J Bus Ethics (2017) 141:489–504 DOI 10.1007/s10551-015-2694-1

Safety Culture, Moral Disengagement, and Accident Underreporting

1 2 1 Laura Petitta • Tahira M. Probst • Claudio Barbaranelli

Received: 29 October 2014 / Accepted: 13 May 2015 / Published online: 28 May 2015 Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Abstract Moral disengagement (MD) is the process by increasing focus on underreporting as well as the adverse which individuals mitigate the consequences of their own individual and organizational consequences of failing to violations of moral standards. Although MD is understood report workplace accidents. to be co-determined by culture norms, no study has yet explored the extent to which MD applied to safety at work (JS-MD) fosters safety violations (e.g., accident underre- Keywords Accident underreporting Á Moral porting), nor the role of organizational culture as a pre- disengagement Á Organizational safety culture dictor of JS-MD. The current study seeks to address this gap in the literature by examining individual- (MD) and organizational-level (culture) factors that explain why Safety Culture, Moral Disengagement, employees fail to report workplace accidents. We tested a and Accident Underreporting latent variable structural model positing organizational culture typologies (autocratic, bureaucratic, clan-patron- National surveillance statistics in Italy (INAIL 2011) age, technocratic, and cooperative) as predictors of JS-MD, indicate that approximately 400,000 workers are injured which in turn is expected to mediate the relationship with each year, representing a rate of 3.7 cases for every 100 accident underreporting. Using data from 1033 employees full-time equivalent (FTE) workers. Not only are the eco- in 28 Italian organizations, findings suggest that bureau- nomic costs of such workplace accidents high—accounting cratic safety culture was related to lower levels of JS-MD, for 2.8 % of the Gross Domestic Product (Eurispes 2010), whereas technocratic safety culture was related to greater but clearly there are steep psychosocial costs as well JS-MD. In turn, JS-MD positively predicted employee (Boden et al. 2001). However, an increasing body of lit- accident underreporting and fully mediated the relationship erature suggests that these national statistics may be large between culture and underreporting. Theoretical and underestimates of the true prevalence of workplace injuries practical implications are discussed in light of the and accidents due to organizational- and individual-level underreporting of workplace accidents. Organizational ac- cident underreporting occurs when an organization fails to & Laura Petitta report injuries occurring at work to national regulatory [email protected] authorities (i.e., organizational underreporting), whereas Tahira M. Probst individual accident underreporting occurs when an em- [email protected] ployee fails to report work injuries to his/her employer Claudio Barbaranelli (i.e., individual underreporting). [email protected] Accident underreporting represents a serious individual, 1 Department of Psychology, Sapienza University of Rome, organizational, and public health concern for a number of Via dei Marsi, 78, 00185 Rome, Italy reasons. For the individual employee, failure to report an 2 Washington State University Vancouver, 14204 NE Salmon accident often results in the worker’s injury going untreated. Creek Avenue, Vancouver, WA 98686-9600, USA From the perspective of the employer, underreporting can 123 490 L. Petitta et al. leave the root causes of employee accidents unaddressed and moral disengagement explains psychosocial mechanisms unfixed possibly to crop up again in the future and affect by which individuals mitigate the moral consequences of other employees. From a public health perspective, inaccu- their misconduct (Bandura 1990), we assert that it may rate accident reporting undermines national surveillance operate as an important variable explaining why em- statistics and policy efforts to develop safer and healthier ployees may choose to not report an experienced acci- workplaces. dent, despite such reporting often being mandatory Unfortunately, research suggests that a large majority according to organizational policies and failure to report of experienced workplace accidents go unreported with can result in harm to oneself as well as one’s coworkers. estimates of individual underreporting ranging from We also argue that it is important to place the occurrence 71 % (Probst and Estrada 2010) to 80 % (Probst and of moral disengagement within the context of the orga- Graso 2013). While much of the prior research nizational culture, given that moral disengagement documenting the phenomenon of underreporting has oc- mechanisms are internalized during organizational so- curred within the United States (e.g., Boden and Ozonoff cialization processes and co-determined by culture norms 2008; Rosenman et al. 2006), recent research indicates (Bandura 2002; Bandura et al. 1996). Moreover, given that individual-level underreporting is a prevalent issue our focus on deviant behavior applied to the safety con- in Italy as well (Probst et al. 2013). Using two different text (i.e., failure to report an accident), we examine or- measures of individual-level underreporting, Probst et al. ganizational culture norms regarding safety (i.e., safety (2013) found consistent results suggesting between 57 culture) as predictors of employee MD and subsequent and 76 % of experienced workplace accidents went un- underreporting. reported in a sample of 563 employees drawn from 20 Using Rest’s (1986) model of ethical decision making as Italian organizations in a wide variety of high risk in- a framework (see also Jones 1991), ethical safety behavior dustrial sectors. Together, these studies suggest that requires first a recognition (i.e., moral awareness) by em- (a) underreporting is a commonplace occurrence among ployees that their decision to report an accident has the employees who experience an accident at work, and potential to help or harm others and that they have volition (b) (rightly or wrongly) employees perceive that non- in making the decision to report. We would argue that this reporting is preferable to reporting. necessary but insufficient condition is typically met, given As a result, a growing body of literature has been in- the mandatory nature of safety reporting in organizations vestigating psychosocial and organizational predictors of and the fact that unreported accidents can increase the such underreporting in an effort to increase the accuracy of likelihood that other employees may encounter the same injury statistics (e.g., Probst et al. 2008; Probst and Estrada workplace hazards. Once moral awareness has been 2010; Probst and Graso 2013). From those studies, a num- established, employees next make an ethical judgment to ber of person- and organizational-level factors appear to determine whether the ethical course of action (i.e., re- partially explain why employees avoid reporting the in- porting the accident) is the appropriate next step. If yes, juries they experience (i.e., why individual-level underre- then ethical intent is established and the likelihood of ac- porting occurs). These include variables such as tually engaging in accident reporting behavior increases. organizational safety climate (Probst and Estrada 2010), We argue that this ethical decision making process can perceived production pressure (Probst and Graso 2011), and be short-circuited during the second (i.e., ethical judgment) job insecurity (Probst et al. 2013). While the phenomenon phase by the use of MD strategies. In addition, we contend of underreporting has received a great deal of attention in that organizational safety culture influences the extent to the United States (e.g., Pransky et al. 1999), Canada which MD by employees occurs. Although MD has been (Shannon and Lowe 2002), and Australia (Quinlan and studied extensively in the social psychology realm, it has Mayhew 1999), it has received less attention elsewhere. received relatively scant attention from the business ethics With respect to Italy, several recent studies have investi- community (see Barsky 2011; Fida et al. 2014, in JBE for gated the prevalence of occupational injuries in this coun- recent exceptions). In particular, Barsky and others (e.g., try, yet little systematic research has been conducted on the Trevino 1986) argue that research on ethical decision individual and organizational factors related to such injuries making and MD needs to emphasize to a greater extent the (Fabiano et al. 2001, 2008) and the extent to which they are interaction between the person and the situation (i.e., the reported. organizational context, including organizational culture) as The purpose of the current research was to add to this a cause of MD behavior. Thus, we believe that our study knowledge base by examining the role of moral disen- contributes to the literature by a) showing that certain or- gagement (i.e., an individual-level factor) and organiza- ganizational safety culture types are predictive of MD tional culture (i.e., an organizational-level factor) as among employees, and b) this MD is related to greater predictors of employee accident underreporting. Because levels of underreporting among employees. 123 Safety Culture, Moral Disengagement, and Accident Underreporting 491

