study because very similar definitions of crime are used in the three nations studied. Social variables were collected from the UN, except for employment data which were secured from the ILO. The variable Inequality was constructed from United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) data employing Ray and Singer’s (1973) index of concentration (CON),5 in which educational disparity serves as the base. This measure was selected over the Gini index because CON is a normalised measure of variation and thus has an upper limit of unity, whereas a Gini with three elements would have an upper limit of .667. The fractional shares comprising the status-inequality measure were derived from primary school, secondary school, and college enrolment figures standardised by population. Steffensmeier et al. (1989) employed a similar measure of educational inequality in their cross-national analysis of female arrest rates. Youth Population is defined as the number of juveniles in the population divided by the total population of the nation. The UN’s age category of 0–14 years (UN yearly estimates are grouped by 15 years, last census year data by four years) defines the juvenile population here. This range is used rather than the next higher range (15–29) because most offenders are young. For example, 13–14 is the modal 1986 United States (US) age for theft, which accounts for 90 per cent of all crime. Thus, the age overlap in this critical range is greater than that for the 15–29

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group. Messner’s (1982) cross-national study of homicide rates and inequality justifiably uses the same age grouping. The third commonly employed social variable, Urbanisation, is defined as the yearly proportion of a nation’s population residing in cities or towns. The data were provided by the UN. Messner (1982), Hansmann and Quigley (1982), and LaFree and Kick (1986) use the same measure. The final social indicator, Unemployment, was constructed from ILO data. It is defined as the proportion of the employable population who are available for employment but are out of work and currently seeking jobs. All economic variables were secured from the World Bank data files. First, GDP per capita is defined as the annual gross domestic product of a nation divided by its population. GDP was used instead of GNP because the former measures only those goods and services which are rendered within the nation’s boundaries, while GNP includes goods and services produced elsewhere but claimed by a nation’s residents.6 Messner (1982) and Bennett (1991a) employ this measure and LaFree and Kick (1986) and Hansmann and Quigley (1982) use a similar one. Inflation is measured by the Consumer Price Index as reported by the World Bank. It is adjusted for the year 1990. In past research, it has not been used as a variable per se but rather as an adjustment device for such indicators as GDP (c.f. Bennett 1991a). Finally, Private Consumption is an indicator obtained from the data files of the World Bank that measures the proportion of GDP consumed within the private sector of the nation as opposed to the public or governmental sector. All missing data (no crime data were missing) were estimated using averaging and trend techniques. Not more than three per cent of the data for any indicator was estimated in this fashion. The analyses rely on simple correlations and graphic presentation of crime and associated variable trends. More sophisticated analyses are not used because of restricted degrees of freedom, based on only three nations and 21 years of data. Since the purpose here is to investigate the usefulness of traditional techniques, and not to evaluate an explanatory model of development or to generalise the model’s findings, such techniques are justified. Two measures of crime are employed in these analyses. In the first analysis, crime trends are explored in each of the three nations. In the second analysis, criminal incidents are grouped into a Violent Crime category - homicide, felony wounding (serious aggregated assault), and rape — or a Property Crime category — burglary and larceny — in order to assess the predictor variables. Robbery and auto theft are not included in these analyses; Trinidad’s data concerning these crimes prior to 1990 were destroyed in the bombing and fire at police headquarters during the Muslimeen coup that year (c.f. Deosaran, 1993). This categorisation of crimes is done to make the analyses as similar to current developmental research as possible, and to reduce the number of figures that would be needed for the evaluation of each crime.

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FINDINGS

The findings are divided into two sections. First, the crime patterns in the three nations are presented in graphic form for the period of 1975–95. The data are presented as rates per 100,000 populations so that comparisons can be made across nations. Second, correlations and graphic depictions of the relationships between crime categories and predictor variables are presented to evaluate the assertion of whether the developing nations’ relational patterns differ. Figures 18.1 through 18.7 present Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago’s crime trends. Homicide data are presented in Figure18.1. It can be seen from this figure that homicide increased in all nations from 1975-95, but to varying degrees with Barbados having the smallest increase over the 21 years (from 3.66 –4.16 per 100,000 population). The number of homicides in Jamaica was two to three times that of the other two nations. The homicide rate peaked in 1980 due to the excessive violence associated with the 1980 elections (c.f. Chevigny 1995, Headley 1996). The trends in homicide appear to be similar for all three nations, excluding 1980 and 1994–95, the latter being when both Barbados and Trinidad experienced a downturn in homicides while Jamaica’s rate continued to climb. These findings are not in agreement with those found in the developmental literature concerning the effect of development on homicide. Aggravated assault data, shown in Figure 18.2, indicate that this crime also increased over the 21 year period. Except for a few slight differences, Jamaica and Trinidad appear to have similar trends: Their rates doubled in the 21 years reported. Barbados, on the other hand, saw a dramatic increase in the crime since 1976, except during the years 1983–85. By 1995, the rate of aggravated assault in Barbados had almost tripled from its rate in 1975.

FIGURE 18.1 HOMICIDE RATE BY NATION, 1975–95

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FIGURE 18.2 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT RATE BY NATION, 1975–95

FIGURE 18.3 RAPE RATE BY NATION, 1975–95

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FIGURE 18.4 BURGLARY RATE BY NATION, 1975–95

FIGURE 18.5 LARCENY RATE BY NATION, 1975–95

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FIGURE 18.6 VIOLENT TO PROPERTY CRIME RATIO BY NATION, 1975–95

Rape, reported in Figure 18.3, increased in all three nations, but the trend lines are too erratic to discern any pattern other than a rise between 1975 and 1995. Of the three nations, Barbados has the lowest rate, Jamaica the highest and Trinidad between the two, except for a five year period (1989–94). All nations showed a decrease between 1993 and 1994 and an increase from 1994 to 1995. Although the patterns in violent crime differ from nation to nation, it is evident from Figures 1 through 3 that these crimes have increased in all three nations over the 21 year period. Figures 4 through 6 present data concerning property crime patterns. Figure 18.4 presents the burglary rates for the three nations. Both Barbados and Trinidad nearly doubled their rates between 1975 and 1987, but the trends differ dramatically thereafter. Burglary in Barbados continued to rise, while in Trinidad it began to fall. By 1995, the gap between the two was more than 500 per 100,000 population. Jamaica’s pattern differs from the other two nations. Although all three nations were similar in 1975, Jamaica’s burglary rate decreased over the 21 year period by almost one-half. It should be noted that all three nations’ rates decreased from 1993 to 1995. Larceny rates are graphed in Figure 18.5. Jamaica and Trinidad’s rates are erratic and crisscross each other during the 21 year period. In general, Jamaica’s rate increased slightly during the period while Trinidad and Tobago’s decreased slightly. As with the pattern for burglary, Barbados had a higher level than the other two nations. Its rate increased dramatically from 1987 to 1992, then began to decrease, and as in Jamaica, it ended up at a slightly higher level than in 1975. For the two

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property crimes reported here, the pattern is not as uniform as observed for crimes of violence. In two nations, the crime rate actually decreased over the 21 year period, and both types of property crime rates dropped in all three nations during the final years of the series, 1993–95. Figure 18.6 reports the ratio of violent crime to property crime in the three nations as well as the US. In general, all nations have become more violent. This has been due in part to increases in violent crimes per se, but also to decreases within some nations in property crimes. Jamaica is by far the most violent of the three nations and experienced the steepest rate of increase from 1991–95 when the ratio doubled. The rates for Barbados and Trinidad are similar for the last six years examined, with Barbados’ ratio having decreased from 1978 to approximate Trinidad’s ratio by 1989. The figure presents similar data for the US in order to put the Caribbean data into perspective. In summary, two conclusions can be drawn about the reported crime in these three Caribbean nations between 1975 and 1995. First, although they are seemingly similar in social and legal culture, the nations differ in the magnitude and type of crime problem they experience. Jamaica has the highest violent crime rate and Barbados has the highest property crime rate. Second, the trends in the three nations differ not only in rates of change, but also in the direction of change. These findings suggest that prior research regarding development and crime which was based on aggregation of nations cannot be as quickly generalised as has been done in the past. That is, crimes of violence do not appear to diminish, nor do property crimes appear to necessarily increase, as level of development increases. Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 7 through 18 present the relationships between the commonly used predictor variables and crime rates and trends for the three nations. These data and trends are presented to evaluate the efficacy of using the current literature’s explanatory models to predict crime in our sample of developing nations. Tables 1 and 2 present the zero-order correlations between the seven predictor variables and crime categories used in Figures 1 through 5. The correlations are calculated using 21 points of crime data and the corresponding 21 entries of each predictor variable. Only correlations equalling .6 or greater are reported in order to simplify the tables and comparisons.7 Two approaches will be used in presenting and discussing the data contained in Tables 1 and 2. First, the correlations between the crime and predictor variables within each nation will be addressed. Second, comparisons within crime categories will be made to determine the extent to which the predictors behave consistently across nations. These analyses relate directly to the purpose of this research: to determine the extent to which aggregation of nations masks empirical relationships and, as a result, limits the generalisability of findings to regions or specific developing nations. The data show that social and economic variables do not predict homicide rates well. In the case of Jamaica, none of the seven variables is related to the

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crime. Only one economic variable is related to this crime in Barbados, while three variables are related to it in Trinidad and Tobago. Across nations, none of the seven variables consistently showed correlations. It appears that the traditional models do not fare well in explaining homicide rates in the three Caribbean nations. Findings more consistent with the traditional models are found for the crime of aggravated assault in the nations of Barbados (five of seven variables are related) and Trinidad and Tobago (four of seven variables are related). The correlations in the two countries also show similar direction and strength. Jamaica’s correlations are weak and show no pattern.

TABLE 18.1 CORRELATIONS OF VIOLENT CRIMES BY SOCIAL ECONOMIC FACTORS

Variables Burglary Larceny B TT J B TT J SOCIAL Inequality -.92 -.64 .60 -.75 * * Youth Pop -.95 -.82 .85 -.81 * * Urban Pop .95 * -.77 .78 * * Unemployment .70 * .86 * * * ECONOMIC GDP per capita .93 * * .79 * * Inflation (CPI) .95 * -.82 .79 * * Private Consumption .69 * * .72 * *

†N= 21, B= Barbados, TT= Trinidad, J= Jamaica * Correlations <.6

The crime of rape shows the most complicated relational pattern. For this crime, none of the seven predictor variables is related to rape in Trinidad and Tobago, but all seven are related to the crime in Jamaica. This is in stark contrast to what was found between Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago for the crimes of homicide and aggravated assault. Jamaica and Barbados are similar here, in terms of predictor relationships and the signs on three of the four social variables. Although two of the three economic variables show an effect in both nations, the effect of GDP is positive in Barbados and negative in Jamaica. This is a prime example of the problem of aggregation: Although the correlational relationships in the two nations differ dramatically, aggregation would have produced a finding that GDP had no effect on rape.

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For property crimes, the findings are equally, if not more, confusing. Unlike violent crimes, all nations show some relationships between the predictor variables and the crime of burglary. Barbados burglary data are related to all of the seven variables. Trinidad and Tobago shows relationships with two of the social variables, and Jamaica shows a total of five relationships. The confusion only gets worse when comparisons are made across nation by individual predictor variable; four of the seven variables for this crime evidence different signs. As an example, for inequality both Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago show a negative relationship, but the relationship is positive in Jamaica.

TABLE 18.2 CORRELATIONS OF PROPERTY CRIMES BY SOCIAL ECONOMIC FACTORS

Variables Murder Aggravated Assault Rape B TT J B TT J B TT J SOCIAL Inequality * * * -.90 * * -.69 * -.73 Youth Pop * -.60 * -.85 -.72 * -.67 * -.81 Urban Pop * .82 * .87 .94 * .67 * .82 Unemployment * * * * .65 * * * -.72 ECONOMIC GDP per Capita * * * .82 * * .61 * -.63 Inflation * .82 * .87 .95 * .68 * .76 Private Consump .65 * * * * * * * -.63

†N=21, B= Barbados, TT= Trinidad, J= Jamaica * Correlations <.6

For larceny, both Trinidad and Jamaica do not show relationships with any of the seven predictor variables. Barbados, on the other hand, shows a strong relationship with six of the seven variables. It should be noted, however, that the relational pattern for Barbados and the crime of larceny is similar to the cross- national pattern for the crime of larceny - as the explanatory models would suggest (c.f. Bennett 1991a). In summary, Tables 18.1 and 18.2 suggest that there exist dramatic differences among the three nations as to how the four social and three economic predictor variables relate to crime. Not only are there differences among nations regarding the strength of the relationships, but, more surprisingly, there are differences in the direction or sign. The most surprising differences are found with the crime of burglary, where four of the seven variables differ in sign between Jamaica and Barbados. The differences in crime patterns and relationships among these ostensibly similar developing nations make the current practice of grouping developing nations in cross-national research highly questionable.

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The final analyses are presented in Figures 18.7 through 18.18. Each figure refers to a specific nation by a set of either social or economic variables. The figures mimic the data presented in Tables 18.1 and 18.2 but the crime data are collapsed into the categories of violent and property. In order to make the figures more readable, the metric of the predictor variables varies both within and between figures. In most cases, the metric of the crime variable is the actual rate per 100,000 populations. Barbados is an exception. Since aggregated assault is relatively higher in Barbados than in the other nations, the nation’s rate was divided by two prior to combining it with the other two crimes. This was done to ensure that aggravated assault was not disproportionally driving Barbados’s violent crime trends. For social and economic variables, the metric is a multiple of 10, 100, or 1,000. As an example, unemployment in the raw data is a proportion. In order to fit well with the violent crime rate scale, it was multiplied by 100; an unemployment number of .15 became 15 in the figures. However, for property crime figures, unemployment was multiplied by 1,000 to correspond to the higher rates of property crime. Therefore, in reading Figures 18. 7 through 18.18, it is important to look only at the relative position of the predictor variables in relationship to the crime trend and not the relative magnitude of the variables themselves. Figures 18.7 through 18.9 show the relationships between violent crime and the cluster of social variables for each nation. Figure 18.7 reports the trends for Barbados, Figure 18.8 reports the same data for Trinidad, and Figure 18.9 shows the relationships among variables for Jamaica. In Figure 18.7, it can be seen that the unemployment trend mimics the trend in violent crime, especially for the years between 1989 and 1995. This is not true for Jamaica, as the data in Figure 18.9 show no relationship between the variables until 1985, when the relationship becomes decidedly negative. Since violent crime is increasing in all nations, and inequality is basically decreasing in all nations, the relationship between inequality and violent crime is negative. It is interesting to note, however, that the specific relationship between inequality and violent crime differs slightly in each of the three nations. This is especially evident between Trinidad and the other nations and is most probably related to the effect of the 1973 oil embargo.

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FIGURE 18.7 VIOLENT CRIME BY SOCIAL VARIABLES BARBADOS, 1975–95

FIGURE 18.8 VIOLENT CRIME BY SOCIAL VARIABLES TRINIDAD, 1975–95

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FIGURE 18.9 VIOLENT CRIME BY SOCIAL VARIABLES JAMAICA, 1975–95

Similar trends are apparent for the relationship between violent crime, urbanisation and youth population even though the rates of change differ among the nations. The finding that the size of the youth population is negatively related to violent crime appears to contradict findings from studies conducted in the US, but is in accordance with studies which include a sample of developing nations (c.f. Bennett 1991a, 1991b). The actual effect of youth population does differ among the three nations, however, which confounds an attempt to develop uniform crime prevention policies for the three nations. Figures 18.10 through 18.12 report the trends in violent crime by economic variables in the three nations. In Trinidad, one can immediately see the effects of the price of exported oil on the economic trends and its fall after 1983. Interestingly, these trends do not completely correspond with reported violent crime. The trends correspond in the first half of the time line where both are increasing. However, as the economic indicators begin to decline, the violent crime rate continues to rise, except for the 1993–95 period. The only economic indicator that appears to change positively with the crime rate is inflation, although the relationship is not a strong one.

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FIGURE 18.10 VIOLENT CRIME BY ECONOMIC VARIABLES TRINIDAD, 1975–95

FIGURE 18.11 VIOLENT CRIME BY ECONOMIC VARIABLES BARBADOS, 1975–95

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FIGURE 18.12 VIOLENT CRIME BY ECONOMIC VARIABLES JAMAICA, 1975–95

Barbados’ crime trends, as presented in Figure 18.11, appear to be more consistent with the nation’s economic trends. There appears to be a time lag between the trend of private consumption of the GDP, GDP per capita, and violent crime which would be expected, given our explanatory models. We would expect the change in economic factors to precede their effect on crime. Jamaica (Figure 18.12) is an anomaly. Here, it appears that the temporal ordering of cause and effect is reversed, except for the variable of inflation. Figures 18.13 through 18.15 report the relational trends between social variables and property crime in the three nations. Figure 18.13 shows the relationship for Jamaica. Of the four relationships displayed, the unemployment trend tracks property crime the best and shows a positive relationship. However, in Barbados (Figure 18.15), the relationship is negative.8 Inequality appears to track this crime as does youth population in Jamaica. In Trinidad, youth population does not track property crime very well, but in Barbados it does. These findings add support to the contention that aggregation of these nations’ social variables and crime data would mask important nation-specific effects and confound any general explanation of criminality as it relates to social factors.

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FIGURE 18.13 PROPERTY CRIME BY SOCIAL VARIABLES JAMAICA, 1975–95

FIGURE 18.14 PROPERTY CRIME BY SOCIAL VARIABLES TRINIDAD, 1975–95

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FIGURE 18.15 PROPERTY CRIME BY SOCIAL VARIABLES BARBADOS, 1975–95

In Trinidad (Figure 18.14), the direction of unemployment’s relationship with property crime is complex. It appears that between 1975 and 1983, the relationship is negative. However, the relationship becomes basically positive, although erratic from 1983 to 1995. In Barbados (Figure 18.15), the relational trend is clearer: As unemployment slowly decreases, property crime increases dramatically. Again, the findings show that different nations’ social data interact differently with their crime rates. Figures 18.16 through 18.18 present the relational trends between economic variables and property crime for the three nations. For Trinidad, Figure 18.17 reports a positive, but lagged, effect of GDP and private consumption upon property crime. The lag appears to be a four to five year interval. This observation gains further support by the viewing of Jamaica’s data in Figure 18.18, although the time lag appears to range from two to five years. Barbados’ relational trends, as shown in Figure 18.16, add more convincing support for the lagged effects of these two variables on property crime. If a researcher had only used the current conceptual and analyses models, as illustrated in Tables 18.1 and 18.2, one would conclude incorrectly that there exists no discernable relationships between economic variables and national crime rates in this sample.

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FIGURE 18.16 PROPERTY CRIME BY ECONOMIC VARIABLES BARBADOS, 1975–95

FIGURE 18.17 PROPERTY CRIME BY ECONOMIC VARIABLES TRINIDAD, 1975–95

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FIGURE 18.18 PROPERTY CRIME BY ECONOMIC VARIABLES JAMAICA, 1975–95

Collectively, the figures graphically support the conclusions reported for the tables: The variables commonly used in prediction models for societal development and crime show dramatic differences among the three nations studied. A hypothesis about the strength and direction of a predictor variable on crime type is frequently supported by one nation’s data, but refuted by others’. In addition, there is variation within the nations. The figures clearly demonstrate that the relational trends between crime type and economic and social predictors vary within a nation across time. These findings cast serious suspicion upon a central generalisation that has emerged from the development and crime literature: As nations develop, their rates of violent crime decrease while rates of theft increase. More importantly, the extent to which informed policy for a specific developing nation – much less a region – can be created employing current cross-national crime models is very much called into question.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper investigated the adequacy of current theoretical perspectives and analysis practices in research on development and crime. Three analyses were conducted. First, crime trends of three apparently similar developing nations in one region of the world were analysed. The findings suggest that even with significant cultural, social, legal and geographic similarities, there are differences

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in the magnitude of crime reported in these nations as well as in their crime trends over time. Second, correlational analyses were performed using social and economic predictor variables found in current developmental models to determine if such models could explain these nations’ crime trends and levels. The analyses revealed that the relationships between the models’ predictors and the samples’ crime data varied dramatically both within and across nations. In some cases, even the direction or sign of a relationship was different. Finally, trends in the predictor variables were plotted against crime type categories in each of the three nations. These plots were presented to aid in the decomposition of the correlation coefficients, that is, to uncover the possibility that a low correlation was actually an indicator of no relationship rather than the statistical outcome of two or more strong relationships cancelling out each other. These analyses confirmed the suspicion that the latter often happens. The analyses also revealed that dramatic differences in crime trends exist across these three nations and that predictor-crime relationships vary substantially over time as well. In short, the uncritical use of developmental models and standard statistical procedures in explaining crime in specific developing nations or regions is unwise. A number of caveats should be recognised and addressed before researchers abandon a lengthy tradition in the literature and a massive body of research findings in favour of this study. First, the nations included in this sample - Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago - comprise only a small fraction of the developing nations and may not be representative of the others. That is, these nations may well be ‘outliers’ and their data may be atypical of the data from the vast majority of developing nations. Second, as was evidenced in the findings presented, there is great variation in levels of crime and in the strength of the predictor variables used in this study. These variations across predictors, and the documented existence of nonlinearity between crime, social and economic factors (Bennett 1991b), create a possibility that the simplistic analyses used here are unable to capture the complexity of the actual relationships. That is, what was observed was an artefact of the methods employed and does not speak to the viability of the conceptual models. Third, it would be erroneous to conclude from these findings that the Durkheimian and routine activities models are, at their core, fundamentally flawed. Theoretical models are designed to explain phenomenon in general, not to account for every situation. That is, their goal is to explain commonalities among observations, not a unique or isolated event. Finally, it is possible that the two theoretical models are truly explanatory, but that the operationalisation of their concepts is flawed. It was discussed previously that comparative researchers must rely upon surrogate measures to quantify their central concepts. Finding that surrogate measures, even those widely used, do not explain a trend does not necessarily invalidate the utility of the underlying construct.

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At the same time, the results cast uncertainty on the current practice of grouping nations based on level of development groups and treating each level as homogeneous. When a group analysis yields a finding of no relationship or no difference, it is uncertain whether the null finding is accurate or whether some developing nations show a difference in one direction or relationship of one type, and the others show the opposite. Such cancelling of results was found in these analyses with the negative effect of inequality on property crime in Barbados and the positive effect in Jamaica. As one cannot disregard the valuable contributions of the existing models and methods, neither can one dismiss the uniqueness of developing nations and their distinctive qualities, which can be easily overlooked in aggregate analyses. To address this issue, as well as to resolve the dilemmas posed by aggregate analyses, we propose utilising alternative methods and models. These models would serve to illuminate relevant variables that accompany a specific nation’s development, as well as refine the findings of larger studies that employ traditional methods and models. An alternative approach to theory building and statistical analysis should consider the uniqueness of a nation’s social, political and economic context, and its relationship to crime rather than placing developing nations into an analysis model with a predetermined set of predictor variables, as is now the case. The ‘generative theory’ approach (Bennett 1980) contends that the development of variables should be derived by searching for correlations among ‘social facts’ and crime in individual nations. Once these correlations are discovered, they can be measured and tested on other individual nations. New variables that appear to explain crime across diverse developing (or developed) nations should be retained for further analysis. The variables that appear only to explain crime in one nation should be considered as scope conditions in any resulting model. The development of the new model should continue until the list of possible social facts is exhausted or a significant amount of variance is explained by the new model. How does one identify potential social facts that may be defined as predictor variables? We propose the use of the case study methodology that employs qualitative methodology. Since the purpose of the case study method is to discover social facts that elude quantitative studies, qualitative methods such as direct observation, historical analysis and in-depth interviews with strategically placed informants should be the research tools used in the first phase of generative theory building. Social facts — such as political coalitions, clientelism, and stability; unique spatial arrangements between offenders and victims; ethnicity; class; immigration, migration, and tourist patterns; colonialism; and cultural imperialism in developing nations — should be explored and analysed. As an example, the high homicide rate in Jamaica has been attributed to the existence of clientelism between the political parties (and therefore the government) and the ‘sufferers’

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or poor of the inner cities (Edie 1994, Gunst 1995). This condition would be identified as a social fact under this methodology. If this condition also is found in other developing nations, the construct would be translated into a quantitative variable and placed into a development model. If clientelism does not apply to other developing nations, however, it should be placed in the model as a scope condition and treated as such in any further application of the model. Another example is the unique spatial arrangements between victims and offenders in developing nations. By this we mean the economic spatial segregation which is commonplace in the developed world but not in most developing nations. In developing nations such as Trinidad, the poorest of society frequently squat or live on land otherwise unusable, including the banks of storm culverts. This small plot of land usually abuts the homes of the wealthy. In some cases, the distance between the legitimate residences and those of impoverished squatters is fewer than 100 feet. If it is established that this spatial proximity increases the incidence of property crime, and this relationship is found in other developing nations, the concept needs to be quantified and included into analysis models. In this example, as well as the previous one, the model enables consideration of phenomena that have escaped traditional analysis. In summary, we propose that it is critical to move beyond the confines erected by current methods and models in development/crime research. A new approach that applies relevant constructs which emerge from developing nations, rather than only the constructs derived from the developed nations, would be useful. Such an endeavour would promise a distinct and refreshing level of insight into the correlates of crime and would, at the same time, supplement - not supplant - the existing literature.

REFERENCES

Anderson, T. and Bennett, R.R. 1996. ‘Development, Gender, and Crime: The Scope of the Routine Activities Approach’. Justice Quarterly 13, 31–56. Avison, W. R. and Loring, P.L. 1986. ‘Population Diversity and Cross-National Homicide: The Effects of Inequality and Heterogeneity’. Criminology 24, 733–49. Bennett, R. R. 1991. ‘Development and Crime: A Cross-National, Time Series Analysis of Competing Models’. Sociological Quarterly 32, 343–63. ———.1991. ‘Routine Activities: A Cross-National Assessment of a Criminological Perspective’. Social Forces 70,147–63. ———. 1980. ‘Constructing Cross-Cultural Theories in Criminology’. Criminology 18, 252–68. Bennett, R. R. and Lynch, J.P. 1990. ‘Does a Difference Make a Difference? Comparing Cross-National Crime Indicators’. Criminology 28, 153–81. Bennett, R. R. and Shelley, L. 1985. ‘Crime and Economic Development: A Longitudinal Cross-National Analysis’. Annales de Vaucresson 22, 13–32. Bennett, R.R. and Wiegand, R.B. 1994. ‘Observations on Crime Reporting in a Developing Nation’. Criminology 32,135–48.

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Blau, P. M. 1977. Inequality and Heterogeneity. New York: The Free Press. Chevigny, P. 1995. Edge of the Knife: Police Violence in the Americas. New York: The Free Press. Cohen, L. E. and Felon, M. 1979. ‘Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach’. American Sociological Review 44, 588–608. Deosaran, R. 1993. A Society Under Siege: A Study of Political Confusion and Legal Mysticism. Trinidad: The McAl Psychological Research Centre, UWI, St. Augustine. Durkheim, E. 1964. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: The Free Press. Edie, C. J. 1994. ‘Jamaica: Clientelism, Dependency, and Democratic Stability’. In Democracy in the Caribbean, ed. Carlene J. Edie, 25–41. Westport, CT: Praeger. Easterlin, R. 1980. Birth and Fortune: The Impact of Numbers on Personal Welfare. New York: Basic Books. Forst, B. and Bennett, R.R. 1996. Unemployment and Crime: A Cross-National Assessment of a Popular Hypothesis. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Chicago. Gunst, L. 1995. Born Fi’ Dead. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Hansmann, H. B. and Quigley, J.M. 1982. ‘Population Heterogeneity and the Sociogenesis of Homicide’. Social Forces 61, 206–24. Headley, B. 1996. The Jamaican Crime Scene: A Perspective. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press. Jain, S. 1975. Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Kick, E. L. and LaFree, G. 1985. ‘Development and Social Context of Murder and Theft’. Comparative Social Research 8, 37–58. Krahn, H., Hartnagel, T.F. and Gartrell, J.W. 1986. ‘Income Inequality and Homicide Rates: Cross-National Data and Criminological Theories’. Criminology 24, 269–95. Krohn, M. D. 1978. ‘A Durkheimian Analysis of International Crime Rates’. Social Forces 57, 654–70. ___. 1976. ‘Inequality, Unemployment, and Crime: A Cross-National Analysis’. Sociological Quarterly 17, 303–13. LaFree, G. and Kick, E.L. 1986. ‘Cross-National Effects of Development, Distributional and Demographic Variables on Crime: A Review and Analysis’. International Annals of Criminology 24, 213–36. Lynch, J. P. 1987. ‘Routine Activities and Victimization at Work’. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 3, 283–300. Maxfield, M. G. 1987. ‘Lifestyle and Routine Activity Theories of Crime: Empirical Studies of Victimization, Delinquency, and Offender Decision-Making’. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 3, 275–82. Merton, R. 1959. Social Structure. New York: The Free Press. Messner, S. F. 1982. ‘Societal Development, Social Equality, and Homicide: A Cross-National Test of the Durkheimian Model’. Social Forces 61, 597–611. ___. 1989. ‘Economic Discrimination and Societal Homicide Rates: Further Evidence on the Cost of Inequality’. American Sociological Review 54, 597–611. Neuman, L. W. and Berger, R.J. 1988. ‘Competing Perspectives on Cross-National Crime: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence’. Sociological Quarterly 29, 281–313.

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Quinney, R. 1965. ‘Suicide, Homicide and Economic Development’. Social Forces 43, 401–06. Ray, J. Lee and Singer, J.D. 1973. ‘Measuring the Concentration of Power in the International System’. Sociological Methods and Research 1, 403–37. Sampson, R. J. and Wooldredge, J.D. 1987. ‘Linking the Micro- and Macro-Level Dimensions of Lifestyle-Routine Activity and Opportunity Models of Predatory Victimization’. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 3, 371–93. Shelley, L. 1981. Crime and Modernization. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Stack, S. 1984. ‘Income Inequality and Property Crime’. Criminology 22, 229–57. Steffensmeier, D. J., Allan, E. and Streifel, C. 1989. ‘Development and Female Crime: A Cross-National Test of Alternative Explanations’. Social Forces 68, 262–83. Wilson, J. Q. 1975. Thinking About Crime. New York: Vintage Books. Wolf, P. 1971. Crime and Development: An International Comparison of Crime Rates’. Scandinavian Studies in Criminology 3, 107–20.

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies, St Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, July 1997 2 (2) , 1–35, with permission. 2. The authors wish to thank Jim Lynch, American University, and Sandra Baxter, Applied Research Analysts, for their critical comments on a previous draft of this manuscript. The authors also wish to thank the Commissioners of Police in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago who so graciously participated in this study. The project was funded, in part, by a Senior Fulbright Research Grant. 3. For a brief but comprehensive discussion of the history of the approach, as well as the similarities and differences among routine activities, lifestyles and opportunity models, see Maxfield (1987). 4. For an extensive discussion of the problems of employing police report data, please see Bennett (1991a) and Bennett and Lynch (1990). 5. The measure of educational inequality used in this analysis was the Coefficient of Concentration (Con) defined as:

N Ó Pi2 - 1/N I=1 CON = ______1 - 1/N where P equals the fractional share of the ith category and N is the number of categories. In most cross-national studies investigating crime and inequality, the latter has been measured by income inequality. The indicator most widely used in past cross-national research is Jain’s (1975) international Gini Index based upon national-level income data (c.f. Stack 1984, Messner 1989). In these analyses, educational disparity, rather than income disparity, was used to measure status inequality. This was done because of the deficiencies in international data on income inequality (c.f. Bennett 1991b) and because of the inability to secure time series inequality data for the three nations studied here. Blau (1977) offers evidence that educational and income inequality are highly correlated and that each could be

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used to measure inequality. Bennett (1991a) has shown empirically that the measures of income and status inequality correlate (r = .865). This suggests that our use of education as opposed to income inequality should not radically affect our results. 6. Since November 1991, the US Commerce Department has used GDP as its primary economic measure over the traditionally used GNP. This change was an indication of the centrality of this measure in an ever-increasing internationalised world. 7. Since Ns are small and the sample was not randomly selected, significance tests are not used or reported. It was decided that .6 would be the cutoff point for substantive significance. The complete tables are available from the senior author upon request. 8. There will not be complete correspondence between the findings reported in Tables 1 and 2 with the findings reported in Figures 7 through 18. The differences are due to the grouping of crime types in the latter.

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chap18.pmd 429 12/8/2006, 11:15 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE Nineteen

Paradise Lost? INTRODUCTION

Crime in the In recent years there has been growing Caribbean: concern about rising levels of crime and A Comparison of violence in various Caribbean countries. This Barbados and concern has affected North American and European tourists as they plan their getaway 1 Jamaica tropical holidays as well as the residents of these developing nations. Adverse publicity John W. King about acts of violence generally and some specific incidents targeting visitors has created a fear around personal safety that presents a challenge for the tourist industry. Recent headlines in the United States (US) and Caribbean press highlight this growing concern. Headlines that read ‘Slaying of a Tourist in St. Thomas Mars Image of an “American Paradise”’ (Rohter 1994) and ‘Shooting Victims Had Long Sought Relaxation in St. Thomas’ Warmth’ (New York Times, January 29, 1996) indicate that visiting our neighbours to the south carries inherent risks. Even in the Caribbean press incidents of violence have become commonplace. A major Jamaican newspaper, The Observer ran an article titled ‘Murder-More Than The Statistics’ (July 14, 1996) examining the personal tragedy associated with increasing rates of murder. At about the same time noted Caribbean criminologist Klaus de Albuquerque, in an article written for Caribbean Week (a regional newspaper) describes an incident that is becoming all too familiar:

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On August 7, 1996, gun violence erupted yet again in Kingston. This time it was Olympic Gardens. The battle, fought over five hours with high powered weapons, spilled into St. Patrick’s Church and School on Bay Farm Road. At first between rival gangs, soldiers from the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) later joined in. Monsignor Richard Albert of St. Patrick’s Church described the night of August 7 as the “worst night of criminal gun violence” he had heard in years. The Monsignor went on to say, “I fear a total social breakdown in this community-it is becoming like Bosnia.” (Caribbean Week August 31–September 13, 1996,1)

The media accounts are not inconsistent with the actual incidence of crime in the Caribbean, especially Jamaica. Jamaica, in particular, has recorded alarming rates of violent crime in recent decades, much of it linked to politics. In 1980 for instance, the homicide rate in Jamaica was 45.3 per 100,000 residents. In the past five years, this rate has ranged from 22.4 to 29.6 per 100,000 — a rate that exceeds even the notoriously violent US (see Table 19.2). While Jamaica is a leader in violent crime, Barbados in recent years has experienced a surge in property crimes. This small tropical paradise records rates of burglary and other crimes of theft at a rate that equals or exceeds many of the larger Caribbean islands. In the last five years, for instance, the burglary rate has ranged from 1049.9 to 1901.9 per 100,000 residents (see Table 19.2). As I will argue later in this paper, these high rates of crime and violence are due to social structural arrangements, law enforcement limitations and increasing foreign penetration via the mass media.

BARBADOS AND JAMAICA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Before examining the factors associated with increasing rates of crime and violence in Barbados and Jamaica, it is important to gain some familiarity with these two island nations. Barbados and Jamaica are both former British colonies, each gaining political independence about the same time (in 1966 and 1962 respectively). Both island nations have been built on a history of slavery, colonialism and the plantation system. Under British rule beginning in the mid 1600s, slaves were brought from West Africa to toil in the sugarcane fields under white British rule. These islands developed a mono-crop economy creating a wealthy and prosperous plantocracy that possessed both economic and political power. Even after Emancipation in 1838, many black slaves continued to work the plantations because few opportunities existed to own and cultivate land. Other freed slaves migrated to neighbouring islands in search of a better life. Today, Barbados and Jamaica along with other Caribbean nations are struggling along a difficult path of economic development. Both economies are heavily dependent on tourism and agricultural products — two sources of revenue that are delicately balanced against the dangers of hurricanes and the vagaries of the

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travelling public. Additionally, Barbados has attracted foreign business and investment in data processing operations and Jamaica has enjoyed profits from natural resources, notably bauxite and alumina. Other Caribbean countries have developed off-shore textile operations creating many needed jobs in this less developed region. While Jamaica and Barbados share a history of slavery, British colonial rule, and an economy built of the plantation system, they are each unique with respect to their present-day status among Caribbean nations. Barbadians or ‘Bajans’ as they are called enjoy a much higher standard of living compared with Jamaicans. In 1994, the per capita Gross National Product (GNP) in Jamaica was $US 1,420 and $US 6,530 in Barbados (see Table 19.1). Various socio-demographic and economic indicators suggest that the quality of life and range of opportunities is higher in Barbados than in Jamaica. In fact, Jamaica more clearly fit the label ‘Third World’ country than Barbados. Jamaica is a heavily indebted country with a high inflation rate (52 per cent in 1992) and a weak currency (one US dollar equals about 35 Jamaican dollars). These profiles become important when considering the impact of inequality on crime in the Caribbean context. In an effort to begin to understand the characteristics of contemporary Barbadian and Jamaican culture and the factors associated with crime in the Caribbean region, I made several trips to these islands. This exploratory investigation consists of interviews with police officials, social scientists at the University of the West Indies (UWI) and social service workers who come into contact with younger people. In addition to these qualitative sources of information, I was able to obtain limited crime statistics from both the Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) and the Royal Barbados Police Force. What follows is a discussion of key factors that emerged from both the interviews and the limited literature on crime and violence in the Caribbean.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

The existing literature on cross-cultural criminology consistently shows a relationship between levels of economic inequality and crime (Messner 1989, Krahn, Hartnagel and Gartrell 1986). While differences exist in conceptualisation and measurement of inequality, there is fundamental agreement that economic inequality is associated with crime. The argument that certain social and economic arrangements are related to crime in Jamaica has been made by Bernard Headley in his recent book The Jamaican Crime Scene: A Perspective (1996). Headley, an American-based criminologist from Jamaica argues that ‘a pattern of dependent capitalist relations in Jamaica has served to produce a situation in which the scarcity of regular, socially acceptable work has condemned a substantial portion of the Jamaican population to an economically marginal existence.’ He goes on to suggest that:

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persistent poverty, structural unemployment and rural dispossession have given rise to acts of scuffling, petty hustling, street crime (often accompanied by extreme violence) and creation of an international drugs-and-guns network peopled by segments of a displaced working class who have historically found economic relief by migrating (Headley 1996, 39).

Thus, when Headley poses the question ‘from whence did we get such “bad” people?’ he answers ‘we got them, and continue to get them from the peculiar processes of our socioeconomic history and development’ (original emphasis). Although Headley is referring specifically to Jamaica, Barbados also experiences conditions of economic inequality with an unemployment rate of 21.9 per cent in 1994. However, as I will discuss later in this paper, Jamaica contends with other criminogenic conditions that are largely absent on the smaller island of Barbados. Actually, it is relative deprivation rather than absolute poverty that appears to be the key instigator behind crime and violence. This finding has been offered by researchers examining crime in both developed and developing countries (Blau and Blau 1982, Stone 1988, Messner 1989, Headley 1996). In countries with significant numbers of affluent tourists arriving each year, the rather modest living conditions experienced by the average Caribbean resident becomes even more obvious. It is not surprising that a sense of frustration accompanied by high levels of property and violent crimes appears throughout the Caribbean. During my last two visits to the Caribbean, members of my travel party were victims of theft. In both cases, large sums of cash were taken in day and night time burglaries. One Jamaican commented that some younger people feel a sense of entitlement to illegal proceeds because the American visitors have so much.

LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES

During my interviews with police officials in Barbados and Jamaica, I noticed a distinct difference in the way police respond to crime in the two countries as well as a different attitude towards the citizenry. In Jamaica, there is a history of coercive, heavy-handed policing styles. Members of the JCF carry side-arms and nightsticks and look very much like the paramilitary force that they are. Bernard Headley summarises this orientation saying:

Nothing has generated more tension, more disrespect, and more hostility between police and the people they are supposed to serve than the notion that the police exist as “something” outside of and apart from the communities they are supposed to serve (1986, 67).

There is fundamental distrust between the police and citizens in Jamaica, especially in the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) where much of the violence occurs. One might argue that this coercive approach is a natural response to the

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extremely high levels of violence in these areas. However, this distrust and alienation creates barriers which make the investigation of these crimes difficult. Not many people are willing to come forward with information, especially when youth gangs with a reputation for violence are involved. The Barbadian response to crime is fundamentally different. Assistant Police Commissioner Alvin Griffith of the Royal Barbados Police Force described to me at length his philosophy behind law enforcement, especially in dealing with youth. The approach is one of diversion and the informal handling of cases whenever possible. Police officers visit homes and talk with the parents of youth who appear to be at risk for more serious lawbreaking. In the 1980s the Juvenile Liaison Scheme was established in Barbados which involves juvenile offenders, their parents, crime victims and various government agencies in an effort to resolve incidents of juvenile crime using a variety of diversionary options. One police inspector described this strategy as a ‘social service’ approach to juvenile crime. For 1992, 102 juveniles were processed, 75 for behavioural problems and 27 for the commission of criminal offences. The offence of larceny was the most prevalent offence representing 55 per cent of the total (Royal Barbados Police Force 1992). Two other crime prevention programmes are noteworthy. The Schools Liaison Programme brings police officers into the school to establish connections with younger people, not unlike the programmes in the US. The building of trusting relationships between younger people and police officers is seen as an important first step in the prevention of delinquency. The Resident Beat Officer Scheme is a community policing effort that the Royal Barbados Police Force believes is instrumental in curbing crime on their island. Police establish relationships with residents who in turn assist police officers through neighbourhood watch groups-both in metropolitan Bridgetown (the capital city) and the more rural parishes in the northern part of the island. There is also a real sense of familiarity among residents in Barbados. The island is small (166 sq. miles) and reflects numerous kinship and friendship ties. During one excursion around the island, my driver was greeting people he knew every few minutes. I asked about this and he informed me that you do not have to look very far to find family ties - many people are related to one another. This may very well create informal social controls on behaviour that keep levels of crime low.

OUTSIDE INFLUENCES: MASS MEDIA AND TOURISM

Brief mention should be given to a less obvious factor that might be considered indirectly related to crime. A full understanding of Caribbean culture requires an examination of the recent influences of North American mass media and tourism. There is presently great concern among Caribbean scholars and policymakers

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that the massive invasion of North American television programming is erasing any remnants of indigenous culture throughout the Caribbean. A report commissioned by the Caribbean Publishers and Broadcasters Association (CPBA) states that:

The Caribbean is exposed to a level of foreign content in books, magazines, radio and television. As a source of news, information, and entertainment, television can have far reaching effects on Caribbean culture and politics. Foreign content in the region’s programming has reached a level that is unacceptable (Hetsberger 1995).

In fact, over 80 per cent of Caribbean electronic media content is foreign produced! Of all sub-regions of the world, the Caribbean is the most penetrated in terms of foreign television programming (Hetsberger 1995). Aside from the issue of the loss of indigenous culture, there is the very real possibility that increasing Americanisation of the Caribbean region has brought with it negative influences associated with rising levels of crime and delinquency. Recent analyses of rising levels of delinquency in China has concluded that increasing Western influence has created the rapid introduction of new ideas, values and attitudes disrupting the traditional mechanisms of social control. The result is a dramatic increase in youth crime (Rojek 1988). Caribbean commentators have cited ‘foreign penetration’ as a correlate of criminogenic images and attitudes. It is the combination of these images along with the presence of other criminogenic factors that give rise to growing criminality. Thus, disenfranchised urban youth who seek power, status and excitement act on their impulses as do the protagonists in many of the American movies and television programmes so common throughout the Caribbean. One commentator states:

Our acculturation process has been subverted by the U.S. propaganda apparatus operating through the cinema and television which spews forth a continuous diet of violence which has been accepted almost unquestionably as suitable for Jamaica as it pursues modernization (Bonnick 1994:157).

A ‘bad guy’ image has been embraced by many Jamaican youth residing in Kingston’s ghettos. Many youth join gangs and pursue a thrill-seeking lifestyle where violence is condoned and even celebrated. Mass tourism impacts crime in two ways. First, it serves as a constant reminder to Caribbean residents of the disparities of wealth and thus might produce a motivation for crime. Second, the presence of tourists creates opportunities for crime, often with minimal risk. In Barbados, ‘crimes against visitors’ are recorded and largely involve burglaries of hotel rooms/rental properties and other forms of larceny (e.g., ‘theft from beaches’ and ‘other theft’). There are, however, a notable number of robberies targeting visitors. Tourists, of course, are especially

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vulnerable because they are in unfamiliar surroundings and may let their guard down, identification of assailants is difficult and they usually remain on the island for a short time thus they are unable to assist in prolonged investigations and prosecutions. On two occasions in both Jamaica and Barbados, police officers interviewed members of my travel group following their victimisation. In both cases, police informed the victims of these burglary incidents that it is unlikely they will apprehend the offender but that they would investigate.

THE CASE OF JAMAICA: GANGS, GUNS AND DRUGS

In the discussion thus far, it has become evident that Barbados and Jamaica are very different with respect to serious crime and delinquency. While both countries have experienced increasing levels of crime, Jamaica clearly contends with some special criminogenic conditions that are either absent or less evident in Barbados. Part of this is tied to the recent social and political history of Jamaica. It is this recent history that provides a glimpse into how Jamaica became so violent and the conditions that continue to fan the flames of violence. Jamaica has a history of political violence. It is important to note that up until the 1960s the levels of crime in Jamaica were similar to the Eastern Caribbean (where Barbados is located). Starting in the 1960s and into the 1970s there developed a new political consciousness borne out of poverty, powerlessness and partisan politics. Carl Stone (1988:24) suggests that this political consciousness:

was rooted in a period when racial militancy became part of political consciousness of urban ghetto youth and crime was seen (in its initial beginnings) as a political act and as an act of protest against an unjust social order.

Later the violence became more organised linked to gangs supported by the two main political parties — The Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP). No longer was this ‘lumpen’ violence (as Stone calls it) a collective response to the conditions of abject deprivation, but rather a means for each political party to maintain power by supplying gangs with weapons and using intimidation tactics during elections to establish dominance and control. The result was the emergence of ‘garrison constituencies’ in Kingston neighbourhoods. A patronage system insured that all the players got what they wanted - politicians received support in elections, local ‘thugs’ who insured the votes received favours such as work contracts and police protection and drug traffickers were provided with guns to conduct their business. In the 1970s and into the 1980s election related violence was especially pronounced. Of the 800 odd murders reported for the island in 1980, most were attributed to political violence between the island’s two warring political ‘tribes’ (Headley 1996). From a criminological standpoint, the evidence points to a subculture of violence that reached such epidemic proportions that even the police were powerless in their

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control efforts. In 1974, the threat became substantial enough that the PNP government under Michael Manley passed a repressive Suppression of Crime Act and created along with it a special ‘Gun Court’ that would hear criminal cases involving guns and mete out severe penalties. In the past ten years, Jamaica has seen a significant reduction in election related violence, however, the political divisions remain as do the issues of most concern to the majority of Jamaicans.

CRIME IN THE CARIBBEAN: SOLUTIONS AND PROSPECTS

It is difficult to propose crime control strategies for the Caribbean region generally due to the unique challenges that each island nation faces. Many North American visitors to the Caribbean (or West Indies) view this ‘continent of islands’ (Kurlansky 1992) in simple geographic terms — a cluster of islands of varying size that have a common history. Yet, there is a distinctive quality to each island nation — in terms of culture, politics and economics. What Barbados and Jamaica can do is to build on their past success in tourism and agriculture. In addition, there has to be a real commitment on the part of government to upgrade the infrastructure of these nations. The road conditions on some of these islands are horrendous. I was told by two taxi drivers that during an election year in Jamaica the incumbent prime minister promises better road conditions and in fact materials for repairs are deposited by the roadside throughout the island. Following the election, these materials remain on the roadside never to be used for the promised repairs. As a result, residents help themselves to these materials for their own renovation projects. Without government commitment towards improving the infrastructure of these islands, all other efforts at economic development and social transformation will not achieve their potential. However, all Caribbean residents should share in the benefits that development has to offer, through adequate employment, home ownership and increased education. Only then can we expect to reverse the pattern of out-migration and feelings of resentment and frustration that contribute to high levels of crime and violence. One striking difference in the crime control efforts of Barbados and Jamaica is the law enforcement response. Clearly Jamaica can learn from the successes of its eastern Caribbean neighbour. True enough, there exists a great deal more violence in Jamaica which may very well call for a more aggressive approach to crime control. Yet there is such little confidence and trust in law enforcement among Jamaicans, thus making it difficult to conduct investigations and successfully prosecute offenders. Aside from establishing positive working relationships between the police and the community, the police need to be more effective in apprehending offenders and investigating crimes. Ellis (1991) points out that when Jamaica experienced a peak in criminal violence in 1980, the apprehension and conviction rates for murder/manslaughter were the lowest in years (54 per cent and three per cent respectively). Increased criminal justice

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effectiveness can occur by empowering the community but also requires a political commitment to educate, train and discipline a police force so that justice is administered fairly. There have been calls for a regional Caribbean police force (Steckles 1995) to overcome the high degree of familiarity among island residents that makes it difficult for police officers to act impartially in their enforcement of the law. A well educated and trained police officer is perhaps the next best thing.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have identified a few factors that are linked to rising levels of crime and violence in two Caribbean countries - Barbados and Jamaica. There are other issues, most notably the plague of international drug trafficking that I have not reviewed but that do contribute to crime in the Caribbean. It is my conviction that American criminologists need to become aware of the nature and extent of crime in neighbouring countries due to the widespread movement of people throughout the Americas. There is a great deal of migration and travel for pleasure between North America and the Caribbean. Much of the out-migration from the Caribbean is motivated by the desperate economic conditions of some Caribbean nations. Crime in the Caribbean in a very real sense touches the lives of North Americans — through the influx of violent drug traffickers and gang member ‘wannabes’ into our cities and through the victimisation of tourists who seek a brief respite from the hectic pace of American living. It is the combination of the factors discussed in this paper that created a level of crime and violence in this region of the world that must be reversed before ‘paradise’ is lost forever.

TABLE 19.1 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC PROFILES

BARBADOS JAMAICA Area 166 sq. miles 4,244 sq. miles Population (1995) 260,000 (1995) 2.5 million Population Density (Persons per sq. mile) 1,542 603 % Urban 38% 53% Per Capita GNP ($US 1994) 6,530 1,420 Official Unemployment Rate 20.5% (1994) 15.4% (1992) Inflation Rate (consumer prices) 2% (1994) 52% (1992) Secondary School Enrolment 85% 66% Expenditure per Pupil ($US) 600.0 97.0

Sources: Population Reference Bureau: Barbados-1990 Population and Housing Census (Statistics Service); US Department of State (Background Notes)

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TABLE 19.2 SUMMARY CRIME STATISTICS FOR BARBADOS AND JAMAICA (OFFENCES PER 10,000 PERSONS)

TYPE YEAR BARBADOS JAMAICA 1991 7.3 22.4 1992 7.6 27.0 Murder and 1993 6.5 28.3 Manslaughter 1994 7.6 29.6 1995 5.3 32.5 1991 254.6 199.4 1992 366.5 197.2 Robbery 1993 278.8 216.6 1994 186.5 218.4 1995 156.9 176.9 1991 1225.7 323.0 1992 1217.6 248.2 Burglary 1993 1561.1 267.0 1994 1264.2 268.7 1995 1046.9 230.3 1991 879.2 740.8 Total Crimes 1992 788.8 806.9 Against 1993 730.7 851.0 Person 1994 716.1 896.1 1995 795.7 923.3 1991 1508.8 659.0 Total Crimes 1992 1645.0 580.8 Against 1993 1901.9 618.1 Property 1994 1483.8 578.1 1995 1230.7 550.6

Sources: Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force.

REFERENCES

Blau, J.R. & Blau, P. M. 1982. ‘The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime’. American Sociological Review 47: 114–29. Bonnick, G. 1994. ‘Crime and Violence: Its Implications for Economic Expansion’. In Jamaica: Preparing for the Twenty-first Century, ed. P. Lewis, 148–60. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers. de Albuquerque, K. 1996. ‘Looting and shooting and killing in a rampage’. Caribbean Week, August 31–September 13. Ellis, H. 1991. ‘Crime and Control in the English-Speaking Caribbean: A Comparative Study of Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago and Barbados 1960–80’. In Crime and Control in

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Comparative Perspectives, ed. H. Heiland, L. Shelley and H. Katoh, 131–61. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Gunst, L. 1995. Born Fi’ Dead: A Journey through the Jamaican Posse Underworld. New York: Henry Holt. Headley, B. 1996. The Jamaican Crime Scene: A Perspective. Washington: Howard University Press. Hetsberger, U. 1995. ‘Personal Interview’. August 17. Krahn, H., Hartnagel, T. and Gartrell, J. 1986. ‘Income Inequality and Homicide Rates: Cross-National Data and Criminological Theories’. Criminology 24: 269–95. Kurlansky, M. 1992. A Continent of Islands: Searching for the Caribbean Destiny. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley. Messner, S. F. 1989. ‘Economic Discrimination and Societal Homicide Rates: Further Evidence on the Cost of Inequality’. American Sociological Review 54: 597–611. New York Times. 1996. Shooting Victims Had Long Sought Relaxation in St. Thomas’s Warmth. January 29 A-11. Rohter, L. New York Times. 1994. Slaying of a Tourist in St. Thomas Mars Image of an ‘American Paradise’. April 19. Rojek, D. G. 1988. Confucianism, Maoism and the Coming of Delinquency to China. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Sociological Society, Minneapolis. Royal Barbados Police Force.1992. Annual Report of the Commissioner of Police. Barbados, Government Printing Office. Steckles, G. Caribbean Week. 1995. The Case for a Regional Police Force. May 27-June 9. Stone, C.1988. ‘Crime and Violence: Socio-Political Implications’. In Crime and Violence in Jamaica: Causes and Solutions, ed. P. Phillips and J. Wedderburn, 19-48. Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. The Observer (Jamaica). 1996. Murder – more than the statistics. July 14.

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology Volume 2 Number 1, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, 1997, pp. 30–44, with permission.

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A Longitudinal INTRODUCTION

Study of The popular tourist myth of the Caribbean Serious Crime as a string of island paradises is being undermined by the realities of crime. Even in the some of the smaller and more remote Caribbean1 communities in the region have experienced some spill-over effects of escalating crime rates. Much of this escalation has occurred Klaus de Albuquerque and since the late 1980s and is a direct result of Jerome L. McElroy the large volume of drugs transiting the region and the increasing number of guns finding their way into most states (de Albuquerque 1995, de Albuquerque 1996a). But there are other contributing factors. With relatively high rates of unemployment and underemployment, increasing income inequality, and the progressive marginalisation of males who fail to meet proscribed standards of education, it is small wonder that a predatory class of young men has emerged. It is this group that is disproportionately responsible for the increases in violent and property-related offences and that has driven fear into the hearts of the citizenry. The extent of this fear is attested to, particularly in urban areas in the region, by the popularity of burglar bars (grill work), high walls and fences, guard dogs, and security guard services. In the Kingston metropolitan area, this fear has reached such hysterical proportions that the middle class and the rich go as far as to grill in their bedrooms and lock their guard dogs in with them at night. Ordinary Jamaicans are rushing to arm themselves. In 1997, more

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than 10,000 applications for gun licenses were made but only 1,096 licenses were issued (Virtue 1998). Prime Minister P.J. Patterson, speaking at his Party’s National Executive Committee meeting in January 1998, intoned, ‘We cannot continue like this. We must save Jamaica from lawlessness’ (The Gleaner Online 1998a). The recent wave of middleclass emigration (MBAs, accountants, engineers) in late 1999 suggests the situation is deteriorating (Rosenberg 1999). Even formerly tranquil St. Kitts has been rocked by lawlessness over the past four years beginning with a series of drug-related murders (de Albuquerque 1996a). As of this writing, American students at an offshore Veterinary School in St. Kitts were leaving the island after ‘purportedly’ being threatened by drug lord Charles ‘Little Nut’ Miller. Miller is fighting extradition to the United States (US) (he is also wanted in Canada) and is afraid of being kidnapped Noreiga-style by US agents and whisked out of the country (Larmer 1998). Does the level of crime in the Caribbean really warrant the kind of fortress mentality that has emerged among the more privileged classes in Kingston, Port- of-Spain and Georgetown? Is violent crime so endemic in some areas that it is creating a new kind of Caribbean emigrant? Is the current lawlessness in Jamaica a harbinger of things to come elsewhere in the region as drugs and indiscipline tear away at the social fabric?

SCOPE

This expansion of an earlier study (de Albuquerque 1984) attempts a long- period examination of serious crime in the region. It contains three main sections. The first reviews the general and specific (Caribbean) literature linking crime and development with some special emphasis on Jamaica. The second tracks violent and property crime rates for nine selected islands and offers plausible explanations for the escalation of crime and for inter-island differences. The third provides a preliminary case study of the determinants of crime in Barbados.

CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT

The literature on crime and development is extensive, disparate in approach, and difficult to easily classify and compare. Despite the caution this diversity suggests, two general findings seem warranted: development is positively related to crime, specifically property crime, and negatively related to violent crime (Bennett 1991). Of the two dominant explanatory frameworks, the Durkheimian or modernisation perspective has been the most enduring. It links rising crime (both violent and property) to the break-up of traditional normative social controls (extended family, community ties, religious beliefs, ascribed status relations) during the process of urbanisation-industrialisation (Neuman and Berger 1988). Different authors emphasise different dimensions of the disequilibrium: the anonymity, youth displacement and social disorganisation associated with rapid

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rural-urban migration (Archer and Gartner 1984, Shelly 1981) the disjunction between modern and traditional values (Clinard and Abbott 1973, Messner 1982, 1988, Stack 1984); cultural heterogeneity and conflict (Hansmann and Quigley 1982, Quinney 1970) and the systemic frustration generated by absolute and/or relative inequality during urban industrial growth (Krahn and others 1986, Krohn 1976, 1978, Wellford 1974, Wolf 1971). A related deprivation variant emphasises blocked opportunity among marginalised out-groups, the so-called subculture or culture of violence thesis (Gartner 1990, Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1967). This is somewhat analogous to Marxian theories based on class conflict and uneven and contradictory capitalist development (Neuman and Berger 1988, Shelly 1981). The Durkheimian formulation, however, has been plagued by two problems: weak and inconsistent empirical support, and a failure to differentiate the determinants of violent versus property crime. Alternatively, the ecological or opportunity or routine activities perspective has been developed from the cost/ benefit calculus characteristic of the Chicago school (Neuman and Berger 1988). This theory emphasises economic and demographic changes over cultural and normative patterns, and tends to predict increases in property-related crime only. The forces of industrialisation and urbanisation increase the availability of material goods and the pool of young potential offenders, and simultaneously reduce kinship contact (potential violence) and the possibility of detection (through anonymity, increased mobility, etc.) (Kick and LaFree 1985). Industrialisation creates more ‘suitable [crime] targets’ and fewer and fewer ‘capable guardians’ (Cohen and Felson 1979, Maxfield 1987). This approach appears more consistent with recent empirical work (Avison and Loring 1986, Bennett 1991, LaFree and Kick 1986).

THE CARIBBEAN

Historically, the Caribbean has had fairly high violent crime rates coupled with very low property crime rates when compared to most developing regions in the world (United Nations 1977). With the growth of urban areas in the late nineteenth and early part of this century, property crime rates increased (Trotman 1986). These rates mushroomed with the post-1960 restructuring of many Caribbean economies away from plantation monocrops toward tourism, related construction, and light manufacturing (McElroy and de Albuquerque 1983). In the 1970s, violent crime rates began to increase and in Jamaica and the US Virgin Islands (USVI) they were comparable to, or exceeded, those of the US (de Albuquerque 1984). In fact, the pattern of violent crime (heavily gang, drug, and gun-related) in these two territories parallels that of the US. These two states now have the dubious distinction of having some of the highest homicide rates and overall violent crime rates in the Americas (de Albuquerque 1996a, de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999). Most of the earlier explanations of crime in the Caribbean fit loosely under

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the Durkheimian modernisation umbrella (Mahabir 1985). Crime is the by product of the decline in traditional informal social control mechanisms (so important in the rural Caribbean) and the rise and shifting character of urbanisation with its new and disjunctive patterns of wealth, residential segregation and work arrangements (McElroy and de Albuquerque 1983). Much of the crime is committed by economically disenfranchised urban youth for whom the promise of material affluence concomitant with modernisation is only realisable through illegitimate means, so crime becomes redefined as a subsistence/survival strategy (de Albuquerque 1984). As a corollary, the familiar economic deprivation argument blames crime on unemployment, poverty, and income inequality which tend to increase during the initial stages of development. The modernisation thesis underlies the work of Allen (1976), Dodd and Parris (1976), Parris (1980), Pryce and Figueira (1980), Jones (1981), McElroy and de Albuquerque (1983), and, to some extent, Mahabir (1985), Ellis (1988), and Headley (1996). Many of these studies emphasise urban deprivation. For example, Pryce and Figueira (1980) note that the county of St. George, which contains the two largest urban centres (Port-of-Spain and Arima) and is home to one third the population of Trinidad and Tobago, accounted for 58 per cent of all crimes in 1972. Likewise, Parris (1980) notes that crime in Guyana is largely confined to the three urban areas of Georgetown, Linden and New Amsterdam, while de Albuquerque (1995) reports that metropolitan Kingston, which contained only 27 per cent of Jamaica’s population in 1993, accounted for 60 per cent of the murders. Empirical testing of the modernisation framework, however, has been relatively limited and inconclusive. For example, de Albuquerque (1984) found no relationship between unemployment, the price of food, and violent crime. He did find that modernisation (a composite indicator incorporating infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy, per capita GNP, and so on) and tourist density were positively related to rape. In a study of self-reported crime in Barbados, Ramoutar (1995) found drug-related offenders were characterised by low socioeconomic status. These weak results were partly responsible for the search for alternative explanations: the deviant socialisation of youth (‘differential association’) in so- called ghetto areas (Allen 1976, Brana-Shute 1980, Dodd and Parris 1976) and an emerging ‘cowboy mentality’ (Lacey 1977) traceable to the influence of American and Italian ‘B’ movies that glorified violence and glamorised the criminal lifestyle (Manley 1975, Parris 1980). One of the more promising theories is a tourism variant of the opportunity/ routine activities perspective (Ryan 1993). This model argues that theft and robbery tend to increase in mass tourist destinations because visitors represent ‘attractive targets’ carrying much portable wealth with little precaution. Because of unfamiliarity, they are more likely (than residents) to wander into criminogenic areas where ‘capable guardians’ are absent and are viewed by potential assailants

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as less likely to report crimes or accurately identify the perpetrators if they do. Two case studies tend to broadly support the theory. For example, air arrivals were a significant predictor of property crime in the USVI between 1960 and 1979 (McElroy and de Albuquerque 1983), and tourists in Barbados in the early 1990s were much more likely to be victimised by property crime than residents (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999).

JAMAICA

While the modernisation and opportunity perspectives may be plausible general explanations for the escalation of property crime in the region, they have been less useful for understanding the rise in violent crime in general and the meteoric increase in violence in Jamaica since the mid-1970s in particular. Early observers argued that political tribalism and clientilism, which pitted poor urban communities against one another, offered a superior explanation (Stephens and Stephens 1986, Stone 1983). With a long history of arming ghetto youth, Jamaica’s rival political parties were clearly responsible for the creation of a subculture of violence and intimidation that emerged in the 1970s, particularly in West Kingston (see de Albuquerque 1996d, Gunst 1995, Headley 1996). In the 1980 election campaign, 889 people were killed (de Albuquerque 1996d), many in shootouts between rival political gangs (‘posses’). The murder rate for that bloody election year was not surpassed until 1997 (The Gleaner Online 1998b). Since 1980, periodic eruptions of gun violence in Kingston have prompted a backlash of heavy-handed patrols by the army and police when it became evident that rival political activists could no longer control their enforcers. With the increasing distrust of the police and army, particularly in opposition strongholds, many of the so called ‘garrison’ constituencies came entirely under the control of posse leaders (‘Dons’), who provide residents protection and other necessities (food, money, school books) financed largely through drug dealing and raids on rival communities (de Albuquerque 1996d). These developments and the growth of the drug trade have spawned the most recent theory of Jamaica violence, the spread of the narco-economy (de Albuquerque and McElroy 2000, Harriott 1996). Indeed, in West Kingston a ganja-economy had emerged in 1970 as local gangs became increasingly sustained by marijuana exports to the US. By the late 1970s, the gangs, many posse members, including some infamous Dons (Bucky Marshall, Claudie Massop), were travelling frequently back and forth to the US where they succeeded in taking over the ganja trade and internationalising the operations of Jamaican gangs. In 1988, the US stepped up the deportation of Jamaican immigrants convicted of a variety of felony offences, including murder. By the end of 1996, over 6,000 Jamaicans had been returned from foreign countries, the majority for drug-related offences (Becker 1996). Many of these ‘deportees’ soon took up where they left off, introducing American gang-style drive-by executions, the recruitment of juveniles (lookouts, runners, hitmen – see Harriott

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1996) and a whole range of semiautomatic weapons in Jamaica and elsewhere (Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Guyana). In summary, it was the ‘changing social organisation of crime and criminals,’ particularly the establishment of a narco-economy with overseas branches, and the ‘social embededness and power of Jamaican criminal networks’ that was primarily responsible for the escalation of violent crime in Jamaica (Harriott 1996, 1). Gangs, populated by chronic offenders, did not emerge sui generis in Jamaica, they were originally the creation of politicians, and they are ‘embedded’ in Jamaican and other Caribbean societies like Antigua and St. Kitts with linkages to the political elite, the police, the judiciary, immigration and customs, local businesses, and the citizenry. Among the chronic offenders are the ‘super predators,’ those very violent criminals who commit a disproportionate number of crimes. Jamaican commentator Vasciannie (1997) calls them ‘dog-hearted murderers’ — they ‘will kill you without a thought, assassinate you for a small fee...enter your home with pure malice and take your life...slay you if you look at them too hard.’ Harriott (1996) reports that the Jamaican police estimated in 1994 that there were 3,000 ‘hardened’ criminals. These super predators are appearing elsewhere in the region as Jamaican drug traffickers extend their efforts to the Eastern Caribbean and as Jamaican-style posses spring up everywhere. Bohning (1997), citing regional law enforcement officials, contend the local drug trafficking groups in places like St. Kitts etc., got their training in Jamaica in the 1970s as ganja traffickers, an obvious reference to Charles Miller. The emergence of narco-economies elsewhere in the region (Puerto Rico, the USVI, St. Kitts, and to a lesser extent, Antigua) and narco-political corruption (see de Albuquerque 1996b and 1996c) have placed drug lords and their gang members in positions of great power (Griffith 1997). Witness the case of St. Kitts where Charles Miller has been able to successfully fight extradition to the US (Larmer 1998) or David Lawrence’s murder trial (Lawrence is accused of murdering a police superintendent) that has three times ended in a hung jury (Rohter 1997). It is small wonder that Caribbean states are rushing to re-introduce the death penalty and to speed up hangings of convicted murderers and several drug lords.

DATA AND METHODS

In an earlier study, de Albuquerque (1984) noted some of the data problems involved in comparative studies of crime in the Caribbean. These include: (1) The reliability of longitudinal data on crime (recording inconsistencies, poor record keeping, definitional changes, etc.) and on the socioeconomic and demographic variables normally used in the analysis of crime, (2) The lack of comparability in offence/offender classification systems, (3) Unclear definitions for some offences, and (4) A need to modernise the labelling of some offences.

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To minimise such problems, this study was limited to serious crimes where the definitions were unambiguous and the crimes were comparable for nine Caribbean states selected because of relatively reliable crime data. As a result, the category of serious assault was discarded because assaults of different levels of seriousness were often combined, categories overlapped, and sometimes simple assaults were included with felonious assaults. Grenada, for example, has five categories of serious assault — maiming, wounding, causing harm, dangerous harm and grievous harm. It was difficult to define the ambiguous category of ‘causing harm.’ It was also suspected that simple assaults were fairly often included with serious assaults in figures for Antigua and Dominica. Several caveats need to be mentioned. The St. Kitts/Nevis data on murder included manslaughter, but we determined the number of such cases was negligible. The data on rape for Antigua and St. Kitts included ‘indecent assault’ and for Jamaica ‘carnal abuse.’ The data on larceny was made comparable by removing data on praedial larceny (absent as a category in some islands) and larceny of motor vehicles. For burglary, various categories were combined, for example, breaking and entering, house breaking, other break-ins, and entering a dwelling house at night. The longitudinal crime data are presented in tabular form in Tables 20.1 to 20.5. They are averaged for the 1980s and 1990s with of course the caveat that these averages are not based on equal numbers of years. Average 1980s rates are not presented for Grenada since the 1980s is only represented by one year. Using data from de Albuquerque (1984), murder, robbery and rape rates for 1969–73 are compared with our data for 1989–93. These are graphed in Figures 20.1to 20.3. Because of data completeness, Barbados was selected as a case study to assess the relative predictability of the modernisation/deprivation thesis versus the opportunity theory on island crime patterns. Three standard indicators — per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), per capita electricity consumption and the unemployment rate — were chosen because of their frequent use in the literature (Bennett 1991, LaFree and Kick 1986, Neuman and Berger 1988). Three other indicators were developed to explore special features of the small-island tourist society. The retail price index was used as a proxy measure of economic pressure in an import-intensive and inflation prone economy. The unemployment rate and inflation rate were combined to create an additional measure of economic pressure/inequality, the so-called ‘misery index’ (Gordon 1998, 361). The daily census of tourists was developed to operationalise the opportunity/routine activities theory. The annual average tourist daily census was computed as follows:

No. of Stayovers x Average Length of Stay + No. of Cruise Arrivals 365

This was employed as a measure of tourist density or presence. All independent variables are presented in Table 20.6 while the dependent crime rate variables are

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listed in Table 20.7. Accordingly, in light of the literature, three broad hypotheses were formulated for testing:

(1) That all indicators would be positively related to property crime as suggested by the opportunity theory; (2) That the tourism presence indicator would be a significant determinant of property crime as the Ryan (1993) variant of the opportunity model proposes; and (3) That violent crime would not be explained.

