27 October 2003

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The Bush administration is The Right Road pushing for in sometime next year. This to Sovereignty in Iraq extremely accelerated timetable is dangerous. Early elections in Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers Senior Associates, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace postconflict situations can pro- duce unstable results and favor radical groups over still-emergent moderate forces. he Bush administration is pushing for constitution into place and race through the Because the administration T an Iraqi constitution to be written and logistical challenges involved in setting up has made elections a requisite approved by spring 2004 and elections to elections. But short-circuiting the process of be held as soon as possible thereafter, most domestic discussion, negotiation, and con- for Iraqi sovereignty and faces likely in the second half of the year. This sensus building that should accompany the growing pressure to transfer approach responds to growing Iraqi and crafting of a new Iraqi political system sovereignty, delaying elections international pressure for a transfer of sov- would be unwise. It would likely result in is not an option. The solution is ereignty from the Coalition Provisional political institutions and processes to which to limit the current constitution Authority (CPA) to an Iraqi government, as many feel little connection and that writing to an interim document well as to domestic pressure to limit the do not command the loyalty or respect of mounting financial and human costs of the some key political actors. Worse still, early that provides the framework occupation. Although this timetable is less elections might provoke precisely the sort of for the of a constituent compressed than the recent proposal by the civil conflict that the CPA hopes so much assembly and an interim govern- French government for elections by early to avoid. ment of national unity. This 2004, it still represents a dangerously accel- Despite these dangers, delaying the would produce an elected Iraqi erated process. The desire for moving so elections is not a viable option. The U.S. quickly is understandable, but the experi- government decided early on after ousting government to which sover- ence of many other countries emerging that a transfer of sover- eignty can be transferred and from civil conflict or forcible regime eignty back to an Iraqi government would create a framework for the change shows that hurriedly organized elec- take place only once elections are held. As a longer-term process of political tions often create more problems than they result, the election timetable is hostage to consensus building necessary solve. Much more thorough political prepa- the inexorably growing pressure for sover- ration is needed for elections to produce eignty. It did not have to be that way. Other to create permanent democratic meaningful and lasting results. countries emerging from conflict and institutions. ■n Undoubtedly Paul Bremer, U.S. civil regime change under some kind of external administrator in Iraq, and the CPA have the occupying or administering force have muscle and the technical resources to rush a regained domestic sovereignty before having 2 Policy Brief

