“Condemned Unheard”- Responses from Parliament and the British Public to the Boston

Massacre in the American Colonies.

Senior Honors Thesis by Shannon Chamberlain

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

Bachelor of Arts of History

Advisor: Dr. Jon Sensbach

University of Florida

Table of Contents:

Introduction………………………………………………………………………...p.3-6

Chapter 1: “Itself of so Interesting a Nature”- The Boston Massacre and Initial Public

Reactions…………………………………………………………………………...p.7-25.

Chapter 2: “Ignorance and Inattention”- Colonial Agents and Parliament’s Response to the

Boston Massacre…………………………………………………………………...p.26-39.

Chapter 3: “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction”- Criticisms of Parliament following the Massacre of St. George’s Fields and the Boston Massacre…………………...p.40-56.

Chapter 4: “A Growing Historical Wind”- Influence of the Boston Massacre in British Politics and Public Opinion from 1770 to 1780……………………………………………p.57-75.

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………p.76-83.

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….p.84-88.

Introduction 3

In his influential book, Hiller Zobel reminds audiences that the Boston Massacre has been an “old friend among the historical residue that we all carry.”1 The story of American

Independence grew from a series of coinciding events throughout 1763 to 1775. One of the most tragic events had been the night of March 5, 1770. While imagery of the Boston Massacre typically presents visions of British soldiers marching through the streets or Bostonians falling to the snow-covered ground, to “this basic scenario, some of us learn a sequel.” This “sequel” has presented itself through fresh interpretations of the Boston Massacre. During Zobel’s time, this

“sequel” represented the focus on John Adams’ successful performance as a lawyer in his defense of Captain Preston and the British soldiers. Author Dan Abrams and historian David

Fisher revisited this same topic through a modern evaluation of Adams’ legal performance in their book, John Adams Under Fire. Historian Serena Zabin explores the local relationships between British soldiers and citizens of Boston in her book, The Boston Massacre: A Family

History. In any case, these approaches to the Boston Massacre share an underlying purpose: to reinvent and retell the same story whose “mythological value” has filled “a need in our national historic memory.” In doing so, most historians have taken a predominantly colonial outlook to present evidence, testimonies, and media coverage of the Boston Massacre, especially since the tragedy is viewed notably as a part of America’s story on the road to independence.2

The narrative of the Boston Massacre has become a central piece of American identity.

As a result, approaches to the tragedy have centralized on a colonial lens. The works of revolutionary figures, such as Paul Revere and John Adams, are commonly used to illustrate the meaning and image of the Boston Massacre. As a result, there has been an unfortunate exclusion

1 Hiller Zobel, The Boston Massacre, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970), 3. 2 Ibid., 3-4. Introduction 4 of other perspectives, particularly the voices from England. For an event that focused so heavily on a battle for public opinion, there is insufficient discussion on the ways in which the British public and Parliament responded to the Boston Massacre. Furthermore, the discussion that has been provided on British public opinion tends to be divided. Historians Hiller Zobel and Neil

Longley York contend that the Bostonian perspective had been the most influential among the

British public. Historian Serena Zabin argues that no side had earned overwhelming influence in

British public opinion. Other historians, mainly F.J. Hinkhouse, argue that the Boston Massacre had not been considered as an important topic of discussion amongst the British public during its time. This thesis seeks to remedy the confusion and contradiction that has surrounded British opinion of the Boston Massacre. Overall, an examination of the daily and monthly media sources reveal that the British public favored the perspective of the Bostonians in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy. Furthermore, there had been a clear sense of public outrage after

Parliament displayed its incompetence through the mismanagement of colonial affairs following the Boston Massacre. When this public outrage is combined with an assessment of the similarities between the Boston Massacre and a recent tragedy in England, it becomes clear that a newfound empathy emerged among the British public. This empathy led to a clear demonstration of British public support for the American colonies. A heightened level of liberalism arose on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly through the spread of radical Wilkite ideologies, throughout the months after the Boston Massacre.

At the same time, I will focus on Parliament’s response to the Boston Massacre, which has been grossly underexamined in discussions on the aftermath of the tragedy. Neil Longley

York and Eric Hinderaker provide an introductory discussion into Parliament’s purposeful negligence and refusal to fully address the Boston Massacre in the House of Commons. Their Introduction 5 arguments inspired an investigation into the motions issued by colonial agents Thomas Pownall and Edmund Burke. These motions were issued with the intent to analyze Parliament’s poor management of the administrational policies that were instituted in the American colonies, especially through a focus on the creation of an imbalance between military and civil authorities.

The British public expressed support for the timing and necessity of the motions issued from these colonial agents, but Parliament chose to vote in the negative against each article within the motions. As a result, pro-American leaning politicians who sought to voice the concerns and grievances of the American colonies were silenced. A period of stalemate opened, in which both the colonies and Parliament were dissatisfied but not necessarily pushed to acts of retaliation. In return, an uneasy limbo followed the Boston Massacre. The timeline to American

Independence stood at a standstill; however, the Boston Tea Party would be the next major event to resurface tensions within the relationship between England and her American colonies.

Opportunities for reconciliation may have been available to Parliament during this window of uncertainty after the Boston Massacre, but the response to the Boston Tea Party, known as the

Coercive Acts, essentially pushed the colonies over the edge. This thesis places the Boston

Massacre within the timeline of American Independence as a fundamental moment in the progression towards disunity, but not a crossed line in which reconciliation would not have been possible. In fact, this time of uncertainty became a missed opportunity. Parliament could have sought to resolve the growing tensions within the relationship between England and the

American colonies, as independence was not at the forefront of the colonists’ minds. Eric

Hinderaker notes, “If it were not for the shootings in Boston, 1770 might have been a year of Introduction 6 reconciliation between Britain’s Parliament and its North American colonies. The signs were favorable.”3

This thesis concludes with a discussion on the Boston Massacre’s representation in recent years, in which library collections and museum programs share the story of the Boston Massacre.

The difference in language and presentation between the United Kingdom and the United States highlights the variances in public memory of this tragedy, which consequentially reminds us that

History is not a subject intended for singular, objective interpretations. The Boston Massacre paradoxically lives on as an enigma and a familiar story, which only adds to its fascination as a comfortable, yet invigorating, piece of national history. An examination of the role that the

Boston Massacre played in British public opinion and Parliamentary debate reveals that March 5,

1770 was a memorable date not only in American History, but in Atlantic History as well. With the recent and continuous scholarly exploration into the Boston Massacre, it becomes necessary to expand the narrow perspective that has guided interpretation of the event from a predominantly colonial lens. The “unhappy disturbance” in the American colonies represents more than just an unfortunate accident between British soldiers and Bostonians. Instead, the

Boston Massacre leads to political contestation between pro-American leaning politicians and traditional Parliament, an empathetic connection between the British public and the American colonies, as well as a cynical criticism of Parliament from the British public.

3 Eric Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2017), 14. E- Book. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature”

Following the Boston Massacre, two political pamphlets had been printed in order to sway public opinion: The patriot-leaning A Short Narrative of the Horrid Massacre in Boston and the loyalist-leaning A Fair Account of the Late Unhappy Disturbance at Boston. These pamphlets would be disseminated throughout London during the aftermath of the Boston

Massacre. The testimonies had been collected urgently, as both the Bostonians and British royal officials sought to present their version of events to the British public and Parliament. Responses to the tragedy would rely on British interpretation and reaction to these two pamphlets. Sections of these pamphlets would be reprinted in daily, monthly, as well as annual magazines and newspapers. In order to evaluate the contents of these pamphlets and the manner in which they had been portrayed in the British media, it is crucial to first present the course of events on the evening of the Boston Massacre.

March 5, 1770, began as a “pleasant but chilly” night, as Private Hugh White paced in front of his post at the Custom House on King Street in Boston, Massachusetts.4 Captain-

Lieutenant John Goldfinch of the Fourteenth Regiment came to King Street. He ran into Edward

Garrick, a wigmaker’s apprentice who accused Goldfinch of not paying the credit due to his master for dressing Goldfinch’s hair. The tension between the two men prompted Hugh White to defend Goldfinch, in which White left his post and entered the street to address Garrick. White swung his musket into Garrick’s head, who then cried out in pain. This commotion attracted the attention of other nearby wigmaker apprentices, who began to gather in front of the Custom

House. About eight to nine boys taunted White, as they provoked him with insults such as

‘Lobster son of a bitch!’ Bells throughout the town began to ring, as the bells signaled the presence of an emergency, which led numerous townspeople to enter the streets due to their

4 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 185-187. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 8 suspicion that a fire had broken out. The situation began to escalate, as snowballs and other small objects were hurled at White. He had just fixed his bayonet and lowered his musket to keep himself clear of the crowd. After larger pieces of ice were chucked at White, he began to pound on the doors of the Custom House to beg for entry. The verbal assault continued, with shouts of

‘Kill him!’ and ‘Fire, damn you, fire, you dare not fire.’ Private Hugh White began to fear for his life and he cried out for help: ‘Turn out, Main Guard!’5

While the situation at the Custom House worsened, an even “more violent and broader confrontation had been boiling” in the area surrounding Murray’s Barracks, where part of the

Twenty-ninth Regiment housed its troops. An unknown man rushed through the nearby