This last is based both on weak and inconsistent empirical support for the Durkheimian thesis in the literature as well as the fact that we were unable to measure some of the major influences on violent crime in the region: drug use and the spread of the narco-economy, emergence of subcultures of violence, and so on. The hypotheses were tested using linear (OLS) regression analysis. Bivariate and multiple regression models were run, and correlation analysis was used to eliminate collinearity in the selection of appropriate (unrelated) independent variables in the multivariate models. In cases where serious autocorrelation was present, the data set was transformed into first differences. The results are presented in Table 20.8.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION Murder

Decadal differences in murder rates were negligible for Barbados and Dominica, while they show moderate increases for Antigua, Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica (see Table 20.1). If 1980 data for Jamaica is excluded, the decadal differences are more marked. St. Kitts/Nevis saw its murder rate almost double from 5.9 in the 1980s to 10.2 in the 1990s. This is clearly the result of the spate of drug-related murders which began in late 1994 with the murder of the deputy prime minister’s son and his companion and the gunning down of a police superintendent (de Albuquerque, 1996a). Jamaica and the USVI continue to have the highest murder rates in the region. Between 1970 and 1977, Jamaica’s average murder rate was 16 per 100,000 (de Albuquerque 1984). In the 1980s, it rose to 21.4 and in the 1990s it stands at 27.7. A closer examination of murders in the 1980s reveals that the majority resulted from domestic disputes (de Albuquerque 1995). By the 1990s, however, the pattern had changed visibly with gang feuds and robbery in 1995 accounting for 46 per cent of all murders (Economic and Social Survey 1995). Paralleling this has been the increasing incidence in the use of firearms in the commission of murders. In 1988, firearms were used in 50 per cent of the murders and by 1996 in 68 per cent (Williams 1997). The majority of perpetrators are young, unemployed/casually

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employed males, aged 15-29, but this group is also disproportionately victimised by murder. The number of women murdered has increased steadily, and in 1997 women made up 10.3 per cent of all murder victims (Taylor 1998). In both decades, the Kingston–St. Andrew Metropolitan Area (KMA) accounted for the majority of the murders. In 1995, 59 per cent of the murders occurred in the corporate area (Economic and Social Survey 1995). De Albuquerque (1995) calculated the 1993 murder rate for metropolitan Kingston at 58 per 100,000, second only to Washington, DC (75 per 100,000) among metropolitan areas in North America and the Caribbean. While the clearance rates for all murders is below 50 per cent in Jamaica (37.9 per cent in 1997), in places like West Kingston clearance rates are in their teens (de Albuquerque 1996d, Sinclair 1998). The code of silence is very strong in Kingston’s garrison constituencies, either out of fear of reprisal, hatred for the army and police, or loyalty to the Dons. The 1990s violent crime scene in Jamaica has been complicated by the large influx of deportees and semi-automatic weapons. For every person on the Jamaica police’s most wanted list, 30 or so deportees are returned from abroad (de Albuquerque 1996d). Overseas Jamaican posses have long been associated with smuggling high-powered assault weapons (M16’s, M-10’s and Tec-9’s) and semi- automatic pistols (Berettas, Glocks, and Brownings) to their posse brethren back home. Former Police Commissioner Trevor McMillan complained bitterly to US authorities for an obvious lapse in the surveillance of Jamaican posses in the US when weapons shipments were discovered by Jamaican authorities (de Albuquerque 1996d). Guns have so permeated Kingston’s garrison constituencies that juveniles often parade around with guns, ‘Rambo’ style. The USVI, with a murder rate second only to Jamaica, saw its average 1980s murder rate (20.1 per 100,000) more than double the 1970s rate (9.0 per 100,000). As in Jamaica, this phenomenal increase was a result of drug feuds, gang vendettas, and the ready availability of guns. The latter are directly linked to the increasing number of robberies of tourists that end in murder. Beginning with the so-called Fountain Valley massacre in St Croix in 1972, when seven Whites and one Black employee were murdered at a golf course club house, White tourists have been disproportionately victimised. Even the US Navy Atlantic Fleet cancelled all shore leave in St Thomas in 1994 following 12 violent attacks (robberies, assaults, and one murder) against sailors. Since 1994, there have been several execution style slayings of visitors to the ‘American Paradise’ (see de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999). In 1992, the US showcase in the Caribbean had a higher violent crime rate (2,776 per 100,000) than New York City (2,162). Things have calmed down more recently in St Thomas in the wake of the massive rebuilding effort after hurricane Marilyn (1995). However, sister island St Croix saw its 1997 homicide rate more than double over 1996 (The Electronic Evergreen April 23, 1997). Guyana’s moderately high murder rates can also partly be explained by the increasing number of guns in circulation and used in the commission of crimes,

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especially robbery. Gang feuds and drug-related killings seem less of a factor in Guyana’s homicide cases. Domestic/family and neighbourhood/community disputes still account for the majority of the homicides. One surprising finding is that murder rates have not increased significantly in Trinidad and Tobago, despite public perceptions to the contrary. The spate of highly publicised murders and recent hangings of death row inmates have certainly contributed to this perception. Robbery

With the exception of Jamaica, most of the other Caribbean states have seen dramatic increases in robbery rates (see Table 20.2). In 1985, Antigua had a robbery rate of 37.3 per 100,000 and by 1995 this had tripled to 111.4 per 100,000. Barbados has also seen its average 1990s robbery rate more than triple (from 64.6 to 212.2) over its 1980s rates. Likewise, Dominica’s rates almost tripled over the same period. Guyana’s average robbery rates have increased by over 200 per 100,000 and the USVI’s by 164 per 100,000. St Kitts has witnessed the most dramatic increase in its average decennial robbery rates, an almost five-fold increase closely associated with the rapid rise in drug use and robbery to support addiction (de Albuquerque 1995). This explanation may also partly apply to the rising robbery rates in Antigua and Dominica. In Jamaica scarcely a week goes by that The Daily Observer does not report a particularly bold robbery (see October 26, 1996, October 29, 1996, and November 5, 1996). The USVI again has the dubious honour of having the highest robbery rates. Police estimate that 75 per cent of robberies in the territory are related to drugs (de Albuquerque 1996a). Tourists are much more likely to be victimised than residents, since they carry more portable wealth and are unfamiliar with their surroundings. One unexpected finding is that relatively law abiding Barbados had almost identical robbery rates as Jamaica between 1990-96. A significant number of the robberies in Barbados are perpetrated against visitors. In fact, visitors are five–six times more likely to be victimised by robbery than residents (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999). Like elsewhere in the region, robbers are becoming more daring in Barbados and are increasingly arming themselves with semi-automatic pistols (The Nation 1998). In Jamaica, the situation is quite different with the majority of tourists being afforded protection by being confined to all-inclusive enclaves. Criminals, therefore, prefer to target business establishments and the well to do - the bulk of the reported cases. However, larger numbers of poorer residents, particularly those in West, Central and East Kingston, are routinely robbed, but because of fear of reprisals, these robberies go unreported (Vasciannie 1997). Indeed, it may be that the level of unreported crime (murder excluded) is higher in Jamaica than anywhere else in the region. This speculation is based on casual observation of the Jamaican crime scene and the fact that robbery rates in Jamaica are significantly lower than in Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and the USVI.

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On the other hand, Guyana’s robbery rates have increased quite sharply since 1980. Dodd and Parris (1976), Parris (1980), and Dodd (1981) have written extensively about the Guyanese phenomenon of ‘choke and rob.’ However, Guyanese criminals have graduated in the 1990s to using firearms and to more selectively targeting their victims — business establishments such as cambios and restaurants, wealthy Guyanese, and the occasional tourist. One favourite tactic is to hold up a business establishment and rob not only the proprietor, but the staff and the patrons as well. The common Guyanese practice of wearing expensive gold jewellery and carrying quite a bit of cash is a motivating factor for robbing venues patronised by middle class and wealthy Guyanese, security guards notwithstanding. For example, on July 16, 1998, an armed gunman involved in three separate robberies in the Bourda area (Georgetown) came away with pendants, chains, rings, gold bands, earrings and one watch valued at Guyanese $706,000. His most successful haul was at a restaurant where he robbed the proprietor, an employee, and a patron (The Starbroek News 1998). Another relatively new tactic of Guyanese robbers is called ‘kick down the door’ (‘home invasions’ in the US). The targets are the residences of wealthy Guyanese, mostly Indo- Guyanese, who generally keep large amounts of cash and gold jewellery at home. Rape

Violence against women has escalated in the region and one indicator of this is the increasing incidence of rape. Although most rapes are committed by a person or persons known to the victim, there has been an increase in the number of rapes committed by strangers (de Albuquerque 1984). Yet there remain some puzzling differences in the rape rates in the nine selected states. Most of the smaller islands (Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts) have higher rates than the larger territories (see Table 20.3). Based on the senior author’s discussions with police authorities and record keepers across the region, we suspect some part of the explanation may lie in reporting discrepancies between large and small islands. However, the data may also indicate that the increasing disrespect and violence being directed towards women in the larger states is spilling over into the smaller territories. Grenada, in this respect, appears to be an anomaly. We are at a loss to explain why Dominica’s average rates would nearly double between the 1980s and 1990s, given its relatively low murder and robbery rates. On the other hand, Barbados continues to maintain relatively low rape rates perhaps reflecting the generally lower level of violence in Bajan society. Guyana’s relatively low rape rates are also somewhat suspect and may reflect the kind of under reporting of particularly sensitive crimes common in close kinship communities (Bayley 1969) in both poor rural areas (the embarrassment and stigma attached) and in urban ghettoes. In the latter, two important factors could account for the under reporting of rape — fear of reprisal and the general

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acceptance that young teenage girls living in the same household as the unrelated male partners of their mothers are fair game to these partners. This pattern of domestic rape in lower and working class communities would also suggest that Jamaica should have comparatively high rape rates, yet Jamaica’s average 1990s rates are considerably lower than many of the smaller islands. As in Guyana, fear of further victimisation or the loss of income from a male breadwinner may keep victims quiet. The police are often poorly trained to deal with rape victims, and sometimes their attitudes towards victims result in re- victimisation. One extreme example is of a woman who went to the Central Police Station in Kingston seeking protection from domestic abuse. She was raped by two policemen and sodomised by a third (The Gleaner June 22, 1998). Over the past three decades, the USVI has consistently experienced some of the highest rape rates in the region. In the 1970s, the average rate was 43.2 per 100,000 (de Albuquerque 1984). In the 1980s, it rose to 66.3 and in the 1990s to 73.6. While many rapes are perpetrated by youths against teenage girls in public housing projects and by older men against unrelated young females (daughters of a common law spouse) living in the same household, there have been increasing numbers of rapes of white residents and tourists (de Albuquerque 1984, de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999). In an essentially colonised society, where traditional values regarding respecting women have broken down, and where white women, some scantily dressed, are viewed as representatives of the colonisers, rape may take on political overtones. But it is also plausible that patterns of residence (living alone or sharing with other women) among white female residents, and the greater nocturnal geographic mobility of both white residents and tourists, may make them easier targets. Burglary

The smaller islands, with the exception of the USVI, have all shown consistent increases in burglary rates (see Table 20.4). In Antigua, burglary rates increased by 600 per 100,000 between the 1980s and 1990s. Corresponding figures for Dominica and St Kitts/Nevis were 356 and 596 per 100,000 respectively. As in the case of robbery, these dramatic increases are suggestive of the same constellation of high unemployment, widening income inequality, and increasing drug use (de Albuquerque 1996a). Burglary rates also seem to escalate during certain seasons - Christmas, carnival, etc. — when it is imperative that those engaged in criminal lifestyles have money in their pockets. In Barbados, the geography of burglary indicates that tourist dwellings (hotel rooms, condominiums, vacation homes) are more likely to be broken into (per 100,000) than resident dwellings (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999). In terms of raw numbers, there are of course more burglaries of resident than tourist dwellings (641 versus 84 in 1993). In the larger Caribbean states and the USVI, burglary rates have fluctuated, and in some cases (Jamaica and the USVI), have actually shown declines. The

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USVI again leads, having burglary rates ten times higher than Jamaica, and roughly five times higher than Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. While the USVI shares some of the same structural features with these other states, hard core unemployment among youth, extremes of wealth and poverty, widespread drug addiction, and so on, it has the additional ingredient of high tourist densities and a significant part-year (winter) population. Burglaries of hotel rooms, vacation homes, apartments and condominiums, are frequent, despite numerous security features. Many USVI residents have been burglarised so many times that they have simply stopped reporting minor burglaries to the police. Jamaica’s very low and steadily declining burglary rates need explication. Clearly what is happening here is that Jamaicans have stopped reporting minor losses in the face of repeated burglaries of homes and businesses (de Albuquerque 1995). Since the Jamaican police are overwhelmed by violent crime, they often can only make a minimal effort to solve property-related offences. This reinforces public perceptions of police ineffectiveness and the level of under reporting continues to spiral upward (Chuck 1998, de Albuquerque 1995). Individual acquaintances in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago tell us similar stories about non-reporting in light of perceived police ineffectiveness. As in the case of robbery, non-reporting is even higher in poorer urban communities, whose residents, despite having less to steal from, are just as likely to be burglarised as wealthier residents who can afford burglar bars, guard dogs, and security guards. Larceny

Larceny in the region is even more subject to under reporting than burglary. Jamaica, again, provides the prime example. It reports some of the lowest larceny rates among the nine states, Dominica excepted, and yet stealing of all sorts is rife in Jamaican society (see Table 20.5). Chuck (1998b) notes that Jamaicans do not even bother to report ‘shooting with intent’ and other gun crimes, which of course raises the spectre of why bother to report lesser crimes like larceny. Take the case of praedial larceny (not included in these reported larceny statistics). Jamaican farmers have long given up reporting crop theft and have instead armed themselves and formed vigilante groups. But Jamaicans living in urban areas do not have recourse to vigilante groups and must endure stealing of all kinds as a simple fact of life in a society where crime has reached epidemic proportions. A similar case can be made for Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. Wealthy and middle class residents in the former have organised crime watch groups and employed barricades and security guard services, but to no avail. Where large numbers of youth are scuffling (hustling) for a living, anything not tied down or left unguarded will be stolen - from automobile hubcaps to veranda furniture. It has become routine practice in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago to pay youths to guard one’s vehicle (petty ransom essentially) while dining at a restaurant or patronising a night club. Poorer urban residents are of course not immune to

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being victimised by larceny, in fact, they may actually have higher rates of victimisation because of their criminologic surroundings. The one exception may be the garrison constituencies of West Kingston where a stolen bicycle reported to a ‘rankin’ posse member is quickly recovered. Larceny rates in the smaller islands, particularly Grenada, and to a lesser extent Antigua and St Kitts, have shown dramatic increases for all the familiar reasons. Where tourist densities are high (the USVI, Antigua, Barbados, and Grenada increasingly) the pickings are easier. In these islands, larceny of valuables from a beach, rental car, and vacation home, apartment, or condominium is common. For example, in Barbados visitors are six to eight times more likely to have valuables stolen from their persons than residents and approximately 20 times more likely to have something stolen from their place of accommodation (de Albuquerque and McElroy 1999). Twenty-Year Differences in Violent Crime Rates

Figures 20.1 to 20.3 graphically display 20-year differences (1969–73 to 1989– 93) in average murder, robbery and rape rates for some of the nine states. With respect to murder, two things stand out. First, murder rates have remained remarkably stable over the 20-year period for Barbados, Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Second, murder rates have increased significantly for Jamaica and the USVI, with Jamaica’s rate doubling. Twenty-year average robbery rates show a somewhat different pattern. Dominica’s rates have remained exactly the same, while Barbados’ rates rose 1,500 per cent, Jamaica’s by 169 per cent, and the USVI’s by 368 per cent. Rape rates have increased dramatically for all four states represented in Figure 20.3. The largest 20-year increase (1,960 per cent) was posted by Dominica, followed by the USVI (367 per cent), Jamaica (205 per cent), and Barbados (166 per cent). These increases graphically underscore the increasing violence against women in the region. In addition to aforementioned factors, this violence may in part be a backlash against the rising educational and occupational status of Caribbean women and their greater economic independence (see de Albuquerque and Ruark 1998). The Barbados Case

Table 20.6 provides a time series of seven socioeconomic indicators (six independent variables) tracked over 17 years. The indicators reveal a slowly growing macro economy in Barbados characterised by high unemployment, relatively flat per capita income, fluctuating tourist arrivals, inflation and levels of immiseration (misery index). Table 20.7 compiles ten crime variables — (all measured as rates) — murder, rape, robbery, larceny, burglary, violent2 (murder and rape), violent3 (murder,

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rape, and robbery), prop2 (burglary and larceny), prop3 (burglary, larceny, and robbery), and total5 (murder, rape, robbery, burglary and larceny). Robbery is included in ‘prop3’ since we consider the motivation for robbery to be property- related. In general, all crime rates in Barbados tend to increase measurably during the 1980s, peak in the early 1990s, and fall off thereafter. The results of regression analyses were modest and somewhat mixed but do indicate local economic influence on crime levels. The eight most significant relationships estimated are reported in Table 20.8 and examined with reference to the three broad hypotheses tested. First, the data tend to support the impact of local economic conditions on property-related crime as suggested by the opportunity theory. Second, they provide weak support for the tourism presence variant of the opportunity model. Third, they indicate some unexpected impacts on violent crime. Specifically, according to Equation 1, nearly 80 per cent of the variation in total property crime (burglary and larceny) was associated with conditions of economic dislocation — rising inflation and falling electricity consumption: r =.96 — and increasing visitor densities. Although roughly 100 bivariate and multivariate experiments were run, however, this was the only case where visitor presence was statistically significant. In the case of other property-related crimes (including robbery), there were some statistically significant results for burglary and robbery but none for larceny and overall property crime (burglary, larceny, robbery). Specific analysis of burglary rates confirmed the influence of economic downturns on property-related crime. Nearly 80 per cent of burglary rates was positively associated with the joint interaction of the unemployment rate and the retail price index (see Equation 2). Movements in the price level were responsible for most of the variation in burglary rates (see Equation 3). According to Equation 4, robbery was also significantly ‘explained’ by constrained economic opportunity as measured by the joint interaction of the retail price index and the misery index. This result, however, is somewhat suspect since the Durbin-Watson test is inconclusive suggesting possible autocorrelation, and since it is difficult to conceptually discriminate the separate influences of the two independent variables (r = -.092). Contrary to expectations, some specific violent crime rates were positively associated with local economic behaviour. For example, according to Equation 5, over 40 per cent of the variation in violent crime (murder and rape) was ‘explained’ by the positive interaction of per capita electricity consumption and the misery index. These results tend to confirm that violent crime in Barbados is linked to modernisation influences and immiseration, and thus lend some support to the Durkheimian perspective. In a follow-up test on violent crime more traditionally defined (murder, rape and robbery), the joint interaction of the retail price and misery indices ‘determined’ four fifths of observed behaviour (see Equation 6). Caution is again warranted, however, on both theoretical and empirical grounds.

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First, it is difficult to conceptually separate out the independent influences of the two independent variables, as was indicated in the robbery results. Second, because robbery behaves like a property offence, the inclusion of robbery in this case may distort the variation in violent crime rates since robbery accounts for over two thirds of the entire dependent variable. In this interpretation, Equation 6 may actually measure other aspects of local economic pressure on primarily property- related crime. Finally, in a series of bivariate regressions, murder was unrelated to any independent variable while rape was found to be positively and significantly related to unemployment (R2=20 %), per capita electricity consumption (R2=29%), and the retail price index (R2=35%). Only the last ‘best fit’ relationship is reported in Equation 7. It confirms de Albuquerque’s earlier (1984) work and it indirectly suggests the pressure of overall economic conditions, particularly the cost of living, on local violence. In multivariate regressions on rape rates, no independent variables were statistically significant. In summary, the Barbados results tend to modestly confirm the link between worsening economic conditions, and to a much weaker extent visitor density levels, on aggregated property crime rates. Similar results (absent visitor presence) were recorded for specific burglary and robbery rates. Similar but less robust and unexpected outcomes were reported for violent crime both narrowly defined (rape and murder) and more conventionally interpreted (murder, rape and robbery). Thus, the Barbados case offers some tentative support for both Durkheimian and opportunity perspectives in the literature. However, this conclusion is circumscribed by the many weaknesses of the test. These include:

(1) The limited number of observations for which complete data were available; (2) The particular years examined - a period of especially sluggish tourist growth (Maxwell Stamp 1991) (3) The use of some non-standard independent variables (retail price and misery indexes, daily tourist census) as well as linear estimators where non-linear models may be more appropriate (Bennett 1991), and (4) Perhaps most importantly, the exclusion of key difficult-to-measure determinants – a growing subculture of violence, the proliferation of posses, rising drug activity, the increasing number of guns, growing levels of indiscipline and so on.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

During the past two decades, serious crime rates (except murder) have significantly increased for most of the nine Caribbean countries. Most striking increases have occurred in property-related crime, notably robbery and burglary, especially in the smaller states (Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St Kitts). Jamaica and the USVI report the highest murder rates in the sample. While such trends

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point to the influence of economic deprivation and its many manifestations, as demonstrated by the Barbados case study, they also indirectly suggest the growing marginalisation of youth, the prevalence of gangs and guns, the spread of drug trafficking, and the rise of intimidating cultures of violence across the region. The increasing indiscipline characteristic of such subcultures may also be partly responsible, along with other aforementioned factors, for the general decline in respect for women reflected in the marked increases in rape rates across almost all islands in the sample. This study argues that the actual situation may be worse than the trends recorded above. Significant discrepancies between larger and smaller countries particularly in property crime rates suggest under reporting (corroborated by Stone 1988). For example, Jamaica’s average robbery rates for 1990–96 were roughly identical to those of Barbados for the same years while recorded burglary and larceny rates were over 75 per cent lower. Such conflicting evidence indicates the need for victimisation surveys and accompanying ethnographic studies ( Gunst 1995, Lieber 1981) to determine the extent the poor are victimised and the extent that they report victimisation. We suspect they are disproportionately victimised and least likely to report. In conclusion, given the reality of these longitudinal patterns of serious crime, it is not surprising that many Caribbean states are rushing to reintroduce capital punishment and are relinquishing sovereignty over their territorial waters to the United States (the notorious Shiprider Agreement — see de Albuquerque 1997) in a bid to stanch the flow of drugs. Other states are establishing new narcotics units and special investigative squads, stepping up combined army and police patrols and sweeps in crime ridden neighbourhoods and attempting to negotiate truces between rival gangs. But these are short-term responses. The longer term solutions like reducing income inequality, adequately funding drug education/treatment programmes, rooting out the corruption which sustains the gangs and ensuring the benefits of tourism are more widely distributed must also be addressed. They are also much more difficult to achieve especially in an environment dominated by neoliberal policies.

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TABLE 20.1 MURDER RATES1 FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN STATES, 1980–96

Antig./ St Kitts T'dad/ Year B'dos Dominica Grenada Guyana J'ca USVI Barb. /Nevis T'go

1980 6.4 14.2 40.6 4.4 23.8 1981 6.0 13.6 22.4 6.8 24.4 1982 7.2 15.0 18.5 7.3 24.6 1983 5.2 5.2 16.7 18.7 6.8 19.3 1984 5.9 2.6 16.8 21.2 6.3 15.8 1985 7.9 6.2 5.4 17.4 19.0 9.1 8.4 19.8 1986 6.3 3.9 9.5 9.9 19.2 2.3 6.6 17.4 1987 3.1 9.3 5.5 11.8 18.8 4.6 8.4 16.0 1988 7.8 7.7 2.7 11.8 17.6 9.0 7.0 24.2 1989 3.1 6.9 6.9 7.5 13.1 18.5 4.7 8.2 15.6 1990 4.7 11.5 7.0 7.4 12.0 22.6 4.7 6.9 1991 6.3 7.3 4.2 2.1 26.0 23.0 14.4 7.8 25.1 1992 4.7 7.2 5.6 7.3 13.8 25.7 7.1 8.8 21.9 1993 7.8 6.5 6.9 5.2 15.2 26.4 9.5 8.9 25.4 1994 13.7 6.8 7.2 27.9 16.3 10.6 29.6 1995 6.0 5.3 11.2 31.4 9.3 9.6 19.1 1996 5.7 9.1 36.8 Av. Rates 5.6 6.5 5.4 14.0 21.4 5.9 7.0 20.1 1980’s

Avg. Rates 7.2 7.2 5.9 16.8 27.7 10.2 8.8 24.2 1990’s

Sources: All population data, except USVI, are from the Caribbean Development Bank. USVI data from the USVI Census Data Centre. The Royal Antigua Police Force; The Royal Barbados Police; Dominica National Crime Data Survey; The Royal Grenada Police Force; Annual Reports of the Guyana Police Force and the Guyana Statistical Bulletin; Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica; The Royal St. Christopher and Nevis Police Force; Annual Statistical Digest, Trinidad and Tobago; Virgin Islands Police Department and FBI. Note: 1 Per 100,000 population

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TABLE 20.2 ROBBERY RATES1 FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN STATES, 1980–96

Antig. / St Kitts T'dad/ Year B'dos Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica USVI Barb. /Nevis T'go2

1980 27.7 186.3 216.0 504.1

1981 93.2 190.1 210.8 559.5

1982 78.2 198.7 165.2 437.4

1983 56.9 176.3 348.1

1984 65.0 2.6 322.1 217.2 288.4

1985 37.3 64.0 5.4 214.5 215.9 13.6 287.0

1986 29.9 61.7 9.5 256.7 202.1 9.2 354.3

1987 44.0 56.5 20.5 208.6 9.2 488.2

1988 56.5 71.8 15.1 188.4 20.3

1989 42.3 70.8 16.6 18.1 348.7 189.5 14.0 433.2

1990 29.8 130.1 11.2 13.8 249.1 223.1 9.3

1991 40.7 253.0 36.4 26.4 548.8 230.3 12.0 626.7

1992 60.7 362.6 26.4 46.1 551.2 201.4 47.6 304.9 619.6

1993 76.0 275.1 53.6 62.8 219.1 76.2 378.8 669.5

1994 97.7 183.6 49.1 220.8 84.1 357.7 521.7

1995 111.4 154.3 45.7 177.9 121.5 305.3 439.4

1996 127.0 48.5 178.6 Avg. Rates 42.0 64.6 11.6 245.3 199.0 13.3 411.1 1980’s Avg. Rates 69.4 212.2 31.9 41.8 449.7 207.3 58.5 575.4 1990’s

Sources: See Table 20.1 Notes: 1 Per 100,000 population 2 Not reported as a separate category until 1992

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TABLE 20.3 RAPE RATES1 FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN STATES, 1980–96

Antig./ St Kitts/ T'dad/ Year B'dos Dominica Grenada Guyana J'ca3 USVI Barb.2 Nevis2 T'go4

1980 22.1 13.3 35.0 70.4

1981 24.8 14.6 34.5 68.2

1982 22.0 12.4 40.8 76.8

1983 16.3 39.3 11.3 36.5 62.7

1984 24.4 19.9 8.0 39.1 72.6

1985 51.9 16.7 40.3 13.2 37.1 38.6 74.0

1986 56.6 25.2 36.5 13.5 39.0 59.5 49.3

1987 47.1 14.7 49.1 18.1 42.8 69.1 66.0

1988 76.9 23.9 45.3 9.7 47.5 47.3

1989 67.4 24.6 43.0 10.7 13.9 45.8 65.1 56.6

1990 72.1 27.2 60.1 21.2 10.9 41.9 62.9

1991 56.3 31.7 76.9 13.7 20.8 44.9 55.0 80.2

1992 82.4 34.2 66.8 11.5 14.6 45.3 73.8 96.3

1993 76.0 37.6 105.8 16.8 22.7 52.5 57.1 73.2

1994 70.2 23.9 22.5 43.3 67.8 63.8

1995 76.8 28.0 21.3 64.5 114.5 54.7

1996 28.7 21.2 71.4 Avg. Rates 58.4 21.5 39.1 12.8 39.8 55.9 66.3 1980’s Avg. Rates 72.3 30.2 77.4 18.3 17.3 52.0 71.8 73.6 1990’s

Sources: See Table 20.1 Notes: 1 Per 100,000 population 2 Includes indecent assault 3 Includes carnal abuse 4 Not reported as a separate category - included in “Other crimes against the person.”

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TABLE 20.4 BURGLARY RATES1 FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN STATES, 1980–96

Antig./ St Kitts T'dad Year B'dos Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica USVI Barb. /Nevis /T'go

1980 557.4 296.3 378.6 506.0 3710.1

1981 628.3 294.3 385.2 576.4 4699.9

1982 596.6 314.1 367.8 616.4 4338.9

1983 592.4 731.7 403.3 378.3 637.8 3907.4

1984 816.0 793.4 452.7 369.9 636.4 3857.7

1985 1103.8 721.5 773.2 365.7 377.7 831.8 771.4 3309.6

1986 1051.9 744.5 1040.6 392.6 383.5 659.0 740.6 3112.3

1987 1321.8 715.2 878.6 429.6 335.2 705.1 718.5 3098.0

1988 1508.6 871.9 857.1 517.6 309.2 867.1 771.9

1989 1512.5 930.0 963.9 431.2 605.4 309.4 832.6 682.3 3637.1

1990 1609.7 1096.3 1019.6 629.5 429.3 330.6 1205.1 617.1

1991 1734.0 968.7 1072.7 677.2 782.4 333.0 1033.5 591.0 3596.7

1992 2003.1 1204.7 1211.4 776.7 483.4 253.0 1009.5 639.3 3126.8

1993 2018.6 1540.4 1570.1 655.5 628.3 270.0 1297.6 675.8 3112.7

1994 2068.7 1239.7 881.4 271.7 1483.6 610.9 2730.8

1995 2186.7 1017.4 1136.0 231.6 2219.6 517.7 2637.2

1996 930.1 1227.5 190.2 Avg. Rates 1299.7 717.4 862.6 407.2 359.5 779.1 665.8 3741.2 1980’s Avg. Rates 1936.8 1142.5 1218.5 854.8 580.9 268.6 1374.8 608.6 3040.8 1990’s

Source: See Table 20.1 Note: 1 Per 100,000 population

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TABLE 20.5 LARCENY RATES1 FOR SELECTED CARIBBEAN STATES, 1980–96

Antig. St Kitts T'dad/ Year B'dos Dominica Grenada Guyana Jamaica USVI /Barb. /Nevis T'go

1980 974.7 383.0 96.8 462.2 3301.2

1981 1066.4 384.3 98.0 301.52 3976.6

1982 946.5 402.6 101.6 99.1 3341.9

1983 922.9 363.4 94.9 106.0 3244.9

1984 914.5 39.7 397.9 124.0 124.9 3125.6

1985 1265.7 873.2 16.1 319.4 133.6 113.6 135.5 2872.7

1986 1051.9 985.2 36.5 109.7 105.6 171.6 151.3 2912.3 1987 1321.8 1084.8 34.1 96.1 111.0 327.1 174.3 3227.1 1988 1508.6 1224.2 26.1 106.2 98.9 184.7 213.2

1989 1442.0 1398.6 27.7 235.9 100.6 87.1 118.6 233.5 3561.0

1990 1462.4 1413.3 37.8 536.1 67.4 88.9 258.7 215.2

1991 1773.1 1452.4 81.1 629.7 186.2 93.6 177.0 222.4 3854.9

1992 1668.7 1302.1 62.6 773.6 145.7 65.4 254.8 235.4 3534.8

1993 1891.5 1127.5 39.8 660.7 144.8 64.7 431.0 226.0 3310.8

1994 1871.8 939.0 746.4 49.0 605.1 256.1 3210.0

1995 1881.0 898.6 1336.0 44.6 591.1 245.9 2646.3 1996 910.4 1784.6 30.6 Avg. Rates 1318.0 1039.1 30.0 266.3 105.2 183.1 200.2 3284.8 1980’s

Avg. 1758.1 1149.0 55.3 923.9 136.0 62.4 386.3 233.5 3311.4 Rates 1990’s

Sources: See Table 20.1 Notes:1 Per 100, 00 population. Does not include praedial larceny and larceny of motor vehicles. 2 Steep declines in larceny rates after 1981 suggest a redefinition of larceny or recording problems.

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TABLE 20.6 SELECTED INDICATORS FOR BARBADOS, 1980–96

Annual Per Capita Per Capita Retail Price Average Percent Un- GDP Electricity Index 1 Year Tourist Inflation Misery Employed (1974 Consumed (March Daily Index prices $Bd) (kwh) 1980 = 100.0) Census

1980 14.5 3222 10361 1331 103.5 7.70 22.20 1981 13.2 3148 8935 1395 118.6 14.60 27.80 1982 13.7 2987 7212 1423 130.8 10.30 24.00 1983 15.0 2989 7207 1491 137.7 5.30 20.30 1984 17.1 3067 7423 1511 144.1 4.60 21.70 1985 18.7 3069 6506 1522 149.7 3.90 22.60 1986 17.8 3212 6983 1516 151.7 1.30 19.10 1987 17.9 3276 8128 1646 156.8 3.40 21.30 1988 17.5 3387 9084 1737 164.2 4.70 22.20 1989 15.6 3498 10022 1697 174.6 6.30 21.90 1990 15.0 3373 9043 1796 179.9 3.00 18.00 1991 17.2 3228 8580 1858 191.2 6.30 23.50 1992 23.0 3030 8282 1899 202.8 6.10 29.10 1993 24.5 3047 8768 1943 205.1 1.10 25.60 1994 21.8 3161 9538 2003 205.2 0.50 22.30 1995 19.6 3248 10291 2142 208.3 1.00 20.60 1996 15.8 3416 10216 2236 210.7 1.20 17.00

Source:Central Bank of Barbados, 1991 and 1997. Note: 1 The ‘Misery Index’ is equal to unemployment plus inflation.

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TABLE 20.7 CRIME RATES1 FOR BARBADOS, 1980–96

Year Murder Rape Robbery Larceny Burglary Violent22 Violent33 Property24 Property35 Total56 1980 6.40 22.10 27.70 974.70 557.40 28.50 56.20 1532.10 1559.80 1588.30 1981 6.00 24.80 93.10 1066.40 628.30 30.80 124.00 1694.70 1787.90 1818.70 1982 7.20 22.00 78.20 946.50 596.60 29.20 107.40 1543.10 1621.30 1650.50 1983 5.20 16.30 56.90 922.90 592.40 21.50 78.40 1515.30 1572.20 1593.70 1984 5.90 24.40 65.00 914.50 816.00 30.30 95.30 1730.50 1795.50 1825.80 1985 6.20 16.70 64.00 873.20 721.50 22.90 86.90 1594.70 1658.70 1681.60 1986 3.90 25.22 61.70 985.20 744.50 29.10 120.80 1729.70 1791.40 1850.50 1987 9.30 14.70 56.50 1084.80 715.20 24.00 80.50 1800.00 1856.50 1880.50 1988 7.70 23.90 71.80 1224.20 871.90 31.60 103.40 2096.10 2167.90 2199.50 1989 6.90 24.60 70.80 1398.60 930.00 31.50 102.30 2328.60 2399.40 2430.90 1990 11.50 27.20 130.10 1413.30 1096.30 38.70 168.80 2509.60 2639.70 2678.40 1991 7.30 31.70 253.00 1452.40 968.70 39.00 292.00 2421.10 2674.10 2713.10 1992 7.20 34.20 362.60 1302.10 1204.70 41.40 405.00 2506.80 2869.40 2911.80 1993 6.50 37.60 275.10 1127.50 1540.40 44.10 319.20 2667.90 2943.00 2987.10 1994 6.80 23.90 183.60 939.00 1239.70 30.70 214.30 2178.70 2362.30 2393.00 1995 5.30 28.00 154.30 898.60 1017.40 33.30 187.60 1916.00 2070.30 2103.60 1996 5.70 28.70 127.00 910.40 930.10 34.40 161.40 1840.50 1967.50 2001.90

Source:The Royal Barbados Police Notes: 1 Per 100,000 population 2 Violent2 (murder and rape) 3 Violent3 (murder, rape, and robbery) 4 Property2 (larceny and burglary) 5 Property3 (larceny, burglary, and robbery) 6 Total5 (murder, rape, robbery, larceny, burglary)

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TABLE 20.8 REGRESSION RESULTS

Beta Dep. Ind. Statistical Nation Co- t 1 2 3 Variable Variable Signif. R Square F D-W efficient price 2.914 5.948 0.000 20.643 1 4 electric -2.494 -4.669 0.000 0.786 2.140 Property (0.000) visitors .596 3.498 0.004 price 0.562 3.598 0.003 30.858 2 Burglary 0.789 1.558 unemployment 0.422 2.704 0.017 (0.000) 38.268 3 Burglary price 0.848 6.118 0.000 0.700 1.325 (0.000) price 0.770 7.426 0.000 39.840 4 Robbery 0.829 1.465 misery 0.583 5.618 0.000 (0.001) electric 0.663 3.484 0.004 7.367 5 5 0.443 2.138 Violent2 misery 0.431 2.265 0.040 (0.007) price 0.770 6.909 0.000 33.626 6 6 0.803 1.644 Violent3 misery 0.561 5.036 0.000 (0.000) 9.689 7 Rape price 0.626 3.113 0.007 0.352 1.902 (0.007) Notes: 1 Adjusted for df 2 Levels of significance in parenthesis 3 At the 0.05 level, the acceptable range for 15 df is between 1.54 and 2.46 4 Includes burglary and larceny only 5 Includes only murder and rape 6 Includes murder, rape, and robbery

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FIGURE 20.1 MURDER RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION: 1969–73 VS. 1989–93

15 Barbados Dominica Jamaica 10 Trinidad and Tobago

USVI Murder Rates per 100,000 Population

0 1969- 1989- 1973 1993

Years

Source: See Table 20.1 and de Albuquerque, 1984

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FIGURE 20.2 ROBBERY RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION: 1969–73 VS. 1989–93

500

400

ulation ulation Barbados p Dominica

000 Po 300 , Jamaica USVI er 100 er p rates

y 200 Robber

100

0 1969-1973 1989-1993

Years Source: See Figure 20.1

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FIGURE 20.3 RAPE RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION: 1969–73 VS. 1989–93 80

50 Barbados

Dominica 40 Jamaica

USVI 30 Rape Rates per 100,000 Population 100,000 Population Rape Rates per

0 1969-1973 1989-1993

Years

Source: See Figure 20.1

REFERENCES

Allen, D. 1976. Urban Crime and Violence in Jamaica. Paper presented at the Conference on Crime and Violence in the Caribbean, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, February 2. Archer, D. and Gartner, R. 1984. Violence and crime in cross-national perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press. Avison, W. and Loring, P. 1986. ‘Population diversity and cross-national homicide: The effects of inequality and heterogeneity’. Criminology 24, 733–49. Bayley, D.H. 1969. The police and political development in India. Princeton: University Press. Becker, M. Reuters. 1996. Jamaica Struggles with Crime Wave. November 10. Bennett, R. 1991. ‘Development and crime: A cross-national, time-series analysis of competing models’. Sociology Quarterly 32, no.3: 343–67.

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Bohning, D. Miami Herald. 1997. Brutal Crimes, Scandal in Island Nation Serve as Region’s ‘Wake-Up Call’. February 28. Brana-Shute, G. 1980. A Profile of Juvenile Delinquency in Paramaribo. Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles, May 7–10. Caribbean Development Bank. 1993 and 1995. Social and economic indicators, 1991 and 1993. Barbados: Economics and Programming Department, Wildey, St. Michael. ———. 1998. Fax communication. July. Barbados: Economics and Programming Department, Wildey, St. Michael. Central Bank of Barbados. 1992 and 1998. Annual statistical digest, 1991 and 1997. Bridgetown, Barbados. Chuck, D. The Gleaner Online. 1998. Use and Abuse of Crime Statistics. July 1. Clinard, M. and Abbott, D. 1973. Crime in Developing Nations. New York: John Wiley. Cohen, L. and Felson M. 1979. ‘Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach’. American Sociological Review 44, 588–608. de Albuquerque, K. 1984. ‘A comparative analysis of violent crime in the Caribbean’. Social and Economic Studies 33, no.3: 93–142. ______.Caribbean Week. 1995. Murder and Mayhem: How Bad is Crime in the Caribbean. June 24–July 7. ______. Caribbean Week. 1996. Give Me a Five Dollar: The Drug Menace in the Eastern Caribbean. January 20–February 2. ______. Caribbean Week. 1996. Drugs and the Economy. February 17–March 1. ______. Caribbean Week. 1996. Drugs and Politics. March 2–15. ______. Caribbean Week.1996. Looting and Shooting and Killing in a Rampage. August 31– September 13. ______. Caribbean Week. 1997. New ‘Big Stick’ Policy - the Shiprider Agreement. February 1–14. de Albuquerque, K. and McElroy, J. 1999. ‘Tourism and crime in the Caribbean’. Annals of Tourism Research 26, no.4: 968–84. ———. 2000. ‘The Caribbean narcoeconomy’. In Neoliberalism and Restructuring in Africa and Latin America, ed. Dennis Conway and Nikolas Heynen. Lantham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. de Albuquerque, K. and Ruark, S. 1998. ‘Men day done: Are women really ascendant in the Caribbean’. In Caribbean portraits: Essays on gender, ideology and identity, ed. Christine Barrow ,1-13 . Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers. Dodd, D. 1981. ‘A day in Babylon: Street life in Guyana’. Caribbean Review 10, no.4: 24–27, 50. Dodd, D. and Parris, M. 1976. ‘Socio-cultural aspects of crime and delinquency in Georgetown, Guyana’. Working Paper Series No. 12. Mona, Jamaica: The University of the West Indies, ISER. Dominica Police Force. 1994. Dominica national crime survey. Roseau, Dominica: Police Headquarters. Ellis, H. 1988. ‘Crime and violence: The social and psychological dimensions’. In Crime and violence in Jamaica, ed. Peter Phillips and Judith Wedderburn,1–18. Mona, Jamaica: The University of the West Indies Press.

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Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1992–96. Crime in the United States 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office. Gartner, R. 1990. ‘The victims of homicide: A temporal and cross-national comparison’. American Sociological Review 55, 92–106. Gordon, R. J. 1998. Macroeconomics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Griffith, I. 1997. Drugs and security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under siege. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Gunst, L. 1995. Born fi dead. Edinburgh: Payback Press. Guyana Police Force. 1980–91. Annual reports. Georgetown, Guyana: Police Headquarters. Guyana Bureau of Statistics. 1995. Guyana statistical bulletin 3, no. 4 December 1994. Harriott, A. 1996. ‘The changing social organisation of crime and criminals in Jamaica’. Caribbean Quarterly 42, no.2/3: 61–81. Hansmann, H. and Quigley, J. 1982. ‘Population heterogeneity and the sociogenesis of homicide’. Social Forces 61, 206–24. Headley, B. 1996. The Jamaican crime scene. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press. Jones, H. 1981. Crime, race, and culture: A study in a developing country. Chichester, England: John Wiley. Kick, E. and LaFree, G. 1985. ‘Development and social context of murder and theft’. Comparative Social Research 8, 37–58. Krahn, H., Hartnagel, T. and Gartrell, J. 1986. ‘Income inequality and homicide rates: Cross-national data and criminological theories’. Criminology 24, 269–95. Krohn, M. 1976. ‘Inequality, unemployment and crime: A cross-national analysis’. The Sociological Quarterly, 17, 303–13. Lacey, T. 1977. Violence and politics in Jamaica. Totowa, NJ.: Frank Cass. LaFree, G. & Kick, E. 1986. ‘Cross-national effects of development, distributional and demographic variables on crime: A review and analysis’. International Annals of Criminology 24, 213–36. Larmer, B. Newsweek. 1996. The ‘Barrel Children’. February 19, p. 45. Larmer, B. Newsweek. 1998. He’s One Tough Nut. August 10. Lieber, M. 1981. Street scenes: Afro-American culture in urban Trinidad. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman. Mahabir, C. 1985. Crime and nation building in the Caribbean. Cambridge, MA.: Schenkman. Manley, M. 1975. The Politics of Change. Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press. Maxfield, M. 1987. ‘Lifestyle and routine activity theories of crime: Empirical studies of victimisation, delinquency, and offender decision-making’. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 3, 275–82. Maxwell S. PLC. 1991. Export competitiveness and marketing study in Barbados. Final Report “E” Executive Summary. Bridgetown: Government of Barbados. McElroy, J. and de Albuquerque, K. 1983. Crime in the Context of Modernization: Theories and a Test Case. Paper presented at the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Southern Regional Sciences Association, Charleston, S.C. Messner, S. 1982. ‘Poverty, inequality and the urban homicide rate’. Criminology 20, 103– 14. Messner, S. 1989. ‘Economic discrimination and societal homicide rates: Further evidence on the cost of inequality’. American Sociological Review 54, 597–611.

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Neuman, L. and Berger, R. 1988. ‘Competing perspectives on cross-national crime: An evaluation of theory and evidence’. Sociological Quarterly 29, 281–313. Parris, M. 1980. ‘Urban crime and violence in Guyana’. In Crime in the Caribbean, ed. Rosemary Brana-Shute and Gary Brana-Shute, 93-104. Gainesville, FL.: University of Florida Press. Planning Institute of Jamaica.1986, 1989, 1996, 1997. Economic and social survey, Jamaica 1985, 1988, 1995, 1996. Kingston Mall, JA: Planning Institute. Pryce, K. & Figueira, D. 1980. ‘Rape and Socio-economic Conditions in Trinidad and Tobago’. In Crime in the Caribbean, ed. Rosemary Brana-Shute and Gary Brana-Shute, 58–77. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press. Ramoutar, K. 1995. ‘Social class and crime in a Caribbean community’. International Journal of the Sociology of Law 23, 273–93. Rohter, L. The New York Times. 1997. Basseterre Journal: Death, Drugs and Courtroom Drama Trample on a Tranquil Caribbean Isle. June 30. Rosenberg, M. J. Associated Pre. 1999. Middle-Class Jamaicans Flee Mayhem. October 3. [email protected]. Ryan, C. 1993. ‘Crime, violence, terrorism, and tourism: An accidental or intrusive relationship’. Tourism Management 14, 173–83. Shelley, L. 1981. Crime and modernization: The impact of industrialization and urbanization on crime. Carbondale, IL.: Southern Illinois University Press. Sinclair, G. The Gleaner Online. 1998. New Police Unit to Investigate Murders. January 8. Stack, S. 1984. ‘Income inequality and property crime’. Criminology 22, 229–57. Stephens, E. and Stephens, J. 1986. Democratic socialism in Jamaica. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Stone, C. 1988. ‘Crime and violence: Socio-political implications’. In Crime and Violence in Jamaica, ed. Peter Phillips and Judith Wedderburn 19–47. Mona, Jamaica: University of the West Indies, Department of Government. Stone, C. 1983. Democracy and clientilism in Jamaica. New Brunswick, NJ. Transaction. Taylor, C. The Gleaner Online. 1998. Mixed Fortunes for Women. January 8. The Daily Observer. 1996. American Tourists Robbed at Knife Point. October 26. ———. 1996. Armed Bandits Strike Again. October 29. The Electronic Evergreen. 1997. The Murder Rate Doubles on U.S. Virgin Island of St. Croix. [email protected] April 23. The Gleaner Online. 1998. Getting Tough on Lawlessness. January 28. ———. 1998. Making the Murder Rate. February 2. ———. 1998. Jamaica Called to Crime War. June 22. The Nation. 1998. Guns Haunting Today’s Society. Editorial, August 8. The Royal Antigua Police Force. 1997. Antigua: Police Headquarters, Commissioner’s Office. The Royal Barbados Police Force. 1994 and 1998. Bridgetown, Barbados: Office of the Commissioner. The Royal Grenada Police Force. 1998. St. George’s, Grenada: Criminal Investigation Division. The Royal St. Christopher and Nevis Police Force. 1995 and 1997. Basseterre, St. Kitts: Police Headquarters.

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The Starbroek News. 1998. Man Accused of Robberies in Restaurant Remanded. www.Stabroeknews.com August 8. Trinidad and Tobago. 1990, 1993, 1995, and 1997. Annual statistical digest, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995. Port-of-Spain, Trinidad: Central Statistical Office. Trotman, D. 1986. Crime in Trinidad: Conflict and control in plantation society, 1838–1900. Knoxville, TN.: University of Tennessee Press. United Nations. 1977. Crime prevention and control. Report of the Secretary General, Geneva: UN, 22 September. USVI. 1988. Records Office. Department of Public Safety. St. Thomas. USVI Department of Commerce. 1985. Comparative Growth Statistics. St. Thomas. USVI Census Data Center. 1998. Personal Communication. University of the Virgin Islands, St. Thomas. Vasciannie, S. The Gleaner Online. 1997. Dog-Hearted Murderers. November 3. Virtue, E. (1998). The Gleaner Online. Jamaicans Rush for Gun Licences. February 23. Wellford, C. 1974. ‘Crime and the dimensions of nations’. International Journal of Criminology and Penology 2: 1–10. Williams, L. The Gleaner Online. 1997. A Love Affair With Weapons of Hate. November 17. Wolfgang, M. and Ferracuti, F. 1967. The subculture of violence: Towards an integrated theory of criminology, London: Tavistock.

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies , St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, January/July 1999 Volume 4 Numbers. 1 and 2, pp. 32-70.

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the jury and the criminal justice system in the caribbean

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The Jury on INTRODUCTION Trial1 There is an outstanding need for social science inquiry into specific social, legal and political institutions of the Caribbean. While Ramesh Deosaran it is useful to have a broad appreciation of the social forces which affect group relations in the wide society, it is important to have some understanding of how the various social groups in the society view and deal with one another when placed in specific institutions. This study draws upon traditional sociological studies to examine social relations within a specific legal institution, the jury system. It explores some aspects of the social psychology of the jury trial in the multiracial post-colonial society of Trinidad.2 It is developed from a series of previous studies by the author (Jury Research Project) on the social composition of jurors and their verdicts, the legal profession’s assessment of trial by jury, and social bias in jury selection, exemptions, and foreman selection. These earlier studies laid a sociological foundation for further work, especially with regard to the psychological factors which mediate between the social composition of jurors and their courtroom behaviour. One study showed racial, social class and sex biases in the selection of 2,443 jurors for 390 trials (Deosaran 1981b). Foreman selection also revealed a strong bias in favour of upper social class, male, and non-Indian groups respectively (Deosaran 1980). The legal profession in Trinidad expressed strong

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dissatisfaction with the apparent reasons used by juries for their verdicts (Deosaran 1980). The first of their kind in the Commonwealth Caribbean, these studies reflect similar work done elsewhere on the social composition of juries (e.g. Baldwin and McConville 1979, 1980, Cant 1974, Sealey and Cornish 1973, Van Dyke 1977), the selection of jury foreman (Baldwin and McConville 1980), and juror stereotyping (e.g. Boehm 1968, Broeder 1965, Efran 1974, Landy and Aronson 1969). This line of research, however, wavers uncomfortably between two strong mandates. On the one hand, through either common or statutory law, questioning jurors on particular verdicts or making firsthand observations of jury room deliberations is strictly forbidden. On the other hand, one of the pillars of democracy and, more particularly, of scientific inquiry is accountability and the obligation to ensure that human conduct is rational and fair. Whatever the worth of jury privacy, the legal restriction on scientific inquiry has contributed to serious gaps in the relevant research. Researchers have had to resort to mock trials, simulated juries, jurors’ anecdotes, courtroom impressions from policemen and other judicial officers, and a host of indirect techniques for measuring jury behaviour (e.g. Adler 1973, Kaplan 1977, Nemeth and Sosis 1973, Simon 1959). A number of reviews have pointed out the practical inadequacies of such indirect techniques (Erlanger 1970, Gerbasi et al. 1977, Tapp 1980, Wrightsman 1978). The major criticism is that the ‘reality’ of the trial is crucially missing from the responses of non-jurors. This study mixes direct observations with data provided by the jurors themselves. The theoretical framework is the interactionist perspective. Given the format of a jury trial, the distribution of rank and order, the allocation of roles and status in the courtroom, the entire situation is a mixture of law, sociology and psychology in action. The law structures the trial, sociology establishes some distinctions on the basis of status and rank, and psychology provides the basis on which impressions and influence also affect the trial outcome. Trial by jury, when set in a courtroom, offers a firsthand example of the way race, class and sex could express themselves in effective ways, given the range of discretion possessed by the participants. For example, a jury, in deciding upon the facts, is in a position to determine motives, credibility and demeanour. Such variables depend upon the imagination of the jurors, the impressions they bring into the courtroom. These impressions and stereotypes persist sometimes, in spite of instructions from the presiding judge or the nature of the ‘hard evidence’ presented. In fact, many trials are conducted on the basis of eyewitness testimony or evidence which are subject to interpretation. The situation is further affected by the fact of having an adversarial system of cross-examination wherein two sides to the same matter are being offered though in varying degrees of strength.

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The sociological context in which trial by jury is held is a matter that cannot be ignored in studying the behaviour of jurors. Trinidad and Tobago is widely recognised as a small multiracial society with attendant strains of political and social competition. Drawn from this wider setting as community representatives, it is a challenge to see the extent to which the jury is susceptible to such community characteristics. Using the principles of social psychology, this study examines the behaviour of jurors in actual cases. The extent to which jurors seek to define the situation, to share feelings, to be guided by former impressions, to associate ascriptive qualities with competence, to attribute causes, to represent the ‘community consciousness’ in the trial, all these behaviours comprise a social psychological perspective of the trial. The study is therefore an attempt to examine the extent to which community characteristics are actually played out in a specific situation where the stakes are high, where decisions do matter, sometimes as life and death outcomes. The approach of social psychology is not merely to examine the individual or small group in the particular setting, but also to take into account the characteristics of the situation itself. Social psychology sees jury behaviour as a product resulting from the interaction of both the situation and the individual or group. It is therefore an interactionist perspective. More specifically, if the situation is so well structured and directive, then the personal qualities of the jurors would be less likely to influence the outcome. If, on the other hand, the situation is unstructured, ambiguous, or on balance, leaving room for wide jury discretion, then the personal qualities of jurors, singly or collectively would be more likely to influence the outcome. This, in sum, takes us towards a social psychology of trial by jury. The study uses the macro trends found in the data to suggest the need for more micro studies if a more specific understanding of jury behaviour is to be achieved. More specificity is required in the way the trial itself is defined before the research variables can be selected on the part of the jurors.

THE STUDY

The present study3 attempts to help fill a research gap by posing a series of questions directly to actual jurors relating ‘to the last case’ they heard. The sample of jurors was randomly drawn from those jurors who sat in 390 trials. Hence, the legal requirement that jurors should not be questioned on any particular verdict was maintained. The research questions were therefore framed in a relatively general manner. Within these necessary constraints and taking into account the social background of jurors, this study examines the social psychological factors of: (i) jurors’ early impressions of the accused, (ii) social influence among jurors during

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their deliberations, (iii) the stability of jurors’ verdicts, (iv) racial motivation of jurors, (v) opinion change by jurors during the trial, (vi) jurors’ participation in jury room deliberations, (vii) motives used in foreman selection, and (viii) subjective vs. objective criteria in jury verdicts. This study, using actual jurors, thus moves from the sociological framework of the earlier related studies (in the Jury Project) to a more specific social psychological analysis of jury behaviour. Trial by jury is in many ways a psychological event circumscribed by legal assumptions and procedures. Or put another way, it is an event which can bear witness to the manner in which the law itself could be subjected to the intangible qualities which a community brings upon a trial. For example, the respective or combined roles of such variables as social status, authority, stereotyping, persuasion, eyewitness testimony, group conflict and decision-making, conformity, cognitive dissonance and attribution of guilt or innocence are all essentially present at one time or another as psychological elements in a jury trial. The fact that judicial decisions are usually made on the basis of probabilities from an adversary process adds salience to these psychological elements. Fisher (1982) defined social psychology as ‘the scientific study of how the behaviour of an individual is influenced by and in turn influences the actions of others in the social environment’ (p. 6). The effects of such mutual interactions are crucial in trial by jury and, in fact, have been identified as very pertinent for social psychological inquiry (Monahan and Loftus 1982, Saks and Hastie 1978, Tapp 1980). It is therefore more than having one juror bring his or her community impressions or stereotypes into the courtroom. The jury trial, possessed by witnesses and a peer group in judgement, compels one side to respond to these community impressions through argument, cross examination or summation. Rather than quickly removing community sentiment and establishing fixed law and procedures, the trial itself gets possessed by a mutually reinforcing network of community sentiments and impressions. A social psychological event thus mushrooms in a framework of legal procedures. In an applied sense, social psychological research could explore the validity or limitations of some of the assumptions made by the ‘rationalist, legal model of human behaviour’ (Inman 1981, 57). For example, are jurors always able to uphold in their minds the assumption that a person is ‘innocent until proven guilty?’ To what extent does ethnic stereotyping in the courtroom or even pre-trial publicity subvert this legal assumption? What are the psychological barriers which make it practically impossible for ‘everyone to be treated equally before the law?’ The law and psychology need not be in conflict as Marshall (1966) once argued. Instead, a research alliance between the two disciplines could be mutually challenging and, more crucially, by enlightened reforms, further the goals of a democratic society.

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THE SAMPLE

A sample of 1,000 jurors was randomly drawn from the 2,443 jurors who had actually served in 390 trials between January 1, 1976, and June 30, 1978 (30 months), and whose social composition (ethnicity, social class and sex) had been already classified in a previous study (Deosaran 1981b). Selection was through stratified random sampling whereby the proportion of each subgroup (ethnicity x social class x sex) was roughly in accordance with its proportion of 2,443. The categorisations were: Ethnicity: Indian, non-Indian; Social Class: upper, middle, lower; Sex: male, female.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

A nine-item questionnaire was finally prepared after (i) discussions with some of the members of the legal profession on the relevance of proposed questions and (ii) a confidential discussion of a draft questionnaire with a group of 16 jurors to assess both jurors’ capacity to recall and the effective wording of the questions. The final questionnaire was confidentially administered six months after the names were complied from the Registry. Due to refusals, incomplete or spoilt questionnaires and wrong addresses, the actual number of usable questionnaires amounted to 610, that is a response rate of 61 per cent.4 However, when this sample of 610 was categorised into ethnic, social class, and sex subgroups, the distribution very closely resembled that found within the population of 2,443. In this way, the sample of 610 was considered representative.5

IMPRESSION FORMATION

Do jurors form a criminal impression of the accused when they see him or her for the first time? In other words, are there stereotypes of ‘guilt’ or ‘innocence’ in jurors’ mind? This issue is important to consider in societies with conspicuously differing ethnic groups such as those in Trinidad. There are floating stereotypes regarding ethnicity and crime in the society. Public controversy has been formed, for example, around the relationship between the ‘poor black youth’ and ‘urban crime.’ As another example, there has been a historical connection between the East Indian male and wife murders. On the social class level, it is widely held that certain crimes are not commonly committed by certain social groups. The mode of dress and social class demeanour also earn different impressions in the wide community. The question was asked: ‘As soon as you saw the accused, what was your impression?’ Possible answers were: looked guilty, looked innocent, hard to tell.

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SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN THE JURY ROOM

The early work by Strodtbeck et al. (1957) suggested that the social characteristics (e.g. social status and sex) of jurors also play an influential role in jury deliberations. This study, like most similar ones (e.g. Diamond and Zeigal 1974, James 1959, Landy and Aronson 1969, Nemeth and Sosis 1973) used ‘mock’ jurors. Other studies did gather information on social characteristics from actual jurors but merely inferred the degree of influence such characteristics might have on jury behaviour (e.g. Adler 1973, Davis et al. 1976, Robinson 1950). Before a researcher can proceed to test the possible relationship between jurors’ social characteristics and the effect of these characteristics in jury decision-making, it would help if he is assured that in actual jury room deliberations, jurors with certain social characteristics influence other jurors who differ in these same characteristics. This problem of linking theory with empirical data is usually a difficult one when dealing with variables of ethnicity, sex or social class. Rarely do people themselves admit to having prejudiced opinions or behaviours. This study, having the social background data of each juror already available, sought to identify the jurors who appeared most susceptible to the influence of other jurors, and then the jurors who felt they exerted influence. This study posed two separate questions to jurors:

(Question 2): ‘Did the other jurors influence you in the jury room?’ Possible answers were: a lot, a little, not at all. (Question 4): ‘Did you influence the other jurors?’ Possible answers were the same as for the above question.

STABILITY OF JURY VERDICT

Given the possibility that extra-evidential factors (social and psychological) may play determining roles in jury room deliberations, it will be interesting to know the extent to which jurors will have ‘second thoughts’ about the verdict, that is, when the salience of those mediating extra-evidential factors is relatively absent. Furthermore, the degree to which jurors show a commitment to their original verdict would be an indirect measure of satisfaction with jury service. The question was asked: ‘If you had to vote on the same case again, would you vote the same way?’ Possible answers: yes, no, not sure.

RACIAL MOTIVATION OF JURORS

Like social class and sex, race has been extensively studied as an attribute of the plaintiff and especially the defendant. Many studies argue that the degree of racial similarity could influence the judgement of jurors. But again, the relevant research did not ask actual jurors whether this was so or not.

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Granting that a direct question to jurors would likely produce ‘socially desirable’ responses, an attempt was made to reduce this possibility by asking: ‘To be frank, what part do you think the race of the accused played in the minds of the other jurors?’ Possible answers were: a very important part, an important part, no importance. It is also necessary here to recall the findings of an earlier study of these same jurors (Deosaran 1981a). Spread across different trials, they had tried 362 accused persons of whom 169 were Indian and 193 non-Indian. Sixty-five per cent of the accused Indians were found guilty as against 62 per cent of non-Indians, a non- significant difference. A preliminary check in the study between racial background of jurors and the direction of their verdicts also showed no significant relationship. The question posed in this study therefore is a further and more specific test of racial motivation in a multiracial society.

OPINION CHANGE BY JURORS

A proper development of a social psychology of the jury trial must take into account the sources and the degree of jurors’ opinion formation and change during the trial. Given the fact that the trial is based on adversary principles of argument, the manipulative presentation of evidence and counterargument is crucial to the psychological dynamics underlying jurors’ opinion fluctuations. Indeed, there is much controversy over whether the minds of jurors are capable of treating properly the relevant arguments brought before them in court. There is also the more specific view that jurors go through a case with their minds largely ‘made up’ already. It was suggested, for instance, that 90 per cent of jurors’ decisions were made before they entered the jury room (Broeder 1965, Kalven and Zeisel 1966). This is particularly so in the cases which received high profile pre-trial publicity. This issue presents a sharp challenge to the ‘impartiality’ of one’s peers on a jury. It also confers a special status on the evidence. If jurors come to a trial with predetermined views on a trial, then the court evidence would have to be presented in a way that also deals with such preconceptions. If, on the other hand, jurors are perceived to come to trial without such preconceived views, then the evidence could be presented as ‘original shapers’ of opinions and not as evidence fighting against or with the pre-trial current as it were. In such differing circumstances, the psychology of evidence presentation is thus implicated. Judge Frank (quoted by Kalven and Zeisel 1966, 150) further raised the possibility that jurors may be pressed to form early opinions if only to maintain some mental stability in the midst of a rather confusing array of evidence. In other words, in their anxious search for meaning in a strange surrounding, jurors feel pressed to make early sense of the proceedings by quickly and perhaps unconsciously forming opinions of guilt or innocence. In such cases, it is crucial to understand the role and effects of the side which presents its evidence first or

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last. The psychology of persuasion should be understood when a courtroom argument is presented to a mind relatively free from preconceptions or to a mind possessed of strong preconceptions. In addition to the facts or legal issues in the case, the psychological elements of early or late presentation of evidence must be taken into strong account. The fundamental question is: To what extent do actual juries change their opinions during the trial? And, if so, from and to what direction? Answer to these questions would establish: (i) the extent to which juror opinion change is a viable issue for more specific research; (ii) the extent to which courtroom elements initially help to shape early juror opinions, a process which could subsequently fall within further psychological analysis of cognitive dissonance (Fischoff 1979), polarisation effects of juror discussions (Kaplan 1977), or attribution of guilt or innocence (Eiser 1978); and (iii) the extent to which early juror opinions persist towards and in jury deliberations. Underlying the above argument is the fact that previous studies have not really extracted the degree of opinion change from the jurors themselves regarding a case on which they actually sat. The present study thus attempts to fill this gap and possibly help direct more specific research. Jurors in this study were asked to state whether in the early part of the trial they felt that the accused was guilty or innocent and whether this early opinion changed or remained so at the end of the trial (i.e. at the verdict).

PARTICIPATION IN JURY ROOM DELIBERATIONS

As an institution, the jury has been upheld as a powerful arm of democracy. Lord Devlin (1956) himself boasted: ‘Trial by Jury... is the lamp that shows that freedom lives’ (p. 164). There is, of course, another more practical view (e.g. Judge Jerome Frank) that the jury is inherently incapable of fulfilling the high expectations held out for it. Part of this scepticism is based on the presumed psychological limitations (e.g. information integration and recall, social bias, etc.) of jurors (Green 1962). There is another question which must be properly answered in determining the democratic status of the jury: Is freedom of expression usually present in the jury room? How democratic is the jury deliberation in itself? Granting the legal difficulties in making firsthand observations, this study asked jurors: ‘During the jury deliberations do you think each juror got an equal chance to give his or her views?’ Possible answers were: yes, at all times; sometimes; not at all.

MOTIVES IN FOREMAN SELECTION

The personality and the behaviour of the jury foreman have been viewed as critical to the jury verdict (Barber and Gordon 1976, Bevan et al. 1958, Williams 1963). However, one of the pioneering studies in this area (Baldwin and McConville

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1980) found no relationship between the social characteristics of the foreman and the verdicts given. Like the more general relationship between social composition of jurors and their verdicts, this foreman-verdict relationship is tentative through lack of response from the jurors themselves or lack of jury room observations. A previous study (Deosaran 1980) found that over 60 per cent of the members of the legal profession in Trinidad felt that jurors selected their foreman because he or she was ‘well dressed’ or a ‘good speaker’. Only eight per cent felt ‘education or experience’ played the most important part. A subsequent study (Deosaran 1981a) revealed significant bias in composition in that nine out of every ten foremen were either upper or middle class, only one in 20 was female while one in five was Indian. So far, however, there has been no published study on the reasons given by the actual jurors themselves. Since the present sample of jurors was drawn from the jury population which produced the above distributions, it will be interesting to know their reasons now. The question was asked: ‘Which one do you think played the most important part in selecting the jury foreman?’ Possible answers ranged from: good speaker, very friendly, well dressed, education or experience. Jurors were required to select only one category.

SUBJECTIVE VS. OBJECTIVE CRITERIA IN JURY VERDICTS

At the heart of the debate over trial by jury is the extent to which extra- evidential (e.g. subjective) factors are allowed to override evidential factors in jury decision-making (Green 1962). It is acknowledged that a jury does have a wide prerogative in considering extenuating circumstances for its verdict, and, quite ironically, subjectivity is accepted as the basis for such a jury virtue. This study, however, did not examine the extenuating circumstances (e.g. public opinion) which could be considered legitimate if not legal. Instead, it examined non-legal sources of possible social psychological influence (e.g. style of lawyer, foreman’s influence, the appearance and courtroom behaviour of the accused). These sources of influence were considered different from the legal ones (e.g. judge’s instructions, rules of law, and the kind of offence committed). The question was asked: ‘From what you have seen as a juror, which two influences were the most important in deciding the verdict of the case?’ Possible answers are already given above in parentheses.