elections. Afghanistan is just one example. still be protected by the system. They may After the defeat of the Taliban in October refuse to accept the results unless they win. 2001, Afghanistan quickly gained its own Several examples of such rejection of results interim administration, led by President occurred in the 1990s, with different but Hamid Karzai, and a detailed transition equally undesirable outcomes. After a long roadmap, finalized in Bonn in December civil war in Angola and then an uncertain 2001. With sovereignty and a roadmap for peace agreement, the two rival movements, transition already in hand, Afghans have been disguised as political parties but still armed, willing to wait for elections. The planned agreed to participate in elections in 1992. elections of next year will take place close to Each side assumed it would win; neither was three years after the end of the war. seriously committed to a democratic process. Marina Ottaway is a senior If elections remain the gate to sovereignty International technocrats under UN supervi- associate in the Democracy in Iraq, there is only one way to reconcile the sion performed logistical miracles in pulling resultant imperative of holding early elections off the elections, for naught. The losing party and Rule of Law Project. She with the need for a lengthy process of politi- launched another military offensive within is the author of more than ten cal consensus building and institutional cre- days of the elections and ten more years of books including Democracy ation: Limit the first phase of constitution civil war followed. Challenged: The Rise of writing to an interim constitution and hold In Cambodia, opposition parties emerged Semiauthoritarianism (Carnegie the first elections under that framework only victorious from UN-sponsored elections held Endowment, 2003) and Africa’s for an interim government of national unity two years after the 1991 peace agreement that and a constituent assembly. This would pro- brought the long-running civil war to an end. New Leaders: Democracy of duce an elected government to which the But the incumbent leader, Hun Sen, refused to State Reconstruction? (Carnegie CPA could hand over sovereignty and create accept the results. Still in control of the bureau- Endowment, 1999), and co- an institutional framework that could oversee cracy and the military, he forced the parliament editor with Thomas Carothers the longer term, less hurried effort to create to accept the formation of a government head- of Funding Virtue: Civil Society permanent democratic institutions. Even ed by two prime ministers—himself and the with more time Iraqis may not reach the head of the winning party. Before long, howev- Aid and Democracy Promotion compromises necessary to make a democratic er, he grew discontented with sharing power (Carnegie Endowment, 2000). system work. The is one of and seized full power militarily. She also is a professorial political strife kept in check only by authori- And in Liberia, elections imposed by the lecturer in African Studies tarian governments capable of strong-arming international community in 1997 recon- at the School for Advanced all existing political forces into submission. firmed the dominant position of Charles This is not a particularly good starting point Taylor, the victorious leader of the armed International Studies of Johns for building democracy, but it is the reality on group that had devastated the country in Hopkins University. the ground, one that makes it all the more years of war. Liberians gave Taylor a majori- important not to rush the process. ty vote not because they liked him but because they realized he would not allow Danger of Premature Elections himself to be sidelined by an electoral loss Rushing to elections in countries emerging and would plunge the country back into war from conflict or sudden regime collapse often in response to an unfavorable showing. prevents the necessary process of negotiation Elections that promised at least stability and over the basic political rules and bargains for a perhaps the start of a political liberalization new democratic system. Holding elections process brought neither. Taylor ruled repres- without a solid underlying political consensus sively, and opposition forces returned to on the rules and substance of a new political fighting. The country lapsed again into dis- system presents at least two major dangers. astrous civil war, prompting recently anoth- First, some of the major political forces er round of international intervention, led may lack the confidence that if they do poor- by West African peacekeepers, with minor ly in the elections their basic interests will U.S. support. Sovereignty in Iraq 3

The second danger of early elections is The Sunni elite, struggling with the calami- that they can increase the power of radical, tous loss of its dominant position, is unlikely uncompromising groups. Such political to be very happy with what elections will forces tend to be the first to organize in post- bring it. conflict situations and do well in hurried elec- tions. Citizens divided along ethnic or Crafting a Political System in Iraq religious lines are often wary of the ability of In building a new political system, Iraqis will a fragile new political system to protect their have to reach agreement on an almost over- core identity-based interests and vote for rad- whelming number of difficult, divisive politi- icals who promise to defend such interests by cal issues. The most important and divisive, any means. but by no means the only, issues that will arise Bosnia is a telling example in this regard. in writing a constitution include the following: Thomas Carothers, who At the insistence of the international powers directs the Democracy and occupying the country after the 1995 Dayton ■ In devising a federal system for Iraq, Rule of Law Project at the Accords, Bosnia held elections just nine which many groups favor, critical decisions months after the peace agreement was will be necessary about the boundaries of the Carnegie Endowment for reached. In those elections, which are now new internal states and the degree of auton- International Peace, is an widely viewed by political analysts as a set- omy they possess. The have already international lawyer and back for reconciliation and democratization, drafted a constitutional proposal calling for a political scientist, and has radical nationalist forces on all three sides of federation composed of one Kurdish and one written extensively on democ- the ethnic divide defeated more moderate Arab state, with significant autonomy for the racy promotion, including groups. New, moderate parties had insuffi- states. Other Iraqis want to see states with less cient time to organize. Voters, still unsure autonomy and with boundaries set in accor- Aiding Democracy Abroad: whether the new system would really protect dance with population size and geography, The Learning Curve (Carnegie them, rewarded the radicals. disregarding ethnic and religious lines. Still Endowment, 1999), and The dangers of rejection and radicaliza- others would be interested in boundaries that Assessing Democracy tion are present in Iraq. The most visible maximize Shia power, enhance Sunni influ- Assistance: The Case of groups on the emergent political scene are ence, or protect minorities. those with clear ethnic or regional identities. Romania (Carnegie In a hurried political campaign, the more ■ A fundamental choice will need to be Endowment, 1996). He also radicalized groups and the sharper messages made whether to have a presidential or a par- co-edited with Marina Ottaway are likely to stand out. Other groups—such liamentary system. The presidential system Funding Virtue: Civil Society as the new, moderate, secular organizations would be in keeping with the strong execu- Aid and Democracy Promotion, and the formerly exiled organizations that tive tradition of Iraq and other Arab coun- the United States hoped would become tries but would raise the specter of a return (Carnegie Endowment, 2000). major domestic forces—are only just begin- to strongman rule. A parliamentary system ning to develop their base. Moreover, the would be less threatening but more alien, and major groups that have already emerged may could be more easily paralyzed by dissension not easily abide by elections results if those and instability. results thwart their ambitions or exacerbate their grievances. The Kurdish parties have ■ Equally hard and contentious will be the governed a virtually independent region of decision whether to incorporate, and if so, Iraq for a decade and would likely be loath to how to incorporate into Iraq’s new constitu- submit to any elected government that tion and legal institutions the principles attempted to curb their autonomy. The Shia derived from the vast body of Islamic laws clerics already have a wide political base and and interpretation known as the Sharia. a surging sense of political destiny, one they might be unwilling to abandon if electoral In addition to constitutional issues, Iraq results did not give them what they want. will also face major choices in establishing the 4 Policy Brief

