Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 33, October, 1987 International, Page 35438 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Contadora peace efforts - Signature of regional peace plan - US policy in the region

Summary and key dates

UN Secretary-General's report on Central American peace efforts (July 3, 1986).

Tegucigalpa bloc meeting (mid-July 1986).

Decisions by and to boycott Contadora meetings (Oct. 31, Nov. 7, 1986). Central American tour by Contadora and Groups (Jan. 19–20, 1987).

Third regional conference with EU (Feb. 9–10, 1987).

Proposal of Arias regional peace plan (Feb. 15, 1987).

Contadora support for Arias Plan (April 13–16, 1987).

European tour by President Arias (May 12-June 7, 1987).

Cancellation by of June 25–26 Central American presidential summit (June 12, 1987).

Announcement by USA of alternative regional peace plan (Aug. 5, 1987).

Signature of regional peace plan at Central American presidential summit (Aug. 6–7, 1987).

Formation of Executive Commission by Central American Foreign Ministers (Aug. 20–21, 1987).

Formation of International Verification and Monitoring Commission (Aug. 22, 1987). Formation of Nicaraguan Reconciliation Commission (Aug. 25, 1987).

Resignation of US special envoy (Aug. 14, 1987).

Award of 1987 Nobel Peace Prize to President Arias (Oct. 13, 1987).

UN Secretary-General's report on Central American peace efforts Tegucigalpa bloc meeting

The Secretary-General of the (UN), Sr Javier Perez de Cuellar, on July 3, 1986, reported to the UN General Assembly and security Council on the recent efforts towards a settlement of the situation in [see 34551 A]. He appealed urgently to the countries of the region (Costa Rica, El Salvador, , Honduras and ) and to those with interests in the region to act in accordance with international law to break “the cycle we have been witnessing in recent months”.

In his report Sr Perez de Cuellar said that the governments of the five countries of the region, together with those of the Contadora Group (comprising the Foreign Ministers of , , and ) and the (comprising the Foreign Ministers of , , and ), were in agreement on the need for a Latin American solution to the region's problems, which should be removed from the arena of East-West conflict, and on the establishment of genuinely pluralistic democratic systems and respect for human rights of all systems. Among other elements for a settlement were the right of all nations to self-determination without interference, the need to carry out far-reaching economic and social reforms, the prohibition of the use of a nation's territory as a base for attacks on another country, and the ending of support by any country within or outside the region to irregular forces or subversive groups operating anywhere in the region.

In mid-July 1986 the Foreign Ministers of the so-called Tegucigalpa bloc (Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador) met in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in an apparent attempt to bring about a greater isolation of Nicaragua. A second bloc meeting held in San Salvador the following week was attended by the then Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Sr Mario Rafael Quinonez Amezquita, who nevertheless repeated that Guatemala was maintaining its “active neutrality”.

Attempts to reactivate Contadora Withdrawal of Honduras and Costa Rica from Contadora process

During the last week of September 1986 the eight members of the Contadora and Lima Groups attending the 41st session of the UN General Assembly in New York initiated a series of meetings to study proposals put forward by Mexico aimed at breaking the deadlock in negotiations and revitalizing the peace process begun in 1983 [see 32486 A]. However, with the exception of Guatemala, the final proposal for a permanent political mechanism operating through diplomatic channels met with little enthusiasm among the Central American countries.

In his address to the General Assembly President Arias of Costa Rica was particularly critical of Nicaragua, stating that the consolidation of the Sandinistas in power constituted “a permanent challenge to the security” of his country and that their regime provided the locale for regional conflict within the East-West confrontation. Honduras stated that Contadora was little better than worthless while President Duarte of El Salvador accused Mexico of being “interventionist”. In addition, both Costa Rica and Honduras argued that there could be no negotiations while the government of Nicaragua continued to press its case against them at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague [see 34542 A; 35443 A], a position endorsed by the US administration.

On Oct. 23 a Guatemalan diplomatic delegation led by Sr Quinonez left for a tour of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador with the aim of reactivating both the Contadora process and the idea of establishing a Central American Parliament, the founding of which had been proposed in the “Declaration of Esquipulas” of May 25, 1986 [see page 4552 A]

At the end of a two-day meeting in Mexico City on Oct 30–31, the Deputy Foreign Ministers from the Contadora and Lima Groups issued a communique stating that they had exchanged views on the situation in Central America and had agreed that recent political and military actions had increased the existing tension in the region. Agreements reached by the Deputy Ministers were to be submitted to a meeting of the Foreign Ministers to be held in Rio de Janeiro on Dec. 17–18 [see below].