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RESULTS:

Impression Formation

Table 21.1 shows that 24 per cent of the jurors formed an early impression (guilty or innocent) when they first saw the accused. In fact, 11 per cent felt he (or she) ‘looked guilty’. Over 75 per cent, however, formed no such impression. When the 13 per cent who felt the accused looked innocent were combined with the 76 per cent who felt ‘it was hard’ to form an impression about innocence or guilt, then it seems that the vast majority (89 per cent) of jurors conform to the legal assumption that jurors come into court as impartial citizens with the view that ‘a man is innocent until proven guilty’. X2 test showed no significant relationship between the ethnicity or social class of jurors and their first impressions. Table 21.1, however, shows a significant relationship with the sex of the juror. (X2 = 10.05, df = 2, p< 0.05). Social Influence

Twenty-two per cent felt that other jurors influenced them in the jury room. The vast majority (78 per cent) felt, however, that there was no such influence. Only their social class made a significant difference in the degree of influence they felt from other jurors (X 2 = 26.78, df = 4, p<0.05). The direction (guilt or innocence) of this influence, it must be noted, was not measured in this study.

VERDICT COMMITMENT

An analysis of jurors’ commitment to their verdict showed that an overwhelming proportion (87 per cent) said they would vote the same way again.

TABLE 21.1 JURORS’ SEX AND THEIR FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THE ACCUSED

First Impression Sex Guilty Innocent Hard to tell Total Male 47 (10)* 72 (16) 345 (74) 464 (78) Female 19 (14) 7 (5) 106 (80) 132 (22) Total 66(11) 79(13) 451 (76) 596(100.0)** (X2 = 10.50, df = 2. p<0.05)

*Figures in brackets are row percentages except those under ‘Total’ which are column percentages. Figures outside brackets are frequencies. **Insufficient information = 14. These gave incomplete answers and as such were not included in the calculations.

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Thirteen per cent, expressed doubt (i.e. ‘no’ or ‘not sure’). Only their sex made any significant difference in their responses (X2 = 18.37, df= 2, p<0.05). As far as these jurors felt that they themselves had influenced other jurors, 34 per cent said ‘yes’. However, only three per cent said ‘a lot’, while 66 per cent said ‘not at all’. The only social background variable to make a significant, difference was social class (X2 = 19.37, df = 4 p<0.05). Almost all of the upper class group (87 per cent) felt they exerted influence as against only 26 per cent of lower class.

RACIAL MOTIVATION

Seventy five per cent felt that the accused played no important part (ten per cent said ‘very important’, 14 per cent said ‘important’). The X2 test showed that ethnicity, sex, and social class made no significant difference in jurors’ feelings about the role of race.

OPINION CHANGE

An analysis of jurors’ opinion change during the trial revealed that early in the trial 41 per cent formed a ‘guilty’ opinion of the accused as against 59 per cent developing an ‘innocent’ (or not guilty) opinion. The difference between these two proportions was highly significant (X2 = 17.70, df = l, p<0.0l). X2 tests revealed, however, that while these opinion shifts were in themselves significant, they were not significantly related to the ethnicity, social class, or the sex background of the jurors. Regarding the degree of opinion change from the early stage of the trial (t1) to the end of the trial (t2), 17 per cent changed their opinion from ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’ as against 49 per cent who changed from ‘innocent’ to ‘guilty’. Figure 21.1 shows these opinion shifts. ‘Guilty’ opinions increased from 41 per cent (t l) to 73 per cent (t2). A two-tailed test of these differences was significant (p<10.05; z = 5.7). Overall, those who changed opinions amounted to 66 per cent as against 34 per cent holding constant opinions.

PARTICIPATION

Eighty-two per cent of the jurors said they were able to give their views ‘at all times’ during the jury deliberations. Seventeen per cent said they got no chance at all or they got the chance only ‘sometimes’. A X2 test showed that ethnicity, social class and sex of jurors made no significant difference in these responses. A cross tabulation was done between (i) the extent to which jurors felt that other jurors influenced them (i.e. Question 2) and (ii) the extent to which they felt they got an equal chance to express their views during jury deliberations (i.e. Question 7). It was found that 82 per cent of the jurors felt they had an opportunity ‘at all times’ to express their views (from Question 7) while only five per cent felt that other jurors influenced them ‘a lot’ (from Question 2). In this same way,

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only seven per cent said they did not have any opportunity at all to express their views (from Question 7) while 77 per cent felt that the other jurors did not influence them at all (from Question 2). As far as these self-reports go, the trends do suggest a strong degree of internal consistency, while lending support to the general veracity of jurors’ perceptions in these respects. In other words, an overwhelming number of jurors (82 per cent) felt they were able to speak quite freely. At the same time, a similarly large number (77 per cent) said they were not influenced at all by other jurors in the jury room.

FIGURE 21.1 JURORS OPINION CHANGE DURING TRIAL

Innocent/ not guilty 100 guilty

80 Per cent from each 70 group 60

10 Innocent guilty / t

First Early Trial End of Trial Impression (n=533) (n=533) (n=533)

1. The number of jurors used was 533 because 77 of sample (610) gave insufficient information.

FOREMAN SELECTION

An analysis of jurors’ reasons for selecting their foremen showed 52 per cent choosing ‘education or experience’ as the most important reason6; 48 per cent chose the personality characteristics of friendliness, verbal ability, or dress appearance.7 An X2 test showed that these choices were not significantly related to the ethnicity, social class, or sex of jurors.

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REASONS FOR VERDICT

Table 21.2 shows the distribution of the ‘two most important’ factors chosen by jurors in reaching the verdict of the last case on which they sat. Fifty-seven per cent of the jurors chose ‘rules of law’ as one of the most important, while for their other choice 78 per cent selected the ‘judge’s instruction’. Since the two choices made are considered equal to each other in rank, the average for each choice was found. Hence, the percentage distribution in column four (Table 21.2) shows that ‘rules of law’ and the ‘judge’s instructions’ were together chosen 78 per cent of the time. In other words, 78 per cent of the jurors’ choices indicated that strictly legal criteria were used in arriving at the verdict.

TABLE 21.2 TWO MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS PERCEIVED BY JURORS IN DECIDING VERDICTS OF CASES

Factor Choice Average Choice Kind of offence 133 (20) * 6 (11) 59 (10) Behaviour looks of accused 41 (7) 3 (1) 22 (4) Style of lawyer 61 (11) 4 (1) 33 (6) Foreman l Influence 19 (3) 3 ( 1) 11 ( 2) Rules of law 324 (57) 104 (19) 214 (39) Judge's Instructions 12 (2) 149 (78) 215 (39) Total 370 ** 539** 554 (100)

*Figures in brackets are column percentages while those outside brackets are frequencies. **Insufficient information = 40 and 71 respectively.

Two categories were constructed: (i) Legal = rules of law, judge’s instructions and kind of offence: (ii) Social psychological = appearance and style of the lawyer, and foreman’s influence.

The legal category got 88 per cent of the jurors’ choices as against only 12 per cent for the category of social psychological factors.

DISCUSSION

This study posed a series of questions to actual jurors who had recently given verdicts in trials. The prohibition against questioning jurors in specific cases compelled us to ask fairly general questions about ‘the last case’ they heard. No further identification of juror, case or locality was permissible. Therefore, while

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there was a research advantage in questioning actual jurors on their trial experience, there were some necessary limitations imposed by law. The study attempted to explore the social psychology of the jury while examining the relationships between the social composition of jurors on one hand and their courtroom perceptions, interactions, and decisions on the other hand. One of the most notable results from the data available was the general failure of the social composition of the jurors to make significant differences in their responses. Social composition (race, social class, sex) made no significant difference in jurors’ responses to four of the eight questions (for which X2 tests were used). For the remaining four questions, only sex made a significant difference in two, while only social class made a significant difference in the other two. Indeed, it is surprising that the race of jurors played no significant part in any of the answers given. Such trends differ very much from what a vast number of other studies have inferred about race and jury behaviour. This general non-salience of social composition factors could very well be due to the levelling demands of the courtroom situation, a position taken by quite a few researchers (e.g. Baldwin and McConville 1980, Simon 1980). Baldwin and McConville explained from their results that, rather than their ‘personal and social characteristics’, it seems that the ‘individual attitudes, beliefs, and prejudices’ of individual jurors ‘are more crucial in understanding the verdict’ (p. 41). Specifically, they found ‘no relationship between the sex, age, social class or race of jurors and their propensity to acquit or to convict defendants’ (p. 39). Similar support in this respect came from two other studies (Deosaran 1981a, Simon 1968). Simon argued:

It is extremely difficult to predict the response or behaviour of a given individual to a concrete situation on the basis of such gross characteristics as occupation, education, sex or age. In any situation what a person thinks or does is function of who he is, the exigencies of the situation, how strongly he feels about the problem, and a host of other factors. (p.118)

This does not close the doors on the impact of social composition. It merely means that the impact may vary for certain trials depending, for example, on the quality of the evidence itself. The pursuit of behaviour manifestations of race, sex and social class could be better served in these instances with more refined psychological measures of values and attitudes rather than having gross social categories. It is possible, for example, that values towards matters of justice and law in this country have a wider and more common spread across race, sex and class than what is suggested in the traditional sociological literature. The data on impression formation by jurors do not lend strong support to the view (largely through simulated trials and mock juries) that jurors perceive criminal stereotypes in the courtroom, at least not as soon as they see the accused. Ninety

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per cent of the jurors questioned said that their first impression of the accused was either an ‘innocent’ or a neutral one. This lends some support to the legal assumption that ‘a man is innocent until proven ‘guilty’ unless, of course, one finds that the proportion (ten per cent) who formed a ‘guilty’ impression is too high an amount for the fairness doctrine to tolerate. The results regarding ‘jury room influence’ suggest a high level of democratic participation with very little social pressure to conform. Generally, jurors felt they were not influenced by others in the jury room. Neither did they influence others very much. Furthermore, 82 per cent of these jurors felt that at all times they got an equal chance to give their views during jury deliberation. Again, these findings suggest that jury behaviour in the jury room is not necessarily an intense tug-of-war among widely differing jurors. Within the limitations of the study, the image projected here is that a jury room deliberation is generally a reasonable and fair process. It is also quite possible that individual jurors generally enter the jury room with fairly similar opinions, thus facilitating the required consensus. A further examination of jury decision-making showed that, even after giving their verdict, almost 90 per cent of the jurors said yes, they would give the same verdict if they had to vote again. This suggests either that they were very convinced about the ‘rightness’ of their verdicts, or that, by post-decision dissonance reduction; they had to enhance their commitment to their earlier decision. But in either case, it serves the cause of jury service to see so many jurors satisfied with the verdict they have given in the court over a fellow citizen. It also implies a high measure of satisfaction with jury service. Given the widespread theoretical and empirical concerns over the effects of race on interpersonal and group conflict in this society, one is surprised that as much as 75 per cent of the jurors completely discounted the race of the accused as playing an important part among them. Even the racial background of the jurors made no difference. It might be of some concern, however, to note that 24 per cent felt this racial factor played at least an important part. This caution is similar to that expressed for jurors’ first impressions. So much is at stake in a courtroom trial that the quality of jury or judicial decision-making is not necessarily reflected through the difference between statistical proportions. The tragedy of having extralegal factors irreversibly and adversely interfere with the trial of one innocent person is enough to take the judicial process to task. A social psychological feature of the jury was revealed by the amount of opinion change which took place by jurors during the trial. The finding that 66 per cent of the jurors changed their opinions about the accused between the early part and the end of the trial does make it possible to construct a communication model for jury behaviour. That is, jurors do seem influenced by persuasion techniques in the adversary process. It is also noteworthy that the ‘guilty’ opinions increased by 78 per cent (i.e. from 41–73 per cent) while ‘innocent’

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opinions decreased by 66 per cent (i.e. from 59–27 per cent). This suggests more persuasion impact by the prosecutor as against the defence on jurors’ minds. Generally then, as jurors moved from their first impressions of the accused, to the early part of the trial, up to the end of the trial (when their verdicts were given) their opinions cumulatively increased in the direction of the ‘guilt’ and correspondingly, decreased in the direction of the ‘innocence’ of the accused. As a means of conforming to legal restrictions, jurors were ‘collapsed’ across trials. Therefore the exact implications of this ‘guilty shift’ for particular verdicts cannot be confidently discussed. Once again, these jurors gave a different account from that given of them by others. In a previous study (Deosaran 1980) many members of the legal profession (65 per cent) felt that jurors selected their foremen on grounds of friendliness, verbal fluency, or dress appearance, with only eight per cent saying ‘experience or education’. In his present study, however, 52 per cent of the jurors said the most important reason for selecting their foremen was his or her ‘experience or education’. Forty-eight per cent advanced ‘friendliness, fluency or dress’ as a ‘most important reason’. This of course, does not conclusively settle the issue. It merely suggests that jurors are more satisfied than other legal observers with their own jurors’ behaviour. Some clarification of this discrepancy is obtained from data of another related study (Deosaran 1981a) which showed that the foreman selected by these juries were in fact heavily biased in favour of upper or middle class males, and non- Indians. Since there is usually little or no time for juries to get to know one another before selecting a foreman, it will be interesting to identify the psychological cues projected by the select group of foremen. Furthermore, the extent to which race, social class, or sex is related to ‘education and/or experience’ could justify the preponderance of foremen with such social characteristics. And the extent to which such social characteristics are related to ‘dress’ or ‘fluency’ (and they usually are) could also reduce the apparent superficiality of some jurors’ response. That 88 per cent of the jurors perceived legal factors (e.g. ‘rules of law’, ‘judge’s instructions’) as ‘most important’ factors in reaching their verdict certainly brought jury decision-making much closer to ‘the legal rationalistic model’. Only 12 per cent perceived social psychological factors (e.g. looks of accused) as ‘most important’ in arriving at a verdict. This result contrasts sharply with the research trend which emphasises the salience of defendants’ characteristics over evidential factors (e.g. see review in Davis et al. 1976). This also runs counter to a previous study (Deosaran 1980) when almost 80 per cent of the members of the legal profession in Trinidad felt that the physical appearance of the accused affects the jury’s verdict. The caution necessary in interpreting the present study, however, rests on the apparent ‘demand’ characteristics of the question itself. That is, it might have looked more responsible to jurors to select legal over social psychological reasons. This may not seem so

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for lawyers observing jurors. An attempt was made to diminish such a possible effect by asking the jurors in this study what they perceived of other jurors rather than describing their own behaviour. Such problems are almost inevitable in the questionnaire method of research. It is hoped, however, that such responses from actual jurors would help inspire further research strategies. Overall, the picture that emerged from this study is that jury behaviour is rational and healthy. It seems relatively unaffected by the race of the accused, or the race, social class, or sex of the juror. Whilst there is substantial opinion change by jurors during the trial, one is assured that, according to them, jurors choose their foreman and arrive at their verdicts in quite reasonable ways. Of course, for reasons already explained, the questions and the results from this study are necessarily somewhat gross. More specific lines of inquiry are now necessary if the social psychological aspects of the jury trial are to be systematised. For example, while we found six per cent opinion change with a heavy increase of ‘guilty’ opinions, we need to know in what ways and at what stages of the trial the prosecution or defence introduces his vital ‘evidential element’ or invoke stereotypes so as to shift jury opinion. Quite possibly, such psychological manipulation, when tied in with attribution theory (Eiser 1978) or symbolic interactionism (Shott 1979) may help explain, in more specific ways, jury opinion formation and change which are central features in the social psychology of the jury trial.

A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF JURY BEHAVIOUR

A social psychological analysis of trial by jury will therefore emphasise an interactionist approach. For instance, if a substantial degree of opinion change is uncovered as the trial proceeds, two questions arise: (i) What specific factors are related to this opinion change; and (ii) How are these factors related to the direction of the opinion change? Furthermore, the social psychological literature has established a relationship between the degree of structure and ambiguity in the situation and the tendency (or opportunity) to project one’s own stereotypes or biases into the situation (e.g. Cohen 1964, Zajonc 1968). More specifically, the less structured or more ambiguous the situation, the more likely would one’s stereotypes or biases come into play. Part of the theoretical explanation for this relationship comes from the assumption that people need ‘to make meaning’ of situations that confront them. One expects, then, that the more structured, concrete and compelling the evidential elements are in a particular case, the less likely would be the projection of jurors’ stereotypes or pre-trial biases into the trial. Of course, there will be times when such projections will coincide with or be reinforced by the compelling evidence. However the crucial area seems to exist when evidence8 is relatively ambiguous or almost equally strong from both sides — the prosecution and the defence.

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In such circumstances, to arrive at a verdict ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ becomes a highly subjective process, with an almost necessary reliance on jurors’ intuitive or projective capacities, especially since they are not required to give reasons for their verdict. This is where ‘juror psychology’ is likely to predominate. This is where, too, the lawyers capacity to invoke such stereotypes and pre-trial biases would become more salient. The trial situation for the jurors could be thus categorised along an ‘ambiguity scale’:

(A) Strong, clear evidence on only one side (e.g. eye witnesses for prosecution vs. no alibi by defence) (B) Strong, clear evidence on both sides (e.g. eye witnesses for prosecution vs. sound alibi by defence) (C) Weak, unclear evidence on both sides (e.g. a controversial confession by prosecution vs. weak alibi by defence)

There could be many other additions to the strong or weak elements on either side of the trial so as to increase or decrease the level of ambiguity in the trial. The above examples are used for illustration. Trial situations Band C (above) would likely appear more ambiguous or conflicting than situation A to the jurors’ minds with C being much, much more ambiguous than either B and A. In terms of the degree of jurors’ psychological input, therefore, the following could be hypothesised: C>B>A. However, the hypothesis must be viewed within the context of two preliminary tests in the judicial process:

(1) the police felt that the evidence they had was enough for a charge to be laid, and (2) the court ruling (when required) that a ‘prima facie’ has been established.

From available research, the extent to which such ‘gate keeping stages’ in themselves enhance the strength of the prosecution’s evidence in the jurors’ minds is not clear. However, even if there were such an effect, the relationships presented above could still stand. A further consequence of this ‘evidence ambiguity’ hypothesis is to resist treating all jury trials as homogeneously as has been usually done in the relevant research (e.g. Baldwin and McConville 1980, Kalven and Zeisel 1966). For example, conclusions on the relationship between the social composition of juries and the direction of their verdicts would be more meaningful if the degree of ‘evidence ambiguity’ across trials is taken into account. This interactionist approach, therefore, offers some scope for more specific social psychological lines of inquiry - even without having access to jury room deliberations.

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FURTHER RESEARCH: SOME THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

In terms of examining the psychological process, it would be helpful if a series of laboratory studies could be conducted with the above model of evidential ambiguity. The level of ambiguity could be reliably varied for comparable groups of subject jurors. At the same time, given the critical role of the jury in a democratic society, it is time for us to have specially authorised project, with the guaranteed confidentiality, on actual jury behaviour in the jury room. If the major concern is over the maintenance of juror anonymity and the freedom to arrive at verdicts, then such a scientific inquiry could be shaped to accommodate these concerns. It is no longer justifiable to have jury behaviour remain totally outside the reach of proper inquiry. The understanding gained from such art inquiry would go a long way in guiding presiding judges themselves in offering effective instructions before the jury retires for its deliberations. The data obtained from this particular study suggest that a more specific format be constructed before more meaningful data could be obtained. For example, it is more effective to set upon specific trials wherein the variables at stake are more readily identifiable. All jury trials are not the same in terms of what the major social or psychological variables are. In a political trial for example, where the state is directly involved in a prosecution against members of an opposition group, the issue of political values is important to examine. What kind of political values do the jurors have? In what direction do their political sympathies lie? How central is the political nature of the trial to the outcome of the trial? While the peremptory challenges could go some way in establishing a balance of viewpoints or a degree of political neutrality, there would be enough political residue left in the jury to affect interpretation of the evidence. In the same way, any attempt to examine racial bias in a jury trial must first find a trial wherein race does play a salient part. For example, how racially different and antagonistic are the adversaries in the trial? The same argument relates to sexual or social class bias. To examine jury behaviour without having such a clearer view of the nature of the jury trial would offer a gross though guiding overview. This consideration, indeed, fits in well with the definition of social psychology. Social psychology places equal importance on defining the situation on one hand and the individual (or group) in interaction with such a situation. Clarifying the salient social or psychological elements in a particular trial would enable the researcher to seek out compatible variables on the part of the individual jurors. In other words, it is not quite effective to study racial bias in an arson trial where political conflict played a significant role, unless, of course, racial conflict is obviously connected to the overall issue. These considerations

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do not mean that racial bias would necessarily emerge on the part of jurors in a trial where race played a significant part. It merely suggests that the variables chosen must have some theoretical compatibility on each side of the social psychological equation. There must be at the start some degree of face validity in the variables chosen for continued study.

REFERENCE

Adler, F. 1973. ‘Social-Economic Factors Influencing Jury Verdicts’. New York University Review of Law and Social Change 3: 16–36. Baldwin J. and Mc Conville, M. 1980. ‘Juries, Foreman, and Verdicts’. British Journal of Criminology 20: 35–44. ___. 1979. Jury Trials. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ___. 1980. ‘Criminal Juries’. In Crime and Justice, ed. N. Norris and M. Tonry, 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Barber, D. and Gordon G. 1976. Members of the Jury. London: Woldwood House. Berman, J. and Sales, B. 1977. ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Systematic Approach to Juror Selection’. Criminal Justice and Behaviour 4: 219-39. Bevan, W., Albert, R., Loiseaux, P., Mayfield, P., and Wright, G. 1958. ‘Jury Behaviour as a Function of the Prestige of the Foreman and the Nature of Leadership’. Journal of Public Law 7: 419–49. Boehm, V. 1968. ‘Mr Prejudice, Miss Sympathy, and the Authoritarian Personality: An Application of Psychological Measuring Techniques to the Problem of Jury Bias’. Wisconsin Law Review 3: 734–50. Bray, R. ,Struckman-Johnson., C. Osborne, M., McFarlane, J., and Scott, J. 1978. ‘The Effects of Defendant Satus on the Decisions of Students and Community Juries’. Social Psychology 41: 256–60 Broeder. D. 1965. ‘The Negro in Court’. Duke University Law Journal I: 19-31. Cant, J. 1974. ‘Statistical Evidence in Jury Discrimination Cases’. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 65: 234–38. Cohen, A. 1964. Attitude Change and Social Influence. New York: Basic Books. Davis, T., Bray, R. and Holt, R. 1976. ‘The Empirical Study of Social Decision Process in Juries’. In Law, Justice, and the Individual Society, ed. J. Trapp and F. Levine. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Deosaran, R. 1981. ‘The Jury System in a Post-Colonial Multiracial Society: Problems of Bias’. British Journal of Criminology 21: 305–23. ___. 1980. Trial by Jury as Social Process: The Trinidad Case. Paper presented at conference of Caribbean Studies Association. Jamaica. ___. 1980. ‘Trial by Jury: An Assessment by the Legal Profession’. Journal of the Bar Association of Trinidad and Tobago 1: 23–36. ___. 1981. ‘Trial by Jury’. Journal of the Bar Association of Trinidad and Tobago 1: 5–20 . ___. 1982. Social Science in Law: A Challenge to the Judicial Process. Paper Presented at Sixth Commonwealth Magistrates’ Conference. Trinidad, September 12–18. Devlin, L. 1956. Trial by Jury. London: Stevens and Sons.

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Diamond, S. and Zeisel, H. 1974. ‘A Courtroom Experiment In Juror Selection and Decision- Making’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 1: 276–77. Efran, M. 1974. ‘The Effect of Physical Appearance on the Judgement of Guilt, Interpersonal Attraction and Severityof Recommended Punishment in a Simulated Jury Case’. Journal of Research in Personality 8: 45–54. Eiser, R. 1978. ‘Interpersonal Attributions’. In Introducing Social Psychology, ed. H Tajfel and C.Fraser. Middlesex: Penguin Books. Erlanger, H. 1970. ‘Jury Research in America: Its Past and Future’. Law and Society Review 4: 345–70. Fischoff, S. 1979. ‘Recipe for a Jury Revisited: A Balance Theory Prediction’. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 9: 355–49 Fisher, R. 1982. Social Psychology. New York: St Martin’s Press. Gerbasi, K. Zuckerman,M. and Reis, H. 1977. ‘Justice Needs a New Blindfold: A Review of Mock Jury Research’. Psychological Bulletin 84: 323–45. Green. E. 1962. ‘The Reasonable Man: Legal Fiction or Psychological Reality?’ Law and Society Review 2: 241–57. Inman, M.1981. ‘Police Interrogation and Confessions’. In Psychology in Legal Contexts, ed. Sally Lloyd -Bostock. London: Macmillan Press. James, R. 1959. ‘Status and Competence of Jurors’. American Journal of Sociology 67: 566– 70. Kalven, H. and Zeisel, H. 1966. The American Jury. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. Kaplan, M. 1977. ‘Discussion Polarization Effects in A Modified Jury Decision r Paradigm: Informational Int1uence’. Sociometry, 40: 262–71. Landy, D. and Aronson, E. 1969. ‘The Inf1uence of the Character of the Criminal and His Victims in the Decisions of Simulated Jurors’. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 5: 142–52. Marshall, J. 1966. Law Psychology in Conflict. New York: Bobbs-Merril. Mills, C. and Bohannon, M. 1980. ‘Character Structure and Jury Behaviour: Conceptual and Applied Implications’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 38:662–67. Monahan, J. and Loftus, E. 1982. ‘The Psychology of Law’. Annual Review of Psychology 33: 441–76. Nemeth, C. and Sosis, R. 1973. ‘A Simulated Jury Study: Characteristics of the Defendant and the Jurors’. Journal of Social Psychology 90: 221–29. Robinson, W. 1950. ‘Bias, Probability, and Trial by Jury’. American Sociological Review 15: 73–78. Saks, M. and Hastie, R. 1978. Social Psychology in Court. Kentucky: Van Nostrand. Sales, D. 1977. ‘Perspectives in Law and Psychology’. In The Criminal Justice System 1. New York: Lenum Press. Sealey, A. and Cornish, W. 1973. ‘Jurors and Their Verdicts’. The Modern Law Review 36: 496–508. Shott, S. 1979. ‘Emotion and Social Life: A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis’. American Journal Of Sociology 84: 1,317–34. Simon, R. 1959. ‘Status and Competence of Jurors’. American Journal of Psychology 64: 563– 70. ___. 1980. The Jury: Its Role in American Society. Massachusetts: Lexington Books.

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___. 1968. The Jury and the Defense of Insanity: Chicago Jury Project. University of Chicago. Strodtbeck, F., James, C. and Hawkins, C. 1957. ‘Social Status in Jury Deliberations’. American Sociological Review 22: 713–19. Tapp, T. 1980. ‘Psychological and Policy perspectives on the Law: Reflections on a Decade’. Journal of Social Issues 36: 165–92. Van Dyke, J. 1977. Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels. Cambridge: Bullinger Publishing Co. Williams, G. 1963. The Proof of Guilt: A Study of the English Criminal Trial. London: Stevens and Sons. Wrightsman, L. 1978. ‘The American Trial Jury on Trial: Empirical Evidence and Procedural Modifications’. Journal of Social Issues 34: 137–63 Zajonc, R. 1968. ‘Cognitive Theories is Social Psychology’. In Handbook of Social Psychology I, ed. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson. Addison: Wesley Publishing Co.

NOTES

1. From Social Psychology in the Caribbean: Direction for Theory and Research, Longman Trinidad Limited, Boundary Road, San Juan, Trinidad, 1992, pp. 205–42, with permission. 2. Trinidad, a Commonwealth state, got independence from the British in 1962. Its population of roughly one million persons is recognised as one of the most multiracial in the Commonwealth. While this has produced some multi-cultural splendours, some measure of ethnic conflict continues to exist in political and social affairs. Racial discrimination has been an issue within the country’s legal profession. Percentages in the Trinidad population (1985) are roughly: Africans 42, East Indians 40, Whites 1.20, Chinese 0.8, Syrian Lebanese 0.1, Mixed 14.2. Between 1623 and 1874, 15 islands in the Caribbean came under British rule. All continue to use the jury system. 3. Kind permission to compile names and addresses from the confidential jury lists in the Registry was given by the Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, Sir Isaac Hyatali, on the condition that jurors’ names were not revealed and actual trial not identified. 4. Relatively low response rates are not untypical in legal research, e.g. Kalven and Zeisel (1966) got about 30 per cent.; Mills and Bohannon (1980) got 40 per cent. 5. For example, while almost all of the 2,443 jurors were middle or lower class (98.5 per cent), a similar proportion (99.5 per cent) was found in the sample of 610. Again, while Indians and non- Indians amounted to 24.7 and 75.3 per cent of the 2,443 the sample of 610 contained 23 and 76.9 per cent respectively. 6. Seventy-two of the samples (610) gave no answer. 7. Friendliness seven per cent; verbal ability 35 per cent; dress six per cent. 8. Evidence here includes prosecution as well as defence arguments, witnesses, etc.

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Pre-Trial This paper seeks to do four things. Firstly, it details the quantity and quality of pre-trial Publicity and publicity generated over an actual case in Juror Prejudice: Trinidad. Secondly, it examines the psychological impact of this publicity on a A Case Study 1 sample of persons qualified to be jurors. Ramesh Deosaran Thirdly, it seeks to measure the subsequent degree of confidence which these prospective jurors have in the press carrying the pre-trial publicity. Fourthly, it illustrates how the structure and process of the actual trial could temper the impact of the pre-trial publicity related to the case.

THE PRESS AND THE LAW Incident, Inquiry, Indictment; Sequence of Events

This section does not deal with the evidential aspects of the case itself. It is confined to the publicity which occurred between the date of the alleged crime and the date when the charge of murder was formally laid (i.e. from September 11– September 29, 1982) against the police inspector, Rudolph Regis.2 The inspector was charged for allegedly causing the death of civilian Reynold Ganesh by striking him with a gun. At the second magistrates’ hearing, the charge was reduced to manslaughter. Another indictment for murder was issued.3 This led to a jury trial in 1984. This trial is discussed later in this paper. The following is a brief outline of the sequence of events upon which the publicity was based:

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1. On Saturday, September 11, 1982, a 27 year old man, Reynold Ganesh, died in an incident involving Police Inspector Rudolph Regis and arising out of a motor car accident. This was first reported in a front page story in the Trinidad Guardian on Wednesday, September 15, 1982. 2. Eyewitnesses then alleged through reports to the police station and statements given to the two daily newspapers that Inspector Regis caused Ganesh’s death with a blow from a pistol. 3. On Sunday, September 20, 1982, Acting Assistant Commissioner (Crime) Allen Drayton issued a press release announcing that Police Commissioner Mr Randolph Borroughs had ordered an investigation ‘shortly after the incident’ had occurred, and that the statements taken had been sent to the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). 4. On Wednesday, September 23, 1982, the Acting DPP, Mr Victor Nunez, referred the matter for a coroner’s inquest. No one was charged at this time. 5. On Wednesday, September 29, 1982, the DPP, Mr Clebert Brooks (just back from vacation), rejected the decision for a coroner’s inquest and ordered that Inspector Regis be charged with the murder of Ganesh. 6. On Thursday, September 30, 1982, Inspector Regis was taken to the magistrates’ court. Against strong objections by defence counsel, the case was postponed to October 5, 1982 by presiding magistrate, Mr Laymas Sinanan. 7. On October 8, 1982 after hearing various statements and arguments in court, the Acting Chief Magistrate, Mr Lincoln Dwarika, reduced the charge from murder to manslaughter. 8. On March 9, 1984, the DPP again charged Regis with murder. The case went before a jury on April 12, 1984.

PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY: DATA AND CONTROVERSY

Between September 11, 1982 when Ganesh was allegedly killed by a blow from the police inspector’s gun, and September 29, 1982 when a charge of murder was formally laid against Inspector Regis, all of the nation’s news media (two dailies, two evening papers, four weeklies, one television and two radio stations)4 consistently gave very graphic details and widespread coverage of the incident, and of the two persons allegedly involved. The Trinidad Guardian first reported the incident on Wednesday, September 15, 1982 in its front page. Between that date and September 29 when the charge was laid (a 15-day period inclusive) there were 456 column inches of publicity, including three very hard-hitting editorials and three front page stories with striking pictures. The rate was 30 column inches per day, with 83 per cent of the publicity occurring in the two dailies. Though not actually measured in this study,

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radio and especially television coverage intensified the impact of the newspaper publicity on the public’s mind. The major thrusts of the publicity were:

(1) That the inspector should be arrested since there was enough ‘evidence’ including statements from two eye witnesses. (2) That both the police and the office of the DPP were showing ‘undue delay and even favouritism’ by not making an arrest. (3) That it was not necessary for the police to refer the matter to the DPP.

The day after it first reported the incident, the Trinidad Guardian published a very forceful editorial (Thursday, September 16, 1982) which said in part:

The reputation of our Police Service, the administration of the present Police Commissioner, and the integrity of the Minister of National Security if not that of the Attorney General will all be severely tested by an incident which occurred during the last weekend. Our reports are that a Police Inspector, riding in a police vehicle, was involved in an accident at San Juan. He left his vehicle and went over to the other car in which Reynold Ganesh was riding. Ganesh, it is understood, chided him about the police setting a bad example on the road. The officer, we understood, then used his pistol in the presence of witnesses to batter Ganesh to death.

The editorial continued: ‘We expect the Police Commissioner to resist any suggestion from any quarter ‘to ease up the man’ or attempt to play enforcer, judge and jury in this serious and nauseating matter.’ Three days after (Sunday, September 19) the newspaper with the largest circulation5 the Sunday Guardian, wrote a 19-inch editorial headlined: ‘No Police Cover-up Must be Allowed.’ The editorial then stated in part:

A police officer is said by eyewitnesses to have pistol-whipped a passenger in a vehicle a few days ago. As a result of the beating, the man whose name is given as Reynold Ganesh died. So far, and despite reports in the Guardian, there has been no response from the police. All we have to go on is a series of rumours indicating police reluctance to take any action.... The law must take its course, by means of the normal enquiry, when the testimony of eyewitnesses can be put to the test and public opinion and conscience satisfied.

Public apprehension over the apparent delay in ‘making an arrest’ was aggravated by the acting DPP’s decision to hold a coroner’s inquest. He had stated (Express, September 23): ‘The death in this case is what they call an unnatural death and the coroner is entitled by law to hold an inquiry to ascertain whether a felony was committed.’ The media and the Bar Association voiced strong objections against this decision. They preferred an immediate arrest.

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Media comment became buttressed by substantial reactions from other quarters, reactions which were highly publicised in the two dailies. For example, the official opposition, the United Labour Front (ULF), made a call in Parliament (Monday, September 28) for an official inquiry into the reasons ‘why no charges have been laid to date... despite evidence of persons who witnessed the incident.’ This call was directed to the Attorney General. The Opposition said they were also considering the unusual step of ‘instituting private indictable proceedings against the police inspector’.6 Naturally, these utterances gained prominent publicity. The Sunday Express published (September 26) a 30-inch article with a range of critical comments by the president of the Bar Association of Trinidad and Tobago, Mr Frank Solomon. Mr Solomon publicly criticised the police for the manner in which they were handling the matter. He said:

We are not satisfied that there was any need for the police to refer their reports to the Director of Public Prosecutions instead of acting immediately by arresting and charging the responsible party as there are witnesses available and an apparent cause of death... Even less can we understand the response of the Acting Director of Police Prosecutions in recommending a coroner’s inquest.

Example of the newspaper editorials (Trinidad Express and Trinidad Guardian) before the DPP, Mr Clebert Brooks, ordered the arrest of Inspector Rudolph Regis on a charge of murdering civilian Reynold Genesh sometime between September 11 and 12, 1982. Regis was charged on September 29, 1982 and found guilty by a jury on May 17, 1984. The Bar Association’s president further explained that since the matter was before the acting DPP, ‘his duty is clearly spelt out in the Constitution’ in that it is ‘not part of his duty to initiate a coroner’s inquest’ and that ‘he is passing the buck.’ Having thus raised this constitutional aspect, the Bar president announced that the Bar has set up a special committee to look into the matter.

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Around that time when no charge had been laid, a weekly (TnT Mirror, September 24), carried a front page banner headline: ‘INSPECTOR REGIS — MIRROR NAMES COP IN THE KILLING.’ The Mirror stated in part:

The police and the Government have so far refused to identify the Police Inspector involved in the killing of a citizen. But today the Mirror is able to tell the country that the officer involved is Inspector Rudolph Regis, 45, a member of the elite Flying Squad.

The Mirror continued: ‘We do this today, not in an attempt to discredit Mr Regis but to clear the obvious innuendo against all other Inspectors who stand accused in the public’s eye.’ This was the first time since the matter was publicly reported that Inspector Regis’s name was published in direct association with the incident. Alongside that story was a picture of Mr and Mrs Ganesh on their wedding day. In fact, the newspaper prolifically published pictures of Mrs Ganesh and her two children weeping. The Express gave front page coverage (39 inches, September 28) to a plan by a human rights group7 for a ‘national day of mourning’ for Ganesh and ‘all those who died at the hands of police brutality in the country.’ During this time, too, the media announced that two lawyers in private practice, Mr Israel Khan and Mr Ramesh Maharaj, had written the DPP asking that a lawyer in private practice be called to prosecute in the matter, and offering their services in this respect. The DPP rejected these requests. Throughout all the media pronouncements, there was a consistent appeal for the Attorney General to ‘take action.’ Also, two eyewitnesses have rather detailed accounts alleging how the police inspector had ‘pistol-whipped’ Ganesh. On September 24, the Express used its entire front page with a picture of Ganesh, his wife and their two infants, to publish the ‘eyewitness account’ of one Winston Ramkhelawan. Ramkhelawan said in part:

Cursing and arguing, he (police inspector) called out to us, “you coolie”8 so and so, look what you do...” the Inspector said “shut you so and so mouth” and struck Reynold on the left side of his face. Blood started gushing out from his mouth. He fell backwards in the middle of the road.

Ramkhelawan also told the newspaper that the police officer who took his statement at the police station ‘was laughing and making fun of him.’ Three days after this media report (September 27), the Guardian published prominently on its front page (23 inches with picture) the second ‘eyewitness’ account by one Ellis Richardson. Richardson said in part:

There was an argument between the police inspector and Ganesh... The Inspector pulled out an identification card and started waving it... the inspector then pulled out a revolver and struck Ganesh on his left cheek. Ganesh fell to the ground and

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blood started to flow from his mouth. At no time did anyone attack or threaten to attack the police inspector.

Quite notably, no comment was publicly reported at this time by the ‘police inspector’ or any ‘eyewitnesses’ on his behalf.

THE CHARGE LAID

Eighteen days after the incident allegedly occurred, the DPP, Mr Clebert Brooks, announced on September 29, 1982 that he had directed the police to charge Inspector Rudolph Regis for murder. This got front page banner headlines in both dailies. Mr Brooks then publicly stated (front page Express and Guardian, September 30):

I wish to make it abundantly clear that in arriving at this decision I was not influenced in any way by the reports which have so far appeared in the press. Such reports in my view have been made without9 a full knowledge and reference to the facts which arise in the said matter. Further, such press reports could be indeed pre mature.

On September 29, 1982, the day on which Regis was charged, the Express published the following story (p. 3):

Senior Superintendent Osmond Kerr, chief investigating officer in the death of 26-year old Reynold Ganesh, yesterday lashed out at the press, describing the reports so far printed as ‘wicked publications.’ Superintendent Kerr said: “I bluntly refuse to comment on the investigation.” However, the Express investigations into the incident revealed that the Inspector involved is claiming that he was attacked by Ganesh and his friends following the mishap on that fateful Saturday September 11. No one has yet been arrested.

On October 1, the Express noted in a front page story that Inspector Regis was to testify in ‘another murder case’ in which he was ‘the officer who laid charges.’ A query from the Express brought this comment (Express, October 1) from the DPP: ‘Of course he will give evidence... he is a compellable witness. As regards the charge against him, he is innocent until proven otherwise.’

EMOTIONAL ELEMENTS IN PUBLICITY

The psychological impact of media publicity depends not so much on the contents of the publicity as on the techniques of communicating the contents. Newspapers, especially when functioning in a competitive context, practise a number of techniques to attract readers’ interest, or as one editor puts it, to ‘give their stories juice.’ Such techniques range from language style, picture displays, type of print used, location of story in paper, to headline writing.

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In an extensive review of the effects of the mass media, Weiss (1969) further noted: ‘The emotional provocativeness of communication stimuli does not inhere in their physical qualities but depends on the way in which they are perceived and interpreted.’ (p. 92) Some specific persuasive elements of communication have been identified by Brown (1963) as stereotyping, substitution of ‘group terms’ for names, appeal to authority, use of pictures, and suggestibility. The emotional aspects of the media’s treatment of this Regis matter were obvious in a number of the above ways, a fact which could have contributed to pre-trial emotions, thus bringing into dispute the juror’s solemn oath ‘to try the issue between the state and the prisoner at the bar and a true verdict given according to the evidence.’10 (emphasis added) There were, for example, six newspaper pictures during this pre-trial period showing either Ganesh and his wife on their wedding day, or Ganesh’s wife with her two children weeping over Ganesh’s death. The language was also quite emotional. The Express (front page, September 24), for example, had:

Mrs Ganesh said she prays each night that justice would be done in her husband’s accident. “Somebody out there has to see to it, that justice prevails. My husband was killed in cold blood for no reason at all, no reason”, she ended.

The headline to this story read: WIDOW: I WANT TO KILL MYSELF. Another Express story (September 22), with an accompanying picture of Ganesh’s two year old daughter crying, contained these words:

The safest and warmest place in the world for Marisa was always her daddy’s arms.... Two weeks ago, she followed him for the last time, in a cortege to the Calcutta cemetery... For Marisa there is only one thought, stark and total, which occupied that virgin mind: “He’s not coming back. I saw them bury him in the cemetery. They killed him. I know that.”

The weekly Bomb (September 24) told this story prominently on its back page with two pictures, one with Ganesh and his wife, another with Ganesh’s two children.:

Today the Bomb sheds a tear for the two kids in the picture. Their father, 27-year old Reynold Ganesh, died after being beaten with the butt of a police gun. The attacker was said to be a policeman who has strong ties with some very senior officers... A Bomb investigation found out that Ganesh was in a van that collided with the policeman’s car... As the policeman’s car screeched to a halt, he came out fuming and cussing like hell. From all appearances, the policeman was dead wrong in causing the accident... The brother of the dead man, Kenrick, 25, told the Bomb ... “I heard that the policeman pulled out a gun from his pocket and swung it at Reynold’s head.” The fatal blow was delivered around six o’clock that morning... It is with deep concern for the small man in this country that the

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Bomb is calling on the authorities to bring this policeman to justice... Look again at the smiling faces of the two kids home. Look at them, and remember that they could have been your children.

The emotional invocations felt through the language and pictures mentioned above were also found in the headlines. One banner back page headline (Bomb, September 24) read: COP ‘GUN - WHIPS’ DAD TO DEATH. Even after the matter came before the court, the TnT Mirror carried this banner headline (October 8): CASE OF THEM vs. US or Cops vs. The People. In this story, the TnT Mirror’s editor wrote: ‘The speed with which the cops or at least certain policemen rallied to the support of murder accused Inspector Regis would have been commendable if it was not fraught with frightening implications.’ The editor was comparing this with the treatment allegedly meted out by police officers to his son when his son went to report a matter. However, in the most dramatic presentation of all, the Express (September 24) gave its lead front page story this headline: PISTOL WHIPPED. The accompanying sub-headline read: ‘The Inspector struck Reynold on the left side of his face and he fell backwards in the middle of the road.’ It must be repeated that such publicity was occurring before any charge was laid on September 29. Another front page headline (Express, September 22) had Ganesh’s daughter crying (in picture) with the words: AND I SAW THEM BURY MY DADDY. There were also numerous media references to Inspector Regis’s nickname, ‘Scorpion,’ and also to his previous post as ‘Head of the elite Police Flying Squad,’ a police division well known for its colourful and controversial methods of raids and investigations. It had the reputation of being the Police Commissioner’s ‘pet squad.’ Overall, then, the pre-trial publicity seemed extensive both in quantity and emotional appeal. There was also a range of incidents which could have possibly contributed to the psychological atmosphere in which this particular matter found itself 11.

FIRST MAGISTRATE’S HEARING AND THE PRE-TRIAL HYPOTHESIS (SEPTEMBER 30, 1982)

1. Inspector Regis was first brought to the magistrate’s court on September 30, 1982 to answer a charge of murder. Against strong objections by defence counsel, the prosecution had the case postponed to October 5, 1982. The defence team consisted of three former policemen, all senior barristers. They were: Dr Aeneas Wills, Senior Counsel, (a former temporary government senator and current legal advisor to the Police Association), former Attorney General and Minister for Legal Affairs, Mr Selwyn Richardson, and Mr Theodore Guerra (a former opposition political candidate).

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2. As Regis was brought to court, there were large bustling crowds in the streets and in the court corridors and many reported instances of police-civilian hostilities. 3. On this first day, too (September 30, 1982), defence counsel, Mr Richardson, declared (front page in both Express and Guardian October 1): ‘The accused has already been pilloried, tried, convicted and sentenced by the press - we are not submitting to any adjournment, because everybody in the country knows the other side of the story.’ Mr Richardson added:

Inspector Regis has been tried and convicted by every newspaper in the country and for a man who has given more than 20 years of his life to the national interest to hear that the state was not ready... he is being deprived of his human and fundamental rights.

He then charged all the newspapers with creating bias against Regis in the minds of citizens. The Express (October 1), had a heavy front page headline; RICHARDSON ATTACKS NEWSPAPERS... ‘PRESS HAS TRIED REGIS’.12 On September 30, the first day of the hearing, the case was postponed to October 5, 1982.

4. After the hearing on that same day (September 30), the DPP told the Guardian that he was ‘not to blame for non-appearance of representation of the state in the matter against Inspector Regis.’ He then added that he ‘was surprised, not hearing from the Police about the arrest, to know that Regis was taken to court.’ (Guardian front page, October 1)

SECOND MAGISTRATE’S HEARING (OCTOBER 5–8, 1982)

1. As the matter came before Acting Chief Magistrate, Mr Lincoln Dwarika, on October 5, further antagonisms were widely reported between the press and the police (Guardian, October 7-9). At one point, the police was reported as deliberately occupying the press table usually reserved for the press. The Guardian (October 7) reported:

The previous day, working court reporters were unable to find accommodation in the First Court because all seats were taken up by Police Officers... In a directive yesterday, Commissioner Randolph Burroughs asked that the Press table... be kept free for working reporters.

The TnT Mirror (October 12) wrote:

Hostile cops have not only tried to keep reporters off the Press table and to blank the public by occupying every available seat in court, but they

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have also used all types of methods to prevent photographs being taken of their colleague.

2. On October 7, the Guardian carried an editorial which stated its position on the publicity so far advanced:

We do not take seriously the charge that press reports following the death of Reynold Ganesh have created any legal prejudice whatsoever against the accused, but we tend to feel that harassment of reporters covering the hearings will not enhance the image of the police in the eyes of the public and, in fact, would serve to reaffirm whatever unfavourable impressions that may have already been created about them in certain quarters.

3. The police established a ‘Regis Defence Fund’ for Regis (front page banner headline, Express, October 2), while the opposition ULF established a ‘Ganesh Family Fund.’ A number of prominent politicians and civilians contributed to one or the other. The preamble to the ‘Regis Defence Fund’ read: ‘It is needless to say that the media gave high publicity to the incident with the obvious intention of influencing a particular type of directive.’ 4. On the fourth day of the hearing (October 8), defence counsel Dr Aeneas Wills argued ‘no prima facie case had been made out with respect to the charge of murder.’ Dr Wills stated that, among other things, ‘cause of death’ was not established. After hearing such arguments, the magistrate, Mr Dwarika, reduced the charge from murder to manslaughter and set $10,000 bail for Regis pending a High Court trial.

In summary, then, the publicity between September 11, 1982 when the incident allegedly first occurred, and September 29, 1982 when the charge was first laid, does not clearly fall within the strict legal definition of ‘pre-trial publicity’ since no matter was then active before the court. This study went further and attempted to show whether or not such publicity created bias one way or another in the minds of persons eligible to be jurors. The publicity, as described earlier, was extensive in both quantity and emotional tone. More than once during the pre-trial stage, the media pressed for ‘action to be taken,’ and severely criticised the authorities for their delay in making an arrest. On the other hand, the DPP criticised the ‘premature’ nature of the publicity and affirmed that his decision to charge Regis was not influenced by the media publicity. Furthermore, on the first day of the hearing, the defence severely criticised the media for ‘trying and convicting’ Regis. One daily, the Guardian, argued in reply that such a criticism cannot be taken ‘seriously.’ What the preceding discussion also suggests for us, is that since the publicity under study was generated before a charge was formally laid against Regis, it may

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not in law be judged under strict contempt of court proceedings. 13 Nonetheless, this publicity was pre-trial publicity in fact, and it remains an open but crucial question whether or not it created bias in the minds of prospective jurors. In other words, the fact that the publicity in the Regis matter was not necessarily unlawful does not rule out the possibility that a case of bias could be made. The media would likely argue, however, that while bias might have been created, this was secondary to its insistence that ‘justice be done,’ that is, in its persistent call for a charge to be laid in the public interest. They will, no doubt, find support in Lord Denning’s view: 14 ‘It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the press and over the broadcast to make fair comment, even outspoken comment on matters of public interest.’ Denning’s ‘public interest’ stance here fits quite well the liberal mould earlier set by Lord Atkin’s ruling in the famous Trinidad case, Ambard v the Attorney General. 15

PRE-TRIAL PREJUDICE AND A FREE PRESS Pre-trial Prejudice Method

This section now provides data on the extent to which the publicity previously examined created possible bias in the minds of eligible jurors. The study, incidentally, does not deal fully with the merits or any evidential aspect of the case. Furthermore, it does not rest on the mere inference that bias (or prejudgement) would flow naturally from such publicity. Rather, it actually measures both the frequency with which the publicity was read by eligible jurors, and also the possible prejudicial effects of the publicity which occurred between the time that Ganesh was reported dead (September 12, 1982) and the time that Inspector Regis was taken to court (September 30, 1982). There were, therefore, two types of measures taken in this study:

1. Background measures of eligible jurors (Questions 1-5 and 10 sex, age education, occupation, reading level and residence). 2. Pre-trial prejudice caused in the minds of eligible jurors and their evaluation of the media’s role during the pre-trial period (Questions 6-9).

Ten days after the magistrate reduced the charge against Regis from murder to manslaughter, this ten-item questionnaire16 was privately and confidentially administered by a team of interviewers17 to 796 eligible jurors18 from the Trinidad population. Apart from percentage distributions, a X2 test was used to determine any significant differences in the responses. The preamble to the questionnaire19 contained a brief chronicle of events leading to the arrest of Regis (See Appendix D). The questions with their respective responses now follow.

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RESULTS

Questions 1–4 and 10 (sex, age, education, occupation and residence):

This sample of eligible jurors was 53.2 and 48.8 per cent male and female respectively. Forty-seven per cent were between the ages of 31 and 50, with 46 per cent between 18 and 30. Only seven per cent fell between 51 and 60. Sixty-one and 39 per cent were from north and south Trinidad respectively. The social class (occupational) distribution20 were (per cent): upper = 11, middle = 64, lower = 25. Educational attainment (per cent): primary = 15, secondary = 47, technical vocational = 24, university = 14. This social class distribution was similar to that found in the only other study available on local jurors.21 Question 5:

Between the time that Ganesh was reported killed and the time that Inspector Regis was taken to court (i.e. from around Sunday 12, September 1982 to Thursday 30, September 1982) how often did you read the newspapers? (Possible answers = 5–7 days per week, 3–4 days per week, 1– 2 days per week, no day at all). Eighty-seven per cent of those who replied (790) to this question22 said that during this period they read the newspapers three or more days per week, with 54 per cent saying ‘5 to 7 days per week.’ Question 6:

How do you think the media made Inspector Regis look? (Possible answers = guilty, innocent, neither guilty nor innocent). Figure 22.1 shows that 68.7 per cent felt that the media publicity made Regis ‘look guilty’ during the pre-trial period with only 7.6 per cent saying ‘innocent.’ One out of every four (23.7 per cent), however, said the media made him look ‘neither innocent nor guilty.’ Since a ‘neither’ response in this context is judicially valid as an ‘innocent’ response (that is, not guilty), these two groups were combined and statistically compared with the ‘guilty’ category (i.e. 31.3 per cent vs. 68.7 per cent). The difference was highly significant (X2 = 104.9, df = 1, p<.001). This result implies systematic bias in that there is less than one chance in a 1,000 that such bias could have occurred merely by chance.

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FIGURE 22.1

Eligible Jurors' Perception of Bias from Pre-trial Publicity (n=779)

80 68.7 70 60 t 50 40

er cen 30 23.7 p 20 7.6 10 0 guilty innocent neither guilty nor innocent

Question 7:

Do you think that the publicity given to this incident would likely influence a jury to believe that Regis is... guilty, innocent, neither guilty nor innocent? Apart from personally feeling the effect of the pre-trial publicity (as extracted in Question 6), eligible jurors were asked here to say how this same publicity may affect a jury actually hearing the case. Responses projected here would help illustrate the salience of the pre-trial publicity. The results show that 64.5 per cent said the publicity would likely influence a jury to believe Regis ‘guilty.’ Only 7.8 per cent said ‘innocent’ with 27.7 per cent saying ‘neither guilty nor innocent.’ When the latter two categories were combined as before and statistically compared with the ‘guilty’ category (35.5 per cent vs. 64.5 per cent), the difference was again highly significant. (X2 = 63.6, df = 1, p<.001). This result suggested that eligible jurors believed that the publicity would create systematic bias in the minds of an actual jury. Question 8:

How do you assess the role of the media in this incident before it came to the magistrate’s court? (Possible answers = The media served the proper course of justice: the media obstructed the proper course of justice; the media merely played its rightful role.)23 Over 55.5 per cent of the respondents (773) said the media ‘played its rightful role’ with 20.9 per cent saying it ‘served justice.’ Twenty three (23.5) per cent said it ‘obstructed justice.’ These differences were statistically

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significant (X2 = 55.1, df = 2, p<.01). In other words, over 75 per cent of these eligible jurors expressed confidence in the media, though a substantial number of them viewed the pre-trial publicity as being prejudicial. Table 22.1 shows a cross tabulation between how these eligible jurors felt the media made Regis look (Question 6) and their evaluation of the media’s role (Question 8). For this analysis, ‘innocent’ and ‘neither guilty nor innocent’ were combined into one category. ‘Serving justice’ and ‘playing its rightful role’ were also combined into one category — ‘positive role’ — leaving ‘obstructing justice’ to stand as the ‘negative role.’

TABLE 22.1 ELIGIBLE JURORS’ PERCEPTION OF PRE-TRIAL BIAS AND THEIR EVALUATION OF THE MEDIA’S ROLE

Pre-trial Bias Media Role Total Positive Negative Guilty 72.9(383)1 27.1(142) 67.9(525) Innocent 83.1(206) 16.9(42) 32.1(248) Total 76.2 (589) 23.8 (184) 100.0(773)

1Figures in brackets are frequencies; those outside brackets are row percentages except those under ‘Total’ which are column percentages. 2 Insufficient information = 23.

When organised in this way, Table 22.1 shows that 76.2 per cent of the respondents felt that the media played a positive public interest role with its pre-trial publicity, even though 67.9 per cent felt that such publicity made Regis ‘look guilty.’ More particularly, of those 525 who said the media made him ‘look guilty,’ 73 per cent felt that the media played a ‘positive role’ in the matter. The impact which the media had on these eligible jurors was quite similar to the impact they perceived for an actual jury hearing the case. For instance, the results show that while 68.7 per cent felt the media made Regis ‘look guilty’ to them, 64.1 per cent felt that an actual jury would be led by the publicity to believe that he is, in fact, ‘guilty.’ Again, while only 7.6 per cent felt the media created an ‘innocent’ image of Regis to them, a similar proportion (7.7 per cent) felt the publicity would cause an actual jury to believe Regis was ‘innocent.’

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Question 9:

Briefly explain your answer. Here, these eligible jurors were expected to explain their responses to Question 8. It was also expected that this would clarify any apparent discrepancy between their answers to Questions 6 and 7 on one hand and to Question 8 on the other hand. Such explanation, however, was recorded only if the eligible juror felt it necessary to offer one. Comments on ‘negative media role:’

Generally, their explanations were quite consistent with the responses they gave to the preceding ‘pre-trial question.’

Police Inspector Rudolph Regis (in suit) on way to court in April, 1984. Mr Regis was found not guilty by a jury in one of Trinidad and Tobago’s most controversial murder trials. On left, Acting Asst Supt of Police, Charles Boney; on right, Acting Senior Supt of Police, Lennard Taylor.

For example, those who saw the media playing a ‘negative role,’ that is, ‘obstructing justice,’ complained that ‘the other side of the story’ was not told. This emphasis on due process was also brought out by such comments from different respondents: ‘Truthful evidence and proper course of justice MUST be taken without biasness to bring about the right verdict.’ ‘The media planted in one’s mind that the accused was guilty from the very beginning.’ ‘The media arrived to conclusions without proper investigations.’

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‘In the case of the weeklies such as the Bomb, he has been tried publicly and found guilty.’ ‘In giving the facts of the events that took place, the media pleaded that too much police officers committed crimes and got away with it. To this end, they had already condemned Regis and others and so could have influenced the mind of most people.’ ‘I will appreciate the importance of the media in a country as ours but to use it for financial gain is what was projected. I have respect for the law enforcement of my country.’ ‘Racial discrimination.’ ‘Reporting was biased in favour of the deceased. No report sought to determine whether the inspector was provoked.’ ‘A man is innocent until proven guilty.’ ‘The media gave only one side of the situation. That is they gave the viewpoint of witnesses who tended to favour the deceased. Obviously the reading public will believe what they read and obviously form a conclusion in their minds which may be wrong.’ ‘The media tried to play the first judge.’ ‘One can ask whether Regis would have been charged if the media did not highlight the incident, and so argue that the media served the proper course of justice. But, on the other hand, the over - sensational manner in which the matter was handled by the media (especially the press) wherein they established a definite bias against Regis, also served to obstruct the proper course of justice. Is it now possible to have a fair trial?’ Comments on ‘positive media role’:

On the other hand, some of those who evaluated the media as playing a ‘positive role’ (i.e. ‘serving justice’ or ‘playing a rightful role’) during the pre-trial period commented:

‘In reporting this case the media did do so in a bias way. But they did serve their purpose of bringing the incident to the ‘front’. ‘It is the duty of the media to inform, educate, and to clarify the facts for the reading public. They have done so.’ ‘It is necessary that a free press report events as they happen without fear or favour.’ ‘This incident may have been just another cover-up or forgotten one because of the person involved, if the media had not made the public aware of what was going on.’ ‘If the incident was not publicised, more than half of Trinidad and Tobago would not have known about it and no proper action as to bring the culprit to justice would have been taken.’

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‘The media should have been more forceful in its coverage so as to apprehend Regis earlier.’ ‘The media reported the only side of the issue it seemed to have access to. Maybe one-sided, but maybe unavoidably so.’ ‘The media created such public awareness, thus generating the personnel responsible for justice in getting to do their job.’ ‘By the media publicising the crime to that extent, it caused the public to call for justice for this crime.’ ‘If it were an ordinary citizen he/she would have been charged immediately. Why should a Police Inspector be treated differently?’ ‘It reported and covered the incident in such a way to arouse the public interest.’ The above comments, flowing from the ‘positive role’ side generally emphasised the ‘public interest’ role of the media as well as the fear that without such a role, there would have been ‘a cover-up.’ Comments on the ‘negative role’ of the media emphasised the establishment of ‘pre-trial bias’ and the subversion of the ‘fair trial’ concept.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND INFLUENCE

Apart from the general results discussed above, a statistical examination was undertaken to see whether the background of these eligible jurors made any significant differences in the responses to the ‘pre-trial’ questions. The factors of age, sex, residence, or reading level generally did not make any significant difference in their responses. Social class and educational level, however, did make some significant difference. A X2 analysis indicated, for instance, that the lower their educational level, the more likely these eligible jurors felt that the media played a positive public interest role by its pre-trial publicity (X2 = 49.1, df = 6, p<.01). Educational level, however, made no significant difference in the way they perceived bias from the media reports. A X2 test further indicated that the lower their social class, the more likely they were to perceive bias from the media publicity in their own minds (X2 = 13.2, df = 4, p<.01) and in the minds of an actual jury (X2 = 18.7. df = 4, p<.01). It was also found that the lower their social class, the more likely these eligible jurors saw the media playing ‘a public interest’ role with the pre-trial publicity (X2 = 74.3, df = 4, p<.01).

DISCUSSION

This study examined the quantity and emotional quality of the media publicity generated between the date on which a police inspector allegedly murdered a civilian and the date on which a charge against the inspector was laid.

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The publicity amounted to 456 column inches. The first newspaper report occurred on September 15, 1982. Between this date and September 9, 1982, when the charge was laid, the publicity averaged 30 column inches per day. This included strongly worded editorials, numerous pictures and headlines all of which contained emotional appeals capable of biasing opinions against the accused. It was against this background of pre-trial publicity that the defence counsel said during the magistrate’s hearing that the press ‘has already tried and convicted’ the accused. However, the circumstances surrounding his publicity were unusual for at least two reasons:

1) No one was charged even when eyewitnesses gave statements. 2) Published comments called for ‘the authorities to take action,’ with such ‘action’ (i.e. an arrest) being taken after 15 days of ‘pre-charge’ publicity.

The press could, therefore, defend its publicity flourish by claiming that ‘official inaction’ compelled it to speak out without malice and in the public interest. The official vacillations over whose responsibility it was to initiate criminal proceedings and whether or not a coroner’s inquest should have been held, merely strengthened this position held by the press. It therefore seems safe to conclude that had the authorities acted more swiftly in laying a charge, the media could not have maintained such widespread publicity on the issue as it did. The irony of this situation is that the very publicity which sought to ‘see that justice is done’ is the same publicity that could now be viewed as being an obstruction to a fair and impartial trial for the accused. It is in this context that we note a recommendation issued around that same time from a Commission of Enquiry into charges of violence brought against some members of the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment.24 The Commission urged that rather than a court, a military tribunal should initiate disciplinary proceedings against the soldiers concerned. The Commissioner argued that a court trial would risk ‘the requirement of a fair trial for those whose conduct has been adversely commented upon and the extensive media coverage of the proceedings of the Commission.’ In its editorial, however, the Guardian (November 6, 1982) disagreed with this recommendation. If the Commissioner’s concern over prejudicial impact of publicity was valid in the soldiers’ case, then such concern should have been even more serious in the Regis’s case. The central issue is, therefore, a mixture of psychology and law. Is the bias created by the publicity in the Regis’s case such that could withstand any evidence presented at a subsequent trial? Is the court fully capable of determining this question without, on one hand, setting ‘an impossible standard’ for bias while, on the other hand, ensuring a fair and impartial trial in a society as small as Trinidad and Tobago? After questioning a sample (796) of eligible jurors, this study found that, indeed, the publicity did generate a substantial degree of bias against the accused.

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However, in the midst of such perceived bias, 75 per cent of these eligible jurors felt that the press played ‘a positive role’ with its publicity, that is, it either ‘served the proper course of justice’ or ‘played its rightful role’ as a free press. Hence, at this point, there seems to be a clash between two democratic institutions: the ‘public interest role’ of the free press on one hand, and the guarantee of a fair and impartial trial by the court on the other hand. A more subtle and perhaps dangerous possibility however, is that these eligible jurors who said ‘the media made him look guilty’ did, in fact, previously believe him to be guilty and were merely praising the media for bringing it out in the open, thus reinforcing their initially biased disposition. Obviously, these are psychological issues which ought to be considered in ensuring a fair trial. It is an open question, however, whether the court is capable of dealing with them.

Dr Aeneas Wills, Senior Counsel, leading defence counsel in the controversial ‘Regis Murder Trial.’ Against massive pre-trial publicity, Dr Wills led a defence team of Theodore Guerra, Osborne Charles, Gerald Stewart, Malcom Holdip and Aeneas Wills, Jnr.

Mr Patrick Chookolingo, publisher of TnT Mirror, and a former editor of Bomb. Faced contempt of court for story ‘The Judge’s Wife’ Chookolingo v the Attorney General, (1981) 1 All ER

HIGH COURT TRIAL

At the preliminary hearing in the Port of Spain magistrate’s court on October 8, 1982, the Chief Magistrate, Mr Lincoln Dwarika, reduced the charge of murder to manslaughter. However, on March 9, 1984, the DPP issued a fresh indictment charging Regis with murdering Ganesh. The trial in the First Assize Court in Port of Spain lasted 22 days (between April 12 and May 16, 1984).25 The trial was

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described by both prosecution and defence as riddled with ‘racial undertones’ and ‘one of the most controversial’ in the history of Trinidad.26 The week before the jury was selected on April 16, defence had objected to the validity of the indictment as issued against the accused. The judge overruled this objection. Regis was eventually found not guilty by the 12-member jury. They took one hour more than the mandatory three-hour period to arrive at their verdict.

PRE-TRIAL HYPOTHESIS AND JURY SELECTION

The High Court trial generated intense controversy. Charges of ‘racialism’, ‘corruption,’ and ‘political ambition’ were sharply exchanged between the prosecution and the defence throughout the trial. The judge, Mr Ivol Blackman, the prosecutor, Mr Victor Nunez, and leading defence counsel, Dr Aeneas Wills, repeatedly expressed concern over the widespread pre-trial publicity generated by this case.27 Under these circumstances, it was highly significant that the jury returned a not guilty verdict. The defence especially was fearful that such publicity would have caused prejudice against the accused. During the preliminary hearing on September 30, 1982, one of the defence lawyers then, Mr Selwyn Richardson,28 complained in court that the press ‘had already pilloried, tried, and convicted’ Regis. Hence, the jury’s not guilty verdict on May 17, 1984 (20 months later), showed that there are after all, certain conditions in an actual trial which could effectively resist the impact of pre-trial publicity. Given this background of concern over possible juror prejudice, it might have appeared quite surprising that neither prosecution nor defence made any open inquiries in court about such possibility during the jury selection process on April 16, 1984. The fact is that there are restrictions against such open scrutiny. The Jury Act states:

‘No challenge to the array shall be allowed; but, in any trial on indictment, every person arraigned, whether for treason or indictable offence, shall be allowed to challenge three of the jurors by way of peremptory challenge and without being subjected to assign any reason thereof; but every peremptory challenge beyond that number shall be entirely void. And in like manner the Director of Public Prosecutions may, without cause assigned, challenge three jurors if one person is arraigned, and six if two are arraigned together, and so forth, being three without cause assigned for every person arraigned, and every further such peremptory challenge shall be void. The challenge to the polls 29 for cause shall be allowed without stint either on the part of the prosecution or defence, and any matter which... would be good cause of challenge to the polls shall be a good cause, and if any such cause of challenge is alleged, the Judge shall forthwith enquire as to the truth or validity thereof and allow or overrule the same as he may deem just.’ (Section 23)

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Given the sociological focus of this book, as well as the racial undertones in this trial, it will be useful to take a look at how the jurors were finally chosen. Each side, the prosecution and defence, used its three peremptory challenges, that is, objections to jurors without giving any cause. The objections were, quite obviously, based on sight or on the ‘looks’ of jurors (there was apparently no other basis for the objections).30 The names of 20 jurors were called. One was absent. Another was excused because of familiarity with a relative of the accused. Of the remaining 18, ten were of East Indian and seven of African descent (henceforth called Indians and Africans). One was White.31 The prosecution and defence made their objections while the jurors filed into the jury box as their names were called. On this ‘assessment by looks’ basis, the defence made three objections, all against Indian jurors. The prosecution also made three objections, all against Indian jurors. In other words, both defence and prosecution used their quota of peremptory challenges but in each case only against Indian jurors. Therefore, from the ten Indian jurors called, only four remained to serve in the trial which involved an African defendant and an Indian victim. The trial jury finally comprised seven Africans and four Indians with one White. There was only one woman (African). As far as this Regis trial was concerned, it was interesting to observe that the challenges available to both defence and prosecution were not randomly applied as far as jurors’ race was concerned. This matter will be further pursued at the end of this paper.

TRIAL REPORTS AND THE JURY

The charge against Regis was that he struck the victim, Ganesh, with a revolver, thus causing his death. The major argument by the defence was that Regis was attacked by Ganesh and three others, and in self defence, he (Regis) cuffed Ganesh. Defence also said that Regis did not use any gun in the manner claimed by the prosecution. The defence was making this counter argument in the face of massive pre-trial newspaper reports in which two eyewitnesses gave graphic details of how ‘Regis used his gun to hit Ganesh.’ These reports, among others, were openly criticised by the defence. However, the argument here is that while, in principle, prejudicial pre-trial publicity should be discouraged, certain features of the trial itself could be used to mitigate against the psychological impact on jurors of such publicity.32 It was found, for example, that during the trial news reports based on defence arguments were much in favour of the accused. Jurors were seen reading these news reports during court recess or before the trial began on certain mornings. Furthermore, since the jurors were allowed to return to their respective homes during the trial, it was conceivable that they were exposed to similar reports on radio and television.33

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In this context, the Jury Act states:

‘When the jury have been once sworn to try any cause, the jurors shall not be discharged, except in cases of evident necessity, nor allowed to separate or hold communication with other persons, until they have given in their verdict; but upon the trial of any person for any offence the Judge may, if he thinks fit, at any time before the jury consider their verdict, permit the jury to separate and go at large’ (Section 26 (1)).