core laws and procedures necessary for the Doing It Right construction of a democratic electoral process, including the following: The Value of Protracted Negotiations… ■ When Nelson Mandela was released in February 1990, the African In adopting a new electoral system, should Iraq opt for a system of proportional National Congress (ANC) demanded that the apartheid government representation, for single member districts, or be disbanded immediately and elections held within six months. The for a mixed system? Proportional representa- government, still intent on finding a formula to enhance the power tion is favorable to small parties and can of the white minority, insisted on prolonged negotiations and on potentially allow better representation of staying in power until the elections. national minorities. It also can lead to unsta- Despite the ANC’s initial dismay, the slow transition was crucial to ble legislatures. With their winner-take-all quality, single member constituencies tend to success. The negotiations showed the white minority that Africans eliminate small parties and render it more dif- would not accept a political system based on ethnic representation ficult to achieve representation for minorities. and convinced the ANC that a quick transition was impossible. The But they are often relatively stable and create lengthy talks forced all political parties to confront not only what stronger ties between elected representatives divided them but also what they had in common. They eventually and their constituents. reached agreement on a set of principles that would be included in ■ In writing a law on political parties, there the future constitution and on transitional power-sharing mecha- will arise critical issues about their registra- nisms. Negotiations were slow and painful but paid off when a tion. For example, should the registration of peaceful transition took place in 1994. parties with a religious identity be allowed, creating the possibility of an Islamist victory …and of Transitional Steps or at least a strong Islamist voice in govern- ment? Or should such parties be outlawed as Many have derived lessons for Iraq from the post–World War II incompatible with liberal democracy, leading reconstruction of Germany and Japan, but Italy provides a more per- part of the population to feel disenfranchised? tinent example. Having signed an armistice with the United States in 1943, Italy was not a defeated enemy in 1945, although the ■ Establishing a voter registration system United States and Great Britain had a strong military presence will be more than a technical challenge; it there. Italy thus maintained its own government, with the main will require choices with important political implications. Ideally, the registration of vot- authority initially in the hands of a Committee of National Liberation ers should be preceded by a national census that included all major parties. In 1946, Italy held elections for a con- and the issuance of identity cards and voter stituent assembly. The Christian Democratic Party was the winner registration cards to all Iraqis. But a census with 35 percent of the vote, but the socialist and communist parties before next summer is out of the question, combined gained 39 percent. What saved the day was the formation partly because of time, partly because census taking in countries with a heterogeneous of a government of national reconciliation, with a Christian population and poor record keeping is a Democratic prime minister and the participation of communists and politically charged exercise that can upset socialists. It was a tense period, but in two years the constituent carefully constructed balances. Although assembly produced a document accepted by all. The parliamentary countries facing transitional elections often elections held in 1948 under the new constitution showed the value do register voters without a prior census, the of the transitional steps. The moderate Christian Democrats had result is frequently controversial. Minorities complain they are underrepresented, and time to get better organized and gained 48 percent of the vote, with opposition groups blame their poor perform- the communist/socialist alliance getting 30 percent. ance on inaccurate voter lists. Sovereignty in Iraq 5

