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1992

Symbolic Action as Politics: The Canadian as a Political Symbol

Jay Marsh Price College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

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Recommended Citation Price, Jay Marsh, "Symbolic Action as Politics: The Canadian Senate as a Political Symbol" (1992). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625753. https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-pf1m-mf47

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SYMBOLIC ACTION AS POLITICS

THE CANADIAN SENATE AS A POLITICAL SYMBOL

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Government

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfilment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by Jay Marsh Price

1992 APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Author

Approved, August 1992

Roger W. Smith

James Mi clot DEDICATION

Ad Glorae Dei

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

APPROVAL SHEET ...... i

DEDICATION...... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS...... iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv

ABSTRACT ...... v

INTRODUCTION ...... 2

CHAPTER I. THE SYMBOLISM OFPOLITICS ...... 10

CHAPTER II. AND THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE . . 21

CHAPTER III. FEDERAL MYTHAND SYMBOLIC REALITY .... 55

CONCLUSION...... 80

APPENDIX...... 82

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 85

iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to a number

of individuals and groups. I would particularly like to thank

the Library of Canadian Embassy in Washington, the Senate of

Canada Information Service, the Government of , and the

Canada West Foundation for supplying me with a considerable

amount of useful information which would have been difficult

to obtain otherwise. I would also like to thank Dr. Donald

J. Baxter, for first suggesting that I study upper chambers,

and Dr. Katherine Rahman, for recommending the Canadian Senate

as a thesis topic. Finally, I would like to thank those on my thesis committee: Dr. James Miclot, for his humor and

encouragement, Dr. Roger W. Smith, for being a sympathetic

sounding board during the writing process, and Dr. Alan J.

Ward, for his patience, guidance, and sense of humor, all of which were needed in guiding the intellectual wanderings of a

bewildered graduate student. ABSTRACT

This thesis tests the ideas of Walter Bagehot and Murray Edelman, who suggest that symbols are very important to a political system, by using the Canadian Senate as a case study. Though this study is primarily concerned with the Senate which was created in 1867, the implications of a future reformed chamber are also included.

The hypothesis is that the Canadian Senate, in spite of its concrete weaknesses, has impacted the by serving as a symbol for highly valued Canadian ideals, in particular the need to protect and the smaller provinces from the federal government. The role of the Senate in the discussions of (1864-1867) and the Constitutional reform issue (ca. 1980-1992) illustrate the degree to which the respond to the symbols of their country. The case of the Canadian Senate suggests that symbols can play an effective role in a political system in two ways. First, a symbol can be a focal point onto which individuals and groups can attach their aspirations. Second, a political symbol can be a tool by which participants in the political process can understand the happenings around them.

v SYMBOLIC ACTION AS POLITICS:

THE CANADIAN SENATE AS POLITICAL SYMBOL INTRODUCTION

The political symbols of a government are often evident to both outsiders and citizens. To the vast majority of a nation’s people, the images of politics provide an important way of relating to the complicated process of government.

Symbols serve a real function by motivating and placating the forces which occur within a country.

One example of a useful political symbol is the Canadian

Senate. The chamber has been a source of controversy for over a century, particularly since much of the literature surrounding the institution has focused on its purely practical aspects, where the Senate does indeed fall short.

However, the Senate is a worthwhile institution because of its ability to represent important ideals. The Red Chamber1 is valuable as a political symbol. Even though its impact does not come from concrete actions, like the alteration of legislation, the Senate has been constructive in Canadian po1i t ics.

1. The Canadian Senate’s nickname is "the Red Chamber," a name derived from the red furnishings of the Senate chamber, itself. Chapter IV explains why the color red is significant to the Senate’s image.

2 3

Upper chambers2 have been a popular subject of study for over two centuries. The usefulness of the British House of

Lords has been debated since the 18th century by several theorists, including Edmund Burke, Montesquieu, Jeremy

Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. The emergence of the United

States of America produced one of the first great systematic analyses of bicameralism, the Federalist Papers. A short time later, the French revolution helped encourage thinkers to write against the aristocratic second house as something outdated. Jeremy Bentham, whose opinions are outlined in

Lewis Rockow’s article, "Bentham on the Theory of Second

Chambers," was one of the earliest critics of the bicameral system. Even John Stuart Mill, who thought that the issue of upper chambers received far more attention than it was worth, wrote on the merits and costs of an in

Representative Government.

At the turn of the century, bicameral ism became the focus of early social scientists as well as philosophers. By that time, enough bicameral systems had been established to allow scholars to compare the upper chambers of several states.

Among these early works are and Upper Chambers, by W.

V. Temperley, Second Chambers in Practice, by the Rainbow

Circle, Second Chambers, by J. A. R. Marriott, and Second

2 For this essay, the terms "upper chamber," "second chamber," "second house," "upper house," "senate," and "legislative council" are treated as synonomous. Unless directly quoted as such these terms will not be capitalized. 4

Chambers in Theory and Practice, by H. B. Lees-Smith. After the 1930\s, interest specifically in the nature of upper chambers declined in favor two different modes of study. In one type of literature, such as K. C. Wheare, Legis latures, and Alexander Brady, Democracy in the . the discussion of bicameralism was simply a component of a larger s tudy. The other type of literature focused on the upper chambers of specific nations rather than on second houses in general. Often, the discussion of a particular country’s second house was just a section of a more general analysis of that nations political system as a whole. In reference to

Canada, such works include C.E.S. Frank, The of

Canada, Robert Jackson and Michael Atkinson, The Canadian

Legislative System:_____ Politicians and Policymaking, J.R.

Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government, and Dawson’s

The , by Norman Ward, which all provide useful insights into the workings of the Canadian Senate by placing the institution in its context in Canadian politics.

The Canadian Senate has long been a topic of controversy and has generated a considerable amount of research. The seminal work on the Red Chamber is Robert A. Mackay, The

Unreformed . Published in 1926 and updated in

1963, this work remains the backbone of scholarship on the

Canadian upper house. Also of major significance is F. A.

Kunz , The Modern Senate of Canada 1925-1963: A Re-appraisal, 5

a book written partly in response to Mackay, which argues that

the Senate has taken on new roles in addition to those which

it has traditionally performed since 1867. In 1988, the

Centre for Constitutional Studies at the

hosted a conference of journalists, academians, and

politicians for the purpose of comparing the different Senate

reform plans. The Centre published the proceedings of this

conference in a work entitled, The Canadian Senate: What Is

To Be Done? Other scholarly works include Senator John

Connolly’s pragmatic view of the chamber and its faults3 and Jonathan Lemco’s scathing attack on Senate critics entitled,

"Senate reform: a fruitless endeavour" in the Journal of

Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. While most scholars

see the Senate as "relatively harmless and possibly of some

use," Colin Campbell argues in, The Canadian Senate: A Lobby

From Within, that the Red Chamber is actually a malicious body which exists to serve the interests of the business and social

elites of Canada. Because he sees reform as difficult to

implement, Campbell advocates the abolition of the Senate in

favor of a new chamber. In addition to the scholarly literature on the Senate is

an equally large body of government-sponsored material which

has emerged in the process of debate on Senate reform. The most comprehensive of these publications is St rengthening

3 Connolly, Hon. John, "The Senate of Canada," The Par 1iamentarian LII (April 1972), pp. 95-103. 6

Canada: Reform of Canada’s Senate, a publication put out by the Albertan government which promotes a "Triple E" Senate which would be "Equal, Elected, and Effective." Senate Reform:

Alberta Sets the Pace. by a member of the Albertan

Legislature, Tom Sindlinger, is a more recent study on the merits of the "Triple E" option. A Canadian government committee on Senate reform, chaired by Gerald A. Beaudoin and

Dorothy Dobbie produced a report popularly called the "Dobbie-

Beaudoin report" which suggests that the Senate be elected by proportional representation. The problems of Senate reform are outlined in Senate Reform: Moving Towards the Slippery

S1 ope. written by Roger Gibbins, and Senate Reform, by Louis

Massicotte and Fancoise Coulombe. Meanwhile, J. B. Rudnyckyj proposed, in a report given to the Canadian government entitled A Multicultural Senate for Multicultural Canada, that the Senate be reformed along ethnic, rather than regional lines. Another source of documents is a -based non­ profit research organization called the Canada West

Foundation, an institution which has produced a number of documents including An Elected Senate for Canada, by Peter

McCormick, E.C. Manning, and Gordon Gibson, and Alberta’s

Senate Election: History In The Making, by David Elton and

Peter McCormick.

In all these sources, however, little attention is given to the symbolic nature of the Canadian Senate. The early books on bicameralism did touch on the symbolic nature of upper chambers, usually in reference to the .

However, symbolism was relegated to a peripheral role relative

to more "useful" functions. Most works assume that the Red

Chamber’s primary role is to impact the political process

positively in the name of regional representation, legislative

review, or for other concrete purposes. The symbolism

surrounding the Senate, which was of great importance to the

founders of Canada, has been largely ignored by twentieth

century scholars. This paper hopes to address this little -

discussed topic.

* Chapter One examines the way in which symbolism affects

politics. Two scholars are especially helpful in

understanding the importance of symbols and symbolic gestures

in the running of a state. The first is the 19th century

English scholar, Walter Bagehot, whose writings on the English

constitution were a response to a widespread underestimation

of apparently non-essential parts of government. A more

contemporary source on political symbols is political

scientist, Murray Edelman, who has observed that mass publics

often respond to the images surrounding politics rather than

its pragmatic aspects. A comparison between the two thinkers

shows that Bagehot and Edelman have very similar views, views whose validity is supported by examples in contemporary

Canadian politics. Chapter Two looks at the evolution of the Canadian Senate

from its 17th century roots to the present Constitutional 8

reform talks. Special emphasis on the Confederation debates

(ca. 1865-1867) illustrates the motives and ideals which

produced the Red Chamber in its current form. The period from

Confederation4 to ca. 1960 demonstrates the serious flaws of

the existing Senate and examines the increasing hostility

towards the chamber. Finally, the period from 1970 to the

present discusses the recent reform proposals, including the

Meech Lake Accords and the 1992 First Ministers Conference.

This chapter should familiarize the reader with the Canadian

Senate by placing it in its historical context.

The recent First Ministers Conference has produced a

proposal for altering the Red Chamber. At the time of

writing, these changes have not yet been fully agreed and many

details need to be worked out. There is a chance that this

latest round of talks will fail just as the Meech Lake Accords

did three years earlier. However, all parties involved seem

to like the proposed alterations. Consequently, this essay is written on the assumption that these changes will occur and

that the nominated, regionally based Senate will soon be a

thing of the past, replaced by an elected body in which all

provinces are equally represented.

In Chapter Three, the Senate as a political symbol

appears in the context of one of its most visible functions:

4 For the sake of convenience, Canada will be referred to as a "Confederation” even though the state has undergone periods both towards and away from centralization. 9

that of representing regions. In spite of the fact that the

Red Chamber has been largely incapable of performing this role

in a practical sense, the ideal of regional representation has

been so strong in the Canadian system that tampering with the

symbolic incarnation of this ideal (i.e., the Senate), has

produced profound results. In two periods of Canadian

History, at the time of Confederation, and in the recent

Constitutional reform talks, the symbolic Senate has served as

an extremely important bargaining chip, and was responsible

for saving the Canadian union on both occasions.

The conclusion argues that, in spite of its negative

reputation, the Canadian Senate has actually been a very

important piece of the Canadian political puzzle. However,

its worth comes not from its practical actions, but from its

symbolic qualities. Therefore, the Red Chamber verifies both

Bagehot’s and Edelman’s thesis that symbolism can play a very

important, if sometimes unappreciated, role in a political process. CHAPTER I

THE SYMBOLISM OF POLITICS

Anthropologist Raymond Firth defines symbolism as

...the recognition of one thing as standing for (re­ presenting) another, the relation between them normally being that of concrete to abstract, particular to general. The relation is such that the symbol by itself appears capable of generating and receiving effects otherwise reserved for the object to which it refers— and such effects are often of high emotional charge.,,s

A symbol is more than just an abstraction which stands for something. It is unlike, for example, a "sign."

Anthropologist Susan Langer suggests that ". . .a sign is

comprehended if it serves to make us notice the object or situation it bespeaks. . . . "6 The sign has no other value

besides this ability to point to the object of meaning.

A symbol can perform this function as well but is not

restricted to such a role. A symbol has the ability to

function within reality. This is why theologian Paul Tillich

says that ". . .every true symbol participates in the reality which it symbolizes."7 The symbol, itself, has an intrinsic

value to which individuals and groups can respond. The

s Raymond Firth, Symbols: Public and Private (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 15-6.