During this trial, the judge allowed the jurors to ‘separate and go at large,’ to return the next day. Section 26(3) further states:

Whenever the jury have not been allowed to separate or are enclosed, the Judge may, for sufficient cause shown to his satisfaction, allow one or more of the jurors to separate from the other jurors, but not so as to hold communication with other persons and provided that the jurors allowed to separate shall remain in the charge of the Marshall or his deputy.

THE PRE-TRIAL HYPOTHESES FAILS: THE IMPACT OF THE DEFENCE

This section now deals with some major features which arose from the trial, which likely mitigated against the prejudicial publicity and, more generally, which helped sway the jury’s minds in favour of the accused. These were:

1. The vacillations displayed by the police in arresting Regis. 2. The changing of the charge from murder to manslaughter, then to murder again. 3. The murder case was prosecuted by the Deputy DPP, Mr Victor Nunez, the same person who had previously referred the matter for a coroner’s inquest rather than laying a charge of murder. 4. In court, the defence accused the prosecution of having ‘racial motives’ in laying the murder charge against Regis. The defence also alleged ‘political interference’ in the way the DPP’s office handled the case. The responses by the prosecution to such charges were not enough to remove all doubts. 5. In the eyes of the jury, the defence was able to make the accused, Regis, appear as the helpless victim of bureaucratic bungling and spite. They also made him look as a loyal police officer who was tortured by unfair publicity. In this way, the massive amount of pre-trial publicity could have had the opposite effect of earning jury sympathy for the accused. 6. The defence was skilful enough to unsettle all of the prosecution’s witnesses and bring into doubt key aspects of the prosecution’s case.34 The main witness for the prosecution, Winston Ramkhelawan, not only contradicted himself in terms of time and speed of driving, but also in terms of his

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actual whereabouts around the time of the vehicular incident. His apparent forgetfulness helped reduce his credibility. On the other hand, the defence witnesses were generally calm, consistent, and appeared credible. The defence also cast doubt on the efficiency of the expert witness, Dr Neville Jankey, as far as the post-mortem was concerned. For example, on April 27, 1984 under cross examination by Dr Wills, Dr Jankey was made to appear contradictory. In a deposition by the government chemist at the magistrate’s hearing, there was this statement: ‘I doubt it, the body was smelling of alcohol.’ However, Dr Jankey, later at the High Court trial, said that the sentence should have read: ‘I doubt that the body was smelling of alcohol.’ The defence was trying to suggest that the deceased had consumed alcohol. Dr Jankey’s explanation did not go down well with the public gallery. Moreover, the prosecution called a medical doctor, Dr Toby, who testified that Regis did indeed suffer injuries. 7. The defence was able to create further doubt in at least three other crucial aspects of the trial. They made it doubtful whether a gun was actually used by Regis so as to cause Ganesh’s death. They made it possible that the victim, Ganesh, was drunk and hostile against Regis. They made it plausible that Regis acted in self defence. In other words, the defence injected serious doubts into the prosecution’s case. At the same time, the prosecution had great difficulty in negating self defence. 8. There were other less tangible occurrences which might have turned the jury’s favour towards the accused during the trial. For example, each morning, about a dozen police officers attended the trial. Many of them sat opposite the jury, and through gestures and facial expressions, projected (perhaps unwittingly) their sympathy for the accused.35 The public gallery generally exhibited its sympathy for the accused, albeit in controlled ways. Such occurrences naturally contributed to the psychological atmosphere of the courtroom, an atmosphere which gradually swung in favour of the accused. 9. The publicity generated by the trial itself was found to be generally favourable to Regis. Over 70 per cent of the headlines reflected the position of the defence. For example, on April 20, 1984, the Express headlined Regis’s words: ‘I was beaten by four men.’ And on each day of the trial, some jurors were seen to be reading the newspapers during their break. In fact, they were all allowed to go home at the end of each day of the trial but with the judge’s warning that they should not discuss the case with anyone.

DISCUSSION

The conduct and outcome of this trial suggest that while prejudicial pre-trial publicity is highly undesirable, there are other aspects of a trial which can militate against the manifestation of such publicity. It is also necessary to note that the

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press behaved in the way that it did mainly because there were grave apprehensions over the manner in which the case was being handled. In fact, had there been an early arrest, the pre-trial publicity discussed here would not have arisen. This trial also suggests that a jury is quite capable of freeing itself from pre-trial prejudice and hearkening to the merits of the evidence presented in open court. Whatever the suspicions were, the fact is that the evidence presented against Regis in court did not in the jury’s eyes pass the test of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ In fact, the crucial importance of this test was repeatedly emphasised by the trial judge in his summation. Justice Blackman emphasised to the jurors the need for them to ‘disregard the publicity and all other extraneous matters,’ and attend to the evidence produced in court. He also explained that where there was conflicting evidence, it was up to them (the jurors) to decide. For example, the judge noted evidence regarding Regis’s injuries as well as the statements given to the police by both sides and told the jury:

Members of the jury, you will have to decide what you make of those observations. Were they, members of the jury, caused by the onslaught on the accused on the Highway at El Socorro on September 11, 1982? Because, members of the jury, as I said earlier on, a person is entitled in law to act in self-defence or necessary self- defence.

The jury of 11 men and one woman listened attentively in an extremely hushed courtroom as Justice Blackman continued his summation to them:

If, members of the jury, you come to the conclusion that the accused on that morning was necessarily defending himself because he had been attacked by four men, it does not matter whether he used his fist, it does not matter whether he used his revolver or pistol. If you come to the conclusion that the accused was necessarily defending himself, then members of the jury, you must acquit the accused. It is not for him to prove that he acted in self-defence. It is for the prosecution to negate self-defence.

Such statements to the jury accentuated the doubts earlier created by the defence over the prosecution’s evidence. And the jury found Regis not guilty, thus ending one of the most controversial murder trials in the history of Trinidad and Tobago. This 22-day trial has left us firmer in the knowledge that a jury trial is much more than pre-trial publicity and a mixture of law and fact. It is also about the skilful presentation and cross examination of evidence, a good grasp of jury psychology and the ‘powers of balance’ inherent in the judge’s summation. The defence itself helped disprove its own hypothesis about the prejudicial impact of the pre-trial publicity.

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REJECTING JURORS WITHOUT CAUSE: DEGRADATION OR BIAS?

As related earlier, the prosecution and defence each objected (challenged) to three jurors. By design or coincidence, all such jurors were of one racial background. No reason at all was given for such open rejections. The law (Jury Act, Section 23) allows for this. From a social psychological viewpoint, the process of and apparent basis for such unexplained rejections seem curious. Is it reasonable for a lawyer to just look at a juror and decide to reject him or her for a particular trial? What does such a rejection, so silently executed, say to the rejected juror? Wouldn’t such a juror feel he has been ‘tried’ and ‘convicted’ in too arbitrary a manner? The point here is not whether jurors of one race, sex, or class were rejected more than those of another race, sex, or class. The more important point here is that the rejection seems to be made in too arbitrary a manner in open court. Hence the general principle is more crucial to consider than the specific instance in this trial. There is some resistance within the British tradition of the jury system against extensive questioning of jurors.36 One must therefore wonder at the possible psychological effects ‘rejection without cause’ would have on jurors who have dutifully consented to serve the administration of criminal justice. Isn’t there a question of jurors’ rights here? Under the cold eyes of the law, such challenges, rejections actually, appear neatly and promptly executed. After all, the Jury Act allows for such rejections ‘without cause assigned.’ But in social and psychological terms, such open court rejections are likely to inflict an unpleasantness which the jurors so rejected would find difficult to explain either to themselves or to others. It leaves a suspicion of unfitness precariously hanging over the head of an otherwise civic minded citizen.37 Furthermore, the extent to which ‘rejection without cause’ are confined to one particular social group, so too would the requirement of randomness in the jury panel be diminished. No doubt this was one reason why the British Jury Act (1974) was amended in 1977 to decrease the number of ‘peremptory challenges’ from seven to three for each accused. Even so, however, the British Jury Act (1974) states:

1. In proceedings for the trial of any person for an offence on indictment - a. that person may challenge not more than three jurors without cause and all or any of the jurors far cause, and b. any challenge for cause shall be tried by the judge before whom that person is to be tried. (Section 12)

The Trinidad and Tobago Jury Act does not allow such a clearly stated guarantee of ‘challenge for cause,’ that is, challenge (beyond the peremptory three) for reasons stated in court. In both countries, however, the psychological implications arising from public rejection without cause (peremptory challenges) still stand.

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But how did this right to challenge jurors ‘without cause’ begin? Blackstone, writing in the eighteenth century, said it was a privilege offered to the accused who faced the death penalty if found guilty.38 Blackstone said in those early days, it was felt that the accused should have the prerogative of objecting to a juror if the mere appearance of such a juror offends the accused. Blackstone wrote:

As everyone must be sensible, what sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another, and how necessary it is, that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him. 39

Today, many features of trial by jury have changed, leaving one to wonder why this practice of peremptory challenge still exists. The death penalty itself is not executed as widely today as in the early days of trial by jury. There are also today improved guarantees of a fair trial for an accused. There does not seem to be any rational reason for retaining peremptory challenges. Denning (1982) wrote:

The peremptory challenge enables the accused to “pack” the jury with those whom he thinks will be sympathetic to his point of view. Just by what the jurors “look like!” The accused will be the exponent of sex discrimination, hair-cutting discrimination, youth discrimination any other kind of discrimination which suits his book. That is all wrong. (p. 70)

The Trinidad and Tobago Jury Act (Section 23) further allows the prosecution as well to make objections to jurors without giving any reason. The judicial irrationality is thus compounded. If, as is possible, certain information is known (e.g. criminal convictions, familiarity with the accused or victim, etc.) about such jurors, then surely there are other more discreet and effective ways to treat the matter. This includes objections with cause. For a system which prides itself on requiring prima facie evidence, the right to reply, substantiation of suspicions, inadmissibility of hearsay evidence etc., it seems quite contradictory to ask, in fact, to command citizens to serve as jurors yet when they do appear, for ‘no reason assigned’ these jurors find themselves just looked at, then turned back in open court. It is impressed upon jurors that they must not stereotype the accused, not judge guilt (or innocence) by the ‘looks’ of the accused. Why then should jurors have the accused, or the prosecution for that matter, judging and rejecting them merely on the basis of their ‘looks?’ The practice of peremptory challenges should be disbanded in our courts. There is no merit in its retention.

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NOTES

1. From Trial by Jury: Social and Psychological Dynamics. Institute for Social and Economic Research, The University of the West Indies, Trinidad, West Indies. 1985, pp. 210– 43, with permission. 2. It turned out that the inspector and civilian were of African and East Indian descent respectively, a factor which obviously contributed to the ensuing controversy. 3. The Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently charged Regis with murder. This jury trial is summarised later in this chapter. 4. These are dailies: Trinidad Guardian (with Sunday Guardian,) and, Trinidad Express (with Sunday Express). Weeklies: Bomb, TnT Mirror, Challenge, Punch. Television and radio: Trinidad and Tobago Television, (state-owned), Radio 610 (state-owned) and Radio Trinidad. The two evening papers, Sun and Evening News were not included mainly because much of what they published eventually found itself in the morning editions of their parent dailies, the Express, and the Trinidad Guardian respectively. 5. Roughly 80,000. Sunday Express now has about 75,000. The Trinidad Guardian and Trinidad Express (dailies) has about 50,000 each. The weeklies — Bomb, Punch, Challenge and TnT Mirror — together have about 220,000. Bulk of weekly publicity done by Bomb and Mirror. 6. The Opposition also announced a series of public meetings on the issue. The first meeting took place, but guarded mention was made of this incident since by that time a murder charge against Regis was laid. 7. The Human Rights Bureau. 8. ‘Coolie’ and ‘Nigger’ are two epithets used in Trinidad against persons of East Indian and African descent respectively. 9. Quite notable for an announcement of this kind, the Express had ‘with’ instead of ‘without’, the latter being what Mr Brooks actually said. 10. Jury Act, Section 24, Trinidad and Tobago. 11. For example, wide publicity was given during the months of this controversy to the many persons allegedly ‘killed or maimed by police brutality,’ (September 28, 1982). Soon after Regis was charged, another police inspector was charged (he was subsequently acquitted) for manslaughter (October 13, 1982). Earlier in the year, a Commission of Enquiry headed by a judge had severely chastised a group of soldiers for assaulting civilians. A charge of assault against another group of soldiers has also been laid (May, 1983). 12. This could be construed as the ‘pretrial hypothesis,’ that is, an allegation that the publicity caused prejudice in the minds of prospective jurors. 13. British Contempt of Court Act (1981). For further information on Contempt of Court, see Halsbury Laws of England, 3rd Edn Vol. 8, pp. 42–48. Also C.J. Miller’s Recent developments and current problems in the field of contempt of court in England and Wales; G Collymore, Contempt of Court. The latter two papers were presented at the Sixth Commonwealth Magistrates’ Conference, September 12-18, 1982, Trinidad. See also Indictable Offences (Preliminary Enquiry) Act, Trinidad and Tobago. Chapter 12:10 Section 42 (Publication of Proceedings). 14. What next in the law (1982).

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15. (1936) All ER 704. See Chapter 11 for fuller discussion of the implications of this ruling. 16. This number represents a reduction from a 12 - item pilot questionnaire. Interviews (during week beginning October 18, 1982) also recorded the district where the eligible juror lived. This was eventually coded as 1 = north Trinidad, 2 = south Trinidad. 17. Given the sensitive and fluid nature of the matter then, interviewing had to be done as swiftly, as confidentially, and as broadly as possible. Hence the technique adopted was to use 122 students from three university classes as field interviewers after due instructions were given on questionnaire administration and legal requirements for jury service. 18. Jury Ordinance, Trinidad and Tobago. 19. Interviewers were warned to confine their contacts to only what the questionnaire asked. 20. These categories are fully described in Chapter Eight. 21. See Chapter Eight. 22. Not everyone of the 796 answered all the questions fully. Therefore, for some answers, note is made of the missing information. 23. From the pilot administration of the draft questionnaire, respondents felt that ‘serving justice’ and ‘playing its rightful role’ were two related but different roles for the media in this matter. Hence, these were offered as two separate choices. 24. Report to Government by sole Commissioner, Mr Justice Ulric Cross, October 1982. 25. The author attended this High Court trial. The case started just as this book was being completed. Hence, only the major features of the trial will be given here. More details of the trial and results from another survey of eligible jurors are being compiled for another research report. 26. For the prosecution — Victor Nunez (Assistant DPP) State Counsels Clyde Constantine, Cheryl Charles, and Anthony Carmona. For the defence — Dr Aeneas Wills Senior Counsel, Gerald Stewart, Osbourne Charles, Theodore Guerra, Malcolm Holdipp, Aeneas Wills Jnr. Noisy accusations of ‘racial’ motives were exchanged during the trial by both sides and reported in the press in April and May 1984. 27. The author submitted a research report on this publicity (amicus curiae) to the trial judge, the prosecution, and defence. 28. Mr Richardson, the former Attorney General, was not among the High Court defence. 29. To poll a jury is to call the names of the persons who comprise the jury and require each juror to declare what his verdict is before it is recorded. It is also meant to be a challenge to each juryman as he is about to be sworn (e.g. See Archbold, Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice, 41st ed). 30. Coote (1978) described the defence’s rejection of jurors in the 1978 ‘Official Secrets’ trial in England: ‘The defendants used seven of the nine challenges available to them to reject jurors they didn’t like the look of. Looks were all they had to go on since they had no chance to vet the panel for loyalty.’ 31. Described as ‘French Creole’ in Trinidad. 32. See R Deosaran, The jury, pretrial publicity, and the right to a fair trial: the Regis case. Paper presented to conference on The Law and Civil Liberties in the Caribbean sponsored by Bar Association of Trinidad and Tobago, Trinidad, October 24–25. 1984.

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33. Deputy Registrar of the Supreme Court, Mr Carlton Best, explained: ‘The physical facilities in the courts are such that it is quite difficult to prevent jurors from mixing with the public during trials.’ Assistant Solicitor General, Mr Rangee Dolsingh (a former prosecutor) has also expressed concern over jurors’ mingling with the public during a trial. 34. Whether or not it was inadequate medical care at the hospital which actually caused death, etc. See No 7 in this list. 35. Regis was Vice President of the Police Association. After the verdict on May 17, 1984, the family of the deceased victim complained of continuous ‘harassment’ by people sitting in the public gallery (Bomb, May 25, 1982). Bar Association President Frank Solomon also explained: ‘All that can be said is that the verdict went counter to pretrial publicity. It can be argued that many features of the process were unfair to the prosecution — not to the accused,’ (communication to author) 36. e.g. See Lord Denning (1982 p. 70). In America, such extensive pretrial examination of jurors is called voire dire. 37. See E. Goffman, The presentation of self in everyday life (1959): Also, H Garfinkel, Conditions of successful degradation ceremonies (1956). Such ‘rites of degradation’ function as social controls but at times with dehumanising effects. In this juror selection process, the extent to which such rejections are viewed as humiliating, so too would public intimidation by the jury summons grow. 38. Sir Wm Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England IV, 353. 39. Ibid.

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chap22.pmd 525 12/8/2006, 11:17 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE Twenty-Three

Ensuring In recent times, some common law countries, in an effort to ensure greater Efficiency and efficiency and effectiveness in the Effectiveness in administration of justice, have been modifying traditional procedural rules that the Criminal underpin an adversarial system and adopting Justice System rules that favour greater use of methods (The Netherlands traditionally employed in civil law countries Antilles and including judge-driven techniques. Changes to the substantive law in order to beef up Aruba (NAA) and prosecutorial services and sharpen Saint Lucia) investigative tools are also being considered. A good starting point in assessing the utility Adrian Saunders and Jacob Wit of this approach is to examine just how justice is delivered in civil law systems which are based on inquisitorial and judge-driven methods and have extensive experience in these measures. The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba (NAA) have a civil law system. The law is codified and hence, every judicial decision has to be based ultimately on the written law (legislation). Judges, both at the pre-trial and the trial stage are actively involved in and control and direct the judicial process. A criminal trial could be characterised as a public enquiry presided over by the judge, who also functions as the main enquirer or inquisitor. He/she is the judge of the facts, decides on the law and is the one responsible for sentencing. There is no jury and there is no desire whatsoever to have one in these countries. Most of the judges and prosecutors are so-called ‘career magistrates’. They receive the same training, consisting of courses, seminars and on the job training over a

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period of six–eight years. They also receive the same salary and consequently, they have the same status within the public service, although they play different and separate roles. It is not unusual that a prosecutor might become a judge or for judges to become prosecutors but the latter occurs less frequently. The prosecutor is the ‘dominus litis’ (the master) of the criminal investigations and pre-trial proceedings. The prosecutor can give orders and instructions to the police. Warrants cannot be obtained by the police directly. All requests for warrants are made by the prosecutor, who has a kind of intermediary function. Although the police can in certain cases arrest suspects on their own accord, in other cases they need an order from the prosecutor. The police can hold a suspect for up to six hours. After that short period, custody can be extended up to two days by a senior police officer who has been sworn in as an assistant prosecutor. These two days may be extended up to a further eight days by the prosecutor himself, but in that case the suspect has to be brought before an examining judge (or judge of instruction) on the third day of his or her custody. If this does not happen, the suspect must be released, irrespective of what he might have done or be accused of. Further extensions of pre-trial detention are possible, but cannot be given by the prosecutor himself. Extensions of pre-trial detentions have to be requested by the prosecutor and can be allowed by the examining judge on certain strict legal grounds. Even when the examining judge has allowed such an extension, the prosecutor does not have to make use of it. He can end the custody at any moment he thinks fit. Although the prosecutor is considered to be a ‘magistrate’ or ‘minister of justice,’ his actions are monitored. This is done by the examining judge, the judge who deals with pre-trial detention, with decisions on requests of accused persons to be released from custody, conditionally or unconditionally (though virtually never on bail, which is considered to be an inappropriate practice). The examining judge can give warrants for searches in houses, for wire-tapping, for taking human material (tissue or hair for example) from the suspect against his will for the purpose of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) investigation, etc. During house searches, other than urgent ones, the examining judge even supervises searches by the police, in the presence of a prosecutor, and may order seizure of the objects the police need for their investigation. The judge may decide to honour a request of either the prosecutor or the defence lawyers to entertain a limited preliminary enquiry in which both the suspect and witnesses can be examined. These examinations are done by the judge himself and take place in his chambers in the presence of the prosecutor and the defence lawyers who are both allowed to ask additional questions. During the examination of the witnesses, the suspect himself is usually not present. At the request of one of the parties, the examining judge could also order and supervise a reconstruction of the alleged crime at the locus delicti. Not all the witnesses are heard by the examining judge, only those whose testimony is disputed and at the same time crucial for the outcome of the case.

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Preliminary inquiries are exceptional. Normally the evidence related in the police report forms the sole basis of the case. These police reports contain the observations of the police officers and the statements they took from witnesses and the suspect. The reports also contain signed statements of the police officers confirming that their report is truthful and made upon their oath of office. Once the preliminary enquiry has been officially terminated by the examining judge, the prosecutor decides whether to indict the accused or not. In the normal case, where no preliminary enquiry is held, the prosecutor will take that decision on the basis of the police reports alone. If the accused is in custody, then his case has to be tried within 106 days after his arrest. In the exceptional case of an ongoing preliminary enquiry in a complicated case, another 30 days may be granted. If the accused has been released at an earlier stage, the case does not have to be tried within that 106 days time frame, although the delay should generally not be longer than two years. After that, the prosecutor risks a decision of non-admissibility of the prosecution case, which means that the case will be thrown out without any further ado. Other sanctions to unjustified delays are increasingly found in reducing sentences. There is no committal procedure. The decision whether to indict or not to pursue a matter any further is the sole responsibility of the prosecutor. But the accused has a right to challenge the decision to indict him. Within five days after an indictment has been served on the accused, the latter can file a petition to have that decision reviewed. This judicial review will be dealt with directly by the Court of Appeal, which will hear the case with urgency. Usually, within a few days, the Court of Appeal will give a written decision, and so, if review is denied, this procedure does not generally cause the commencement of the trial to be delayed. The case terminates if the Court decides to review the decision and to dismiss the case or discharge the accused. From this decision, no appeal lies to the Supreme Court in The Netherlands. The decision of the prosecutor not to pursue the case and, therefore, not to indict the accused can also be the subject of complaint by the victim of the alleged crime, if any, or others who are considered to have a direct legal interest in such a prosecution. Such an application goes straight to the Court of Appeal. If the court agrees with the applicant, the court will accordingly order the prosecutor to proceed with the case before the court of first instance. Trials can be very short even when the accused does not admit the accusation. There is no formal plea. Normally no witnesses are heard at the trial. After establishing the identity of the accused and after reading him his rights, the prosecutor will read out the indictment. The judge will then start with examining the accused. While doing this, he will go through the statements as laid down in the police report(s) and other evidence, if any, and confront the accused person with those statements. He will also go through this evidence if the accused wants to remain silent as the evidence has to be identified publicly. After examination by the judge, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer are allowed to ask further

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questions. Sometimes the judge will honour a request from either side to hear witnesses. The names of these witnesses have to be announced beforehand and the relevance of their evidence must be made clear in advance, unless such relevance is clear from the statements given to the police. If there are many witnesses to be heard, the trial judge will usually decide to refer the case back to the examining judge to have him hear these witnesses. The judge will do so in order to be able to complete the cases set down on the list for that day. After this has been done, the prosecutor is given the floor to give his opinion on the evidence and the applicable law. He might conclude that the evidence is not as good as he thought before the trial started, in which case he will advise the court to acquit the accused, an advice that the judge does not have to follow. Usually, however, the prosecutor concludes that there is enough evidence for a conviction on one or more of the charges in the indictment and he then will ‘demand’ a certain sentence. After this speech called ‘requisitoir’, the defence attorney will address the court to comment on the evidence or to bring forward legal points and defences. He will also comment on the ‘demanded’ sentence. Depending on the content of the defence, the prosecutor may wish to respond to the defence submissions in which case the judge will allow him to do so. The defence (first the lawyer and then the accused himself) will have the last word. The judge will then give a decision orally, to be put in writing shortly after the sitting. He can also, and will often, reserve judgement but not longer then three weeks, in which case a written decision is given. Thus, a trial judge is able to try ten to 15 serious criminal cases in one day. A murder trial might take not longer than one or two hours. Both the defence and the prosecution have a right to appeal the decision. The appeal has to be filed within two weeks. In case the accused is in custody, the appeal has to be heard within six months. If that does not happen, the accused must be released from custody irrespective of the accusation. If the accused is not in custody, he is allowed to await his appeal in liberty, unless the Court of First Instance has ordered his immediate detention. In that case, the accused can request the Court of Appeal to release him pending the appeal. This could be in the form of an unconditional release or a suspension of the custody (a conditional release). The appeal procedure involves a complete review of the case. It is a trial de novo before three judges. This procedure is practically the same as in the court below. Accused and witnesses, if any, will be heard again if requested. New witnesses may be heard and new evidence may be adduced. In the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General or Prosecutor General (an appointed official whose status is equal to the position of the Chief Justice) or his Advocate-General will act on behalf of the State. In exceptional cases, the prosecutor who brought the case in the court below is allowed to argue the case with leave of the Attorney-General. From the decision of the Court of Appeal lies an appeal to the Supreme Court in The Netherlands. This procedure is called cassation and is only allowed on points of law. It is open to both the Attorney General and the accused. This

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appeal has to be filed within two weeks after the Court of Appeal has delivered its decision. In assessing the foregoing, the following points must be borne in mind: 1. The examining judge is not allowed to try the case he ‘prepared’ for trial because he might not be perceived to be impartial. This must be seen in light of the fact that the trial judge will be, amongst other things, judge of the facts as there is no jury. 2. Great trust and confidence is placed in the police officers, the prosecutors and the judges. Their integrity and professional background must be of the highest standards. Without that the system cannot work. 3. The system guarantees expedition and efficiency. There is not much scope for theatrics and absolutely no room for accused persons unduly to delay the proceedings. The system is very strict on time limits and delays on the part of the State will almost inevitably be sanctioned with the release of the accused. 4. The procedures are extremely streamlined. Any defence the accused wants to put forward, including constitutional motions, will have to be put forward in the criminal case itself (‘concentration of defences’). Points in limine may be argued at the start of the case, but preliminary decisions on those points cannot be appealed separately. The accused or the prosecutor, as the case may be will have to wait until the case has been completed in order to prevent delays. At the same time the accused is allowed to bring all his defences, again, in the course of an appeal. 5. The criminal law, both substantive and procedural, is very accessible because of its codification and the way it is published in handbooks that contain the full text of the Code along with background information as to each section: parliamentary history, doctrine, case law and other commentary, and a clear index.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

In order to be effective, the police needs efficient investigative tools. As these might tend to infringe on fundamental rights, a legal or statutory basis is usually needed. It has to be objectively established that these methods are necessary in a democratic society and that they are proportionate. Hence, there must be transparency and judicial monitoring. 1. Wiretapping

Wiretapping has a statutory basis (sections 167 - 74 Code of Criminal Procedure), since 1998. Only the examining judge can give a warrant to tap telephones. He can only do so upon a request by the prosecutor stating facts and reasons which would make it incumbent to listen in to conversations via specified telephone

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numbers. Before giving a warrant of such sort, the examining judge has to find that the facts of the case justify a serious suspicion that this particular phone is used by or on behalf of a person suspected of a crime carrying a maximum sentence of such length that pre-trial detention is possible, that is for the more serious crimes. A warrant is valid for only 14 days, but can be extended by the examining judge at the request of the prosecutor, each time with another 14 days. The whole process of wiretapping is constantly monitored by the examining judge. Wiretapping is executed by a separate branch of the police force, in accordance with internal instructions that ensure the confidentiality of the obtained information. All the conversations are recorded (audio). Transcripts are made of the relevant conversations and to the extent that they are relevant. The examining judge will be provided with these transcripts. He can also ask for the audio recordings if he wishes. After the wiretapping has been ended, the suspect, if his whereabouts are known, will be informed about the wiretapping as soon as the interests of justice allow this. If the wiretapping leads to further steps in the investigation (arrests, etc.) copies of the transcripts will be added to the file and handed to the defence counsel. If the defence wishes to check the audio recordings, they will be given the opportunity to do so. If the wiretapping does not lead to any further steps, the examining judge will order the destruction of all the transcripts and audio recordings. This will have to take place under his personal supervision. Wiretapping has proved to be a very useful tool in the fight against organised crime and governmental corruption. It enables law enforcement to get a clear picture of criminal organisations. It has lead to the arrest of high officials and ‘big fish’ in the drug trade. It has also been responsible for the interdiction of enormous quantities of cocaine. It is now common knowledge that it is hardly possible to investigate major drug organisations without the use of judicially supervised wiretapping. 2. Searches in homes and other private places

To carry out searches of homes and other private places, a warrant by the examining judge is needed. If the searches are planned, they have to be executed under supervision of the examining judge himself, who has to be accompanied by an assistant registrar and a prosecutor. The search itself is usually done by the police officers who have been assigned to do the case. An official report of the search has to be made and signed by the examining judge and his assistant registrar who usually drafts the report. This approach ensures a careful, precise and orderly procedure for obtaining evidence and a correct treatment of the people who live in the house.

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3. Special investigation techniques

A. Surveillance

The systematic following of a person or observing his whereabouts is only permitted with the explicit approval of the prosecutor. Surveillance is systematic if it enables a more or less complete picture to be gained of certain aspects of a person’s life such as their financial activities or structural personal contacts with specific individuals. Systematic surveillance, which has to be distinguished from ordinary surveillance or incidental observation, may include observing a person over a number of days using an observation team or following someone using a scanning device. Systematic surveillance of private homes is not permitted, but other locked premises such as office buildings or warehouses and storage buildings may be placed under surveillance, be it only in the context of an investigation of a serious crime.

B. Undercover practices (‘sting operations’)

1. Covert investigation or infiltration Covert investigation or infiltration is usually performed by a police officer ‘under cover’ and is defined as participating or cooperating with a group of people that is believed to be planning or committing crimes. The officer runs substantial risks, one of them being that in order to be plausible to the group, he might have to take part in their criminal activities and thus commit crimes himself. The activities of that officer will therefore constantly have to be monitored by the prosecutor who will have to decide at what point the officer should withdraw from the group. In order to achieve such monitoring the officer might have to be wired. The infiltrating officer should never incite a person to commit criminal offences other than the ones the person had already planned to do. In other words, it should be clear that the officer has not induced the person to commit a crime he would otherwise never have done. 2. Pseudo purchase or supply of services This would usually need to be approved by the prosecutor since the purchase of drugs is a crime. If possible, it should be monitored by other police officers. Under no circumstances should the police officer act on his own. 3. Systematic gathering of evidence This is done by a special branch of the police force in conformity with special and detailed regulations. This branch is closely monitored by a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) prosecutor, who regularly reports to the chief prosecutor and the Attorney General.

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4. Allowing monitored criminal activity with delayed intervention This is a risky method, but it is nevertheless used regularly in the NAA. When drugs come ashore, usually only lower ranking members of the criminal organisation will be at hand. Direct intervention may therefore not lead to elimination of the organisation. Law enforcement officers may therefore tend to allow the drugs transport to go through in the hope that they will be able to follow that transport and that this will lead them to the higher ranked criminals. The risk is that they will not be able to follow the transport and so lose track of hundreds of kilos of drugs. For these reasons, the approval of the Attorney General is needed and in some cases even the approval of the Minister of Justice. 4. Evidence by ‘quid pro quo’ witnesses (deals with criminals)

In some serious cases the prosecution, when confronted by serious difficulties in obtaining hard evidence, have felt it necessary to make a ‘deal’ with one or more accomplices. This method is usually used with much restraint and only when it is absolutely necessary. In order to guide prosecutors on this slippery slope of law enforcement, the Attorney General has published guidelines as to this method. No deals can be made by the police. If they feel that the accomplice might desire to make a deal they must inform the prosecutor who will then take over. He will have to decide to what extent use of this method is necessary and proportionate. Once the prosecutor deems the method justified, a meeting with the accomplice witness will be held. The prosecutor will have to advise the witness that he can (or should) have a lawyer to assist him in making the deal. The terms of the deal must be reduced into a written contract, in which the ‘quids’ and the ‘quos’ are clearly outlined in detail. The prosecutorial quo may not necessarily be a complete immunity of the witness and it must be clear from the wording of the contract that it has not been suggested by the prosecution to the witness that in the latter’s own case, as a defendant, certain results as to sentence are guaranteed. It will always ultimately be the judges who decide on sentence. It must also be made clear to the witness that he will have to testify under oath and that he should only tell the truth and not what the witness considers the prosecution might want to hear. It should also be clear from the contract that the witness is made aware of the fact that should he lie under oath he will be prosecuted for perjury. The courts have generally accepted the above guidelines. They have also made refinements of them to meet the required standards of transparency and a fair trial. Thus it has been ruled that the prosecution will have to inform the defence beforehand that they have made a deal with the witness, and they will have to provide the defence with a copy of this agreement and any other information relevant thereto. If so desired by the defence, witnesses have to be heard about

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any relevant aspect of the ‘deal’. It is preferable that this be done in open court by the trial judge himself. It has happened in cases before the Court of Appeal that the prosecutor himself has been summoned to give sworn evidence. 5. Anonymous witnesses

It is possible to use as evidence written statements of so-called anonymous witnesses. This is only allowed in exceptional and serious cases however. The statement has to be given by the witness in person to the examining judge in camera. The witness has to give his name and personal information to the examining judge. He will have to give reasons to the judge why it is that he wants to give his statement anonymously. The judge has to be satisfied, firstly, that the statement is such that it can be objectively and reasonably assumed that the witness would run a severe risk of having to fear for his life or his health if his identity was disclosed. Secondly, that the witness feels so threatened that he would not give his statement if his name were known. Thirdly, that because of that it can be reasonably assumed that he will not obey a summons to appear in court to give evidence. If the examining judge allows the witness to be heard anonymously, he will state his reasons for doing so in the minutes relating the statement given by the witness. If he is not satisfied that the witness should be heard anonymously, he will hear the witness under his proper name and according to normal procedure, unless the prosecutor objects. In that case, the examining judge will not take down the statement of the witness. In the event that the witness is heard as an anonymous witness and not in the presence of the parties, the defence will be provided with the statement the witness has given and be allowed to submit further questions in writing. The judge will then put these questions to the witness and take down his answers. These answers will thereafter be sent to the defence. Questions apparently aimed at the discovery of the identity of the witness will not be permitted by the examining judge. The written statements can be used as evidence against the defendant. According to case law from the European Court on Human Rights, the use of these statements is not in violation of the European Convention, but it has been made clear that such statements should be used sparingly, with the utmost caution and only as corroborating evidence (in contradistinction to main evidence). The underlying idea is that criminal procedure should not only be fair for defendants but also for witnesses and victims. Over the last eight or so years, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC) has embarked upon a series of judicial reform measures. These reforms, inspired by the leadership of Chief Justice the Right Honourable Sir Dennis Byron, have been generally aimed at heightening the independence and improving the accountability of the ECSC judiciary; simplifying and modernising court rules

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and procedures; strengthening the capacity of the judiciary better to govern and manage itself; introducing and maximising the use of modern information technology; streamlining case flow and improving productivity by redesigning work processes, reorganising staff into teams and introducing support structures; and creating a unified court of general jurisdiction through merger of the District Court into the High Court. To date, the civil justice system has benefited tremendously from these reforms and one indicator of the success in that respect has been that, in most of the busier ECSC jurisdictions, the average period between the filing and final disposition of a civil case has shrunk from approximately three–five years to 12–18 months. Radical reform of the criminal justice system is now being tackled by the ECSC with Saint Lucia being used as a test site. Such reform is long overdue. A September 2003 study of the Saint Lucia prison population1 indicated that 101 detainees were held awaiting trial, including 41 on murder charges. Several of these accused persons had been detained in prison for more than two years without receiving a trial date. Many others were out on bail with no clear indication as to when their trials would commence. Mr Robert Lipscher a well qualified international court consultant was retained by Chief Justice Byron to investigate the causes of the weaknesses in the justice system and to design and assist in overseeing the implementation of a package of measures that would address the problems. Lipscher found that the trial courts lacked unified leadership, programmatic responsibilities among the judiciary and executive branch agencies were uncoordinated, court staff was poorly organised and that effective case management systems were lacking. Further, laws in many areas were antiquated and national resources in the amount required to bring about serious change were inadequate. It was impossible for the judiciary to resolve these problems on its own. A coordinated effort on the part of all three branches of government, necessitating broad and intense consultations was required. Accordingly, in February 2004 a conference attended by representatives of concerned government ministries, including the Attorney General’s chambers, judges, magistrates, the registry, members of the private and public bar, police, prisons, and probation officials was convened to discuss the state of the criminal justice system in Saint Lucia. The conference resolved that ‘The system of criminal justice administration is dysfunctional, some say even broken. It is in need of immediate reform.’ The resolution went on to list the following as broad expectations that should be met from any reform of the system: ‘efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability in criminal justice administration; speedy resolution of matters; cost effectiveness; fairness; accurate information, and competence’. The resolution specifically called for reorganisation of the criminal courts, including merger of the District Courts and the High Court, elimination of the preliminary inquiry

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process, new criminal procedure rules, and establishment of case management methods and legal aid for indigent accused persons. Lipscher’s proposals called for the creation of streamlined trial courts by administrative merger of the District Courts into the High Court and the establishment of specialised divisions of courts including an integrated family court and specific family justice reforms. Having noted the absence of unified leadership as a critical weakness in the existing court structure, Lipscher proposed that judicial accountability be enhanced by having each court division managed by a presiding judge with the assistance of a division manager. Central management authority of the trial courts would vest in a managing judge who will report to the Chief Justice and a trial court administrator who will report to the Supreme Court Administrator. The plan not only called for a streamlined administrative structure with clear lines of management authority but also the implementation of new case management systems and procedures, the application of modern technology, job redesign, and staff reorganisation. Progress on Saint Lucia’s reformed criminal justice system has required tremendous patience and persistence. The reluctance of key personnel to embrace change; the bureaucratic hurdles to be overcome in redesigning and reorganising job descriptions and tasks in the public service; the fact that approvals for various aspects of design and implementation had to be sought from a wide variety of Government Ministries and departments, each with its own priorities; the sheer time it takes in the public service of many Caribbean states for a major project to move from conceptualisation to implementation…all of these circumstances have resulted in sluggish implementation of the project. At the present stage, Lipscher’s design has been translated into a completed set of draft rules which are currently being discussed. In the interim some aspects of the design, particularly as they pertain to the summary procedure are already being implemented. The current draft prescribes for the following procedure in indictable cases:

ORIENTATION SESSION

This is held with a member of the criminal division case management team. Its purpose is to take attendance; to note adjournment requests; to verify the accuracy of information concerning a defendant’s address and contact information and to acquaint defendants with basic court procedures.

INITIAL HEARING

This is held within 72 hours of arrest. The initial hearing will be conducted by a Magistrate. The accused will not be required to plead. The hearing will consider questions of bail; hear and review any applications made either by the defence or the prosecution; explain the defendant’s rights and in particular set time tables

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within counsel must be retained if no counsel already is retained, and notify the defendant of the next date for court appearance.

SUFFICIENCY OR COMMITTAL HEARING

This is held within 28 days of the initial hearing or such other reasonable time fixed by order of the Court. It is presided over by a judge normally in open court and attended by all parties. The Prosecution must have disclosed all documents including witness statements to be relied upon at this hearing prior to the hearing. The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether upon a consideration of the documentary evidence (the statements given to the police) and taking the evidence in the light most favourable to the prosecutor, a jury could return a verdict of guilty against the defendant. Counsel may make oral submissions to the court at this hearing. If the Court finds that the prosecution has not met its burden it shall discharge the defendant.

INDICTMENT

Once the accused is committed, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) may prefer or decline to prefer an indictment. A time limit is given to the DPP to indict.

ARRAIGNMENT

On the return of the indictment, a judge shall:

1. Arraign the defendant and explain to the defendant a) His option to plead guilty or not guilty; b) That if the plea is not guilty the case will be scheduled for trial; c) That sentence may be reduced if there is an early guilty plea, and d) That sentence reduction will be less for a defendant who pleads guilty at a later stage 2. Again consider the issue of bail if the accused is not on bail 3. Inform the defendant of the right to know the maximum penalty and any mandatory minimum penalty provided by law for the offence charged.

Immediately following the arraignment, the court enters a scheduling order setting forth the next steps in the process, including:

a) The dates by which the prosecution and defence must make further or required disclosure; b) The date by which pre-trial applications must be filed c) The date of the omnibus conference, and

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d) The projected trial date or window

OMNIBUS CONFERENCE

An Omnibus Conference serves the following purposes:

a) to review the status of disclosure; b) to discuss trial readiness issues and action to be taken to cure any defects in readiness; c) to set out issues to be resolved at trial; d) to arrange for mediation or restitution discussions when appropriate; e) to review a defendant’s sentence exposure and sentence options; f) to discuss plea and sentence reduction possibilities still available in consideration of guilty plea; g) to discuss witness lists and the need to subpoena witnesses; h) to identify possible scheduling conflicts and ways to resolve them; i) to determine whether an interpreter will be needed at trial; j) to set a firm trial date; k) to set down for hearing by a judge any legal issues that must be resolved prior to trial ; and l) to set a hearing date before a judge for a defendant who so desires to withdraw his or her plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty instead.

In the course of designing the project, there has been much discussion on the utility of regulated and judicially supervised plea bargaining. The current draft does not however explore or develop the concept. With respect to law enforcement, a traditional complaint not just in Saint Lucia but in many Caribbean common law countries is that too many convictions are based on confession statements. This certainly does reflect, at the very least, substantial weaknesses in the investigative phase of law enforcement. There is therefore much that can be learned from the Netherlands Antilles in this regard. Measures such as wiretapping often occasion a knee jerk response among some who instinctively believe that such a measure runs contrary to established constitutional human rights protections. The truth is that carefully legislated and judicially supervised wiretapping has long been regarded as a legitimate tool well within the bounds of the European Convention of Human Rights which is the document that informs Caribbean Constitutions. There is little reason to expect that Caribbean courts will deem such legislation to be an infringement of the Constitution. Significantly, Saint Lucia has only recently, despite a howl of protest there, enacted wiretapping legislation.

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LESSONS LEARNED

To date, a number of lessons have been learned from progress on the Saint Lucia experiment. As the project proceeds to full implementation, more will no doubt be gleaned. Interestingly, some of these lessons have resulted in conclusions that the civil law approach has long embraced and that are in fact endemic to that system. The following represents some of the more important ones which appear to be crucial to a reform strategy that seeks to eliminate delay, improve efficiency and guarantee fairness. In the first place, the project appears to confirm the view that, in order to be successful, judicial reform has to be internally driven, that is, led by the judiciary. Dynamic judicial leadership is critical to success. The ECSC’s reform thrust was considerably boosted by the fact that in Sir Dennis Byron that court had an energetic, visionary, reform oriented Chief Justice. Further, in order to lead the process of reform, the judiciary must considerably strengthen its administrative capacity. In the English speaking Caribbean, the Trinidad and Tobago judiciary, beginning with Chief Justice de la Bastide’s leadership, clearly recognised this fact and that country’s judiciary has led the way in training and nurturing, not just in Trinidad and Tobago but also throughout the rest of the region, a cadre of competent court administrators, positions which ten years ago were non-existent. Judicial reform and in particular criminal justice reform must be undertaken in close collaboration with the many interested parties who have a direct stake in the smooth running of the criminal justice system. The respective roles of the forensic department, prison and probation authorities, the private and public bar, the police, magistrates, judges, court staff and all the appropriate government Ministries are all complementary. Decisions that directly affect one group invariably impact upon another group. The reform process can be stymied if any of these bodies is left out at the planning stages. Reform will not be accomplished merely by the passage of new laws or by simply affording more resources, whether human or material, to the justice system. Expert and insightful analysis of the causes of the bottlenecks and general inefficiencies in the justice system is critical to determining and prescribing of appropriate measures. If this is done effectively, it may well be that less, but much better trained, personnel will be required to staff the justice system. Work on the Saint Lucia project seems to indicate that criminal justice reform in the Caribbean must perforce embrace some if not all of the following:

ELIMINATION OF THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (PI) PROCESS

In many countries in the Caribbean, a major source of delay has been the requirement for the holding of a preliminary inquiry when a person has been charged with an indictable offence. The State’s witnesses are made to give before

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a Magistrate full oral testimony in the presence of the accused so that the Magistrate might determine whether a sufficient case has been made out for the accused to stand trial before a jury. In every case, the witness would have already given the police a statement which statement ought to be disclosed to the defence. Preliminary Inquiries afford counsel for accused persons an opportunity to cross- examine key witnesses whose evidence might be tenuous in an effort to expose the weaknesses therein and so possibly secure an early acquittal. They however consume time and precious judicial resources. It is certainly possible to eliminate them altogether while continuing to afford to counsel in certain circumstances some opportunity to cross-examine crucial witnesses.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL PROSECUTORIAL SERVICE

The importance of a strong central prosecutorial service overseeing all prosecutions whether at the level of the District Court or High Court needs no elaboration. This is actually one of the strengths of the civil law approach as noted earlier. If the criminal justice system is to be enhanced it is imperative that measures be taken to secure strong and competent prosecutors.

THE FACILITATING OF EARLY GUILTY PLEAS

A high percentage of defendants ultimately plead or are found guilty. It is to the advantage of the justice system that an accused who is genuinely guilty should plead guilty at the earliest possible opportunity. It is also to the advantage of the accused person since an early plea of guilty attracts a lesser form of punishment than otherwise. Creative measures need to be devised therefore to facilitate guilty pleas. Naturally, it is important that no accused person should feel coerced to plead guilty and therefore protocols must be put in place to ensure that judicial officers satisfy themselves fully that a person pleading guilty completely understands the import of the plea and that it is voluntarily given and is genuine. Well regulated and judicially controlled Plea bargaining is another area that should be embraced.

PROVISION OF DIVERSIONARY SERVICES FOR PETTY CRIMINALS, DRUG ADDICTS AND JUVENILE DELINQUENTS

The Criminal justice reform has to proceed in tandem with the provision of special ancillary services to cater for these kinds of offenders.

INTRODUCTION OF CASE MANAGEMENT AND CASE FLOW MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES

The central task of the court office must be to see the cases through the system from filing to final disposition. Court offices and the personnel working in them

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should be organised around the fulfilment of this responsibility. Reasonable expedition and efficiency must characterise the case flow and we must ensure, inter alia, that:

a) Cases are so managed that at every stage in the life of the case, specific personnel are responsible and accountable for the smooth flow of the case to its next phase; b) Indictable cases flow and are actually handled in a seamless manner from arrest to final disposition thereby eliminating the disjuncture between the magistrate’s and high court aspects of the case management; c) Constant analysis and re-analysis is made of all relevant procedures to ensure the elimination of unnecessary steps and clutter; d) Judicial resources are freed up from tasks that can be accomplished by non-judicial personnel so that judges and magistrates have more time to devote to the things which only judicial officers can accomplish, and e) Firm trial dates are given and observed.

These measures have all been fine-tuned in the civil law system which places a high premium on efficiency. Caribbean common law Constitutions all guarantee a right to a trial within a reasonable time. This is a right that not merely satisfies the interests of the accused but also those of the victims of crime as well as other users of the court system who have no desire to see their cases delayed by inordinate attention being afforded cases ahead of theirs in the queue. More significantly, an efficient and effective criminal justice system reduces crime and enhances the peace and security of a society. This in turn creates a favourable climate for investment and economic activity in general. When it takes several years to conclude the trial of a person accused of a crime, the social and economic consequences are truly incalculable.

MAXIMISING THE USE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY

It is unnecessary to elaborate upon this. The use of modern Information Technology (IT) not only helps to make a system more efficient but it can also serve as a valuable management tool in the deployment of resources. Moreover, measures such as video conferencing for vulnerable child witnesses, witnesses who are overseas and even for remand prisoners who must make the trek from the prisons to the court every week merely for a remand hearing can result in great savings in time and expense to the justice system.

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CONCLUSION

As we in the common law world seek to reform our criminal justice systems, there is undoubtedly much that we can learn from the civil law countries that place a premium on expedition and efficiency. Although the two systems are very different, they both share a desire for fairness, efficiency and effectiveness. Criminal justice systems in which accused persons experience horrendous delays and whose dockets are replete with a backlog of unheard cases cry out for radical reform. Court resources are not infinite and hard choices must sometimes be made. Whenever a justice system seeks to combat escalating crime there is always a risk that the due observation of individual human rights can be a casualty. The justice system can only be effective if it is fair under all the circumstances and strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of the individual and those of the state. Fairness and efficiency must proceed hand in hand. In the coming months and years, it will be interesting to see just how the Saint Lucia project develops and what difference it makes to the criminal justice system in that country.

NOTES

1. The Bordelais Prison Report was prepared by Mr Justice Michael Gordon and Madame Justice Indra Hariprashad-Charles.

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drug trafficking and public policy in the caribbean

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chap24.pmd 544 12/8/2006, 11:18 AM C ONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE WAR ON DRUGS Twenty-Four

Conflict and INTRODUCTION Cooperation in The Caribbean region has always contended the War on with a wide variety of threats to its economic, political and social wellbeing. Drugs: Hurricanes, for instance, pose a constant The Caribbean threat to economic stability and growth. A Experience1 particularly devastating natural disaster can destroy island infrastructures and drive John W. King2 tourists away. Large scale out-migration makes it difficult to retain the talent necessary to promote innovation and technological advances. Trade imbalances make it difficult to compete and flourish in an increasingly global economy. These threats and others create a delicate balance in setting and achieving goals for long-term growth and development.

PATTERNS AND TRENDS

In recent years, a new threat has appeared on the Caribbean horizon. The safety and security of Caribbean nations is now under attack by sophisticated criminal enterprises whose resources give them a considerable advantage over the island nations within which they operate. Drug trafficking and the related problems of government corruption, money laundering, and increasing rates of crime and violence have gripped the region, focusing the worlds attention on this new global threat. As Maingot (1994 p.144) suggests:

The word “communist” seemed to have disappeared from the vocabulary, replaced by “czar,” “don,” “kingpin,” “gig man”– however, each island referred to the new

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breed of pirates. It was a challenge which demanded greater cooperation with the US, in part because the US was the source of much of the problem.

The new threat is indeed multifaceted and one which requires regional and international efforts and resources. It is not surprising that the Caribbean region is the focus of increased drug trafficking activity. It is an inevitable consequence of its geographic ‘advantage.’ This group of islands dotting the Caribbean Sea is strategically located between the drug producing countries of South America and the primary drug consumption nation - the United States (US). Colombia alone produces about 80 per cent of all the cocaine in the world, and the US has the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest drug-consuming nation (Griffith 1997). The large volume of commercial and leisure travel throughout the region provide a convenient mechanism that facilitates the transportation of drugs. Various methods are used, such as body carrying by ‘mules’ (couriers) or by the secreting of illicit cargo on commercial container vessels or private aircraft. Whichever method is used, it is assumed that a great majority of this illicit merchandise goes undetected as it arrives into the US. Successful drug trafficking operations are also built upon ‘patterns of accommodation’ between traffickers and corrupt law enforcement personnel. It would be difficult to imagine the degree of success that these illicit enterprises enjoy without the deliberate cooperation and assistance from individuals charged with combating these activities. Cases of government corruption throughout the region have been widely reported. Caribbean leaders are sensitive to US claims that they are not doing enough to address these issues, sometimes denying or downplaying the extent of the problem. This type of diplomatic ‘name calling’ occurred most recently in negotiations between the governments of the US and Jamaica. The conflict arose in response to a comment made by Patricia Hall, director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at the US State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. She claimed in a network broadcast on US television that an ‘elected representative’ was ‘known to maintain contacts with drug traffickers,’ and that ‘there does not seem to be any effort to remove him.’ Caribbean leaders rallied around the Jamaican Government’s angered response to these allegations demanding evidence to support the claim or a public withdrawal of the accusation (Caribbean Insight January 1997). As I will discuss later in this paper, these tensions arise, in part, over the perceptions of sovereignty and the legacy of colonial rule. Whereas geography, travel patterns, and government corruption provide the opportunities for drug trafficking enterprises, economic adversity throughout the Caribbean can be seen as a motivating factor for involvement in the drug trade. In a region of the world where the average person has little opportunity for significant upward mobility, involvement in the drug trade may be an attractive option. In the Caribbean, American economic aid has fallen 90 per cent, to $26 million in 1995 from $226 million a decade earlier (Rohter 1997). For the Jamaican

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farmer, growing ganja may be the only way to survive. For young men living in Kingston, Bridgetown and San Juan, involvement in the drug business can become irresistible when they face unemployment rates that exceed 25 per cent. Thus, any attempt to offer long-term solutions to the problem of drug trafficking requires a serious examination of the adverse economic conditions that underpin many of the social problems experienced in the developing world. The previous discussion suggests that in the late 1990s Caribbean leaders and citizens face a dilemma that is the product of many factors, some longstanding and some of recent vintage. These preconditions of Caribbean drug trafficking activity are not irreversible. They can be addressed in a variety of ways, through law enforcement intelligence and strategies, economic assistance, and diplomatic dialogue and negotiation. All measures, however, require a level of mutual understanding and respect that is sometimes lacking when politically driven agendas and narrowly defined objectives are sought. The remainder of the paper examines the issues that make negotiation difficult and the ways in which common ground can be found to address the threat drug trafficking enterprises pose.

SUPPLY AND DEMAND

There is no question that Caribbean nations are presently experiencing an enormous amount of drug activity that includes the cultivation of some drugs (ganja or marijuana in Jamaica and Belize), the trans-shipment of drugs throughout the region, drug-related crime and violence, drug-related corruption of officials, arms trafficking, money laundering, and drug addiction. What is less evident and subject to regional and international debate is the best way to address the problem. Caribbean leaders often cite the insatiable American appetite for illicit drugs, claiming that the most realistic and enduring policy is to reduce the high demand for drugs. In fact, there is growing support for funding demand reduction programmes, both in the US and the Caribbean. One prominent Caribbean scholar, Klaus de Albuquerque who has written extensively on the issue of drugs and crime in the Caribbean, also sees the solution in reducing demand: ‘The most effective long-term solution would be for the US to address the demand side of the drug problem. Current US policy aimed at reducing supply, interdiction, and longer prison sentences, is myopic and US officials complaining about drug-related corruption in the region seems to me a bit like blaming the victim, since it is drug-related corruption in the US that makes the former possible.’ (de Albuquerque 1996, 13) The reality though, is that most of the budgetary and manpower resources for US anti-drug efforts have focused on the areas de Albuquerque cites as failures. Most estimates suggest that interdiction efforts uncover only a fraction of all illegal drugs entering the US. Similarly, drug eradication programmes face many obstacles in achieving success. Because the problem is international in scope, it requires the cooperation and shared resources of many nations. And because the

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nations involved possess varying degrees of power and resources, it is inevitable that conflicts will arise out of this asymmetric relationship. This asymmetric relationship is evident with respect to trade issues. Because agricultural and textile products are a significant source of export revenue, Caribbean leaders often cite unfair trade policies between their nations and the US as a contributor to the economic marginality of the region. The lack of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) parity with Mexico is the most visible example of this trade imbalance.

MARITIME COUNTER-DRUG MEASURES

In response to the growing threat of trans-national drug trafficking, sub- regional, regional, and international programmes and policies have been created. Because the problem of drugs is global in nature, much of the focus in recent years has been on the importance of international cooperation in fighting the drug cartels. Caribbean governments have formed regional alliances and have combined resources to ensure the security of the region. One of the most successful examples is the Barbados based Regional Security System (RSS). Created in 1982, the RSS was borne out of a security agreement among Eastern Caribbean states whose aims included ‘promotion of regional and international cooperation; promotion of unity and defence of sovereignty; harmonisation of foreign policy; joint diplomacy; economic integration’ (Griffith 1993, 153). The RSS sought to provide logistical support, share intelligence, provide training and coordinate military and police resources in response to internal and external threats to security. On a wider scale, the United Nations (UN) has sponsored several significant drug control treaties. Though not limited to maritime counter-drug measures, these agreements have brought together nations representing most parts of the world in an effort to address the multi-faceted business of narcotics trafficking. A recent example is the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. This treaty, signed by 137 parties, is noteworthy because it addresses key issues previously neglected in earlier cooperative efforts: ‘Among its strongest recommendations are measures to prevent money laundering, to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals, to improve international judicial cooperation and to introduce the technique of controlled deliveries’ (United Nations 1997, 233). In addition, the Convention provides for strengthened mechanisms to ensure the extradition of major drug traffickers. In recent years the Government of the US and representatives of Caribbean nations have been working on bilateral maritime counter-drug agreements to ensure the security of the Americas against the growing threat posed by organised drug cartels. Belize, which is geographically located within the larger Caribbean basin, was the first to sign a Mutual-Legal-Assistance-Treaty (MLAT) with the US in 1992. By 1995, agreements were completed with Antigua-Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the Dominican Republic, and

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Trinidad and Tobago (see Table 24.1). This agreement was commonly referred to in the press as the ‘Shiprider Agreement.’ Tensions arose in 1996 when the governments of Barbados and Jamaica questioned some of the provisions in the agreement. Prime Ministers Owen Arthur of Barbados and P J Patterson of Jamaica publicly expressed their concerns about the agreement and called for continued discussion. Their primary concerns revolved around the issues of reciprocity and sovereignty. From their perspective, the agreement as originally written lacked the element of reciprocity, suggesting that the more powerful party to the agreement, the US, had the upper hand in pursuing suspected drug traffickers into another country’s territorial waters. This simply would not do. The situation became more critical when the US suggested that non-compliance might result in negative consequences, such as decertification of the offending country. Decertification would have significant economic ramifications for these small scale economies. Barbados was even faced with the possibility of having its airport downgraded, possibly affecting tourist travel. All of these implicit and explicit threats were seen as attempts to coerce Caribbean nations into an agreement symbolic of the colonial-type control that some West Indians still feel strongly about.

TABLE 24.1 CARIBBEAN MARITIME COUNTER-DRUG AGREEMENTS Ship- Ship- Entry-to- Over- Order- Country Pursuit boarding rider Investigate flight to-land Antigua & Barbuda X X X X X X Bahamas X X Barbados * Belize X X X X Dominica X X X X Dominican Republic X X X X Grenada X X X X X X Guyana X X Haiti X X Jamaica * Netherlands Antilles X X X X St Kitts & Nevis X X X X X X St Lucia X X X X X X St Vincent/ X X X X Grenadines Trinidad & Tobago X X X X X X Turks & Caicos X Source: US Department of State * While Barbados and Jamaica have agreed in principle to most of the treaty provisions outlined here, they exercise authority to grant or deny permission to US law enforcement personnel in counter-drug efforts. This is a significant departure from other Caribbean nations that have given the US standing authority to unilaterally combat drug trafficking in foreign waters.

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For reasons of self-interest and the maintenance of friendly relations with the US, most Caribbean nations signed maritime counter-drug agreements with the US before the public debate about sovereignty. Government leaders in Trinidad and Tobago supported at the outset, cooperation with the US in combating drug trafficking, even if it meant some degree of ‘intrusion’ on the part of US law enforcement officials. Prime Minister Basdeo Panday and his Attorney General, Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj felt that the threat posed by the drug cartels required this type of action. The political opposition predictably voiced a different opinion, suggesting that the country has surrendered its territorial waters to US vessels in pursuit of or in random surveillance against drug traffickers (Ali 1997). In Barbados and Jamaica, there was a great deal of support for the position taken by its leadership, even from the opposition political parties. This was, after all an issue about a much cherished national identity and the right to self governance. There was even some concern among Caribbean leaders whose countries had already signed a Shiprider treaty that entering into an agreement with the US bilaterally was not in the best interests of the Caribbean community. Trinidadian Foreign Affairs Minister Ralph Maraj stated that ‘It is unfortunate that we have gone and done it separately and bilaterally’, referring to his Government’s hasty signing of the treaty (Ali 1997, 10). Caribbean Governments have a good record of uniting as a region to promote their economic and political interests. The Shiprider Agreement, however, stands as an exception to Caribbean unity. What Barbados and Jamaica were able to achieve through their resolve was an agreement that they could live with. The final agreement, though not yet ratified by the Barbadian legislature, ensures cooperation in counter-narcotics law enforcement efforts without ‘giving away’ national sovereignty. Unlike the agreements signed by other Caribbean nations, Jamaica and Barbados will maintain some degree of control over maritime counter-drug operations in their territorial waters. More specifically, entry of US personnel will be permitted on a case by case basis and random pursuit of suspected traffickers into territorial waters or airspace is not permitted. Authority to allow the boarding of vessels by US law enforcement has been delegated at the operational level, so that Barbadian and Jamaican coast guard officials may determine the necessity and legitimacy of these counter-drug efforts. In other words, no ‘blanket authority’ allows US law enforcement personnel to operate in Jamaican or Barbadian territorial waters at will. Unlike smaller, less equipped Caribbean nations, Barbados and Jamaica have the resources to respond to maritime narcotics activities in ‘real time’, necessitating a mechanism by which authority in these situations can be granted (Roach 1998). ‘It remains in our exclusive control to give or withhold permission’, says Jamaican Prime Minister P J Patterson (Caribbean Insight June 1997, 12). Perhaps most importantly though is the provision of reciprocity. This ensures that for each right exercised by US law enforcement authorities working abroad,

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Barbados and Jamaica may exercise similar rights in their counter-drug operations in American waters (Vasciannie 1997). This provision may be largely symbolic, since Caribbean nations lack the resources to engage in large scale counter-narcotics operations in foreign waters. However, perceptions can become quite important when nations negotiate matters of national concern, sometimes resulting in a verbal ‘face saving’ exchange in the press. Stephen Vasciannie, the minority opposition leader of the National Democratic Movement in Jamaica states: ‘Jamaica and Barbados will have an agreement which respects some of our basic interests, while other Caribbean states are left to face the cold chill of arrangements which, at least in theory, treat them as second-class nations’ (Vasciannie 1997, A4).

SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

The real issue is the meaning of sovereignty for small economically dependent nations. The islands comprising the Commonwealth Caribbean are recognised by other nations as politically independent and as such, are entitled to the same privileges and subject to the same responsibilities as more powerful sovereign nations. Issues of security, however, pose special problems when there exists an imbalance of resources and political clout. Some argue that absolute sovereignty cannot exist for small economically dependent states whose political interests may be inimical to more powerful nations geographically located in close proximity. Griffith (1997, 22) suggests that: ‘...of all the countries in the Americas, those in the Caribbean are least able to cushion the impact of domestic and international sovereignty challenges presented by drugs.’ Because the problems facing these vulnerable nations are many - migration, global trade imbalances, rising crime and violence, environmental degradation - it is unrealistic, argues Griffith that ending the drug siege will ensure complete sovereignty of Caribbean nations. The fact that these issues link the Americas in an interdependent relationship simply makes complete sovereignty untenable. Thus, a re-conceptualisation of sovereignty is needed in a time of global interdependence involving a skewed distribution of power and capabilities. Elliott Abrams, a former US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs during the Reagan administration voices a similar opinion. He notes that though the majority of Caribbean nations enjoy a democratic form of governance, ‘democratic stability in the Caribbean is far weaker than most Americans think’ (Abrams 1996, 87). Thus, the many problems facing these nations may at any time tip the delicate balance creating instability for neighbouring states in the hemisphere. Abrams’s position is clearly pragmatic when he states:

...the anti-colonial mindset, and the insistence on full independence, that marked the 1960s should be relegated to the past. Developments in the world economy, and indeed in international criminal activity, have made full independence tantamount to full vulnerability for the smallest states. (Abrams 1996, 92)

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Klaus de Albuquerque does not share the pragmatism of Griffiths and Abrams. Rather, he suggests that the US must share the blame for the problem of drugs and related corruption and money laundering before criticising Caribbean nations for their ‘half-hearted’ efforts. While he agrees that the problem is serious and complex, he is critical of the means by which the US government has approached the issue, calling the coercive tactics used by the US a ‘new big stick policy’ (de Albuquerque 1997). Historically, this approach is reminiscent of US military intervention in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and elsewhere in Central America. The fact that the US possesses a great deal of leverage in these regional issues should not, according to de Albuquerque and others, make the issue of nationalism and sovereignty moot. Can the concerns of the ‘pragmatists’ be balanced with those of ‘nationalists’ or are they fundamentally incompatible? The final ‘Shiprider’ agreement between the Governments of Barbados and Jamaica and the US achieved, in my opinion, the type of balance that can be reasonably expected in an increasingly global community. The problem of drug trafficking is unique and complex, unlike any other threat to the safety and security of all nations. No nation is immune to this threat and no nation can expect to win the ‘war on drugs’ on its own. The issue of the sovereignty of Caribbean nations is not just symbolic — it involves the real exercise of authority in one’s own territorial waters and the crafting of legislation to achieve law and order, both nationally and in concert with other nations. Even the most zealous anti- drug advocate needs to recognise that international cooperation requires mutual respect and the shedding of ethnocentric attitudes.

Rethinking sovereignty should not mean less local control or less local responsibility for law enforcement. It means finding ways to bridge national borders through the creation of minimum standards, which all nations must achieve (Kerry 1997, 187).

If superpower nations are to expect cooperation from smaller nations in the war on drugs, they should understand that the typical resources used in such a war — planes, boats, and weapons — will be insufficient in the long run. What Caribbean leaders have long sought is the kind of trade relationships with the US and Europe that other less developed nations enjoy. Only then can the small nations of the Caribbean begin to thrive economically, possibly redirecting individuals away from the temptations of drug use and trafficking. Please find below, explanations for some terms:

• ‘Shipboarding’: Standing authority for the US Coast Guard to stop, board and search foreign vessels suspected of illicit traffic located seaward of the territorial sea of any nation.

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• ‘Shiprider’: Standing authority to embark law enforcement officials on platforms of the parties, which officials may then authorise certain law enforcement actions. • ‘Pursuit’: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to pursue fleeing vessels or aircraft suspected of illicit traffic into foreign waters or airspace. May also include authority to stop, board and search pursued vessels. • ‘Entry-to-investigate’: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to enter foreign waters or airspace to investigate vessels or aircraft located therein suspected of illicit traffic. May also include authority to stop, board and search such vessels. • ‘Overflight’: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to fly in foreign airspace when in support of counter-drug operations. • ‘Order-to-land’: Standing authority for US law enforcement assets to order to land in the host nation aircraft suspected of illicit traffic.

REFERENCES

Abrams, E. 1996. ‘The Shiprider Solution: Policing the Caribbean’. The National Interest, (Spring): 86–92. Ali, K. 1997. ‘Trinidad Treaties Still Very Hot Topic’. Caribbean Week, May 24–June 6, p. 10. Caribbean Insight. 1997. ‘Caricom Angered by US Drug Pressure’. Jan. 1997, p. 1. Caribbean Insight. 1997. ‘Summit With US Sets out Co-operation Plan’. June, 1997, pp. 1– 12. de Albuquerque, K. 1996. ‘Drugs in the Eastern Caribbean’. Caribbean Week, Vol. 7, no. 12 (Mar 16–29). de Albuquerque, K. 1997. ‘New ‘Big Stick’ Policy.The Shiprider Agreement’. Caribbean Week, February 1–14, pp. 6–7. Griffith, I. 1993. The Quest for Security in the Caribbean. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Griffith, I. 1997. Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Kerry, J. 1997. The New War: The Web of Crime that Threatens America’s Security. New York: Simon and Schuster. Maingot, A. P. 1994. The United States and the Caribbean. London: Macmillan. Roach, A. 1998. Legal Advisors Office, US Department of State [Telephone Interview, August 3]. Rohter, L. 1997. ‘Drugs! Aliens! Washington, Wake Up’. New York Times, May 4, p. 3E. United Nations International Drug Control Programme. 1997. World Drug Report. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Vasciannie, S. 1997. ‘Shiprider Sails Home’. Jamaica Gleaner, May 19, p. A4.

NOTES

1. From Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology Vol. 3, Nos. 1–2, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice, The University of the West Indies, St Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago, 1998, pp. 83–95, with permission. 2. The author wishes to thank Ms Susan Snyder and Mr Ashley Roach of the US State Department for their kind assistance.

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Does Drug INTRODUCTION Enforcement Reduce Crime? The entire Caribbean is facing a wave of An Empirical criminal activity linked to narcotics…. You are seeing increased crime rates right across Analysis of the the region, from Trinidad and Tobago in the Drug War in South through Jamaica and the Bahamas in Central American the North in the English-speaking and Caribbean Caribbean…I might add that it is also Countries occurring in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico as well as the Eastern Caribbean Horace A. Bartilow — Peter Phillips, Jamaica’s Minister of National Security (The Nation Newspaper 2005).