Boylston’s Alley repeatedly shouting, ‘Town born, turn out!’6 Ensign Alexander Mall called out to the barrack-gate sentry to restrain the man, but the sentry and nearby civilians did not carry out Mall’s request. Shortly after the man’s exclamations, the alley filled with civilians armed with clubs and sticks. About twenty to thirty townspeople approached a small group of British military officers to demand that they keep the soldiers in the barracks. The townspeople verbally assaulted the officers as they asked a series of questions: ‘Are the inhabitants to be knocked down in the street? Are they to be murdered in this manner?’ Furthermore, they remarked that

‘We did not send for you. We will not have you here.’7 These townspeople were referencing the placement of British troops in Boston over the past two years, in which various skirmishes between soldiers and civilians had upset the local population. Specifically, throughout the first few days of March, soldiers of the Twenty-ninth Regiment had gotten “tangled” into confrontations with ropeworkers. The most infamous had been those at John Gray’s ropewalks.8

5 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 185-187. 6 Ibid., 187-188. 7 Ibid., 187. 8 Ibid., 182-183. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 9

The British officers calmly tried to reassure the townspeople that they would do everything they could to keep the men in the barracks. The officers further requested that the crowd disperse, which they did momentarily; however, at the Cornhill end of the alley, a section of the mob decided to go towards the Main Guard.9

The mob from Murray’s Barracks, a throng of protestors at Dock Square, and the townspeople responding to the perceived threat of fire all began to pour into King Street. The

Custom House filled up with a sizable crowd. At the Main Guard, Captain Preston was aware of the worrisome events at the Custom House but was preoccupied with the legality of sending the

Main Guard to help Private White. In the end, his concern for both White’s safety and the money in the Custom House led him to send a relief party that consisted of Corporal William Wemms and six privates. Once Preston himself arrived at the Custom House, he ordered the sentry to fall into a single, semicircular line. Preston knew it was unlikely that his men would be allowed a calm and quiet withdrawal, evident by the continuous goading. The crowd increased both

“physically and audibly.” It became clear that the “hope of avoiding tragedy sank fast.”10

Although Captain Preston had told civilians that the soldiers would not fire without his command, the overall state of confusion and agitation proved that “this was not a night for military precision.”11 As the commotion augmented, Private Montgomery, a British soldier from the relief party sent to help Hugh White, was hit with a club. He was struck down and fell on his backside. After he rose back up, his rage fueled his following actions. He shouted, “Damn you, fire!” He then pulled the trigger on his musket.12 Richard Palmes consequentially swung at

9 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 187-188. 10 Ibid., 192-197. 11 Ibid., 198. 12 Ibid., 198. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 10

Montgomery and then at Preston. Montgomery attempted to stab his bayonet at Palmes, but

Palmes was able to dodge the attack. There was a pause after Montgomery’s first shot, which quickly ended as Private Kilroy aimlessly shot into the crowd. A few men were stricken down as shots unloaded, the first had been Crispus Attucks. Five men died from the events of that night.

The crowd began to disperse, but slowly reapproached to gather the dead. The soldiers reloaded their muskets and cocked their pieces because they had mistaken the intent of the mob as they reapproached the Custom House. The muskets went into firing positions, but Captain Preston shouted at his men ‘Do not fire!’

Further down on King Street, towards the Town House, a larger group began to swell.

Shouts of ‘to arms!’ filled the night. Multiple church bells throughout Boston rung.13 Captain

Preston grew fearful, as rumors were spread that crowds of thousands were waiting at the next street over to harass the soldiers. Officers who attempted to rejoin their regiments were assaulted.

For example, Lieutenant Ross of the Fourteenth Regiment received “a solid blow from a thrown stick” and two ensigns of the same regiment were “set upon and knocked down.”14 Various townspeople of all “political persuasions” ran to alert Governor Thomas Hutchinson. They begged him to put a stop to the commotion. Once Hutchinson reached the Town House, he angrily questioned Preston as to why his troops were brought to the Custom House. Preston replied, ‘I was obliged to, to save my sentry.’15 After a discussion with Preston, Hutchinson ascended to the second floor of the Town House and went to the balcony to address the people.

He expressed his concern for the situation and promised that a full inquiry would be made into the events of that night. He then advised the crowd to go home peacefully. Some responded and

13Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 200-201. 14 Ibid., 201. 15 Ibid., 203. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 11 left, while other remained due to their mistrust of Hutchinson. They demanded that the troops leave the area first. A concession was made that once Lieutenant Colonel Carr marched the troops back to their barracks, the townspeople would disperse.16

The next morning, Hutchinson called for a council meeting at the Town House. The

Boston selectmen already awaited his arrival, as several councilors urged Hutchinson to demand that General Dalrymple remove the troops from Boston. Hutchinson claimed that he did not have the authority to order for a removal of the soldiers.17 Boston’s justices of the peace and justices from nearby towns came to the council meeting to further press Hutchinson for the removal of the troops. Initially, Hutchinson did not relent. Although this sense of incapability was characteristic of the confusion that surrounded the balance of power between the civil and military authorities in the American colonies, General Dalrymple offered an attempt to help

Hutchinson. Dalrymple stated that he would move the Twenty-ninth Regiment to Castle William if Hutchinson simply expressed his desire for the removal. Samuel Adams noted that if

Dalrymple had the authority to remove the Twenty-ninth Regiment, he should be able to remove the Fourteenth Regiment as well. Secretary Andrew Oliver also pressured Hutchinson to remove the troops. Originally a staunch loyalist to Hutchinson, Oliver now argued that the Governor either remove the troops or ‘quit the Government.’ Dalrymple and Hutchinson recognized that the outcome of the troops’ removal was inevitable. Although they blamed one another for the military retreat, they moved ahead to remove the troops from Boston.18

Expresses were sent to General Gage, who approved the removal of the troops and demanded that any soldiers ‘found to have acted in any manner deserving Punishment’ should be

16 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 203-204. 17 Ibid., 206-207. 18 Ibid., 208-209. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 12 held in confinement.19 On the other hand, Gage also stated that if the soldiers had truly acted in self-defense, he had hoped the colonists would be able to decide their fate in a fair and just manner. Over the next few days, Gage instructed Dalrymple to gather the “military version of the shooting and the precedent provocations.” Before Gage’s instructions even had the chance to arrive, Lieutenant Colonel William White ordered British officers to collect testimonies from their soldiers.20 Around the same time, the patriots had begun to compile their own testimonies from the townspeople of Boston. These Bostonian depositions would be finalized and sent to

London a short while after the loyalist depositions.

Once the military depositions were taken and transported to London, the testimonies were compiled into a loyalist-leaning pamphlet known as A Fair Account of the Late Unhappy

Disturbance at Boston. The pamphlet opened with the argument that the townspeople of Boston were predisposed to be discontented with the British military occupation in the colonies, as they were the same rebels who neglected to uphold and follow the various acts of taxation passed by

Parliament.21 The pamphlet then lamented that anyone who showed support for the authority of

Parliament was denounced and ostracized. The writers argued that it became “a crime” to refuse non-importation agreements and other patriot-led forms of defiance against the British crown.22

A Fair Account then suggested that the Sons of Liberty and other patriots treated the British soldiers poorly since their arrival, as they used language and acts of violence that would not

“have been justified…towards prisoners of war of the nation with which we are oftenest at enmity.”23 This treatment, the pamphlet said, naturally produced resentment and the desire for

19 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 209. 20 Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, 36. E-Book. 21 A Fair Account of the Late Unhappy Disturbance at Boston, (London, 1770), 5-6. 22 Ibid., 6. 23 Ibid., 7. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 13 revenge among the British soldiers. The pamphlet had been quick to clarify that the soldiers’ bitterness was not the cause for the shootings that occurred on March 5, 1770. Overall, the introduction provided a collective summary of various depositions to exhibit that the need to protect the sentry and the right to self-defense provided enough justification for the events that transpired the night of the Boston Massacre.24

The Appendix of A Fair Account included the testimonies which sought to exonerate the soldiers. The testimonies shared evidence of violence that would have justified the need for self- defense. For example, Deposition No.100 from Thomas Lochead noted that the townspeople who gathered around the Custom House had been armed with “clubs and sticks” and some in the crowd “threw snow-balls” at the soldiers.25 Other testimonies revealed the crude language and harassment that aggravated the soldiers. Deposition No. 102 from Samuel Leslie exhibited that the townspeople egged on the soldiers with phrases such as ‘Fire, you rascals, fire; no, you cowardly dog, you dare not fire.’26 In addition, some testimonies displayed the confusion seen throughout the night, which in turn made it difficult to follow standard military protocol. In

Deposition No. 104, John Gillispie declared that part of the crowd pleaded for the civilians to leave the soldiers alone, while the other part of the crowd cried out ‘Knock him down!” at passing British officers. These contradictory messages led to a sense of confliction on how to safely transport the soldiers back to their barracks without facing violent confrontations with the mob.27 Another set of testimonies revealed the pugnacious nature of the Bostonian crowd. In

Deposition No. 105, Edward Hill recalled a skirmish between himself and a Boston civilian. The civilian demanded that Hill give up his weapon, but Hill stated that he would like to keep the

24 A Fair Account, 9. 25 “Appendix,” in A Fair Account of the Late Unhappy Disturbance at Boston, (London, 1770), 3-4. 26 Ibid., 5-6. 27 Ibid., 7. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 14 weapon for himself. The civilian pushed Hill down as he grabbed Hill’s stick. Then, members of the mob joined this civilian and a blade was thrusted at Hill. Afterwards, he got up and ran to the barracks of the Fourteenth Regiment for safety.28 As a whole, these testimonies sought to establish justification for the soldiers’ actions through exhibiting the Bostonian crowd as violent and hostile.