6 Quoted in Firth, p. 64. 7 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 242.

10 11

existence or non-existence of a symbol can potentially alter

the outcome of a particular situation in a way that a mere

sign cannot.

A symbol’s presence evokes a response. According to some

scholars, for example political scientist Murray Edelman,8 the strong, often unconscious, reaction to symbols occurs in part

because of the remoteness of the object from the viewer. Individuals and groups are likely to have strong responses to

a symbol when there is a lack of immediate contact or

understanding of the object in qu.estion.

(W)here public understanding is vague and information rare, interests in reassurance will be all the more potent and all the more susceptible to manipulation by political symbols. . .it is one of the demonstrable functions of symbolization that it induces a feeling of well-being: the resolution of tension."9

Because of their ability to stimulate action and feeling

in societies, symbols can have very real effects in the realm

of politics. Symbols are important to politics partly because

they are important to human society in general. Jung once

remarked, "They are important constituents of our mental make­

up and vital forces in the building up of human society; and

8 The Symbolic Uses of P olitics. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 1964 and Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company), 1971. In this essay, only The Symbolic Uses of Po1i t i cs is quoted, hereafter referred to as "Edelman."

9 Ibid., p. 38. 12

they cannot be eradicated without serious loss."10 Symbols can

reaffirm a group’s identity by continuing linkages with the

past. Symbols can also act to visibly identify what the

society or nation considers important or unimportant. Symbols and myths11 can help to clarify complicated situations and

make them understandable and manageable.

The notion that symbols form an important part of the

political process is not new. Walter Bagehot, in The English

Const i tut ion, wrote in 1867 that there are two halves to any

functioning po1itic a 1 system. One half derives its value from

the "machinery” of government. Bagehot calls these elements of

a political system which contribute concrete, easily

perceptible results, "efficient.” The term refers to ".

.those (parts of the government) by which it in fact works and

rules."12 The other half of the system involves those

features whose strength lies in their ability to arouse people

to action, qualities which Bagehot describes as "dignified" in

character. He assigns both the Monarchy and the House of

10 Carl Jung, Man and His Symbols (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964), p. 93. 11 In popular usage, the term "myth" implies untruth or superstition. In the social sciences, the term has a more neutral meaning. A "myth" is a set of beliefs and assumptions held by a group of people to explain a particular set of phenomena. Such beliefs may or may not correspond to "reality." In this essay, "myth" will refer to the second definition rather than to the more common first one.

12 Walter Bagehot, The Collected Works of Walter Bagehot, ed. Forest Morgan, vol. 4: The English Constitution (Hartford, The Travelers Insurance Company, 1891), p. 53. Hereafter referred to as "Bagehot." 13

Lords to the "dignified” half of the British constitution.

These components . .excite and preserve the reverence of the population.”13 Since symbols are defined as signs which arouse popular response, political symbols fall into the category of "dignified."

Bagehot goes on to explain that the "efficient" parts of government appear to be the "useful" ones while the

"dignified" elements are mistaken for being useless.

There are indeed practical men who reject the dignified parts of government. They say, We want only to attain results, to do business: a constitution is a collection of political means for political ends; and . . .any part of a constitution [which] does no business, . . . however dignified or awful it may be, is nevertheless useless."14

Both aspects of politics are necessary for a well-functioning polity. The "dignified" functions help gain the popular support needed to sustain the "efficient" components.

No orator ever made an impression by appealing to men as to their plainest physical wants. . .but thousands have made the greatest impression by appealing to some vague dream of glory or empire or nationality. . . .It is very natural, therefore, that the most useful parts of the structure of government should by no means be those which excite the most reverence.15

The "symbolic" or "dignified" parts of a political system are valuable because they help arouse people to act.

The 20th Century political scientist, Murray Edelman, also looks at the impact of symbolism in politics. In

13 Ibid., P- 53.

14 Ibid., P- 54.

15 Ibid., P. 56. 14 particular, he examines the role of "condensation symbols," about which he says:

Practically every political act that is controversial or regarded as really important is bound to serve in part as a condensation symbol. It evokes a quiescent or an aroused mass response because it symbolises a threat or reassurance. . .the meaning can only come from the psychological needs of the respondents; and it can only be known from their responses.

The symbol, itself, contains meaning and value and is more than just a point of reference. In anthropology,

"condensation" means a coalescing of several meanings and feelings upon a single object. The individual who uses a condensation symbol may not be aware of the distinction between symbol and object. The result is an emotional response to the object itself, often expressed in terms of threat or security. Condensation symbols exist where a threat of or by an object is perceived to exist and the perceived value of an object takes precedence over its strictly utilitarian value.

This is because the observer is either unable or unwilling to rationally distinguish between perceived reality and the real situation. For example, Edelman notes that,

There is no check on the fantasies and conceptualizing of those who never can test objectively their convictions that the government and their home towns abound in communist spies and dupes and that John Birch symbolizes resistence to the threat.17

Bagehot’s "dignified" elements are similar to, but should not be confused with, Edelman’s "condensation symbol." In most

16 Edelman, p. 7.

17 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 15 instances, condensation symbols are false images and illusions with little connection to reality. By contrast, Bagehot’s

’’dignified” elements, while arousing public emotion, are also real and legitimate components of a political system.

To Edelman, there is another type of political symbol-- the referential symbol. Unlike the condensation symbol, the referential symbol is firmly grounded in reality. This type of symbol is used simply to clarify and simplify the complicated nature of the real world. Edelman states,

Such symbols are useful because they help in logical thinking about the situation and in manipulating it. Industrial statistics and cost figures in cost plus contracts are referential political symbols.18

The user is aware that the term is just a shorthand for a much more sophisticated situation. Therefore, in this repect, a political symbol does function as a "sign.” A political symbol could fall under Bagehot’s "efficient” category as well as his "dignified” one. Referential symbols are useful tools for understanding a process, object, or society. For example, cultural anthropologists have looked at a society’s symbols in order to understand that culture better. Firth explains:

Over a wide range of instances, anthropologists have observed what symbols people actually use, what they have said about these things, the situations in which the symbols emerge, and the reactions to them. Consequently, anthropologists are equipped to explain the meanings of symbols in the cultures they have studied, and to use

18 Ibid. , p. 6. 16

such explanations as a means of furthering understanding of the processes of social life.19

Therefore, symbols help observers understand a society or a

particular aspect of a society, such as the political system.

Symbols are complicated entities, performing many

functions. For example, symbols can play important "dignified"

roles in the political process. Referential symbols can

clarify a situation while condensation symbols can obscure it.

Additionally, Edelman notes that the same object can be both

referential or condensational, depending on the circumstances.20 To understand how a political symbol

functions in a society, these characteristics of being

"dignified," referential, or condensational each deserve

attention and study.

In politics, some symbols are easy to recognize, such as

a flag, national anthem, or national monument. However,

institutions and basic political processes also have a great

deal of symbolic value attached to them. One institution which has taken on symbolic value is the upper chamber of a

bicameral form of government. Apologists and detractors alike

can see in an upper chamber the embodiment of something that

they either support or dislike. Supporters of second houses

may see the chamber as representing the concept of what Sir

John MacDonald called a "sober second thought." To a

19 Firth, p. 25.

20 Edelman, p. 6. 17 detractor, on the other hand, the upper chamber may represent undemocratic or anachronistic elements in the government.

The ability or inability to promote symbols is extremely important for a political institution’s legitimacy because symbols are such a noticeable part of politics. The public reacts to the symbol and not to the less known detail of its workings. The media may guarantee that the average Canadian is relatively aware of an institution such as the Senate, but the information which is presented is selective. Discussion of the more pragmatic aspects of the Senate, such as the impact of elected senators on the political power system, is confined to a very small number of people.

As a result, the symbolic elements of the Senate receive a great deal of coverage and are accessable to a large number of people. As Edelman observes in The Symbolic Uses of

Po1i t i cs:

Controversial political acts remote from the individual’s immediate experience and which he cannot influence are highly available subjects for. . .[personal] opinion. For much of the mass public, that is, they are bound to become condensation symbols, emotional in impact. . .most citizens have only a foggy knowledge of public affairs though often an intensely felt one. In Edelman’s terms, when the Canadian public focuses on the

Senate, an institution which is "remote from an individual’s immediate experience," that focus probably centers on its symbolism rather than in an insightful understanding of the

21 Ibid. , pp. 8-9 . 18 complicated processes of Canadian government. In Edelman’s words:

The basic thesis is that mass publics respond to currently conspicuous political symbols: not to 'fa c ts,’ and not to moral codesembedded in the character or soul, but to the gestures and speeches [and institutions] that make up the drama of the state.22

This is why, for example, Edelman suggests that political leaders often manipulate symbols in order to obtain a particular public response. Canadian political scientist

Roger Gibbins provides an illustration of such manipulation by describing how provincial leaders in have used popular discontent against the central government in for their own ends by manipulating the symbols of federal- provincial relations.

Gibbins says in his book Prairie Politics that 'to some degree is deliberately sustained and manipulated by provincial politicians.’ This situation occurs because the politicians stand to gain personal power as a result of 'fed-bashing.’23

The author who made this statement, Tom Sindlinger, went on to say, "Clearly, regional differences and frustrations can make good election material."24 For political leaders, political symbols can provide very real benefits if used in a purposeful way.

22 Ibid. , p. 172. 23 Roger Gibbins as quoted in Sindlinger, p. 30.

24 Tom Sindlinger, Senate Election: Alberta Sets The Pace (Alberta: By the Author, 1989), p. 31. 19

Those who are most involved with the political symbol

(and who are most susceptible to its tantalizing images) are

a nation’s political and intellectual elites, not the bulk of

its people, who usually do not care. For example, Randall

White writes,

(n)o student of how modern democracy actually works will be surprised to discover that in Alberta, as elsewhere, the late twentieth century debate on Senate reform has been led by political elites.25

Most of the discussion about the Senate has been confined to

journalists, government officials, and scholars. "Even when hockey is not on Alberta’s agenda, talk of a Triple E-Senate can rarely be heard outside the confines of the Alberta ."26 These elites can sometimes fall into the trap of admiring certain political symbols without even recognizing

these elements as symbols. What they sometimes see as an

"efficient" political component is really a political symbol.

Hence, they do not understand the mechanisms through which

these "dignfied" elements really function in the system.

As Bagehot noted in The English Constitution, many recognize only the "efficient" aspects of government as valid poltical elements and do not notice the importance of the symbols to a political system. They are unaware of the degree to which symbolic actions influence politics. Edelman notes,

25 Randall White, Voice of Region: The Long Journey to Senate Reform in Canada ( and Oxford: Dundurn Press, 1990), p. la. 26 George Oake, "'Triple-E’ doesn’t hold candle to Oilers," . May 18, 1992. 20

It will shock many to suggest that political constitutions are so largely irrational, in genesis and in impact. The shock itself is pertinent to the observation, for, as one psychiatrist has pointed out, most men are convinced that their political decisions are logical, defensible, and wholly rational...."27

Recognition of the importance of political symbols adds

a new dimension to an understanding of politics. Institutions which might appear impotent by "efficient" standards become

constructive when "dignified" functions are taken into

account. By recognizing "dignified" elements as useful to

politics, scholars can see that political symbols, such as the

Canadian Senate, do play a significant roles in the governing

of a nation.

27 Edelman, p. 19. CHAPTER II

BICAMERALISM AND THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

The bicameral system emerged in the 17th century in

England as a response to the incorporation of non-aristocratic elements into the process of governing the country. The social cleavages of English society at that time precluded the representatives of the nobility and the people from working together in the same chamber. In describing the political system of England, the 18th century thinker, Montesquieu, remarked:

In a State, there are always people distinguished by birth, wealth or honours; but if they were mingled with the people, and if they had there only one voice like the others, public freedom would be their slavery, and they would have no interest in defending it, because most resolutions would be against them.”28

The result was a political segregation into two houses: an upper one to represent the interests of the landed elites and a lower one to represent everyone else. While a few other countries in Europe, such as , experimented with similar structures, most nations did not have enough popular participation to produce the conflict of interests which a bicameral system was intended to remedy. For much of the 18th

28 Montesquieu as quoted in Louis Massicotte and Fracoise Coulombe, Senate Reform (Ottawa: , Research Branch, 1988), p. 1.

21 22 century, the idea of bicameralism remained largely isolated to

Britain and a handful of Continental intellectuals such as

Mont esqu ieu.