Policymakers throughout the Caribbean basin struggle to make sense of the rising levels of violent crime that currently plague the region. While government officials and scholars attribute the rise in violent crime to the drug trade that transits the Caribbean basin (Harriott 2002, Harriott 2003), very little attention is given to how prohibitive drug control enforcement policies may actually contribute to the current increase in violent crime throughout the region. Existing country studies conclude that the rise in violent crime and acts of narco-terror in Latin America is attributed to United States’ (US) sponsored drug control enforcement policies that encourage Andean governments to militarise the drug war, consequently creating an environment in which the drug trade and the accompanying violence continues to increase (Bagley 1992, Crandall 2002).

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However, while these studies are compelling, the causal inference of the argument is unclear because drug control enforcement is endogenously related to violent crime in Latin America. Counterfactually, even in the absence of US supported drug control enforcement towards the region, violent crime would most likely increase due to the fact that cocaine is largely produced in Andean Latin American countries and domestic drug cartels and narco-insurgent organisations, who are indigenous to the political landscape of these countries would naturally utilise violence against each other and against governments in order to expand and protect their enterprise. Avoiding the endogenous relationship between prohibitive drug control policies and the increase in violent crime would clarify the causal inference of the literature’s argument. In this study, endogeniety is avoided through the selection of observations to be studied and through the utilisation of a series of structural equations to estimate the data (Berry 1984, King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Our selection of observations comes from Central America and the Caribbean. Countries in this region play an important strategic role as drug transit zones and money laundering centres. In most of these countries, the US actively supports drug control enforcement policies. However, drug producing cartels and narco-insurgents organisations are not indigenous to the political landscape of these countries. The question we ask is: what effect does US supported drug control policies towards the Caribbean basin, specifically drug interdiction and trafficker immobilisation, have on violent and property crimes in Central American and Caribbean countries? In answering this question, we employ a structural equation model1 to analyse crime data for Central American and Caribbean countries from 1984–2000. After controlling for socioeconomic factors that affect overall crime, the regression estimates show that drug control enforcement contribute to increasing levels of violent and property crimes. Our findings are consistent with existing country studies regarding the effects of drug control policies on political instability and violence in Latin America (Bagley 1989, Crandall 2002, Labrousse and Laniel 2001). The policy implications of these findings suggest that current methods of executing the drug war may be counterproductive and could exasperate the domestic security crisis that currently threatens the political and economic viability of countries throughout the Caribbean basin. This article is organised as follows. In the next section we begin our analysis by establishing the causal linkages between drugs and crime. The underlying logic of how prohibitive drug control enforcement should, in theory, reduce violent crime is then discussed. Given this context, we then examine the literature regarding the effects of US sponsored drug control policies towards Latin America and its effects on violent crime in the region. Here we highlight the limitations in the causal inference that the literature makes between prohibitive drug control enforcement and violent crime. In the section that follows, we consider the

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possibility that since marijuana and cocaine consumption is governed by different demand elasticities, drug control enforcement may have different effects on violent and property crimes. We generate a set of hypotheses and then proceed with a discussion of the operationalisation of the variables and the statistical model that is used in the analysis of the data. This section is followed by a detailed discussion of our empirical results and concludes with an evaluation of the policy implications of our research.

THE DRUG-CRIME NEXUS

Among the many social ills that are associated with drug trafficking is its threat to individual and societal security; namely the escalation of violent homicide and property crime (Williams 1994). Recent scholarship have identified a tripartite classification scheme of psychopharmacological effects, economic compulsive drives, and systemic violence to identify the relationship of drugs to violent crimes against people and property (Goldstein 1985). The psychopharmacological dimension relates to individuals becoming irrational, agitated, impulsive, uncontrollably angry and physically abusive even to the point of committing murder. The economic compulsive dimension is associated with violent criminal acts to obtain money for personal drug consumption (e.g. through burglaries and robberies). The psychopharmacological and economic compulsive dimensions relate to violent and property crimes committed by drug abusers (Goldstein 1985). The systemic dimension arises when violence is used to enforce contracts or to resolve ‘turf wars’ in illicit drug markets. This type of violence is a function of the enormous profits that are generated from illicit drug proceeds (Goldstein 1985). Violence, in the form of assassinations, kidnappings and extortion, has become a booming industry in many Latin American countries (Sanchez 1998). In many of these countries turf wars between rival traffickers and narco-insurgents are a frequent manifestation of the violent nature of the drug industry. Not only do traffickers engage in systemic violence against each other, but they also utilise kidnappings and assassinations to coerce businesses and government agents into criminal cooperation (Lupsha 1995, Lupsha 1992, Lupsha 1996).

THE LOGIC OF DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME REDUCTION

The fact that drugs and violence are causally related is a major reason for prohibiting the production and use of illicit drugs. Theoretically, prohibitive drug control policies are, therefore, informed by the logic that the reduction of the supply of illicit drugs will increase market prices and thereby force users to forgo illicit drug consumption, which will reduce violent crime (Reuter and Kleinman 1986). By this logic, efforts to reduce domestic drug consumption in the US have led American policymakers to seek collaboration with foreign countries to eradicate

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the production and trade of illicit narcotics (Toro 1992). By the mid 1970s, one policy statement on America’s drug abuse stated:

No matter how hard we fight the problem of drug abuse at home we cannot make real significant progress unless we succeed in gaining cooperation from foreign governments, because many of the serious drugs of abuse originate in foreign countries. Thus, our capability to deal with supplies of drugs available in the United States depends strongly on the interest and capability of foreign governments in drug control (The Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force, 1975, 50).

Consequently, the goal of America’s prohibitive drug control policy has been to secure the cooperation and collaboration of foreign governments in the areas of crop eradication, drug interdiction and the arrests or ‘immobilisation’ of drug traffickers. The primary focus of this analysis, however, is on the effects of interdiction and trafficker immobilisation on violent and property crimes.

DRUG CONTROL ENFORCEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

To date, however, there is little empirical research that has attempted to systematically explore what effect, if any, does prohibitive drug control policies have on violent and property crimes in countries allied with Washington in combating the drug trade. Existing research on this issue largely comes form country studies that document the experiences of Latin America. In their implementation of prohibitive drug control, American policymakers have frequently introduced US military forces into countries like Bolivia, Columbia and Peru to battle traffickers at the source of their operation. For example, US forces frequently intervened into Bolivia, Columbia and Peru in an attempt to destroy cocaine laboratories and eliminate the various narco-insurgent and trafficking groups who control the drug trade. Scholars contended that the militarisation of drug control enforcement in the region has facilitated an escalation of kidnappings, homicides, assassinations and the spread of narco- insurgent violent confrontations against governments and civilian populations in the region (Bagley 1992, Crandall 2002, Labrousse and Laniel 2001, 185-8, Lupsha 1996, Tokatlian 1994). Researchers, moreover, note that the militarisation of the drug war has proved to be repressive, and has undermined democratic governance in the region. Washington’s policy deteriorated an already dismal record of human rights abuses in the Andean region in general, and in Columbia in particular. Scholars contend that the strategy deepened the legitimacy crisis for Andean governments and destabilised the region in ways that fostered the growth of the drug trade even more and with it the increased level of violence (Armstrong 1980, Bagley 1989, Blachman 1989-90, Flores 1986). In executing drug control enforcement, American policymakers actively

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encouraged their Latin American partners to enact legislation that would allow drug traffickers to be extradited to the US. However, some analysts make the claim that the escalation of violence in the region is a consequence of the attempt to implement extradition. In an interview, Javier Pena, former Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) case agent who was assigned to investigate the Medline drug cartel in Bogotá, Columbia, noted:

One theme I always try to relay is that traffickers around the world [are] always afraid of one thing, which is extradition…. Pueblo Escobar was deathly afraid of extradition. Extradition is what really started the war against Columbia… Escobar was killing a lot of police officers, bombing buildings, killing men, women, and children…there’d be like two or three car bombs a day in Bogotá, there’d be two or three a day in Medline (Drug Enforcement Administration Museum, 2003).

THE LIMITATION OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE

While these claims are all compelling, the causal inference of the argument is unclear because US supported drug control enforcement is endogenously related to violent crime in Latin America. Violent crime in Andean countries is a reflection of the region’s political fragmentation, which is characterised by the emergence of indigenous drug cartels and various narco-insurgent groups who in many instances has displaced the power of the state to effectively exercise control over significant portions of their own territory (Crandall 2002). Therefore, existing country study analysis of the impact of US supported drug control enforcement on violence in Latin America could be subject to omitted variable bias, because prohibitive drug control enforcement may be correlated with a causally prior omitted variable — political fragmentation — which could affect the dependent variable — violent crime. And in so far as drug control enforcement is a rational response by Andean governments to political fragmentation (i.e. the loss of territorial control and the growing security threat from narco insurgents and traffickers), then drug control enforcement is a mere consequence rather than the cause of violent crime in the region. Counterfactually, since drugs and violence are causally linked, even in the absence of US sponsored drug control enforcement in Latin America, violent crime would likely increase due to the fact that illicit drugs are indigenously produced in Andean countries and it is expected that traffickers and narco-insurgent groups would utilise violence against each other and against governments in order to expand and protect the drug trade. Essentially, existing country studies are unable to separate the level of violence that is endemic to countries that produce illicit drugs from the enabling effects of US supported drug control policies towards the region. In this study, we avoid endogeniety by selecting cases or observations to which

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the source of omitted variable bias does not apply (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 191–93). Hence, we systematically estimate the impact of US supported drug control policies on violent crime in Central American and Caribbean countries. Unlike the Andean countries in Latin America, drug producing cartels or narco-insurgents organisations like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Natioanl Liberation Army (ELN) in Columbia and the Shining Path in Peru are not indigenous security threats to countries in the region. However, these countries serve primarily as drug transit centres and in most of them the US actively monitors and assists in the implementation of the drug control policies of governments in the region. There are, for example, 19 DEA field offices that are stationed in various Caribbean and Central American countries who assist local law enforcement in drug control (Smith 2006). In addition, the US has secured various drug interdiction agreements with over 15 governments in the region. Chief among these are the overflight and bilateral Maritime Law Enforcement Cooperative agreements. These agreements permit land and sea patrols by the US Coast Guard and Navy as well as maritime searches and seizures and drug arrests by US law enforcement authorities within the sovereign boundaries of Central American and Caribbean countries (The Strategic South American/Caribbean Unit 2001). In addition, to avoiding endogeniety through the case selection, we also address the problem by utilising a series of structural equations to estimate the data (Berry 1984).

WHY DRUG CONTROL MAY INCREASE CRIME? A COUNTER- INTUITIVE EXPLANATION

Theoretically, drug control enforcement is based on the logic that the reduction in the supply of illicit drugs will increase market prices, which would reduce drug consumption and violent crime. However, for this to be true it must be assumed that the demand for illicit drugs is elastic, namely, that the illicit drug market is highly sensitive to changes in prices brought about by the amount of drugs that is interdicted. The theoretical representation of this assumption is represented in Figure 25.1. Starting with DD and SS1, the market is in equilibrium at price P1 and output Q1. Drug control interdiction measures shift the supply curve upward by the level of the interdiction from SS1 to SS2. A higher price P2 now prevails, along with reduced supply Q2 — the quantity of drugs that now enters the market. In representing elastic demand (DD), the interdiction effort causes revenues to drug traffickers to decline from 21 (P1 x Q1) to 16.5 (P2 x Q2). These conditions may reduce the level of violence by both users and traffickers. Drugs consumed by users would be reduced and thereby diminish the psychopharmacological motive for violent behaviour. Declining revenues to drug traffickers would also diminish the systemic motive for violence between them.

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FIGURE 25.1 THE EFFECTS OF INTERDICTION ON DRUG REVENUES WHEN DEMAND IS ELASTIC S 2

9 S 1 8 D 7 6 P 5.5 2 = 5 4 P 3.5 1 = 3 2 S 2 S D 1 1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Q 2 Q 1

FIGURE 25.2 THE EFFECTS OF INTERDICTION ON DRUG REVENUES WHEN DEMAND IS INELASTIC S S D 2 1 9 8

P2 = 7 7 6

P1 = 4 5 4 3 2

1 S2 S1 D

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Q2 Q1

The assumption of demand elasticity is more applicable to the marijuana market. Relative to cocaine or heroin, marijuana is far less psychopharmacological addictive and largely inhibits violent behaviour among users and generates

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significantly much lower profits for traffickers (White and Gorman 2000, Miczek et al. 1994, Pacula and Kilmer 2004, 8-9). However, given the psychopharmacological addictive nature of cocaine abuse, we assume that the demand for cocaine is moderately to highly inelastic (Wisotsky 1986, 113–14). And therefore, cocaine interdiction under conditions of demand inelasticity is likely to increase violence by drug users (especially the economic compulsive dimension) and drug traffickers (the systemic dimension). The theoretical representation of this assumption is represented in Figure 25.2. Starting with DD and SS1, the market is in equilibrium at price P1 and output Q1. Drug control interdiction measures shift the supply curve upward by the level of the interdiction from SS1 to SS2. A higher price P2 now prevails, along with reduced supply Q2 — the quantity of drugs that now enters the market. In representing inelastic demand (DD), total revenues to drug traffickers increase from 20 (P1 x Q1) to 28 (P2 x Q2). Thus, under conditions of demand inelasticity, cocaine interdiction results in traffickers earning more revenue as a result of higher prices, despite reductions in the amount of cocaine sold. Higher prices force cocaine addicts to engage in more violent behaviour to pay for their increasingly costly addiction, resulting in more economic compulsive violent and property crimes. Higher revenues encourage drug traffickers to expand the size of their operations, which ultimately encroach on the trafficking operations of competitors and consequently, ignite turf wars, resulting in an increase in systemic violent crime. The arrest of drug traffickers is also more likely to increase violent crime due to the fact that traffickers will be replaced at a higher rate than the level of arrest. In fact the immobilisation of drug traffickers may be counterproductive to the goal of reducing crime. Given the strong financial rewards of the drug industry, especially in the cocaine market, the removal of one trafficker merely opens up opportunities for others to enter the industry. And new traffickers are more likely to commit more violent crime as a way of consolidating their position as they move deeper into the drug industry (Spelman 1994, Spelman 2000). The discussions above lead to the following hypotheses:

H1: Increases in the level of marijuana interdiction will have little or no effect on violent and property crimes. H2: Increases in the level of cocaine interdiction will increase the level of violent and property crimes. H3: Increases in the level of trafficker immobilisation or arrests will increase the level of crime, especially violent crimes.

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MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF DRUG CONTROL ENFORCEMENT ON CRIME The Primary Explanatory Variables

In measuring our independent variables (cocaine and marijuana interdiction, and trafficker immobilisation) we take into consideration that differences in the size of government agencies responsible for drug control enforcement will affect the level of drug interdiction and the arrests of drug traffickers. Specifically, countries with larger drug enforcement personnel may tend to have higher levels of drug seizures and arrests than countries where the number of drug enforcement personnel are small2. Therefore, the independent variables are operationalised as the ratio of a country’s interdiction of cocaine and marijuana and trafficker immobilisation as a proportion of the size of a country’s drug enforcement personnel. For the countries in our sample, it is calculated by dividing a country’s yearly cocaine and marijuana interdictions in kilograms and yearly arrests of drug traffickers by the yearly number of a country’s drug enforcement personnel3. The data for cocaine and marijuana interdiction and trafficker arrests were collected from various issues of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report and from the Organisation of American States (OAS): the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). The drug enforcement personnel data were adopted from various issues of The Military Balance (Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984–2000). The Primary Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in this study feature eight indicators of crime. The data were collected from various issues of International Criminal Police Organisation’s (INTERPOL’s) International Crime Statistics, and is calculated in terms of crimes per 100,000 persons. The first indicator measures Total Crime and is operationalised as the total number of crimes that is detected by or reported to the police, as indicated by the countries’ national crime statistics (International Criminal Police Organisation 1984–2000). Theft, Aggravated Theft, and Breaking and Entering are three indicators that represent measures of property crime. Theft measures the criminal loss of personal property and includes motor vehicle theft. Aggravated Theft measures theft with dangerous aggravated circumstances, which includes robbery. Breaking and Entering measures the criminal act of entering a residence or enclosed property through the slightest amount of force without authorisation (International Criminal Police Organisation 1984–2000). Serious Assault, Homicide, Violent Robbery and Rape are four indicators that represent measures of violent crime. Serious Assault measures an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury. This type of assault is usually accompanied by the use of a weapon

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and is likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Homicide measures criminal acts performed with the purpose of taking human life. Violent Robbery measures the criminal act of taking or attempting to take something of value from the custody of a person by force or by the threat of force or through violence whereby placing the victim in fear and/or results in physical injury. Rape measures forcible sex against the victim’s will. Sexual assaults or attempts to commit rape by force or threat of force are also included in this measure (International Criminal Police Organisation 1984-2000). Potentially Confounding Variables

In addition, to the primary explanatory variables, we control for potentially confounding influences on property and violent crime. These variables include: geographical distance from the US, the level of unemployment, the level of economic growth, the level of external debt and the level of illicit drug consumption in the US. Geographical Distance

Drug trafficking is as much about acquiring wealth as it is about covering distance. Drug traffickers are more likely to smuggle drugs through countries in the region that are closer to the US than through countries that are further away4. And since drugs and crime are causally linked (Goldstein 1985), countries that are closer to the US are more likely to be exposed to higher levels of smuggling, and are more likely to experience higher levels of violent and property crimes than countries that are further away. Hence, it is expected that greater distance from the US will have a negative effect on crime. The distance variable measures the geographical distance between the capitals of countries in the region and the US capital and land contiguity reported in miles. This variable was taken from Direct-Line Distances, US Edition ( Fitzpatrick and Modlin 1986). Unemployment

Economic depravation theories of crime argue that rising levels of unemployment provide the rationale whereby crime becomes a subsistence or survival strategy (Neuman and Berger 1988). Consequently, high levels of unemployment will increase the level of crime, since the only means of survival is through participation in criminal activities (Chaiken and Chaiken 1982, Ehrlich 1973, Spelman 2000). This variable was collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2001. Economic Growth

The level of economic growth is traditionally used as a control variable in social science research to explain the level of crime. It has been empirically

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demonstrated that increasing levels of economic growth have a negative effect on crime (Levitt 1996, Marvell and Moody 1994). Economic opportunity theories of crime argue that individuals weigh the tradeoffs between wages they can earn from the criminal economy and wages they can earn from the legitimate economy and then strategically choose the activity that maximises their personal utility (Grogger 2000). In many countries where thousands of people have limited job skills, the steady decline in wages from the legitimate economy, compared to the high incomes that can be earned in the criminal economy, forces a clear economic choice. Hence, increasing levels of per capita economic growth in the legitimate economy is expected to discourage participation in crime. The economic growth variable was collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2001 and measures the annual per capita economic growth for the countries in our sample. External Debt

Largely informed by modernisation theories of development, the literature on crime in the lesser developed countries (LDCs) suggests that development is positively associated with crime, especially property crime. It is argued that the new forms of wealth that is generated during the early stages of industrialisation encourage rural-urban migration, which produces anonymity by fostering the breakdown of the traditional social controls, (such as extended families, community ties and religious beliefs) that once minimised the likelihood for crime. The combination of new wealth and anonymity increase both the incentive and the benefits to commit crime (Albuquerque and McElroy 1999, Becker 1968). Dependency theorists, however, argue that underdevelopment, not development, is the enduring consequence of LDCs’ integration into the world capitalist economy (Wallerstein 1974). And a chronic feature of this integration is the rising levels of external debt, which has foreclosed industrial development for many LDCs (Payer 1974). Rising levels of external debt in LDCs depress wealth creation, discourage rural-urban migration and the anonymity that it produces. High levels of debt also reduce disposable income and individual consumption (George 1988), especially the consumption of illicit drugs – all of which is expected to have a negative impact on crime, in particular property crime. The indicator for total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private non- guaranteed long-term debt, the use of International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit, and short-term debt. The variable was collected from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2001. US Drug Consumption

Former US drug czar, General Barry McCaffrey, once estimated that about 300 metric tons, of the approximately 575 metric tons of cocaine available world

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wide in 1994, was consumed in the US (McCaffrey 1995). Therefore, while the objective of drug control enforcement is to reduce the supply of illicit drugs and the associated level of crime, it is important to control for the US consumption of illicit drugs5. And since Central American and Caribbean countries serve primarily as drug transit centres for markets in North America, increases in US drug consumption is expected to drive up profits for trafficking gangs in the region, increasing the likelihood for systemic violent crime between them. The variable for US drug consumption measures the yearly consumption of cocaine and marijuana measured in metric tons and was collected from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONCD 2001). Endogenous Variables

In our theoretical discussions, hypotheses 2 and 3 predicted that cocaine interdiction and the arrests of drug traffickers will increase the level of violent and property crimes. But since drugs and crime are causally related, increases in crime would also force governments to increase drug control interdiction and the arrests of drug traffickers. In other words, drug interdiction and the arrests of drug traffickers are endogenously related to crime. Our analysis deals with this simultaneity problem by including endogenous or instrumental variables that predict drug interdiction (cocaine and marijuana) and the arrest of drug traffickers. However, due to the fact that drug trafficking is unobservable; we cannot observe what portion of the total amount of drugs that is smuggled is actually interdicted. Nor can we observe what portion of the total number of the traffickers is actually arrested. In addressing these limitations economists have developed methodological models that utilise proxy variables that indirectly measure the underlying structure of illicit transfers (OECD, Statistics Directorate. et al. 2002). Following this methodological tradition, our research design utilises proxies that indirectly capture the underlying structure of drug trafficking and indirectly predict interdiction and the arrest of drug traffickers. These proxies emerged from extensive interviews with DEA special agents in New York and San Diego, and interviews with Coast Guard and drug enforcement agents in Canada, Jamaica, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago and Colombia. With the permission from the officials at the Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida, interviews were also conducted with former drug traffickers who were willing to share their insights into the structure and complexities of drug smuggling6. A full discussion of how these endogenous proxy variables are measured is provided in the appendix. Former drug traffickers and law enforcement personnel confirm that geographical distance (Distance) from the US is an important proxy that shapes the level of interdiction and arrests. Drug traffickers are more likely to smuggle drugs through transit countries that are closer to the US than countries that are further away. And countries that are closer to the US are more likely to be more exposed to higher levels of smuggling and the interdiction and arrests of traffickers

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than countries that are farther away. In addition to distance from the US, Caribbean and Central American law enforcement respondents noted that the length of a country’s coastline (Coastline) is an important proxy that shapes the level of interdiction and the arrest of drug traffickers. Drug traffickers are more likely to move their drugs through countries with longer coastlines, which reduce the chances of detection by coast guard personnel, than through countries with shorter coastlines, which increase the likelihood of detection7. Canadian and American drug enforcement personnel noted that the level of individual political freedoms (CivilLiberties) is also an important proxy that influences the level of interdiction and arrests. They note that in countries where political and civil liberties are relatively high, citizens are protected from arbitrary arrests, searches and seizures by the state. While these rights protect the civil liberties of citizens they also place constraints on the ability of drug enforcement officers to interdict the drug trade8. Drug traffickers are, therefore, more likely to smuggle drugs through countries where political rights and civil liberties are relatively high as opposed to countries where individual political freedoms are low and the state is not constrained by the civil liberties of its citizens. Drug enforcement officials from Colombia and Jamaica also reported that the political openness (InstitutionalOpenness) of a country’s polity is an important proxy that influences the level of interdiction and arrests. Drug traffickers are more likely to smuggle drugs through countries where the political system enables non-elites to influence political elites in regular ways. For example, in Colombia where a number of Cartel leaders have been indicted in the US for drug trafficking offences, the country’s open political institutions make it easier for traffickers to influence Colombia’s Congressional leaders in order to block US demands for their extradition9. The DEA investigative agents note that government corruption (G’ovtCorruption) is an important proxy that influences interdiction and the arrests of drug traffickers. Drug traffickers are more likely to move their drugs through countries where government corruption is embedded in the normal operations of the state and its agents, as opposed to countries where government agents and institutions are relatively clean. Since corruption undermines the integrity of the state and its officials, corruption has a negative effect on drug interdiction and the arrests of traffickers10. Canadian border control personnel noted that the level of economic openness (EconomicOpenness) is an important proxy that influences the level of interdiction and arrests. The movement towards greater economic openness in trade and investment facilitate the expansion of the drug trade because it is now easier to conceal illicit drugs among licit cargo, which make it more difficult for law enforcement to detect and interdict drug trafficking11. Our Caribbean and Central American respondents reported that their bilateral partnership with the US to interdict drug trafficking (US-CBBilateral Agreement)

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and US economic aid (USAid) provide many of these countries with the necessary financial, technical and logistical support in the execution of their drug control enforcement policies, all of which affect the level of interdiction and the arrest of drug traffickers. Moreover, our respondents recognised that the drug enforcement efforts of neighbouring countries (NeighbourEffort) in the Caribbean basin also affect the level of interdiction and the arrests of drug traffickers. For example, if drug enforcement measures in the Dominican Republic are rigorous in the patrol of that country’s territorial waters and air space, then traffickers seeking to penetrate the American market could simply move their smuggling operations through Haiti where drug enforcement surveillance may be less rigorous. In other words, law enforcement officials clearly recognise that the interdiction of drugs and the arrests of traffickers across countries are related12. Columbia’s drug enforcement personnel noted that since countries in the Caribbean basin serve as transit zones for drugs that are produced in Andean countries, the level of drug seizures that is made by drug enforcement personnel in Columbia, Bolivia and Peru (AndeanCocaineInterdiction and AndeanMarijuanaInterdiction) would also shape the structure of drug trafficking through the Caribbean basin and hence influence the level of interdiction and arrests by governments in the region13.

THE STATISTICAL MODEL

The theoretical model can be rewritten as a regression equation in which the independent variables are Marijuana Interdiction, Cocaine Interdiction, Trafficker Arrest, Distance, Unemployment, Per Cap Economic Growth, External Debt, and US Drug Consumption. The model is specified for country level data where each case is a country in a year as shown in equation 1:

1 β1 β1 β1 Violent/ PropertyCrime it = 0+ 1 MarijuanaInterdictionit+ 2 CocaineInterdictionit β1 β1 β1 β1 + 3TraffickerArrestit+ 4Distanceit+ 5Unemploymentit+ 6PerCapEconomicGrowthit β1 β1 ε1 + 7ExternalDebtit + 8USDrugConsumptionit + it (equation 1)

Where the dependent variable, Violent/Proper Crime, refers to eight indicators

of crime. Subscript “i” refers to a country and subscript “t” refers to a year. Yearj is Year2 = 1985, Year3 = 1986, Year4 = 1987, Year5 = 1988, Year6 = 1989, Year7 = 1990, Year8 = 1991, Year9 = 1992, Year10 = 1993, Year11 = 1994, Year12 = 1995, Year13 = 1996, Year14 = 1997, Year15 = 1998, Year16 = 1999, and Year17 = 2000.

Year1 = 1984 is used as the base category. Statej is State2 = The Bahamas, State3 = Barbados, State4 = Belize, State5 = Dominica, State6 = El Salvador, State7 = Grenada, State8 = Guyana, State9 = Honduras, State10 = Jamaica, State11 = Panama, State12 = Dominican Republic, State13 = St Kitts, State14 = St Vincent, State15 = Trinidad and Tobago, and State16 = Venezuela. State1 = Antigua and Barbuda is used as the base category.

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To deal with the simultaneity problem, instrument variables for Marijuana Interdiction, Cocaine Interdiction and Trafficker Arrest variables are estimated and included in the equation 1. The equations for these endogenous variables can be found in the appendix. The estimation method is three stage least squares εj εk 14 assuming COV ( it, it) 0 where j k . RESULTS

Our initial hypothesis was that given the highly addictive nature of cocaine usage, coupled with the acute psychoactive aggressive behaviour that it produces and the high profits that it generates, drug control enforcement is more likely to destabilise the cocaine market and result in higher levels of violent and property crimes. And since marijuana usage, relative to cocaine, largely inhibits aggression and generates much smaller profits, we hypothesised that drug control enforcement of marijuana will have little or no effect on violent and property crimes. In all eight models of crime, the hypotheses of this analysis are supported by the statistical results. The results for model 1 through 8 are presented in Tables 25.1 and 25.2. As expected drug control interdiction of cocaine has a positive effect on total crime and all models of property and violent crimes. With the exception of theft and violent robbery, the immobilisation of drug traffickers has a positive effect on total crime, and all other models of property and violent crimes. And while the positive effect of marijuana interdiction on violent robbery does not support our hypothesis, it is important to note that marijuana interdiction has a negative effect on serious assault and has no statistical significant effect on total crime and all other models of property and violent crimes. Most of the control variables in the model performed as expected. Geographical distance from the US performed as expected in seven out of the eight models of crime. Per capita economic growth performed as expected in six of the eight models of crime. And as expected the size of countries’ external debts has a negative effect on all eight models crime. The effects of unemployment and the level of US drug consumption are not statistically significant in most models of crime. However, it is important to note that US drug consumption is positively associated with homicide and is consistent with our theoretical expectations that high levels of US drug consumption is expected to drive up profits for trafficking gangs in the region and thereby increase the likelihood for systemic violent crime between them.

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TABLE 25.1 CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1984–2000 STRUCTURAL EQUATION THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARE

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Explanatory Aggravated Breaking Variables Total Crime Theft Theft and Entering Marijuana -2812.151 -3845.233 -2020.6 -144.6246 Interdiction (1664.841) (2503.182) (1765.716) (489.6392) 888.9178*** 518.7938*** 727.8228*** 342.1962*** Cocaine Interdiction (134.2409) (201.1767) (141.1133) (39.34567) Traffic 888.0825*** 103.9846 569.7957*** 224.8855*** Immobilisation 94.10341 142.9145 99.23849 27.59206 -908.6579* -4215.783*** -2104.571*** -680.7476*** Distance from the US (522.628) (784.1348) (555.1285) (154.0535) -37.82292 -62.41521 33.78748 -19.62774 Unemployment (39.65578) (59.59574) (42.07606) (11.72679) -118.3548** -6.212851 -133.5909*** -40.26899*** Economic Growth (51.86641) (77.32291) (52.52057) (14.95009) -51.78754*** -17.25804*** -36.56786*** -15.41712*** Total External Debt (4.479615) (6.740079) (4.734127) (1.319286) US Drug 126.8982 1738.266 2050.141 182.7661 Consumption (1265.632) (1906.211) (1315.532) (362.7321) 5611.264*** 10831.07*** 7445.061*** 2283.418*** Constant (1263.099) (1888.668) (1313.579) (370.5987) Observations 153 153 153 153 R square 0.40 0.23 0.31 0.47 Standard errors in parentheses * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

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TABLE 25.2 CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1984–2000 STRUCTURAL EQUATION THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARE

Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Explanatory Serious Violent Variables Homicide Rape Assault Robbery Marijuana -420.1791** -58.86942 356.5157*** 36.12969 Interdiction 208.9459 104.0114 127.513 39.92345 58.77203*** 61.31294*** 28.04511*** 16.79834*** Cocaine Interdiction (16.90022) (8.38965) (10.34436) (3.21778) Traffic 106.3309*** 67.27444*** 8.22521 19.42514*** Immobilisation (11.82328) (5.838922) (7.289937) (2.274411) 230.375*** -184.681*** -199.0677*** -46.13634*** Distance from the US (65.44886) (32.61016) (39.96125) (12.50237) -6.978839 1.515861 0.2244098 -0.8772528 Unemployment (4.970682) (2.473433) (3.044483) (0.9497828) -10.27692 -11.2967*** -10.15388*** -3.388839*** Economic Growth (6.565886) (3.250137) (4.065552) (1.249738) -4.899693*** -3.784189*** -0.7898278*** 1.028669*** Total External Debt (0.5626025) (0.2792768) (0.3449527) (0.1075513) US Drug -81.90866 176.8616*** 51.28411 43.69448 Consumption (161.9539) (79.71964) (100.0528) (30.7383) 27.47047 490.643*** 505.5325*** 150.3672*** Constant (159.2224) (79.07096) (97.63007) (30.30736)

Observations 153 153 153 153 R square 0.33 0.58 0.34 0.41 Panel Corrected Standard errors in parentheses * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

CONCLUSION

The results of this analysis provide strong statistical confirmation for the findings of existing country studies that conclude that US sponsored drug control enforcement towards Latin America has facilitated an increase in violent crime. Our findings may also explain the recent rise in systemic violence that is currently being waged by rival trafficking gangs that operate in Nuevo Laredo and other towns along the US–Mexican border. Recent reports indicate that the current situation arose in 2003 after the Tijuana cartel was dismantled upon the arrest and death of the cartel’s two top leaders, Ramon and Benjamin Arellano-Felix. And consistent with our theoretical expectations, the resulting power vacuum has led to violent conflicts between the major players in the drug trade (Minix and Marsolais 2005). At first glance the statistical results of this analysis may seem to support policy proposals that call for the legalisation of drugs. While legalisation may eliminate

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the systemic dimension of violence in the drug industry, it would not necessarily eliminate the psychopharmacological dimensions of drug-induced violence. What these results suggest is that prohibitive drug control policies by themselves are counter-productive in the reduction of crime. Instead policymakers must ask: Why do people increasingly feel the need to medicate themselves with addictive substances? Answers to this question will invariably lead us away from simply looking at the drug problem as an issue to be solved largely by prohibitive enforcement. Policymakers must, therefore, address much broader concerns to which drugs and violence are inextricably linked. These concerns include ethnic strife, overpopulation, environmental degradation, civil war, and disease. Not only do these socioeconomic and political upheavals motivate people to consume and smuggle drugs, they also undermine the basic structures of family, community, and kinship networks that are important protective social controls that can discourage drug use and involvement in drug trafficking.

REFERENCES

Albuquerque, K. de, and J.L. McElroy. 1999. ‘A longitudinal study of serious crime in the Caribbean’. Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology 4, 32–70. Armstrong, S. 1980 The Christian Monitor. US-Bolivia Relations Further Strained as cocaine Smuggling Charges Fly. August 5. Bagley, B.M. 1989. ‘The New Hundred Years War? U.S. National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America’. In The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security, ed. by D. J. Mabry. New York: Greenwood Press. ———. 1992. ‘Myths of Militarization: Enlisting Armed Forces in the War on Drugs’. Drug Policy in the Americas, ed. P. H. Smith. Boulder: Westview. Becker, G. 1968. ‘Crime and Punishment: An economic approach’. Journal of Political Economy 76, 169–217. Berry, W. D. 1984. ‘Nonrecursive Causal Models’. In Quantitative Applications in Social Science, ed. M. S. Lewis-Beck, Vol. 37. Newbury Park: SAGE. Blachman, M.J., and Sharpe, K.E. 1989-90. ‘The War on Drugs: American Democracy under Assault’. World Policy Journal 7, no.1: 135–63. Chaiken, J.M., and Chaiken, M.R. 1982. Varieties of Criminal Behavior. Santa Monica: Rand. Crandall, R. 2002. Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Towards Columbia. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Drug Enforcement Administration Museum. 2003. Drug Enforcement Administration Historical Interviews - Javier Pena - Tape No. 163, ed. S. Fearns. Arlington, Virginia: DEA Museum. Ehrlich, I. 1973. ‘Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and emperical Investigation’. Journal of Political Economy 81, 521–65. Flores, A.R. 1986. ‘Drug Abuse problems in Countries of the Andean Subregion’. Bulletin on Narcotics 38, nos. 1–2: 27–36.

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Fitzpatrick, G.L. and Modlin, M.J. 1986. Direct-Line Distances. Metuchen, N.J., and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. George, S. 1988. A fate worse than debt. New York: Grove Press. Goldstein, P.J. 1985. ‘The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Framework’. Journal of Drugs Issues 14, 493-506. Grogger, J. 2000. ‘An Economic Model of Recent trends in Violence’. In The Crime Drop in America, ed. A. Blumstein and J. Wallman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harriott, A. 2002. Crime Trends in the Caribbean and Response. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press/ UN Office of Drugs and Crime. ___.2003. Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy. Kingston, JA: University of the West Indies Press. Institute for Strategic Studies. 1984–2000. The Military Balance. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. International Criminal Police Organisation. 1984–2000. International Crime Statistics. Saint- Cloud, France: UN Secrétariat général de. King, G., Keohane, R.O. and Verba, S. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Labrousse, A. and Laniel, L. 2001. The World: Geopolitics of Drugs, 1989/1999. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Levitt, S. D. 1996. ‘The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation’. Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 319–51. Lupsha, A. P. 1995. ‘Transnational Narco-Corruption and Narco Investment: A Focus on Mexico’. Transnational Organized Crime 1, no.1: 84–101. ———. 1992. ‘Drugs Lords and Narco-Corruption: The Players Change but the Game Continues’. In War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of US Narcotics Policy, ed. A. W. McCoy and A. A. Block. Boulder: WestView Press. ———. 1996. ‘Transnational Organized Crime Versus the Nation State’. Transnational Organized Crime 2, no.1: 21–48. Marvell, T.B., and Moody, C.E. 1994. ‘Prison Population Growth and Crime Reduction’. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 10, 109–40. Thomas, M.B., and Moody, C.E. 1996. ‘Specification Problems, Police levels, and Crime Rates’. Criminology 34, no.4: 609–46. McCaffrey, B.R. 1995. Conference. Lessons of 1994: Prognosis for 1995 and Beyond. Paper read at SOUTHCOM - National Defense University Annual Strategy Symposium, at Miami, Florida. Miczek, K.A, DeBold, J.F., Haney, M., Tidey, J., Vivan, J. and Vivan, E.M. 1994. ‘Alcohol, drugs of abuse, aggression, and violence’. In Understanding and preventing violence, ed. A. J. Reiss and J. A. Roth. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Minix, D.A., and Marsolais, M. 2005. ‘The Streets of [Nuevo] Laredo’. In Vernacular Colloquium. Puebla, Mexico. Neuman, L., and Berger, R. 1988. ‘Competing Perspectives on Cross-National Crime: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence’. Sociological Quarterly 29, 281-313. Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2001. What America’s User’s Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988–2000. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2002. Measuring the non-observed economy: A Handbook. Statistics Directorate. International Monetary Fund. Bureau of

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Statistics. International Labour Organisation. Bureau of Statistics. and Commonwealth of Independent States. Statistical Committee. Paris, France: OECD. Pacula, L.R. and Kilmer, B. 2004. Marijuana and Crime: Is There a Connection Beyond Prohibition? RAND. Payer, C. 1974. The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World. New York: Monthly Review Press. Reuter, P. and Kleinman, M.A.R. 1986. ‘Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement’. In Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, ed. M. Tonry and N. Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Smith, P. 2006. ‘Latin America: DEA to Expand into Guyana’. In Drug War Chronicle: The Drug Reform Coordination Network. Sanchez, G.G. 1998. ‘Columbia: Violencias sin futuro’. Foro Internacional 38, no.1: 37-58. Spelman, W. 1994. Criminal incapacitation, The Plenum series in crime and justice. New York: Plenum Press. ———. 2000. ‘The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion’. In The Crime Drop in America, ed. A. Blumstein and J. Wallman. New York: Cambridge University. The Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force. 1975. White paper on Drug Abuse. Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office. The Nation News Paper. 2005. Crime Wave Rampant in Region. The Strategic South American/Caribbean Unit. 2001. The Drug Trade In the Caribbean: A threat assessment. Drug Enforcement Agency. Tokatlian, J.G. 1994. ‘The Miami Summit and Drugs: A Placid, Innocuous Conference’? Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 36, no.3: 77–82. Toro, M.C. 1992. ‘Unilateralism and Bilateralism’. In Drug Policy in the Americas, ed. P. H. Smith. Boulder: Westview Press. Tulder, Frank van. 1992. ‘Crime, Detection Rate, and the Police: A Macro Approach’. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 8, no.1: 113–31. Wallerstein, I. 1974. The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press. White, H.R., and Gorman, D.M. 2000. ‘Dynamics of the drug-crime relationship’. In The Nature of Crime: Continuity and Change, ed. G. LaFree. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice. Williams, P. 1994. ‘Transnational Criminal Organizations and International Security’. Survival 36, no.1: 96–113. Wisotsky, Steven. 1986. Breaking the Impasse in the War on Drugs. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

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APPENDIX

1. CoastLine — The coastline variable for the countries in our sample was collected from the CIA World Fact Book 2002, in which a country’s total coastal line is measured in kilometres. 2. CivilLiberties — This was collected from the Freedom House Index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1972-2000. The scores are rescaled from 1 to 7 – where 1 is the lowest score for political rights and civil liberties and 7 is the highest score. 3. InstitutionalOpenness — This variable was collected from the POLITY IV data set. The variable is measured by an index ranging from -10 (high autocracy or the most closed political institutions) to 10 (high democracy or the most open political institutions). 4. GovtCorruption — This variable was collected from the Transparency International Perception Corruption Index. Scores on the index range from 10 (which indicate a perfectly clean government) to 0 (which indicates a completely corrupt government). 5. EconomicOpenness — This variable was collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2001 and is computed as the yearly aggregate of a country’s total imports and total exports divided by its GDP. 6. US-CBBilateralAgreement — This variable measures whether or not countries, in any given year, are signatories to a maritime interdiction agreement with the US. This variable is coded 1 if a country is party to this agreement and 0 otherwise. The data was collected from various issues of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 7. USAID — This variable measures US economic and military assistance, in millions of US dollars. These data were collected from the US Agency for International Development, US Overseas Loans and Grants. 8. NeighborEffort — This variable is calculated via the following formulae: N 1 1 for a single country j, Drug* Enforcemen Personnelt ¦ Distance jfrom i 1i i N 1 where N is the total number of countries, i is a neighbouring country and i¹

j. Distance from ji is the distance from a single country j to a neighbouring

country i, and drug enforcement personnel i is the number of the drug enforcement personnel in a neighbouring country i. 9. AndeanCocaineInterdiction and AndeanMarijuanaInterdiction — This variable measures the ratio of cocaine and marijuana interdiction among Andean countries as a proportion of their drug enforcement personnel. The data were collected from the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report; the Organization of American States (OAS): the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control

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Commission (CICAD) and the drug enforcement personnel data was collected from The Military Balance. Endogenous Equations

2 φ2 φ2 φ2 (2) TraffickerArrest it = 0 + 1TraffickerArrestit-1 + 2Violent/PropertyCrimeit + φ2 φ2 φ2 3MarijuanaInterdictionit + 4CocaineInterdictionit + 5Distanceit + φ2 φ2 φ2 6Unemploymentit + 7PerCapEconomicGrowthit + 8ExternalDebtit + 17 16 φ2 φ2 9USDrugConsumptionit+ 10GovtCorruptionit + + M Yearjij J State ε2 ¦ ¦ jij + it j 2 j 2 3 θ3 θ3 θ3 (3) MarijuanaInterdiction it = 0 + 1MarijuanaInterdictionit-1 + 2Violent/ θ3 θ3 θ3 PropertyCrimeit + 3TraffickerArrestit + 4NeighborEffortit + 5US- θ3 θ3 θ3 CBBilateralAgreementit+ 6CoastLineit+ 7Distanceit+ 8AndeanMarijuanaInterdictionit θ3 θ3 θ3 + 9GovtCorruptionit + 10USDrugConsumptionit + 11EconomicOpenness 17 + θ3 CivilLiberties + θ3 InstitutionalOpenness + θ3 USAid + Year it 12 it 13 it 14 it ¦M jij 16 j 2 ε3 + + it ¦J State jij j 2 4 ν4 ν4 ν4 (4) CocaineInterdiction it = 0 + 1CocaineInterdictionit-1 + 2Violent/ Property ν4 ν 4 ν4 Crimeit+ 3TraffickerArrestit+ 4NeighborEffortit+ 5US-CBBilateral ν4 ν4 ν4 Agreementit+ 6CoastLineit+ 7Distanceit+ 8AndeanCocaineInterdictionit + ν4 ν4 ν4 9GovtCorruptionit + 10USDrugConsumptionit + 11EconomicOpenness ν4 ν4 ν4 it + 12CivilLibertiesit + 13InstitutionalOpennessit + 14USAidit 17 16 + + + ε4 M Year it. ¦ jij ¦J State jij j 2 j 2 NOTES

1. We also assumed that the relationship between drug control enforcement (drug interdiction and trafficker immobilisation) and crime are exogenously related and employed a time series cross-section model. There are now significant differences from the structural equation model that assumes an endogenous relationship. 2. In this study we adopt the definition of drug Enforcement personnel as defined and identified by the US State Department, the US Drug enforcement Agency (DEA) and the London Based Institute of Strategic Studies who collects this information and reports it in the publication, The Military Balance. Specifically, a country’s drug enforcement personnel include a country’s coast guard, customs agents, border police, special drug enforcement agents that are attached to a country’s police force, and special paramilitary drug enforcement strike forces that are attached to a country’s military. 3. We also analysed the data with just cocaine and marijuana interdiction and trafficker arrest without considering the size of countries drug enforcement personnel. There were no significant differences from the statistical results that are reported in this study. These results are available from the authors upon request. However, since researchers in sociology and criminal justice who study crime have provided

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theoretical and empirical reasons for considering differences in the size of respective law and drug enforcement agencies, we made the decision to report the results that took these differences into consideration. Examples of these studies include: Marvell, Thomas B., and Carlisle E. Moody. (1996). ‘Specification Problems, Police levels, and Crime Rates’. Criminology 34 (4), 609–46, Tulder, Frank van. (1992). ‘Crime, Detection Rate, and the Police: A Macro Approach’. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 8 (1), 113–31. 4. Interview with Green [pseudonym], former dug trafficker, Federal Correctional Complex, Coleman, Florida, August 14, 2002. Author’s interview with DEA special agent in San Diego, July 14, 2004. 5. It would also be useful to control for drug consumption of the Central American and Caribbean countries in our data set. However, these data are not available. 6. Interviews were conducted with DEA special agents in New York in June 2001. This author also conducted interviews with former traffickers in the Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida in August 2002. A sabbatical grant provided travel support for interviews conducted with drug enforcement officials in Colombia in November 2002. The sabbatical grant also provided travel support for interviews conducted with the Coast Guard and drug enforcement officials in Jamaica and Belize during May, June and July 2003. And additional financial support from the Canadian Studies Faculty Research Grant Program grant provided travel support for interviews conducted with the drug enforcement officers of the Canadian Royal Mounted Police in June 2004 and June 2005. 7. Interview with ‘Johnny’ [pseudonym], former dug trafficker, Federal Correctional Complex, Coleman, Florida, August 14, 2002. Interviews with the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) and Coast Guard officers, June 17, 2003. Interviews with the officers attached to the Maritime Wing of the Belize Defence Force, May 27, 2003. 8. Interviews were conducted with DEA special Agents in New York, June 11, 2001 and with drug enforcement agents attached to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Drug Branch, Ottowa, June 8, 2004. 9. Interviews were conducted with officials attached to the Colombian National Police, Directorate of Anti-Narcotics (DAN), November 20, 2002. Interview with officials attached to the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), June 19, 2003. 10. Interviews were conducted with the DEA’s financial investigative agents in New York and San Diego, June 11, 2000 and June 6, 2005. 11. Interviews were conducted with agents attached to the Canadian Border Services, Ottowa, August 3, 2005. 12. Interviews were conducted with the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) and Coast Guard personnel, June 17, 2003. Lead author’s interviews with the personnel attached to the Maritime Wing of the Belize Defence Force, May 27, 2003. Interviews were conducted with personnel attached to Trinidad and Tobago’s Coast Guard, in August 20, 2003. 13. Interviews were also conducted with officials attached to the Colombian National Police, Directorate of Anti-Narcotics (DAN), November 20, 2002. 14. Rank and order condition is satisfied and equation is identified if more than one unique variable is presented in each equation. In Equation 1, the unique variable is the US drug consumption variable.

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terrorism, insurrection and political violence in the caribbean

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chap26.pmd 580 12/8/2006, 11:19 AM THE POLITICS OF INFORMATION AND THE PEOPLE’ S REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT Twenty-Six

The Politics of INTRODUCTION Information This is a story of how a revolutionary and the government struggles to survive in a Caribbean environment dominated by People’s Westminster-type politics and privately- Revolutionary owned media. This story emerges from the political violence of the 1979 coup in 1 Government Grenada and the United States’ (US) 1983 (The 1979 Coup in ‘intervention’ which followed the murder of Grenada and the Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several 1983 US other government officials. Intervention) During the last 25 years, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)2 have been Ramesh Deosaran experiencing mounting tensions which, in many cases, are related to influences emanating from outside countries, e.g. Cuba, Russia, the US, and the string of unsettled countries in Central and Latin America. These tensions have usually erupted from sharp ideological differences, at the centre of which existed a sustained struggle over ‘freedom of the press.’ The successful coups in Grenada (1979) and nearby Suriname (1982) and the murder on October 19, 1983 of Grenada’s Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop3 have produced the most dramatic manifestation of these tensions. This paper examines the bitter, prolonged confrontation which took place between 1979 and 1983 between Bishop and his People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) in Grenada on one hand and the Privately-Owned Media (POM) in the Caribbean. This examination is done against the background of similarly fierce

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communication struggles in Guyana, Jamaica and other Caribbean states. The underlying theme is that the POM has little or no tolerance for leftist or revolutionary groups which attack private property and which fail to uphold the traditional requirements of the Westminster model of Government, for example, a multiparty electoral system and the separation of powers.

A CARIBBEAN REVIEW

The years 1978-83 have witnessed severe tensions between Caribbean Governments and the POM. For example, both the ruling People’s National Congress (PNC) led by the late Forbes Burnham in Guyana, and the People’s National Party (PNP) led by Michael Manley (when he ruled in 1979) have been engaged in protracted confrontations with the POM. In some of the smaller states, the governments placed a series of restrictions on the media. In Montserrat, for example, the government (a budget of just over $13 million) have proposed a Newspaper Registration and Surety Ordinance (1981) which requires newspapers to declare full details of proposed operations and lodge a bond of $50,000 with the government. In early 1981, the Dominican government has had to unleash severe censorship as a reaction to a coup threat. In Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados, there have been skirmishes between the media and the respective governments and while there have been government complaints of ‘press irresponsibility’ no legislative or serious political actions had been taken against the POM in these two countries. In fact, the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution specifically guarantees (Chapters one (4) (k)) freedom of the press in addition to ‘freedom of conscience and expression.’ Since the successful coup by Bishop’s New Jewel Movement (NJM) against Eric Gairy’s oppressive and corrupt regime on March 13, 1979, the constitution and the entire POM there had been quickly disbanded. The PRG’s broken promises to reopen the POM and call early elections in Grenada evoked very strong criticisms from the POM across the Caribbean. Except for Guyana and Grenada under the PRG, the POM in the Commonwealth Caribbean was fairly well established. There were three major regional bodies:

1. the 27-member Caribbean Publishers and Broadcasters Association (CPBA) (including the POM and some government-owned media but excluding the media in Grenada and Guyana), 2. the Caribbean News Agency (CANA), supported by the CPBA in the dissemination of regional and international news, and 3. the Caribbean Press Council (CPC) supported by the CPBA as a ‘watch dog’ or complaints against the media.

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The POM, through the CPBA and on their own, had a strong direct involvement in the Miami-based Inter-American Press Association (IAPA). The most influential POM in the region are five dailies — the Gleaner in Jamaica, the Advocate and Nation in Barbados, and Guardian and Express in Trinidad. With a combined daily circulation of almost 250,000, these are the media which have led the struggle over the issue of a ‘free press against totalitarian governments.’ Clearly, ideological differences existed over individual rights, freedom of expression, and the right to private property.

GRENADA AND CASE 7578

Case 7578 is based on a petition filed in December 1980 and brought against the PRG before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR), the human rights agency of the Organisation of American States (OAS) to which CARICOM states subscribe. The petition, filed by the five POM mentioned in the preceding paragraph, crystallises the persistent struggle between the PRG and the POM in the Caribbean. The petition charged the PRG for violating the human rights of its citizens by:

1. failing to allow them to participate in government (through elections), 2. failing to respect the right of freedom of thought and expression by closing down the Torchlight and the Catholic Focus newspapers (the Grenadian Voice was closed after the petition was filed), 3. the confiscation of property without compensation of the Trinidad Express shares in the Torchlight.

The PRG, having previously informed the IACHR that they were seeking ‘a friendly solution’ to the POM complaints, not only failed to do so but eventually failed to appear before the IACHR to answer the charge. The POM then issued a press release stating in part:

Their (PRG) failure to appear before this internationally regional tribunal at this meeting indicates that they themselves recognise that their refusal to hold free and fair elections and the continued detention of over 100 persons is indefensible.... Pressure must be brought on the Government of Grenada to allow a free and independent press to be established in that country.

But while it did not physically appear before the IACHR, the PRG on July 31, 1981 (seven months after the POM petition), issued a six-page written response to the POM’s charges, in which it questioned the legality of the petitioners’ standing (e.g. ‘None of the petitioners are citizens of Grenada or reside therein’). Clause two of the PRG response further stated:

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The petitioners have not made or exhausted all reasonable efforts to obtain redress by the judicial powers in Grenada....Although the fundamental rights clauses in the Constitution of Grenada have been suspended by the People’s Revolutionary Government, the Grenada Courts still apply British Common Law principles and local Statute Law and the Government of Grenada is suable in the courts under the local Crown Proceedings Ordinance.

The PRG defended its 1979 revolution on the basis of ‘The historic right of the peoples of the Americas to revolt against any Government which denies the masses freedom to organise and express their collective political will.’ The PRG explained (Clause three (b)) that it intends ‘to replace the old constitution with a new one designed to enable the people to participate more fully and continuously in the Governmental process.’ Explaining its delay in calling national elections, the PRG continued (Clause three (b) (ii)):

Since the triumph of the Revolution, it has come under attack from external and internal sources which have embarked on economic sabotage, internal violence and other methods of subversion... thus forcing the People’s Revolutionary Government to adopt measures necessary for the maintenance of national security.

The PRG then dealt quite extensively with the POM’s charges of suppression of expression and the media in Grenada. It argued (Clause four (1)):

The Torchlight newspaper was closed by the People’s Revolutionary Government in the interests of national security because that paper had embarked on a course of activity creating internal fear, suspicion, and unrest by the dissemination of fabricated stories. The PRG listed four specific instances to support their charges against the privately-owned Torchlight newspaper. These were:

1. The reprinting of “a completely false article by a West German paper” alleging that the PRG was about to “build a missile base” aimed at other Caribbean Islands, and that “there was a Russian naval base” in Carriacou (an adjoining island), 2. Publishing information about the “whereabouts of an army coup” and “publishing photographs of the Prime Minister’s personal security” men in spite of requests by Government not to do so, 3. Publishing “false allegations” in which the Torchlight accused the PRG of oppressing members of the Rastafarian community.

The PRG concluded:

As a result, the Government was forced to take steps to terminate publication of the Torchlight on 13th October 1979. People’s Law No. 81 of 1979 and of 26th

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October 1979, imposed a statutory ban on non-Grenadian ownership of shares in a Grenadian company, and a limit of individual ownership to 4 per cent of the paid capital of a newspaper company.

In October 1979, the PRG stated its intention not to allow any new newspaper in the country until ‘a media policy’ was published. There has since been no such ‘media policy,’ but the restriction against new publications came into force by People’s Law No. 18 of 1981. On November 11, 1979, Grenada’s prime minister, Maurice Bishop, told the American Association of Jurists in Jamaica that the shutdown of the Torchlight was temporary, that he wanted a new editor, that he wanted a ‘genuinely independent, rational, responsible and free press,’ so that ‘when criticisms came in, whether for the Government or against the Government, publish them.’ He also stated that he intended to meet the Torchlight shareholders the next day (i.e. November 12, 1979) to put forward those views. The Torchlight, however, rejected Bishop’s proposals and in fact, decided that the paper should not resume publication until People’s Law No. 81 1979 (banning foreign ownership of shares) was repealed. The PRG immediately viewed this reaction as the Torchlight’s refusal ‘to admit any bias or danger’ in its kind of reporting. Two weeks after Bishop’s murder, I asked the managing director of the Express, Ken Gordon, about this incident. He explained that Bishop, after promising to compensate for the shares ($35,000) ‘eventually refused.’ He added:

Even when the Torchlight management sought to remove the things Bishop thought offensive, we found that he also wanted to appoint his own editor, one Mr Don Rojas, and it was at that stage that the Torchlight management said we could have none of that. (November 1, 1983).

So far, this heated exchange of charges between the PRG and the POM reflected a very unusual struggle over information rights in the Caribbean. In the British Westminster or even American tradition, such governmental complaints against the private media are usually channelled either through Press Councils or by rebuttals in the ‘offending’ newspapers, except for libel charges which are heard in court. In a revolutionary situation, things are obviously different. This struggle was also enlightening because it showed very clearly the crucial importance given by political groups to information control. In fact, Bishop’s NJM took over Grenada’s radio station only 30 minutes after they had captured Gairy’s small army (4:30 a.m. on March 13, 1979). The overbearing importance which Case 7578 held for the politics of the Caribbean media was further reflected by Donald Trotman, legal counsel for the POM (December 9, 1982): ‘Our petition was considered the most important case (by the IACHR) for this session. ...Whatever the outcome, this petition must be afforded deserving eminence in law and politics of the hemisphere.’

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There are, as well, five other important features to this information struggle between the PRG and the POM:

1. The POM’s petition, so critical of the PRG, emerged from publishers outside of Grenada though within the Caribbean and with the Trinidad Express having a direct financial interest (4,608 of a total of 22,643 shares) in the Torchlight.4 2. While the other serious complaint against the PRG was its delay in handling ‘fair and free elections,’ the sustained attack by the POM was based on its (POM) collective philosophical conviction that they had the undisputable right to publish. This right also implied a struggle for an assured place for free enterprise in Caribbean society — an economic feature seriously questioned by Bishop, Manley and Burnham. Underlying the POM’s position was its strong objection to the PRG’s confiscation on September 21, 1979 of the Coca Cola Company in Grenada; 3. This led to another feature, the POM’s heavy opposition to Cuban and Russian influence in Grenada. And so the struggle inevitably moved from one over information rights to a sharp ideological conflict. The POM’s response to the PRG’s defence (July 31, 1979) claimed:

1. Article 44 of the Inter-America Convention of Human Rights made their complaints as non-Grenadians legal, and that they had ‘exhausted all reasonable efforts’ to seek redress, 2. People’s Law No. 14 (1979) has the legal separation of powers between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, and that in any case Laws No.2, 10, and 14 (1979) gave the PRG full authority over their respective institutions, 3. That, according to Article 23, the PRO violated Grenadian’s right to vote, 4. That the transfer of shares from the Torchlight to the Trinidad Express had been done legally, and 5. That the specific complaints by the PRG against the Torchlight were ‘wholly and completely false.’

On December 31, 1982, the PRG again sought to refute the POM arguments. The PRG’s refutations were generally similar to its first response of July 31, 1979. It assured the IACHR, however, that Grenadian citizens do have the privilege of ‘participating directly in the affairs of the Government through various institutional organisations based on the principle of popular participatory democracy.’ In the midst of these confrontations, it must be noted that at the early stage of the Grenada revolution, and based on his early assurances over restoring a ‘free press and fair election,’ the POM had supported Bishop. Recounting this

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early position on behalf of the POM, the CPBA issued a release which read in part:

After the coup, the vast majority of people in Grenada gave almost unqualified support to the Bishop regime. Those who had reservations about armed overthrow and its future implications rationalized these reservations on the ground that there comes a time when people pushed too far must resort to means other than constitutional.

But by October 1982, the POM got the IAPA to pass a resolution condemning the PRG for ‘stifling a free and independent press.’ Even up to the day before Bishop was placed under ‘house arrest,’ the Trinidad Guardian concluded that the PRG had grown extremely vicious and ‘has abandoned freedom of choice and slaughtered freedom of the press.’ The wheels of early support by the POM had thus turned into outright condemnation with Case 7578 operating as the central force.

FURTHER DETAILS OF THE POM VS. PRG STRUGGLE

A check of news stories and comments in the two Trinidad dailies, the Guardian5 and the Express (two of the POM discussed above), revealed that between March 14, 1979 and October 19, 1983, (i.e. from the day after the coup to the day on which Bishop was killed) there was a total of 407 stories on Grenada. From the 288 which could be judged either ‘favourable’ or ‘unfavourable’ to the PRG, 79 per cent were unfavourable and 21 per cent favourable. As far back as August 1, 1981, Bishop himself declared: ‘The Express has been the most rabid opposer of the Grenada Revolution from the very beginning and has carried over 150 attacks on the revolution at a rate of three a week.’ This might have been an exaggerated estimate but it does reflect in rather concrete terms the thrust of the media’s projection of the PRG’s image. The following is a selected sample of ten incidents which will help underline the depth and range of the information struggle:

1. On October 17 and 22, 1979, both Antigua’s Deputy Prime Minister Lester Bird and Barbados’ Foreign Minister Henry Forde, attacked the PRG for ‘suppressing the media’ in Grenada. As the PRG neared its collapse in October 1983, it was Barbados’ Prime Minister Tom Adams and Jamaica’s Prime Minister Edward Seaga who led the full political assault against the PRG. In November, 1980, Bishop called Adams ‘a yard fowl, Uncle Tom, and house slave’ of the US. 2. On February, 11, 1980 the PRG closed down the Catholic Focus after its first issue. 3. On June 19, 1981, the PRG closed down the only other privately owned

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paper, the Grenadian Voice and placed its editor, Leslie Pierre, in prison without trial. This was just after the second issue. The first issue had sold all of its 2,000 copies. A mimeographed type sheet, the Voice was apparently used to ‘test’ the PRG’s law against new publications. The Voice at this time was publicly described by Bishop as part of a ‘CIA plot’ to overthrow the PRG. 4. On July 4, 1981, the CANA representative in Grenada, Alistair Hughes, was barred by the PRG from leaving the island. Secretary of the CPC, Hughes was publishing his own newsletter across the Caribbean, the Grenadian Newsletter. 5. On June 22, 1981, the Board of Directors of the Voice submitted a complaint against the PRG to the CPC. This petition charged ‘unlawful closure’ of the paper and ‘physical harassment’ by the PRG. The CPC rebuked the PRG for denying Grenadians ‘freedom of expression.’ 6. On January 8, 1981, Bishop told a Caribbean group of socialist organisations assembled in Grenada that ‘progressive leaders in and out of power in the regions are in danger of being assassinated.’ He then labelled the POM in the Caribbean ‘the Mafia press.’ (On October 19, 1983, Bishop was murdered by members of his PRG). On November 22, 1982, Bishop described the POM as ‘mongrels wagging their tails for their United States (U.S.) masters.’ 7. On July 12, 1981, Bishop launched a ‘Media Workers Association’ of Journalists from his state-controlled media. He then accused the international and regional news agencies (Associated Press, United Press International, Agence France Presse, and CANA) as being ‘in collusion’ with the CIA. 8. On July 22, 1981, Bishop rejecting their call for a meeting over press abuses publicly attacked the CPBA for being ‘an unholy alliance of regional media magnates’ and for engineering the downfall of Jamaica Prime Minister, Manley. 9. On September 29, 1981, a small group of Trinidad journalists accused the POM of ‘media conspiracy’ (The week before the POM had each written an identical front page editorial condemning Bishop and the PRG. This group was loudly congratulated by the Media Workers Association of Free Grenada (Media Worker 1981). The group then sent a two-man delegation to Grenada; their report of June 1983, defending the PRG was met with deep scepticism if not outright rejection (e.g. see Express September 15 1983). A similar mission had been planned by the Press Association of Jamaica, a group highly critical of the Gleaner for its stance against the PNP. The months of October-December, 1981, saw heightened counterattacks by the PRG and their supporters (e.g. W I novelist George Lamming, PRG Ministers Selwyn Strachan and Bernard Coard, the latter

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noting that there is no ‘free press’ in the region because it is controlled by the ‘rich and powerful’). 10. On June 29, 1983, when asked by the POM to help fight the PRG’s detention of the editor of the Grenadian Voice, US Congressman Ronald V Dellums refused by stating:6 ‘It would seem evident that the concern expressed regarding Mr Pierre (the editor) is but another example of the propaganda campaign launched to discredit the Grenada revolution.’

In terms of media function, two interesting features were noted:

1. The POM, especially the Guardian and the Express, while very critical of the PRG, allowed some news items and commentaries favourable to the PRG. This was so even when the POM were criticised. For example on October 5, 1979, the tabloid Express gave its entire centrespread to a lengthy statement by Bishop on PRG policies. Again, when the Express editorial called for the ‘isolation of the PRG,’ the PRG’s angry response got lead space on page 3 of the Express (August 1, 1981). The Guardian (April 4, 1982) gave extensive coverage to the Press Association of Jamaica’s report that Grenada has ‘more press freedom now than before the coup.’ In such exchanges, while one recognizes the crucial propaganda struggle one cannot fail to appreciate that such exchanges also ‘made news’ and also helped sell the paper, a point obviously appreciated by the POM. 2. During this information war, apart from restrained support from the Burnham’s Chronicle and the Caribbean Contact (organ of the Caribbean Council of Churches), the PRG had to rely on its radio station and the Government newspaper, the Free West Indian, the only newspaper in Grenada. Revolutionary slogans, salutary speeches, and self praises were prolifically spread across this newspaper’s pages. Quite notably, there was also no critical assessment of the PRG’s leadership policies. Up to 1983, there was no word in this government-controlled paper of the critical internecine struggles of the PRG, struggles which burst open so tragically in October 1983.

THE CONCEPT OF FREE PRESS

It is essential to clarify the term ‘free press.’ The term essentially means a press free from direct government control and one under private ownership subject to existing publication and property laws. Hence, to the extent that private property is seen as an integral right within a mixed economy such as that widely found in the Commonwealth Caribbean, so too would the right to publish be upheld by the publishers. ‘Free press’ thus means a press that is, at least in theory, independent from political control and one which stands by the adversary relationship with the government of the day.7 It is this latter feature which gives

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the press its ‘watchdog’ role and hence its widely conceived status as a ‘voice of the people’ on the range of issues which occupy the nation’s mind. This ‘watchdog’ role is further legitimised by the need for elected governments to be accountable to the people and to be tested on its policies during its term of office. It falls within the duty of the press to uphold this system of accountability.8 A newspaper, therefore, becomes an economic commodity with a political function, albeit one obligated to perform within legal limits. The terms ‘free press,’ ‘private media,’ and ‘independent press,’ are used interchangeably but in all cases within the above conceptual limits. Quite often, the criticisms shared between the government and the press mask the fundamental economic and political interests at stake. Both claim to be acting in the ‘name of democracy’ and in the public interest. Obviously, there are many occasions where this is clearly so. At other times, the claim is not quite clear. Indeed the claim was quite often not quite clear in the struggle between the PRG and the free press in the Caribbean. The struggle was essentially one over information circumscribed by ideological interests. On one hand, the PRG constructed national goals, international relationships, strategies to deal with internal opposition, and a political philosophy which it wanted to legitimise, both internally and externally. It wanted, very urgently, to persuade others of the virtues in its theories and practices. This need to communicate effectively became an overwhelming consideration since the PRG was functioning in a political context very unfamiliar to people in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Though initially viewed as a legitimate replacement to the deposed Eric Gairy regime, the PRG was not an elected government. Its early advantage dwindled under the mounting attacks by the press. On the other hand, the free press across the Commonwealth Caribbean (mainly Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados) began questioning the manner in which the PRG was conducting its political affairs and, more particularly, the kinds of controls it exerted over the free press in Grenada, its delay in calling general elections, and the treatment it was allegedly meting out to its political opposition in Grenada. The leverage for such press attacks also came from the fact that Grenada belonged to CARICOM, an economic organisation of 13 Commonwealth Caribbean states. The family ties, close trade obligations, historical similarities, and shared political systems within CARICOM blurred the concept of national sovereignty. Though the PRG relied on such sovereignty as one of its lines of defence, the press acted on the traditions well set within the Caribbean that is a free press and periodic elections. In fact, these were two prominent reasons for the Caribbean’s earlier tolerance of the PRG coup. The Gairy regime was condemned for corrupt electoral practices and suppression of free speech. Within the first month of assuming power, the PRG repeatedly announced its intention to hold elections ‘as soon as possible’ and to restore to Grenadians all the basic freedoms that ‘Gairy had taken away.’ As the criticisms from the press inside and outside Grenada increased, the

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PRG retaliated by first imposing restrictions on the local press, then closing them down. The questions which arose early in the struggle were: 1. Are the interests of the free press always those of the people? 2. To what extent is the press entitled to criticise a revolutionary government, especially in its early stage of consolidation? 3. How does a revolutionary government respond to what it considers ‘unfair and counter revolutionary’ attacks from the press?

The Caribbean media quite early stated its firm belief that it was speaking ‘for all democratically-minded people’ of the Caribbean. For example, the Trinidad Guardian, faced by PRG attacks that the free press was controlled by ‘minority interests,’ replied with a touch of sarcasm:

In our country, the minority consists of shareholders of various political parties, classes and creeds, of trade union executives and newspaper employees, and there are also many independently owned newspapers and aggressive house organs and political periodicals. To that extent, at least, the Trinidad and Tobago Press represents accurately the people in a democracy (Guardian Editorial, November 24, 1982).