Not only did A Fair Account provide testimonies from a loyalist perspective, but it also attempted to nullify the claims made in the opposition’s pamphlet, A Short Narrative of the

Horrid Massacre in Boston. For example, A Fair Account argued that some of the testimonies in the opposing pamphlet referenced gunshots from inside the Custom House, which A Fair

Account said, “deserves little or no regard.” The placement of soldiers in front of the Custom

House may have given the false illusion of shots being fired from the Custom House itself.29

This counterclaim against A Short Narrative is further evidenced when a certain witness in the

Bostonian pamphlet had been discredited. Charlotte (Charles) Bourgate, a French boy who was an indebted servant, had told Justice of the Peace Richard Dana that he was forced by Mr.

Manwaring to fire from the Custom House on the night of the Boston Massacre. A Fair Account noted that the boy deserved no credit, especially since he retracted his statement and then tried to reinstate his original story after he spent a night in jail.30 As a whole, A Fair Account attempted to provide arguments that both increased opinion in favor of the British soldiers and denounced the claims made in the opposing pamphlet, A Short Narrative.

Around the same time that customs commissioner John Robinson left for London with the loyalist testimonies, James Bowdoin and two other men, Dr. Joseph Warren and Samuel

28 “Appendix,” in A Fair Account, 8. 29 A Fair Account, 23-24. 30 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 212. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 15

Pemberton, collectivized the testimonies that would be assembled into A Short Narrative of the

Horrid Massacre.31 These testimonies had been produced during the town meetings that followed the night of the Boston Massacre. The first town meeting on March 6 included statements from witnesses who claimed that the soldiers themselves had planned the entire tragedy, a conspiracy of sorts. Within two days after this meeting, a committee was appointed in order to document the overwhelming number of accounts.32 Hutchinson criticized this process of gathering testimonies, as he argued that there was ‘no cross examination and no body present to ask any questions to elucidate any of the depositions.’ As a whole, he suggested that these accounts were not entirely credible. The radicals pushed back against Hutchinson’s critique.

They claimed that the loyalists and Dalrymple himself were aware that this committee had convened and that the loyalists had made a personal choice not to attend the meetings.33 On the other hand, the loyalists had valid concern that their voices would not be taken seriously. The last deposition in A Short Narrative, Deposition No. 96 from Thomas Greenwood, had “blamed the inhabitants for the trouble.” The radicals put a footnote at the bottom of this testimony that stated, ‘no credit ought to be given to his deposition.’34

A Short Narrative opened with a list of colonial grievances that had preceded the Boston

Massacre. For example, the pamphlet suggested that the presence of customs commissioners in

Boston had been “detrimental” to “political interests” of the town. The commissioners, the pamphlet argued, had become part of “Governor Bernard’s political schemes.” They supposedly silenced the voices of any politicians that spoke out against their policies, such as Captain

Timothy Folgier. The writers of A Short Narrative took note of these commissioners and

31 Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, 247. E-Book. 32 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 210-211. 33 Ibid., 210-211. 34 Ibid., 213. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 16

Governor Bernard’s political plans to argue that these royal officals had neglected to listen to the people and thus were responsible for any resentment that the colonists developed. This introduction then noted that the royal officals had “rendered” the Bostonians as “disgustful.” As a result of their clear distrust and dislike of the Bostonians, the pamphlet argued that these royal officials and Governor Bernard sought to bring “the displeasure of the nation upon the town.”

Essentially, the pamphlet suggested that the royal officials wanted to excite “disturbances and tumults” in order to make Boston appear unruly and disobedient. As a result, the pamphlet concluded that the royal officals should be seen as responsible for the placement of troops in

Boston and consequentially “all disturbances and bloodshed” that had occurred in the years prior to the Boston Massacre.35

Before the depositions are presented, A Short Narrative sought to place blame for the

Boston Massacre on the royal officials in the colonies who upheld the placement of troops in

Boston. The placement of troops in Boston during peacetime represented a violation of the personal liberties granted to British citizens through the Magna Carta. This accusation was followed by an attempt both to address the conduct of the military and to examine the sequence of events on the night of the Boston Massacre. A series of short witness statements were cross- referenced to produce a collective account of the affairs that took place throughout the evening.

For example, Samuel Drowne declared that he “saw about fourteen or fifteen soldiers of the 29th regiment, who came from Murray’s barracks, armed with naked cutlasses…and came upon the inhabitants…himself being one of the assaulted persons.”36 The following statements all expressed a similar sentiment as seen in Drowne’s declaration. The pamphlet concluded this

35 A Short Narrative of the Horrid Massacre in Boston, (Cornhill: Edes and Gills, 1770), 7-9. 36 Ibid., 25. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 17 section with a summary of the shootings, the town meetings that followed, and the measures that resulted from the meetings.37

The Appendix of A Short Narrative includes 96 depositions, which sought to prove that the soldiers were at fault for both instigating the tragedy and frightening the townspeople. In an attempt to show the soldiers as the agitators, Deposition No. 31 from Nathaniel Appleton stated that Appleton’s twelve-year old son was stuck down by a soldier’s cutlass as he was trying to run some errands on the night of March 5. While he begged for his life, the boy supposedly heard the soldiers say, ‘I will kill you all.’38 To further portray the soldiers as cruel and violent beings,

Deposition No. 26 from William LeBaron revealed that a British soldier made a pass at LeBaron with his sword. LeBaron ran as he had no weapon to defend himself. The deposition then stated that LeBaron was pursued by a soldier with a bayonet as he was running away.39 On a more accusatory note, some of the depositions labelled the entire tragedy as a conspiracy planned by the soldiers. For example, Deposition No 12. from Mary Brailsford recounted that a British soldier came to Mr. Thayer’s house prior to March 5 in order to warn Mr. Thayer. The soldier said, ‘before Tuesday night next at twelve o’clock, there will be a great deal of blood shed, and a great many lives lost.’ He then advised that Mr. Thayer stay home that night.40 The rest of the depositions attempted to provide evidence for a variety of details: the number of individuals that stood in front of the Custom House, the number of soldiers present, the person who ordered the soldiers to load their weapons, and so on. As a whole, these depositions clearly exhibited a

37 A Short Narrative of the Horrid Massacre, 25- 48. 38 “Appendix,” in A Short Narrative of the Horrid Massacre, (Cornhill: Edes and Gills, 1770), 18. 39 Ibid., 15. 40 Ibid., 8. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 18 patriot-based leaning in an attempt to portray the British soldiers as relentless, bloodthirsty men who actively sought to harm Bostonians ever since their military occupation began in 1768.

Throughout the second half of March, the draft of A Short Narrative was approved and compiled by Bowdoin, Warren, and Pemberton. Once finalized, the pamphlet was quickly sped off to London as “an antidote to the poison the radicals believed Robinson was preparing to spread.”41 Although Robinson reached London with the loyalist testimonies first, the depositions had not yet been compiled into a printable pamphlet. In an interesting gesture to A Short

Narrative, the editors of A Fair Account chose to begin with a natural continuation of the endpoint in A Short Narrative. The first deposition in the loyalist pamphlet is No. 97.42 In the time it took to construct the loyalist testimonies into A Fair Account, the opposing political pamphlet began to appear in printed newspapers and magazines.

Firstly, it becomes important to note that early literature which discusses British coverage of the Boston Massacre argues that “the affair” was no more than “a minor topic of the day.”43

This is an outdated perspective. By 1970, Hiller Zobel was able to recognize that reports on the

Boston Massacre “had more direct effect outside of Boston,” as “the London newspapers gave the American version substantial play during April and May.”44 This argument is further proven in many of the British newspapers and magazines that reported on the Boston Massacre. Most of the opening statements within various articles reference that the Boston Massacre had been a popular topic of discussion throughout London. For example, in The Annual Register, the opening for its section on the Boston Massacre stated the following: “The unhappy Riot at

41 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 213. 42 Ibid., 212-213. 43 F.J. Hinkhouse, The Preliminaries of the American Revolution as seen in the English Press 1763-1775, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926), 150-151. 44 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 214. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 19

Boston has been so variously represented, and itself of so interesting a Nature, that we think it necessary to lay the different Accounts of it before our Readers.”45 Furthermore, The London

Magazine stated in its opening for the section on the Boston Massacre that “the late melancholy disturbances at Boston having been much the subject of conversation, the following account, published by the order of that town, cannot be but acceptable to our readers.”46 In both of these opening statements, the two magazines argued that the reason as to why they had printed accounts of the Boston Massacre is due to its popularity as a point of gossip in London society throughout 1770.

These annual magazines, however, have the benefit of being printed at the end of the year or during the beginning of the following year; therefore, they contain information on the outcomes of the trials and other pertinent information that shaped London opinion throughout

1770. For example, after its opening statement, The Annual Register provided a message from the town of Boston. This message discussed the events from that night, the deaths that occurred, as well as the town meetings that followed. The London Magazine printed almost the same exact message with some slight variations. The Annual Register then included statements from Captain

Preston and an “Account of the trial of Captain Preston, at Boston, in New England.”47 As a result of access to statements from both sides, sections from multiple political pamphlets, as well as the trial summaries, these magazines provided a more balanced and all-encompassing version of the Boston Massacre to their readers. Newspapers that reported the event as soon as A Short

Narrative reached their printing presses had not been as balanced. Consequently, it becomes

45 Edmund Burke and J. Dodsley, The Annual Register, or a view of the history, politics, and literature, for the year 1770, (1785), 211. 46 Richard Baldwin, “Unhappy Disturbances at Boston,” in The London Magazine. Vol. 39. (London: Paternoster Row, 1770), 249. 47 Burke and Dodsley, The Annual Register, 211. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 20 necessary to look at the daily and monthly works, such as the London Evening Post. These media sources allow us to better comprehend the manner in which the Boston Massacre was portrayed in the weeks and months following the tragedy, especially without the hindsight of trial verdicts.