With the establishment of British settler colonies in the

17th and 18th centuries, the British exported their notions of government to the . From to , one of the central concepts which was exported was that of a parliament, where the representatives of the people (who were usually the elite of colonial society) could help make laws and govern the colony. However, with the absence of a titled nobility, the need for an "upper chamber" to represent such interests was unnecessary. Therefore, each colony needed only two institutions: the assembly and the royal governor with a council which performed serveral functions. Mackay writes,

"In each there was the time honoured council, with its three­ fold duties of an upper house, a privy council, and a superior court of the colony."29 The division between legislative, , and judicial had not been clearly distinguished in a colonial setting. To an extent, the various royal governors’ councils functioned more like modern cabinets than second chambers; and the colonies of British were at best only partly-bicameral.

The American Revolution in 1776 and the creation of the

Constitution of the in 1787 provided a different

29 Robert A. Mackay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada, revised edition (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), p. 18. 23 type of upper house. The absence of a significant titled class in any of the British colonies made the need for a special house for the aristocracy unnecessary. However, the majority opinion in Philadelphia held that bicameralism still had merits. The founders of the American republic, such as

Madison, believed that a popularly elected body of the people could not be trusted to always make competent decisions.

The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention. . .may be justly and effectively answerable for the attainment of those ob jects . "30

Furthermore, in the American situation, the interests of the constituent states, instead of a nobility, justified a second chamber, particularly among small states who believed their interests would be neglected in a popular assembly. As with the Canadian founding fathers 80 years later, a crucial part of the debate about the U.S. Senate revolved around the issues of checking government and representing regional interests.

The inhabitants in the remaining colonies of British

North America, and their leaders in London, watched the events which were taking place south of the St. Lawrence with great interest. To better administer the vast space to the west of

New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, known officially as "Canada," the British Government produced the Constitutional Act of

30 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers No. 63. (New York: The New American Libarary of World Literature, 1961), p. 384. 24

1791, which divided this large into and

Lower Canada, each of which would receive its own government.

One of the provisions of this Act, which better distinguished

between executive and legislative powers, was the division of

the old Governor’s council into two parts: one body to remain with the governor as an "executive council,” the other modeled

after the House of Lords in Britain. Because the hereditary

aristocratic element did not exist in the , the

founders of the Constitution of 1791 had to settle for a

system of appointing influential people to each province’s upper chamber, called the "legislative council." The governor would nominate a person to sit on the council and would approve or disapprove of the selection. This was the

situation in the Canadas; the maritime provinces of Nova

Scotia, , and retained the

earlier model of a governor’s council which performed the

function of the upper chamber.

The paradigm of an elected and an appointed upper house was retained when Upper and were united in 1841. However, while the composition and function of the Legislative Council resembled that of the 1791 model,

its role dramatically changed as a result of pressure for

responsible government. By the mid-1840’s, the current

Governor-general, Lord Sydenham, had succeeded in transforming

the old Executive Council into a functioning , with a prime minister and other members directly selected from the 25

majority group in the Assembly. With the Assembly’s control

over the executive came control over the nomination of members

to the legislative council. Its links to an independent

Governor shattered, the Legislative Council was now

subservient to the wishes of the Assembly. The autonomy of

the Legislative Council continued to erode when, in 1849, a

controversy between the members of the Legislative Council and

the Assembly over a financial matter concerning the 1837

rebellion caused the new Governor-general, Lord Elgin, to

permit the Government (and hence, the dominant group in the

Assembly) to appoint up to 12 additional councilors to tip the

balance of the upper house in favor of the Government.

Following British precedent31, the Government, which had the

support of a majority in the lower house, could now threaten

the upper house by advising the Governor to swamp it with

supportive members. This helped to ensure that the Legislative

Council would never effectively challenge the lower house, and

Mackay concludes, "For all practical purposes the [colonial] Canadian parliament had now become a single chamber."32 This

lack of power developed into a lack of incentive for

councilors to do their jobs effectively. Member attendance

31 In 1832, a comprehensive reform was proposed by the British House of Commons. The House of Lords was against the measure, but passed the bill because the Commons threatened to swamp the upper house with members who supported the majority opinion in the lower house.

32 Mackay, p. 28. 26

dropped and popular support for the nearly useless chamber

van i shed.

In 1855, discontent with the appointed house was so great

that both houses passed a reform bill to make the Legislative

Council an elected body, based on equal provincial representation. Yet even this did not completely solve the

council’s image problem. The system of electing

representatives drew the same type of persons who went to the

Assembly: assertive, attractive to the public, and skilled at

raising money for campaigns. Mackay notes:

. . .(T)he elective system tended to place in the upper house the type of ambitious politician who was attracted to the lower house. Only men of wealth, of energy and ambition would undertake the difficult task of a campaign. . . .The quieter, more judicial type of citizen .met death at the hands of his more aggressive opponent .33

"Politicians” flocked to both houses, leaving those of a less

aggressive temperament unable to get into office. Such

experiences prompted one United Canadian legislator, H. L.

Langevin, to remark in 1865:

. . .(T)he elective principle in our existing Legislative Council was merely an experiment, and . . .in Lower Canada, we have become tired of the system. . .because the very nature of the system prevents a large number of men of talent, of men qualified in every respect and worthy to sit in the Legislative Council, from presenting themselves for the suffrages of the electors. . . .34

33 Ibid., p. 31.

34 Parliamentary Deabtes in the Subject of Confederation of the British North American Provinces (Quebec, Hunter, Rose and Company, 1865), p. 373. Hereafter referred to as Confederation Debates. 27

This brief experiment with an elected upper chamber was enough to convince many political leaders of the day that such a body was more trouble than it was worth. For example, John

A. MacDonald, one of the people who had helped bring about the elected upper house in the first place later changed his mind. Pope writes:

.at an early period of [MacDonald’s] career, he favoured an elective Upper House, but eight years’ experience of this system was sufficient to change his views, and to convert him into a firm upholder to the nominative principle. . . .To his mind the chief among the objections to a Senate chosen by the popular vote, was the ever-present danger of its members claiming the right to deal with money Bills, and the conseauent possibility of disputes with the House of Commons.3

Thus, many of United Canada’s prominent figures concluded, with most contemporary scholars, that an elected upper house and the parliamentary, or Westminster, model of government, in which the executive is responsible only to the lower house, were so difficult to reconcile as to be incompatible.

During the 1860’s, a number of forces combined to encourage the union of all of the provinces of British North

America. Among the most important of these was the defense of

British North America from the potential aggressions of the

United States. As United Canada’s Minister of Agriculture,

Thomas D’Arcy McGee, noted during his province’s Confederation debates:

35 Joseph Pope, Memoirs of Sir John Alexander MacDonald G.C.B.: The First Prime Minister of the of Canada (London: Edward Arnold, 1894), p. 235. Hereafter referred to as Pope. 28

The proposed Confederation will enable us to resist the spread of this universal democracy [i.e. the United States]; it will make it more desirable to maintain on both sides the connection that binds us to the parent state [i.e. Britain]; it will raise us from the position of mere dependent colonies to a new and more important position; it will give us a new lease of existence under other and more favorable conditions; and resistance to this project, which is so pregnant with so many advantages to us and to our children means simply this, ultimate union with the United States.36

The first concrete steps towards uniting Canada with the four maritime provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince

Edward Island, and Newfoundland took place in 1864. In that year, a meeting originally designed to discuss only the prospects of unifying the maritime provinces provided an opportunity for representatives of United Canada to push for a greater British North American union. Brown notes:

During 1864, the Confederation movement had prospered mightily. In the late summer of 1864, a conference on was hastily called for Charlottetown . . . .The heard about the conference and asked if it could present more sweeping proposals for union of all the colonies.17

The result of the Charlottetown Conference was a basic plan for Confederation. In October of 1864, delegates from all the provinces except Newfoundland met in Quebec to work out the details of the Charlottetown plan. Among the crucial discussions at Quebec was that on an upper chamber for the new

Canada, which took up six of the meeting’s fourteen days. One

36 Confederation Debates, p. 143. 37 Craig Brown ed., The Illustrated (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1987), p. 332. 29

of the key figures at the Quebec Conference, Sir John

MacDonald, would also be influential in promoting the

Confederation Scheme to his own province of United Canada, and

Yurko concludes:

The records of the Quebec Conference show that no single delegate possessed as much influence or played a greater role than Macdonald [sic]. He shrewdly pilotted the Canadian scheme for union through the conference with few alterations; none of which touched the heart of his scheme for a strong central government.38

From the Charlottetown and Quebec conferences emerged a plan

for the government of a united British America, the details of

which were then debated in each of the provinces. For example,

from February 3 to March 14 of 1865, both houses of the United

Canadian legislature deliberated over each aspect of the plan

and the implications thereof. The record of these debates is

preserved in the Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of

Confederation of the British North American Provinces, a work which remains one of the main sources of information about the

ideals and intentions of the Founders of Canada.39 Following

these debates were nearly two years of negotiations, out of which came a list of proposals which was agreeable to the

provinces United Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.

Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland objected to several

38 William J. Yurko, P. Eng. and Pratt, David S., Renewed Federali sm:_____ Structural Reform of the Canadian Senate (: By the Author, 1982), p. 12.

39 For the sake of convenience, ’’Founders of Canada" will refer to both the delegates at the Charlottetown and Quebec Conferences and those individuals who debated the proposals in their provincial . 30 details regarding their status in the new Confederation and did not join until 1873 and 1947, respectively.

In the fall of 1866, the final proposal went to Britain

for passage by the British government. Until 1982, all major

constitutional proposals in British North America required the approval of Parliament and the Monarch. In the spring of

1867, both houses of the British Parliament passed the resolutions which became the "British North America Act of

1867," and signed the "B.N.A. Act", as the document came to be called, making the Confederation of

British North America official. The B.N.A. Act would serve as

Canada’s constitution until 1982.

The Act stated that the Dominion of Canada would have a bicameral government with an appointed Senate (see

Appendix)40. This Senate, in theory, had the same powers as the House of Commons, but in practice, would be the lesser of the two bodies. The Senate consisted of 72 senators41, 24 from each of the three "sections" of Canada: , Quebec, and the third Maritime section in which Nova Scotia and New

40 For most of the period in which Confederation was discussed, the official name of the new second house was to be the "Legislative Council," following British colonial precedent. The chamber’s name change to "Senate" was a last- minute alteration which occurred just prior to the final passage of the British North America Act.

41 Since 1867, the number of Senators in the Red Chamber has changed several times to accomodate additional provinces to the union, each addition officially instituted by a separate British North America Act. Currently, there are 104 Senators. 31

Brunswick each 12 had senators. The Senate’s members were

appointed by the Governor-General and would serve for life.

Senators were required to own a minimum $4,000 worth of

property within their provinces and could be removed from

power if their net worth dropped below that figure. This

qualification served as a compromise between a chamber of

hereditary nobility and one of commoners, who already had their own chamber.

The inspiration for the Senate came from three sources:

British parliamentary tradition, the experience of previous governments in British North America, and the compromises which brought Canada’s three distinct regions together. That

the founders of Canada wanted to imitate the British model is evident from contemporary sources. Yurko writes, "Colonial

legislators, enamored with the durability of English political

institutions, sought to make Canada’s government 'an image and transcript of the British Constitution’.”42 In 1865, the safety of Canada rested in the maintenance of links with

Britain. Even the French-Canadian, Cartier, said:

I desire to say that I am of the opinion. . .that this confederation could not be realised if it should tend to destroy and weaken the bond which attaches us to Great Britain.43

Not surprisingly, the anglophones at the Quebec conference were just as adamant about remaining loyal to Britain and to

42 Yurko, p. 30.

43 Quoted in Boyd, p. 209. 32 maintaining links with her, which included symbolic links. In

1907, Andre’ Siegfried noted:

The respect manifested for Parliament is a very British sentiment. Its members are really proud of belonging to it, and like to think of themselves as younger brothers of the M.P.s of Westminster.44

For those of British extraction, the

linked them to their roots in Britain, with the foundations of

British democracy. Such ties ran deep and formed the core of

the their identity--they were most emphatically British

Americans and not United States Americans. Consequently, they

tried to avoid those things which were considered "American,"

including governmental systems.

To follow the system of Parliamentary government was to

link Canada to the mother country and her traditions. Among

these traditions was the House of Lords. MacDonald stated: ”We

resolved then, that the constitution of the Upper House should

be in accordance with the British system as nearly as

circumstances would allow.”45 A bicameral system modeled on

the American system of two strong chambers would have meant altering the British form of government and was, therefore

unaccept ab1e.