The PRG attacked the press in the Caribbean for being ‘tools of imperialism, puppets of US policy,’ and ‘weapons of the ruling economic class.’ For example, the late Grenadian Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop, told a group of socialist organisations assembled in Grenada that the Caribbean press was run by hard line capitalists whose interests were economic domination. He called the Caribbean press ‘the Mafia press’ (Express, January 8, 1981). He subsequently described the Caribbean press as ‘mongrels wagging their tails for their US masters,’ and being ‘in collusion with the CIA’ (July 12 1981, November 22 1982). On July 22, 1981, he attacked the press for being ‘an unholy alliance of regional media magnates’ and for engineering the downfall of Jamaican prime minister, Michael Manley. His deputy, Bernard Coard, also noted in 1981 that ‘there is no free press in the Caribbean’ since it was controlled only by the ‘rich and powerful.’ Up to the time of the PRG’s collapse in October 1983, a ruling by the IACHR was not given. However, since the assumption of office in 1984 by the New National Party (NNP), the press is free to publish once again. This is so withstanding the skirmishes between the government and Grenada’s private media. The Caribbean press gave strong support for the invasion of Grenada by the joint US- OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States) forces. Clearly, the press enjoys a strong advantage today. It sees itself as being morally enhanced by the widespread support for the invasion reported from Grenada itself. Opposition to the invasion came from several sources (e.g. some unions, academics, journalists, and churchmen). Its quantity, however, has been very much less than that favouring

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the invasion. Editorially, the privately-owned press across the Caribbean had rejected such opposition. This is the important point here.

THE FREE PRESS AND THE PRG LEGACY

The Caribbean press has, therefore, consistently maintained that the freedom it enjoys is identical to that enjoyed by the population. The press insists that both must be preserved. It further argues that any governmental control of the press or monopoly of the media is an erosion of the people’s right to freedom of information. From at least two Caribbean governments, Grenada and Guyana, this right has been seriously challenged. The Guyana’s policy of ‘development support communication’ argues that:

Developing countries such as Guyana...face very real dangers from unquestioned acceptance of public communication models and concepts transferred from the industrialised developed West. ... Certainly, government ownership of the media is not a denial of freedom of expression but rather a guarantee of the right to information of a kind relevant to the nation’s development priorities.9

The PRG also adopted this doctrine. It did eventually monopolise the media in Grenada. The Caribbean press has pointed out the similarity in the language here and in the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). Information control however, should be considered in the context of the political system involved. This is necessary because information is not neutral and particularly so when ‘national goals’ are seriously at stake. The objective by governments is largely to persuade, and to persuade in its own political interest which may not necessarily be in the national interest. The Soviet bloc already has a political philosophy which justifies their control of information.10 They do not need any help from United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). In the Third World, especially those countries spawned from British colonialism, government structures range from one-party states to an almost unmanageable number of parties. Then there is the Grenada case of a government in power, with one party and not formally elected a revolutionary government. Government controls over information and journalists would therefore vary according to the insecurity experienced by the party in power. And the results could range from mild censorship to blatant coercion. The essential point here is in the Westminster system such as that now experienced by Caribbean states, that the ruling party dominates the government, and the checks and balances are generally ritualistic.11 The prime minister as chief executive has dictatorial powers in his cabinet. He is usually head of his political party. To have governmental controls over the media and journalists is therefore to put, quite unfairly, one party in a very strong advantage over the other parties.

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The problems here are aggravated when the government of the day does not enjoy clear or overwhelming majority support. Problems could also occur where the plurality of local interests includes cultural differences or political views which strive from small quarters to find expression for radical change. In the context of Caribbean political structure, the question boils down to this: Which is a better guarantor of press freedom: a government dominated by the political interests of one party, or a group of businessmen dominated by the need to sell its newspaper product ‘successfully’? There is, of course, much common ground. Both plead the public interest. The question is perhaps better put this way: Which of the two would the public have better control over? Grenada and Guyana have shown that once in power, and for whatever reasons, governments develop a range of techniques to monopolise political power. As a ‘free - floating commodity,’ a newspaper could go under from very heavy pressure from the public. More than this, there is always the opportunity for another newspaper to be opened. 12 This brings us to the other issue. Supporters of the PRG have branded the Caribbean media as representing a ‘minority interest.’ Caribbean novelist George Lamming told the Oilfields Workers Trade Union in Trinidad: ‘Every national daily in the region, the Gleaner, the Advocate, and the Guardian has a history of a certain voice. ...It spoke in the interest of a minority ruling group. (Express November 30, 1982).’ Lamming was condemning the press for attacking the PRG in Grenada. An official of the Communist Party of Trinidad and Tobago, James Millette, agreed with Lamming and added: ‘West Indian newspapers...have always represented a minority reactionary view in West Indian society (Express December 3, 1981).’ The irony in such responses is that they appear in the very newspapers they so vehemently attack. The argument of ‘tokenism’ or ‘pretence to be fair’ may be present, but it is not enough to prevent the following question: Why did ‘alternative’ newspapers designed to carry the ‘majority view’ consistently fail in the Caribbean? Is it only because of poor advertising support or is it through poor market support? In the free enterprise system, both are related. The fact that publications such as the Gleaner and Express do succeed does say something fundamental about business management, public confidence, and Caribbean democracy. A ‘revolutionary’ cannot expect to have his views well supported in any of these newspapers when his attack is also directed against the very existence of these newspapers. Political shortcuts such as that taken by the PRG also face tremendous odds in the Caribbean media. Any attack against the right to private property is an attack on the free press. The conflict is therefore inevitable. It is here that the psychology of the media must be also considered. Confidence in the press is enhanced when the public sees these newspapers consistently taking ‘tough stands’ against apartheid, against corrupt politicians, against corrupt

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elections, against vice and immorality. Public confidence in the press is enhanced when citizens can write letters to the editor, have their social activities published and their daily grievances argued in the news pages, sometimes under specialised consumer columns. Press freedom thus becomes part of community folklore. This is the kind of psychological relationship between the public and the press which may very well baffle the Marxist whose intense concerns are with private ownership and false consciousness. In the present political circumstances, Caribbean people would more likely trust information coming from the independent press rather than from the hands of politicians. It is notable that in the Caribbean a mixture of controls does effectively exist. It is less so in Guyana. The private media has taken the view that its right to publish is a firm manifestation of the plurality of interests which must flourish in a multiparty democracy.13

CONCLUSION

This view finds good ground today amidst the distrust which Caribbean people apparently have for their politicians. The NWICO, advanced by politicians, will therefore also find its many virtues difficult to be heard in the Caribbean. Two concluding points are now made:

1. Any informational strategy adopted by a ruling regime must also take into account competing sources of information. The PRG’s attempts at media control lost the battle with the press in the Caribbean. Gradually, the PRG’s attempts took on the appearance of propaganda rather than a ‘developmental exercise.’ The PRG was in the region but gradually made to appear as being outside it, and in a sense treacherous to it. This was the kind of impact made by the press criticisms against it. 2. The NWICO does not and may not be allowed to lay down political conditions to accompany its prescription for news control. The free press not only insists that control by governments be totally rejected but mores o that as ‘an instrument of public expression,’ the press also has the responsibility to ensure that the government in power is a properly elected and accountable government and one which genuinely subscribes to ‘a free press’ as well.

This is the moral force which the free press in the Caribbean sees itself enjoying. This is part of the information legacy left by the 1983 collapse of the PRG in Grenada. The PRG had advocated a ‘one party state’ and state control of the media. There is some philosophical merit in the concept of a ‘one-party state’ with subsequent media control to guide national development. An underlying basis

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for this philosophy is that ‘superficial’ social conflict and ‘frivolous’ media content would be diminished by the patriotic ideals of an ‘all people government.’ Using Grenada as an example, this paper sought to show how the realities of Caribbean politics make this philosophy a difficult one to realise. The ‘patriotic ideals,’ of political groups quickly get reduced to self-serving machinations. The dynamics of democratic politics makes it almost impossible for anyone political group to claim a monopoly on political virtue. The Grenada experience from 1979-83 suggests that Caribbean people are prepared to accept multiparty electoral politics - even with all its concomitant problems.

REFERENCES

Bishop, M. 1975. Fascism — A Caribbean Reality? Trinidad: Oilfield Workers Trade Union. Guyana Ministry of Information. 1974. Communications and Information for Development Purposes in the Caribbean area. Seminar organised in corporation with International Broadcast Institute and the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung. Issues in Communication. 1977. International Institute of Communications, Washington. Kopkind, A. 1980. ‘Trouble in Paradise’. Columbia Journalism Review, March/April. Manley, M. 1974. The Politics of Change. London: Deutsch Publishing Co. Reno, P. 1964. ‘The Ordeal of British Guiana’. Monthly Review, July/August. Siebert, F., Peterson, T. and Schramm, W. 1978. Four Theories of the Press. Chicago: University of Illinois.

NOTES

1. From The Grenada File: The Media, Law and Politics, Extra-Mural Publications (now School of Continuing Studies), The University of the West Indies, St Augustine, Trinidad, West Indies.1989, pp. 10–33, with permission. 2. Between 1623 and 1874, 15 islands in the Caribbean came under British rule. In 1973, 12 politically independent Caribbean states, with a total population of about five million, established the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). The three major countries are Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. The first two to get political independence were Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (in 1962). The last, St Kitts-Nevis got independence in September, 1983. All these states fundamentally operate under the British Westminster model of government. 3. Five days after his house-arrest by Grenada’s People’s Revolutionary Army on October, 14, 1983, Bishop and at least 17 others were murdered. The subsequent invasion by the forces of the US and countries of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), a subgroup of CARICOM, led to an acrimonious controversy which raged throughout the Caribbean over ‘territorial sovereignty,’ US and Communist influence, and the role of the media. 4. The Express also has a financial interest in the Barbados Nation, and has offered technical assistance to a number of newspapers in the smaller islands. It offered

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technical and financial assistance to the ailing Jamaica Daily News before its ultimate collapse. 5. A fire of unknown origin burnt down the Guardian in March 28, 1980. The Guardian resumed publication eight months after on November 26, 1980. The Guardian, through its parent company, also has financial interests in the Barbados Advocate. 6. Letter sent to Mr George Neavell, Editor of Wichita Eagle-Beacon who relayed the POM’s request. 7. See Deosaran, R, Ideological Conflict in the Caribbean Media and the Grenada Tragedy. Paper presented to Intercultural Communication Conference on Latin America and the Caribbean, University of Miami, December 1, 1983. Also, R Deosaran, The Role of the Press in the Caribbean: Private Ownership and Public Responsibility. Caribbean Review, 1984 13 (4). Also M Bishop, Fascism — A Caribbean Reality? OWTU, Trinidad, 1975. 8. There is some debate as to whether this adversary role is merely used to mask the support by both for the economic superstructures; and whether issues on accountability are not well tackled at the fundamental ideological level. In this context, between 1975 and 1984, a series of conferences have been held around UNESCO on the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The UN members were deeply divided. This ‘non-aligned’ group was much for it. The private publishers, the US and about 25 other western states are against substantial parts of it. 9. CA Nascimento, former Minister of State, Prime Minister’s Office, Government of Guyana. Paper delivered at Communications Conference, Georgetown, Guyana, December 1, 1974 10. See, for example, V Prokhorov, The Marxists’ Press Concept, Zhuranlist (Moscow), (3), 1970. 11. The argument here is not that this system is immutable or inherently appropriate for the Caribbean. In fact, there are many reasons to show the opposite. The point here is that given the political structure as it is, the free press will see itself entitled to resist governmental control or monopoly. Government control of the press will also be unfair to other parties. To change the political system as the PRG tried will also meet with opposition from other states within the region. 12. The role of advertising and inter-locking economic networks do mitigate against this possibility. But it is held here that this is a less difficult proposition than trying to change a government, especially one which dispenses with fair and free elections. 13. Gleaner chairman, Oliver Clarke said in September 1981: ‘Problems would develop if the ruling party held a monopoly over any section of the media. The development of public opinion is better served though a variety of sources.’

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chap26.pmd 596 12/8/2006, 11:19 AM T HE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONFLICT Twenty-Seven

The Psychology ILLEGAL ACTIVITY FOR LEGITIMATE of Political REASONS: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRAIN OF CONFLICTING NORMS and Social There are two related features which 1 Conflict continue to form part of our national life (The 1990 and which no doubt found themselves very Muslimeen active in the seesaw approach by the central Insurrection in Government and City Hall in the Mucurapo Trinidad and conflict. One, the practice of illegal activities Tobago) for legitimate reasons, legitimate reasons defined as ‘pressing social need’ as accepted by a significant section of the community. Two, the tendency for government to show Ramesh Deosaran ambivalence and conflicting behaviour in matters of public policy when faced by such ‘social-need’ actions. These two features figured prominently in the rise of Abu Bakr and the Muslimeen claim to Mucurapo. The social needs identified here are the need for public transportation, the need for the poor to ‘make a living,’ and the need for housing. These three social needs respectively led to the rise of PH-taxis, vending on the city streets, and squatting on State lands. A PH- taxi is a vehicle licensed for private use but illegally used to carry passengers for a fare. Vending on the city streets is illegal unless allowed by special license. Squatting is the illegal occupation of land belonging to someone else; in this case the State. The Muslimeen were accused of being squatters at Mucurapo. In each case, the law was openly flouted. A law usually sets down a particular code of behaviour which must be understood or at least followed by members of society. The extent to which this code is

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upheld as being worthy or necessary to be followed then sets up the legal norm. The law is the legal instrument. The legal norm is the psychological condition for the law’s sustenance. These three forms of social behaviour (PH-taxis, street vending, squatting) are deviant, in fact, illegal, but are still supported by substantial sections of the national community. They are distinguished from other types of illegal activities which receive a larger amount of public condemnation. For example, in the years preceding the Muslimeen insurrection, there were many illegal acts which in the public mind went without effective police action, (e.g. loud music in residential areas, traffic violations, praedial larceny, etc). The police on their behalf repeatedly complained of inadequate manpower and vehicles to provide the kind of response expected by the public. Such illegal acts and the lack of police action, however, did produce strain on the public’s regard for law and order. But at least, the community, by and large, was at one in agreeing that such acts were illegal and not to be tolerated at all. There is another group of illegal acts (e.g. rape or assault) which bring direct physical harm to others and earn wider, stronger public disapproval. There are thus stronger social sanctions against them, and the lack of police action serves to aggravate the temper of the general public. On the other hand, the ‘social-need’ group of illegal activities – PH-taxis, street vending and squatting - grew out of hand and are practised on socioeconomic and political considerations. They are illegal but they do not receive the strong social sanctions meted out to the former group (rape, assault) by the entire community. They are high profile activities, openly practised and enjoyed by large sections of the national community and without the law being applied with finality. In the case of PH-taxis, many citizens on a daily basis depend on them for transport which is otherwise lacking. Many citizens also patronise street vendors for goods and services. The vendors also claim that they are ‘making a decent living.’ Squatting is seen as a necessary response by the poor to the shortage of land and housing. In fact, PH-taxi drivers, street vendors and squatters have each formed themselves into associations to defend ‘their rights’. Many established social and political organisations in the country (e.g. unions and opposition parties) have lent support to these groups on the basis of social need. In other words, these illegal practices were reinforced by ‘significant others’ in the society. In the case of street vendors and squatters particularly, all political parties at one time or another have given tacit support to the need for their practices while remaining ambivalent as to how to use the law against these illegal activities. Street vendors and squatters have become political movements, putting pressure on political representatives for ‘better jobs’ and homes respectively. These three forms of illegal activity have gradually become politicised in the sense that one government after another have been accused of causing PH-taxis, street vending and squatting because of bad socioeconomic planning and for failing to put a proper social infrastructure in place. These became ‘hot potato’ political

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issues. The legal mechanisms for social control and social order became severely punctured by these ‘social need’ incursions. The whole idea of the rule of law was suspended in embarrassment. The Muslimeen dispute thrived upon this unholy climate to the point where the Muslimeen accused the government and police of ‘singling them out’ for persecution. Over the years, these illegal activities grew out of hand with no official policy to provide effective relief, or no appropriate legislation or law enforcement measures to stem the tide. They were therefore allowed to be practised as illegal activities for legitimate reasons that are to fulfil social needs. And respect for the law and authority suffered almost fatally. The Muslimeen attack was the ultimate illegal act. But given the climate of illegality so widely dispersed across the country, such an attack was not entirely unexpected. The legitimacy of a rising social, economic or political need is of course a central matter of class relations within a society. The consequent debate, which was typified in the Muslimeen position, is sometimes lodged in the context of a conflict model of society. One position, briefly stated, is that laws in a free market economy generally reflect the needs and interests of the ruling class. The corollary is that governments move more easily to accommodate the needs of the more politically powerful as against those with less political clout in the society. Such political power could arise from wealth as well as from voting strength. The two are not always in a direct relationship, that is, the wealthy group may not have the power of many votes while the group with many votes may not have great consolidated wealth. A matter calling for public policy may arise and which may put each group in opposition to each other. In such circumstances, a democratic government in a capitalist economy is faced with a dilemma. It struggles to walk the tightrope of sustaining its many voters while not alienating the wealthy group whose immediate support is necessary for economic development. It makes a government’s task easier, however, if the issue at hand is one which has clear implications for public peace and order. The government can then loudly rely upon the legal norm for peace and order. Of the three ‘social need’ practices cited above, all have implications for public peace and order, though in different degrees. On one hand, they expose the class divisions in the society since the groups involved in these ‘social need’ practices are the poorer citizens. On the other hand, these practices are all illegal so they raise the issue of respect for the law. Street vending in particular brings the class conflict in sharper focus because the vendors tend to obstruct the trade of established business houses in the cities. The businessmen claim they pay heavy taxes to the government and expect to trade without undue obstruction. Squatting is more prevalent on State lands. The PH-taxis trade is less ridden with direct class conflict but illegal all the same. Each illegal practice is widely spread across the country. The extent to which they are officially tolerated without sanction is therefore a measure of government’s inability or unwillingness to uphold the

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rule of law in these respects. At the same time, the extent to which each illegal practice is tolerated is also a measure of government’s sensitivity to the political strength of those involved in or benefiting from the practices. This is the politics of law. Or perhaps, the law of politics. A political process of conflicting norms therefore develops and which tends to destabilise respect for law and order. Let us briefly examine how the government responded to these three practices and what implications these responses had for the country as a whole, especially in the context of the Muslimeen controversy.

1. PH-TAXIS

The rise and prevalence of PH-taxis (i.e. private cars used as taxis) is an example of how the public tolerates and enjoys illegal means to serve legitimate ends. During the sixties and seventies, transportation problems plagued the nation, especially students and workers who had to travel daily from and to home. The public transportation system had virtually collapsed under the strain of first, an expanding secondary school system and then an expanding oil boom economy. The number of buses and licensed taxis were not enough. On mornings and evenings, there were large, uneasy, anxious crowds waiting for transportation. Many persons with private cars began to ‘pick up passengers’ who willingly pushed, shoved and paid their way into these PH cars. Soon, public servants, teachers and even police officers used their ‘off time’ to ‘pull bull’ (i.e. to drive taxis). Even police officers were passengers in these illegally run PH-taxis. In fact, as said earlier, they plied the illegal trade too. This was in full public knowledge. So the law which said that only licensed H-vehicles should pick up passengers had to take a back seat to a pressing social need. Today, in the face of intermittent official threats (a kind of official ‘grand-charge’), the PH-taxis trade flourishes. The need and clientele for them are both there even though the passengers know that in case of an accident the PH vehicle is not properly covered for accident insurance. This clash between legality and social acceptance was evidenced in an editorial in the Express when a group of PH drivers threatened to go ‘on strike.’ The editorial acknowledged the ‘social service’ performed by these drivers but added that ‘lawbreaking should not be made into a respectable occupation.’2 The PH trade continued as usual. In fact, wherever the police attempted to stop these PH drivers, the passengers would rise up in anger against the police. And the police backed away.

2. STREET VENDING

The other example is street vending. There are laws governing the extent and locations of street vending. This insistence on street vending in forbidden areas of the city arose as part of the demands made after the 1970 Black Power protests. The social and economic inequities in the society were articulated with political

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vigour so much so that the then Prime Minister Dr Eric Williams made several concessions in procuring space in Port of Spain for these vendors, many of whom were called ‘Drag Brothers.’ A chunk of the Frederick-Queen Street area was allocated by the PNM (People’s National Movement) Government for these ‘young, poor, black brothers’ in the face of heavy protests from the business elite and their respective organisations. Today, this section stands out with dubious pride as the ‘People’s Mall’ in the centre of the main shopping area. The law soon found itself confused with the new politics of ‘small man entrepreneurship’ in the City. In the years after 1970, a flood of other vendors began; occupying the streets and sidewalks as if to stretch that ‘right’ to vend. Several times when the police attempted to regularise street vending in the City there would be protests from the vendors and their sympathisers. Where would we go? We are poor and unemployed. This is advantage. The cries came in different volumes and styles. Soon enough, the Central Government intervened on the vendors’ behalf and asked for reprieve. The law had to take a side once again. Social need found a political voice and the existing law remained dumbfounded. The administrative officers at the City Corporation and their consecutive Mayors (Stevenson Sarjeant and Augustus Williams) for example, have faced public embarrassment several times. They had to back down from ‘clearing the streets.’ Up to the day before the July 27, 1990 insurrection, Mayor Williams warned street vendors to get off the streets or face police action. The police also appeared confused in trying to execute what they saw as their duty to the law of the land. Several police attempts to clear the streets were met with countervailing instructions from ‘higher up’. But given the sociology of street vending, there is another side to this story, especially in the city of Port of Spain. It is argued that there is a legitimacy which must be noted in spite of what the strict law says. Firstly, it is argued that street vending is a robust sign of ‘small man entrepreneurship’ which the government should encourage, especially in face of the big time business houses in the city. The economic elite should make some room for the upcoming ‘small’ businessman. The political implications for a government hankering after a ‘small man’ image are obvious. The added fact that these street vendors in Port of Spain are overwhelmingly of African descent produces a bothersome factor for political resolution. The major business houses in the cities of Port of Spain and San Fernando are of Syrian-Lebanese and East Indian descent. Secondly, street vendors have become a political force, stressing that ‘selling on the streets is better than thiefing.’ When street vending erupted in November 1992 as a public controversy, the vendors formed associations claiming that they had to ‘make work rather than thief.’ The national unemployment rate at the time was over 20 per cent and as high as 35 per cent in the outskirts of Port of Spain. The need to sell is therefore seen as a legitimate one, though the means were illegal. The new Mayor of Port of

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Spain, Ethelbert Paul, following his PNM Government’s promise of ‘a shining, clean Port of Spain,’ moved during October 1992 to clean up the streets and regularise vending with alternative accommodation. However, the new Prime Minister Patrick Manning intervened a few weeks after and issued a press release asking for a reprieve for these street vendors. The government appeared ambivalent and sent mixed signals to the national community once again. Would there be another tragedy? Sensing the social implications of such ambivalence and political pampering, the Trinidad Express editoria1ised:

The manner in which the vending situation in Port of Spain has been handled is an example of inspired ineptitude... Mayor Ethelbert Paul seemed determined to put some order to the huge vendor overflow that threatened to clog up the capital’s main street. So the next thing that happens is that a statement is issued from the Prime Minister’s Office saying in part that “in light of the present economic circumstances and the fact that the Christmas trade is vital to the livelihood of these vendors, the Prime Minister has directed the Mayor of Port of Spain to hold immediate discussions with the vendors in order to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.”3

To the Express, all this was deja vu. It had made a similar argument when City Hall waffled with the Muslimeen. The Express pointed to the confusion that flows when the right hand does not know what the left hand of the State is doing. Arguing for controlled vending and relocation, the Express added:

We operate in a certain system and as small business persons, vendors must play by the rules of the game. Nobody wants to deprive them of making a living but this is everybody’s town and vendors must not be made to feel they have a right to trample on other people’s rights.

Of course, the Express’s position, like that of the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Commerce or Downtown Owners and Merchants’ Association, can be discussed in the wider context of the urban lumpenproletariat’s ‘struggle for a better life,’ or even as a symptom of institutionalised social class conflict in the society. When the PNM government was taking steps to ‘regularise’ street vending, leader of the UNC (United National Congress) Opposition in the Senate, Wade Mark, said: ‘The vending problem has escalated because of the PNM’s and NAR’s (National Alliance for Reconstruction) mismanagement of the economy. It is a cardinal sin against God to rob the poor and helpless of the means to make a living.’4 The problem and the arguments have a long history. More specifically, there is the argument within the unions that this widespread and rising need to ‘common-class vending’ is one of the harsh results of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) agreement and government’s faulty socioeconomic planning. In other words, such argument diffuses the illegality and enhances the legitimacy of

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the vendors’ actions. It also imposes some feelings of guilt and even remorse on the government of the day. And the zig–zagging between the law and social need arises — once again. Bakr’s reliance on the social need hypothesis did strike at least an early blow in the public mind. He ‘needed’ the Mucurapo land for religious and social services. And upon this claim, he built a moral authority. Such large social conflict positions do have a particular seduction and some generalised notions of social justice in them. They awaken the collective conscience of the nation. At the same time, the police officers and the Members of Parliament also have a duty to the law. In fact, they took an oath to uphold the rule of law. But is this enough? The psychology of social justice confronted the necessity of the law at hand. Even with its insistence that ‘the vendors be moved for breaking the law,’ the Express editorial obviously remained subdued with the need for large social reforms in the society. Regarding the dilemma faced by the elected Members of Parliament, their oath of office reads as follows:

I, having been elected a Member of Parliament, do swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the law, and will conscientiously and impartially discharge the responsibilities to the people of Trinidad and Tobago upon which I am about to enter.5

On December 7, 1992, a High Court judge, Justice Clem Razack, ruled that vending is illegal and dismissed an application for judicial review by 21 vendors in San Fernando. Five days after, the San Fernando Mayor, Hazel Rogers-Dick, said that ‘vending was allowed to avoid social unrest while a long term solution is being worked out,’ A different picture emerged for Port of Spain vendors. In January 1993, the Port of Spain City Corporation took action to move the vendors from the city’s streets after it had given a short reprieve to sell during the Christmas season. The vendors (438) formed an association and held public meetings protesting the City Corporation’s ‘denial of their making a decent living,’ about 400 vendors signed membership. Their leader issued a statement which declared 1993 as ‘Vendors’ Liberation Year.’ The vendors took the matter to court seeking in the first instance to get temporary relief until the constitutional motion is heard. The judge, Justice Anthony Lucky, granted them this relief, that is, he allowed them to continue selling on the street sides but in ‘an orderly fashion.’ Several organisations, mainly business, expressed surprise at this decision. The same judge was scheduled to hear the substantive motion. All this naturally confused the public. The vendors’ attorney submitted that while the vendors were not challenging the City Corporation’s powers to permit vending, they felt that the Corporation had created a ‘legal, expectation to continue vending since they have been doing so for a long time.’ The City Corporation’s attorney, Russell Martineau, replied that street vending is illegal and that while there may be ‘some sympathy for the vendors’ cause, the solution was not be found in the courts.’ He

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added that ‘Parliament made laws for the peace, order and good government of the country.’ This ‘sympathy’ for the vendors obviously challenged the strict application of the law in this instance, especially if as indeed was the case, most of the vendors had been on the streets for a long while. An attorney, Ernest Koylass, wrote a letter to the newspaper in which he said:

I am observing the Port of Spain vending issue with some amusement and bewilderment. We start with the premise that vending on the street/pavement is illegal. Now the City Council has conceived a brilliant plan to create confusion. It seems that we never learn. One might be forgiven for thinking that, Mucurapo Road (the Mucurapo dispute) would have taught the authorities a lesson: It seems not.6

Another letter writer, Peter Popplewell, said:

If my memory serves me right, it was about 20 years ago that drivers of PH-cars in San Fernando sought to form an association to look after their interests. Today persons carrying on the practice of street vending are trying to have a legally constituted United Vendors Liberation Movement (UVLM). The reason with which these two groups have justified their position is: “We have a constitutional right to earn a living.” The real reason is that those who have the power to control our behaviour feel that it is not politically smart to confine certain groups within the law. I am going to start a guild among die hard criminals and seek registration of the group as the Federation of Unemployed Contract Killers.7

The social need of the vendors, supported by consumers, established a conflicting norm, one that challenged the existing law against street vending. And the fact that the City Corporation, with such law intact, had to defend itself against the vendors added some public confusion to the entire issue. It also helped to politicise the issue which was in fact a point made by a committee appointed by the government to settle the issue in late 1992.

3. SQUATTING

In the run-up to the 1981 and 1986 general elections, squatting in state lands became a hotly debated issue. In 1986 particularly, both the PNM and National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) jostled one way or another to retain middle class support while still courting the political loyalty of the thousands of squatters across the land. The illegal occupation of state lands (squatting) was widespread all across the country. In apparent disgust, one PNM Minister of Agriculture said: ‘The explosion of squatting in the total scenario has pushed the issue of land tenure and land utilisation into a national mess.’8 The ‘social need’ practice provided a big problem for the authorities. Further, all political parties tried to regularise squatting without jeopardising the political

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loyalty of these squatters. Many of these squatters joined community associations which they used for political leverage. The National Land Tenants and Rate Payers Association (formed in 1974), for example, took up the cause of squatters alongside its other concerns. Many of its top officers were also political activists in their respective communities. The ‘Godfather’ of this organisation was Karl Hudson- Phillips, a Deputy Leader of the NAR. He also served as its legal advisor. Squatting, an illegal activity, had political clout. Squatting became a hot political issue in election campaigns with contending parties rivalling each other in offering ‘the best deal’ for squatters. This practice provides another example of the clash between illegality and ‘legitimate’ social needs, and are relevant to what the Muslimeen were claiming for themselves at Mucurapo. It is not only the confusion over having conflicting norms, one in law and the other in social need. It is also a case where the confusion is used as a political vehicle to expose inadequacies in government’s socioeconomic planning. In his sense, such ‘legitimacy by social need’ situations become ready mechanisms for opposition attacks upon the existing government. Further, in all the cases cited above, those who clamoured under the umbrella of social need did not really have their lot improved when governments changed. This is the politics of persistent poverty. Be it with PH-taxis, vending or squatting, quite often the opposition groups joined with the protestors, promising a better deal ‘if put in power.’ Between 1981 and 1993, three different governments were in charge, yet the lot of these ‘social need’ groups was not effectively changed. In fact, the social needs grew worse, the illegal practices spread wider and the law looked dumber in the face of it all. These problems are deeply structural but made to look easier by political groups when in opposition. But when voted into power, these same groups failed to make any improvements either through social infrastructure or legislation. And to the matter more at hand, the law was not applied. The impoverished conditions and subversion of the law were persistent. These examples are important to consider to get a fuller understanding of the psychological climate in which the Muslimeen dispute existed. There were significant trends of lawlessness in several areas of society. The peculiarity of these examples (as against white-collar crime) is that they were supported by significant social justifications. The Muslimeen relied upon similar justifications. More specifically, the NAR when in opposition had promised to provide a speedy settlement to the Mucurapo land dispute. When the NAR gained power in 1986 things grew worse, resulting in the July 27 insurrection. Prime Minister Robinson had told a meeting of land tenants in 1990: ‘Squatter regularisation is underway. Persons who in were on state lands up to December 31, 1986 would be permitted to claim ownership of the land.’9 The PNM when in Opposition during 1986-91 had also promised a ‘fair and just’ settlement with squatters and the Muslimeen at Mucurapo. The PNM returned to power on December 20, 1991 and up to 1993 there has been no such effective

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settlement either with the squatters as a whole or with the Muslimeen specifically. On the contrary, Abu Bakr has accused the PNM and prime minister of perpetrating the confusion over the Mucurapo dispute. This clash between conflicting norms can result in rather the ironic expressions of persistent poverty. Not only does it put the government on the defensive: the law itself is put under threat. For example, when the Port Authority in November 1992 attempted to move 116 squatters from the Sea Lots area (outskirts of the city), the squatters refused with one of its leaders saying:

We are going to fight to the end…If the PNM government and Port Authority want us to move out, they have to find rent-free homes for us. 99 per cent of the residents living here are unemployed and on the brink of starvation and we cannot afford to pay rent.10

These squatters threatened to ‘put the government in court’ if it persisted in moving them. Shades of the Muslimeen dispute. In March, l993, the National Housing Authority (NHA) served notices on about 200 squatters at Sea Lots to move out or face legal action. The squatters immediately mobilised themselves and went to the National Squatters Association to complain. The Association promised to take up the matter with the Minister of Housing and the prime minister as well since the squatters were on lands within the prime minister’s constituency. The PNM Minister of Housing, Dr Vincent Lasse, said that there were about ‘50,000 houses on squatted lands representing 200,000 persons’.11 Their voting strength was acknowledged. He promised to bring legislation ‘soon’ to ease the problem. In years gone by, squatters used to plead their case largely on grounds of ‘social hardships.’ As the years rolled on, their pleadings became based on political, patronage and political promises made during election campaigns. These 200 squatters at Sea Lots, when asked by the Housing Authority to move out from lands illegally occupied, their spokesman, John Demol: ‘We were on the lands since 1981 and were allowed to remain there all the time. Why move us now?’ Again, shades of the Muslimeen dispute. Another squatter said:

When Patrick Manning wanted our vote in 1981 he promised to regularise our tenancy. I have nowhere to go. My five children must have a place to rest their heads. In 1991 again, Manning promised to deal with our squatting problem but the PNM had not kept its promises.12

Manning became prime minister in December 1991 when the PNM was voted into power. The reliance upon political promises made during election campaigns became a widespread defence against the agencies which threatened to remove squatters from different parts of the country. This matter of political patronage and promises therefore gradually became a mediating factor between the application of the law and squatting.

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It is noteworthy that in 1983 a High Court ruling chided the State for breaking down a squatter’s house without the authority of a court order. A major issue was ‘due process.’ The mass psychology of squatting thus enticed the population to believe that squatters had certain rights and quite often, the politicians eventually found themselves in a compromising mood to sustain if not win votes. After all, the ‘social need’ was most present and the politicians did not mind seeing the law take a back seat for a time at least. In a strict sense, the law of the land was once again subverted by those who took an oath to uphold it. The other options were to amend the laws or provide alternative housing for these squatters. Neither option came with the speed required if the law was to be held in respect. In this sense, many of the circumstances surrounding the Muslimeen land dispute were not unusual. Examining the social implications of having ineffective laws, Allott explained:

Laws are often made ineffective because of the over-ambitions of the legislators and the under-provision of the necessary requirements for an effective law, such as acceptance and enforcement machinery....laws may become ineffective even when they were originally achieving their object, because of changes in the social context of attitude and behaviour.13

The public attitude towards lawfulness has changed. The laws against PH- taxis, vending and squatting were well in place but lacked supporting machinery and wide public acceptance in varying ways. This lack of social acceptance was not merely in terms of public opinion, at least as held by certain depressed sections. It was also manifested in active, unchecked and even politically-supported ways. This led to a popular description of Trinidad and Tobago society as a ‘vie-ke-vie’ society, a society which ‘moves by vaps,’ that is, a society in which ‘anything goes’ without effective sanctions. It was against such a social background that Abu Bakr and the Muslimeen complained that they ‘were unfairly singled out’ for persecution by the State. If he were a squatter, why weren’t the authorities moving with equal alacrity against the thousands of other squatters in other parts of the country? Of course, Bakr and his Muslimeen became more than hard pressed squatters to the State. They became a threatening, political movement.

A THEORY OF CIRCULAR SUBVERSION: FROM ILLEGAL MEANS TO LEGITIMATE ENDS AND BAKR

Abu Bakr and the Muslimeen group were accused of subversion. But there was a less dramatic yet permeating manner of subversion of the law over the years by two successive governments. Initial1y, by not carrying out the law in more full-headed manner over the Mucurapo dispute, the PNM and NAR governments were gradually creating a political Frankenstein. Of course, in the midst of this haggling, the Muslimeen activities at Mucurapo were being projected

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as legitimate ones and took on a religious-political aura, as enough to neutralise the State’s legal thrusts. Or put another way, the ruling party while trying to work with the law, treated the Mucurapo dispute, not as a strict legal matter, but also as a socio-political problem. Soon enough, the Mucurapo dispute took on an appearance as a fighter between two political groups, an ‘opposition group’ at Mucurapo and the ruling party, with other political groups intervening one way or another. The ‘good work’ being done by the Muslimeen at Mucurapo became at times a palliative and other times an incendiary device. Different criteria were used at the same time to judge the same Mucurapo dispute. At one point, it was the legal norms. At another point, it was the political norms. The political norms which guided City Hall’s negotiations, for example, were different from the legal norms on which the court order was based. And this created a circular process of subversion and confusion. The political norms affected the legal norms which in turn affected the political norms. In a behavioural sense, the Muslimeen defiance grew, then fed itself from the wider context of conflicting norms discussed above. Then other groups, witnessing the ‘success’ gained by the Muslimeen defiance, also challenged the legal norms on socio-political considerations. It was a social psychological phenomenon of circular subversion, fuelled by conflicting norms in an adversarial system of democracy. If, as it sometimes seemed, the State found favour with the ‘good works’ of the Muslimeen, then surely the State had the power to amend the laws or procedures to allow Bakr and the Muslimeen a freer passage to Mucurapo. This was not done. If on the other hand, the State felt that the law, as it was, must be upheld, then it should have applied from the beginning, a consistent approach through its agencies and in the courts. All this, in a sense, sounds simple enough. But there was a quadrangle of confusion placed upon this Mucurapo dispute. First, the PNM and then the NAR governments showed differing inclinations towards this situation, thereby undermining the consistency required of government authority. Secondly, and particularly when the NAR was in power (1986–91), the PNM-controlled Port of Spain City Corporation practised an approach that publicly varied with that determined by the central Government. This variance was facilitated and even aggravated by the ‘split-authority’ which each had over the Mucurapo lands. Thirdly, the courts displayed such an irregular course of rulings which, the independence of individual judges notwithstanding provided confusion in the public mind. Fourthly, even when the High Court gave an order, the police proved unable to execute the court order and at that time still received ministerial commendation - all of which contributed to the growing confusion over the Mucurapo land dispute. The overall picture is that the authorities allowed what was initially a legal matter to snowball into a diffused socio-political controversy.

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The issue of tolerating illegal activities to serve legitimate ends is, however, just one part of a larger picture. What is also in issue is the inefficient, lazy and confused manner in which the government typically moves to resolve such disputes. If, for example, small-man entrepreneurship such as street vending is seen as a clear and pressing demand, then the government should quickly establish clear and durable policies to accommodate these legitimate demands in the places they arise. After all, the issue of street vending, like PH cars and the Mucurapo land title, has been a long standing one, but without any clear, self-respecting official policy. By their delayed responses and apparent ambivalence, the central Government in these respects exposed a belief that the relevant laws were not adequate to deal with some of the situations at hand. Yet they made no amendments to re-establish the equity and supremacy of the law. The argument here is not merely that each law as is must be slavishly obeyed for all time. There are needs and fresh circumstances which require laws to be changed. After all, a law over time can itself become unjust. And a government must be sensitive enough to make the change. Given the stress upon government from different interest groups in the society, however, the need to change a law may not be all that clear to everybody. This is where political debate, bargaining and elections come in. If, however, each time a public dispute arises, the Government’s way is to embark on ad hoc, double- edged arrangements by choosing politically partisan solutions with socially divisive implications, then it is merely digging its own grave in the long run. In terms of public behaviour, the government must take the lead in setting up clear and equitable laws for proper standards of public conduct. When different groups of people feel they can pull and tug in any way and time they choose at public law or standards of conduct, then the road to civil disorder is laid down. This is the eventual tragedy of tolerating conflicting norms for too long. The society is organic enough to feel the social impact in its entire body from an attack on one part. The politics of Port of Spain swiftly find its way through the urban-based media into other parts of the country. Once it was known that vendors could get around the law and sell here and there in Port of Spain, then the streets of Sangre Grande, Arima and San Fernando were also ambushed by other vendors determined to confront the police. If they in town could do it, then why not we, these other vendors argued. The public administrators and the police in these latter areas had a hard a time controlling the situation. The San Fernando City Council in particular also had bitter, protracted disputes with vendors. Even when Government moves to establish equitable and appropriate laws or standards of conduct, it must be done at the right time. Delayed action could be worse than doing nothing at all. The July 27 insurrection is proof.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION

Clearly, the laws of the land (legal norms) and certain opposing social trends (social ‘norms’) were in a strained relationship in several areas of national life. And in the midst of this social strain, the Muslimeen affair occupied a prominent and controversial place. In other words, the Mucurapo dispute and its attendant controversies were in the lively context of such widespread social strain. Norms are standards of conduct which are accepted and shared by a community. They operate as social psychological mechanisms of social control and freedom. They allow a community to impose sanctions upon those who deviate. At the same time, a citizen frames his motives for social behaviour in anticipation of how his behaviour would affect the norms of the community. The existence of norms thus, establishes a wide public expectation that everybody will conform to them. It is therefore the psychological basis for social relations. In terms of PH-cars, street vending and squatting, each ‘deviant’ trend flourished within the community. But yet each was clearly illegal and stated as such by the authorities. Yet each such illegal trend benefited certain groups especially in economic terms. The notion of having norms for social order was therefore destabilised in these respects, leading to what many called a ‘lawless’ society. The law and its supportive infrastructure are designed to establish and maintain social norms as acceptable standards of conduct. The major rationale being ‘for the public good.’ This was indeed the defence put forward by attorney for the City Corporation in February 1993 in the case brought against it by the vendors. For a norm to be an effective social regulator, it must have the acquiescence of the general public and in fact must also be supported with appropriate sanctions. As discussed earlier, the legal standards for PH-cars, vending and squatting have been constantly violated in public view. And further, large sections of the public actively benefited from such violations, their argument being that they were in social need given the hardships faced. The salience of the legal norms thus suffered in the face of social demands. Of course, the justification offered by the violators was not foolproof since in some clear instances, alternatives were offered by the authorities. For example, the City Corporation had established at minimal cost to the vendors alternative sites for their trade. But the vendors insisted on being where they wanted to be. The police officers on several occasions were called off by the political elite for fear of political reactions. But the main issue is the extent to which these conflicting norms, the legal standard on one hand and the illegal practice through social need on the other hand, came into perpetual conflict, thus leaving the society without a full, clear and well-sanctioned obligation to either. This leads to anomie, a state in which there are no clear standards to guide behaviour in a given area of social life.14 While this collapse of social norms exists, and there are no new ones to fill the psychological space, the society is left confused between claims of legitimacy on one hand and legality on the other hand. At the time of this shiftlessness, there

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are no new codes of behaviour either through renewed legislation or with wide social approval to replace effectively these norms that have become weak or subverted. This shiftlessness and unclear standards of public conduct have become a subject of widespread concern in the country. During the years 1911–93, 188 letters were written to the two dailies on the subject, some linking it to the Muslimeen dispute, others linking it to other forms of social disintegration. This is apart from the numerous speeches by public officials and church leaders. In fact, public officials themselves have been accused of being responsible for encouraging such unclear standards of public conduct. One letter- writer said: ‘We have had bad examples of the judiciary reneging on their responsibilities in the case of the Muslimeen and allowing street vending by a few and excusing themselves with the semantics of the law.’15 The Chamber of Commerce said: ‘What in the world has happened to respect for law and order? What has happened to honour? What has happened to morality? In short, what has happened to our value system?’ 16 Of course, many such comments are status quo oriented and do not show an understanding of the complex relationships between certain social and legal norms and the perpetuation of interest groups. However, they were not pure ‘middle class hysteria.’ There is indeed massive confusion in the society over what is right and wrong behaviour, especially in the realm of public conduct. Ironically, the Muslimeen themselves in May 1990 had raised questions of public conduct quite similar to those raised in December 1992 by the Chamber of Commerce. Whatever else may be the reasons, the conspicuous existence of conflicting norms as discussed above is one very likely reason for the confusion. As James McLay, New Zealand, Attorney General and Minister of Justice, said:

The sort of balance that is necessary for a diversity of civil liberties to flourish can exist only where there is a general sense of self-restraint operating in a society...and where people are essentially at one on at least the fundamentals of social order.17

Over the years, a culture of resistance to established norms has developed especially in the urban areas of Trinidad. Government has opted for policies of appeasement, thereby containing rather than redirecting the energy of this unholy stream. While the socioeconomic reasons for such a culture of resistance are matters of debate, clear and well-supported standards of public conduct are widely perceived as missing. This lack of guidance in normative behaviour would most of all affect the youth. It is not that norms should be followed regardless of their merit. It is assumed that once norms are established and that there is clear and good justification for them, then it provides necessary guidance for the social obligations of youth. Social control is enhanced by the presence of legitimate and legal norms. These norms in turn are maintained by the roles which the public institutions and significant officials are called upon to play. In other words, social norms are supported by the values practised in the

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wider society at key levels. For example, the extent to which these norms are supported by high status citizens and those in public office, to that extent would the norms be respected in the society. Ironically, it was Abu Bakr who made this point repeatedly. And as it appeared, if he ‘was breaking the law,’ it was largely, because others had or were ‘breaking the law’ too. In other words, the society was seen to be not only ‘lawless,’ but also ‘shameless.’ That during the years of the Muslimeen dispute there were strong and enduring complaints against the administration of justice, the police and parliament itself, all helped subvert the efficacy of the legal norms at the time. And the Muslimeen were caught in the centre of this inefficiency in the sense that they were allowed for many years to remain at Mucurapo without a proper lease. The norms in direct question here are legal norms thus lending a specificity and sanction potential which cultural or other loose social norms do not have in equal degree. For example, shame and social ostracisation operate as sanctions against those who do not conform to religious norms within a particular community. There is much of this variation within multicultural Trinidad. There may even be some disagreement over the value and relevance of such religious norms and a respectable debate could follow within the community. But statutory laws and the norms they are expected to establish are wider in application and clearer in the accompanying sanctions. When these are held in open and repeated disrepute, as illustrated above, the implications for public order and lawfulness are wider and more serious. This was the point being made by numerous editorials and commentators in the years immediately preceding the July 27, 1990 insurrection. There is of course a relationship between the extent and rate at which norms are sustained or broken in one area and in another area of social life. This fluidity of behaviour is part of the social psychology of public conduct, especially when positive law is confronted by ‘customary law’.18 The authorities cannot ‘pick and choose’ which illegal act to pursue. If so, then the entire notion of respect for the law would be brought into disrepute. The legitimacy of State authority, in these respects, rests on two conditions:

1. The consistent application of the law 2. The social norms which give rise to the law must be widely shared in the community

That these two conditions were not effectively fulfilled in the above respects helped to undermine the very legitimacy of State power and weakened its capacity to govern over time. Social disintegration was in the making. And the Muslimeen insurrection was on the way. The disintegration of social obligations within the youth community in the country is no doubt largely due to the confusion provided by competing norms

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or the subversion of established norms. The tendency for forming delinquent subcultures, especially in the face of limited means for socially valued goals, becomes a tempting option for the youth. Subcultures become havens for the marginalised and dispossessed. These ‘youth havens’ vary in character and social structure. In one type, hedonism replaces social obligation as the dominant value. In another type, there may be a strict code of discipline and shared responsibility. But in any case, the youth who remains experiences a mode of attainable rewards within the subculture. The Mucurapo commune was a subculture for the youths. There were norms there, but shaped for goals set by the Muslimeen hierarchy. There was a strict and clear condition that they ‘must follow the leader, the Imam.’ For the youth, it was therefore a movement from one subculture to another subculture. For them, however, in the Mucurapo commune there was a consistency of standards which they found lacking in the wider society. After the insurrection, Catholic Archbishop Pantin wondered why so many youths had flocked to Mucurapo. This is part of the answer. In the social scenario mapped out by PH-taxis, vending and squatting, the legal standard was left suspended by the changing social realities. And this put a lot of strain on social integration, the collective obligation to a common standard of public conduct. One of the overriding factors in this context is that while the society held out great value in earning a decent living, in being properly housed and transported, the means to achieving these conditions were disturbingly scarce. The level of economic development and social planning was not able to meet the demands. And in different ways, the beneficiaries of the PH-trade, street vending and squatting made the point. Each of these trends was an argued response to the difference between socially valued goals and the limited means to achieve these goals.19 Five major responses to such conditions are hereby outlined:

1. The Conformists: These form the majority of people in a community. They accept the socially valued goals and the limited means available for these goals even when these means are practically available only to a few. 2. The Innovators: These are the people who accept the socially valued goals but use both illegitimate or illegal means to reach them. 3. The Ritualists: These pursue the socially valued goals but without having a clear justification for these goals. 4. The Retreatists: These are people who have rejected the socially valued goals and also the means available to achieve them. 5. The Rebels: These are people who reject both the socially valued goals and the means to achieve them, but go on to seek ways of constructing both new goals with new means to achieve them.

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Guns and ammunition captured from the Muslimeen

The foreign media pack up to leave Trinidad

By and large, the PH-traders, squatters and vendors were in this sense innovators. They engineered new but illegal ways to ‘beat the system’ and relieve social hardships. But how much hardships have they caused to others? Have they caused hardships to so many that the protests against their innovations were overwhelming? A lot of middle class citizens grumbled at the spread of street vending. The open, protests, however, came mainly from the economic elite which helped to apply downward pressures on the lower - class beneficiaries. For example, the downtown merchants put steady pressure upon the state to ‘do something about these vendors.’ They asked that the law be enforced. And the vendors did not miss making the opposite point, that is, these ‘rich merchants’ were against the poor for ‘making a decent living.’ In other words, while there was a clash between legal standards and social need, there was also a social class dimension in the entire landscape. Feelings of relative deprivation became politically active within the underclass.

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It was the politics of social strain in a developing society with significant social and economic disparities. In December 1992, the Government appointed a committee to work out ‘suitable arrangements’ for the Port of Spain vendors. After attempting the task, the committee chairman, Noel Garcia, said: ‘The street vendors are being misled. Those who have political axes to grind are playing politics with the issue. They are not really concerned with the vendors.’20 The vendors’ spokesman, Ricardo Welch, offered a different view, calling upon vendors ‘not to be afraid to fight for your rights as poor people’. He was re-echoing a popular slogan of Abu Bakr during the days before the insurrection. And the law sat uneasily in the midst of such political tension. The Muslimeen group at Mucurapo appeared to be a special case. They were first, part innovators and part retreatists. They accepted the socially valued goals, prepared to use illegitimate means to preserve these goals, but at the same time they also sought to establish a commune as retreatists to be self sufficient. And this engagement provided difficulties both for themselves and the authorities. Towards July 27, 1990, they turned towards open rebellion using illegal means to ‘reconstruct’ the social system. The mixed public reactions in the public and private domain over the Muslimeen actions were no doubt due to the wider confusion over social norms and the apparent ineffective ways in which the relevant sanctions were applied when these norms were threatened or subverted. More specifically, the fact that particular legal norms (e.g. those against squatting) were allowed to exist without effective revisions in the face of mounting social challenges also added to the state of growing normlessness in the society. This situation also expresses itself in another less tangible way. The country is well noted for an oral tradition in which public officials continuously preach about the ideals of society, about proper standards of public conduct, yet they themselves in significant numbers remain accused in the public eye of transgressing some if not all of these norms and ideals. Discussing the salary increases which the Government had previously given to 621 senior public officials, a union member in early 1993 said:

President Hassanali is asking us workers to show self restraint and self responsibility, yet he recently had his tax free salary moved from $13,000 to over $16,000 per month while so many workers are losing salary and their jobs. Is this a good example? You don’t see these people want us to run wild?

This was a widespread sentiment within the population. Calypsonian Sugar Aloes, yearning for a ‘new order,’ had gone further and to the glee of the 1993 calypso season crowd denounced the re-appointment of Hassanali as President. The perceived fattening of politicians’ pockets with so many others left wanting led to heated debate in and out of Parliament.21 The president’s speech to which this union member alluded was made on March 9, 1993. In part, President Hassanali said: ‘Self-restraint ought to be reflected

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in various aspects of the individual’s life, his personal character, his personal relationships, and in the discharge of his social, economic and administrative responsibilities.’22 Such perceived contradiction establishes a social psychology of deviance and, in fact, has been a common topic in the nation’s calypsoes. In certain circumstances, therefore, some crimes against private property, while wrong in themselves, thus have a social psychological foundation in the society. The Muslimeen insurrection has provided an infamous signpost to this disturbing psychological condition. Explanations for crime do not necessarily mean that such crimes should be accepted or even tolerated. There are some who see the law as possessing an overall majesty, with little or no room for social or political explanation of crime. Dealing with the looting of private property during the six- day siege, Morgan Job wrote:

Without law, there can be no security, no growth, no development, no job creation. But there will be rage. Our rage against private property has been contrived. It derives from ignorance, our memory of communal land and the Marxist emotions developed by our African leaders.23

Job is correct on the need for law. But there are other conditions upon which a society depends for its laws to be respected and effective. On several occasions, the Muslimeen pointed to the state of double standards in the society while claiming that they were ‘singled out for persecution.’ In particular, the spread of white-collar crime in the society has often been used as a ‘justification’ for many of the illegal acts committed by the ‘have-nots’. The fact that many of those accused of white-collar crimes (e.g. foreign exchange breaches, under-invoicing, etc.) have not been convicted has also led to widespread feelings of ‘discriminatory persecution’ within the underclass. The government, it is alleged, is unwilling or unable to catch the ‘big fish.’ One commentator, apparently representing the ‘conscience’ of the underclass, wrote soon after the insurrection:

The retailers’ wealth comes straight out of the pockets of the people, and in that sense these ‘profits’ belong to the people of this country. When these retailers slip their money out of the country and hoard it in foreign banks where it is not available for the local capital market that is ‘looting’ plain and simple.24

This is the climate of social contradictions (perceived or real) upon which disputes of the Muslimeen kind feed for their manifestation and perpetuation. It is a symptom of social pathology. It is not that the ideals and norms are not known. It is that they are not made salient enough within the society. The country has therefore widely accepted as one of its day-to-day sayings: ‘Do as I say but not as I do.’ This is an ultimate condition for social disintegration. The moral anchor is deserted.

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Evidence that some of the nation’s legal norms were under siege or at least in distress was sharply witnessed on Friday April 8, 1993 when about 40 workers of the Unemployment Relief Programme (URP) tried to storm the building (Central Bank Towers) which house Prime Minister Patrick Manning and Finance Minister Wendell Mottley. They were angry that their regular pay cheques had not been received on time. The point is not that the workers were angry for such a reason. Workers’ protests for such reasons have in fact grown quite common. What is frightening is how the ‘smash and break’ syndrome has become a common means of protest on such occasions. The common target is urban business houses. It does not mean that the social and legal norms against such action are totally absent. After all, once such ‘smash and break’ protests occur, the newspapers and business organisations reaffirm these norms and the necessity to uphold them. What is apparent, though, is how lowered the thresholds for breaking these norms have become, especially for the urban underclass. These ‘micro riots’ are now wrapped up in the political psychology of the country. On this particular occasion, a spokesman for the angry group, in full view of national television, threatened the authorities with these words: ‘We are angry and hungry and if we do not get our money we will go downtown and loot up the place.’ Several police officers were around at the time. Indeed, the group of workers, heads banded and with knives and cutlasses, then went to the main shopping area and looted. Even some of the shoppers were reportedly mugged.25 The City was quickly overtaken by panic and fear as memories of the July 27 insurrection returned to shoppers and merchants. This incident was one day after the Government announced that the nation’s dollar ‘will be floated.’ Such floating, in effect, is a devaluation of the currency, a policy which in itself creates public anxiety. Three days after, Works Minister, Colm Imbert, implausibly stated that it was a ‘group of other people’ who did the looting. In a frenzy, merchants began locking up their stores and shoppers started to scamper. Police soon appeared on the scene and dispersed the looters. The Guardian reported:

Memories of July 27, 1990 returned to the streets of downtown Port of Spain yesterday when about 40 disgruntled workers of the Unemployment Relief Programme (URP) went on a rampage, smashing showcases, and looting a number of businesses on Henry and Charlotte Streets.26

The wounds of the Muslimeen insurrection were reopened. If there were any doubts about the scars left by that insurrection, the reactions to this violent rampage should dispel those doubts. Almost ritualistically, the Guardian once again reminded the nation: ‘We are a nation of law and order.’ These newspaper stories and editorials on the event are cited to reflect the public passions which surround such rampage. Dealing with the workers’ violent actions of April 8, 1993, the Express editorialised:

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This shameful incident is one of the fruits of the July 27, 1990 coup attempt when much of urban Trinidad in the north was looted...Once a dog sucks egg, the old people say, it never loses the taste for it. So too, the 1990 orgy of looting demonstrated how easy it is to summon the requisite audacity from mob ignorance, how simple it is to submerge one’s sense of right and wrong.27

Submerge one’s ‘sense of right and wrong?’ The more plausible argument in the circumstances is that there was nothing much for them to submerge. The sense of social responsibility in this group of protestors was already diminished. By social comparison and energised feelings of relative deprivation, these protestors see themselves more as crusaders than as sinners. And this, as discussed earlier, is the more dangerous condition. The arithmetic in their numbers does not fully reflect the wider social psychology of the sinister undercurrent in the society. The Express editorial, however, caught on to the diffused irresponsibility which such violent protests reflect. It added:

Another more common manifestation of this predatory attitude is the way women are publicly harassed and privately terrorised in Trinidad. Or, another example, there is the irresponsible burning of the hills which people do in the dry season simply to squat and grow vegetables...And yet, without excusing the looters in any way, it must be pointed out that much of the entire society is to blame. First, because it is only one fruit of the vulgar belief that money is king and wealth celebrated - howsoever it may have been obtained. Then there is the racial and economic resentment which politicians have too easily encouraged in the past, and continue to encourage today, as if anyone who is privileged...is fair game for those less well off.28

The Express newspaper, even as a bastion of private property itself, still found room to lodge the protestors’ attack on private property in the wider context of social contradictions discussed above. This connection between the grievances of certain groups and the illegal actions they choose will be a recurring theme in the discussion of the country’s social order. While the causes for such illegal actions may be controversial, the overall situation is a symptom of social disintegration which in itself is an incubator for social disorder and even insurrection.

A THEORY OF ADVERSARIAL DIFFUSIVENESS

The fact of the matter is that the government at a much earlier time could have sensibly and fairly dealt with Abu Bakr and his Muslimeen group’s interest in the Mucurapo lands. That was also a time when there was a wider public acceptance of social and legal standards with respect to the issues involved. But as said earlier, the years from 1983-90 saw almost a decade of official confusion while in these same years, there was the emerging challenge to the established order by Abu Bakr’s consolidation of moral authority and ‘claim by occupancy’ of

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the lands. Responsibility for the July 27 tragedy, in this sense, should be also placed at the doorsteps of the successive PNM and NAR governments who continued along a path of administrative inefficiency and ambivalence. Their respective attempts to seek political settlements mixed untidily with the rule of existing laws and court orders. And in an adversarial system of politics, there are serious implications. In this context, three psychological propositions are advanced.

Soldiers search captured Muslimeen rebels

The hardest hit areas in Port of Spain

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Proposition 1: The longer a public controversy takes to get settled, the more complex and confused the means get with the ends and the more politicised the issues become. Proposition 2: The longer a public controversy takes to get settled, the more likely the issues would move from controllable specificity to unmanageable generality. Proposition 3: The longer a public controversy takes to get settled, the more likely would subjective interpretations grow over the objective factors.

These propositions together form a theory of adversarial diffusiveness and are quite relevant to a Westminster-type political system where the process of adversarial relationships are institutionalised and with the right to oppose the ruling party in the competition for power. These propositions manifest the psychology of political conflict in a multi-party democracy, especially when social and legal standards of public conduct are very unsettled. And when the government attempts to gain lost ground, it is like trying to put spilt milk back into the bottle. There are, of course, certain controversies in which the government (or other authority) may want ‘to play for time’, wait for things to cool down, and when hopefully, the public would no longer be as active with the controversy. In such circumstances, the government may choose to do nothing or appoint an official inquiry. Either way it is playing for time.

FIGURE 27. 1

+denotes trend towards resolution by initial dispute antagonists. -denotes trend away from resolution. A is the initial land conflict, not only the drift away from resolution but its up and down journey towards July 27, 1990. B, D, and F illustrate the diffusion from A into other conflict issues in an adversarial social political system. C and E further illustrate that a spawned conflict could produce yet another conflict issue.

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Such strategies do not work well in controversies with a very active antagonist whose agenda obviously contains more than the initial issue at hand. Delays become advantageous to the antagonist. Bakr himself, apparently realising that he was gathering public momentum, resisted several attempts at compromise with the government. In 1984, for example, Bakr refused to accept the City Corporation’s offer of ‘a lease of a suitable lot at Mucurapo of an adequate size to meet your requirements under such terms and conditions as the Council may decide.’ A similar resistance arose in the Samaroo discussions. The offer did not seem satisfactory enough. As the controversy gets prolonged, a psychological process of ‘shaping by approximation’ develops, that is, the adversarial process gradually throws up other actors who help reinforce the main antagonists on both sides. Competing standards of conduct gain their respective supporters. By gestures and actions, one by one and in interaction with one another, these signals push the controversy to a point of almost no return. For example, what was originally seen as deviant becomes socially valued because ‘important supporters’ have gradually emerged on each side. The controversy becomes wrapped up in the psychology of symbolic interactionism. Each side gradually gets politically consolidated and to back down would mean to lose face in public. The law itself becomes a subject of political dispute. The ensuing conflict becomes politicised with adversarial diffusiveness. Abu Bakr’s presence in the country did not merely symbolise a legal dispute over the Mucurapo lands. He eventually gravitated towards the centre of the adversarial system as a legitimate voice for sectional and even wide social concerns. By so doing, he eventually picked up a following of other souls whose immediate concerns were less with the Mucurapo lands than with unemployment, drug trafficking, political corruption and public health - an everyman’s package of socioeconomic grievances. In relating his struggle to build the Mucurapo mosque and school, he echoed calypsonian Black Stalin’s words: ‘Black Man Doh Get Nuttin’ Easy.’ He helped reenergised the 1970 Black Power grievances but this time with Muslim garb. Far from being tied to the Mucurapo issue, Bakr aroused public sentiments over the social and economic divisions of the society. He was building himself into a symbol for the underdog. And he was given the time and the issue to do so. Once a controversy gets extended into wide public discourse, the initial elements of the controversy get not only blurred by wider concerns of social justice but by partisan forces entering to raise ‘more fundamental issues’ of the society. The adversarial system comes to life with a political legitimacy that unsettles the strict application of law. Far from being a single issue of illegal occupation of the Mucurapo lands, the issue spread out to include the right to educate Muslimeen children, the right to worship and the right to the enjoyment of property. And so the nation’s constitution itself was brought in to defend the rights of the alleged offender. The controversy is worked up so that rather than

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cornering the original offender, the larger issues conspire to accuse ‘the system’ itself. It is similar to controversies over ‘poverty and crime.’ In delinquency particularly, while a poor youth may be guilty beyond a shadow of a doubt for a particular crime, once his socioeconomic background begins to be analysed, there is strong argument that his destitute circumstances ‘caused’ him to commit the crime. The particular youth eventually becomes almost invisible. His self responsibility disappears in the ensuing debate over social circumstance. The bells of liberal sociology ring loudly and for many, attractively. For such reasons, Abu Bakr’s actions and the dire consequences are viewed differently by those on different sides of the ideological spectrum. For example, referring to the subsequent looting, Chris Searles (1991) wrote:

The reality seemed to be with the looters, turning aside from both government and would-be insurgents, to take momentary profit and advantage from a system which seemed to count them as nothing and tasting, for a few illusory minutes, an imaginary economic power.29

Political violence and especially civil riots always leave behind prolonged controversy over causes, especially over whether it is the system or the individual rioters to be held responsible. Liberals and the ‘progressive left’ have usually framed their explanations of social disintegration and ‘property attacks’ on the alienation experienced by protesters. They claim that the wide socioeconomic disparities, fuelled by feelings of relative deprivation, frustration and anger, lead to street uprisings. The conservatives say, generally, that in a democratic society there are enough legitimate ways in which a person could achieve if he wants to and if aggrieved, there are other ways to express such grievance and gain satisfaction. They say that it is largely a matter of personal responsibility. Describing the Los Angeles riots of 1992, and as a countervailing view to Searles, Midge Decter, Distinguished Fellow of the Institute on Religion and Public Life, said:

The condition of those young men is beyond the reach of government. Indeed the efforts of government have done much to undermine their capacity to take charge of their own lives. Yet taking charge of their own lives is the only thing that will save them. As black political scientist, Glenn Loury, recently said: “The problem of the black underclass is a problem that will only be solved one by one and from the inside out.” Holding blacks responsible for themselves would be a mark of respect that has heretofore, despite all passionate protestations been withheld from them in liberal thought.30

One of the objectives of public law is to possess a specificity that will reduce if not diminish subjective interpretations. But once caught up in wider socioeconomic issues and public rhetoric, what was initially specific to the controversy becomes turned and tossed by subjective interpretations. Adversarial

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diffusiveness takes over. It becomes a basket for everyman’s grievances. Unmanageable generalisation is born, the public imagination is captured and the law itself becomes politicised. There is sometimes a virtue in such extended public debate. It helps expose certain inadequacies in law. At the same time, it pushes a resolution of the controversy further away. The Muslimeen benefited from the delay. But in the end, the entire nation, including the Muslimeen, paid a heavy price. However, given the structural conditions under which this diffusiveness grows and operates, could the social and political responses to the Muslimeen controversy be any other way? The social and legal norms are there but they appear to be in an unholy alliance with the spread of privilege and resources within the society. That is, the normative ideals are there, but there are cracks and divisions within the society such that if put under a similar stress, these cracks and divisions would likely reawaken with similar diffusiveness. It is like a sleeping juggernaut.

NOTES

1. From A Society Under Siege: A Study of Political Confusion and Legal Mysticism, The Mcal Psychological Research Centre, The University of the West Indies, Trinidad, West Indies. 1993, pp. 131–79, with permission. 2. Trinidad Express, September 21, 1972. 3. Trinidad Express, November 23, 1992. 4. Trinidad Express, November 25,1992. 5. Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. First Schedule, 1976 6. Trinidad Express, December 8,1992. 7. Trinidad Express, February 7, 1993. 8. Keith Rowley in Trinidad Guardian, February 19, 1993. 9. Trinidad Guardian, July 16, 1990. 10. TnT Mirror, November 29, 1992. 11. Trinidad Guardian, November 29, 1992. 12. Trinidad Express, March 23, 1993. 13. A. Allot, The Limits of Law,1980, p. 287 (London: Butterworths) 14. E. Durkeim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, 1952 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) 15. Christine Miller in Trinidad Express, February 17, 1993. 16. Trinidad Express, December 24,1992. 17. The Conflict in Society. Commonwealth Law Conference, 1983. 18. See e.g. Ian Stewart, Sociology in Jurisprudence, in Alan Hunt, Doreen McBarnet and Bert Moorhouse. Law, State and Society,1981 (London: Croom Helm Ltd). 19. R. Merton Social Theory and Social Structure, 1957 (New York: Glencoe) 20. Trinidad Guardian, December 13, 1992. 21. The Government had raised the salaries of the President, Prime Minister, Ministers, Members of Parliament and other senior public servants at a time when other public servants were owed salary arrears. 22. Trinidad Express, March 9, 1993.

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23. Trinidad Guardian, August 20, 1990. 24. Geoffrey Frankson in Trinidad Express, September 13, 1990. 25. Trinidad Express, Apri112, 1993. 26. Trinidad Guardian, April 9, 1993. 27. Trinidad Express, April 12, 1993. 28. Trinidad Express, April 12, 1993. 29. C. Searles, Race and Class, 1991 33 2. 30. Commentary, July 1992. p. 17.

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victimisation in the caribbean

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Human In an era of globalisation, human trafficking Trafficking is a worldwide problem affecting every continent and most countries in the world and the and it ranks as one of the most lucrative Dominican forms of trans-national crime. Traffickers respect neither boundaries nor borders and Republic: move within and across nations. The A Victim-Centric trafficking of persons for sexual and labour Approach exploitation is an international, organised, criminal phenomenon that has grave Janice Joseph1, Zelma W. Henriques consequences for the safety, welfare and and Patrice Morris human rights of its victims (Interpol 2004). A number of factors have led to its expansion, such as the easy profits made from exploitation; growing deprivation and marginalisation of the poor, discrimination against women, restrictive migration laws, a lack of information about the realities and dangers of trafficking, and insufficient penalties against traffickers. Using a victim-centric approach, this chapter focuses on the victims of human trafficking in the Dominican Republic and responses to their victimisation. First, the chapter presents a brief overview of the literature on human trafficking. Second, it examines the nature and extent of the victimisation in the Dominican Republic and this is followed by a critical assessment of the government response to these victims. Finally, this chapter provides a number of recommendations.