Honduras on Oct. 31 announced its decision to boycott all Contadora-sponsored meetings until Nicaragua had withdrawn the charges filed against it at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A similar decision taken by Costa Rica was reported on Nov. 7, Sr Arias having strongly criticized the Group for failing to reprimand Nicaragua over its decision to bring charges against Costa Rica.

The Contadora and Lima Groups, in a joint statement released at the end of a two-day meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on Dec. 17–18, expressed their “grave concern” over recent events in the region and said that they would renew their efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement [see 35112 A]. The statement condemned the bombing of civilian populations, the increasing number of irregular forces in the region and the policy of intervention from outside, which it described as a “clear violation of international law”. It was announced that the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Sr Joao Clemente Baena Soares, and Sr Perez de Cuellar were to travel with the Foreign Ministers to Central America in January in an attempt to overcome the objections to points in the draft Contadora peace treaty as presented to the five Central American Foreign Ministers in June 1986 [see 34551 A; see pages 34032-33 for Contadora Act as issued in June 1984 and for revised draft of September 1986].

The decision for the eight Foreign Ministers to meet again had been taken at the General Assembly sessions of the OAS in Guatemala City on Nov. 10–17. At that time the efforts of Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru to pass a strong resolution backing Contadora had failed. Nevertheless, a draft resolution expressing continued support for the peace efforts of the Contadora Group was finally approved by all five Central American countries on Nov. 14. Shortly after the OAS conference Sr Perez de Cuellar and Sr Baena Soares had offered (i) to place at Contadora's disposal “an arsenal” of resources including themselves personally and a civilian or military presence to monitor border incidents; (ii) to supervise the withdrawal of military forces, the dismantling of military bases or the dissolution of guerrilla groups; (iii) to investigate arms trafficking; (iv) to protect refugees, and to ensure fulfilment of agreements to limit the acquisition of weapons and eliminate foreign military advisers. Diplomats said that the joint initiative appeared to have been designed specifically to address many of the objections raised by individual Central American governments to different aspects of the Contadora draft peace treaty.

The West German news agency, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, reported that on Dec. 18 Costa Rica had rejected a proposal by the Contadora Group whereby a surveillance and inspection commission in the border area between Costa Rica and Nicaragua would have been created. The Costa Rican Foreign Minister, Sr Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto, said: “We all know that the total solution of the Central American situation requires a change in Nicaragua.”

Ministers attending the Rio de Janeiro meeting announced also their decision to create a group to address issues of common interest such as foreign debt, regional integration, technological development and conflict in the region.

Tour of Central America by Contadora and Lima Groups

Having met in on Jan. 17, 1987, “to define the strategy of their tour through Central America”, the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora and Lima Groups, and the Secretaries-General of the OAS and of the UN visited Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador on Jan. 19–20.

The immediate goal of the tour was to ascertain whether “the minimal conditions of trust and political communication necessary to prevent the outbreak of war in Central America” could be created. However, speaking in Mexico City on Jan. 21, Sr Perez de Cuellar said that although Contadora was not exhausted “neither Contadora nor the United Nations nor the Organization of American States can do very much if there is not the political will and the sincerity to find peaceful solutions among the Central American governments”. A communique issued by the eight Foreign Ministers supported his assessment.

In San Jose (Costa Rica), President Arias had meanwhile presented an alternative plan for democratizing Nicaragua, involving a ceasefire between the Nicaraguan anti-government “contra” guerrillas and the Sandinista Army, a general amnesty and an end to the Nicaraguan state of emergency. Nicaraguan government negotiations with the contras, a central issue for the US administration, was apparently not a priority. However, speaking to journalists on Jan. 20, President Arias announced: “There will be no peace in Central America without democracy in Nicaragua…. The day the Sandinista government can say it has been elected freely by the majority of Nicaraguans there will be no more problem.” In Managua (Nicaragua) later the same day President Ortega of Nicaragua presented a nine-point proposal, the most important points of which included Nicaragua's willingness to resume bilateral dialogue with the USA, broken off in January 1985 by President Reagan's administration and also the regional discussions of the items in the Contadora peace plan pending unanimous approval; (ii) a call to Costa Rica and Honduras to resume bilateral talks to resolve conflicts along the border areas; and (iii) a promise to offer guarantees to any arms-bearing Nicaraguan in Honduras who wanted to take advantage of the existing amnesty conditions.

The Honduran President, Sr Jose Azcona del Hoyo, on Jan. 20 described Contadora as a “weak” group with no solutions and said that his government's position was unchanged with regard to the ICJ lawsuit. President Duarte of El Salvador supported this and restated his government's position on the need for democracy in Nicaragua. However, he also proposed a summit of all five Central American Presidents to try to forestall the increasingly dangerous escalation of the conflict.