These myriad constitutional, legal, and tution could be written, widely debated procedural issues will inevitably arise in craft- within Iraq, and voted on, all in the less than ing a new political system in Iraq. They would six months remaining in the timetable for the be contentious in any context. They will be constitution announced by U.S. Secretary of particularly difficult to solve in Iraq, given its State Colin Powell in September. Given its ethnic and religious divisions, its history of near complete authority over political and conflict and repression, and its lack of experi- legal matters, the CPA could give U.S.-sup- ence with even partial efforts to democratize. ported aid technocrats leeway to race the This does not mean that reaching consensus is country through the logistical preparations impossible or that Iraq can never be demo- for elections. Constitutions, electoral systems, cratic. It only means that these issues need to rules for the registration of parties, voter reg- be thoroughly aired, and compromises must istration mechanisms, and all the rest can be be negotiated at length. Thus, expectations for pulled ready-made off the shelf. But no mat- a rapid process are not realistic. Fundamental ter what miracles of organization and effi- issues cannot all be settled within the next ciency outside experts manage to accomplish, nine months or even the next year—no matter Iraq will not be politically ready for elections

Iraq needs an interim constitution to elect an interim government of national unity and a constituent assembly.

how hard both Iraqis and the CPA work. next year. There are no technical shortcuts to Indeed, the projected timetable is extremely the necessarily lengthy processes of political short even by the standards of the typical hur- compromise, consensus building, and civic ried postconflict election, which usually takes education. Overlooking this fact could lead about two years to organize. to outcomes similar to those witnessed in Cambodia, Angola, Liberia, or Bosnia. Value of the Provisional The CPA should therefore pursue a dif- Under these circumstances, there are only two ferent course. The constitution writing ways to ready Iraq for elections by the second beginning now should be limited to produc- half of 2004. One way is to treat the process ing an interim constitution or basic law. of political construction and preparation as a Such a document would contain a broad technical rather than a political challenge, commitment to democratic principles and keeping most decisions in the hands of a very respect for human rights; institutionally, limited circle of Iraqi elites and CPA officials however, it would only provide a minimalist and minimizing wider political negotiations and temporary framework needed to elect an and public participation in the process. Paul interim government of national unity that Bremer promised that “the constitution will would rule the country for three years, and a be widely circulated, discussed and debated constituent assembly that would oversee the among the Iraqi people” and ratified in a ref- writing of a permanent constitution in the erendum. Yet, it is impossible that the consti- same period. Under this approach, the 6 Policy Brief