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LITERATURE REVIEW Definition

Although the trafficking of human beings is a major problem today, there is a great deal of confusion about precisely what is human trafficking. This confusion is reflected in the various, sometimes contradictory, definitions and concepts used in national legislation and international conventions. Because the trafficking of human beings is a complex phenomenon, it is imperative that a clear definition be established. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) argues that human trafficking violates a number of international conventions and in the case of receiving and transit countries, the phenomenon violates a number of national laws. It defines trafficking as any illicit transporting of migrants and/or trade in them for economic personal gain and it occurs when a migrant is illicitly recruited, kidnapped, sold, and or moved, either within national or across international borders (International Organisation for Migration 2001). This definition of the IOM is very restrictive because it places particular emphasis on migrant workers. It may be true that migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to being exploited given their circumstances of migration, but migrant workers are not the only group of individuals who are trafficked throughout the world. This definition is also not applicable to individuals who are trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation. The United States Department of State refers to this phenomenon as ‘trafficking in persons’ and identifies two forms of human trafficking; sex trafficking and labour trafficking. According to the United States (US), sex trafficking involves the use of force, fraud, or coercion that causes someone to be exploited for sexual purposes, and this could include prostitution or pornography. Labour trafficking includes labour without compensation, which could include forced or bonded labour (United States Department of State 2003). The US definition acknowledges the victimisation inherent in human trafficking, but it does not capture the magnitude of the problem or its trans-national nature. In recent years, increased attention to the global problem of trafficking in persons has led to a worldwide push for the development of a working definition of trafficking that encompasses the full nature and scope of the abuse. In February 2000, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the IOM submitted a joint statement to the Ad Hoc Committee recommending the following definition of trafficking:

recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons... by improper means, such as force, abduction, fraud or coercion, for an improper

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purpose, like forced or coerced labour (including bonded labour or debt bondage), servitude, slavery or sexual exploitation {Trafficking Protocol Article 3} (United Nations 2006).

The United Nations’ (UN) definition provides the most comprehensive of all definitions so far. This definition contains three distinct, but interconnected elements:

1) the recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person; 2) the use of threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud or deception, abuse of power or a position to achieve the consent of a person in order to control another person; and 3) sexual exploitation of others or forced labour or services or servitude.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF VICTIMISATION

The United Nations (2006) defines a victim as:

a person who, individually or as a part of a collective, has suffered damage, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of his or her fundamental rights through acts or omissions in violation of criminal law (p.4).

Although the number of victims of trafficking began to grow in the 1990s, it is impossible to determine the number of persons trafficked each year. The clandestine nature of trafficking makes it difficult to assess the extent of the problem. It is, however, a large scale problem. According to the US government, an estimated 600,000–800,000 men, women, and children are trafficked across international borders each year. Millions more are trafficked within their own national borders for a variety of purposes, including forced labour, bonded labour, sexual servitude, and involuntary servitude (US Department of State 2006). Victims are often lured with false promises of good jobs and better lives, and then forced to work under brutal and inhumane conditions. Victims may initially consent to a form of work, but not to the use of threats, physical and emotional abuse, or coercion that is used to maintain the work. While there is no single victim stereotype, a majority of trafficked persons are women and children. They often come from vulnerable populations characterised by oppression, high rates of illiteracy, little social mobility, and few economic opportunities. Traffickers specifically target these individuals because they are often the easiest to recruit and control and are least likely to be protected by law enforcement. The feminisation of poverty and low socioeconomic deprivation in underdeveloped countries often determine a victim’s decision to migrate to a ‘richer’ country in search of a better job, higher wages, and a better standard of living.

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The insatiable demand for sex has resulted in a lucrative trade in sex trafficking. Sex trafficking can include street prostitution, pornography, stripping, live sex shows, and sex tourism. Women and girls are treated as commodities in prostitution rackets, and often work in closed brothels that operate out of residential homes or work in massage parlours, spas, strip clubs and other fronts for prostitution. Trafficking organisations make huge profits from the trafficking of females for purposes of prostitution (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006), and this is the most common form of human trafficking (United Nations 2006). Labour exploitation involves forced labour and bonded or debt bondage. Forced labour is a situation in which victims are forced to work against their own will. Their movements may be restricted, and they often experience violence. This form of labour trafficking can include domestic servitude, agricultural labour, sweatshop factory labour and janitorial, food service and other service industry labour. Victims of bonded or debt bondage are often exploited as a means of repayment for a loan or service, and usually the value of their work is greater than the original sum of money ‘borrowed’ (US Department of State 2005). In child trafficking, children are victims of both labour exploitation and sexual exploitation. Labour exploitation occurs when children are forced to work in hazardous conditions that can affect their health and/or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social well-being. It is estimated that, worldwide, there are 246 million exploited children aged between five and 17 involved in child labour. The number of victims of these forms of trafficking is very significant and increasing (US Department of State 2006). Once trafficked, the victims are even more vulnerable to victimisation. Traffickers use a variety of methods to ‘condition’ their victims including intimidation and threats (Leidholdt 2003), blackmail (Stark and Hodgson 2003), and debt bondage (Klain 1999). They also use emotional abuse and emotional manipulation (Klain 1999), seduction (Zimmerman et al. 2003), social isolation and identity control (Klain 1999, Leidholdt 2003). These strategies are used to prevent the victims from escaping.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING VICTIMS AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Dominican Republic, (República Dominicana) is a country located on the eastern two-thirds of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola, bordering Haiti. Hispaniola is the second largest island of the Greater Antilles islands, and lies west of Puerto Rico and east of Cuba and Jamaica. The Dominican Republic is considered to be a middle-income developing country dependent primarily on agriculture, trade, and tourism which accounts for more than $1 billion, annually. The Dominican Republic is considered a source, transit, and destination country for sexual exploitation and forced labour. The UN (2006) has labelled the Dominican Republic ‘high’ as a country of origin and ‘medium’ as a destination

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country. Victims are trafficked internationally, regionally, internally or they may be trafficked into the Dominican Republic from another country.

WOMEN AS VICTIMS

In the Dominican Republic, women 18-25 years of age are at the highest risk of being trafficked for sexual exploitation. It is estimated that 50,000 Dominican women work in prostitution around the world and that an estimated one-third of these women are trafficking victims (Mittleman 1999). Women from the Dominican Republic are often recruited through acquaintances or family networks, and by means of false promises and misleading employment advertisements. The primary destinations include Argentina, Australia, the Netherlands, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Netherlands Antilles, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Panama, Suriname (US Department of State 2006). In addition, foreign men have reportedly married local women in order to take them abroad for prostitution (Steglich and Guinn 2002). The IOM (1996) reported that victims who were trafficked from the Dominican Republic to Europe experienced exploitation and abuse. For example, those who were trafficked to Greece:

had to work as dancers/prostitutes for the first three months without pay which meant incurring debts for accommodation, food, clothes, etc. Then, for the following three months they were allowed to keep 25-30 percent of what they earned from which their debts had to be settled. They were rotated every week to different cabarets and had one day off a week. All of them suffered physical violence by the traffickers and were told not to reject any client (p.4).

Likewise, those arriving in Spain described a similar system of exploitation, but they had the advantage of understanding the language and could talk with the traffickers and clients. A similar situation was found in Switzerland as well. Those who worked in Switzerland reported that they frequently changed their place of work, forced to consume excessive amounts of alcohol, paid by the customer, and contributing to the traffickers gain (p.4).

One ugly side-effect of tourism in the Dominican Republic is the creation of a lucrative sex tourism industry which has increased throughout the country as the number of international visitors increased. The Dominican Republic is one of the most popular sex tourism destinations in the world, and it is advertised on the Internet as a ‘single man’s paradise’ (Scheeres 2001). Consequently, many of the women who are trafficked internally work in the sex tourism industry. For many of the tourists who participate in these sexual-economic exchanges, the Dominican Republic has become known as one of the Sexual Disneylands of the Caribbean (O’Connell Davidson and Sanchez 2005). Many of the women who are trafficked into the Dominican Republic for sexual

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exploitation are Haitian immigrants (Silie 1999). However, these women experience prejudice from the larger society as well as from local sex workers. Haitian sex workers are often accused of undercutting the prices that the Dominican women charge their clients. Furthermore, Haitians are perceived as dirty and diseased, so that many Dominican women, including sex workers, go to great lengths to distance themselves from them. In fact, many of these Haitian women are concentrated in the lowest paid sex jobs (Kempadoo 2004).

MEN AS VICTIMS

Most of the men who are trafficked in the Dominican Republic for labour exploitation are Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descent. Every year, Haitians, primarily males, are trafficked to the Dominican Republic to work in the sugarcane industry. They often live in shantytowns, referred to as ‘bateyes’ or sugar cane work camps consisting of barracks and a few houses. Bateyes vary in size and are located close to cane fields so that groups of workers can live nearby to their work. There are over 400 bateyes and the conditions in the bateyes are substandard, with limited or no electricity, running water, medical assistance or schooling. Housing in the bateyes is poor and most individuals sleep in barracks on iron beds without mattresses or on dirt floors. Many families of five or more share living quarters that measure as little as ten square feet. Bathroom facilities and cooking facilities, where available, are generally unhygienic. The availability of fresh food, including fruits and vegetables, is severely limited and clean water is often unavailable (see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006). In various shantytowns, field guards have kept workers’ clothes and documents to prevent them from leaving. Employers also sometimes withhold wages to keep workers in the fields. These immigrants work longer hours and have fewer benefits than workers in other industries (Lee 2003, US Department of State 2006). Human rights non-governmental agencies, the Catholic Church, and activists described Haitian living conditions in bateyes as modern-day slavery (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006).

CHILDREN AS VICTIMS

Child labour is a serious problem in the informal sector of the economy. It is common in the Dominican Republic for children to be put on the street to fend for themselves because parents are forced to use their meagre resources to care for younger siblings. Homeless children, called ‘palomas’ (doves), are frequently at the mercy of adults who force them to beg and sell fruit, flowers, and other goods on the street. In return for their work they are given basic housing. Although the ages at which these children are forced to work, the hours they work, and their failure to comply with compulsory school attendance all violate the law, these practices still continue (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2004).

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Within the Dominican Republic, children are also forced to work as prostitutes primarily in the tourist areas. Newspaper reports indicated that as many as 30,000 children and adolescents may be involved in the sex industry. Poor adolescent girls and boys are sometimes enticed into performing sexual acts by the promise of food or clothing or for money (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006). There are also indications that children from the Dominican Republic are trafficked out of the Dominican Republic to Curaçao for sexual purposes. Traffickers approach certain brothel owners to ‘order a child.’ This child, usually an 8–12 year old girl from the Dominican Republic, is then flown to Curaçao, and handed over to a client. After one week the girl is returned to the brothel owner and flown back to the Dominican Republic. An average of US $2,200 is paid per child. To cover the costs, sexual acts with the child are put on video and sold for profit on the black market (Borland et al. 2004). Many Haitian children are also trafficked into the Dominican Republic. It is estimated that in the northern part of Haiti, 2,000-2,500 children cross the border annually (Regan 2002). A study estimated that 50-60 Haitian children are trafficked into the country each week, and that many Haitian girls age 12 and older are brought into the Dominican Republic to work as prostitutes (see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006). The restavèk system has been used as the main vehicle to traffic Haitian children into the Dominican Republic as conditions in Haiti have worsened. The word, restavèk which means ‘stay with,’ refers to children who are virtually enslaved as domestic servants. The practice started during the last century, when peasants began sending their children to work for city families in the hope that they would receive food, schooling and the chance of a better life. Under this system, some poor Haitian families arranged for Dominican families to ‘adopt’ and employ their children, in hopes of assuring a more promising future for them. ‘Handlers’ or ‘arrangers’ place children as young as six with families in the Dominican Republic with the understanding that children taken into another family will be treated ‘almost’ like family members. In exchange, the birth parents in Haiti would receive monetary payment or a supply of clothes and food. This practice requires that the children be responsible for household ‘chores’ which require long hours of work resulting in a form of indentured servitude. In many cases, adoptive parents do not treat the adopted children as full family members and expect them to work in the households or family businesses rather than attend school. In addition, although the children receive shelter, food and clothing, everything is inferior to the families whose roofs they share. If they have access to education, the programmes are frequently of lesser quality than those available to Dominican children and are frequently offered at night (International Rescue Committee Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2005). This form of trafficking is circular in most cases, with the children staying in the Dominican Republic for 1 to 5 months and then returning to their families. Some children

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are thought to travel two or more times per year (Tejeda, Cemephise and Artola 2002). There is also a thriving trade in Haitian children in the Dominican Republic. A Haitian child can be bought at Dajabón, a bustling Dominican town on the Haitian border, for the equivalent of £54.22 (100.35 USD) to be trafficked in the Dominican Republic. On market day in Dajabón, the only papers that are needed to get across the bridge that links the two countries are peso notes to bribe the border guards. The scouts are usually paid around 600 pesos, half of which goes to the scout and half of which is paid to the immigration authorities as a bribe. Getting them over the border is easy; about a third of trafficked children come through the mountains and the rest go through official border checkpoints. It is believed that the Dominican Republic government and the military are complicit in this form of human trafficking. Most of the boys under the age of 12 end up begging or shoe-shining and giving their proceeds to gang leaders while older boys are taken to work in construction or agriculture. The girls are used as domestic servants or prostitutes. Although there is a law against trafficking in the Dominican Republic, it is rarely enforced (Younge 2005).

RESPONSE TO THE VICTIMS: A VICTIM-CENTRIC ANALYSIS Victim-Centric Approach

The victim-centric perspective is a victim-centred approach which focuses on the perspective of the victim. This perspective also shifts the focus away from seeing trafficked persons as objects to understanding them as human beings who are often compelled to make choices that result in being trafficked. A victim- centric perspective, therefore, is a useful analytical tool for understanding why specific types of individuals are vulnerable to trafficking. This victim-centric approach also focuses on policies and programmes that will empower victims to take control of their lives. In other words, understanding the victimisation process is an important part of the identification of solutions. Although the Dominican Republic has undertaken modest improvements to combat trafficking throughout the country, the US government reports that the government of the Dominican Republic does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. It has also listed the Dominican Republic as a Tier two country2 and suggests the Dominican Republic needs to do more to address corruption, which often impedes investigations and law enforcement efforts in the country (US Department of State 2006). Limited Legal Protection for Victims

In August 2003, the Dominican Republic adopted an anti-trafficking law (Law No. 137-03) which deals with the smuggling of illegal migrants and trafficking of

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persons. It defines trafficking in persons as including other forms of trafficking such as, trafficking for pornography, illegal adoption, and forced marriages, and trafficking in organs. The law stipulates penalties from 15-20 years imprisonment and fines of 175 times the minimum wage for trafficking. Punishment is enhanced by a sentence of five or more years under certain aggravated circumstances, such as trafficking in children. In addition, the five year enhanced penalty applies when the victim suffers physical or mental injury as the result of the trafficking. In addition, the law provides for criminal liability of the organisations and corporations that are involved in the trafficking of persons (Mattar 2003). Using this law, the Dominican Republic government has been successful in closing down several brothels where children had been exploited, and convicted one of the brothel owners and sentenced him to five years imprisonment. The government also secured convictions of four other trafficking defendants under its anti-trafficking law. These convictions resulted in 15 year prison terms for each defendant, and 24 children were rescued from a brothel as a result (US Department of State 2006). Despite these successes, there are problems and limitations in the law. One of the major problems is that the Dominican Republic has created a law to deal with both smuggling and trafficking rather than creating separate legal responses to these two crimes that are completely different. In addition, it focuses almost exclusively on child victims and has limited emphasis on adult victims. Moreover, it addresses sexual exploitation while ignoring other forms of exploitation, such as labour exploitation. Adult victims and victims of labour exploitation are, therefore, not protected under this new law. The Dominican Republic has legislation against procuring and pandering. Under this legislation, individuals who traffic women and children for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation can be prosecuted. However, enforcement of procuring and pandering crimes is extremely poor. Bar and brothel raids are conducted where child prostitution is suspected, but adults found in circumstances of prostitution, even as a result of coercion, deception and force, are ignored. These raids are also made more difficult because children are told to lie about their age, carry false identification, or are removed from the premises before the raids take place. In addition, there is widespread corruption, and police officers are sometimes paid off for notifying owners of impending raids (see Steglich and Guinn 2002). The Dominican Republic has also passed legislation stating that the exploiters of prostitution would be punished only if the victim was a minor. What this means is that the sexual exploitation or forced prostitution of women above the age of 18 is accepted and cannot be penalised. Moreover, the government usually does not enforce prostitution laws (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006). In fact, the nearly 25,000 child prostitutes in the country appeared to be valued more highly than middle-aged prostitutes (Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women 2004).

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In an attempt to control sex tourism, the Dominican Republic, like Jamaica, has also enacted legislation against ‘tourist hustling,’ introduced a licensing system for vendors and tourist guides, and has established special units to patrol resorts and enforce anti-hustling laws. These measures, however, are designed to protect tourists and the tourism industry rather than the victims of human trafficking (O’Connell Davidson, and Sanchez 2005). Victims as Illegal Immigrants

In many cases, the government of the Dominican Republic has treated trafficked victims as illegal aliens and has deported them to their countries of origin (Steglich and Guinn 2002). Many Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) reported that random deportations continued to occur at the end of the sugar cane harvest in order to avoid paying full wages to Haitian workers. Some sugar cane companies permit security guards to work with the military to ‘round up’ and deport Haitian labourers. Migration authorities and security forces sometimes conduct periodic sweeps throughout the year to locate and repatriate illegal migrants although some of these Haitian immigrants express a credible fear of persecution or torture if they are returned to Haiti (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006). By deporting these Haitians for violating the Dominican Republican’s immigration laws, the Dominican Republic is returning these trafficked victims to the same conditions that initially prompted their victimisation. They are, thus, made vulnerable to ‘re-victimisation.’ Furthermore, equating human trafficking with illegal migration does not stop human trafficking but drives it underground, thereby making it more invisible. Borders will continue to be porous, and stricter immigration measures can result further abuse of the victims. The practice of treating trafficked persons as illegal immigrants largely undermines the complexity of this phenomenon and disregards the problem as a human rights issue by focusing on the security of the country rather than the security of the trafficked person. This approach also confuses illegality with vulnerability of the victim. The United Nations’ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons (2000) {Article 7} stipulates that a receiving (destination) country should consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in its territory, temporarily or permanently. The application of immigration and related criminal provisions clearly does not comply with the United Nations protocol and further victimises trafficked victims. Lack of General Services for Victims

The new anti-trafficking law (Law No. 137-03) in the Dominican Republic refers to the trafficked person as a victim who is entitled to basic rights such as

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the right to privacy, identity, confidentiality, legal assistance, physical, social and psychological counselling, information, housing, medical care, education, training and decent employment opportunities (Mattar 2003). Despite these provisions in the law, the services are not available to victims of human trafficking because of lack of resources; for example, there are no shelters in the country specifically available for victims of human trafficking. In fact, most of the limited services provided for trafficked victims are implemented by NGOs, and adult trafficking victims are generally referred to the IOM. Overall, the medical, psychological, and legal needs of the victims are still not adequately addressed. The US government has recommended that the government of the Dominican Republic should work to increase funding to those agencies and organisations that are providing shelters and social services to trafficking victims (US Department of State 2006). In addition, the Dominican Republic has failed to comply with the Article six of the United Nations Trafficking Protocol (2000) which specifies that states should provide measures for the physical, psychological, and social recovery of victims of trafficking. Repatriation and Reintegration of Trafficked Victims

Article eight of the United Nations Trafficking Protocol (2000) imposes the responsibility on countries of origin to repatriate victims from abroad. Repatriation efforts may be limited unless they are accompanied with measures that make a significant impact on the economic status of victims. Assisting victims to resettle and start a new life is a daunting challenge for concerned governmental agencies and NGOs. In addition to psychological and social considerations, the victim faces the practical financial consideration of providing for their daily livelihood, and the ‘success criterion for repatriation is generally that the person is not re- trafficked’ (Marshall and Thatun 2005, 45). The new anti-trafficking law does not address the right for Dominican victims to return to the Dominican Republic (Mattar 2003), and the government of the Dominican Republic has provided only limited assistance to trafficked victims. When trafficked individuals are repatriated from abroad, they are given a ‘control record’ that goes into their official police record. They are, therefore, treated as criminals by legal authorities, either for prostitution or illegal migration (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006). Victims of human trafficking face major problems being reintegrated into their home communities when they are freed from the situation into which they were trafficked. The reintegration of the trafficked victims at the family and community levels is often very slow, especially if sexual exploitation was involved, because most countries stigmatise victims of human trafficking, especially victims of sexual exploitation. This is true in the case of the Dominican Republic where the laws are not very explicit, and where certain forms of sex work are met with disapproval and female victims are often stigmatised as ‘whores’ (Kempadoo 2004).

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Although the Center for Integral Orientation and Investigation (Centro de Orientación e Investigación Integral/COIN), with the support of IOM, provides some clinical services and adult education classes for returned women, this service is minimal because adequate reintegration resources are not available to assist the victim with work-related training or to provide financial support during the transitional period (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2006). It is clear that the poor economic conditions in the Dominican Republic that contributed to the vulnerability of these victims to traffickers can also prevent a successful reintegration into society for those victims who were trafficked abroad. Such a situation can result in these victims being re-trafficked. Preventive Strategies and Victims

There are several approaches to prevention. One is based on economic vulnerability, and prevention programmes often attempt to reduce poverty and empower potential victims so they will not fall prey to traffickers. A second approach to prevention is raising awareness about the risks of trafficking. Awareness-raising programmes are essential because, if people are aware of the risks involved in human trafficking, they will avoid being victims of trafficking. A third approach to prevention is through tighter and tougher border controls. This is based on the assumption that, if it becomes difficult for people to cross borders, they will not be trafficked. In the Dominican Republic, some efforts at prevention have been embraced. These preventive measures focus on people who are known or thought to be vulnerable to trafficking. COIN, for example, counsels women who are planning to accept job offers in Europe and the Eastern Caribbean. It also conducts community and educational campaigns on various issues such as citizenship, legal work requirements, health, forced prostitution, domestic servitude, and the dangers of trafficking. A booklet containing contact details on NGOs and consulates abroad and a comic book illustrating the experience and stories of trafficked women are also part of the campaign (Organisation of American States 2002). A Special Police Unit for Children and Adolescents has been established to prevent illegal acts from being committed against children and adolescents. With the support of the International Labour Organisation/International Program on the Elimination of Child Labour (ILO/IPEC), the Secretary of Labour is also working on programmes to eradicate child exploitation. The government has also stepped up efforts to control the Haitian border in an attempt to lower the number of Haitians being trafficked into the Dominican Republic (Steglich and Guinn 2002). The government of the Dominican Republic has also signed a migration agreement with Spain in 2001 to establish a legal migration scheme between both countries. This bi-lateral agreement will hopefully create opportunities for legal and safe migration for many unskilled and semi-low skilled workers. In 2002,

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the government of the Dominican Republic also made the eradication of child sexual exploitation a national priority (Steglich and Guinn 2002). What is, however, missing from its prevention paradigm is an emphasis on the elimination of the root causes of human trafficking. Lack of employment opportunities, poverty, hopelessness, and marginalisation seem to be contributing factors why Dominicans seek jobs abroad. If these issues are not addressed, then human trafficking will continue to be a major problem in the Dominican Republic.

NEED FOR A VICTIM-CENTRIC APPROACH TO TRAFFICKING

Human trafficking is a complex and sensitive issue affecting the core dignity and human rights of its victims. Consequently, the elimination of human trafficking cannot be addressed until careful attention is given to the needs of the victim. It is clear from the above discussion that, in the Dominican Republic, the human rights of the trafficked victims are not sufficiently maintained or addressed, and the victims’ needs are minimised in its anti-trafficking approach. It is, therefore, imperative that the government takes a more victim-centric approach to human trafficking. The victim-centric approach suggests that a holistic framework is necessary to address comprehensively the needs of the trafficked victim and avoid re-victimisation. Elements of this framework would include victim services for empowerment, victims’ access to justice, and prevention of victimisation. Based on this approach, the following policy initiatives and strategies are recommended:

RECOMMENDATIONS Victim Services

Like many countries, the Dominican Republic tends to objectify victims of human trafficking, and this objectification of victims has led to the lack of services available for trafficked persons. The victim-centric approach shifts the focus away from seeing trafficked persons as objects toward understanding them as human beings who have being subjected to degradation, humiliation, and abuse. The victim-centric approach implies an empowerment approach through assistance so that these individuals can reclaim their lives. Consequently, the Dominican Republic should ensure that:

• social services, such as counselling, medical assistance, legal assistance, and employment are provided to victims of human trafficking so that they avoid re-victimisation. • its citizens trafficked abroad are safely and voluntarily returned without any fear of reprisals on return to the Dominican Republic. • trafficked victims in the Dominican Republic are safely and voluntarily

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returned to their country of origin and not deported to their country of origin.

The complex needs and unique situations of trafficked persons require effective, well-established systems of support. Consequently, assistance to trafficked victims needs substantial financial resources, and NGOs have limited capacity to offer financial support to these victims. The government of the Dominican Republic should:

• establish a fund and other financial support for victims of human trafficking by making it a priority on the political agenda. Victims’ Access to Justice

The emphasis on trafficking as a migration problem has led to the criminalisation of trafficked victims. In addition, the deportation of trafficked victims often allows the traffickers to evade prosecution. The Dominican Republic should:

• strengthen existing legislation with a view to providing better respect for and protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for victims of trafficking by enacting laws that are victim-sensitive and victim-friendly. • refrain from criminalising trafficking victims for their involuntary illegal entry or residence in the country. • exempt all trafficked persons in the country from prosecution for crimes committed while being trafficked even if they do not testify against their captors or provide the identity of their traffickers. • provide victims of trafficking, including ‘illegal’ immigrants, with legal and other assistance in the course of any criminal, civil, and other actions against traffickers/exploiters, including a temporary or permanent residence permit and a safe shelter.

A victim-centric approach, focusing on the rights of the victims could be instrumental in encouraging trafficked victims to testify against their abusers. In order to achieve this, the Dominican Republic should:

• establish a victim-witness protection programme which would not only protect the safety of the victims, but would also aid law enforcement authorities in prosecuting the traffickers. • provide victims with civil remedies, including compensation for trafficking and other criminal acts to which they have been subjected.

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• protect victims and their families against retaliation and intimidation for exposing their captors. Prevention of Victimisation

Although the root causes of human trafficking are complex, socioeconomic inequality coupled with marginalisation appear to be the underlying impetus that determines people’s desire to create a better economic situation for themselves. The prevention of human trafficking should, therefore, be examined with a socioeconomic context and viable alternatives should be available to prevent people from being trafficked. The preventive measures undertaken by the Dominican Republic to combat human trafficking are commendable, but it is clear that these prevention measures focus primarily on child victims, with less emphasis on labour and other forms of exploitation and victimisation. It is, therefore, important that preventive measures be based on an understanding and acceptance of the root causes of human trafficking. The Dominican Republic should:

• establish programmes to prevent not only child trafficking but adult trafficking, and to prevent labour as well as other forms of trafficking. • address poverty, marginalisation, and gender inequality in an attempt to reduce the opportunities for human trafficking. • vigorously enforce anti-trafficking laws by reducing corruption among government officials (US Department of State 2006).

Human trafficking is a complex issue, and efforts to prevent it should take into consideration the various dimensions of the problem, including the dynamics of the victimisation process. The prevention and elimination of human trafficking will require interdisciplinary and long-term approaches which address the trafficking cycle and which explicitly recognise the links and interaction between the trafficker and the trafficked. Given these complexities, there is no quick or easy solution to the problem of human trafficking. The Dominican Republic, however, should try to focus on the risk factors that predispose its citizens to be trafficked.

FURTHER RESEARCH

Efforts to prevent trafficking and to aid trafficking victims will not be successful until information about the routes, nature and extent of this problem and the needs of victims are available. Unfortunately, most of the information on human trafficking is scanty, and most of the data provided by various organisations lack credible foundation, thus creating gaps in the knowledge and understanding of human trafficking in the Dominican Republic. There is, therefore, an urgent need to improve data gathering and information on human trafficking. To better serve the needs of victims, the Dominican Republic needs to:

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• conduct empirical studies that are victim-sensitive in order to determine the extent of the victimisation of its citizens. This would include examining the age, gender, and other characteristics of the victims and the impact of trafficking on the victims. • conduct a needs assessment study to determine whether the limited services available are useful. The purpose of such an assessment is to determine whether the services provided to victims of trafficking are victim friendly, culturally sensitive, and effective. • develop a substantive database on victims’ experiences so that the government can gain a better understanding of the plight of these victims.

CONCLUSION

Human trafficking is an international crime that affects practically every country in the world. In the Dominican Republic, women and children are being trafficked into sexual exploitation and labour exploitation intra-regionally, internally, and internationally. In addition, men, women and children, primarily from Haiti, are trafficked into the Dominican Republic. Although the Dominican Republic has made some attempts to meet the needs of the trafficked persons, more needs to be done. To be a victim of trafficking is to be exploited, isolated, violated, and imprisoned. These individuals face incredible hurdles, and it is the responsibility of the government to protect the victims of trafficking by providing the services necessary for them to take control of their lives. With regard to service delivery to victims, the government of the Dominican Republic needs to create comprehensive programmes for victims; these programmes should be integrated so that their delivery would be efficient for victims; and finally, they need to be accessible to victims. The Dominican Republic, therefore, needs to develop a dynamic system approach within a multi-agency framework to address the needs of victims of human trafficking. The fight against trafficking in human beings in the Dominican Republic requires the government’s immediate attention. The Dominican Republic, therefore, needs to make human trafficking a high political priority. This would entail the allocation of more resources, enactment of comprehensive legislation, a commitment to vigorously prosecuting traffickers, the incorporation of the victim-centred dimension and analysis in research studies, and the signing of more bilateral and multilateral agreements with other countries. This pluralist and multi-faceted approach will be the pathway to victim empowerment and the elimination of human trafficking – a modern form of slavery – in the Dominican Republic.

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REFERENCES

Borland, R., Faas, L., Marshall, D., McLean, R., Schroen, M., Smit, M., & Valerio, T. (2004). HIV/AIDS and mobile populations in the Caribbean: A baseline assessment. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: International Organisation for Migration. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 2004. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices– Dominican Republic – 2003; http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27895.htm. Retrieved June 2006. ———. (2006). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/hrrpt/2005/61725.htm. Retrieved July 2006. Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women. (2004). Dominican Republic presents Fifth Periodic Report on Efforts to Comply With Women’s Anti-Discrimination Convention: Trafficking in women, prostitution among issues of concern for committee experts. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/wom1458.doc.htm. Retrieved July, 2006. International Organisation for Migration. 2001. Trafficking in migrants: IOM policy and responses. http://www.iom.int/en/who/main_policies_trafficking.shtml#chap1 ———. 1996. Trafficking in women from the Dominican Republic for sexual exploitation. http:/ /www.oas.org/atip/country%20specific/TIP%20DR%20IOM%20REPORT.pdf International Rescue Committee Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2005. Brown Medical School Dominican Republic Delegation, http://www.womens commission.org/pdf/Ht_Do.pdf#search=’HIV%20human%20trafficking%20 dominican%20republic. Retrieved July 2006. Interpol. 2004. Trafficking in women. http://www.interpol.int/Public/THB/Women/Default.as Kempadoo, K. 2004. Sexing the Caribbean: Gender, race, and sexual labour. New York, NJ: Routledge. Klain, E. J. 1999. Prostitution of children and child sex tourism: an analysis of domestic and international responses. Washington DC: American Bar Association Center on Children and the Law for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Lee, S. 2003. Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic. Center for Latin American Studies, University of California, Berkley. http://socrates.berkeley.edu:7001/Research/graduate/ summer2003/lee/. Retrieved July 2006. Leidholdt, D. A. 2003. ‘Prostitution and trafficking in women: An intimate relationship’. In M. Farley Ed. Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress, (pp. 167–83). Binghamton, NY: Haworth Maltreatment & Trauma Press. Marshall, P. & Thatun, S. 2005. ‘Miles Away: The trouble with prevention in the Greater Mekong Sub-region’. In K. Kempadoo Ed. Trafficking and Prostitution reconsidered: New Perspectives on migration, sex work, and human rights (pp. 43-63). Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers. Mattar, M.Y. 2003. The Birth of a new anti-trafficking legislation: The Dominican Republic’s Law Number 137-03 Regarding Illegal Trafficking of Migrants and Trade in Persons. Paper presented at the Conference on New Steps in Path-Breaking Strategies in the Global Fight against Sex Trafficking, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 8–9 December. http:/ /www.protectionproject.org/vz2.htm. Retrieved June, 2006. Mittleman, J. 1999. ‘The globalisation of organized crime, the courtesan state, and the corruption of civil society’. Global Governance, 5(1): 103–27. O’Connell Davidson, J. O., & Sanchez Taylor, J. S. 2005. ‘Travel and taboo: Heterosexual

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sex tourism to the Caribbean’. In E. Berstein & L. Schaffner, Eds. Regulating Sex: The politics of Intimacy and Identity, (pp. 83–99). New York: Routledge). Organisation of American States. 2002. Trafficking in women and children: Research findings and follow-up. Working Paper presented at the 31st Assembly of Delegates. October 29– 31, 2002. Punto Cona, Dominican. http://www.oas.org/CIM/XXXI%20Asamblea%20de%20 Delegadas/ADdoc-9.ing.DOC Regan, J. December 2, 2002. Haiti: Somber anniversary for children. Latinamerica Press. http:/ /www.lapress.org/Article.asp?IssCode=&lanCode=1&artCode=3145. Retrieved July, 2006. Scheeres, J. 2001. ‘The Web, where “pimps” roam Free,’ Wired News, July 7. Silie, R. 1999. Mesa De Desarrollo Fronterizo y Equilibrio Insular. Banco Mundial–PUCMM: Santo Domingo, República Dominicana. Stark, C. and Hodgson, C. 2003. ‘Sister Oppressions: A Comparison of Wife Battering and Prostitution’. In M. Farley Ed., Prostitution, Trafficking and Traumatic Stress (pp. 17–32). Binghamton, New York: The Haworth Maltreatment & Trauma Press. Steglich, E., & Guinn, D. 2002. In modern bondage: Sex trafficking in the Americas Central America and the Caribbean – Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua & Panama. Chicago, IL: International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University, International Human Rights Law Institute. Tejeda, D.; Cémephise, G.; Artola, J. 2002. Tráfico De Niños Haitianos Hacia La República Dominicana. Ed. Bilingüe (Francés-Español), UNICEF-OIM, Santo Domingo, República Dominicana. United Nations. 2006. Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns. New York, NY: United Nations. US Department of State. 2003. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report. http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2003/ ———. 2005. The facts about human trafficking for forced labour. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Washington, DC July 25, 2005. http://www.state.gov/g/ tip/rls/fs/2005/50861.htm ———. 2006. Trafficking in Persons Report, 2005 http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006/ 65988.htm. Retrieved June 2006. ———. 2006. Trafficking in Persons Report, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006/65988.htm Younge, G. September 22, 2005. Haitian children sold as cheap labourers and prostitutes for little more than £50. The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/ 0,3604,1575268,00.html?gusrc=rss. Retrieved June, 2006. Zimmerman, C., Yun, K., Shvab, I., Watts, C., Trappolin, L., Treppete, M., Bimbi, F., Adams, B., Jiraporn, S., Beci, L., Albrecht, M., Bindel, J., and Regan, L. 2003. The health risks and consequences of trafficking in women and adolescents. Findings from a European study. London: London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM).

NOTES

1. All correspondence should be sent to this author. 2. A Tier two country that does not fully comply with the minimum standards but are making sufficient efforts to bring themselves into compliance.

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Effects of INTRODUCTION

Ethnicity and There is a large but not well-integrated Nationality literature on risk-taking. Junger, West and Timman define risk-taking as ‘...not taking on Driving appropriate account of the possibility of Attitudes negative consequences of one’s actions’ and Perceived (2001, 440). Other researchers conceive of risky behaviour as rejecting conventionality Risk of (Donovan, Jessor and Costa 1991), Victimisation sensation-seeking (Hirschberger et al. 2001, Mawson et al. 1996, Ulleberg 2003) aversion Michael R. Norris and to delaying gratification (Mischel 1981), Jacqueline Bergdahl external locus of control (Crisp and Barber 1995) and seeking control at the boundaries of life through edgework as a result of alienation caused by participation in the modern labour force (Lyng 1990). In criminology, risk-taking can be traced to a genetic predisposition (Wilson and Herrnstein’s 1985, impulsivity), to social learning (Gottfredson and Hirschi’s 1990, low self control), or to some combination of both genetic and environmental factors. Robin traces the need to experience fear from the modern philosophers Locke, Burke, Tocqueville and Hobbes in post-modern thought: ‘No longer awaiting the arrival of the one true answer, we turn to fear as a substitute foundation, albeit a negative one, for morals and politics’ (Robin 2004, B12).

COLLEGE STUDENTS AND RISK-TAKING

College students are likely to indulge in risky behaviours such as cigarette smoking,

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binge drinking, drinking and driving and unprotected sex (CDC 1997). Windle (2003) notes that many college students are recently away from home and adult supervision, and encounter social and institutional approval of alcohol abuse. College athletics, residence hall life, Greek letter organisations and peer pressure all contribute to excessive drinking, which leads to hangovers, physical and sexual assaults, sleep and study interruptions. The National College Health Risk Behaviour Survey reported that 27.4 per cent of college students admitted to driving while drinking, while 35.1 per cent reported riding with a drinking driver (CDC 1997). Youthful feelings of invulnerability, peer conformity and overestimation of benefits from risky behaviour may undermine decision-making competency. Risk-taking may be exacerbated by peer and cultural pressures to satisfy informal norms or to receive praise (Greenberg et al. 1990, Jessor and Jessor 1977), and adolescents and young adults may be particularly susceptible to such pressures (Baumeister and Scher 1988). Rolison and Scherman (2003) presented college students with a drinking and driving scenario: those who indicated they would participate tended to score high on subscales of perceived peer participation, perceived benefits and sensation-seeking.

ETHNICITY AND DRIVING BEHAVIOUR

Previous research in the US suggests a paradoxical link between perceived risk of harm from violent crime and actual risk: that is, middle class, middle-aged White women have the most fear of violent victimisation yet have the lowest actual risk; young males, disproportionately poor and from ethnic minorities, have the least fear but the most risk (Karmen 2000). Although property crime has decreased in both the US and Jamaica since the ‘crime wave’ of the late 1960s and early 1970s, violent crime has greatly increased in Jamaica: homicide rates per 100,000 population for that country rose from 17.6 in 1976 to 43.0 in 2001, compared with 5.6 per 100,000 population in the US for 2001 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004, Harriott 2003). Previous research in the US on ethnicity and driving behaviour shows that Native Americans are more likely to abuse alcohol and have alcohol-related fatal crashes than African Americans, Hispanics and Whites (Cherpitel and Tam 2000). Analysis of the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse by both Caetano and McGrath (2005) and Watt (2004) shows that Whites and Native Americans have the highest self-reported rates for both risk-taking and driving under the influence (DUI). Bravers (2003) points out that African American and Hispanic adults drive fewer miles than Whites but have higher risks of fatal crashes. She found that Hispanics were more likely to be DUI and African Americans were less likely to use seat belts, both behaviours associated with higher risk of fatal crashes, when compared with Whites. However, this ethnic difference diminishes when

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controlling for level of education: drivers who have not completed high school – overrepresented in minority samples — are more likely to drive impaired and without seatbelts. A substantial literature shows that African American college students are considerably less likely to abuse alcohol than Whites (Nielsen 1999, Hanson, 1995). However, the picture is not so clear for Hispanics. Recent studies show significantly higher self-reported DUI rates for Whites (Royal 2003), yet Hispanics — like Native Americans — are overrepresented in alcohol-related traffic crashes (Voas et al. 1998). Romano, Tippetts and Voas (2005) found no differences between African American, Hispanic and Whites in running red lights. Although DUI was the best overall predictor of red light running in their study, lack of valid license was the best predictor of this violation in Hispanic drivers.

METHOD

A convenience sample of students from the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) Wright State University (WSU) and the University of the West Indies Mona Campus (UWI, Mona) were given a self-administered survey. Large sections of lower level undergraduate classes in sociology and government were sampled during the fall term of 2003 and the spring term of 2004 for a group administration of the survey.

COMPARING JAMAICA AND THE UNITED STATES

Students from the US form the greater proportion of the sample (67 per cent). Ten surveys from Jamaica were discarded as the respondents did not drive and therefore did not respond to items regarding driving on the questionnaire. The sample was 69 per cent female, and US students were significantly younger than Jamaican students, 21 versus 26 years (t = 4.395, p = .000). Comparing Jamaican and American students overall, American students drive more than twice the average annual miles of Jamaican students: 17,445 versus 6,668 respectively (t = -2.217, p = .029). In addition to driving considerably more, Americans were also significantly younger when they first started driving: 16 versus 20 years of age (t = 5.981, p = .000). Very small percentages of students reported being in car crashes or being at fault for crashes. Both Jamaican and US students reported 0.7 crashes on average; however, students from the US reported significantly more at-fault crashes (0.4) than Jamaican students (0.2) (t = -2.629, p = .010). There were no significant national differences in weight or perceived number of drinks required to become intoxicated, or percentages of driving time spent with child or adult passengers. However, within the US sample, Hispanic students reported weighing less but requiring significantly more drinks to become intoxicated (see also Bergdahl forthcoming, Caetano and Clark 2000). US students

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reported spending significantly more time alone in their vehicles than Jamaican students (77% versus 59%; t = -3.158, p=.003). Reflecting the changing face of higher education, the majority of respondents in this study were female: 59 per cent of Caucasians, 66 per cent of Hispanics, 63 per cent of African Americans and 73 per cent of Jamaicans. In US data, females are four times less likely than males to have a single vehicle fatality, although these rates seem to be converging because of women driving more miles and men driving more responsibly (Bergdahl and Norris 2002). Norris, Bergdahl and Harriott (forthcoming) analysed gender differences for the respondents in the present study. In the aggregate, males and females were equivalent in annual miles driven. That being said, US females were five times more likely to report being at fault for crashes than Jamaican females (p = .05). Although there was no difference between Jamaican and US males in feeling safe at night, US females reported feeling much safer at night than Jamaican females (68 per cent versus 25 per cent, p = .001). Table 29.1 shows ethnic differences in employment, licensure, self-reported drinking and driving, fear of being stranded and the small proportions of ethnic sub samples that say they never hurry when driving. Differences among sub samples are all statistically significant, except for ‘Drinks and Drives,’ which is marginally significant. White students in the US are considerably more likely to be working while attending college. African Americans are highly likely to have valid license and insurance and

TABLE 29.1 RESPONDENT EMPLOYMENT, LICENSURE AND CONCERNS

African Chi Square Caucasian Hispanic Jamaican American Signif. N 138 251 45 44 Employed 70.4% 56.6% 58.3% 48.8% .024 Valid Licence 98.6% 93.2% 100.00% 79.5% .000 Valid Insurance 97.8% 86.2% 95.8% 69.8% .000 Drinks Alcohol 66.4% 59.6% 52.2% 34.9% .003 Drinks and 66.7% 60.5% 56.3% 31.3% .059 Drives Fears Being 40.9% 66.0% 43.5% 78.0% .039 Stranded Never Hurries 1.5% 1.2% 0.0% 7.7% .017

to refrain from drinking and driving when compared with other US students in the sample. This is contrary to an opportunity model of documentation, which suggests that racism, poverty and involvement with the criminal justice system may interfere with proper licensing and insurance, and therefore could be a

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defensive strategy against racial profiling by the police, commonly referred to as ‘driving while black’ (DWB): Blacks in the US are more likely than Whites to be searched and arrested during traffic stops and to have the police use force against them (Rennison 2001). Jamaicans are the least likely of all student groups to have valid license and insurance, to drink and drive, to fear being stranded and to be in a hurry while driving. Inadequate documentation for Jamaicans may reflect greater relative inequality, a less formal culture, or some combination of both factors.

TABLE 29.2 BEHAVIOURS THAT RESPONDENT ALWAYS DOES

African Chi Square Caucasian Hispanic Jamaican American Signif. Slows with parents 28.7% 44.0% 62.5% 42.1% .001 Speeds with friends 2.2% 7.7% 20.8% 0.0% .000 Slows with child 51.1% 55.1% 52.2% 38.1% .056 Speeds on freeway 46.7% 32.3% 45.8% 27.5% .030

Table 29.2 shows behaviours and percentages of respondents that say they always practise them. Differences among sub samples are all statistically significant, except for ‘Slows with Child,’ which is marginally significant. Interestingly, African Americans are least likely to speed with parents in the car but most likely to speed with friends. Jamaicans are least likely to drive slower with children in the car, which is interesting since data in Table 29.1 suggest that Jamaicans are conservative drivers. US Caucasians and African Americans are more likely to speed on the freeway.

TABLE 29.3 CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH RESPONDENT FEELS VERY SAFE

African Chi Square Caucasian Hispanic Jamaican American Signif. At night 22.6% 4.5% 8.3% 4.8% .000 In strange area 5.9% 3.6% 0.0% 2.4% .006 In urban area 19.9% 8.5% 20.8% 7.3% .000 In strange car 6.6% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0% .000 When angry 5.1% 0.8% 4.2% 0.0% .026 Tailgating 2.9% 1.2% 4.2% 2.7% .001 At 70 mph 21.2% 6.5% 29.2% 12.5% .000 At 80 mph 10.2% 4.5% 8.3% 7.3% .002

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The data presented in Table 29.3 are percentages of respondents who indicated they felt very safe in a variety of conditions and manoeuvres. As shown by Chi square tests, all of the ethnic differences in Table 29.3 are highly significant. Caucasians are considerably more likely to feel very safe at night, in unfamiliar or urban areas, in an unfamiliar vehicle or at 80 miles per hour on the freeway. African Americans were more likely to feel very safe when following too closely or driving at 70 miles per hour. The fact that none of the African Americans in this study report feeling very safe in a strange area or vehicle is consistent with the DWB syndrome noted in the discussion of Table 29.1.

CONCLUSION

As mentioned earlier, college students are at higher risk of violent victimisation than the general population. Jamaican college students have over seven times greater risk of being harmed by violent crime than their counterparts in the US, mostly due to greater relative inequality in Jamaica (Harriott 2003). Risks of being in a fatal car crash are remarkably similar for Jamaicans and Americans; however, since Jamaican college students in this study report driving about half the annual mileage of their US counterparts, their actual risk is twice as great, probably because of a more dangerous driving environment. According to Evans’s (1991) theory of motorisation, risk of death or injury in a car crash increases as more miles are driven, but his theory was based on US data and does not take into account more dangerous driving environments in developing nations such as Jamaica. Very little research on driving attitudes and behaviour has compared African Americans with others of African descent. Our findings suggest that African American college students have more in common with White and Hispanic college students than with those from Jamaica, especially in having a valid licence and insurance. Despite a considerable amount of research on Hispanics and driving, more work needs to be done in controlling for different variables that contribute to their elevated risk of being in a fatal crash. These variables include linguistic handicaps in recognising road signs, cultural attitudes toward alcohol, transient employment - which requires them to drive in unfamiliar areas at odd hours and in states of fatigue, a tendency to drive older vehicles, and their relative lack of education, even when compared to other disadvantaged US groups such as African Americans (Bergdahl forthcoming). Previous research on college student driving behaviour has focused on US data and mostly Caucasian subjects. The importance of cross-national studies is paramount: ‘Comparative sociology is not a particular branch of sociology; it is sociology itself’ (Durkheim 1895, quoted in Wilson and Herrnstein 1985, 439). Future research should extend comparisons of African Americans and Jamaicans with other African-descended peoples, and also compare US Hispanics with Latin Americans.

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REFERENCES

Baumeister, R. and Scher, S. 1988. ‘Self-defeating Behaviour patterns among Normal Individuals: Review and Analysis of Common Self-destructive Tendencies’. Psychological Bulletin 104: 3-22. Bergdahl, J. and Norris, M. 2002. ‘Sex differences in fatal crashes: A Research Note’. The Social Science Journal 39: 287–93. Bergdahl, J. Forthcoming. ‘Ethnic and Gender differences in Attitudes toward driving’. In The Social Science Journal. Blows, S., Ivers, R., Connor, J., Ameratunga, S. and Norton, R.2003. ‘Car Insurance and the Risk of car crash Injury’. Accident Analysis and Prevention 35: 987–90. Bravers, E.R. 2003. ‘Race, Hispanic Origin, and Socioeconomic status in relation to motor vehicle occupant Death Rates and Risk Factors Among Adults’. Accident Analysis & Prevention 35: 295–309. Bureau of Justice Statistics. 2004. ‘Homicide trends in the United States: 2002 update’. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Justice. Caetano, R. and Clark, C.L. 2000. ‘Hispanics, Blacks and Whites driving under the influence of alcohol: Results from the 1995 National Alcohol Survey’. Accident Analysis and Prevention 32: 47–57. Caetano, R. and McGrath, C. 2005. ‘Driving under the influence (DUI) among U.S. ethnic groups’. Accident Analysis & Prevention 37: 217–24. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention .1997. Youth risk behaviour surveillance – National College Health Risk Behaviour. United States. Cherpitel, C.J. and Tam, T.W. 2000. ‘Variables associated with DUI offender status among Whites and Mexican Americans’. Journal of Studies on Alcohol 61, 5:698–703. Crisp, B. and Barber, J.1995. ‘The effect of locus of control on the association between risk perception and sexual risk-taking’. Personality and Individual Differences 19: 841–45. Donovan, J., Jessor, R. and Costa, F. 1991. ‘Adolescent health behavior and conventionality- unconventionality: An extension of problem-behavior theory’. Health Psychology 10: 52– 61. Evans, L. 1991. Traffic Safety and the Driver. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. Gottfredson, M. and Hirschi, T. 1990. A General Theory of Crime. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S. and Lyon, D. 1990. ‘Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58: 308–18. Hanson, D.J. 1995. ‘The United States of America’. In International Handbook on Alcohol and Culture, ed. D.B. Heath. Westport, CN: Greenwood. Harriott, A. 2003. Understanding Crime in Jamaica: New Challenges for Public Policy. Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press. Hirschberger, G., Florian, V., Mikulencer, M., Goldenberg, J. and Pyszczynski, T. 2001. ‘Gender differences and the willingness to engage in risky behavior: A terror management perspective’. Death Studies 26: 117–41. Jessor, R. and Jessor, S. 1977. Problem Behavior and Psychosocial Development: A Longitudinal Study of Youth. New York: Academic Press.

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Karmen, A. 2000. Victims of crime: Issues and Patterns. In Criminology: A Contemporary Handbook , ed. Sheley, J. Belmont, CA: Wadsorth/Thomson Learning. Lyng, S. 1990. ‘Edgework: A social psychological analysis of voluntary risk taking’. American Journal of Sociology 95: 851–86. Mawson, A., Biundo, J., Clemmer, D., Jaobs, K., Ktsanes, V. and Rice, J. 1996. ‘Sensation seeking, criminality and spinal cord injury: A case control study’. American Journal of Epidemiology 144: 463–72. Mischel, W. 1981. Introduction to Personality. New York: CBS College. Nielsen, A.L. 1999. ‘Testing Sampson and Laub’s life course theory: age, race/ethnicity and drunkenness’. Deviant Behavior 20: 129–51. Rennison, C.M. 2001. Criminal Victimization 2000: Changes 1999-2000 with Trends 1993- 2000. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Robin, C. 2004. ‘Fear itself’. Chronicle of Higher Education. B 11–12. Rolison, M. and Scherman, A. 2003. ‘College student risk-taking from three perspectives’. Adolescence 38: 689–705. Romano, E., Tippetts, S. and Voas, R. 2005. ‘Fatal red light crashes: the role of race and ethnicity’. Accident Analysis & Prevention 37: 453–60. Royal, D. 2003. ‘National survey of drinking and driving attitudes and behavior – 2001 – Vol. 1: Smmary Report’. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Washington, D.C. Ulleberg, P 2003. ‘Social influences from the back-seat: Factors related to adolescent passengers willingness to address unsafe drivers’. Transportation Research Part F 7: 17–30. Voas, R.B., Wells, J., Lestina, J., Williams, A.F. and Greene, M. 1998. ‘Drinking and driving in the United States: the 1996 National Roadside Survey’. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 30: 267–75. Watt, T.T. 2004. ‘Race/ethnic differences in alcohol abuse among youth: an examination of risk-taking attitudes as a mediating factor’. Journal of Ethnicity in Substance Abuse 3: 33–47. Wilson, J. and Herrnstein, R. 1985. Crime and Human Nature. New York: Touchstone. Windle, M. 2003. ‘Alcohol use among adolescents and young adults’. Alcohol Research and Health 27: 79–85.

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Perceptual Fear Fear of crime is defined by Ferraro (1995, 4) and Risk of as ‘an emotional response of dread or anxiety to crime or symbols that a person associates Victimisation with crime.’ This is fundamentally a social psychological concept which has informed Derek Chadee and Jason Ditton the discipline of criminology (Chadee 2006). Fear of crime is an under-researched area in the Caribbean, a gap which this paper seeks to fill. This paper looks mainly at findings from a longitudinal research project on fear of crime undertaken in Trinidad and conducted in 1999, 2000 and 2001. This project consisted of three cross-sectional surveys with some questions repeated across the three years and others asked only once. This paper focuses on findings from fear of crime and media questions, risk of victimisation questions and longitudinal results.

MEDIA AND FEAR OF CRIME

Morgan (1983, 146) pointed out that Gerbner and his associates (Gerbner et al. 1976, 1979, 1980) directed the attention of researchers to media effects on anxiety and away from the then current interest in aggression.1 Two of Gerbner’s works (Gerbner and Gross 1976, Gerbner et al. 1979) were influential in establishing that frequent television viewing was associated with the belief of becoming a crime victim. Gerbner’s findings were challenged by a number of authors including Doob and Macdonald (1979) who argued that the ‘neighbourhood effect’ and sample demographics moderated the relationship

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between television viewing and feelings of vulnerability to criminal victimisation. Hughes (1980, 295) was also critical of Gerbner, noting that Gerbner’s:

hypothesis concerning television watching and the perception of environmental menace, reverses direction after controls, and while this relationship is not statistically significant, it suggest that those who watch television heavily are less likely to be afraid of walking alone at night in their neighborhoods.

The findings are mixed as to the relationship between television viewing and fear of crime. For example, some authors have found a relationship (Morgan 1983, O’Keefe and Reid-Nash 1987, Gebotys et al. 1988, Sparks and Ogles 1990, Bazargan 1994, Haghighi and Sorensen 1996, Chiricos et al. 1997, 2000, Lane and Meeker 2003), and others have not (Gomme 1986, Sacco 1982, Skogan and Maxfield 1981, O’Keefe 1984). Sacco (1982, 476) describes a typical lay and common professional criminological attitude to the relationship between the media and crime:

The argument that mass media exert direct causal effects upon perceptions of crime possesses a certain intuitive appeal. In general, this position seems to follow logically from the three widely accepted assumptions upon which it is based. First, since most people do not have direct personal experience with serious crime, the major source of public thought and feeling regarding crime must be vicarious in nature. Second, the mass media of communication are information sources to which the members of modern society widely attend. Finally, as a number of researchers have documented, contemporary North American media contain a substantial proportion of crime-related news and information content.

Findings on the relationship between newspaper reading and the fear of crime are similar to those on television viewing. Some have found a positive relationship (Jaehnig et al. 1981, Gordon and Heath 1981, Heath 1984, Gebotys et al. 1988, Liska and Baccaglini 1990, Winkel and Vrig 1990, Williams and Dickinson 1993, Haghighi and Sorensen 1996 and Lane and Meeker 2003) and some have not (Sacco 1982, Skogan and Maxfield 1981, Gomme 1986, O’Keefe and Reid-Nash 1987, Bazargan 1994, Perkins and Taylor 1996 and Chiricos et al. 1997). Many studies have indicated that crime constitutes a relatively small but variable percentage of newspaper news. Two reviews are available. Dominick (1978, 108) concludes that ‘a typical metropolitan newspaper probably devotes around 5-10 per cent of its available space to crime news’. A later review of some 36 studies suggests that between 1.6 per cent and 33.5 per cent of newspaper coverage relates to crime news (Marsh 1991, 73). Inevitably, different researchers have used different methods, and the bewildering variety of sampling approaches, sample sizes, measurement techniques and definitions of what constitutes crime prohibits any definitive quantification of the amount of crime news in newspapers. Indeed, Reiner (1997, 198) concludes:

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given that different studies work with vastly different concepts of crime, and have ranged over many different newspapers and places, it is not possible to conclude from a literature review whether there is a trend for a greater proportion of news to be about crime. Although later studies tend to find higher proportions of crime stories than earlier ones, they have also tended to adopt the broadest concepts of crime, so this may well be a result of the measurement procedures used rather than a reflection of change in the media…In conclusion, estimates of the extent of news devoted to crime are highly sensitive to the varying definitions adopted by different researchers.

Chadee and Ditton (2005, 324) noted:

That crime news which appears in newspapers is inevitably a selection, with Ditton & Duffy (1983) indicating that only 0.25 per cent of possible crime events (crimes made known to the police or heard in the courts in the region of Scotland covered by the newspapers they studied) appearing in newsprint. In addition, this selection is distorted, with crimes involving violence being reported with 22 times the frequency justified by officially recorded occurrence.

MEDIA RESEARCH FINDINGS

Trinidad has three (3) main daily newspapers. A content analysis of these three was undertaken for the period May–August, 2000. Crimes reported were counted, and were also subdivided into violent and non-violent crimes. Tables 30.1 to 30.5 show that crimes against persons are over-reported in newspapers and crimes against property are under-reported. The media crime/actual crime ratio is highest for murder in each newspaper. However, murder only accounts for approximately one per cent of all crimes actually reported to the police during the period of the study. The picture ‘painted’ by the newspapers is of more violence than that reflected in police statistics. The average of violent crimes as a proportion of total crimes for the three newspapers was 56 per cent, however, from police data for the same period, violent crimes were only 30 per cent of the total crimes reported (see Chadee and Ditton 2005).

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TABLE 30.1 RATIO OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE AND CRIMES REPORTED IN ALL DAILY NEWSPAPERS IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FOR THE PERIOD MAY–AUGUST 2000

Newspaper Police Reports Media Crime/ Crimes (% of (% of Crime Actual Crime crime) reports) Ratio Burglaries 7.5 41 .183 Robberies 11.8 31 .381 Narcotics 17.5 10 1.75 Rape and Sexual 7.5 4 1.875 Wounding/Shooting 16.4 3 5.467 Fraud 6.3 3 2.1 Murder 21 1 21.0 Other serious crimes 12 7 1.714

TABLE 30.2 RATIO OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE AND CRIMES REPORTED IN THE EXPRESS NEWSPAPER IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FOR THE PERIOD MAY–AUGUST 2000

Newspaper Police Reports Media Crime/ Crimes (% of (% of Crime Actual crime) reports) Crime Ratio Burglaries (+ Car theft) 6.3 41 .153 Robberies 10.1 31 .326 Narcotics 15.1 10 1.51 Rape and Sexual 6.2 4 1.55 Wounding/Shooting 20.0 3 6.667 Fraud 6.6 3 2.2 Murder 22.3 1 22.3 Other serious crimes 12.3 7 1.757

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TABLE 30.3 RATIO OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE AND CRIMES REPORTED IN THE TRINIDAD GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FOR THE PERIOD MAY–AUGUST 2000

Newspaper Police Reports Media Crime/ Crimes (% of (% of Crime Actual crime) reports) Crime Ratio Burglaries (+ Car theft) 8.0 41 .195 Robberies 11.1 31 .358 Narcotics 21.1 10 2.11 Rape and Sexual 8.4 4 2.1 Wounding/Shooting 16.2 3 5.4 Fraud 7.6 3 2.533 Murder 17.0 1 17.0 Other serious crimes 10.4 7 1.486

TABLE 30.4 RATIO OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE AND CRIMES REPORTED IN THE NEWSDAY NEWSPAPER IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FOR THE PERIOD MAY–AUGUST 2000

Newspaper Police Reports Media Crime/ Crimes (% of (% of Crime Actual Crime crime) reports) Ratio Burglaries (+ Car theft) 7.6 41 .185 Robberies 13.6 31 .419 Narcotics 15.5 10 1.55 Rape and Sexual 7.3 4 1.825 Wounding/Shooting 13.2 3 4.4 Fraud 4.7 3 1.567 Murder 23.9 1 23.9 Other serious crimes 13.2 7 1.886

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TABLE 30.5 RATIO OF CRIME REPORTED TO POLICE AND CRIMES REPORTED IN ALL NEWSPAPERS AND IN EACH NEWSPAPER IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FOR THE PERIOD MAY–AUGUST 2000

Media Media Media Crime/ Media Crime/ Crime/ Actual Crime Crime/ Actual Actual Crimes Ratio Actual Crime Crime ALL Crime Ratio Ratio Ratio NEWSPAPERS EXPRESS TRINIDAD NEWSDAY GUARDIAN Burglaries .183 .153 .195 .185 Robberies .381 .326 .358 .419 Narcotics 1.75 1.51 2.11 1.55 Rape and Sexual 1.875 1.55 2.1 1.825 Wounding/Shooting 5.467 6.667 5.4 4.4 Fraud 2.1 2.2 2.533 1.567 Murder 21.0 22.3 17.0 23.9 Other serious crimes 1.714 1.757 1.486 1.886

In August 2000, a fear of crime survey utilising a sample of 705 respondents was undertaken by the ANSA McAL Psychological Research Centre. Among the variables measured in this study were those measuring media consumption/usage. Table 30.6 gives summary information on the media consumption variables. Forty- four per cent listened ‘very often’ to the radio, 28 per cent ‘often,’ 20 per cent ‘infrequently,’ with seven per cent ‘not listening.’ The mean number of weekly days of newspaper readership for the Express was 2.51, for the Trinidad Guardian, 1.1 and for Newsday, 3.17. The mean number of TVNEWS watching days per week was 5.47 days, while the mean number of TVHOURS viewed was 23.06 hours for the week.

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TABLE 30.6 DESCRIPTIVES OF MEDIA CONSUMPTION

Mean Number of Per Cent and Mean Number of Days TV Hours and Radio Listening Newspaper Read per Week TV News Days Viewed per Week Frequency Number TV News TV of Radio % Express Guardian Newsday of Days Days Hours Listening Mean = Mean = Very often 44 0 35% 67% 32% 5.47 days 23.06 hrs S.D.* = S.D.* = Often 28 1 12% 9% 5% 2.25 days 18.64 hrs Infrequently 20 2 13% 8% 9% Don't listen 7 3 10% 6% 13% 4 6% 1% 7% 5 4% 2% 6% 6 3% 1% 3% 7 17% 7% 26% Mean (Days) 2.51 1.11 3.17 S.D.* (Days) 2.60 2.03 2.80

*S.D. – Standard Deviation

Table 30.7 shows results from a regression analysis with age, ethnicity, sex, and crime residence together with RADIO, NEWSPAPER, TVHOURS and TVNEWS that demographic factors influence fear of crime. However, the media variables have no impact on fear. The independent variables were RADIO, NEWSPAPERS, TVHOURS and TVNEWS, and were created in the following way. Frequency of listening to the RADIO was measured on a four point scale (in this order): ‘very often = 4’, ‘often = 3’, ‘infrequent = 2’ and ‘don’t listen = 1’. Frequency of reading NEWSPAPERS was measured by adding the number of days for the week that respondents read the three daily newspapers. The range of this variable was 0-21. TVHOURS was measured by multiplying the reported weekday average by five and the weekend day average by two. The results of the two multiplications were summed to give a continuous variable. Finally TVNEWS was measured by the number of days that prime time television news was watched, and thus ranged from one to seven. For a fuller elaboration on the methodology used, see Chadee and Ditton (2005). They concluded that:

The results clearly indicate that there is no relationship between fear of crime and the media in Trinidad, insofar as the “media” is adequately operationalised as reading newspapers, watching prime time television news, and listening to the

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radio. Demographic factors (Age, Sex, Crime Residence and Ethnicity) are better than media variables to explain variance in the dependent variable.

TABLE 30.7 REGRESSION OF FEAR OF CRIME

SAMPLE Variable b(t ratio) TV news .164 (1.478) TV hours 5.93-3 .438 Newspaper -2.47-2 -.507 Radio 3.50-2 .14 Age -.395 - 2.66** Sex 3.811 7.94**** Ethnicity -1.99 -4.07**** Crime Residence -2.35 -4.73**** N 705 R2 .178

= Unstandardised regression coefficients with t ratio * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 **** p < .0001

Content analyses of local crime news presented in the Trinidad newspapers show a clear bias towards over-representing crimes against person and under- representing crimes against property. Survey data clearly show that media consumption was not a good predictor of fear. However, the authors believe that the use of other methodologies including experimental design would one day provide the answer to one of the most debated issues in the social psychological literature of fear of crime — What is the relationship between fear of crime and the media?

RISK ASSESSMENT AND FEAR OF CRIME Risk of Victimisation

Risk of victimisation is defined as a person’s assessment of his likelihood of being a victim of crime (Ferraro 1995). Though there are many challenges in measuring one’s risk, Ditton and Chadee (2005, 505) noted that ‘whilst wholly unequipped with the information necessary to make a rational calculation [of the likelihood of victimisation], almost all respondents are prepared to proffer answers.’ Risk of victimisation is a combination of perceived likelihood and perceived impact of victimisation and therefore is a ‘subjective risk.’ However, Young (1988, 173) points out that:

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The exercise of relating an objective crime rate to a subjective level of fear is, from a realist perspective, flawed, because it assumes: that rationality would involve each subgroup of society having a fear of crime rate proportional to their risk rate; [and] that there is an objective crime rate irrespective of the subjective assessment of various subgroups.

An objective risk assessment is not impossible but such an assessment is a group and not a personal one. In other words, an individual’s average general (group) risk is not that individual’s actual personal risk. For example, given the crime rate in a particular area, the probability of victimisation of being burgled may be ten per cent. However, this average (group) rate will differ (higher or lower) depending on the kind of protective and defensive practices individuals adopt. Chadee et al. (2006, 4) wrote:

Thus, it follows that enquiry regarding the terminology and conceptualisation of risk demands additional attention. The necessity for debates such as those regarding actual (“objective”) and appraised (“subjective”) risk has developed, in part, from the exponential growth of research and investigation. On an abstract level, contemporary discourse now talks of rapid social change and uncertainty (Beck 1992) and the decline in trust and confidence in expertise (Giddens 1990). Risk in the current era describes a shift from the confidence of modernity to a condition of perpetual doubt (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Thus, as a society, we now speak specifically of the omnipotence of risk (Furedi 1998), primarily in relation to negative consequences and feelings of insecurity.

There have been a number of studies that attempt to identify a relationship between fear of crime and risk of victimisation. Not all these studies have been successful in achieving this task. Chadee and Ditton (2005) provide a summary of studies with correlation between fear and risk of victimisation (see Table 30.8).The studies are listed in alphabetical order, and the table is highly derivative of one constructed by Ferraro (1995, 29–30). It can be seen from Table 30.8 that the correlation range is wide (from 0.09– 0.76) but the comparison is hardly fair, as the operationalised definitions of risk and fear are almost all idiosyncratic, there is an enormous range of sample sizes, an assortment of sample selection mechanisms, a variety of respondent interview methods, a 32-year range in publication, an extensive geographic range of research location, a variety of sample entry eligibility criteria, a series of differing correlation techniques, and questioning on a broad range of offences.

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TABLE 30.8 STUDIES COMPARING SUBJECTIVE RISK AND SUBJECTIVE FEAR

Study; date Subjective Risk Subjective Fear r2 Bankston & Thompson, Risk index Fear index 0.43 1989 Chadee, 2003 10 item scale 10 item scale 0.43 Chadee & Ditton, 2003 28 point index 28 point index 0.36 Ferraro & LaGrange, 10-item index; 2 latent 10-item index; 2 latent 0.56 1992 variables variables Ferraro, 1995 10 item scale 10 item scale 0.65 5-item index; 4-item index; 2 latent Giles-Sim, 1984 0.42 pers./prop. variables LaGrange & Ferraro, 11-item index; 2 latent 2 items; pers./prop 0.20 1989 variables 10-item index; 2 latent 10-item index; 2 latent LaGrange et al., 1992 0.71 variables variables Mesch, 2000 3-item index 2 items 0.18 2 pers. Items 2 pers. Items 0.45 Miethe & Lee, 1984 2 prop. items 2 prop. items 0.31 Ortega & Myles, 1987 Neighborhood risk GSS 0.20 Parker, et al.; 1993 4-item index Single item score 0.47 Riger et al., 1978 Rape risk NCS 0.68 Schwarzenegger, 1991 Victim prognosis GSS, ‘daytime’ GSS 0.09 Sparks & Ogles, 1990 Risk of violence Fear of violence 0.24 Taylor et al, 1986 1 risk measure 4 worry measures 0.68 9-item index, mixes Thomas & Hyman, 1977 4-item index 0.70 fear and risk Thompson et al, 1991 3 item risk rape scale 3 item fear rape scale 0.35 Tulloch, 2000 4 point risk scale 4 point fear scale 0.57 Warr & Stafford, 1983 16 items 16 items 0.76

Updated from Table 3.2 in Ferraro, 1995: 29-30.