44 Andre Siegfried, Canada and the Race Question (New York: Appleton and Co., 1907), p. 179.

45 Confederation Debates, p. 35. 33

To the more conservative of Canada’s founders, such as

Sir John A. MacDonald46 and George-Etienne Cartier, an upper chamber was vital for any well-functioning system of responsible government and the checking role of the chamber was to be its most useful function. According to MacDonald, There would be no use of an Upper House if it did not exercise, when it thought proper, the right of opposing or amending or postponing the legislation of the Lower House. . .for it is only valuable as being a regulating body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, and preventing any hasty-or ill- considered legislation which may come from that body.47

By 1867, democratic traditions had become established throughout the British Empire to the extent that there was a general recognition in both British North America and Britain that the future Canada would have a democratic system of responsible government in which the people’s assembly would be the central source of political power. However, democracy was still something of a novelty and many thinkers at the time were not convinced that a lower house could be counted upon always to act with wise self-discipline for the good of the state. For example, D’Arcy McGee stated:

The idea of a universal democracy is no more welcome to the minds of thoughtful men among us than was that of absolute monarchy to the mind of the thoughtful men who

46 John A. MacDonald was the Attorney General for Upper Canada under the United Canadian government. He would become the first and was later knighted as a result of his efforts. Though there were two other MacDonalds in attendance of the United Canada Confederation debates, only Sir John A. MacDonald will be referred to in this essay.

47 Confederation Debates, p. 36. 34

followed the standard of the third William in Europe.48

Democracy needed limitations placed on it, and one way was to develop an upper chamber to check the power of the lower house. Pope writes:

Indeed the all but unanimous opinion of Imperial statesmen, coupled with the fact that every British colony possessing responsible government recognizes the utility of a second chamber, was to his [MacDonald’s] mind a general admission of the necessity for an Upper House. . . .49

Cartier, whose experience under United Canada had convinced him of the value of an "un-democraticM (i.e. unelected) second chamber, noted:

The weak point in democratic institutions is the leaving of all power in the hands of the popular element. The history of the past proves that it is an evil. In order that institutions may be stable and work harmoniously there must be a power of resistance to oppose the democratic element.

One of Sir John MacDonald’s favorite illustrations came from

American President, George Washington. "'Even so,’ said

Washington, 'the Senate is the saucer into which we pour legislation to cool.’"51 In a Senate, the lower chamber’s bad legislation could be improved or rejected, and the threat of possible rejection would encourage the people’s representatives to produce good bills in the first place.

48 Ibid . , p . 143 . 49 Pope, pp. 233-4. 50 Confederation Debates, p. 571.

51 Pope, p. 233. 35

However, the recent experience with the elected

legislative council of United Canada convinced many during

Confederation that an elected upper house might prove too

powerful. Thomas Ryan, who represented the United Canadian

district of Victoria, stated:

If the constituents of both Houses are nearly the same, you lose the power of check, or at least you will not have it effectual, because you will have the same sentiments and feelings represented in the House as in the other.52

Of even more concern was the threat of a rivalry between two

elected chambers. Were it to be elected, the upper chamber would have every right to be a powerful player in Ottawa. To

the Founders, therefore,

their chief reason for rejecting the elective principle and going back to nomination appears to have been that if the Senate felt the sap of popular election in its veins, its spirit would become too high, it would claim equality as a legislative power with the House of Commons,. . .and collision between the two houses would ensue .53

The British parliamentary model, which Canada was expected to

emulate, did not allow for an easy co-existence between two

equally powerful chambers. In 1865, the only nation which had

two chambers of roughly equal standing was the United States, which at the time was hardly a positive example. The Civil War would certainly have confirmed the views of the representative

from North Waterloo, I. E. Bowman:

52 Confederation Debates, p. 334.

53 Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1891), p. 165. 36

I have always believed, and still believe, that we could not expect two branches of the Legislature, owing their existence to the same source, and being elected bv the voters, to work in harmony for any length of time.

To many during the process of Confederation, deadlock would surely result if a conflict between two equal chambers developed, and with such strong regional identities in Canada, the chance of conflict would be likely. John MacDonald warned:

There is an infinitely greater chance of deadlock between the two branches of the legislature, should the elective principle be adopted, than with a nominated chamber-- chosen by the Crown, and having no mission from the people .55

To deal with the threat of a deadlock between the houses, the conservative members during Confederation proposed having a chamber whose members were nominated by the Governor General.

For MacDonald, Cartier, McGee, and others, a nominated chamber had several advantages. Not only would such a move prevent a competition between rival elected chambers, it would also follow British precedent of the House of Lords. As representative J. H. Bellrose from Laval remarked:

. . .it would have been wiser to abolish the Council than to make it elective. In the spirit of the English Constitution, the Legislative Council is a tribunal for purifying the legislation of the Commons. . . ,56

Additionally, nomination would insure that the most capable people were permitted to be in this chamber for the important task of revision. Though elections produced many capable

54 Confederation Debates, p. 808.

55 Ibid., p. 37.

56 Ibid. , p. 481. 37

figures, including both Cartier and MacDonald, a person who

was electable did not necessarily have the qualities needed

for the task of "cooling legislation." Therefore, an appointed

Senate would serve as a check on the impulsiveness of

democracy and would allow a voice for wisdom and prudence in

the political process. John MacDonald called this the

function of "sober second thought."57 "He would have that House conservative, calm, considerate and watchful. . . ."58

Not everyone agreed with such an ideal. Representative

H. H. Dorion of Hochelaga was outspoken in his defense of an

elected upper chamber. Glad that United Canada had gone from

a nominated chamber to an elected one, he remarked:

(T)he nominated Chamber had fallen so low in public estimation. . .that it commanded no influence. . .the new system has worked well; the elected members are equal in every respect to the nominated ones. . . .59

Dorion did not share the more conservative delegates’ fears of

deadlock and excessive democracy. However, he was in the

minority because most of the influential participants in the

process of confederation, particularly Sir John MacDonald. were still fearful of the threatening apparition "universal

democracy," which they perceived to be the cause of the

undoing of the United States.

57 Ibid . , p . 35 .

58 Ibid. , p. 24.

59 Ibid. , p. 254. 38

Though some were skeptical about bicameralism, not having an upper chamber was not a realistic option for any of Canada’s founders. Even the delegate from Lambton, Mr. A.

Mackenzie, who knew of several successful unicameral states, noted: . . .while it is in my opinion that we would be better without an Upper House, I know that the question is not, at the present moment, what is the best possible form of government, according to our particular opinions, but what is the best that can be framed for a community holding different views on the subject.60

In particular, it was argued that a forum for the smaller provinces was vital to the very formation of the Canadian state. Upper Canada, which would eventually become Ontario, was the largest of the provinces in terms of population and demanded that the arrangement of seats in the new lower house be allocated on the basis of population, "rep by pop" as it was commonly called. Mr. Mackenzie stated:

I am convinced that at that time there was not an individual who could appear in public in Canada West [Upper Canada], and take any share in the public discussions of the day, with any chance of getting a favorable hearing unless he asserted that he was in favor of representation by population.61

Mackay argues that most delegates to the Confederation debates

. . .generally agreed that representation in the lower house should be on the basis of population, since on no other condition would Upper Canada have entered the scheme. The question shifted, therefore, to the construction of the upper house.62

60 Ibid . , pp . 426-7 .

61 Ibid. , p. 422.

62 Mackay, p. 36. 39

A lower house based on "rep by pop" meant that both

Quebec and felt threatened in the absence of a checking Senate. For example, the would constitute about 30% of the population in .

While this is a significant percentage, the remaining 70% of the country would be anglophone and thus could outvote any

Quebecois measure in the Lower House. Consequently, the

Quebecois looked to a strong position in the future upper house to protect their interests. Yurko aruges, "Quebec had a distinct language, race, religion and culture to protect and equal representation [in the Senate] provided the necessary safeguards."63 A prominent Upper Canadian journalist and political figure, John Brown, observed,

Our Lower Canadian friends have agreed to give us representation by population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they could have equality in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step.64

The Maritime provinces, among whom support for un ificat ion was tenuous at best, had concerns of their own. At the Quebec Conference, Edward Palmer of Prince Edward Island said:

I am not inimical to the grand scheme of Confederation. I believe it will be productive of great benefits. But I take exception to the principle adopted by this resolution [on Confederation], Representation by population is not applicable when a certain number of provinces are throwing their resources into one Confederation, and giving up their own self-government

63 Yurko, p. 9.

64 Confederation Debates, p. 88. 40

and individuality. When a colony surrenders that right, she should have something commensurate in the Confederation.65

The largest of the Maritimes, Nova Scotia, had only a fifth of the population of Upper Canada, which had sixteen times the population of the smallest Maritime province, Prince Edward Island.66 In the lower house, no single Maritime could hope to achieve its objectives against the wishes of the larger provinces. Even if all of the Maritimes banded together and voted as a bloc, they would be unable to overcome the hegemony of Upper and Lower Canada, the future Ontario and Quebec, should they work together.

These three competing interests insured that no formula for seat distribution in a single chamber would suffice to protect everyone. The American Civil War illustrated the dangers of unsatisfied regional interests, prompting the founders to seek a way to accommodate the interests of all provinces involved. D’Arcy McGee concluded: "I think. . .that I am justified in regarding the American conflict as one of the warnings which we have received. . . . "67 One solution was to have all the provinces equally represented in an upper house, as had been done in United Canada, or in the United

65 Quoted in J.H. Stewart Reid, Kenneth McNaught, and Harry S. Crowe, eds., A sourcebook of Canadian History: selected documents and personal papers (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1959), p. 216. 66 White, p. 68.

67 Confederation Debates, p. 131. 41

States to the south. Thus even the smallest province would

have enough power to potentially check the wishes of Ontario.

In addition, this would have made all provinces symbolically

equal; there would be no second class province in Canada.

However, there was a key difference between America and

Canada: a vast discrepancy in provincial size. The relative

equality of the two halves of United Canada, or even among the

states in America, would not exist in the new Canada, and

complete equality would give a vastly disproportionate share

of the power to the smallest provinces.

Eventually, a compromise was created: In the upper

house, the divisions of Canada would be represented as blocs

rather than as individual provinces. Upper Canada, Lower

Canada, and the Maritime Provinces together would each have an

equal share of seats. Within the Maritime section, the seats would be divided equally among the constituent provinces. This

system did not satisfy everybody. Quebec and the Maritimes

each argued that their section in the Senate should be larger

than the others, in order to protect their interests.

However, because of a lack of a feasible alternative, the

three-section system received enough support to make it

through the provincial legislatures and the British

Parliament. At the end of the Confederation debates, many

felt that the Senate was the best institution that could be

had in light of the circumstances. M.C. Cameron,

representative of North Ontario said: 42

Well, we find honorable gentlemen who advocate this scheme to say that it is not a perfect measure, that it is not what any one of the provinces would desire or accent of itself, but that it is necessary to have this patch-work of a Constitution. . . .68

The addition of more seats as new provinces came into existence did not diminish the bias of the Senate. The system of three regions was ill-suited to accommodate the admission of in 1870, in 1871, Prince Edward

Island in 1873, the Northwest in 1887, and Alberta and in 1905. Prince Edward Island entered into the Maritime section upon admission to the Confederation, with four Senate seats which reduced the seats of Nova Scotia and

New Brunswick to 10 each. The British North America Act of

1915 created a fourth section for western provinces, each of which received six seats.

Once established, the Senate not only helped keep the together, it also linked Canada to her protector and political ancestor, Britain. For example, senators were officially nominated by the Governor-General (though, in fact, selected by the Prime Minster). The senators officially received their powers from the Crown, as in Britain, where a peerage can only be granted by the Sovereign. MacDonald observed that ". . .nomination by the Crown is of course the system which is most in accordance with the British

Const i tut ion. "69

68 Ibid., p. 982.

69 Ibid. , p. 35. 43

Links to the British parliamentary tradition have been especially evident in the ceremony which has opened each new session of Parliament since federation, a ceremony which takes place in the Red Chamber. With the Monarch (or, more likely, her envoy, the Governor General) in attendance, the formalized rituals for the start of the legislative year commence, almost exactly as in Britain. As Mackay describes it:

At such times the Commons, led by their , crowd the antechamber and the space behind the bar at the lower end of the chamber. The speech from the at the opening of the session, that is, the statement of the Government’s programme for the session, is read in English and in French, as are declarations of to bills during or at the close of the session.70

The representatives of the House of Commons enter into the

Senate Chamber according to a prescribed set of rules and rituals.

The customs which regulate the summoning of the Commons to the Senate Chamber by the Gentleman Usher of the , and his elaborate bows to the Speakers and to the Throne, and the occasions on which the Speakers shall raise their three-cornered hats in acknowledgement of His Excellency’s gracious speech are quite as binding and quite as important as they are in the British Parliament. Of all this pageantry the Senate chamber is the state, and the senators supporting members of the cast71.