Prior research (Bandura et al. 2000) has shown that MD psychological mechanisms, differently belonging to these strategies have been used to justify corporate-level safety four major points. Briefly, cognitive reconstrual occurs transgressions (e.g., insisting upon the safety of the Pinto when the individuals redefine the detrimental conduct as long after it was known to be unsafe). However, this is the socially valuable and acceptable (moral justification); first study to demonstrate how organizational-level safety when they compare their behaviors with more reprehensi- culture can activate MD among individual employees and ble actions (advantageous comparison); and/or when they subsequent accident underreporting. By examining the use convoluted verbiage to confer a respectable status to conjoint influence of both individual- and organizational- reprehensible activities (euphemistic labeling). Obscuring level factors that potentially contribute to such underre- personal agency operates by attributing to others the porting, we seek to gain a more complete understanding of pressure to enact detrimental behavior (displacement of the reasons why employees avoid reporting experienced responsibility), and/or by holding others around as re- injuries at work and to provide managerial suggestions on sponsible for damaging actions (diffusion of responsibility). how to encourage more accurate accident reporting in the Disregarding the harmful consequences of one’s actions future. refers to minimizing, and/or ignoring, and/or distorting the We begin by briefly reviewing the literature on moral damaging effects of one’s actions. Finally, vilifying the disengagement, defining accident underreporting, and de- recipients refers to divesting people of human qualities in lineating theory-based arguments regarding the relationship order to exonerate oneself from damaging others (dehu- between the two constructs. In particular, our review of the manization); and/or to attributing others provocative con- literature on moral disengagement will focus on the con- duct thus justifying the inevitable harming reaction ceptual and empirical contributions pertaining to the work (attribution of blame). setting and safety. Next, we discuss the theoretical con- Although much of the work on MD has demonstrated struct of organizational culture and apply a model of cul- that MD may lower inhibition and is strongly associated ture typologies to safety. We also develop hypotheses with several manifestations of aggressive behavior as well regarding organizational culture as a predictor of moral as other forms of deviant conduct within the context of disengagement and accident underreporting. decision making, family abuse, criminal pursuits, and military and political settings (e.g., Aquino et al. 2007; Bandura 2002; Bandura et al. 1996, 2001; Mayer et al. A Review of Moral Disengagement and its 2009), there have been a limited number of studies that Relevance to Workplace Safety have investigated MD mechanisms within organizational contexts. For example, MD has been found to be used at Moral disengagement (MD) was first introduced by Ban- the corporate level in order to neutralize organizational dura (1990) to explain the psychosocial mechanisms by responsibility for transgressive actions (Bandura et al. which individuals mitigate the moral consequences of 2000; White et al. 2009). Of note, this stream of research damaging behaviors. Such mechanisms allow people to provided empirical support for the majority of the eight disengage from moral self-sanctions associated with mis- MD mechanisms, but not all of them (e.g., diffusion of behavior, thus acting without feeling obliged to any kind of responsibility did not emerge), although the investigation reparation in spite of the individuals’ moral standards that was conducted at the organizational-level and targeted would normally serve to guide human conduct. Social corporate units/departments, rather than individual em- cognitive theory postulates an agentic role of the indi- ployees. The study of MD practices at the individual-level viduals in self-regulating their conduct. That is, people has included research on general unethical behavior toward develop self-regulatory functions in accordance with their others at work (Barsky 2011; Moore et al. 2012), as well as moral standards that ensue from the anticipatory positive other more specific instances of misconduct or unethical and negative self-reactions to different courses of actions behaviors. For example, recent research (Fida et al. 2014) they pursue. In particular, such internal control allows the has examined the role of MD in self-exoneration for ap- individual to selectively disengage self-sanctions when propriating the work of a colleague, justifying leaving work enacting damaging/detrimental behaviors. The four major without permission, and predicting counterproductive work points in the self-regulatory system at which internal moral behaviors toward others (e.g., stealing something belong- control can be disengaged from detrimental conduct are (1) ing to another or insulting someone) or the organization re-construing the conduct, (2) obscuring personal causal (e.g., purposely doing work incorrectly). agency, (3) disregarding the injurious consequences of To our knowledge, the only study on MD specifically one’s actions, and (4) vilifying the recipients of one’s applied to safety-related violations was conducted by Bar- misbehavior by blaming and devaluating them. Overall, baranelli and Perna (2004). In particular, the authors de- MD neutralizes damaging conduct through eight different veloped a MD measure in order to assess the applicability of 123 492 L. Petitta et al.