In the immediate aftermath of the Boston Massacre, town leaders expressed their concerns in regard to the media: “the London press, they feared, was never quite sympathetic enough to make their case fully appreciated.”48 Traditionally, native Britons held lowly views of the American colonists during this period of colonial resistance to the Stamp Act and other forms of taxation. When Preston’s case had been presented, the town leaders feared that its impact on public opinion would be stronger than any attempt to counter it. Nevertheless, the majority of public opinion remained in favor of the Bostonians, as newspapers and magazines typically represented the voices from A Short Narrative more often than those from A Fair Account. When newspapers and magazines did provide a more balanced account, they often led the story with the printings from the Boston Gazette and A Short Narrative before they introduced letters from

Captain Preston and other British military figures.

The General Evening Post reported on the Boston Massacre during April, in which the newspaper opened discussion with a reprint from the Boston Gazette. The reprint began with a lambaste on the placement of troops in Boston. The newspaper noted that the Boston Massacre represented a “recent and melancholy demonstration of the destructive consequences of quartering troops among citizens in a time of peace.” After the reprint provided a description of the violence, the excerpt then stated that “several were laid dead on the spot, and some lay struggling for life.” The report listed those who died alongside a description of the council

48 Neil Longley York, The Boston Massacre: A History with Documents, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 428. E- Book. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 21 meetings that followed. The report concluded that Boston sought security through the removal of troops from the town. Interestingly, the newspaper then revealed that the Boston Gazette included a letter from Captain Preston. He had expressed his approval that the town of Boston had set aside prejudice to ‘set forth advocates for truth, in defense of his injured innocence.’

Despite the quotations that were placed around the piece of the letter they chose to include, the

General Evening Post had also felt the need to include, in parenthesis, that “these [were] his words.” Not only did the newspaper include only a short paragraph from the military perspective, but it also emphasized that these were not the words of the General Evening Post immediately after Preston’s quote. The newspaper appeared more comfortable to mention the words of the townspeople over those of Preston, which in turn reveals an intriguing hesitancy to give attention to the military perspective of the Boston Massacre.49

Under an alias in The Gazetteer, Junius Americanus presented his case against A Fair

Account as it begun to disseminate amongst the British public. He concluded that A Short

Narrative stood unchallenged in its proof that the “soldiers fired upon and killed people without the order or interposition of any civil magistrate,” in which the Bostonians were left “insulted, injured, and incensed.”50 Americanus disputed many of the arguments provided in A Fair

Account. He criticized a claim made by Governor Bernard, who had suggested that that the

Bostonians had planned to rebel and that the Boston Massacre had been some sort of design amongst the townspeople. Considering that no evidence had been made to support that statement,

Americanus denounced its validity. He lamented that this argument of premeditation had been one of the principial viewpoints held in the pamphlet. Furthermore, he noted that A Fair Account

49 "News,” from General Evening Post (April 21, 1770 - April 24, 1770), Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Burney Newspapers Collection. 50 "News," The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, (1 May 1770), Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Burney Newspapers Collection. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 22 had sought to “exculpate the soldiers for firing upon and killing the inhabitants,” while also suggesting that the Bostonians wanted to avenge themselves against the soldiers. Americanus argued that the acts of the soldiery must have been so atrocious as to arise the spirits of honest men to risk their lives in defense of their civil liberties. He then appealed to the people of

London. Americanus remarked that he does not know “what sort of man” in the streets of

London “who would not have had the same feelings and have adopted the same resolution” in response to the misdoings of the soldiery.51

To understand the popularity of A Short Narrative, an excerpt from the “Advertisements and Notices” section of the London Evening Post reveals that A Short Narrative had been put on sale for the price of two shillings and six pence. The excerpt included a description of the pamphlet, in which it is stated that the events of March 5, 1770, were “perpetrated by soldiers of the 29th regiment.” Furthermore, the description noted that the accounts provided in A Short

Narrative came from approximately “one hundred persons of reputation in the town of Boston.”

Not only did this description place blame on the British soldiers, but it also argued for the credibility of A Short Narrative. The description also stated that the pamphlet for sale would include a “copper plate representing the scene of action near the Town Hall of Boston,” likely

Paul Revere’s or William Bingley’s artistic representation of the event. A Fair Account was not listed for sale within this article, even though this London newspaper had been printed in May. A

Fair Account had been published already but had not been popular enough to warrant an advertisement for sale at the same time as A Short Narrative. This reveals that A Fair Account

51 "News," The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, (1 May 1770). “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 23 likely did not captivate public attention to the same extent as A Short Narrative in the immediate aftermath of the Boston Massacre. 52

A Fair Account would be featured for sale in The Gazetteer, but not until July and at a price that had been significantly lower than A Short Narrative.53 While A Fair Account had been shorter than A Short Narrative, which may serve as possible indication of the price difference, the variations in both the column lengths and the amount of advertisements dedicated to each pamphlet further cement the popularity of A Short Narrative. In its first advertisement in the

London Evening Post, A Short Narrative had been granted a generous column. In the column,

James Bowdoin provided certification of the meetings where testimonies were collected.

Furthermore, the list of names involved with those town meetings were signed and verified by the town clerk, William Cooper. A short description of the Boston Massacre was included at the beginning of the advertisement. It is interesting that a week later, in the second advertisement for

A Short Narrative, the price for the pamphlet had risen. The first advertisement initially listed A

Short Narrative for sale at only two shillings.54 One may argue that the frontpiece had been the reason for the price increase, but both advertisements list the front piece as being included in the sale. Even if the frontpiece had been made more luxurious through the addition of a copper plate, the ability to market the pamphlet and increase its prices through such additions only further attests to its popularity. This rise in price reveals the success of the first advertisement in driving the popularity for A Short Narrative upwards. On the other hand, advertisements for A Fair

Account had been shorter, only stating that the pamphlet included evidence otherwise not found

52 “Advertisements and Notices," from the London Evening Post, (May 8, 1770 - May 10, 1770), Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Burney Newspapers Collection. 53 "Advertisements and Notices," Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser, (9 July 1770), Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Burney Newspapers Collection. 54 "Advertisements and Notices," London Evening Post (May 3, 1770 - May 5, 1770), Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Burney Newspapers Collection. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 24 from the narrative that had been published in Boston. In addition, advertisements for A Fair

Account were, and still are, much scarcer to find. This lack of popularity may have occurred because advertisements for A Fair Account appeared as public attention towards the Boston

Massacre began to wane until the arrival of the legal trials during the later months of the year.

The Critical Review published pieces on the Boston Massacre throughout the summer months of 1770 as A Fair Account began to spread. Critical Review writer Tobias Smollett critiqued the drawings and accounts produced by the Bostonian colonists. Smollett expressed his distaste for Paul Revere’s engraving, as he commented that it was in ‘every-way dismal.’55

Smollett noted that the purpose of A Short Narrative had been to ‘enflame,’ as when people produce political pamphlets in this state of agitation and anger, they are likely to produce evidence that ‘prove[s] anything comfortable to the prevailing disposition of the times.’56

Smollet argued that these hostile sentiments led to dubious and dramatic accounts. To his readers, Smollett suggested that the military accounts would exonerate the British soldiers.

Conversely, Ralph Griffiths, editor of the Monthly Review, was skeptical of the military accounts within A Fair Account. Griffiths argued that the writers of these testimonies were mainly

‘officers in the army,’ thus the perspective presented in A Fair Account had been limited and biased. Griffiths did not offer as many criticisms as Smollett on A Short Narrative. On the other hand, Griffiths expressed annoyance that the depositions in A Short Narrative did not contain any new perspectives or evidence that had not already been printed by the daily newspapers that covered the tragedy throughout the Spring of 1770.57

55 Serena Zabin, The Boston Massacre: A Family History, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 2020), 175. 56 Ibid., 176. 57 Ibid., 175. “Itself of so Interesting a Nature” 25

As these newspapers and magazines demonstrate, the Boston Massacre served as a topic of interest among the British public, in which the Bostonian perspective and A Short Narrative gained significant popularity. Naturally, after having spread and discussed news of the tragedy during the Spring of 1770, the London public and the colonists became eager to hear

Parliament’s response to the Boston Massacre. After all, when sending the political pamphlets to

London in the first place, both parties sent sections of their accounts and private letters to various

MPs with the hopes to sway their opinions. After the examination of the manner in which the public received news of the Boston Massacre, it becomes crucial to discuss Parliament’s response to the news about the Boston Massacre. While public opinion had been a matter of importance to the American colonists and royal officials, Parliament’s opinion had mattered the most. Parliament alone had the ability to legislate and execute change to the administration of colonial affairs.