The "dignified” nature of the Senate is further augmented by its setting. In terms of physical structure, the Senate chamber is ideally suited to its symbolic role. Though the room is not especially large (its seating can accommodate, at

70 Mackay, p. 86.

71 Ibid, p. 63 . 44

most, 120 individuals), it is massive in its proportions. A

series of stone gothic arches hold up a heavy coffered

ceiling. The seats are arranged in two sections which face

each other along either side of a central aisle which leads to

the Throne.

At the upper end of the chamber is the Throne which is occupied by the sovereign, of present, or by his (or her) representative the Governor General or his Deputy, on state occasions, when Parliament is opened or prorogued of Royal Assent is given to legislation.72

The Senate’s nickname, the "Red Chamber," comes from the red

upholstery and carpet in the room, in imitation of the red

color associated with the House of Lords. Incidentally, the

color for the chamber of the Canadian House of Commons is

green, just like the chamber of its British prototype, and

like the British lower house, it is much less ornate than the

upper chamber, which is the center of political ceremonies.

All of these features reinforce the associations between

Canada’s political institutions and those of Britain. The

gothic of the Parliament buildings, in addition to being

fashionable in the 1860’s and 1870’s, was reminiscent of the

medieval world of the Magna Charta, where British

par 1iamentarianism had its birth. The throne is a symbolic

reassurance of Canada’s status as a Monarchy and of her links

to Britain and British political traditions in North America.

When ceremonies take place in the Red Chamber, the formal,

impressive, room with its British overtones, fits with the

72 Ibid. 45 opening rituals which are, themselves, deliberately British in origin. In this cermonial capacity, the Senate, like the House of Lords, functions as one of Bagehot’s "dignified" forms of government.

Since Confederation, the Senate’s main role has been primarily ceremonial and "dignified." The chamber’s

"efficient" side is much less developed. This lack of power stems from several reasons, such as the fact that the British

North America Act, while explicit about the functions of

"Parliament," of which the Senate is a part, has, aside from passages about voting procedures, only one clause which describes the Senate’s "efficient" capacities, stating that the Red Chamber cannot initiate money bills. The B.N.A. Act concentrates on the Senate’s composition rather than its duties. For example, in spite of the Red Chamber’s image as protector of regions, the B.N.A. Act never specifies how the chamber should perform this task. Consequently, since 1867, support for the Senatorial regional representation has lived on, not in the practices of the Senate, itself, but in an ideal of what the Red Chamber does and might actually do were it were properly reformed. Yurko remarked:

Although interest in renewing the second chamber has been rekindled, many of the ideas and opinions surrounding the debate have changed surprisingly little. Most observers agree that the Senate has not lived up to its potential, yet many wish to retain an Upper House that functions as a chamber of sober second thought and regional representation.73

73 Yurko , p . 1. 46

Whereas democracy was suspect in 1867, by the 20th century, it was widely accepted throughout the British Empire as a good thing. Anti-democratic institutions, including the once venerated House of Lords, came under increasing fire, either to be reformed into more acceptable chambers or face being abolished altogether. The House of Lords had been in a state of decline since the late 18th century and in the

Parliament Act of 1911, many of its powers were stripped away, officially reinforcing the already existing tendency of the

Commons to dominate.

Like their British cousins, the Canadians became increasingly hostile to their Mundemocratic" second house.

More and more, the Senate became the victim of the Abbe de

Sieyes’ famous maxim: "If it [an upper chamber] agrees with the Representative House it will be superfluous, if it disagrees, mischievous"74 Pro-democratic sentiments were especially pervasive in the western provinces, where it was increasingly felt that the supposed protector of their provincial in practice was nothing of the sort. In 1961,

David Elton, president of the Canada-West Foundation, summed up the western provinces’ decades-old grievance:

For Western Canadians the current political system in this country is much like being the patron of a casino, where you are forced to place your bets on a hook and anchor wheel that you know has been rigged. Its been

74 Quoted in Mackay, p. 162. 47

rigged in favour of , not so that they win most of the time, but that they win every time. . . ,75

Consequently, the western provinces have been very adamant

about Senate reform. "Given that regional conflict has been

most pronounced in the West," Gibbins argues, "it is easy to

see Senate reform as being designed largely if not exclusively for western interests."76 Equal representation would give all

the smaller provinces considerable voice in the operation of

the Senate and would thus augment the image of the Red Chamber as provincial protector.

In addition to the failure of regional representation,

another feature of the Senate which aroused popular

indignation was the partisanship of the institution. Jeffrey

Simpson, a columnist for The Globe and Mail, concluded:

. . .(I)t seems to me that partisanship had prevented, and always will prevent, the Senate from discharging its two essential functions; representing the regions, and contributing effectively to the legislative process.77

In law, senators are appointed by the Governor-General in

order to produce a body of independent, non-partisan members

to represent the regions. In fact, as was fully intended in

1867, Senate nominees are selected by the Prime Minister, a

75 Quoted in the Centre for Constitutional Studies, The Canadian Senate, What Is To Be Done? Proceedings of the National Conference on Senate Reform May 5-6. 1988 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1989), p. 44. Hereafter referred to as Centre for Constitutional Studies.

76 Roger Gibbins, Senate Reform: Moving Toward the SLipperv Slope (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 1983), p. 7.

77 Centre for Constitutional Studiesj. p. 35. 48

selection automatically approved by the Governor-General. Thus

the Senate is filled with political appointees and the chamber

has become as partisan as the House of Commons. From very

early on, Prime Ministers, including Sir John MacDonald, chose

senators from their own parties. Senators in the Red Chamber

are even arranged by party affiliation78 rather than by

region, the chamber being divided into Government and

Opposition benches. Not only did the Senate embody the

partisanship of each Prime Minister, the life-tenure of its

members insured that a particular partisan composition would

remain in place long after the government which created it was

gone. Thus the Senate could be behind the times by

representing parties which might not be in favor at the

present.

The Senate’s credibi1ity was further eroded in the period

from 1921-1945, when Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie

King was in power. To King,

. . .the Senate was merely meant to be a loyal ally of the prime minister and the Cabinet. . .If the Senate could contribute something useful to the resolution of Canada’s regional problems, or anything else, well and good. If not, it should at least stay out of the way of the man or. . .the 'Parliament,’ which represented the people ,79

To solve federal-provincial disputes, King promoted a previously seldom-used convention to bypass the Senate: a

78 The Senate chamber is divided into majority and opposition halves just as is the House of Commons.

79 White, p. 112. 49

conference of the provincial leaders with the prime minister

which would discuss matters relevant to the provinces and the

federat ion.

From the 1920’s to the 1960’s, scholars and politicians

accepted the Senate as a permanent part of the Canadian

governmental system, albeit one which was quiescent. One of

the most common criticisms of the Red Chamber was that it

acted as a rubber stamp for the government in power in the

House of Commons, particularly when the same political party

controlled both houses of Parliament, as the Liberals did from

1962 to 1984. When F. A. Kunz wrote The Unreformed Senate of

Canada, in 1963, the Red Chamber had not vetoed a piece of

legislation in over 40 years, although it technically had

power to do so.80 Jackson and Atkinson note:

The tendency of the Senate to amend government bills increases appreciably when the majority of senators do not belong to the government’s party in the House of Commons. The actual rejection of important legislation is very unusual...."81

Even when the partisanship of the chambers was different,

conflicts between the houses remained minimal. What revisions were made for legislation were usually corrections of

typographical errors or the addition of editorial comments.

For example, the Senate managed to catch a mistake in a 1930

80 F.A. Kunz, The Modern Senate of Canada 1925-1963: A Re-appraisa1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), Appendix I . 81 Robert J. Jackson and Michael M. Atkinson, The Canadaian Legislative System: Politicians and Policymaking (Toronto: Gage Publishing Ltd., 1980), p. 110. 50

Export bill which mistakenly confused "importation" and "exportation."82 Even F. A Kunz, who firmly believed that legislative revision is a valuable function, stated:

by far the most important category of technical amendments made by the Senate to government legislation consists of administrative improvements--changes designed to make the legislation technically better, without affecting the underlying principles.83

From 1925 to 1962, the Senate amended or rejected only 162 bills out of a total of 9,370 which were sent to it by the

House of Commons. This means that the Red Chamber passed 51 times more bills than it rejected or amended. The "sober second thought" was, therefore, a senatorial quality which seldom seemed to be implemented.

In spite of these facts, for decades little hope existed of changing the system. Unless the Canadian Government was prepared to adjust to an entirely new power structure, it seemed unlikely that significant reform proposals would take place. At best, only minor changes would occur, as in 1965, when senators’terms changed from life to 75 years, but such measures would not greatly change the role of the Senate as a checking (or non-checking) body. Consequently, a Canadian

Government publication remarked: "In our opinion, none of the changes proposed do anything other than focus some attention upon the Senate in anticipation of more substantive changes

82 Kunz, p. 178.

83 Ibid., p. 182. 51

later."84 Political scientist Roger Gibbins was more

pess imi s tic:

There is a disturbing element of national brinkmanship in this scenario; Canada must be led to the verge of regional dismemberment before Senate reform is possible. Given the scope of institutional change that would flow from Senate reform, the design problems that would be encountered, and the entrenched opposition that now exists, this may be the only alternative for those who advocate Senate reform.85

Interest in Senate reform picked up again in the late

1960’s and 1970’s but did not become significant until the

1980’s. In 1982, Canada finally succeeded in patriating its

Constitution. Canada now has the power to reform its own

institutions and amend the system of government without having

to go through the British Parliament. The role of the Senate

in amending the new Constitution, which included the reform of

the Red Chamber, itself, came to be an issue after patriation.

Meanwhile, a different aspect of Senate reform was being

discussed in the West. Annoyed with the lack of an avenue to

address their grievances, the Western Provinces made the Red

Chamber the scapegoat for their hostility and called for

substantial Senate reform. Alberta led the attack with its proposal for a new Senate which would be "Elected, Equal, and

84 Peter McCormick, E.C. Manning, and Gordon Gibson An Elected Senate For Canada: A Commentary on the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Senate Refrom (Calgary: , 1984), p. 34. Hereafter referred to as McCormick et al.

85 Gibbins, p. 47. 52

Effective," commonly called the "Triple 'E’ option. In this plan senators would be directly elected (in order to make them responsible to their provinces) to an effective chamber (which would actually be powerful enough to protect provincial

interests) and all provinces would have equal representation (to ensure that Ontario would not dominate the chamber).

The main outline of the "Triple E" formula is the

Government of Alberta’s Strengthening Canada. The result of an Albertan Legislative committee’s intensive study of the attitudes of the province’s citizens, Strengthening Canada calls for an "Elected, Equal, and Effective Senate." The document states explicitly:

. . . only equal representation by province would afford Canadians the balanced process of federal government which they deserve. The Committee [which produced the document], strongly adhered to the majority point of view in Alberta that Canada is made up of equal partners.86

The report also suggests that Senators need to be directly elected. "Senators should be elected on a first-past-the-post basis, a system now in use in federal and provincial elections."87 The move would give a reformed Senate more credibility and more power to act on behalf of the provinces.

Gibbins remarks:

In this age, . . .institutional legitimacy flows from the electoral process. If the regional legitimacy of the

86 Alberta, Select Special Committee on Upper House Refrom, Strengthening Canada: Reform of Canada’s Senate (Edmonton: Plains Publishing, 1985), p. 26. Hereafter referred to as Alberta.

87 Ibid . p. 5 . 53

federal government is to be increased, if Ottawa is to be seen as a truly national government by electorates across the country, this enhanced legitimacy can best be achieved through the direct popular election of regional representatives.88

In the 1980’s, the Western Provinces attempted to secure

the "Triple E" Senate by incorporating it in a series of

documents known as the Meech Lake Accords. These proposals

resulted from a meeting of the premiers of each province with

the Prime Minister, , in 1987. The western

provinces failed, but because of their pressure, the Accords,

if adopted, would have allowed moderate reforms of the Red

Chamber, such as more provincial participation in choosing

Senators. However, in 1990, the Meech Lake proposals failed to

get the approval of enough provinces to pass, and so none of

the anticipated changes took place.

The failure of Meech Lake prompted the premiers of the

provinces to start over to negotiate many Constitutional

issues. The most recent attempt has been a conference of

provincial Constitutional Affairs ministers under the

leadership of the federal Constitutional Affairs Minister, Joe

Clark. In the spring and summer of 1992, after a great deal of

success, the conference nearly foundered upon the Senate

issue. Heated controversy erupted over the form which the new

Senate should take. The western provinces wanted one solution while Quebec wanted another. In order to adopt any changes,

seven of the nation’s ten provinces, provided that those seven

88 Gibbins, p. 11. 54 consituted over 50% of Canada’s population, must pass the measures. In addition, Quebec’s importance to the existence of the Canadian union makes it necessary for that province to also support any future changes, meaning that both the Quebec and the West need to agree on the future composition of the

Red Chamber. The result was a stalemate in which no one was satisfied, a situation which threatened the very existence of

Canada as a federation.