MD mechanisms in relation to safety norms within the At the individual-level, there are many reasons proposed workplace. Their research initially consisted of a pilot study as to why accidents may be underreported at work (e.g., on 400 subjects who were administered 14 open-ended fear of reprisals or loss of benefits, Webb et al. 1989; questions exploring how they would behave in response to Sinclair and Tetrick 2004). In a systematic examination of specific safety risks and dangers. Consistent with prior re- reasons for not reporting, Probst and Estrada (2010) found search (White et al. 2009), the content analysis identified several common employee rationales that could be only six out the eight theorized mechanisms of MD indicative of MD mechanisms at work, i.e., reasons for (specifically, moral justification; advantageous comparison; underreporting that serve to justify their non-compliance displacement of responsibility; diffusion of responsibility; with reporting requirements. In their study, over half of distorting consequences; and attribution of blame). Their employees who engaged in underreporting said they did second study provided evidence of the validity of a single not think anything would be done to fix the problem; nearly factor 30-item job safety MD (JS-MD) scale, which included half (47.5 %) indicated they did not think it was that im- all the six mechanisms identified in the pilot study. portant. Both of these could be viewed as strategies to Given the demonstrated applicability of MD to the weaken self-sanction by disregarding and minimizing the workplace safety context, we next introduce the concept of consequences of actions that breach safety reporting re- accident underreporting and explore the potential role of quirements. Employees also indicated not reporting acci- MD in explaining why employees may fail to report acci- dents because they did not want to be the one to break the dents they experience at work. company’s safety record or adversely affect their work- group’s safety performance. These latter two rationales could be seen as attempts at cognitive reconstrual by re- Accident Underreporting at Work and the Role defining the detrimental conduct (underreporting) as so- of Moral Disengagement cially valuable (moral justification). Such self-deterrents suppress the sense of guilt associated with violations As alluded to earlier, accident underreporting at the indi- (Bandura 2002) and allow an individual to engage in vidual-level involves a comparison between the number of maladaptive safety behaviors. experienced workplace accidents and the number of those In a study of copper miners, Probst and Graso (2013) experienced workplace accidents that are actually reported found that perceived organizational production pressure to the employer. As the discrepancy between the number of was related to negative reporting attitudes and greater ac- reported and experienced accidents increases, underre- cident underreporting. Although they did not explicitly porting can be said to increase (Probst and Graso 2011). examine MD as an explanatory mechanism for such un- Thus, it is important to take into account the overall derreporting, it is possible that excessive production pres- number of experienced accidents relative to the number sure from the organization could lead to diffusion or reported, since both variables provide important informa- displacement of responsibility, i.e., ‘‘If my company cares tion regarding the employee’s workplace safety outcomes. more about production than about my safety, why should I Probst and Graso (2011) also proposed that Behavioral care about accurate reporting?’’ Reasoning Theory (BRT; Westaby 2005) might serve as a Finally, in a two-country study, Probst et al. (2013) useful theoretical framework for understanding how and found that perceived job insecurity was related not only to why individuals choose to underreport accidents at work. increased numbers of experienced accidents, but also a Drawing upon behavioral intention theories (e.g., theory of greater failure to accurately report those accidents. In their planned behavior; Ajzen 1991), BRT predicts behavior discussion, they suggested that ‘‘employees may have a based upon individual attitudes toward the behavior itself, stake in maintaining a safe image at work even as their subjective norms (i.e., social pressure), and perceived workplace experience of accidents and injuries increases as control (i.e., the ease/difficulty of enacting) over the be- a function of job insecurity’’ (p. 398). Again, while MD havior, but further expands upon such theories by incor- was not specifically measured in that study, their results porating context-specific reasons for and against specific indicated that employees were motivated to underreport in behaviors into the model. Westaby (2005) defined reasons an effort to retain their job, suggesting cognitive recon- as ‘‘the specific subjective factors people use to explain strual via advantageous comparison may be at work to their anticipated behavior’’ (p. 100). According to BRT, rationalize the underreporting (i.e., ‘‘Hiding an accident reasons serve as influential drivers of human behavior, may be wrong, but potentially losing my job would be because they help people satisfy their needs to justify, worse’’). defend, and understand their behavioral decisions (Wes- Based on moral disengagement theory and these prior taby et al. 2010). empirical results, we expect to find:

123 Safety Culture, Moral Disengagement, and Accident Underreporting 493

Hypothesis 1 Job safety moral disengagement will be functioning; and (c) Payne’s (2000) multidimensional positively related to higher accident underreporting in the model of cultural intensity and strength. workplace. Building upon Enriquez (1970) typology of culture (e.g., autocratic, bureaucratic, clan-patronage, technocratic, and cooperative), the Petitta et al. (2014) model of culture Organizational Culture as a Contextual Influence conceptualizes the extent to which each culture type is on Moral Disengagement and Accident deeply rooted (i.e., intensity) and shared among organiza- Underreporting tional members (i.e., strength). Specifically, intensity con- siders at progressively deeper levels, the extent to which According to social cognitive theory, MD mechanisms are people within their organization (a) have a positive attitude internalized during the socialization processes that regulate toward the cultural expression (i.e., attitude); (b) align their moral standards of an individual. As such, MD is embed- behavior to that cultural expression (i.e., behavior); (c) be- ded within and co-determined by cultural norms (Bandura lieve it to be important (i.e., value); and finally, (d) con- 2002; Bandura et al. 1996). Organizational culture refers to sider the cultural expression to be so deeply rooted that it the members’ shared perceptions (Clarke 1999) of a com- reflects a fundamentally accepted part of the organization bination of widespread norms, values, beliefs and as- (i.e., ingrained belief). On the other hand, strength refers to sumptions that ‘‘tie’’ together individuals belonging to the the extent to which these attitudes, behaviors, values, and same context (Schein 1985). Organizational culture helps ingrained beliefs are shared and widespread among orga- individuals make sense of their work world and represents nizational members. As it will be described in the a core group of shared set of assumptions, norms, and ‘‘Method’’ section, this conceptualization of safety culture patterns of behavior which orient organizational action. allows to measure members’ perception of both intensity Therefore, the culture of an organization is expected to (i.e., progressively deeper layers) and strength (i.e., the predict and explain how employees internalize organiza- degree of pervasiveness of each cultural layer among tional shared norms and how MD mechanisms develop at members) of organizational culture. the workplace. While organizations often have a prevailing While Petitta et al. argued culture can vary on multiple dominant culture (Rousseau and Fried 2001), there are also different organizational dimensions (e.g., organizational numerous more specific dimensions of organizational cul- communication, decision making, etc.), the focus of the ture related to characteristics such as decision making, current study was on the dimension of safety culture. In an communication modalities, error management, and the autocratic safety culture, communication mainly flows like. Because our interest is specifically in predicting ac- downwards and one’s own direct superior/leader (i.e., au- cident underreporting, we focus on organizational safety thority) is the source of instructions and directions for culture, i.e., attitudes, behaviors, values, and beliefs about employees. Dialogue mainly consists of the delivery of safety norms and regulations shared among organizational safety directives and feedback involves corrections which members. Because organizational safety culture falls highlight errors to avoid. In a bureaucratic safety culture, within the larger concept of organizational culture, before the fundamental value is adherence to organizational safety delving into the specific conceptual and operational fea- norms and regulations set by top level bureaucratic officials tures of safety culture investigated in the present study, we (i.e., experts who develop norms also in line with local first introduce the theoretical frame that we used as a ref- government requirements). Individuals are expected to re- erence for organizational culture. spect roles and boundaries and to execute tasks without any Our conceptualization of safety culture is based on a expectation of individual initiative beyond their role combined typing and profiling conceptualization of orga- definition. Within the clan-patronage safety culture, there nizational culture proposed by Petitta et al. (2014). is a clear distinction between in-group and out-group Specifically, this theoretical definition of culture was de- membership with in-group members privy to informal (yet veloped in line with (a) Enriquez’s (1970) identification of potent) bases of power. Individuals within the group act a typology of organizational culture (i.e., autocratic, bu- differently in the presence of outsiders. This ‘‘two-faced’’ reaucratic, clan-patronage, technocratic, and cooperative); context provides members with different safety rules and (b) Schein’s (1985) model incorporating three embedded directions dependent upon their current interaction with levels of culture expression, ranging from the most visible members of their inner circle versus more external people. and external layer of organizational artifacts (e.g., lan- The technocratic safety culture is characteristic of contexts guage, furniture, dress codes), to the deeper level of norms which are result-oriented and focused on competition and and values that contribute to shape how artefacts are innovation. However, prioritizing achievement orientation manifested, and to the most ingrained basic assumptions may result in safety violations if shortcuts to excellence that members hold about their organizational reality and its include skipping safety steps, or hiding errors, etc. Finally, 123 494 L. Petitta et al. within a cooperative safety culture, value is given to the Method achievement of consensus and the participation of all members during decision making. An emphasis is placed Participants and Procedure on the contributions of all individuals to collective safety outcomes due to the organizational assumption that the Surveys were administered to 1033 employees from 28 resultant whole is greater than the sum of its parts. different organizations in Italy. The mean organizational Despite the lack of studies on the impact of organiza- sample size was 70 employees (SD = 30) and ranged from tional culture on individual safety-related MD, there is 5 to 110. Seventy percent of the companies were private some empirical evidence to suggest that during the so- and 30 % were public. Together, these organizations rep- cialization process at work, employees will internalize resent a wide range of industry sectors where safety com- different moral standards and norms in relation to safety, pliance is a paramount concern, including manufacturing, and that this will contribute to shape the mechanisms that construction, transportation, military, and health care. In they subsequently use to justify the enactment of poor the overall sample, 79.9 % of respondents were male, safety behavior (in the current study, underreporting). For 18.1 % female, with 2 % leaving the item blank. The av- example, White et al. (2009) found that industry standards erage age was 40.43 years (SD = 10.48), and the average promoted the development of collective moral disengage- tenure in the position was 12.93 years (SD = 9.59). Also, ment which was related to the extent to which corporate 84.3 % were permanent workers, 13.7 % were contingent executives, lawyers, and public relations personnel justified workers, with 2 % leaving the item blank. Ten percent held their actions regarding the dangers of secondhand smoke, the role of supervisor/manager whereas about 86 % were lead, silicosis, and vinyl chloride. non-managers, with 3.8 % leaving the item blank. Fur- Given the exploratory and pilot nature of the current thermore, managers/supervisors in our sample were dis- study, we do not develop differential hypotheses on the tributed across most organizations (18 out of 28 impact of specific safety culture typologies on MD. organizations). Therefore, on the basis of the above arguments, we hy- The research team approached administrators within pothesize that: each organization to request their organization’s par- ticipation in the study. Upon reaching agreement on par- Hypothesis 2 Different safety culture types will activate ticipation, the research team provided information sessions varying levels of moral disengagement, which in turn will at each organizational location to describe the project, be positively related to accident underreporting. That is, encourage participation, and address concerns from po- moral disengagement mediates the relationship between tential participants. Participation was voluntary and safety culture types and accident underreporting. anonymous. The research team distributed questionnaires While we posit that the effects of culture on underre- which the majority of participants completed that same porting will be mediated by MD, there is also reason to day. In some instances, employees were allowed up to two potentially expect direct effects of safety culture on acci- weeks to complete the survey at home and return it in a dent underreporting. For example, organizational norms sealed envelope to the research team. and social pressure may serve as disincentives for indi- vidual employees to report their accidents to company of- Measures ficials (Sinclair and Tetrick 2004). Landsbergis et al. (1999) found that injury rates were higher in a variety of Below is a description of the measures used to provide data industries that were implementing lean production cultures. for the current analyses. Further, Probst (2002) found that when employees were threatened with layoffs, they chose to focus more on pro- Safety Culture duction at the expense of safety. Additionally, misguided safety incentive programs (Probst and Graso 2013) may To measure safety culture, we utilized the 20-item job foster punitive vs. non-punitive consequences for not re- safety sub-scale of the Intensity & Strength Organizational porting an accident and encourage/discourage employees’ Culture Questionnaire (JS-I&SOCQ; Petitta et al. 2014). behavior toward violation of safety standards. This sub-scale measures the five cultural typologies (au- Thus, we also test an alternative model positing the tocratic, bureaucratic, clan-patronage, technocratic, and follow: cooperative) within a safety context. Respondents are first provided the following prompts describing each of the Hypothesis 3 Safety culture types will predict accident cultural typologies with safety as the frame of reference: underreporting, both directly and indirectly through moral ‘‘With respect to enacting safety behaviors that are disengagement.