“Ignorance and Inattention”

In eighteenth-century America, the colonies designated “agents” who resided in England to serve as liaisons with the British government.58 These agents were tasked with looking after the interests of the American colonies, by “forwarding documents and news, preparing and presenting petitions…preventing adverse bills from passing through Parliament, promoting trade… and handling Indian and military affairs as well as colony finances in London.”59

Individual colonies chose their own agents. For example, Pennsylvania selected Richard Jackson to succeed Jared Ingersoll in 1760.60 Richard Jackson would also be appointed to serve as an agent for Massachusetts in 1765, as he succeeded Jasper Mauduit.61 The New England colonies, alongside Virginia in particular, began to recognize the importance of being “well and continuously represented in Great Britain.” The colonists considered the agency to be ‘the most important, effective, and regular means of maintaining contact with the various branches of the

British government and of guarding both general and special colonial interests.’62

Colonial agents amassed power in British politics after the Seven Years’ War, as many were elected to seats in Parliament during the 1760’s. Barlow Trecothick, who served as a liaison between the New England colonies and the Rockingham-Newcastle region, earned a Parliament seat in 1768.63 Colonial agents who served in Parliament were not only responsible for arguing legislation on behalf of colonial interests, but for sharing with outside agents the “timing and techniques of lobbying.”64 For example, colonial agents relied on Richard Jackson, both a MP

58 Michael Kammen, A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), 3. 59 Ibid., 4. 60 Ibid., 22-23. 61 Ibid., 22-23. 62 Ibid., 8. 63 Ibid., 93. 64 Ibid., 98. “Ignorance and Inattention” 27 and an agent, to advise “the best time and manner for presenting petitions.”65 This “dual status” as a Parliamentarian and a colonial agent bestowed a priceless resource upon the American colonies. Prior to the 1760’s, colonial agents struggled to present legislation to Parliament. In

1755, William Bollan attempted to prevent Parliament from extending the Mutiny Act to the

American colonies. He proposed a petition, in which the House of Commons denied entry of the petition into their minutes.66 The House of Commons refused to discuss the petition, as its members argued that ‘speaking out to the people in America’ was solely the responsibility of the crown’s appointed governors.67 The restricted access to Parliament, coupled with Parliament’s refusal to address the interests of the American colonies, only reinforced the tensions that pro-

American leaning politicians would later recognize as driving the American people closer and closer to rebellion.

In their refusal to discuss the interests of the American colonies, Parliamentarians were blinded to general knowledge on colonial affairs. Most of London’s politicians were men who

“for generations, managed to avoid familiarity with America,” which made the tasks of the colonial agents significantly more difficult.68 While lobbying in 1759, William Bollan commented that these British officials were ‘either wholly strangers to the nature of the colonies or under some prejudice concerning them.’69 Furthermore, Michael Kammen and other British political historians have seconded the conclusion that Parliament had exhibited an ‘ignorance of the people over whom it claimed to exercise supreme authority.’70

65 Kammen, A Rope of Sand, 98. 66 Ibid., 96. 67 Ibid., 96. 68 Ibid., 92. 69 Ibid., 92. 70 Ibid., 92. “Ignorance and Inattention” 28

Colonial agents found that to present correspondence, in the form of letters from the colonies, was the simplest way to introduce information to Parliamentarians. News of the Boston

Massacre was initially shared with pro-American leaning politicians through such letters. These letters exposed members of Parliament to the colonists’ perspective of the tragedy before debate officially began in the House of Commons. Colonial agents presented the Boston Massacre through more than just formal letters. In addition to the use of correspondence and petitions, the agents also pursued informal means to share information with Parliamentarians.71 When news of the Boston Massacre reached London, William Bollan ‘directly drew up a memorandum,’ which

“friends of the colonies” used to share the colonial perspective with Parliamentarians.72 The informal approaches included personal interviews and luncheons, where the colonial agents met with Parliamentarians to show them the memorandums as well as colonial newspapers. At the same time, colonists felt they were disadvantaged with the use of such measures as “imperial authorities…sent their reports through official channels,” while the colonists were forced to rely on the “hope that someone friendly to their cause would informally do the same for them.”73

Benjamin Franklin was considered to be “the master publicist of the colonies.” He used every technique possible, both formal and informal, to personalize each meeting devoted to voicing the interests of the American colonies.74 In a letter to Samuel Cooper, Franklin shared his response to the Boston Massacre in a more indirect manner, as he placed the event in the legal context of the Crown’s permittance of standing armies during peacetime in the colonies.

Franklin noted the hypocrisy, as he claimed that placing standing armies during peacetime within

71 Kammen, A Rope of Sand, 94. 72 Ibid., 94. 73 Neil Longley York, The Boston Massacre: A History with Documents, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 427. E- Book. 74 Kammen, A Rope of Sand, 94. “Ignorance and Inattention” 29

London would not be tolerated, yet it was permitted in the colonies.75 He argued that the colonies and colonial agents had submitted to Parliament’s usurpation of power as a result of the

“Ignorance and Inattention” displayed by Parliament in regard to the rights of the colonies. He suggested that this ignorance had been a consequence of the “Inability to contend” on part of the struggling colonial agents.76 In the postscript of his letter, Franklin reassured Cooper that his own response to the state of affairs in the colonies, as well as Cooper’s copies of A Short Narrative, were “a good deal handed out among [the Ministry and Parliamentary connections].”77 Franklin also jested that the copies of A Short Narrative had been “very badly written by a blundering clerk.” Franklin even sent the copies back to Cooper so that he could read them for his own

“private amusement.”78 A Short Narrative truly was written hastily, as Bostonians acted with a sense of urgency to get their side of the story to London as quickly as possible. A race was initiated between A Short Narrative and A Fair Account: two of the most prominent, and opposing, political pamphlets written on the Boston Massacre.

As mentioned, James Bowdoin, Samuel Pemberton, and Joseph Warren drafted the text that would eventually be assembled into A Short Narrative.79 Their draft was approved on March

19, 1770, although the pamphlet was less than halfway finished.80 As a result of the scramble that ensued to finish the rest of the pamphlet, “the narrative did not take stock of the affidavits in a comprehensive or detailed way.”81 Nevertheless, the pamphlet was approved and shipped to

London. Approximately forty copies of A Short Narrative were sent to the following individuals:

75 Benjamin Franklin to Samuel Cooper, 8 June 1770, Benjamin Franklin Papers, National Historical Publications and Records Commission. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-17-02-0090 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, 247. E-Book. 80 Ibid., 247. E-Book. 81 Ibid., 248. E-Book. “Ignorance and Inattention” 30

Barlow Trecothick, William Bollan, Benjamin Franklin, George Grenville, Edmund Burke,

Thomas Hollis, and more.82 In addition to the pamphlet, some of the recipients were sent a personal letter from Bowdoin, Pemberton, and Warren. In this personal letter, the three men pleaded for changes to imperial policies. They argued that the ‘execrable deed’ on March 5 revealed that ‘a full and just representation of it should be made to persons of character, in order to frustrate the designs of certain men.’83 They then stated that these ‘designs’ would be the ‘ruin of our constitution and liberties.’84

Furthermore, when Warren and his fellow authors sent A Short Narrative to various

Parliamentarians, they occasionally included a report of the town meetings that followed the

Boston Massacre. This report claimed that the soldiers had been nothing but hostile since their arrival in Boston, as they were prejudiced against the town due to its perceived rebellious tendencies. The report then issued forward a brief summary of additional unpleasant encounters that had occurred between the soldiers and the civilians prior to the Boston Massacre. The report moved onward to discuss the course of action pursued by the town of Boston after the tragedy, which had included the arrest of Captain Preston and the plans to investigate the affair as a legal matter. The report then pleaded that no “ill impressions” be held by the Majesty’s ministers and those who were naturally disposed against the town, especially until the Bostonians themselves have had a chance to present their own evaluation against the loyalists’ perspective. The patriots knew the opposition’s testimonies were already on the way to London. The report concluded with a solemn announcement that the town has been left in anxiety since the event and that the

82 Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, 248-249. E-Book. 83 Neil Longley York, “Rival Truths, Political Accommodation, and the Boston ‘Massacre,’” (Massachusetts Historical Review, 2009), 73. 84 Ibid., 73. “Ignorance and Inattention” 31 removal of troops from Boston to Castle William had been a necessary response.85 Although the men addressed themselves to over three dozen political figures, most of the Parliamentarians

“undoubtedly-pointedly-ignored the packet of materials from Boston,” once again demonstrating the pattern of intentional disregard for the interests of the American colonies.86

When the testimonies for A Short Narrative concluded on March 24, 1770, its competitor,

A Fair Account, had already been a week at sea.87 A Short Narrative was drafted to influence

Parliamentary response to the tragedy, which also motivated Royal Governor Thomas

Hutchinson and Lieutenant Colonel William White to request testimonies from twenty-two soldiers and five civilians.88 John Robinson, a customs commissioner, had been snuck onto a ship that sailed for London on March 16, “carrying with him a parcel of the military depositions” that were featured in A Fair Account.89 Once the testimonies arrived in England, they were delivered to the government ministries.90 The testimonies had not yet been collectivized into the pamphlet itself, leading Hutchinson to “lose whatever advantage he might have gained by hurrying his depositions off to London,” as A Short Narrative appeared first in London print.91

By the vote of a Boston town meeting, the copies of A Short Narrative that were not sent to London were to be impounded to prevent any influence over the impending trial of the British soldiers.92 While the testimonies were eventually leaked before the trials, the intent behind the