After months of struggle, a solution emerged on July 8,

1992 in which there would be a trade off. The proposal suggested that there be a popularly elected Senate, in which

t each province would receive equal representation--a situation which closely resembled Alberta’s "Triple E" option. To compensate for its loss of strength in this chamber, Quebec would receive official recognition as a "distinctive society," a status meaning that the Quebec government would have greater than hitherto autonomy over Quebec affairs. At the time of writing, the proposal still needs the approval of 7 out of 10 provinces, provided that these seven contain over 50% of

Canada’s population. In addition, both the House of Commons and the British monarchy need to approve the measure, although the latter would be . At present, prospects for such change appear good, even though the final reaction of all ten provinces is not yet certain. CHAPTER III

FEDERAL MYTH AND SYMBOLIC REALITY

The myth that the Canadian Senate serves to promote

provincial interests is common among the public, scholars,

politicians, and journalists alike, but as Kunz argues, "the

federal function of the Senate has proved to be one of the most enduring myths of political demagogy in Canadian history."89 This myth has been extremely pervasive among the

Canadian people, especially in western Canada, the Maritimes

and Quebec. Its ostensible purposes was described by R. A.

Mackay:

A primary purpose [of the Senate] was to provide compensatory representation in the upper House for the weak numerical position of the Maritime region in the Lower House. From this followed the principle of equality of representation as between the three sections or division of the new nation, a principle extended later to the new Western provinces. With a view to assuring it sufficient strength to protect the province or section, its membership was fixed in number, appointments were for life, and its powers over legislation were left unlimited except as to the initiation of money bills.90

It has done none' of these things but as a "dignified” part of government, the Red Chamber has been extremely useful. Twice

the symbolic ideal, which the Senate embodies, has prevented

the Canadian union from shattering. The first was in the

89 Kunz, p. 319.

90 Mackay, p. 174.

55 56

period from 1865-1867, when the Canadian Confederation was

first established. The second was in the period 1980 to 1992,

when the reform of the Senate became a key issue in a

Constitutional reform package.

The Senate issue in 1867 was primarily one of fortifying

provincial egos. The allocation of seats determined the

status of particular provinces within the new Confederation.

For Quebec, nothing less than complete equality with Ontario was acceptable. Technically, Quebec had a smaller population

than the former Upper Canada, which would become Ontario.

However, official recognition of Quebec’s worth by giving it

the same representation as Ontario was a sign that Quebecois were formally the "equals” of the British to the west and

east. The provision of roughly equal provincial, or in the

case of the Maritimes, regional, representation in the Senate was (and still is) official recognition that all of the

provinces are valuable.

For the Maritime Provinces, which were important to the

geographical intregrity of Canada but lacked the population

base ever to be powerful members of the Confederation, this

recognition was especially important. Senate representation

gave the smaller members of the Confederation the feeling of

being important and helped assuage provincial inferiority

complexes. Kunz remarks:

The assertion of the federal function of the Senate as the time of Confederation, therefore, was rather a well- calculated political device used as a constitutional 57

tranquilizer, to palliate the sectional fears of the weaker partners to federalism from the numerical majorities of the House of Commons. In order that such fears might not endanger the ultimate outcome of the bargain, the value of the Senate as a reliable safeguard of provincial rights had to be stressed.”91

However, this need to stress regional protection in the Senate

runs counter to the system of appointing Senators.

The Senate was intentionally created to serve two opposing goals. In 1961, barrister John N. Turner stated,

’’Historically, the Senate was the political embodiment of two

competing systems: federalism and the British parliamentary

tradition."92 In order to be an adequate defender of the

Maritimes and Quebec, the Senate needed to be powerful enough

to give these two regions a strong voice in Ottawa. On the other hand, to prevent a conflict between two strong

legislative houses, the Red Chamber had to be the weaker of

Canada’s two chambers, called into service only under exceptional circumstances. The nomination of senators by the

Governor General served the latter goal by removing the potential power of a popularly elected body, but this

consequently negated the Red Chamber’s powers to protect

regions. Turner continued:

Provincial rights cannot thrive under a system whereby appointments are made by the federal government. Of this the founders were fully aware. . . .Once the nominative

91 Kunz, p. 317.

92 John N. Turner, "the Senate of Canada--Po1itical Conundrum," in Robert M. Clark, ed., Canadian Issues: Essays in Honour of Henry F. Angus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 58. 58

idea was accepted, it was inevitable that the Senate should never excercise any real power; nor, as it has been suggested, was it intended that it should.93

The Senate cannot be simultaneously strong and weak, a fact which was known even 1867. Yet many of the Founders of

Canada, such as John MacDonald, argued that the future Senate could serve both goals. There are two possible explanations for such a position. Either the Founding Fathers were hopelessly naive about the consequences of their actions, or they deliberately wanted a weak Senate but paid lip- service to the image of an upper chamber which defended regions.

That such individuals were naive does not make sense: they were among the most educated and knowledgeable men in

British North America, many with distinguished political records and a wealth of experience from the United Canadian government. Those who had witnessed the alteration of the

United Canadian Legislative Council would have understood the implications of an elected vs an appointed second chamber. In addition, men such as A. A. Dorion, Thomas Ryan, and A.

MacKenzie explicitly outlined the problems inherent in an appointed upper chamber. Such attitudes would be in keeping with John MacDonald’s treatment of the Senate after Confederation. For example, though he praised the value of an independent, non-paritsan upper house, as Canada’s first Prime Minister, he founded the

93 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 59 practice of insuring that party loyalists would sit in the

Senate. C.E.S. Franks observes:

Senators are appointed by the prime minister through 'instrument of advice [to the Governor General],’ and since the time of Sir John A. MacDonald successive prime ministers have used the Senate to reward loyal supporters. . . .94

It was not beyond MacDonald to defend one ideal during the

Confederation debates while later on acting on an entirely different set of principles. Many modern scholars' such as

Turner, Mallory, Lemco, and Mackay insist that while provincial protection was extremely important during

Confederation, the Senate was not seriously considered to be the cornerstone of this ideal.

Therefore, the Founders of Canada probably preferred to err on the side of a weaker chamber while giving homage to the

Senate as a symbol of regional representation. As Turner not ed:

The Upper House was conceived in negative terms, the parliamentary strain proving stronger than the federalist urge. Yet the statesmen of Upper Canada had to speak the language of federalism and the Senate was the lip-service which was paid. The Senate was a mere psychological pallative for the weaker partners to the Confederation, because the nominative principle as embodied in the Senate is irreconcilable with a true federalism.95

Though knowing that Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia could not rely on a nominated chamber, many of the Founders maintained the pretense that an appointed house would serve

94 C.E.S. Franks, The (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 187.

95 Turner, p. 64. 60 regional interests. Mackay implies that the leaders from all of the provinces, including New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, recognized this fact as they entered into Union:

The Fathers, as we have seen, did not intend the Senate to be an equal partner with the Commons in the control of the government. . . .The British North America Act of 1867 aimed primarily to divide the whole field of government between the federal and provincial authorities. . . . ”96

Primary sources show, therefore, that many of the Fathers of the Confederation, such as Sir John MacDonald and Sir

George-Etienne Cartier, did not consider protection of the provinces to be the primary function of the Senate, but as

Jonathan Lemco states:

Almost all of the proposals of reform suggested in recent years have implied an understanding that the had wanted an upper house to protect regional interests and serve as a check on an unruly lower house. Following James R. Mallory and a handful of others, however, I wish to stress that this was not their first priority. . .The Cabinet and the House of Commons were to produce the first line of territorial defence, not the Senate.97

For many at the Quebec Conference and the Confederation debates, the recent American Civil War served as a frighteningly conspicuous example of ’’states’ rights” being taken too far. John MacDonald mentioned early in the United

Canadian conference:

96 Mackay, p. 51.

97 Jonathan Lemco, "Senate Reform, A Fruitless Endeavour,” Journal of Commonwelath and Comparative Politics 24 (November 1986): 269-277. 61

Ever since the [American] union was formed the difficulty of what is called 'State Rights’ has existed, and this has much to do in bringing on the present unhappy war in the United States. They commenced, in fact, at the wrong end. They declared by their Constitution that each state was a in itself, and that all the powers incident to a sovereignty belonged to each state. . . . Here we have adopted a different system. We have given the General Legislature all the great subjects of legislation. . . .We have thus avoided that great source of weakness which has been the cause of the disruption of the United States.98

From a Canadian point of view, what happened in America was

that the states were given too much power —so much power that when disputes arose between groups of states, there was no

force to compel the two sides to compromise or work together.

Cartier, for example, remarked in a speech in favor of

conf ederat ion:

When we have confederation, our government, you may be sure, will be more imposing and command more respect [from the regional units than in the U.S.]. The great defect in the United States constitution is the absence of some personification of that executive authority which imposes respect upon a ll.99

The Founders knew that the future Canada would have even

deeper social cleavages than the United States. British North

America had, in addition to the sharp geographic cleavages between Upper Canada, Lower Canada, and the Maritimes,

religious divisions between Roman Catholic and Protestant and

linguistic divisions between francophone and anglophone.

98 Confederation Debates, p. 33.

99 Quoted in John Boyd, George Ettienne Cartier. Bart.: His Life and Times: A Political History of Canada from 1814 until 1873 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947 ),_p. 225. 62

These divisions roughly corresponded to the divided regional

units of British North America. This meant that if there was

to be a stable country, the provinces would have to be kept

under greater control, so as to keep the goals of the country

as a whole in mind. Sir John MacDonald felt that the less influence any one

province had in the government, the better. To have a

powerful forum for provincial interests would simply allow

potentially divisive issues and positions onto the national

1 eve 1, which wouId ultimately weaken the fabricof the country

as a whole. "We must . . . have a strong Central Government with all authority except what is given to local governments

in each Province, and avoid the errors of the American Constitution.”100 Stability would be had by promoting those

things which Canadians shared in common rather than those

things which divided them. While there was plenty of

opposition to the centrist model, the prevailing sentiment

during the Confederation debates was that too much provincial

power in federal politics was a bad thing. What powers the provinces would have would not lie with

the Senate at all, but the provincial governments themselves.

In the B.N.A. Act, the Provinces have jurisdiction over 16

"Classes of Subjects," including provincial taxation, control

over municipal institutions, property and civil rights, and

100 John MacDonald quoted in Mackay, p. 35. 63

"Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province."101 Cartier remarked:

The constitutional act which we have had approved in England safeguards the privileges and the rights of the minority as it does those of the majority. . . .With the system of provincial government and a central power, individual interests as well as general interests will always find defenders and a rampart for defence.102

Though, initially, provincial governments lacked a large

amount of power, eventually, they did take control of many

local affairs. Keith reports that by 1876 they

established their right to legislate to protect themselves, seeing that without legislation they possessed no powers other than those essential for the mere orderly conduct of their business....103

Provincial leaders quickly realized that they needed to rely

on their own governments to protect their interests and not on

representation in the Senate.

Quebec continues to provide the best example of reliance

on provincial government to meet its needs. Even with its 24

Senate seats, Quebec cannot use the Red Chamber to promote

French culture and interests on the national level. As one

newly-appointed anglophone senator remarked about the

contemporary Senate, "I am not going to need to speak French

101 The British North America Act. 1867, art. I, sec. 92.

102 Quoted in Boyd, p. 275. 103 Arthur Berriedale Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, 2d. ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928), pp. 541-2. in the Senate."104 Even in 1867, nearly three quarters of a

century of contact between the anglophone and francophone

Canadians had shown that neither group could dominate the

other. A French rebellion in 1837 had shown to the British

government both the futility of trying to suppress the French

and the danger of not addressing their needs. Francophones in

Quebec and New Brunswick comprised over 20% of the population

of British North America--a percentage large enough not no be

ignored.105 Quebec would be allowed to have its own

provincial government to handle matters which were unique to

the province. Then as now, the Senate was not the front line

of defense for Quebec and its "distinctive society." As

Robertson concludes, "None of its [Quebec’s] discomforts can

be removed by Senate reform."106

Some during the Confederation debates envisioned the

Cabinet as a major protector of regional rights. For example,

Christopher Dunkin, who predicted that the future Senate would

be worthless in defending the provinces, concluded,

(t)he Legislative Council, we have seen will not be the check which these sections will require. The Executive Council [i.e., the Cabinet] has got to be that check

104 "Victory for a Reformer," MacLean’s . October 30, 1989 p. 34. 105 White, p. 68.