123 Safety Culture, Moral Disengagement, and Accident Underreporting 495 indicated by the boss…’’ (autocratic); ‘‘With respect to (Bandura et al. 1996), in everyday life transgressions strictly adhering to the rules and safety procedures pro- (Caprara et al. 2009), and in general unethical behavior to- posed by the organization…’’ (bureaucratic); ‘‘With re- ward others at work (Barsky 2011; Moore et al. 2012). spect to following one set of safety rules when you are with The abbreviated version of the scale was developed outsiders but following different practices within the based on the published item factor loadings reported by group…’’ (clan-patronage); ‘‘With respect to following the Barbaranelli and Perna (2004). For each of the six MD safety practices only if this doesn’t impede the achieve- mechanisms (i.e., moral justification; advantageous com- ment of the result and the progress of the work…’’ (tech- parison; displacement of responsibility; diffusion of re- nocratic); and ‘‘With respect to proactively involving all sponsibility; distorting consequences; and attribution of members of the organization in the diffusion and adoption blame), the two items showing the highest loadings within of safety practices…’’ (cooperative). After viewing the each mechanism were selected resulting in a final short- prompts, respondents indicate how many people (ranging ened scale of 12 items. A sample item is ‘‘Safety checks are from 1 = almost no one to 4 = almost everyone) from useless, because most machines will eventually malfunc- their organization (1) manifest a positive attitude toward tion’’ and response options ranged from 1 = Strongly the cultural typology, (2) engage in behavior that is in line Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. Table 2 in Appendix 1 with the cultural typology, (3) attribute importance to the reports the complete short-version of the JS-MD scale used cultural typology, and (4) consider the cultural typology so in the present study. fundamental as to consider it deeply ingrained in the or- ganizational texture. Accident Underreporting Thus, the progressively deeper intensity of safety culture layers could vary from low (attitudes) to high (deeply Using a measure developed by Smecko and Hayes (1999), rooted belief), whereas the strength of the safety culture is employees were asked to indicate how many safety acci- reflected in estimates of how many people express that dents they experienced and reported to appropriate com- cultural feature/layer (e.g., almost no one to almost ev- pany officials and how many accidents they had eryone). The overall score of each culture type (e.g., au- experienced but not reported to appropriate company of- tocratic) is the averaging of the answers provided to ficials over the past 12 months. Although the workplace progressively deeper (intensity) culture layers (e.g., auto- accident variables were self-report in nature, previous cratic attitude, autocratic behavior, autocratic value, and studies do indicate that self-report measures of accidents autocratic deeply rooted belief) within that specific culture and unsafe behaviors are related to independent observa- type. Therefore, higher mean scores of autocratic, bu- tions of these variables (Lusk et al. 1995). reaucratic, clan-patronage, technocratic, and cooperative In order to ensure consistent interpretation of the ques- dimensions are interpreted to reflect a greater manifestation tion, we provided the following definitions for the terms (i.e., in terms of both intensity and strength) of that cultural used in the items. Accident: An unplanned and uncontrolled typology within the employees’ organization. Previous event that led to injury to persons, damage to proper- research on the JS-I&SOCQ (Petitta et al. 2012, 2014) ty/plant/equipment, or some other loss to the company. reported excellent scale reliability and construct validity. Reported event: A safety incident that was reported to a company official (e.g., supervisor, manager, safety offi- Safety Moral Disengagement cial). Unreported event: A safety incident that was NOT reported to any company official. Moral disengagement related to workplace safety norms was Using these data, we could compute the total number of measured using a shortened 12-item version of the unidi- experienced accidents relative to the number actually re- mensional Job Safety Moral Disengagement scale (JS-MD; ported. Accident underreporting was then operationalized Barbaranelli and Perna 2004). Items from this version were as the proportion of the total number of experienced acci- carefully developed following the guidelines and the word- dents that went unreported to the organization. To avoid ing of other scales produced in the literature for measuring zeros in the denominator, a very small constant (.00001) moral disengagement (e.g., Bandura et al. 1996; Caprara was added to the denominator (Tabachnick and Fidell et al. 2009). Each item clearly reflects a specific moral dis- 2007). Due to high skewness and kurtosis, this variable was engagement mechanism. However, as it is common in the then considered as ‘‘censored’’ in the following analyses. literature on moral disengagement, from a factorial point of view items in this scale reflect a single moral disengagement Control Variables latent dimension, and the six mechanisms are not separable. As noted above, this is a very common result, obtained also We included the respondents’ type of contract (i.e., per- when MD is measured in adolescent aggression domain manent vs contingent) as a control variable because 123 496 L. Petitta et al. literature (Quinlan 1999) suggests contingent workers are and JS-MD) measured by the 32 observed variables. The less likely than permanent workers to report accidents. model was tested on the covariance matrix using the Item responses were coded as follows: permanent was Maximum Likelihood Robust estimation method. Next, scored 0; and contingent was scored 1. Furthermore, we compared the fit of the six-factor model against a one- while both managers and non-managers must report ac- factor model in which each item loaded onto a single cidents (e.g., European Agency for Safety and Health at factor. Work; EU-OSHA, 2014; Occupational Safety and Health Results from the six-factor CFA showed excellent fit Administration; OSHA, 1993), managers take on the re- indices: v2 (409, N = 1032) = 982.118, p \ .001, sponsibility of observing employees on the job, investi- RMSEA = .037 (.034; .040), CFI = .95, TLI = .95, with gating incidents, and reporting accidents as part of their factor loadings all significant and above .51 with the ex- normal supervisory role. Therefore, the type of position ception of one item of MD which displayed a factor loading may affect the accident reporting behavior. The coding of .25. Therefore, we dropped this item and again ran the was respectively 0 for non-managers, and 1 for managers six-factor CFA measured by the remaining 31 observed (i.e., supervisor, manager). Finally, our sample included variables. Results from the second CFA still showed ex- organizations from both public and private sectors. Be- cellent fit indices: v2 (379, N = 1033) = 914.648, p \ .001, cause safety processes might be more mandatorily applied RMSEA = .037 (.034; .040), CFI = .96, TLI = .95, with and controlled in the context of public administration, we factor loadings all significant and ranging from .65 to .92 for included respondents’ belongingness to different organi- culture factors, and from .51 to .72 for MD. Additionally, zation types as a control variable. The coding was, re- correlations among the latent JS-MD and culture factors spectively, 0 for public and 1 for private organization ranged from .12 to .35. On the other hand, correlations type. among the five culture factors ranged from .02 to .72. Fi- nally, results from the one-factor CFA showed inadequate fit Data Analysis Approach indices: v2 (394, N = 1033) = 7999.334, p \ .001, RMSEA = .137 (.134; .139), CFI = .39, TLI = .28. Taken The resulting data for this study were hierarchical in together, these results demonstrated the appropriateness of nature with people nested within organizations. Because the six hypothesized latent factors and the distinctiveness of such data are non-independent, they can result in artifi- JS-MD and the safety culture typologies. cially low estimates of standard errors. To rectify this, the common data analytic approach would be to use multilevel modeling. However, the number of organiza- Descriptive Statistics and Correlations tions in our sample was limited to only 28, whereas researchers (e.g., Heck and Thomas 2000; Hox 2002) Means, standard deviations, alpha coefficients, and zero- have recommended a minimum of 50–100 groups to order correlations among the scales are reported in obtain reliable multilevel-SEM results. Therefore, we Table 1. As shown in the diagonal of this table, each used a different approach that statistically takes into study variable has a good degree of internal consistency account the hierarchical structure of our data, while also reliability (Cronbach’s alpha), ranging from .86 to .93. being consistent with the literature’s recommendations Zero-order correlations were calculated at the indi- related to the level-2 sample size. Specifically, we used vidual- and organizational-levels and suggest interesting the ‘‘TYPE = COMPLEX’’ procedure within MPLUS preliminary patterns of relationships. In support of (Muthe´n and Muthe´n 1998–2012). This MPLUS com- Hypothesis 1, we see that higher use of safety-related mand produces corrected parameters estimates, standard MD mechanisms is significantly related to higher levels errors, and test statistics in the presence of multilevel of employee accident underreporting behaviors both at interdependency. the individual- (r = .16, p \ .01) and organizational- level (r = .54, p \ .01). In partial support of Hy- pothesis 2, technocratic safety culture is positively Results correlated with higher levels of JS-MD both at the in- dividual- (r = .33, p \ .01) and organizational-level Measurement Model (r = .46, p \ .05). Finally, type of contract, organiza- tion type, and type of position showed some significant In order to test the factorial validity of the JS-IS&OCQ correlations with accident underreporting and MD. and the shortened version of the JS-MD, a preliminary Hence, based on these patterns of relationships, these confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) tested the fit of a six control variables were included in the subsequent latent variables’ structure (i.e., five cultural typologies structural models. 123 Safety Culture, Moral Disengagement, and Accident Underreporting 497