85 Joseph Warren, et al. to Thomas Pownall, “Report of the Committee of the Town of Boston,” 1770. 86 Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, 249. E-Book. 87 York, “Rival Truths,” 74. 88 Ibid., 75. 89 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 212. 90 Ibid., 213. 91 York, “Rival Truths,” 74. 92 Ibid., 73. “Ignorance and Inattention” 32 impoundment of A Short Narrative demonstrates that the target audience was in London, not

Boston. As Neil Longley York argues,

“the real battle for public opinion was not going to take place in the town of Boston or out in the Massachusetts countryside, where the "patriot" view could be expected to prevail; rather, it would occur elsewhere in the colonies and more especially on the far side of the Atlantic.”93

By April 26, 1770, news of the Boston Massacre reached Parliament. Initial reactions sparked a sense of outrage amongst certain pro-American leaning politicians. Edmund Burke was one of the first to respond. He seethed that Parliament’s members should ‘walk out of their places,’ as they should resign for their misdoings.94 When full scale debate began on May 8,

Thomas Pownall opened the discussion by “vouching for the loyalty of the people of

Massachusetts,” on the basis of their cooperation in previous colonial wars.95 He argued that throughout the time he had worked closely with the colony of Massachusetts, “they had no idea of England but that of her being their home.”96 Pownall continued with his statement that the people of Massachusetts had experienced political unrest due to the concern for their civil liberties. Bostonians perceived both the unconstitutional actions of the military authorities in the colonies and Parliament’s continuous expression of power over colonial civil authorities as threats to their civil liberties. Pownall then warned Parliament that unless the British government transferred power from the British military back to the colonial civil governments, or at least remedied the current separation that had led to an ineffective relationship between the two, “you may drive a zealous and a good people to rebellion.”97 Pownall then motioned to address the

93 York, “Rival Truths,” 73. 94 Jerome Reich, British Friends of the American Revolution, (New York: M.E. Sharp Inc, 1998), 30. 95 Ibid., 30. 96 Henry Cavendish, Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates of the House of Commons During the Thirteenth Parliament of Great Britain, v.2 (London : Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, & Longmans [etc.], 1841), 2. 97 Cavendish, Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates, 4. “Ignorance and Inattention” 33 state of the Crown’s separation of civil and military government in America, in which he pleaded that Parliament “take the matter into the most serious consideration, and correct the evil, where evil shall be found to exist.”98

William Beckford, who had seconded the motion, argued that rather than provide more troops in an attempt to suppress the emerging sense of “rebellion” in Massachusetts, Parliament should instead look to implement a “steady plan of government.”99 In his observation of Boston,

Beckford addressed Governor Bernard’s concerns over the ability of the civil authorities to regulate the military authorities in the colonies. If this were the case, then there would be “no safety for this country if these military notions are to be extended.” An increase in the military presence would only further minimize whatever sense of control Bernard, and now Hutchinson, had felt that he had as governor. 100 To express his approval of Boston’s conduct, Beckford remarked that the Bostonians had acted with “great moderation” during the Boston Massacre, as they did not kill any of the British soldiers in retaliation. Although the House of Commons responded by laughing at Beckford, he countered with the following statement: “you may laugh; but I tell you these proceedings are contrary to the laws of God and man. You never would listen to these people. They are condemned unheard.”101 Colonel Isaac Barre contributed to the discussion on the motion when he presented the following question: Governor Bernard had told

Parliament that there was no civil magistrate to act upon the military two years prior, and if the soldiers had been “improperly placed there” in the first place, then why had the soldiers been

98 Cavendish, Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates, 4. 99 Ibid., 8. 100 Ibid., 8. 101 Ibid., 9. “Ignorance and Inattention” 34 allowed to remain in Boston?102 Despite the arguments made by Beckford and Barre, the House agreed to adjourn and no action was taken on Pownall’s motion.103

The very next day, Edmund Burke issued his own motion that sought to extend the enquiry that had begun with Pownall’s motion. Burke argued that Parliament had lost its right to civil and military powers in the colonies due to the “senseless manner in which [they] had exercised them.”104 He expressed his frustration with Parliament’s failure to restore the relationship between the colonists and the mother country. He noted that “you promised a remedy; you have provided none.”105 Burke then shared the resolutions contained in his motion, each of which sought to address the causes of the late political unrest in the American colonies.

The second resolution aimed to reveal that Parliament had contributed to the instigation of the recent disturbances in the colonies. Burke argued that Parliament had sent inconsistent and ill- judged instructions to the American governors throughout the past few years.106 The fourth, fifth, and sixth resolutions centered on the issues of taxation and the dissolution of legislative assemblies in the American colonies. The final resolution sought to address the question of treason. Burke stated, “to lay before this House suggestions of treason…when in reality no such treason or misprisions of treason did subsist…is an audacious insult on the dignity of parliament.”107 After Burke finished his speech, Henry Seymour seconded the motion, in which he expressed his agreement to this “censure on the conduct of government.”108

102 Cavendish, Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates, 10. 103 Ibid., 12. 104 Ibid., 19. 105 Ibid., 23. 106 Ibid., 23. 107 Ibid., 23-24. 108 Ibid., 24. “Ignorance and Inattention” 35

The debate opened with an immediate objection from Mr. Rice, who quibbled that this motion should have been brought before the “committee on the state of the nation.” The opposition focused on the argument that this motion was introduced in the wrong place and at the wrong time.109 On the other hand, MP Thomas Townsend argued in favor of Burke’s timing. He noted that “it was my honorable friend’s duty not to let the session pass over without motioning a censure on the conduct of the administration.”110 In doing so, Townsend suggested that time was of the essence. Colonel Mackay further expressed this sense of urgency, in which he stressed the importance of providing an agreeable plan for the administration of government in the colonies.

Otherwise, “the case of Boston may become the case of all the other provinces.”111 Alexander

Wedderburn furthered Mackay’s argument, as he used the Boston Massacre to show that the

American colonies had become more and more rebellious out of necessity: how else were they to protect the liberties and civil rights that had been undermined by Parliament? In his observation on the removal of troops from Boston, as well as the struggle between civil and military authority throughout this removal, Wedderburn confidently argued that “[Boston is] now in a state of successful resistance.”112

Lord North followed Wedderburn with a rebuttal. Lord North claimed this motion was more than willing to place blame for Boston’s political unrest on Parliament but did nothing to offer a solution to remedy these misdoings. Lord North commented that “if the plan of the gentlemen is one to restore peace to America, they should not bring it forward until they have determined what administration shall follow.”113 Although North’s criticism was valid, Burke’s

109 Cavendish, Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates, 24. 110 Ibid., 26. 111 Ibid., 27. 112 Ibid., 29. 113 Ibid., 31. “Ignorance and Inattention” 36 motion firstly sought to address Parliament’s accountability in the augmentation of tensions through administrational misconduct. Without an understanding on the causes of these tensions, how can Parliament offer redress to the American colonies? As he reflected on the order of troops to Boston, Lord North stated that “there was every expectation, that as soon as the military forces arrived, the civil government would recover its energy.”114 Lord North asserted that the placement of troops “was never intended to establish a military force there,” but rather as a

“consequence of the great riot in Boston,” referring to the Stamp Act protests.115 Lord North closed his arguments with the insistence that he had not intentionally served a role in “quieting the people of America,”116 even if politicians such as Burke believed otherwise. Although

Wedderburn attempted to counter North’s arguments, the opposition was in the majority standing. The second resolution was voted with 79 Yeas and 199 Noes.117 The following resolutions were also voted in the negative, which caused Burke’s motion to fail.

As mentioned, before Parliament had met to discuss the Boston Massacre, Bostonians had sent A Short Narrative to various politicians. Nineteen of them had been members in the

House of Commons. After Parliament had met, these politicians were able to send return letters to Boston. Pownall addressed the colonies on May 11. After he read A Short Narrative, Pownall remarked, ‘only wonder’d that something of this sort had not happen’d sooner.’118 Pownall also encouraged Boston to let Parliament “decide whether the practice of posting troops among the civilians in the colonies was unconstitutional.”119 Despite the fact that he had just argued this exact position before Parliament a few days prior to no avail, Pownall continued to put

114 Cavendish, Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates, 32. 115 Ibid., 32. 116 Ibid., 32. 117 Ibid., 37. 118 Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, 249. E-Book. 119 Ibid., 249, E-Book. “Ignorance and Inattention” 37 misguided faith in Parliament’s capabilities. On the other hand, Barlow Trecothick advised that the colonies take their own initiative. He suggested that they should appeal to Parliament ‘in a regular constitutional way,’ so that they may present their grievances directly.120 Whilst sympathetic, all of the correspondents who received A Short Narrative from Boston shared a common theme throughout their advice: “Boston was on thin ice,” and needed to tread carefully to achieve its goals.121 If the colonists acted with moderation and caution, the correspondents suggested that Parliament would respond in a like manner. Unfortunately, although these recipients had attempted to encourage a mutually beneficial path towards reconciliation,

Parliament failed to act accordingly. As seen with Pownall and Burke’s attempts to address the situation in the colonies, the House of Commons ‘decided overwhelmingly not to use the