US policy US response to Latin American diplomatic moves

The US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr Elliott Abrams, was quoted by Central America Report of Oct. 10, 1986, as saying: “There is no longer any room for a neutral attitude towards Nicaragua…. Taking a middle ground is tantamount to approval of communist acts.” Having reportedly been given the responsibility for co-ordinating US efforts to aid the contras he left for a tour of Central America shortly after the Bill containing the provision of US$ 100,000,000 in aid to the contras became law on Oct. 18 [see 35443 A].

It was reported in mid-November that the $ 300,000,000 in economic aid to Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica originally approved as part of the 1986 contra aid package had been withheld due to foreign aid budget restrictions [see page 34548].

In his address before the Permanent Council of the OAS on Nov. 10, the US Secretary of State, Mr George Shultz, reportedly declared that something had to be done about the Nicaraguan threat to the democracies of its neighbours and to all America, but denied that his government was attempting to undermine the Contadora process. He announced that the US President's special envoy, Mr Philip Habib, was to undertake a tour of the region the following week (ie prior to the Contadora and Lima Group meeting to be held on Dec. 17–18-see above).

According to the Miami Herald on Jan. 28, 1987, Mr Abrams had denounced the leftist influence in the Contadora process exerted by Mexico and Peru which, he claimed, were attempting to impose a treaty favouring Nicaragua. Mr Abrams was critical of the fact that on Dec. 18 the Contadora and Lima Groups had publicly condemned only one of the interested foreign powers (the USA-see above 35443 A). Meanwhile, the US permanent representative at the UN, Gen. Vernon Walters, criticized the Secretary- General's decision to participate in the Central American tour in January 1987 on the grounds that the conflict was “regional and ought to remain so”. Similarly, at an extraordinary session of the OAS Permanent Council on Jan. 8 the US ambassador to the OAS questioned the legal basis for the participation in the tour of Sr Baena Soares and repeated a request for a detailed explanation of the purpose of the tour. In January Mr Habib visited Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay where he talked to officials prior to their departure for Panama.

Relations with EU

The third conference of Contadora and Central American countries with member nations of the European Communities (EU), held in Guatemala City on Feb. 9–10, 1987, ended with a joint declaration proclaiming support for the Contadora principles of democracy, non-intervention and diplomacy as “the only means through which a peaceful negotiated solution to the could viably be reached” and with the ratification of a co-operation agreement signed in Luxembourg in November 1985 [see page 34034] EC representatives agreed to maintain current levels of aid to Central America, estimated at $ 75,000,000 in 1987.

Despite the final agreement the conference had been marked by hostility between Nicaragua and the Tegucigalpa bloc nations. Dr Ricardo Acevedo Peralta, the Salvadorean Foreign Affairs Minister, had boycotted the opening ceremony after Nicaragua had objected to El Salvador speaking for Central America as a whole (Dr Acevedo having been chosen as joint spokesman at a meeting to which Nicaragua had not been invited). Similarly a paragraph in the final declaration expressing joint support for Contadora as the “only viable option” for a negotiated solution in Central America had initially been opposed by Sr Madrigal (the Costa Rican Foreign Minister), who told reporters: “Contadora is a corpse whom no one dares to bury.”

Several members of the European delegation (which altogether comprised four ministers and eight deputy ministers) at the meeting expressed concern over a recent visit to Europe by Mr Habib (taking in Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain) during which, they claimed, he had asked European nations not to support the Sandinista government nor to send ministers to the meeting.

Arias plan - US, Contadora and European response

At the end of a one-day meeting in San Jose on Feb. 15, 1987, Sr Arias and the Presidents of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, gave their verbal endorsement to, but did not officially sign, a 10- point regional peace plan drafted by Costa Rica. They did, however, sign a general statement of principles and invited President Ortega to a meeting of all five Central American presidents to take place in Guatemala within 90 days, at which the plan would be open to “substantial modification”. After initially dismissing the proposal as “pro-Yankee” and describing it as an attempt to circumvent the efforts of the Contadora Group, Nicaragua on Feb. 18 confirmed that it would attend the summit to discuss the plan, but insisted that it should not supersede the Contadora negotiating process. (The meeting was later postponed by President Arias and scheduled for June 25–26.)

Announced as an alternative to the proposals of the Contadora and Lima Groups and reportedly first discussed during a meeting between President Arias and President Reagan on Dec. 4, 1986, the plan had been outlined in early January at a meeting between Sr Madrigal, Mr Habib and Mr Abrams. The Costa Rican administration had recently been taking firm action against contra activity in Costa Rica [see 35309 A].