Table 1 Descriptive statistics, correlations, and Cronbach’s alphas Variable Mean SD 12345678910

1. Permanent versus .14 .35 --.27 .47* -.43* -.27 -.15 .06 -.29 .23 .24 contingent 2. Non manager versus .11 .31 -.07* – -.53* -.23 -.26 -.36 -.32 -.29 -.27 -.33 manager 3. Public versus private .70 .46 -.19** -.25** – .02 -.02 .20 .12 .05 .24 .30 4. Autocratic culture 2.82 .73 -.07* -.02 -.01 (.86) .79** .38* -.04 .69** -.10 -.18 5. Bureaucratic culture 2.89 .73 -.09** .03 -.04 .67** (.87) .46* -.01 .83** .04 .15 6. Clan-patronage culture 2.44 .84 -.03 -.03 -.03 .20** .21** (.92) .69** .64** .27 .38* 7. Technocratic culture 2.21 .88 .06* -.05* -.05 .04 .04 .49** (.93) .24 .46* .42* 8. Cooperative culture 2.73 .77 -.11* -.03 -.02 .51** .51** .18** .05 (.89) .29 .34 9. Moral disengagement 1.93 .75 .09** -.14** .09** -.14** -.16** .14** .33** -.11** (.88) .54** 10. Accident underreporting .06 .22 .03 -.05 .10** -.02 .01 .03 .09** .03 .16** – Correlations below the diagonal are at the individual-level (listwise n = 922), whereas those above the diagonal are at the organizational-level (N = 28). Mean and SD are reported at the individual-level; Cronbach’s alpha is reported along the diagonal in brackets * p \ .05; ** p \ .01