106 Gordon Robertson, A House Divided: Meech Lake, Senate Reform and the Canadain Union (Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1989), p. 1. 65

107

If the Senate were to represent interests at all, Dunkin said,

it would be only as a last resort, after other parts of the

government had failed to reconcile the provinces.

Therefore, even many of the founders of Canada

recognized, at the outset, that the system of Senate regional

representative was flawed. For example Christopher Dunkin

said during United Canada’s debates: ". . .1 do not hesitate

to affirm that there is not a particle of the Federal

principle about it [the Senate]; that it is the merest sham that can be imagined.”108

Subsequent years have substantiated Dunkin’s observation.

The main reason why the Senate does not effectively represent

regions or provinces is because is was not designed to empower

either the smaller provinces or Quebec. As Mackay argues:

Intended to represent the interests of the various sections and provinces, it was deprived of any real representative character by reason of the fact that the sections and provinces were given no hand in the appointment of its members.”109

The idea that smaller provinces could have a strong voice in

the Senate hinged on the assumption that these smaller

provinces could check or revise the legislation passed by the

Ontario-dominated lower house. However, that function has

turned out be imaginary. Because of the Senate’s lack of

107 Confederation Debates, p. 498.

108 Ibid. , p. 493 . 109 Mackay, p. 159. 66

legitimacy, Senators do not excercise the legal powers which

they possess. For example, Nova Scotia’s check on the power of Ontario means little more than the ability of Nova Scotian senators to proofread the bills for grammatical and spelling mistakes and suggest amendments to the government; the Senate always yields to the government. A chamber of 72 editors hardly qualifies as an effective vehicle for the defence of the small provinces. However, sources indicate that none of

the provinces which joined the union in 1867 banked on the

Senate as their main source of protection, and most scholars since then have generally accepted that fact.

Therefore, both contemorary sources and later scholarship present a strange scenario. If, as many believe, most at the time of Confederation agreed that the Senate would be a relatively weak body and provinces would have other means of protection, why was there such a fuss over the Senate?

Symbolism appears to be theanswer. While the Senate would not be an ’’efficient” part of the provinces’ defense plans, it was conceived of as a gauge of provincial status in the

Confederation. If, for example, Quebec was given more than one third of the seats, the Maritimes would see Quebec receiving preferential treatment in the new Confederation. On the other hand, if the Maritimes recieved a larger share of Senate

Seats, it would appear to Quebec that the anglophones were trying to maintain hegemony over the political system. In

Edelman’s words, both Quebec and the Maritimes, would have 67

used what they regarded as unfair representation in the Senate

as indicating not only inequalities and preferential treatment

in the Senate but also elsewhere in the Confederation.

By acknowledging the theoretical equality of the three

regions, the Founders of Canada hoped to soothe provincial

egos enough to persuade both Quebec and the Maritimes to join

the federation without giving them the powerful voice in an

upper house which might threaten the stability of the union.

The second instance of the usefulness of the Senate as a

"dignified" institution occurred in the midst of

Constitutional reforms in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.

The issue of reforming the Senate, while ever present in

Canadian politics, came to a head in the 1980’s when great

changes to the Canadian constitution were debated. Decades of

provincial grievances errupted, especially in Quebec and the

Western provinces.

Representation in the Senate was not an issue for Quebec

after Confederation. In 1867, Quebec, a very large province, had tried to obtain as much representation in the Senate as

possible, yet from then until the early 1980’s, its desire to obtain Senate reform was minimal. Robertson writes, "Senate

reform was no part of Quebec’s 'five points’ of May, 1986.

Quebec, like Ontario, has never evinced much interest in the question."110 It had usually relied on its powerful position elsewhere in the Confederation, such as in ’s

110 Robertson, p. 12. 68 conferences with the Prime Minister, to reach its goals and did not pay much attention to the Red Chamber.

Then, in 1981, Quebec found that Canada had a new

Constitution which did not suit its own interests and had been adopted without its imput111 . Consequently, Quebec sought more of a say infuture constitutional changes. The opportunity for meaningful changes to the Constitution developed at the Meech Lake Conference in 1987, where Quebec made a series of demands. These included official recognition of Quebec as a ’’” in Canada, which meant that the province would have the autonomy to preserve, protect, and promote French culture within its borders through measures such as making Quebec an exclusively French-speaking, rather than bilungual, region. This meant that Quebec no longer required special protection in the Senate.

Meanwhile, the Western and Maritime provinces, particularly Alberta, had been demanding more effective representation in the Senate for nearly 100 years. Robertson wr i t es:

Over the years, dissatisfaction of the West with the arithmetic of Senate representation increased. Westerners saw, year after year, and regardless of the government in power, a House of Commons dominated by the representation of ’"central Canada.’’ However, far from having a second chamber that could qualify this imbalance, westerners saw a Senate in which the 'central

111 The other nine provinces agreed to a new, patriated Constitution in just after midnight on November 5, 1981. The Quebec premier, Rene Levesque, had not been notified of this later meeting and awoke that morning to find a new constitutional package without his approval. 69

region’ of Ontario and Quebec had 48 seats while the West had only 24. In western eyes there was and is neither provincial nor genuine regional equality to offset the preponderance of population in the industrialized and prosperous centre of Canada."112

As in 1867, equal Senate representation was a major goal for the smaller provinces. At the time, several Canadian leaders, such as former cabinet minister Gordon Robertson, felt that

Western/Maritime and Quebecois demands could have been reconciled. He envisioned a compromise in which the Western and Maritime provinces received equal representation in, the

Senate in exchange for granting Quebec its status as a

"distinct society."

Had it been approved, the would not have dramatically altered the Senate, though the process of reform would have begun. Meech Lake centered on placating

Quebec, but once the "Quebec Issue" had been settled, reforming the Red Chamber would have been next on the agenda.

The Accord required the prime minister to hold a consitutiona1 conference with all ten of the provinces annually until the

Senate issue was resolved. Meech Lake would have been the first step to rectifying the western provinces’ grievances over the Senate. The first change to the Red Chamber would have been that the prime minister would have had to choose new appointees from lists of candidates submitted by the provincial governments.

112 Robertson, p. 3. 70

The Meech Lake Accord failed due to the fact that two

provinces, Manitoba and New Brunswick, did not ratify the

Accord by the 1989 deadline. Since then, the Canadian

government has struggled to coordinate the need for reform in

Canada with the interests of the country’s constituent

provinces. The most recent attempt was in the spring and

summer of 1992, during a conference between the national

Minster of Constitutional Affairs, , and the

constitutional affairs ministers from each of the provinces.

The center of controversy was the number of seats each

province would have in the reformed Senate. By June of 1992,

there was general agreement that the system of appointing * senators should be abolished and that senators should be popularly elected,113 However, the more divisive issue was

how the seats would be arranged in the new Red Chamber, whose

legitimacy and reach would be greatly enhanced by the election

of its members.

The talks of 1992 continued to reflect the antagonisms which existed during the Meech Lake Conference. For example,

since Quebec’s hopes for official recognition of its cultural

heritage were dashed in the failure of the Accord, that

province vigorously pursued a policy to gain as much power in

the Senate as possible. Equality among the provinces in the

Red Chamber would severely curtail that goal. Quebec’s

113 Jenish, D’arcy, MA Critical Moment: The First Ministers Prepared for Another Round of Talks” Mac lean’s June 8, 1992, p. 12. 71

Intergovernmental Affairs Minister, Gil Remillard, remarked,

’’Wewill not recognize that Quebec must be on the same footing as all the other provinces concerning such an important institution as the Senate.”114 If Quebec did not receive this concession, Remillard continued, "When we return to the table, if we were to return to the table, we will no longer feel bound in any manner whatsoever [to compromise].”115

On the "Western" front, the traditional large province/small province split had been compounded by a developing rivalry among the western provinces. The Pacific edge of Canada has long felt a sense of separateness from the other parts of Canada. Yurko writes:

The isolation and alienation felt in the Pacific region are not solely the product of geography. From their beginnings, both British Columbia and the developed in a manner quite distinct from the rest of Canada. . . [in particular,] British Columbia’s political culture .is well developed and quite distinct from other western provinces.118

Such feelings were exacerbated by recent demographic trends.

Population changes over the past decade have transformed

British Columbia from one of the "small” provinces to one of the "large" ones. A 1986 census discovered that British

Columbia held 11.4% of the Canadian population, the third

114 Quoted in Robert McKenzie, "We’ve agreed to nothing, Quebec says," Toronto Star, May 30, 1992.

115 Ibid.

118 Yurko, pp. 133-4. 72

largest province in terms of population.117 As a result, the

British Columbian leadership at the conference promoted the

concept of five Senate sections instead of four, with British

Columbia and the northern Territories as a separate section.

However, the other western provinces did not think that

British Columbia was large enough to merit its own Senate

section. Alberta, led by premier , had continually

pushed for the famous "Triple E" option in which all provinces

would be equally represented. Because of British Columbia’s

moves for a five-section Senate, the provinces of

Newfoundland, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia rallied

to Alberta’s side. Together these five small provinces came to

be called the "gang of five."

Meanwhile, Ontario, which, with Quebec, had dominated the

Senate, favored the status quo. The Federal Government in

Ottawa, represented in the talks by Joseph Clark, also

supported this view. To Clark, the Senate was a relatively

passive tool in the workings of Canadian government and a more

powerful Senate would make things more complicated for the

Prime Minister and Cabinet. Journalist Lorne Gunter concludes:

. . . (F)ederal Constitutional Affairs Minster Joe Clark has stoutly defended the status quo. He will brook no changes to federal institutions that would see the central Canada-dominated House of Commons give up significant legislative power to a reformed Senate in which each province enjoys equal legislation.118

117 Sindlinger, p. 12. 118 Lorne Gunter, "Shootout at the Triple-E Ranch," British Columbia Report. June 15, 1992, p. 9. 73

Therefore each of the four major actors in the Senate reform issue wanted a solution that favored its particular group without compromise. The result was an impasse which threatened to shatter Canada.

Considerations of the impact of Senate changes on the political system as a whole did not seem to be especially important to these Constitutional Affairs Ministers. In spite of Joe Clark’s enthusiasm for things staying as they were, many in Ottawa, including Brian Mulroney, would have accepted any settlement which would allow Canada to stay united.

Remarkably little attention was given to the numerous works which pondered the consequences of Senate reform, other than brief references to the "Triple-E" slogan presented in

Strengthening Canada. Journalist Carol Goar wondered:

Before making such a costly and far-reaching change, one would presume that a nation would want to take a hard look at the pros and cons. But this is not happening. Canada’s constitutional affairs ministers are so busy trying to work out the mechanics that they are paving scant attention to the rationale or ramifications."119

The controversy was an internecine struggle among the provinces to determine who would be dominant in the reformed

Canada. In White’s words, "The logic of Quebec’s, or New

Brunswick’s, extra Senate seat would be strictly symbolic."120 As with the Confederation debates a century earlier, fights over status were significant, with the

119 Carol Goar, "Too bad we didn’t grab chance to abolish Senate," Toronto Star, May 28, 1992.

120 White, p. 237. 74 symbolic status of the Senate representation a decisive issue.

This situation corresponded to a paradigm put forth by Swedish sociologist Ulf Himme1strand, who suggested that there are certain acts which are "symbolic acts." These he defined as

". . .acts which have symbols as their exclusive objects, neglecting largely the objective or conceptual referents of these symbols.’"121 In spite of the volumes of carefully thought-out analyses about the merits of potential Senate reforms, provincial interest rather than political theory has been the main consideration in this conflict. For example, the people of Quebec were probably not concerned with erudite political theory when their premier, Robert Bourassa, made the threat that if Quebec did not get adequate representation in the Senate, "My province will vote soon in a where we will destroy Canada."122 Quebec’s position in a reformed

Senate appeared to be so signficant to Bourassa and the

Quebecois, that the Quebeckers seemed willing to sacrifice

Canadian unity in its name.

The Senate became a condensation symbol when the issue of its reform became a source of possionate debate. When emotional situations erupt, such as during Senate reform, a condensation symbol serves as a way to focus the emotion on a single issue. Edelman states:

121 Quoted in Edelman, p. 10.

122 William Claiborne, "Senate Question Snarls Canada’s Charter Talks," Washington Post, June 12, 1992, pp. A25-26. 75

It evokes a quiescent or an aroused mass response [in this instance, a mass response channeled through elected representatives] because it symbolizes a threat or reassurance. Because the meaning of the act in these cases depends only partly and not at all upon its objective consequences, which the mass public cannot know, the meaning can only come from the psychological needs of the respondents; and it can only be known from their responses.