While it was based on a 21-point draft proposal put forward in September 1983 by the Contadora Group [see 32850 A], the Arias plan placed more emphasis on internal “democratization” within Nicaragua. Moreover, while the Arias initiative suggested that the Contadora Group should help verify compliance with the agreement, it was clearly presented as an alternative to the stalled Contadora treaty.

The reported original objective of President Arias was that once agreement to the plan had been gained from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, Nicaragua should accept or reject it within 15 days. President Cerezo of Guatemala (which, with its attitude of “active neutrality”, was the most independent of the four countries in terms of its relationship with the USA) was understood to have refused to support such an ultimatum.

A Costa Rican delegation formally presented the plan to Nicaragua during the second week of April, President Cerezo and President Ortega having affirmed their support for negotiations between all countries in the region following talks in Managua at the end of March.

The US Senate approved the Costa Rican plan by 97 votes to one during the last week of March, although press reports suggested that the Reagan administration, concerned at what it considered to be the plan's leniency towards Nicaragua and at its implications for the USA's perceived security interests in the region, was attempting to ensure that Nicaragua's internal politics would be the main focus of discussion at the forthcoming summit.

A principal objection to the plan was that it did not guarantee that an end to US aid to the contras would be matched by a simultaneous restoration of political freedom in Nicaragua. Other doubts centred on the ability of the Central American Presidents to enforce their plan on the rebel groups, particularly in El Salvador where (despite repeated US claims) they were less dependent on external assistance. Mr Habib, who was received by Sr Arias on April 27, said that the purpose of his visit was to learn about the peace initiative and of new developments, but he refused to give further details. During the last week of April, President Azcona, echoing statements made several days earlier by Dr Acevedo, said that he doubted the efficacy of the Arias plan and that the key to peace in Central America lay in the “rectification” of the Nicaraguan system. A visit by President de la Madrid of Mexico to Guatemala City during the second week of April was widely interpreted as a counter to efforts by Washington to force President Cerezo to abandon his “active neutrality” in the Central American conflict.

The Foreign Ministers of the Contadora and Lima Groups meeting in Buenos Aires (Argentina) on April 13–16 issued a document expressing “satisfaction” both over the plan to hold a presidential summit in Guatemala and over the Arias plan. President Arias, returning from a 26-day tour of Western Europe on June 7, said that support for his peace plan had been forthcoming from all of the countries he had visited and was also expected from the EC. After paying an unofficial visit to Portugal on May 10–11, President Arias had visited Spain, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Italy.

Postponement of June 25–26 summit - Rescheduling for Aug. 6–7

President Duarte, with the backing of Honduras, obtained on June 12 the postponement of the meeting of Central American Presidents scheduled for June 25–26.

Sr Duarte gave as his reason the fact that he was planning a European tour and that it was unwise “to have a meeting of the five heads of state if the respective Foreign Ministers did not hold at least four meetings prior to the summit”. His request for a postponement had been made one day after a visit by Mr Habib who was on a tour of the region.

President Ortega called for the summit to go ahead as planned. Sr Arias was quoted as expressing irritation with the procedural obfuscation but described El Salvador's objection as “valid”.

During a meeting with President Arias in Washington on June 17 President Reagan expressed reservations about the Arias peace plan and said that his “greatest concern is the need for the Sandinistas to act on genuine democratization before pressure on the regime is removed in any way”. President Arias, however, on June 18 described US aid to the contras as “incompatible” with his proposal, and recognized “that it is not possible for them the Sandinistas to become democratic as long as there is a war in their territory”.

At the conclusion of a two-day tour on July 26–27 of Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, President Arias announced that the obstacles preventing the holding of a meeting of Central American heads of state had been overcome. A new date of Aug. 6–7 for the holding of such a presidential summit in Guatemala City was “guaranteed”, he said, as were two Foreign Ministers” meetings, the first of which was to be held on July 31-Aug. 1 in Honduras and the second on Aug. 4–5 in Guatemala. The Contadora countries were to participate in the first preliminary meeting only, the Central American countries having disagreed over whether Contadora should play a role in the summit. Although Nicaragua had announced on July 25 that it would attend the two Foreign Ministers” meetings it described the exclusion of the Contadora Group from the second meeting as “extremely negative for the process”.

Guatemala's Defence Minister, Brig.- Gen. Hector Gramajo Morales, announced on Aug. 4 that his country's Army had uncovered a guerrilla plot to try to seize a foreign embassy during the presidential summit.

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