United States would fulfill its commitment Doing It Wrong to transfer sovereignty to an elected govern- ment in the second half of 2004 but avoid Bosnia many of the risks of early elections. The elec- “It is worth bearing in mind that both Bosnia and the rest of the for- tions would be for significantly lower stakes than those currently being discussed. Yet the mer Yugoslavia had already held democratic elections when they fell process would create nascent democratic apart in war. Indeed, their disintegration can, in part, be attributed to institutions that would have the legitimacy the nature of the democracy which emerged. In Bosnia the 1990 and the time necessary to take the Iraqi polit- election amounted to a poor ethnic census and as politicians exclu- ical class and society through the inevitably sively represented the narrow interests of their own ethnic group difficult process of settling the many choices and dilemmas that arise in constructing a and not the entire electorate, Bosnian society polarized and politics permanent democratic system. degenerated into a zero-sum affair.” The interim constitution should be kept —International Crisis Group, as simple as possible. For the three-year inter- “Doing Democracy a Disservice,” September 9, 1998 im period, it should establish a unitary rather than a federal system. This is not because a unitary system is the best for a democratic Liberia Iraq but because the contentious issues of fed- “In the 1997 Special Elections in Liberia, many voters understood eralism cannot be quickly solved. The interim their choice to be between Taylor or war, clearly an unenviable range constitution should provide for a parliamen- tary system rather than a presidential one, of options. Given the legacy of the recent conflict and the pervasive with proportional representation. This would fear that Taylor would return to war if not elected, many Liberians avoid the dangerous winner-take-all quality made a calculated choice that they hoped would more likely promote of an early election for a strong presidential peace and stability. One Liberian said, ‘He [Taylor] killed my father but post and would make the constituent assem- I’ll vote for him. He started all this and he is going to fix it.’” bly as inclusive as possible. The registration of political parties should be kept quite open to —Terrence Lyons, “Peace and Elections in Liberia” in Krishna Kumar, ed., encourage new organizations to form and to Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance dispel fears that registration rules are being used to exclude some groups. Voter registra- tion should proceed using a very simple method, such as election day finger marking, Cambodia to encourage a large turnout and make as “The process of holding elections has yet to lead to any national rec- many Iraqis as possible feel they are part of onciliation; rather, it has legitimized Hun Sen’s authority…Thus, a the process. decade after the UNTAC intervention, political factionalism, ‘strong- Establishing an interim constitution and man’ tactics, corruption, and social cleavages are still common in an interim government before moving to a permanent constitution and permanent polit- Cambodia. Despite two elections, Cambodian democracy is not yet ical institutions would mean deliberately fully representative or plural.” postponing many of the most difficult politi- —Daniel P. L. Chong, cal choices facing Iraq. It would not mean “UNTAC in Cambodia” in Jennifer Milliken, ed., sweeping them under the rug, as would hap- State Failure, Collapse, and Reconstruction pen if a permanent constitution were quickly put into place and aid technocrats took responsibility for solving the major issues of an electoral process. Sovereignty in Iraq 7

An objection that has been raised against ment an exit strategy. But as has been painful- the idea of putting the writing of the consti- ly learned in many countries around the tution in the hands of an elected assembly is world, holding elections does not a democra- that this body would be dominated by Shias, cy make. In some cases, elections are not even who constitute 60 percent of the population, the beginning of democracy. Elections are a and that this would lead to the transforma- necessary part of the process of building new tion of Iraq into a Iran-style theocracy. But democratic institutions. But if elections are not all Shias support radical Islamists—a poll rushed and held without adequate political conducted in August by Zogby International preparation, they can provoke political con- in four cities indicated that only 27 percent flict, distort emergent processes of political of Shias polled favored an Islamic govern- representation, and aggravate rather than heal ment. Furthermore, a constitution is never societal divisions. The idea of a slower transi- approved by a simple majority, but by a qual- tion with interim steps and provisional insti- ified majority, and this would make it even tutions may not seem as satisfying or decisive more difficult for radicals to have their way. as a democratic “big bang.” And those Iraqi

If elections are rushed without adequate political preparation, they can provoke political conflict and aggravate societal divisions.

The approach suggested here does not political actors who stand to benefit from a guarantee that when Iraqis eventually confront rapid process that rewards those already in and try to solve the challenges of building favored political positions may well resist it. democratic institutions they will reach happy But a more gradual process, rooted in extend- compromises that all major political actors can ed negotiation and consensus building on the accept. But it does increase the probability that part of major domestic political actors, as well this will happen. In the end, some groups will as broader public debate and participation, lose out, as some always do in a democratic corresponds to lessons from other countries process. The losers are more likely to accept and the real needs of Iraq. ■ such an outcome, however, if the issues have been the subject of real negotiations and han- dled within the framework of institutions— The Carnegie Endowment normally does not take such as a constituent assembly—that were institutional positions on public policy issues; the chosen by Iraqis rather than the CPA. views presented here do not necessarily reflect the The Bush administration is understand- views of the Endowment, its officers, staff, or trustees. ably anxious to have an elected government in Baghdad, both so it can claim success in © 2003 Carnegie Endowment for International establishing democracy and begin to imple- Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW

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