There is a further subset of studies (Bankston et al. 1987, Boggs 1971, Box et al. 1988, Jaycox 1978, Lee 1982, Lewis and Maxfield 1980, McPherson 1978, Roundtree and Land 1996, Smith and Torstensson 1997) that have investigated empirically risk and fear, but that have not reported the quantitative relationship. A few studies suggest, from their titles, that they are about some quantifiable version of risk, but turn out not to be (Chan and Rigakos 2002, Gustafson 1998, Walklate 1997). For yet other studies, definitions are unconventional. Chiricos et al. (1997a) mislabels safety variables as risk ones, Rucker (1990) fear variables as risk ones, and Wiltz (1982) risk variables as fear ones. For Furstenberg (1971), risk equals

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fear, and for Brantingham et al. (1986), risk is combined with fear, and the result confusingly called ‘fear.’ Fear and risk are separate concerns, and that risk is not acting as a proxy for fear. Ferraro (1995) argued that risk captures the cognitive dimension whilst fear, the affect dimension. Both constructs assist in understanding behavioural responses to risk and fear cues.

RESEARCH FINDINGS ON RISK OF VICTIMISATION

Ditton and Chadee (2005) assessed people’s perception of their likely future risk of criminal victimisation. The authors utilised data from a three wave Trinidadian longitudinal fear of crime study conducted during the period 1999– 2001. Respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood of being a victim in the next year. Among the questions that the authors asked were: ‘How does past experience of victimisation affect prediction of future victimisation?’ ‘How likely do you think it is that being a victim of crime in the near future will happen to you in the next year?’ Each respondent was also allowed to specify up to three crimes that he or she had been a victim of in the year prior to interview. These questions were asked of all respondents at each of the three waves. The authors compared respondents’ expectations with their actual outcomes. Risk of victimisation was measured using Ferraro’s (1995) scale. Of those who expected victimisation, 83 per cent were incorrect on the second wave of the longitudinal study, and 90 per cent were incorrect on the third wave of the longitudinal study. Contrarily, of those who did not expect it, only nine per cent were incorrect on the second wave, and merely five per cent on the third. On the other hand, those who expected victimisation were more likely to be victimized (17 and nine per cent were on successive waves) than those who had not expected it (ten and five per cent). In a slightly more complicated way, we can assess how this simply demonstrated the lamentable failure (for many) to become a victim affects their subsequent predictions of victimisation risk in the future. Of the 27 who had thought it would be likely that they would be victims during year two and indeed had been victims during that year, 19 (70 per cent) thought they would be victims in year three. Of the nine who had thought it would be unlikely that they would be victims during year two but had been victims during that year, five (56 per cent) thought they would be victims in year three. Of the 142 who had thought it would be likely that they would be victims in year two but had not been victims during that year, 112 (79 per cent) thought they would be victims in year three. Finally, of the 99 who had thought it would be unlikely that they would be victims during year two and had not been victims during that year, 39 (39 per cent) thought they would be victims in year three. The authors identified at each wave, four types of possible respondent (see Table 30.9). Respondents are classified into one of four types: ‘realists’ (who have

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had past victim experience, and expect victim experience in the future); ‘pessimists’ (who haven’t had past victim experience, but expect victim experience in the future); ‘optimists’ (who have had past victim experience, but don’t expect victim experience in the future); and ‘idealists’ (who haven’t had past victim experience, and don’t expect victim experience in the future). With one exception, neither gender nor age was related to membership of any type. The relationship between state–trait anxiety and fear of crime is explained in Chadee et al. (submitted), in which it is shown that only about four per cent of fear of crime is explained by state and/or trait anxiety. Similarly, only about two per cent of risk of victimisation can be explained in that way. At each wave, about half are ‘pessimists’, about a third are ‘idealists’, but only a handful are either ‘realist’ or ‘optimists’. ‘Realists’ and ‘optimists’ are inevitably few in number, as the total in these two categories together cannot exceed the small number of actual victims. Generally speaking, people are more likely to be negative (not expecting future victimisation) than positive (expecting future victimisation). In wave 1, 59 per cent were negative, in wave 2, 62 per cent, and in wave 3, 54 per cent. In wave 1, 72 per cent of victims and 58 per cent of non-victims were negative about the future; in wave 2, 68 per cent of victims and 62 per cent of non-victims were negative about the future; and in wave 3, 72 per cent of victims and 58 per cent of non-victims were negative about the future. Table 30.9 also gives the percentages of each type at waves 1, (2) and [3].

TABLE 30.9 PERCENTAGES OF EACH TYPE OF RESPONDENT AT EACH WAVE

Had Past Victim Experience? Yes No Realist Pessimist 9 51 Expect Yes (8) (54) Future [5] [49] Victim Optimist Idealist Experience? 3 37 No (4) (34) [3] [43]

Wave 1 N = 296; Wave 2 N = (297); Wave 3 N = [296]

Risk and fear of crime are two related but yet distinct concepts. Ferraro (1995) argued that risk captures the cognitive dimension whilst fear the affect dimension. Risk analyses, together with fear, allow for predicting people’s overestimation of victimisation. As a contributing factor to fear, this concept has been not widely investigated.

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LONGITUDINAL FEAR OF CRIME RESEARCH

Many researchers have indicated that a longitudinal approach to the topic is the only realistic way forward, although few (Skogan 1986, O’Keefe and Reid- Nash 1987, and Denkers and Winkel 1998 are exceptions) have so far undertaken such a study. For example, Skogan stated:

Behaviour measures typify the current activity of survey respondents, while victimisation measures characterize their past experiences ... Cross-sectional data, however, cannot discern the consequences of adopting various behavioural stances for an individual’s risk of being a victim. Panel data is required. A survey measuring both victimisation and behaviour adequately, conducted at two or more points in time, and involving the same sample of respondents, would allow for untangling the relation between the two. A panel study would reveal the extent to which naturally occurring differences in exposure to risk contribute to subsequent victimisation, as well as the impact of that experience on those involved (1981, 740).

Eve wrote: ‘Longitudinal research designs should be encouraged since it is only through longitudinal designs that questions about multiple victimisation and the consequences of victimisation can be determined…’ (1985, 401). ‘The problems with the temporal ordering of events [e.g. does fear precede or follow victimisation?] are not likely to be overcome or untangled until rigorous, longitudinal research becomes available…’ (Fattah 1993, 48). The longitudinal studies that have been conducted into the general fear of crime have made considerable contributions to previously well established difficulties. Skogan’s (1986) study reports a two-wave panel of 1,738 adult residents of American high crime neighbourhoods. By controlling for past experiences and attitudes (using wave one data), it was possible to show that ‘recent victims report higher levels of worry and concern about crime. Also, even controlling for what they did in the past, recent victims report doing more to protect themselves from both personal and property victimisation‘ (p. 146).

MEASURES

First, the questions used to measure general feelings of safety were the now standard globals. Each was asked: ‘How safe do you feel or would you feel about…

17. Walking alone at night in your district/neighbourhood? 18. Walking alone during the day in your district/neighbourhood? 19. Being alone inside your home at night? 20. Being alone inside your home during the day?

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Offered responses for each were ‘very safe,’ ‘somewhat safe,’ ‘somewhat unsafe’ or ‘very unsafe.’ The numbers 17–20 mirror question numbering in the original questionnaires. Second, the questions used to measure fear of becoming a victim of particular crimes were the now standard specifics (adopted from Ferraro and LaGrange 1992). Each was asked: ‘How much would you say you fear...

29. Being approached on the street by a beggar? 30. Being cheated, conned, or swindled out of some money? 31. Have someone attempt to break into your home while you are away? 32. Have someone break into your home while you are there? 33. Being raped or sexually assaulted? 34. Being murdered? 35. Being attacked by someone with a weapon? 36. Have your car stolen? 37. Being robbed or mugged on the street? 38. Property damaged by vandals? 39. Being kidnapped? 40. Being a victim of crime in your workplace? 41. Being a victim of crime when you are out liming?2 42. Being a victim of crime in the near future?

Respondents were offered the following response options: ‘very afraid,’ ‘afraid,’ ‘unafraid’ or ‘very unafraid.’ The numbers 29-42 mirror question numbering in the original questionnaires. Table 30.10 shows that, for waves 1 to 3 (taking question 17 as an example) 45 per cent are stable over time, a further 38 per cent (13+25) being a little bit unstable, 14 per cent (6+8) are partly unstable, and four per cent (3+1) very unstable. On only one occasion (question 18 – yet that question typically exhibits little variance) does the percentage stable exceed 50 per cent, and then only by one per cent.

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TABLE 30.10 PER CENT STABILITY TO SAFETY (17–20) AND FEAR (29–42) QUESTIONS (WAVES 1–3)

Question N -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 17 OutAloneDark 314 2 6 13 45 25 8 2 18 OutAloneDay 323 1 1 14 51 29 3 1 19 InAloneDark 321 2 2 17 44 25 8 2 20 InAloneDay 323 - 2 15 49 29 4 1

29 FearBeg 317 1 5 24 44 21 5 - 30 FearCon 323 1 6 17 42 27 7 - 31 FearBurgAway 322 - 2 20 45 23 11 - 32 FearBurgThere 322 - 6 15 39 27 12 1 33 FearRape 311 2 6 19 37 22 14 1 34 FearMurder 318 1 4 18 40 24 13 1 35 FearAttack 321 - 4 16 41 25 13 1 36 FearCarStolen 132 - 5 17 44 24 9 - 37 FearRob 321 1 3 21 41 26 8 - 38 FearVandal 322 1 4 16 39 29 12 - 39 FearKidnap 323 2 4 21 39 20 13 1 40 FearWorkCrime 196 2 2 20 43 28 5 1 41 FearLiming 259 - 2 19 39 30 9 2 42 FearVictFuture 291 1 4 14 43 27 9 1

-3: Very much more unsafe or afraid -2: More unsafe or afraid -1: Bit more unsafe or afraid 0: Equally unsafe or afraid, or equally safe or unafraid +1: Bit more safe or unafraid +2: More safe or unafraid +3: Very much more safe or unafraid

This approach uses the full value range for the variables. Typically, these are compressed into binaries (e.g. ‘very safes’ are added to ‘safes,’ ‘very unsafes’ to ‘unsafes,’ and don’t knows are dropped), and sometimes net gross effects are compared between repeat cross-sectional surveys. Table 30.11 shows the result of analysing data in this way. Here, compressed binary versions of the same questions are compared in the conventional manner. Looking at Table 30.11, waves 1 to 3 (and again taking question 17 as an example), one might, under other circumstances, say that 62 per cent felt safe in year one, and 70 per cent felt safe

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in year three, and, thus, feelings of safety had increased by eight per cent. However, this conceals the fact that 19 per cent had moved from being initially unsafe to being later safe, and 11 per cent had moved from being initially safe to being

TABLE 30.11 CONCEALED INSTABILITY TO SAFETY (17–20) AND FEAR (29–42) QUESTIONS (WAVES 1–3)

% % Net Yet % Yet % Real Question N Safe Safe % Unsafe Safe to % at 1 at 3 change to Safe UnSafe change 17 OutAloneDark 314 62 70 +8 19 11 30 18 OutAloneDay 322 86 93 +7 11 4 15 19 InAloneDark 321 73 81 +8 17 8 25 20 InAloneDay 323 84 91 +7 12 4 16

29 FearBeg 317 69 71 +2 19 17 36 30 FearCon 323 51 60 +9 25 16 41 31 FearBurgAway 322 28 43 +15 24 9 31 32 FearBurgThere 322 32 47 +15 26 11 37 33 FearRape 311 34 46 +12 24 12 36 34 FearMurder 318 29 42 +13 25 12 37 35 FearAttack 321 23 39 +16 27 11 38 36 FearCarStolen 132 30 35 +5 23 18 41 37 FearRob 321 27 38 +11 23 13 36 38 FearVandal 322 39 57 +18 30 13 43 39 FearKidnap 323 42 53 +11 24 13 37 40 FearWorkCrime 323 42 53 +11 20 10 30 41 FearLiming 259 38 54 +16 27 11 38 42 FearVictFuture 291 32 45 +13 25 12 37

later unsafe: a net change of eight per cent concealing a real change of 30 per cent. Table 30.12 shows that, for waves 1 to 2 to 3 of the Trinidad data (taking question 17 as an example) 57 per cent are stable over all three waves, 12 per cent changed from 1 to 2 and stayed that way at 3, 18 per cent were the same at 1 and 2, but changed at 3, and 13 per cent changed from 1 to 2, and then changed back again at 3. Overall, the largest number (range: 44 per cent — 78 per cent) were wholly stable over all three waves.

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TABLE 30.12 PER CENT STABILITY TO SAFETY (17–20) AND FEAR (29–42) QUESTIONS (WAVES 1–2–3) Single Single No Double Question N early late change change change change 17 OutAloneDark 307 57 12 18 13 18 OutAloneDay 320 79 8 8 5 19 InAloneDark 319 67 12 13 9 20 InAloneDay 320 78 9 7 6

29 FearBeg 312 51 15 21 13 30 FearCon 316 48 14 26 13 31 FearBurgAway 317 56 12 22 11 32 FearBurgThere 320 52 12 25 11 33 FearRape 305 53 14 23 11 34 FearMurder 310 52 12 24 12 35 FearAttack 318 52 14 23 12 36 FearCarStolen 119 44 14 29 13 37 FearRob 316 54 13 23 10 38 FearVandal 315 43 15 28 14 39 FearKidnap 315 52 16 22 11 40 FearWorkCrime 180 48 13 18 21 41 FearLiming 247 48 15 23 14 42 FearVictFuture 279 52 13 23 12

No change: Either safe, safe, safe; or unsafe, unsafe, unsafe (qus 17-20); Or, either unafraid, unafraid, unafraid; or afraid, afraid, afraid (qus 29-42). Single early change: Either safe, unsafe, unsafe; or unsafe, safe, safe (qus 17-20); Or, either unafraid, afraid, afraid; or afraid, unafraid, unafraid (qus 29-42). Single late change: Either safe, safe, unsafe; or unsafe, unsafe, safe (qus 17-20); Or, either unafraid, unafraid, afraid; or afraid, afraid, unafraid (qus 29-42). Double change: Either safe, unsafe, safe; or unsafe, safe, unsafe (qus 17-20); Or, either unafraid, afraid, unafraid; or afraid, unafraid, afraid (qus 29-42).

The findings from the longitudinal design are revealing. The dynamics of fear of crime in a population is often concealed by aggregated data from cross-sectional surveys. These surveys are unable to identify and analyse shifts in respondents’ fear levels over time. Our results show the degree and frequency of fear of crime changes. Such findings can better inform policy and programmatic interventions and resource allocation in the reduction of unrealistic fear and the control of realistic fear.

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Gustafson, P. 1998. ‘Gender Differences in Risk Perception: Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives’. Risk Analysis 18, 805–11. Haghighi, B. and Sorensen, J. 1996. ‘America’s fear of crime’. In Americans view crime and justice: A national public opinion survey ed. T. Flanagan & D. Longmire, Ch. 2, 16–30. London, Sage. Heath, L. 1984. ‘Impact of newspaper crime reports on fear of crime: Multimethodological investigation’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47, no.2: 263–76. Huesmann, L., Moise-Titus, J., Podolski, C.-L. & Eron, L. 2003. ‘Longitudinal Relations between Children’s Exposure to TV Violence and their Aggressive and Violent Behaviour in Young Adulthood: 1977–1992’. Developmental Psychology 39, no. 2: 201–21. Hughes, M. 1980. ‘The Fruits of Cultivation Analysis: A Reexamination of some Effects of Television Watching’. Public Opinion Quarterly 44, no.3: 287–302. Humphries, D. 1981. ‘Serious crime, news coverage, and ideology’. Crime & Delinquency April, 191–205. Jaycox, V. 1978. ‘The Elderly’s Fear of Crime: Rational or Irrational?’.Victimology 3, 329–34. Katz, J. 1987. ‘What makes crime “news”?’ Media, Culture and Society 9, 47–75. Lane, J. and Meeker, J. 2003. ‘Ethnicity, information sources and fear of crime’. Deviant Behaviour 24, 1–26. Lewis, D. and Maxfield, M. 1980. ‘Fear in the Neighbourhood: An Investigation on the Impact of Crime’. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 17,160–89. Liska, A. E. and Baccaglini, W. 1990. ‘Feeling safe by comparison: Crime in the newspapers’. Social Problems 37 no.3: 360–74. Marsh, H. 1991. ‘A comparative analysis of crime coverage in newspapers in the United States and other countries from 1960–1989: A review of the literature’. Journal of Criminal Justice 19, 67–79. Morgan, M. 1983. ‘Symbolic Victimisation and Real World Fear’. Human Communication Research 9, no.2: 146–57. O’Keefe, G.1984. ‘Public views on crime: Television exposure and media credibility’. In Communication Yearbook, ed. R. Bostrom, Ch.19, 514–35, Vol. 8. Beverly Hills: Sage. O’Keefe, G. and Reid-Nash, K. 1987. ‘Crime News and Real-World Blues’. Communication Research 14, no.2: 147–63. Perkins, D. and Taylor, R. 1996. ‘Ecological assessment of community disorder: Their relationship to fear of crime and theoretical implications’. American Journal of Community Psychology 24, no.1: 63–107. Reiner, R. 1997. ‘Media made criminality: The representation of crime in the mass media’. In The Oxford Handbook of Criminology. 2nd Edn., ed. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner. Ch 5, 189–232. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rountree, P. & Land, K. 1996. ‘Perceived Risk versus Fear of Crime: Empirical Evidence Of Conceptually Distinct Reactions in Survey Data’. Social Forces 74, 1353–403. Rucker, R. 1990. ‘Urban crime: Fear of victimisation and perceptions of risk’. Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology 18, no.2: 151–60. Sacco, V. 1982. ‘The effects of mass media on perceptions of crime: A reanalysis of the issues’. Pacific Sociological Review 25, 4: 475–93. Sheley, J. & Ashkins, C. 1981. ‘Crime, crime news, and crime views’. Public Opinion Quarterly, 45, 492–506.

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Skogan, W. & Maxfield, M. 1981. Coping With Crime: individual and neighborhood reactions. London, Sage. Skogan, W. 1981. ‘Assessing the behavioural context of victimization’. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 72, no.2 : 727–42. ———. 1986. ‘The impact of victimisation on fear’. Crime & Delinquency 33 no.1: 135–54. Smith, S. 1984. ‘Crime in the News’. British Journal of Criminology 24, no.3: 289–95. Smith, W. & Torstensson, M. 1997. ‘Gender Differences in Risk Perception and Neutralising Fear of Crime’. British Journal of Criminology 37, 608–34. Sparks, G. & Ogles, R. 1990. ‘The Difference between Fear of Victimisation and the Probability of Being Victimised: Implications for Cultivation’. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 34 (no.3): 351–58. Surette, R. 1998. Media, Crime, and Criminal Justice: Images and Realities. 2nd Edn. London: Wadsworth. Walklate, S. 1997. ‘Risk and Criminal Victimisation: A Modernist Dilemma’. British Journal of Criminology 37, 35–45. Williams, P. & Dickinson, J. 1993. ‘Fear of crime: read all about it? The relationship between newspaper crime reporting and fear of crime’. British Journal of Criminology 33 no.1: 33– 56. Wiltz, C. 1982. ‘Fear of Crime, Criminal Victimisation and Elderly Blacks’. Phylon: The Atlanta University Review of Race and Culture, XLIII: 283–94. Young, J. 1988. ‘Risk of Crime and Fear of Crime: The Politics of Victimization Studies’. In Victims of Crime: A New Deal, ed. M. Maguire and J. Ponting, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

NOTES

1. Surette (1998, 114) points out that research is usually into aggression and violence rather than to crime (and that aggression isn’t necessarily criminal, and that crime isn’t normally violent). Research investigating the relationship of media consumption to aggression has certainly not died out, as the work of Huesmann, et al., (2003) testifies. 2. ‘Liming’ is a Trinidadian word. It means youths hanging about on street corners at dusk.

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chap30.pmd 673 12/8/2006, 11:20 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE Contributors

Horace A. Bartilow, PhD Jerome de Lisle, PhD Associate Professor, Lecturer, School of Education, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities and Education, University of Kentucky, Kentucky, USA University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Richard R. Bennett, PhD Tobago Professor and Chair, Department of Justice, Law and Society, Jo-Ann Della-Giustina, PhD American University, Washington DC, Associate Professor, USA Department of Criminal Justice, Bridgewater State University, Jacqueline Bergdahl, PhD Massachusetts, USA Associate Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology and Ramesh Deosaran, PhD Anthropology, Professor of Criminology and Social Wright State University, Ohio, USA Psychology and Director, Centre for Criminology and Criminal Christopher Birkbeck, PhD Justice, University of the West Indies, Professor, CENIPEC, St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Universidad de Los Andes, Venezuela Tobago

Derek Chadee, PhD Jason Ditton, PhD Senior Lecturer, Professor, Department of Law, Department of Behavioural Sciences, University of Sheffield, UK and University of the West Indies, St. Director, Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Scottish Centre for Criminology Tobago Anthony D. Harriott, PhD Beth Daniels Senior Lecturer, PhD candidate, Department of Government, University Department of Justice, Law and Society, of the West Indies, American University, Washington DC, Mona Campus, Jamaica USA Zelma W. Henriques, PhD Klaus de Albuquerque, PhD Professor, Professor of Sociology, Department of Law and Police Science, Department of Sociology and John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Anthropology, City University of New York, USA College of Charleston, USA

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Marlyn J. Jones, PhD Patrice Morris Associate Professor, PhD candidate, Division of Criminal Justice, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers California State University, Sacramento, University, USA USA Michael R. Norris, PhD Janice Joseph, PhD Assistant Professor of Sociology, Professor, Criminal Justice programme, Department of Sociology and Richard Stockton College of New Jersey, Anthropology, USA Wright State University, USA

John W. King, PhD Ken Pryce, PhD Assistant Professor, (now deceased was attached to the Criminal Justice Programme, Department of Sociology, University of Department of Sociology, the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Balwin-Wallace College, USA Trinidad and Tobago as Lecturer, 1976)

Betsy Ann Lambert Peterson, LLB, Ian K. Ramdhanie LEC, LLM PhD candidate, Magistrate, Magistracy, Trinidad and University of the West Indies, Tobago St. Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago James P. Lynch, PhD Associate Professor, Adrian Saunders Department of Justice, Law and Society, Judge, American University, Washington DC, Caribbean Court of Justice, Trinidad USA and Tobago

Joan R. Mars, PhD Satnarine Sharma, TC, CMT Assistant Professor, Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Criminal Justice, William P. Shields University of Michigan-Flint, USA MSc graduate, American University, Washington D.C, USA Jerome McElroy, PhD Professor of Economics, Jacob Wit Department of Business Administration Judge, Caribbean Court of Justice, and Economics, Trinidad and Tobago Saint Mary’s College, USA

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A Arms, 279, 280, 301, 384; possession of, Abduction, 629 186 Abuse, 290, 309; of power, 284 Army, 256 Access, 369 Arrest, 245, 288, 292; statistics of, 90 Accountability, 286 Arson, 266, 277, 278 Acts: of commission, 267; of omission, Aruba, 526 267 Assault, 51, 229 Addictive, 572 Association of Caribbean Adversarial system, 476, 618 Commissioners of Police (ACCP), 243, Advocate-General, 529 249, 252, 253, 255 Advocate, 583, 593 Attachment, 23, 26 Affective, 316 Attorney General, 500, 507, 529 African Americans, 646-648 Attribution, 478, 480 African descent, 517; Africans, 517 Auditing, 304 Age, 89, 371, 380, 391, 659 Australia, 631 Agence France Press, 588 Avoidance, 288 Aggregation, 403 Aggression, 24, 97, 133, 136, 144, 288 B Agriculture, 46 Bail, 536 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Bar Association, 499, 500 (AIDS), 335, 393 Barbados, 548-553, 583 Alcohol, 354; abuse of, 646 Belize, 566 Alibi, 492 Biases, 475, 506, 509 Alienation, 434 Bilateral agreements, 548 Alliance, 478 Black Power, 600 Alternatives, 324 Bolivia, 558 Ambiguity, 492 Bomb, 278-279 Amended Domestic Violence Act 1999, 226 Bonding, 361 American Association of Jurists, 585 Build, Own, Operate, Transfer (BOOT), American Society of Criminology, 43 336 Amnesty International, 333 Brazil, 631 Analysis of the National Household Break-in, 51, 563 Survey of Drug Abuse, 646 British Jury Act (1974), 521 Anecdotes, 476 Broken promises, 259 Anomie, 162, 401, 403 Broken windows, 260 Anonymity, 493, 534 Brothels, 630 Ansa McAl Psychological Research Brutality, 290, 291 Centre, 658 Bullying, 122 Antagonist, 621 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, Anti-drug, 547 and Labor, 630, 632, 633, 635 Antigua–Barbuda, 548 Bureau of International Narcotics and Anxiety, 653 Law Enforcement Affairs, 546 Applied research, 253 Burglary, 51, 557 Apprehension, 520 Businessmen, 599 Argentina, 631

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C Civic, 251, 254, 368 Campaign donations, 244 Civil law, 526 Campus, 647 Civil liberties, 567 Canada, 566 Civil rights, 310 Capacity building, 241 Civil society, 246, 266, 286 Capital punishment, 457 Class, 521; conflict, 614 Capitalist, 92, 599 Coast guard, 566 Caribbean, 27, 43, 44, 49, 58, 159, 545; Coastline, 567 criminal justice institutions, 32 Cocaine, 557, 563, 565, 569; Caribbean Basin, 568 interdiction, 568 Caribbean Constitutions, 538 Coerced labour, 629 Caribbean Contact, 589 Coercion, 629 Caribbean criminology, 19, 21, 26, 34, Cognition, 316 44, 48, 52–57, 60–61, 94–96, 125, 160, Cognitive dissonance, 255, 478 162, 164 Colombia, 546, 558, 559, 566, 567 Caribbean Insights, 546, 550 Colonial, 342, 432 Caribbean News Agency (CANA), 582 Colonialism, 48, 54, 56, 61, 265, 425, Caribbean Press Council (CPC), 582 431, 592 Caribbean Press, 592 Colonisation, 31 Caribbean Publishers and Broadcasters Commission of Enquiry, 280, 514 Association (CPBA), 582 Committal, 528 Caribbean Supreme Court (ECSC), 534 Committee on Elimination of Caribbean Task Force on Money Discrimination against Women, 635 Laundering, 243 Common Law, 348, 351 CARICOM Task Force on Crime and Common-law, 229 Security, 243, 248 Commonwealth Caribbean, 476, 551, CARICOM, 242, 247, 302, 590 589 Cartel, 567 Commune, 613 Catholic Focus, 583, 587 Communist Party of Trinidad and Caucasians, 648 Tobago, 593 Causal responsibility, 67 Community: characteristics, 447; needs, Central America, 552, 556 254; policing, 239–264, 303, 307, 310, Centre for Ethnic Studies, 96, 117 319, 434 Centre for Integral Orientation and Community Service Orders Act 1997, 150 Investigation, 637 Comparative research, 362 Centre for the Prevention of School Computer crime, 27 Violence, 102, 134 Confession, 492 Child prostitution, 635 Conflict, 255, 315, 318, 443, 478 Child victim, 641 Conformist, 613 Childhood aggression, 91 Conformity, 362, 478 Children’s Act 1980, 166 Content analysis, 655, 660 Children, 383 Convention on the Rights of the Child Chronicle, 589 1989, 150 Chusai-san, 249 Convention, 548 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 588 Convergence: hypothesis, 90; Citizen, 245, 246, 252, 257, 266, 278, phenomenon, 120 287, 298, 301, 303, 307 Conviction, 352; rate, 246, 255 City Cooperation, 601, 603, 604, 610 Correctional centres, 324, 335 City Hall, 597, 602, 608 Corruption, 19, 70, 244, 256, 349, 446, 457, 545, 567

677

index.pmd 677 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

Costa Rica, 631 Curfew, 292 Counselling, 324, 337 Custodial, 323, 327, 343 Court of Appeal, 529 Court, 301, 342, 353, 475, 476; D atmosphere, 519; contempt of, 506; Dajabon, 634 defence lawyers, 528; defendants, 433, De-industrialisation, 55 488; dominus litis, 527; In camera, Death penalty, 27, 247, 256, 331, 339, 332, 534 340, 446; judicial review of, 331 Creole, 31 Decentralisation, 47 Creolisation, 31–34 Decertification, 549 Crime, 20–30, 44-49, 55-59, 61, 66, 69, Degenerative lawlessness, 259, 260 74, 92, 94, 155, 199, 241, 247, 559, Delinquency, 89, 245, 434; truancy, 151 655; and development, 401-403, 442; Delinquents, 245, 613 control, 284, 285, 292, 298; data, 246; Demographics, 653, 659 detection, 247; endogenous factors, Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), 527 75; exogenous factors, 75; fighting, Deportees, 245, 294, 445, 449 287; figures, 246, 302; in the Deprivation, 334 Caribbean, 61, 160; management, Deterrence, 27, 340 286, 288; news, 654; prevention, 246, Deviance, 19, 92, 401, 403, 616 247, 254, 255, 258; rate, 257; Deviant, 19 reduction, 254; reporting of, 248; Discipline, 303, 325 scientific study of, 19, 58; spiral of, Discretion, 304, 312, 314, 317 308; statistics, 248; survey, 658; Disease, 572 traditional, 242; wave, 288, 293, 294 Disorder, 257 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, 152, 153, Disorganisation, 44 156 Disposition, 310, 515 Criminal justice, 20, 521, 539, 542; Dispossessed, 613 administration, 125, 526, 535, 246; Dissonance, 489 case backlog, 246, 247; caseloads, 287; Domestic Violence Prevention and case management, 246; cross- Treatment Act, 225 examination, 476; delays, 539; due Domestic Violence (Protection Orders) Act, process, 310; in Trinidad and Tobago, 1992, 227 150; plea bargaining, 540; reform of, Domestic violence, 97 540; system, 33, 55, 59, 156, 219, 222, Dominica, 548 224, 294, 296, 541, 648 Dominican Republic, 549, 552, 568, Criminal trial, 526 582, 627, 630 Criminality, 287 Dons, 445, 449, 546 Criminals, 251, 295 Downtown Owners and Merchants’ Criminogenic, 251, 303, 339, 433, 435, Association (DOMA), 602 436, 444 Drugs, 98, 172, 186, 242, 244, 245, 354, Criminology, 20, 21, 43, 50, 61, 74, 159, 433, 436, 438, 441-457, 550, 557, 563, 645, 653; critical, 21, 25; radical, 161 569; abuse, 125; cartel, 556; control, Cross-national research, 401, 402, 406, 555, 556, 559, 560; cooperation in war 414, 423 against, 52; counter drug operations, Crowd: control, 269; dispersal, 271 468, 548, 553, 562, 563, 566, 568, Cuba, 552, 581, 630 569, 663; industry, 562, 572; trade, 24, Cultural change, 31, 34; conflict, 32, 34; 25, 54, 56, 61, 160, 242; traffickers, pressures, 646; transformation, 250 549, 558, 560-568; trafficking, 70, 244, Culture, 28, 30; shock, 251 349, 438, 546, 566, 567, 572, 628 Curacao, 633 Drug Enforcement Agency, 559, 567

678

index.pmd 678 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM I NDEX

E Guyana, 581, 582, 592 East Indians, 517 Eastern Caribbean, 638 H Economic: activity, 541; development, Haiti, 552 243; disparities, 615; division, 621; Harassment, 290, 292, 310 openness, 567; vulnerability, 638 Helplessness, 151 Education, 354, 375, 437, 441, 457 High Court, 506, 516, 540 Election financing, 244 Hispanics, 646–648 Employment, 339, 355, 437 Hispaniola, 630 Empowerment, 324 Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus Ethnic: divisions, 269; violence, 280 (HIV), 335 Ethnicity, 94, 271, 381, 425, 479, 485, Homicide Act 1957, 202–204 659 Homicide, 51, 226, 291, 406, 408, 412, Europe, 631, 637 413, 425, 431 European Convention of Human Rights, Homosexuals, 335, 393 538 Hopelessness, 639 European Court on Human Rights, 534 Human rights, 308, 331, 333, 349 Exploitation, 92, 630 Human trafficking, 627, 629, 633, 635, Eyewitness, 306, 478, 498, 501, 514 642

F I Fear, 662; of crime, 61, 255, 256, 294, Identity, 31 308, 326, 327, 343, 653, 654, 669 Illegal, 310, 597, 598, 610; activities, First-time offender, 256, 349 609; adoption, 635; arms, 242, 294; Free press, 583, 589 drug trade, 19, 47; means, 515; Frustration, 24 migrant, 634 Illicit, 546; drugs, 557; narcotics, 558; G trafficking, 552, 553 Gambling, 244, 434-438, 443-450 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 565 Gang, 95, 123, 151, 457 Immigration, 44, 425, 437, 438, 443, Ganja, 445, 446 629, 632, 639 Garrison, 436, 445, 449, 454 Imprisonment, 246, 248, 275, 348, 350, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 405, 369 407, 413, 419, 447 Indentureship, 92, 187 Gender, 89, 173 Indicators: economic, 242, 413-422, Ghetto, 436, 444, 445, 451 438; social, 242 Gleaner, 583, 593 Industrialisation, 45-47, 54, 271, 404, Globalization, 627 442, 443, 565 Gross National Product (GNP), 405, 407, Inequality, 404, 432, 433, 441-444, 447, 413, 419, 432, 444 452, 457, 641 Governance, 244, 246, 267, 551, 558, Inflation, 405, 407, 432, 447, 454, 455 633 Inner city, 292, 426 Greece, 631 Institute for Strategic Studies, 563 Grenada, 548, 581, 583, 585, 592, 594 Insurrection, 243, 303, 609, 612, 617 Grenadian Newsletter, 588 Integration, 24, 613 Grenadian Voice, 583, 588, 589 Inter-America Drug Abuse Control Gun court, 437 Commission (CICAD), 563 Gun, 292, 293, 436, 437, 441, 443, 445, Inter-American Commission of Human 449, 456 Rights (IACHR), 583

679

index.pmd 679 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

Inter-American Press Association (IAPA), enforcement, 241-250, 253-266, 285, 583 286, 290, 295, 301, 307, 431-437, 550, Inter-American Development Bank 553 (IADB), 228 Lawlessness, 19, 257, 259, 277, 303, 442; International Criminal Police by approximations, 260 Organization, 563, 564 Least developed countries (LDCs), 565 International Labour Organization Legal, 475, 479, 571; dispute, 621; (ILO), 402, 406, 407 expectation, 603; marriages, 229; International Organization for mechanism, 599; norm, 598, 599, 610, Migration, 628 617; restrictions, 490 International Rescue Committee Legalistic, 313 Women’s Commission for Refugee Loitering, 317 Women and Children, 633 Looting, 277, 278, 279, 616 INTERPOL, 406, 563 Italy, 631 M Mafia, 591 J Marginalisation, 30, 44, 54, 151, 613, Jamaica Constabulary Force, 284, 285, 639, 641 290 Media Workers Association of Jamaica, 549-551, 553, 566, 581, 582, Journalists, 588 585, 630 Media, 259, 304, 307, 308, 309, 310, Japan, 631 317, 431, 434, 435, 582, 593 Juror: eligibility, 507; exemptions, 475; Mediation, 256, 475 Migration, 425, 437, 438, 443, 639; laws, 627 Jury, 202, 203, 446, 475; Act, 518, 521; Military, 251, 267, 270, 291, 293 composition of, 475; deliberations of, Minimum wage, 635 478, 481, 489, 492, 493; foreman Misery index, 447, 454, 455 selection, 475, 478, 483; impartiality, Modernisation, 162, 403, 435, 442-445, 481, 514; impression formation, 479, 455 488, 489; prejudice, 516; psychology, Money laundering, 243, 244, 349, 545 492; social acceptance of, 477, 485; Monopoly, 595 verdicts, 480 Motivation, 307, 312, 313, 404, 435 Juvenile, 245, 324, 329, 406, 434, 445, Multiparty, 595; democracy, 620 449; delinquency, 20, 70; justice Multi-racial, 475, 477, 481 system in Trinidad and Tobago, 160; Murder, 186, 199, 229, 256, 266, 291, offenders, 150 294, 304, 305, 329, 334, 384, 390, 430, 436, 437, 442, 445, 447, 448, K 454, 456, 458, 466 Kidnapping, 173, 186, 245, 248, 256, Muslimeen, 259, 260, 407, 597-599, 349 605-608, 611- 617, 621 Kingpin, 546 Mutilation, 342 Koban, 249 N L North American Free Trade Association Labour, 247; exploitation, 627, 630 (NAFTA), 548 Larceny, 51, 384, 410, 411, 414, 434, National Alliance for Reconstruction 447, 453, 454, 462 (NAR), 602 Latin America, 555, 559, 581 National Housing Authority (NHA), 606 Law, 244, 277, 286, 292, 342, 348;

680

index.pmd 680 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM I NDEX

National Land Tenants and Rent Payers degradation rituals, 290; dereliction of Association, 605 duty, 279, 280; detection rate, 255; Netherlands Antilles, 526, 528, 538, 631 harassment, 292; ineffectiveness, 453; Netherlands, 631 interventions, 290; killings, 291, 305; New Jewel Movement (NJM), 582 misconduct, 287, 310; negligence, New National Party (NNP), 591 288; reform, 246, 247; Service, 499; Norms, 610, 611; conflicting, 608; shooting, 305; Police State, 308; cultural, 33, 136, 612, 622 violence, 290 Policing, 126, 241, 248, 249, 251, 254, O 255, 272, 286, 288, 290, 298; citizen Organization for Economic Cooperation participation, 243; foreign practices, and Development (OECD), 243 241-243; styles, 225, 254, 284, 285, Offences against the Person Act, 201 288, 303, 433 Offender, 28, 30, 53, 55, 58, 221, 308, Policy makers, 245, 557, 558, 559 323-327, 348, 349, 446 Political, 598; corruption, 244; Office of the United Nations High expediency, 58, 247; interest, 593; Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), norms, 608; policing, 265-267, 273, 628 280; psychology, 617; responsibility, Off-shore banking, 243, 244 67; tension, 615; violence, 243, 271, Oilfields Workers Trade Union (OWTU), 290, 295, 436 593 Pornography, 635 Organization of American States (OAS), Poverty, 29, 92, 121, 160, 302, 433, 436, 583, 638 444, 453 Overcrowding, 325, 328, 329, 332-339, Pre-trial, 333, 348, 349, 351; bias, 513; 343, 393 detention, 527; publicity, 497, 498, 506-520 P Press freedom, 593 Panama, 631 Prison, 32, 126, 159, 248, 290, 329, 333, Paramilitary, 269, 286, 288-290, 293, 336, 348; corrections in, 323; figures, 433 246; industry, 393; length of Parental structure, 89 confinement, 375; reform, 246 Parliament, 500, 507 Prisoners, 164, 246, 248, 290, 291, 308, Parole, 323, 326, 329, 330-337, 375, 393 323, 324, 327, 376, 380; desistance, Penal, 326, 327, 338, 342, 343, 348-351, 338; economic status of, 368 354, 368; reform, 247 Private: consumption, 405, 407, 421; People’s National Movement (PNM), media, 591; property, 583; security, 59 601 Probation, 323, 348-362 People’s National Party (PNP), 582 Property: crime, 51, 354; victimisation, People’s Revolutionary Government 665 (PRG), 581 Prostitution, 151, 163, 244, 245, 631, Peru, 558 633 PH- taxi, 597, 598, 600 Protest, 245, 246, 304, 306 Plantation, 23, 247, 265; society, 31; Psychology, 292, 303-318, 328, 392, 475, system, 92 478, 593; counseling, 637; space, 610 Plural society, 24, 31 Public: attitude, 339; complaints, 303; Police, 160, 244, 252, 265, 274, 301, conduct, 609, 612; confidence, 256, 303, 350; attacks, 308; beatings, 296, 303, 307, 310; controversy, 620; 309; behaviour, 267, 310; betrayal, disturbances, 270; expectation, 610; 280; brutality, 256, 291, 307, 308, 311; fear, 255-257, 260; imagination, 622; corruption, 256; culture, 265; management, 286, 293; order, 277,

681

index.pmd 681 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

285, 286, 612; policy, 247, 259; efficacy, 188; fulfilling prophecy, 119, protest, 276; safety, 266, 279, 324, 123, 190; interest, 550; report, 95, 326, 350 185, 188; report methods, 90; Puerto Rico, 630 restraint, 161 Punishment, 27, 97, 290, 291, 324, 326, Sentencing, 246, 247, 326, 331, 339, 333, 339-341; flogging, 342; 342, 348-351, 356, 361, 385-390, 394 incapacitation, 340; incarceration, Sex, 370, 379, 389, 475, 479, 521, 659; 245-248, 326-337, 339, 341, 354; assaults, 646; exploitation, 627, 630, whipping, 342 639; industry, 633; promiscuity, 91; tourism, 631, 636; trafficking, 628; R workers, 631 Race, 89, 94, 173, 247, 475, 521; Sexual assaults, 646 background, 481, 521; conflict, 27, Shame, 612 271; discrimination, 272, 273, 512; Shantytowns, 632 motivation, 478; tension, 279; Shiprider Agreement, 457, 549, 550, 552 undertones, 517 Slavery, 92, 187, 335, 431, 432, 629 Rape, 51, 186, 229, 279, 349, 374, 384, Smuggling, 634, 635 390, 407, 409, 411, 413, 444, 447, Snipers, 277 451, 454, 468, 564 Social: acceptance, 607; bond, 23, 45, Re-arrest, 351, 352, 374 362; change, 31; class, 89, 383, 475, Recidivism, 173, 245, 246, 248, 325, 479, 485; conflict, 92; control, 19-32, 328, 337, 338, 350, 368, 369, 374-378, 54, 55, 247, 402, 572; disintegration, 387, 391, 394 612; disorganisation, 99, 442; Regional Security System (RSS), 243, 548 disruption, 46; distance, 271, 272; Regional Task Force in Community environment, 478; facts, 425; Policing, 252 integration, 403; interaction, 45; Rehabilitation, 189, 221, 248, 323-328, justice, 155; mobility, 45; needs, 598, 333-343, 368, 369, 376, 392, 393 599, 603; norms, 610, 611, 612; order, Reintegration, 325, 326, 336-368 45; organisation, 45, 54; pathology, Relative deprivation, 125, 433, 614 616; problems, 66, 68, 80; psychology, Research, 316, 558; longitudinal, 665; 162, 475, 477, 478, 483, 487, 488, methodology, 185, 659 491, 493, 612, 616; status, 480; strain, Restorative justice, 221, 256 610, 615; stratification, 47, 109, 402; Revolt, 584 structure, 109, 117 Revolutionary, 581 Sociology, 341, 475, 476 Riot, 270, 276, 278, 301, 328, 334, 335 South America, 546 Risk, 318, 336, 343, 368, 375, 430, 435, Soviet bloc, 592 661, 662; environmental factors, 645, Special Anti-Crime Unit, 256 genetic predisposition, 645; rates, 55; Squatters, 259, 302, 303, 426, 597, 598, risk-taking, 645, 646; 604-607, 613 Robbery, 186, 245, 307, 349, 374, 384, State of emergency, 256, 274, 278 385, 390, 391, 394, 407, 435, 444, Stealing, 305 450, 454, 456, 459, 467, 563, 564 Stereotypes, 119, 123, 476, 478, 479, Russia, 581 488, 491 Street crimes, 244, 287 S Street vending, 598, 600, 601 Saint Lucia, 535, 536, 538, 548 Subculture, 436, 445, 448 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 548 Subjective, 483, 620; risk, 660 Self: administered survey, 647; concept, Substance abuse, 91, 337 328; control, 93; defence, 314; Supreme Court Administration, 536

682

index.pmd 682 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM I NDEX

Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 149 415, 419, 421, 433, 441, 444, 447, Suriname, 581, 631 452, 453, 454, 456, 569 UNESCO, 406, 592 T United Labour Front (ULF), 500 Terrorism, 70, 248, 266 United Nation Children’s Fund The Children (Amendment) Act 2000, 150 (UNICHEF), 628 The Children Act, 150 United Nation Commissioner for The Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Human Rights (UNHCHR), 628 Force, 558 United National Congress (UNC), 602 Theft, 401, 404, 405, 423, 431, 433, 435, United Nations Convention Against 444, 453 Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Theories: Adversarial diffusiveness, 260, Psychotropic Substances, 548 620; Classical, 92; Conflict, 44, 90; United Nations, 242, 333, 339, 402, 406, Consensus, 44; Control, 19-26, 30, 32, 443, 548, 630 54, 55, 247, 362, 402, 572; Urban, 403, 435, 436, 441-453; crime, Development, 44-46; Differential 479; poor, 296 association, 161, 162, 444; Ecological Urbanisation, 44, 46, 402, 404, 405, 407, perspective, 443; Generative 417, 442, 443, 444 approaches, 48, 61, 160, 425; Human Use of force, 239, 244, 245, 290, 292, ecology, 44-45; Interactionist 297, 301-318; complaints, 307-311; approach, 476, 493, 621; of crime, 43, extra-judicial killings, 291; probable 44, 53, 61, 161; of delinquency, 161; cause, 312 of victimisation, 28, 29, 34; rational choice, 247, 340; routine activities, 27, V 28, 401-429, 443-447; social bond, 23; Variables, 139, 313; intervening, 125; strain, 92, 161; structural, 92; latent, 139 Techniques of neutralization, 189; Vending, 603, 605 Traditional, 160 Victim, 29, 53, 55, 155, 172, 186, 221, Tourism, 19-65, 294, 431-437, 443-448, 228, 233, 293, 294, 331, 343, 425, 455, 457, 631 426, 433, 434, 436, 449, 451, 454, Tourist, 30, 243, 244, 250, 294, 425, 430, 631, 637, 641 433, 435, 438, 441-456 Victimisation, 29, 136, 248, 293, 308, Traffic, 287, 374 325, 436, 438, 452, 628, 634, 636, Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of 639, 646, 650, 653, 660, 661, 663; of Industry and Commerce, 602, 611 tourists, 28, 29; protection Trinidad and Tobago Jury Act, 522 programme, 640; rate, 28, 54; risk, 55; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, 302 surveys, 53, 60, 66, 642; Trinidad and Tobago Regiment, 514 Vigilantism, 292 Trinidad and Tobago, 549, 566, 582 Violence, 19, 47, 56, 70, 89, 96, 155, Trinidad Bomb, 503, 504, 512 230, 247, 251, 276, 277, 284, 288, Trinidad Express, 500, 505, 519, 583, 587, 290-297, 334, 373, 401, 430, 431, 436, 593, 600, 602, 603 443, 445, 457, 551, 555, 569; hyper Trinidad Guardian, 498-500, 505, 506, masculinity, 144; inter-ethnic, 266; 514, 583, 587, 589, 591, 593, 658 interpersonal, 45; physical, 228; Trinidad Mirror, 504 reduction, 97; school, 245; state, 288

U W Unemployment Relief Programme, Westminster system, 582, 592 (URP), 617 White collar crime, 19, 243, 384, 390 Unemployment, 45, 155, 302, 404-407, Whites, 646

683

index.pmd 683 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

Wiretapping, 530, 531 Witness, 310, 518; credibility of, 476, 519 Women, 451 World Bank, 242, 402 World Health Organization (WHO), 406

Y Youth, 303, 306, 317, 393, 403-406, 417, 434-436, 442-445, 452, 453, 457, 613, 632

Z Zero tolerance, 260

684

index.pmd 684 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM I NDEX Author Index

A Bazargan, M., 654 Abbott, D., 443 Becker, M., 445 Abrams, E., 551 Beckett, K., 327 Adler, F., 476, 480 Beirne, P., 22 Agresti, A., 356 Bell, A., 156 Aguirre, C., 32 Benford, R.D., 68 Ahire, P., 286 Bennett, R., 19, 21, 22, 25, 27, 43, 45, Alderson, J., 266 46, 48, 60, 160, 284, 401-407, 414, Aldrich, A., 367 417, 424, 425, 428, 429, 442, 443, Allen, D., 444 447, 456 Allport, G., 317 Bergdahl, J., 648 Aloes, S., 615 Berger, R., 401, 403, 442, 443, 447, 564 Alpert, G.P., 255 Berk, R.A., 225 Anderson, E., 144 Berry, W.D., 556, 560 Anderson, R.E., 139 Biderman, A., 53 Anderson, T., 401, 405 Binder, A., 89, 159 Archbishop Pantin, 613 Birju, A., 32 Archer, D., 443 Birkbeck, C., 21, 22, 28, 30, 244, 320, Armor, D.A., 190 350, 354 Armstrong, S., 558 Bishop, M., 581, 585, 591, Aronson, E., 476,480 Blachman, M.J., 558 Arthur, J.A., 160, 162 Black, D., 20 Arthur, O., 549 Black, W.L., 139 Artola, J., 634 Blackman, I., 516, 520 Ashworth, A.J., 216 Blau, J.R., 433 Austin, R., 90 Blau, P.M., 428, 433 Auten, J., 288, 289 Blumberg, M., 244, 301, 313 Avison, W. R., 404, 443 Blumstein, A., 47 Boehm, V., 476 B Boggs, S., 662 Baccaglini, W., 654 Bohning, D., 446 Bagley, B.M., 555, 556, 558 Bolland, O.N., 31 Bakr, A., 606, 607, 615 Bonczar, T., 352 Baldwin, J., 476, 488, 492 Boney, C., 511 Bandura, A., 320 Bonnick, G., 27, 435 Bankston, W., 662 Booth, K., 99 Banton, M., 33 Borland, R., 633 Barber, J., 645 Boroughs, R., 498 Barios, L., 134 Boxer, P., 136 Barlow, H.D., 163 Braithwaite, J., 21, 171 Barnes, A., 335 Brame, R., 161, 162, 376 Baum, K., 254 Branna-Shute, G., 444 Baumeister, R., 646 Brantingham, P., 663 Baumer, E., 374, 375 Brathwaite, F., 31 Bayley, D.H., 252, 254, 451 Bravers, E. R., 646 Bayley, D.M., 266 Bravo, D.L., 348, 350

685

index.pmd 685 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

Brener, N., 134 Cloward, R.A., 45 Brezina, T., 144 Coard, B., 588, 591 Broadhurst, R. G., 376 Cohen, A.K., 161 Brockenbrough, K.K., 136 Cohen, B.P., 22 Broeder, D., 476 Cohen, L.E., 28, 401, 404, 443 Brogden, M., 286 Collinson, H., 228, 229, 231 Brooks, C., 498, 500 Connell, R.W., 136 Brooks, K., 286 Cook, P., 27 Buerger, M.E., 29 Cooley, C., 190 Burkowitz, L., 24 Cornell, D.G., 136 Burnham, F., 582 Cornish, W., 476 Bursik, R.J., 44 Costa, F., 645 Byron, D. Sir., 539 Crandall, R., 555, 556, 558, 559 Crisp, B., 645 C Caetano, R., 646, 648 D Cain, M., 20, 22, 25, 32, 286, 160 D’Andrea, M., 135 Caldera, T., 224 Danns, G. K., 265, 284, 286 Campbell, A., 144 Davis, T., 480 Campbell, J., 265, 270, 271, 278, 279, de Albuquerque, K., 49, 430, 441-457, 280, 282, 283 552, 565 Canestri, F., 348, 351 de Certeau, M., 31 Cant, J. 476 de la Bastide, Michael, 539 Cardarelli, A. P., 254 Debarbieux, E., 133 Cardien, K., 133 DeCoster, S., 90 Carlson, T. M., 375 DeLeon, M., 44 Carr, T. S., 376 DeLeon-Granados, W., 232 Carranza, E., 349 Dellums, R.V., 589 Casey, J., 220 Demol, J., 606 Cashmore, E.E., 99 Denkers, A., 665 Cemephise, G., 634 Denning, L., 507 Cernkovich, S.A., 26 Deosaran, R., 20, 22, 25, 92, 96-99, 159, Chadee, D., 20, 22, 25, 97–99, 159, 245, 162, 243-246, 251, 252, 259, 260, 320, 653, 655, 660, 663 369, 407, 475, 481, 483 Chaiken, J.M., 564 Diamond, S., 480 Chambliss, W.J., 92 Díaz-Cotto, J., 33 Chase, A., 275 Dickinson, J., 654 Cherpitel, C.J., 646 Ditton, J., 655, 660, 663 Chesney-Lind, M., 28 Dodd, D., 21, 187, 444, 451 Chevagny, P., 284, 291 Doerner, W., 313 Chevannes, P., 133 Donovan, J., 645 Chevigny, P., 266, 408 Douglas, M., 341 Chiricos, T., 44, 654, 662 Dow, M., 327 Chookolingo, P., 515 Dr. Jankey, N., 519 Chouthi, S., 226 Dr. Toby, 519 Chuck, D., 453 Drayton, A., 498 Clark, C.L., 648 Duffecy, J., 376 Clarke, J., 286 Duffee, D., 33, 351 Clegg, I., 22 Durkheim, E., 45, 401, 403 Clinard, M., 46, 443 Dwarika, L., 498, 505, 515

686

index.pmd 686 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM I NDEX

E Gamson, W., 67 Eck, J. E., 255 Ganesh, R., 497, 498, 499, 517 Edelman, M., 338 Garcia, N., 615 Edie, C. J., 426 Garfinkel, I., 320 Efran, M., 476 Garland, D., 341 Ehrlich, I., 564 Garner, J., 225 Elliot, D.S., 94 Garofolo, J., 28 Ellis, H., 437, 444 Gartin, P.R., 29 Ellsberg, M., 224, 228, 231 Gartner, R., 443 Empey, L., 95 Gartrell, J. W., 404, 405, 432 Enloe, C. H., 266, 267, 269, 271 Gebotys, R., 654 Erickson, M., 95 Gendreau, P., 375 Erickson, R., 286 Gentles, E., 21 Erlanger, H., 476 George, S., 565 Evans, H., 134 Gerbasi, K., 476 Gerbner, G., 653 F Giordano, P.G., 26 Fagan, J.A., 225 Glaser, D., 375 Farrell, A.D., 144 Glaze, L., 352 Farrington, D., 91, 188 Glissant, E., 31 Fattah, E., 665 Gold, M., 95 Felson, M., 28, 401, 404, 443 Goldstein, H., 286 Felson, R.B., 93, 144 Goldstein, P.J., 557, 564 Fernald, L.C., 97 Gomme, I., 654 Ferracuti, F., 443 Gondles, J. R., 336 Ferraro, K., 653, 660, 661, 663 Gordon, K., 585 Figueira, D., 444 Gordon, M., 654 Finckenauer, J., 340 Gordon, R.J., 447 Finlay, B., 356 Gottfredson, M., 161, 645 Fisher, R., 478 Greenberg, J., 646 Fishman, M., 66 Greene, J. R., 254 Fitzpatrick, G.L., 564 Griffin, M., 134, 135 Flannery, D.J., 144 Griffith, I., 21, 160, 446, 551 Flora, J., 134, 135 Grigg, D., 23, 24 Flores, A.R. 558 Grogger, J. 565 Flowers, G.T., 376 Gross, L., 653 Fogelson, R.M., 269 Gudjonsson, G.H., 137 Forst, B., 405 Guerra, T., 504 Foucault, M., 340 Guinn, D., 631, 638, 639 Fox, J., 286 Gunst. L., 426, 445, 457 Fraser, M.W., 144 Gusfield, J., 67 Fraser, R., 286 Guy, H., 257, 307 Furnivall, J.S., 24 Furstenberg, F., 662 H Fyfe, J., 313, 314 Hagan, J., 94 Haghighi, B., 654 G Hagley, L., 32 Gabaldon, L. G., 244 Hair, J.F., 139 Gaines, L. K., 334 Hall, P., 546 Gairy, E., 585, 590 Hansmann, H. B., 404, 405, 407, 443

687

index.pmd 687 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

Hanson, D.J., 647 Jervis, V., 144 Haralambos, M., 99 Jessor, R., 645, 646 Harriott, A., 96, 97, 244, 264, 286, 287, Jessor, S., 646 289, 290, 291, 292, 445, 446, 555, Jimenez, M. A., 350, 353 648, 650 Job, M., 616 Hartjen, C.A., 22 Jones, H., 444 Hartnagel, T. F., 404, 432 Jones, M., 351 Hassanali, N., 615 Jud, G.D., 28 Hastie, R., 478 Hawkins, D.F., 94 K Hawkins, G., 340 Kalven, H., 492 Headley, B., 24, 27, 96, 159, 264, 408, Kaplan, H.B., 90 432, 433, 436, 444, 445 Kaplan, M., 476 Heath, L., 654 Kappeler, V. E., 269 Heimer, K., 90 Karmen, A., 646 Hengeller, S.W., 183 Kelly, B., 136 Henry, S., 134 Kempadoo, K., 632, 637 Herman, K.C., 135 Kempf, K.L., 23, 26 Herrera, A., 224 Kennedy, D., 251 Herrnstein, R., 645, 650 Keohane, R.O., 556, 560 Hetsberger, U., 435 Kick, E.L., 45, 46, 401-407, 443, 447 Hewitt, J.D., 98 Kilmer, B., 562 Hill, A., 288 King, G., 556, 560 Hindelang, M.J., 95, 119 King, J.W., 159 Hindelang, M.S., 28 Kingery, P., 137 Hirschberger, G., 645 Kitsuse, J.I., 66 Hirschi, T., 23, 26, 99, 119, 161, 361, Klain, E.J., 630 645 Kleinman, M.A.R., 557 Hirst, M.J., 58, 59 Koylass, E., 604 Hodgson, C., 630 Krahn, H., 404, 432, 443 Hoekveld, G.A., 24 Kraska, P.B., 269 Holborn, M., 99 Krohn, M.D., 46, 401, 403, 404, 405, Holdaway, S., 156 443 Holland, J., 21 Kullgren, G., 224 Holoski, M.J., 375 Kurlansky, M., 437 Howard, K.A., 134, 135 Huggins, M.K., 266, 267 L Hughes, M., 654 Labrousse, A., 556, 558 Huizinga, D., 94 Lacey, T., 291, 444 LaFree, G., 28, 45, 46, 401-407, 443, 447 I Lamming, G., 588 Imbert, C., 617 Land, K., 662 Inman, M., 478 Landy, D., 476, 480 Lane, J., 654 J Larmer, B., 442 Jagan, C., 275, 278-280, 282 Lasse, V. Dr., 606 Jain, S., 428 Laub, J., 183 Jaycox, V., 662 Laurent, L., 556 Jeffries, C., 267, 269, 270, 272 Lee, M.G., 97 Jensen, G.F., 89, 99, 159, 183 Leiber, M., 21

688

index.pmd 688 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM I NDEX

Leidholdt, D.A., 630 Maxwell, C.D., 225 Leipciger, M., 375 Maxwell, S., 456 Levitt, S.D., 565 Mazerolle, P., 144 Lewin, K., 316 Mazza, C., 98 Lewis, D., 662 McCaffrey, B.R., 565 Lewis, R., 144 McConville, M., 476, 488, 492 Lieber, M., 457 McCorkle, R.C., 66 Lind, I., 28 McDevitt, J., 254 Lipscher, 536 McDowall, D., 376 Liska, A.E., 144, 654 McElroy, J., 443, 444, 445, 449, 450, Loftus, E., 478 452, 454, 566 Longbottom, J., 136 McGrath, C., 646 Loper, A.B., 136 McKay, H.D., 44 Loring, P. L., 404, 443 McKinney, J.C., 30 Lowry, R., 134 McLanahan, S., 99 Luckenbill, D.F., 30 McLay, J., 611 Lucky, A., 603 McNulty, T.L., 144 Lui, X, 90 Mead, G.H., 190 Lupsha, A.P., 557, 558 Meeker, J., 654 Lurigio, A.J., 260 Meeks-Gardener, J., 97 Lynch, J., 19, 21, 22, 25, 27, 43, 53, 160, Meier, R.F., 28, 92 405, 428 Meithe, T.D., 66 Lyng, S., 645 Merton, R.K., 162, 190, 401 Messner, S.F., 46, 401-407, 428, 432, M 433, 443 Mackenzie, D.L., 376 Miczek, K.A. 562 Mahabir, C., 49, 92, 159, 264, 444 Miethe, T.D., 28 Maharaj, R., 501, 550 Miller, D.T., 190 Maingot, A.P., 545 Miller, R.R., 334 Makkai, T., 21 Millette, J., 593 Maller, M.G., 376 Minogue, N., 137 Maller, R.A., 376 Minor, W.W., 26 Manley, M., 444, 582, 591 Mintz, S.W., 23 Manning, P., 602, 617 Mischel, W., 645 Manning, P. K., 269 Modigliani, A., 67 Mansfield, Y., 28 Modlin, M.J., 564 Marenin, O., 160, 162 Monahan, J., 478 Mark, W., 602 Moody, C.E., 565 Mars, J.R., 96, 244, 264 Moore, B., 272, 273 Marsh, H., 654 Moore, M., 251 Marshall, P., 637 Morgan, K., 351, 352, 362 Martineau, R., 603 Morgan, M., 653 Martinson, R., 375 Moser, C., 21 Marxist, 593 Mosher, D.L., 144 Mastrofski, S. D., 254 Mottely , W., 617 Matter, M.Y., 637 Muncer, S., 144 Matthews, R., 44 Murphy, L., 137 Matza, D., 188, 189 Mawson, A.,645 Maxfield, M. G., 401, 428, 443, 654, 662

689

index.pmd 689 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

N Priyadarsini, S., 22 Nagin, D.S., 27 Pryce, K., 19, 21, 22, 25, 92, 159, 160, Nelson, F., 367 444 Nemeth, C., 476, 480 Quick, O., 203 Nettleford, R., 31 Quigley, J.M., 404, 405, 407, 443 Neufeind, W., 375 Quinney, R., 44, 92, 405, 443 Neuman, L.W., 564, 401, 403, 442, 443, 447 R Nicholson, D., 217 Ramdhanie, I. K., 369 Nielsen, A.L., 647 Ramkhelawan, W., 501, 518 Nixon, C.L., 136 Ramoutar, K., 21 Norris, M., 648 Rankin, J., 99, 161, 183 Nunez, V., 498, 516 Razack, C., 603 Nurse, K., 144 Reckless, W.C., 121 Nye, F.I., 95, 188 Regis, R., 497, 498, 500, 511, 517, 519 Regoli, R.M., 98 O Reid-Nash, K., 654, 665 O’Connell Davidson, J.O., 631, 636 Reinke, W.M., 135 O’Connor, M., 225 Reno, P., 275 O’Dowd, D.J., 58, 59 Richards, P., 226 O’Keefe, G., 654, 665 Richardson, S., 504, 516 O’Gilvie, N., 293 Riechers, L. M. , 255 Ogles, R., 654 Roach, A., 550 Ohsako, T., 98 Roberg, R. R., 255 Robin, C., 645 P Robinson, T., 219 Palmer, S., 33 Robinson, W., 480 Panday, B., 550 Rodway, J. A., 272 Parenti, C., 327 Roger-Dick, H., 603 Parris, M., 21, 187, 444, 451 Rohlehr, G., 92 Parry, O., 144 Rohter, L., 430, 446, 547 Paternoster, R., 26, 161, 162 Rojek, D.G., 89, 99, 159, 183, 435 Paton, D., 342 Rolison, M., 646 Patterson, P.J., 549, 550 Romano, E., 647 Paul, E., 602 Rosenbaum, D.P., 260 Payer, C., 565 Rosenberg, M.J., 442 Pelfrey, W.V., 28 Rosenfeld, D., 234 Pena, J., 559 Rosenthal, R., 190 Perkins, D., 654 Rountree, P., 662 Petersilia, J., 337 Royal, D., 647 Pierre, L., 588 Ruback, R. B., 376 Piquero, A., 255 Rucker, R. 662 Piquero, A.R., 144 Rudner, R.S., 21 Piven, F.F., 45 Ruether, W., 375 Pizam, A., 28 Russell, D., 225 Poleo, W., 350 Ryan, C., 444 Potts, F., 136 Ryan, S., 92 Pratt, J., 326, 327, 328, 338, 340, 341 Price, S., 23

690

index.pmd 690 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM I NDEX

S Sparks, G., 654 Sacco, F.C., 97 Sparrow, M., 251 Sacco, V., 654 Spector, M., 66 Saks, M., 478 Spelman, W., 255 Sampson, R., 159, 183 St. Pierre, M., 274 Sampson, R.J., 55, 404, 405 Stack, S., 404, 428, 443 Sanchez, G.G., 557 Staff, J., 93 Sanchez-Taylor, J.S., 631, 636 Stangeland, P., 28 Sandhu, D.S., 135 Stark, C., 630 Sarjeant, S., 601 Steckles, G., 438 Sasson, T., 327 Steglich, E., 631, 638, 639 Savitz, L., 168 Stephan, C., 320 Scher, S., 646 Stephan, W., 320 Scherman, A., 646 Stephens, E., 445 Schmallager, F., 340 Stephens, J., 445 Schoeneman, T.J., 190 Stevens, D.V., 255 Schwartz, M.D., 94 Stone, C., 292, 433, 436 Seaga, E., 587 Strachan, S., 588 Sealey, A., 476 Strodbeck, F., 480 Seidman, R.B., 92 Sumner, C., 22 Seigel, L.J., 89 Sykes, G., 189 Seiter, R. P., 337 Sykes, R., 286 Senna, J., 89, 351 Seymour-Smith, C., 30 T Shahabuddeen, M., 268, 272, 274 Tam, T.W., 646 Shaw, C., 44 Tapp, T., 476 Shelley, L., 45, 46, 401, 403, 443 Tatham, R.L., 139 Sheman, L., 225, 313 Taylor, C., 449 Sherman, L.W., 29 Taylor, I., 19, 92 Short, J., 95, 161 Taylor, L., 511 Shrauger, J.S., 190 Taylor, R., 654 Siegel, L., 351 Taylor, S.E., 190 Simon, R. 488 Tejeda, D., 634 Sims, B., 351 Thatun, S., 637 Sinclair, G., 449 The Scher, S., 646, 555 Sirkin, M., 144 Thomas, R., 92 Skogan, W., 654, 665 Thornberry, T., 98 Smith, D.C., 135 Tippetts, S., 647 Smith, J., 202 Tisak, M.S., 136 Smith, M.G., 24, 31 Tittle, C.R., 92 Smith, P.T., 272, 282 Tokatlian, J.G., 558 Smith, P., 560, 662 Toro, M.C., 558 Smith, R.T., 31 Tracy, Jnr., P., 91 Snow, D.A., 68 Travis, J., 336, 337 Solomon, F., 500 Trotman, D., 585 Sorensen, J., 654 Trotman, D.V., 92, 159, 264, 443 Sosis, R., 476, 480 Truss, J.M., 234 South, S.J., 144 Turk, A., 266 Soyibo, K., 97 Turnball, W., 190

691

index.pmd 691 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

Twemlow, S.W., 97 Winkel, F., 665 Winkvist, A., 224 U Wolf, P., 402, 405 Ulleberg, P., 645 Wolfgang, M., 94, 443 Wooldredge, J. D., 404, 405 V Wright, P.B., 93 Vagg, J., 21 Wrightsman, L., 476 Valier, C., 327 Van Dyke, J., 476 Y Vasciannie, S., 446, 450, 551 Young, J., 19, 44, 92, 660 Vaz, E.W., 187 Younge, G., 634 Virtue, E., 442 Visher, C., 336, 337 Z Voas, R.B., 647 Zeisel, H., 480, 492 Zimmerman, C., 630 W Zimring, F.E., 340 Waddington, P., 288 Walker, J., 137, 139 Wallerstein, I. 565 Walters, G.D., 137 Walton, P., 19 Warr, M., 29 Watt, T.T., 646 Webb, J., 44 Wei, E., 98 Weis, J., 91 Weis, J.G., 159, 165 Weis, W.G., 89 Wellford, C., 443 Wells, C., 203 Wells, E., 99, 161, 183 Welsh, R., 615 Werner, N.E., 136 Whetton, J., 22 Whittlesey, D., 24 Wiegand, B., 60, 406 Wilks, J., 375 Williams, A., 601 Williams, E, 600 Williams, L., 448 Williams, P., 654 Williams, S., 557 Williamson, J., 136 Wills, A., 504, 516 Wilson, J., 645, 650 Wilson, J.Q., 405 Wilson, W.J., 55 Wiltz, C., 662 Windle, M., 646

692

index.pmd 692 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM I NDEX

693

index.pmd 693 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM C RIME, DELINQUENCY AND JUSTICE

694

index.pmd 694 12/14/2006, 10:01 AM