‘massacre’ as an excuse to investigate Boston’s affairs.’122

Since Parliament did not provide any reconciliatory measures to address the strife between the royal officials and Bostonians, the struggle between “provincial autonomy and imperial authority remained, only to worsen.”123 Parliament consistently oscillated between a hand-on and hands-off approach, which led to a sense of confusion over the level of autonomy granted to the colonies. The Boston Massacre was the result of a very hands-on, encroaching administration of the colonies. The placement of military troops in Boston during peacetime was considered to be an unusually invasive measure. The removal of troops after the tragedy resembled a surface-level solution to the immediate causes of the Boston Massacre. The underlying grievances in regard to provincial autonomy continued to foment. When Parliament rejected Pownall and Burke’s motions, the British government had abandoned the opportunity to

120 Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, 249. E-Book. 121 Ibid., 250. E- Book. 122 York, “Rival Truths,” 84. 123 Ibid., 86-87. “Ignorance and Inattention” 38 thoroughly investigate the state of the affairs in the colonies. Burke noted the irony of the entire situation, as he remarked that “it is an unhappy practice, when ministers, by their weakness, precipitate a country into difficulties, and then urge those difficulties as a reason why you should not inquire.”124

Neil Longley York labels this dismissive approach as “the politics of avoidance.” He argues that this strategy was short-sighted, as it allowed Parliament to temporarily ignore the rising tensions between itself and the American colonies. This led York to acknowledge that

“what worked in the aftermath of the ‘massacre’ could not have worked in the aftermath of the far more serious bloodletting at Lexington and Concord.”125 During the years before the Boston

Massacre, the colonies had not sought independence from Britain. York argues that “for most irate Bostonians, the ‘massacre’ provided an opportunity to force the issue of imperial reform, not an excuse to found a new nation.”126 Boston simply wanted a greater sense of autonomy within the British empire, not independence from it. To reveal the sense of confliction experienced by the American colonists, York shares the concerns of Thomas Cushing. A congregationalist and town leader from Boston, Cushing “wanted to avoid confrontation and yet…did not want London trampling American rights.”127

Burke further expressed the desire of the American colonies to be trusted with handling their own military and civil affairs. He argued that Parliament had promoted “an arrangement of confusion” with its administration of the colonies.128 In regard to the placement of trust in the

American colonies to govern their own affairs, Burke commented the following:

124 Cavendish, Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates, 23. 125 Ibid., 87. 126 York, “Rival Truths,” 87. 127 York, The Boston Massacre: A History with Documents, 429-430. E-Book. 128 Ibid., 16. E-Book. “Ignorance and Inattention” 39

“America cannot be governed here; that the detail of her military and civil affairs cannot be administered in a house of parliament…you must depend on your administration. The trust is a great one; but it is a trust that is necessary.”129

Overall, Boston was not granted a balanced relationship between the civil and military authorities, as well as a clear understanding of the level in which imperial authority was to be maintained. Despite this mismanagement of colonial affairs, Parliament consistently failed to offer a solution at a time where it would have been accepted. This inability to recognize and remedy the colonial grievances that led to tragedies such as the Boston Massacre would only exacerbate the deterioration of the relationship between the American colonies and England.

During Burke’s motion, Alexander Wedderburn ominously predicted that “you have lost [the

American colonies], not by foreign invasion…but by domestic mismanagement… to have lost the American provinces in the way we have lost them makes the cause more hopeless, the calamity infinitely greater.”130

129 Cavendish, Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates, 15. 130 Ibid., 30. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction”

To establish a pattern for Parliament’s refusal to entertain the demands of pro-American leaning politicians, it becomes critical to examine a similar tragedy to the Boston Massacre known as the Massacre of St. George’s Fields. This event resulted from an attempt to arrest liberal politician John Wilkes, an avid supporter of the American colonies. Historians Hiller

Zobel and Pauline Maier have hinted that both the patriot support for MP John Wilkes and the inspiration that the colonists took from him perhaps led to more than just positive support. Zobel suggestively notes that “the Massacre of St. George’s Fields, as his supporters on both sides of the ocean called the incident, had no Massachusetts parallel.” In this statement, Zobel implies that a parallel should be expected.131 Furthermore, Maier emphasizes the popular zeal that surrounded the admiration of Wilkes in her inclusion of a patriot creed that had been printed in

Boston. This creed stated that ‘I believe in Wilkes, the firm patriot, maker of number 45.’132 This

‘maker of number 45’ is a reference to Wilke’s newspaper The North Briton, in which issue number 45 included an attack on King George III and his prime minister. Maier also notes that within the colonies, chants of “Wilkes and Liberty” sounded from taverns, which were the same chants that echoed throughout the British mob on the day of the Massacre of St. George’s Fields.

Furthermore, colonial streets and even children were given the honor of being named after

Wilkes.133 This near-worship of Wilkes and the multiple parallels drawn between the two events leads to a compelling interpretation that perhaps the Boston Massacre had been slightly influenced, and at least manipulated afterwards, to represent that English tragedy from 1768.

After he composed his forty-fifth issue of The North Briton, which openly criticized the

King and the prime minister, Wilkes was charged with seditious libel. Wilkes fled to France in

131 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 94. 132 Pauline Maier, “John Wilkes and American Disillusionment with Britain,” (The William and Mary Quarterly, 1963), 373. 133 Ibid., 375. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 41

1763, but he was tried and found guilty during his absence. He returned from France in 1768, only to face his postponed imprisonment. On May 10, 1768, a group of “lower people” developed the notion that “Mr. Wilkes would be permitted to go to Westminster to take his seat in Parliament.” Approximately 300 people assembled outside the King’s Bench Prison.134 The group was reported to have been peaceful, as they gathered with chants of “Wilkes and Liberty” alongside various “huzzahs.” Scottish troops were stationed outside the prison for some days, and upon this crowd’s arrival, were worried about the mass gathering and its intentions. They secured four or five justices, who came out alongside a series of troops to announce the Riot Act, which ordered the crowd to disperse or else face legal punishment. According to certain testimonies, the soldiers began to strike out at the crowd before the reading of the Riot Act had finished. Once the proclamation concluded, more soldiers began to quit their post and accost the mob.135 Several individuals were murdered or maimed. Young William Allen’s death would be the most noticeable loss as he had been an innocent bystander. At some point during the outbreak of violence, an unknown member of the mob had thrown a stone at the Scottish soldiers. Once he had been chased in retaliation, the man fled into a cowhouse as the soldiers ran in after him.

William Allen, the innkeeper of an inn that was adjoined next to the cowhouse, had just entered.

Since the other man had already made his escape, the soldiers suspected Allen to have been the man who threw the stone. Scottish soldier Donald Macleane fired his bayonet and hit Allen above the breast. Allen died a few moments later.136

134 A collection of pieces relative to the inhuman massacre in St. George's Fields, on the 10th of May 1768, (London, 1769), 8. 135 Ibid., 8-11. 136 Sean Harris, “The Massacre of St George's Fields and the petition of William Allen,” UK Parliament Petitions Committee, October 31, 2016. https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/326/petitions- committee/news/99182/the-massacre-of-st-georges-Fields-and-the-petition-of-william-allen/ “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 42

Donald Macleane was charged with wilful [sic] murder, while Donald Maclauray and

Alexander Murray were charged as accomplices. Macleane was acquitted and the other two soldiers were discharged. Disappointed with the results, William Allen’s father began a private prosecution of the soldiers through help from a friend, MP John Glynn. Glynn had been a supporter of Wilkes, especially since he had served as Wilkes’ legal counsel. As a result, he was happy to help Mr. Allen, who gave Glynn a petition to present in front of the House of

Commons. Although delayed, on April 25, 1771, John Glynn “begged leave to bring up the petition.” The petition led to a debate on the floor, in which Lord North and his supporters opposed the entry of the petition into the House of Commons. Edmund Burke, a constant “critic of North’s ministry,” suggested a Parliamentary inquiry into the matter. Despite Burke and

Glynn’s efforts, the motion to bring up the petition would be voted in the negative, 158 votes to

33 votes.137 The motion had failed, once again silencing debate on the mishandled administration of military affairs underneath King George III. This scenario reflects the same underlying pattern that was seen in the House of Common debates in regard to the Boston Massacre the previous year: Parliament consistently refused to take accountability or offer reconciliation after grave tragedies that resulted from Parliament’s misdoings. These misdoings arose through the creation of an imbalance between civil and military authorities in the American colonies and the exclusion of liberal MP John Wilkes from his seat in Parliament. Rather than allow for an open exchange of debate, Parliament overwhelmingly dismissed motions that would force the government to address its own role in causing such disturbances. As a whole, the responses to both the Boston Massacre and the Massacre of St. George’s Fields reveal Parliament’s pattern of

137 Harris, “The Massacre of St George's Fields and the petition of William Allen.” “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 43 neglect to address the grievances of those it presides over as well as its refusal to admit and remedy its own responsibility in the aggravation of tensions.