Structural Models indicate that a link among these culture types is possible when normative safety culture schemas (i.e., Bureaucratic) In order to more rigorously test our hypotheses, a first are potentially conveyed by the supervisor (i.e., Autocratic) structural equation model (Model 1) was performed using or by proactive involvement of all members of the orga- the WLSMV method of estimation. This method produces nization (i.e., Cooperative). correct parameter estimates and goodness of fit indices in As predicted by Hypothesis 1, MD exerted a positive presence of censored variables, such as the accident un- significant effect of .24 (p \ .01) on accident underre- derreporting measure included in the model. Again, due to porting.2 In support of Hypothesis 2, after controlling for the multilevel structure of data, in order to obtain an ap- type of contract (permanent vs. contingent), job position propriate correction for standard errors, we used the (non manager vs. manager), and type of organization TYPE = COMPLEX procedure in Mplus. In this model, (public vs. private), technocratic safety culture exerted a no direct effects were posited among the five culture significant and positive effect of .37 (p \ .001) on MD, variables and accidents underreporting; rather we posited while bureaucratic safety culture exerted a significant but that the effect of safety culture on accident underreporting negative effect of -.16 (p \ .001). All other effects on MD would be fully mediated by MD. were not statistically significant. The model1 showed an adequate fit to the data: v2 (484, Technocratic safety culture and bureaucratic safety N = 922) = 540.278, p \ .05, RMSEA = .011 (.003; culture exerted indirect effects on accident underreporting .016), CFI = .95, TLI = .94. As can be seen in Fig. 1, through MD, respectively, of .09 (p \ .01) and -.04 there were low to moderate correlations amongst the dif- (p \ .01). The remaining Autocratic, Clan-Patronage, and ferent cultural types with significant correlations ranging Cooperative Safety Cultures exerted no significant indirect from .19 (clan-patronage and cooperative) to .73 (bureau- effects on accident underreporting through MD, respec- cratic and autocratic). To the extent that multiple culture tively, of -.011 (p = 433), .001 (p = 863), and -.006 types potentially co-exist in the same context, this might 2 Because not all employees experienced a workplace accident, we 1 Because we utilized a convenience sample, we also tested our ran an alternative regression analysis to test whether the strength and results controlling for age and gender. Gender was the only variable direction of the relationship between MD and underreporting significantly correlated with both accident underreporting and MD. remained consistent when restricting our sample to only include Therefore, it was tested as an additional control variable in our those individuals who actually experienced a workplace accident. hypothesized structural model. Notably, our results did not change After controlling for type of contract, public versus private sector, and after controlling for this sample demographic (results are available managerial status, we found that MD remained a significant predictor upon request to the authors). Therefore, we can rule out the of underreporting, F(1, 153) = 7.52, p \ .007, DR2 = .05. Notably, hypothesis that these demographics are potential convenience sample the beta coefficient was .22, which is nearly identical with the SEM bias that exert a significant influence on the activation of MD or results reported using the full sample where the path coefficient was accident underreporting. .24. 123 498 L. Petitta et al.

Fig. 1 Results from the final structural model (Model 1). Autocratic Note *p \ .05, **p \ .01, Culture ORG. TYPE CONTRACT POSITION ***p \ .001. Dotted lines are .73*** non significant effects. ORG. Bureaucratic TYPE .21*** -.18* organization type Culture -.16*** .21*** R²=.21 R²=.14

.61*** Clan-Patronage Moral Accident .54*** Culture Disengagement .24** Under-reporting .52*** .37** .19*** Technocratic Culture

Cooperative Culture

(p = 660). Finally, none of the control variables exerted a the affected employee, failure to report an accident often significant effect on accident underreporting, whereas the results in the worker’s injury going untreated. From an type of position was the only control variable exerting a organizational perspective, underreporting can leave the significant (p \ .05) and negative (-.18) effect on MD. root causes of employee accidents unaddressed and unfixed That is, lower levels of MD were associated to respondents possibly to crop up again in the future and affect other holding the role of manager/supervisor. Overall, the model employees. From a societal perspective, inaccurate acci- explained the 21 % of MD variance and the 14 % of ac- dent reporting undermines national public health surveil- cident underreporting variance. lance statistics and impedes policy efforts to develop safer In order to test Hypothesis 3, a second alternative and healthier workplaces. Thus, it is important to develop a structural equation model (Model 2) was performed that more comprehensive theoretical understanding of the rea- modeled the direct and indirect effects among the five sons why employees may engage in such behavior. culture variables and accident underreporting. This model The literature suggests that there are both person- and showed an adequate fit to the data: v2 (479, organizational-level factors that explain why employees N = 922) = 535.093, p \ .05, RMSEA = .011 (.003; avoid reporting the workplace accidents they experience .016), CFI = .95, TLI = .94. Furthermore, results from the (Probst and Graso 2011). Given that accident reporting is Chi square test for difference testing between Model 1 and typically mandatory in organizations and not considered a Model 2 were not significant (Dv2 (5, N = 922) = 7.274, discretionary behavior (Probst 2013), failure to report an p = .201). Because the two models showed the same level experienced accident can be considered a form of safety of fit to the data, Model 1 was preferable given its greater non-compliance. Therefore, the primary purpose of the parsimony (Preacher 2006). Therefore, the final results are current study was to contribute to the growing literature on those reported in Model 1 and shown in Fig. 1. underreporting by exploring the role of both MD (an in- dividual-level factor) and organizational culture (an orga- nizational-level factor) as predictors of employee accident Discussion underreporting. In doing so, we sought to gain a better understanding of the antecedents and mechanisms by While the popular press tends to focus on high-profile in- which employees avoid reporting experienced workplace stances of individuals ‘‘faking’’ workplace injuries in order accidents. to falsely receive workers compensation or extended dis- The results from our study suggest that organizational ability payments, the reality is that accident underreporting safety culture serves as an antecedent that differentially is a far more prevalent phenomenon with estimates sug- predicts the activation of safety-related MD among em- gesting up to 80 % of experienced accidents go unreported ployees. In particular, organizational contexts pervaded by (Probst et al. 2008; Probst and Graso 2013). Such under- bureaucratic enforcement of safety norms (i.e., bureau- reporting has numerous adverse consequences for em- cratic safety culture) were related to lower levels of em- ployees, employing organizations, and society at large. For ployee MD. Conversely, a technocratic safety culture (in