A lack of a sense of scale permeates the nature of a condensation symbol. "The point is that there is no necessity, and often no possibility, of continuously checking . convictions against real conditions."124 This lack of scale had been quite evident during most of the Constitutional talks. Brown writes, "Canadians, like their historians, have spent too much time remembering conflicts, crises and fai lures . "12S

The conference on reforming Canada’s constitution had shown remarkable agreement on many complicated issues such as defining provincial jurisdiction over mineral rights. Yet after all these significant issues were discussed and agreed, the conference nearly collapsed over the deeply symbolic issue of reform of the Senate. The Quebecois perceived the of the western and maritime provinces as a threat to their status as a "distinctive society" within

Canada. Symbolic gestures had been importantto Quebec before, such as in the issue of bilingual road signs, but

123 Edelman, p. 7.

124 Ibid.

125 Brown, p. 543. 76

Gordon Robertson notes that there was little understanding by the anglophones,

. . .of the symbolism that is involved. . . .French is pychologically important [in order] to resist the stead encroachment of the English-speaking sea of over 200 million that surrounds Quebec in North America. Without that understanding, the 'language of signs’ policy appears petty and vengeful."126

As with the road sign issue, the Senate reform issue became a symbol of the preservation of French identity. When ethnic identity is at stake, even the most mundane institutional problem can be appear to be a matter of life or death.

The group of five also felt threatended psychologically but could do little about it. The western provinces perceived the power of Ontario and Quebec as a threat to their interests. Consequently, the "Triple E" Senate developed into a platform from which to recognize and enhance the smaller provinces’ status. Goar states:

What began as a theory devised by a few Alberta political scientists was adopted by a premier (Don Getty) for a gimmick to capitalize on western discontent. The gimmick became a slogan, the slogan became a political crusade and the crusade acquired momentum."127

What should have been a relatively straightforward matter of reform was blown out of proportion once provincial pride got involved. Dominance in the Senate was a goal for each province because the attainment of that goal was sign of a particular province’s high status within the confederation.

126 Robertson, p. 23.

127 Goar. 77

The extent to which the group of five or Quebec would be better protected by a reformed Senate is uncertain, especially if there is a continuation of the practice that Senators have a national, rather than provincial, focus. As Lemco notes,

’’Since the Confederation period, senators have almost always tried to represent the nation as a whole rather than a particular province.”128 Such "efficient” questions were secondary to a larger struggle for psychological preservation.

The issue took on a significance well beyond the reallocation of seats. The Senate reform talks of 1992 had degenerated into the uncontrolled regional fighting which MacDonald and Cartier feared.

In the summer of 1992, the Constitutional Affairs

Ministers agreed upon a proposal which would allow equal representation of provinces in the Senate, which would please the small provinces, in exchange for greater autonomy for

Quebec. Though the details would be worked on in the months ahead, leaders from Quebec and the smaller provinces were encouraged by the proposal. This proposal closely resembled the proposal of the Meech Lake Accords, in which both the small provinces and Quebec would have benefited. The

"distinctive society” had been a focal point for Quebecois identity and security, but when this goal seemed unattainable,

Quebec’s prominance in the Senate became the main defense for

Quebecers and their interests, placing Quebec on a collision

128 Lemco, p. 270. 78 course with the group of five as each region tried to take over the same symbol. Accord came about when each side discovered the possibility of receiving a symbolic "security blanket,” in exchange for allowing the other side to gain something. This exchange of real and tangible results helped ease tensions and enabled progress to be made.

Symbolic gestures have been and remain a vital part of the negotiation process between provinces and between the

Canadian government and the nation’s regions. Symbols can overcome the suspicion and rivalries which might become deadlocked on functional details of the new Senate. In both

1865 and 1992, controversies errupted over symbolism and it took symbolic motions to restore order. As Norman Ward said,

"The Senate of the 1980’s, like that of the 1860’s, continues to be seen as an almost mystical balance-wheel. . . . ”129 As had happened in 1867, the exchanging of symbolic reassurances helped bring the provinces together again. The leaders at the

First Minister’s Conference of 1992, in their attempts to bring about an agreement which would keep Canada together, resorted to the same tactics which were used in 1867.

This incident illustrates the fact that the Canadian

Senate can act as one of Edelman’s "Condensation symbols."

During the Constitutional reform talks, the Senate, or more accurately, regional representation in the Senate, functioned

129 Norman Ward, Dawson’s The Government of Canada, 6th ed. (Toronto, Buffalo, New York: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 153. 79 as a condensation symbol for Canada’s Constitutional Affairs

Ministers. Blown out of proportion by a lack of perspective, the ideal of what a reformed Senate might do provoked strong emot ions.

On the surface, regional representation appeared to be one of the main "efficient” functions of the Senate in 1867.

It appeared to represent the concept of regional representation, but it was not equipped to act on this value.

During Confederation, the Senate’s main value was as a barometer of the federal-provincial relationship. During the

Constitutional reform talks of the late 20th century, the

Senate’s possible reform took on great signficance to the leaders of several province--it became a symbol, a symbol with power. CONCLUSION

Institutions are symbols in addition to being tangible

parts of a political process. In regards to Canada, the

institution of the Senate has survived primarily because of

its symbolic nature. Like the House of Lords, the Canadian

Senate has been a ’’dignified'* part of the government,

symbolizing Canada’s British political heritage and providing

a setting for ceremonies and ritual.

In the Confederation Era, the Senate also functioned as

Edelman’s ’’referential symbol;" it was a tool with which to

understand the process of negotiating a new country. Both

Quebec and the Maritimes used the Senate to gauge each other’s

status in the new Confederation. The Senate also derieved

importance from the ideals for which it stood. Though most of

the Fathers of Confederation realized that the future Red

Chamber would be weak, they upheld the pretense that it was a

defender of regional rights because to say otherwise would

have indicated an insensitivity to the notion that all

provinces needed a degree protection from the federal

government.

In the recent Consitutional reform talks, the Senate became a condensation symbol for the leaders of the western

provinces and Quebec. Nearly all of the provinces saw the

80 81 prestige of strong representation in the Senate as compensation for decades of Ottawa’s indifference. Because the Canadian public remained largely uninvolved in the issue, the provincial leaders tended to exaggerate what the Senate could do for a province.

The Canadian Senate has been most valuable as a

"dignified” part of Canadian politics. Far from being useless, political symbols can be vital, and even indispensable, to a state, even though the "efficient” worth of these bodies may be negligible. Thus, the Red Chamber supports Bagehot’s statement that "dignified" elements of a political system are as meaningful as "efficient" ones.

Though written to support a different thesis, the words of F.A. Kunz are appropriate to this examination of the

Senate’s symbolic nature. He says that his conclusions about the Canadian Senate, ". . .by no means try to belittle the services of the Senate; they simply clarify their exact nature."130 The institution of the Canadian Senate is important to Canada, not because of its ability to act but because of its capacity to represent and motivate. Without a symbolic Senate as an incarnation of provincial rights, the unification of British North America in 1867 would never have happened. For over 125 years, Canada may have owed its very existence to the much-maligned Red Chamber.

130 Kunz, pp. 316-7. APPENDIX

EXCERPTS FROM THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT OF 1867 PERTAINING TO THE SENATE

IV. Legislative Power

17. There shall be One Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an Upper House styled the Senate, and the House of Commons. 18. The Privileges, Immunities, and Powers to be held, enjoyed and excercised by the Senate and by the House of Commons and by the Members thereof respectively shall be such as are from Time to Time defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada, but so that the same shall never exceed those at the passing of the Act held, enjoyed, and excercised by the Commons House of Parliament of the of Great Britian and Ireland and by the Members thereof. 19. The Parliament of Canada shall be called together not later than six Months after the Union. 20. There shall be a Session of the Parliament of Canada once at least in every Year, so that Twelve Months shall not intervene between the last Sitting of the Parliament in one Session and its first Sitting in the next Session.

The Senate

21. The Senate shall, subject to the Provisions of this Act, consist of Seventy-two Members, who shall be styled Senators. 22. In relation to the Constitution of the Senate, Canada shall be deemed to consist of Three Divisions;

1. Ontario; 2. Quebec; 3. The Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; which Three Divisions shall (subject to the Provisions of the Act) be equally represented in the Senate as follows: Ontario by Twenty-four Senators; Quebec by Twenty-four Senators; and the Maritime Provinces by Twenty-four Senators, Twelve thereof representing Nova Scotia, and Twelve thereof representing New Brunswick. In the case of Quebec each of the Twenty-four Senators representing that Province shall be appointed for One of the Twenty-four Electoral Division of Lower Canada specified in Schedule A. to Chapter One of the Consolidated Statues of Canada.

23. The Qualifications of a Senator shall be as follows:

(l)He shall be of the full age of Thirty Years:

82 83

(2)He shall be either a Natural-born Subject of the Queen, or a Subject of the Queen naturalized by an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdon of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the Legislature of One of the Provinces of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Canada, Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick, before the Union of the Parliament of Canada, after the Union: (3)He shall be legally or equitably seised as of Freehold for his own Use and Benefit of Land or Tenements held in free and common Socage, or seised or possessed for his own Use and Benefit of Land or Tenements held in Francelieu or in Roture, within the Province for which he is appointed, of the Value of Four Thousand Dollars, over and above all Rents, Dues, Charges, Mortgages, and Incumbrances due or payable out of or charged on or affecting the same: (4)His Real and Personal Property shall be together worth Four thousand Dollars over and above his Debts and Liabilities: (5)He shall be resident in the Province for which he is appointed: (6)In the case of Quebec he shall have his Real Property Qualification in the Electoral Division for which he is appointed, or shall be resident in that Division.

24. The Governor General shall from Time to Time in the Queens* Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified Persons to the Senate; and, subject to the Provision of the Act, every Person so summoned shall become and be a Member of the Senate and a Senator. 25. Such Persons shall be first summonded to the Senate as the Queen by Warrant under Her Majesty’s Royal Sign Manual thinks fit to approve, and their Names shall be inserted in the Queen’s proclamation of Union. 26. If at any Time on the Recommendation of the Governor General the Queen thinks fit to direct that Three or Six Members be added to the Senate, the Governor General may by Summons to Three or Six qualified Persons (as the Case may be), represening equally the three Divisions of Canada, add to the Senate accordingly. 27. In case of such Addition being at any Time made the Governor General shall not summon any Person to the Senate, except on a further like direction by the Queen on the like Recommendation, until each of the Three Divisions of Canada is represented by Twenty-four Senators and no more. 28. The Number of Senators shall not at any Time exceed Seventy-e ight. 29. A senator shall, subject to the Provisions of this Act, hold his Place in the Senate for Life. 30. A Senator may by Writing under his Hand addressed to the Governor General resign his Place in the Senate, and thereupon the same shall be vacant. 84

31 The Place of a Senator shall become vacant in any of the following cases:-- (1)If for Two consecutive Sessionsof the Parliament he fails to give his Attendance in the Senate. (2)If he takes an Oath or makes a Declaration or Acknowledgement of Allegiance, Obedience, or Adherence to a Foreign Power, or does an Act whereby he becames a Subject or Citizen, or entitled to the Rights or Privileges of a Subject or Citizen, of a foreign Power: (3) I f he is adjudged Bankrupt or insolvent, or applies for the Benefit of any Law relating to Insolvent Debtors, or becomes a public Defaulter: (4)If he is attainted of Treason or convicted of Felony or of any infamous Crime: (5)If he ceases to be qualified in respect of Property or of Residence; provided, that a Senator shall not be deemed to have ceased to be qualified in respect of Residence by reason only of his residing at the Seat of the Government of Canada while holding an Office under that Government requiring his Presence there.

32. When a Vacancy happens in the Senate by Resignation, Death, or otherwise, the Governor General shall by Summons to a fit an qualified Persion fill the Vacancy. 33. If any Question arises respecting the Qualifications of a Senator or a Vacancy in the Senate the same shall be heard and determined by the Senate. 34. The Governor General may from Time to Time, by instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, appoint a Senator to be Speaker of the Senate, and may remove him and appoint another in his Stead. 35. Until the Parliament of Canada otherwsie provides the Presence of at least Fifteen Senators, including the Speaker, shall be necessary to constitute a Meeting of the Senate for the Excercise of its Powers. 36. Questions arising in the Senate shall be decided by a Majority of Voices, and the Speaker shall in all Cases have a Vote, and when the Voices are equal the Decision shall be deemed to be in the Negative. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Jay Marsh Price

Born at White Sands Missile Base, New , April 8,

1969. Graduated from Santa Fe High School, Santa Fe, New

Mexico, May 1987, B.A. in History from University of New

Mexico, 1991. M.A. candidate, The College of William and Mary,

1991-1992, with a concentration in Comparative Politics. The course requirements for this degree have now been completed.

In the fall of 1992, the author returned to the Southwest to help with the family business.