123 Safety Culture, Moral Disengagement, and Accident Underreporting 499 which safety practices are only followed if they do not individual employees to morally disengage from their impede achievement of desired production outcomes) ap- organizational duty to accurately report workplace acci- pears to be related to higher employee disengagement from dents. Such safety-related MD includes justifying safety the safety-related moral consequences, which in turn was violations due to a) perceived benefits (moral justifica- related to increased accident underreporting. tion), b) social pressures to produce (distorting conse- Interestingly, MD fully mediated the relationship be- quences), and/or c) placing blame elsewhere (attribution tween safety culture and accident underreporting. This of blame). indicates that safety culture does not have a direct effect Our study also responds to prior calls for a better on accident reporting behaviors, but rather has its influ- understanding of how moral disengagement is situa- ence via the role that culture plays in shaping safety- tionally motivated (Shu et al. 2011), i.e., determining related moral disengagement. Consistent with literature on the specific contextual factors that trigger MD the development of MD in other settings (Bandura 2002), mechanisms such as organizational culture (Fida et al. employees actively elaborate the shared contextual norms 2014). While the literature on MD mechanisms has long and develop strategies that enable them to violate such suggested that they are internalized during the social- norms and self-exonerate from the responsibilities of their ization process that regulates moral standards of an safety misconduct. These results were obtained after individual, and are co-determinedbyculturenorms controlling for type of contract (permanent vs. contin- (Bandura 1990), our study is the first to explore the role gent), job position (non manager vs. manager), and type of organizational culture (i.e., a context-level factor) as of organization (public vs. private), none of which exerted a predictor of MD mechanisms applied to organiza- a significant effect on accident underreporting. Taken tional settings, and specifically to safety at the work- together, our findings confirm that it is important to si- place. In particular, the five-typology model of safety multaneously consider both context- and individual-level culture (i.e., autocratic, bureaucratic, clan-patronage, variables when explaining safety violations, and add to technocratic, and cooperative) proposed in the current that literature by demonstrating the important roles of studyallowedustoexaminethelikelihoodofMD organizational culture and MD mechanisms in predicting activation as a function of the strength and intensity of employee accident underreporting. these culture types. Specifically, we found that bu- reaucratic safety culture attitudes, behaviors, values, and Theoretical Implications beliefs shared among organizational members appeared to provide a protective factor from MD justifications. Our findings make several novel contributions to the Conversely, shared attitudes, behaviors, values, and extant literatures in two distinct areas—MD and occu- beliefs indicative of a technocratic safety culture ap- pational safety. As noted above, this is the first study to peared to be a risk factor for the emergence of MD. As merge these two streams of research to investigate the Probst and Graso (2013) noted, research has shown that extent to which JS-MD predicts employee accident un- employees often view the organizational demands of derreporting. The results of our study suggest that MD safety and production as competitive in nature. Hence, mechanisms which allow people to mitigate the moral organizations which place an emphasis on production at consequences of misconduct (Bandura 1999) may explain the expense of safety may foster a Technocratic Culture individual variation in the enactment of underreporting. in which employees share the perception that the safety Moreover, the results of the current study also highlight risks are worth the potential rewards accrued by a focus the potentially important role played by safety culture in on production. As a result, the Technocratic Culture activating these MD mechanisms and increasing the may become a contextual factor that triggers MD likelihood of subsequent underreporting. While there is a mechanisms. robust literature on the relationship between safety cul- Finally, our results contribute to research on social ture and climate and employee safety outcomes, the cognitive theory (Bandura 1986). Our finding that MD present study is the first to explore MD as an explana- fully mediates the relationship between safety culture and tory mechanism for that link. To our knowledge, current accident underreporting is consistent with the agentic na- safety climate and culture theories have not looked at ture of individuals posited by Bandura (Ibid.), and further MD as a mediating variable, but rather focus on safety expands its application to safety misconduct. That is, in- knowledge and motivation as individual-level mediators dividuals actively elaborate shared contextual norms and linking culture and climate to safety performance (e.g., develop strategies that may more (or less) enable them to Neal et al. 2000). While safety culture and climate can violate such norms and self-exonerate from the responsi- certainly shape knowledge and motivation, our research bilities of their violations from the responsibilities of their indicates that culture is also related to the propensity for safety violations. Our results also support the interactionist 123 500 L. Petitta et al.

(i.e., individual-environment) perspective suggesting that 1985), intervention effectiveness assessment should evalu- individuals internalize contextual norms and shape them in ate the extent to which the safety culture may be affected at ways that help them to disengage from the sense of guilt multiple levels within the organization, i.e., employees, su- associated with their safety violations. Accident underre- pervisors/middle management, and top management. Fi- porting appears to be fostered by a technocratic safety nally, our results indicate that safety-related training culture, yet this effect is exerted only through the devel- programs might also fruitfully aim to enhance employees’ opment of moral justifications for engaging in behaviors awareness of their own moral reasoning and the specific that sacrifice safety. Conversely, underreporting appears to strategies (i.e., MD mechanisms) they use to develop morally be discouraged by bureaucratic organizational contexts disengaged thinking. Such self-awareness is the first step to which emphasize rigorous adoption of safety procedures. recognizing their own use of MD, as well as MD enacted by Again, this effect is exerted through a reduction in MD. other organizational members. In conclusion, by better un- derstanding the conjoint influence of safety culture typolo- Practical Implications gies and employee safety-related MD, organizations may be able to more effectively focus their safety improvement The findings of our study are of practical relevance from efforts. several standpoints. First, as noted earlier, the economic costs of workplace accidents account for 2.8 % of the gross Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions domestic product (GDP) in Italy (Eurispes 2010). Our study demonstrated that the combined effects of organi- In addition to the theoretical and practical contributions zational culture and MD account for 14 % of accident noted above, there are other notable strengths of the current underreporting. While this may seem like a relatively small study. First, the large and diverse samples drawn from a wide proportion of variance explained, interventions to modify variety of organizations in at-risk industry sectors afford the organizational culture and reduce the subsequent en- greater confidence in the external generalizability of the actment of MD have the potential to significantly reduce current findings. Additionally, by correcting for the non-in- the high social and economic costs of workplace injuries dependence of employees nested within organizations, we and underreporting. were better able to estimate the effect sizes relating culture, Our inclusion of organizational culture, and particularly MD, and accident underreporting. five specific patterns of safety culture, is also in line with Despite these strengths, it is also important to recognize the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU- the limitations of our study in order to promote future re- OSHA) preventive initiatives (e.g., Working together for search that can further build upon our work. First, as with risk prevention, EU-OSHA, 2013) that focus on the im- much occupational health psychology research, our study portance of joint management and employee involvement relies on a convenience sample to test our hypotheses, and in injury prevention programs. Our study indicates that a on self-report data. Such self-report measures of accidents bureaucratic safety culture discourages employees to and accident reporting could be misleading due to im- morally disengage from safety violations, whereas a tech- pression management goals of the employee and/or other nocratic safety culture is predictive of higher employee incentives for employees to respond to survey questions MD. Therefore, management and employees should be about reporting in a specific way. However, it is important made aware of the specific influence that their organiza- to reiterate that the data collected in the study were com- tional culture may have on the development of MD pletely anonymous and employees knew individual data mechanisms and subsequent underreporting. Our findings would not be shared with supervisors or management. suggest that enhancing bureaucratic features related to Notably, in the current study, we found that across the safety enforcement and de-emphasizing technocratic fea- entire sample, employees indicated they failed to report tures related to production pressure at the expense of safety 247 accidents out of a total of 485 accidents actually ex- may help decrease the activation of safety-related MD and perienced. This alone suggests that while employees may subsequent underreporting behaviors. not be willing to tell their employer about all of their ac- While modifying existing culture patterns is challenging, cidents, they were willing to tell us as researchers. More- research suggests interventions should focus on changing over, previous research indicates that self-report measures programs that crystallize the organization’s beliefs and be- of accidents and unsafe behaviors are related to indepen- haviors (DeJoy 2005). Furthermore, given the deeply rooted dent observations of these variables (Lusk et al. 1995). In nature of shared organizational culture beliefs (Schein comparing self-ratings and observer ratings of employee

123 Safety Culture, Moral Disengagement, and Accident Underreporting 501 use of hearing protection, they found that these were highly multilevel framework to include the direct impact of one’s correlated (.89) concluding that self-reports of safety-re- supervisor. While the current study was focused on the lated behavior are appropriate and ‘‘may be the best choice contextual effects at the organizational-level, it would also when time and monetary resources restrict measurement to be important to consider the role of supervisor ethics and one indicator.’’ Nevertheless, future research could address safety leadership. Supervisors serve as the interface be- this question empirically by evaluating the extent to which tween upper management and the individual employees social desirable responding is related to employee levels of and help to ‘‘translate’’ the espoused organizational culture underreporting. into enacted aspects (Zohar and Luria 2003). Therefore, A second limitation concerns the cross-sectional nature future research could further develop hypotheses regarding of the data. Although this study provides an initial test of potential mediating and/or moderating roles played by su- the proposed relationships, longitudinal research would pervisor leadership in the activation of MD mechanisms. allow us to more rigorously test the causal direction of our hypothesized relationships, as well as how the effects of organizational safety culture on MD may unfold over time. Conclusions For example, longitudinal research could better delineate the potentially recursive relationships between culture Despite these limitations, the current research is the first to norms and MD mechanisms proposed by social cognitive empirically demonstrate that safety-related MD mechan- theory (Bandura 2002). In other words, while internalized isms predict employee accident underreporting behaviors. cultural norms may prompt the development of MD, sub- Our study is also the first to explore the role of organiza- sequent behavior (e.g., accident underreporting) may in tional culture (i.e., a context-level factor) as a predictor of turn further shape the cultural content. MD mechanisms in a variety of organizational settings and Moreover, although our analytic approach accounted for industries. By demonstrating that certain cultural typolo- the nested nature of our data by correcting the standard gies (particularly bureaucratic and technocratic) are dif- errors of organizational culture, future research obtaining a ferentially related to the enactment of safety-related MD larger number of organizations would allow for an even and subsequent accident underreporting, we contributed to more rigorous test of the model within a full multilevel the extant literatures in these areas by identifying a new approach. Also, our study targeted organizations in at-risk mechanism by which culture impacts employee safety be- of injuries sectors, yet future research using other survey havior. Whereas previous research has focused on the im- data collected from additional and different at-risk pro- pact of culture and climate on employee levels of safety fessional groups should be conducted in the future to knowledge and motivation as predictors of safety perfor- provide further support for the study’s findings. Along a mance, our research suggests that another potentially im- similar vein, the current research while relying on a data portant explanatory mechanism is the impact of culture on from a diverse set of organizations and industry sections employee MD. As such, our findings add to our theoretical nevertheless represents only a single national context and practical knowledge regarding the individual and (Italy). Therefore, it would be good to replicate our find- contextual factors influencing employee safety in the ings in other countries, and in particular countries that may workplace. differ on potentially relevant national cultural dimensions, such as individualism/collectivism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. Appendix 1 Finally, with respect to ethics specifically, one inter- esting avenue for future research would be to expand our See Table 2.

123 502 L. Petitta et al.

Table 2 Job safety MD scale items JS-MD scale Italian version English version

1. Il servizio di prevenzione e protezione non serve a nulla: gli 1. Safety prevention is useless; accidents happen to those who are incidenti capitano a chi e` disattento inattentive 2. E` giusto che i datori non facciano applicare le norme di sicurezza, 2. It is ok if employers avoid enforcing safety rules, especially if it se questo garantisce un risparmio e dei salari piu` elevati results in savings and higher wages. 3. E` inutile un controllo sulle attrezzature perche´ anche dopo i 3. Safety checks are useless, because most machines will eventually controlli molte macchine non funzionano bene malfunction 4. Non ha senso che il singolo lavoratore applichi le norme di 4. Individual workers are not responsible for any failure to enforce sicurezza, dal momento che queste andrebbero applicate a livello safety policies if everyone in the company does not comply collettivo 5. Tutti i giorni si corrono dei gravi rischi per la salute: non vale la 5. Serious safety risks are taken every day; therefore, it is worthless to pena preoccuparsi di quelli relativi alla sicurezza sul lavoro worry about workplace safety 6. Non ha senso punire i singoli lavoratori che non applicano le misure 6. It does not make sense to single out individual workers who fail to di sicurezza: o si puniscono tutti o nessuno comply with the safety rules; either everyone who breaks the rules should be punished or no one 7. Un addetto qualificato deve occuparsi dell’applicazione delle norme 7. Designated officials should be responsible for safety in the sulla sicurezza, non e` compito dei singoli lavoratori workplace; it is not the responsibility of individual workers 8. I lavoratori dovrebbero occuparsi di cose piu` serie e non di piccoli 8. Employees have more serious things to be preoccupied with than difetti ai dispositivi minor machinery malfunctions 9. Le norme sulla sicurezza sono esagerate in realta` molti lavori non 9. Safety risks are exaggerated; most work is not as dangerous as sono cosı` pericolosi come sembra portrayed 10. Un lavoratore non puo` essere incolpato se non vengono applicate 10. Individual employees should not be blamed if safety rules are not le norme sulla sicurezza, di questo devono occuparsi i suoi capi followed; this is the responsibility of their boss 11. Chi non e` attento sul lavoro deve dare la colpa a se stesso/a se 11. Those who are inattentive at work should blame themselves if they subisce un incidente have an accident 12. Per essere piu` competitive sul mercato e` giusto che le aziende 12. It is ok for companies to cut their safety budget in order to be more taglino i costi per la sicurezza competitive in the market

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