The connection between the Boston Massacre and the Massacre of St. George’s Fields was further cemented after there was a skirmish in Boston between two individuals: Christopher

Seider/Snider, an eleven-year old boy, and a loyalist named Ebenezer Richardson. Ebenezer

Richardson, who had earned a loyalist reputation due to his previous work as an informer for customs services, lived nearby Theophilus Lillie’s shop. Lillie had refused to sign a non- importation agreement and was quite outspoken with his criticism against the radicals. He complained that the patriots violently enforced a policy that consequentially prevented individuals such as himself from having the right to make their own choices. On February 22,

1770, a group of boys had gathered outside Lillie’s shop in order to prevent the entrance of buyers into the shop. They enacted their own form of punishment for Lillie’s refusal to sign the non-importation agreement. When Richardson had stepped in, the boys began to taunt him instead, since they knew his reputation as a tory sympathizer. As they pelted rocks at him,

Richardson retreated to his nearby house. A group of men, followed by the younger boys, approached his home. The group began to taunt Richardson with exclamations such as ‘Come out, you damn son of a bitch.’ Once the men tossed bricks at the house, the younger boys followed suit with stones and sticks. Richardson eventually brought a musket to the window and fired eleven slugs through Christopher Seider. While doctors hurried to treat him, it was too late:

Seider would die a few hours later.138

138 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 173-179. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 44

Immediately, the death of Seider was compared to the death of William Allen, the young man who had been shot and killed in the Massacre of St. George’s Fields. The Boston Gazette reported the incident with a cry for vengeance. The newspaper stated that ‘The Blood of young

Allen may be cover’d in Britain: But a thorough Inquisition will be made in America for that of young Snider.’139 To further cement the parallels, Seider’s funeral became “Adam’s spectacular.”

The event was turned into a propagandist mass-gathering. Hutchinson commented that, if given the choice to resurrect Seider, the Boston Sons of Liberty ‘would not have done it, but would have chosen the grand funeral.’140 The same had occurred for Allen’s funeral in Britain, which had also represented a grandeur event with incredibly high attendance. Considering that the

Boston Massacre would follow less than two weeks after Seider’s death, remembrances would remain in the minds of the mob who approached the British soldiers on March 5, 1770. The connection would once again be drawn to the Massacre of St. George’s Fields, as The Boston

Gazette reported that ‘A more dreadful Tragedy has been acted by the soldiery on Kings Street,

Boston, New-England, than was sometime since exhibited in St. George’s Fields, London, in Old

England, which may serve as Beacons for both Counties [sic].’141

In an interesting observation, historian John Shy examines the discussion of military affairs at the time that troops were stationed in both Boston and St. George’s Fields. He mentions colonial agent William Bollan, who purposefully used ambiguity in his pamphlet Continued

Corruption, Standing Armies, and Popular Discontents. Shy argues that after having read the first few pages of the pamphlet, in which Bollan criticized the existence of standing armies in a

139 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 179. 140 Ibid., 178. 141 Maier, “John Wilkes and American Disillusionment with Britain,” 387. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 45 free state, it is difficult to discern whether he had discussed the events in Boston or England.142 It is not until Bollan “makes an unmistakable reference to the affair” in England that it becomes clear which region he had referenced in his pamphlet. With the use of such ambiguity, Shy suggests that Bollan recognized and manipulated the similarities between the two events. Bollan did this to purposefully reveal that Parliament’s mismanagement of military affairs was so common that readers could not separate the two tragedies without explicit reference to either occurrence.

In a response to Parliament’s failure to address the grievances that surrounded both tragedies, The Annual Register further revealed that Parliament had established a pattern as it silenced liberal, minority Parliamentarians. The Annual Register noted that the motion issued by

Pownall on May 8 had been appropriate to examine the “present critical situation of affairs” and that it had become the duty of Parliament “to enquire how the Ministers here… have managed so unfortunately, as to kindle the present flame of dissention between the mother country and her colonies.” Despite the relevancy and importance of such a motion, the register complained that the motion took on “the usual fate of those made by the minority.” This unpleasant result prompted the register to offer a condemnation of Parliament’s fickle nature, as colonial taxes had been “imposed-repealed-imposed again,” and treasons “charged, adopted by Parliament, not proved, nor attempted to be proved.” The register then assessed the motion that had been passed on John Wilkes in regard to his competency as a MP. The bill initially had ruled that Wilkes was incapable to serve in Parliament, and a new motion had been issued to reverse this decision.

Once again, Parliament rejected the motion. These two debates that dealt with the consequences

142 John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), 396. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 46 of the Boston Massacre and the Massacre of St. George’s Fields were silenced in their attempts to address the grievances that prompted both the tragedies in the first place. The budding tensions that resulted after both motions had failed were recognized by the Annual Register. The register’s arguments contributed to the growing consensus that Parliament deserved to be criticized and re-evaluated for its aggravation of political unrest in both the colonies and

Britain.143

With these connections in mind, it is no surprise that the discontent and bitterness which followed the two tragedies led to an emergence of liberal political views among the British public. The British public, after they witnessed Parliament’s failure to respond swiftly to their own tragedy, had been disappointed by the empty results of Parliament’s debates on the motions issued by Pownall and Burke. The Britons were left disgruntled after the motions issued on the

Boston Massacre and Wilke’s seat in Parliament had failed. Interestingly, colonial agents were aware of this frustration and sought to exploit it. One Connecticut agent had suggested that the debates on the Boston Massacre were not ‘conducted for the sake of the colonies, but only to distress the ministry.’144 In their rebuke of Parliament for its “ineffectuality” in the administration of colonial policy, the colonial agents sought to reveal to the public the ineptitude of Parliament. The true purpose of the debate, this agent had argued, was not necessarily to provide relief to the colonies.145 In other words, certain agents have argued that the Boston

Massacre debates were for show. If the intention had been to rile up the British public, the plan had been successful. The patience of the British public had worn thin and the incompetence of

Parliament became a common gripe. In fact, immediately after the Boston Massacre, the British

143 Edmund Burke and J. Dodsley, The Annual Register, or a view of the history, politics, and literature, for the year 1770, (1785), 90-93. 144 Shy, Toward Lexington, 320. 145 Ibid., 320. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 47 public began to exhibit pressing concerns that Parliament had failed to protect the interests of the

British Empire. The longer Parliament waited to offer reconciliation, the more likely it would be that the colonies would begin to distance themselves from the British Empire.

An unnamed political club voiced their displeasure with Parliament’s mismanagement of colonial affairs. Their debates were published in The London Magazine. One of the main concerns expressed by the debaters had been the lack of an attempt to offer reconciliation to the

American colonies following the grave tragedy. Lucius Verus Paterculus, a member of the club, claimed that Parliament had made reconciliation with America “a matter of the last importance” and neglected to actively address the situation in the colonies.146 As a result, Lucius argued that the administration was fraudulent and incapable due to its lack of attention to protect the interests of the Empire. He demanded that “the interest of this nation must not be sacrificed to the fraud.”147 This viewpoint is further reinforced by a debater named Tullus Aufidius, who claimed that members of Parliament put on a façade. He noted the hypocrisy in which Parliament believed Britain needed to impose law and order on the colonies, yet its members refused to allow open debate on colonial affairs and oftentimes adjourned when the situation had been brought to the floor. Tullus was quite accusatory of Parliament, as he expressed his frustration that its members refused to “undergo the honest test of an examination into their conduct.”148 To conclude his argument with a warning, Tullus noted that it is time for Parliament to tremble and reflect while the American colonies continued to rebel. Now, Parliament must “apprehend a storm that will sweep them to destruction.”149

146 Richard Baldwin, “Debates of a Political Club,” in The London Magazine, Vol. 39, (London: Paternoster Row, 1770), 394-395. 147 Ibid., 395. 148 Ibid., 442. 149 Ibid., 443. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 48

Titus Manlius continued the assault on the administration. He argued that Parliament’s members used their power for their own interests, as they “gloried in their delinquency.”150 He also commented on Parliament’s hypocrisy as it denied “all debate on the very subjects which they particularly recommend to our notice,”151 which in turn supported his claim that the current administration had been “dead to the feelings of justice.” It is clear that these debaters shared an overwhelming distrust and disappointment in Parliament’s late mishandling of affairs. They began to worry that once Parliament “virtually overturned the constitution” with its current mismanagement of colonial affairs, the mainland would be next in Parliament’s attack on civil liberties.152

Another debater named Horatio Cibus suggested that the happiness of the Empire is dependent on the resolution of the unfortunate dissention in the American colonies. He believed that Parliament should not punish the colonies for the late disturbances, as Parliament itself had not offered any means to achieve reconciliation with the colonies. He declared that punishment without a resolution was not just. He further noted that taxation of the colonies in the first place had been an apprehensible if not illegal measure. Horatio concluded his speech with his suggestion that the role of Parliament had become vital in that moment to save the relationship between Britain and its colonies, but he recognized that such a task would not be easy.153

Considering that the debaters had been using anonymous Roman names, there is no effective means to assess their credibility; however, their opinions represented an emerging consensus

150 Baldwin, “Debates of a Political Club,” 443. 151 Ibid., 443. 152 Ibid., 443. 153 Ibid., 441-442. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 49 among the British public that Parliament did not act with the best intentions to protect the interests of the American colonies.

The main counterargument comes from Publius Varro, who specifically addressed the

Boston Massacre. Varro exclaimed that “God forbid” a soldier has the right to defend himself just as any other civilian when illegally attacked. Varro believed that the townspeople were the aggressors on that night. Varro then stated that it was the fault of the Bostonians that reconciliation had not yet been achieved. He suggested that the colonists “demand concessions which the mother country can never consistently allow.”154 He further argued that “fashionable soever as it may be to condemn our troops, for supporting the due execution of the laws… I trust that justice will triumph over clamor.”155 In this statement, Varro revealed that popular public sentiment had been to take the side of the Bostonians rather than the soldiers. His statement exhibits the influence that A Short Narrative had in the recent media coverage of the tragedy.

Although he disagreed with the sentiments of this popularity, Varro’s revelations align with the emerging political stance of the British public, in which liberal views in favor of the American colonies had begun to spread across London.

The Boston Massacre became a public source of spectacle due to its dramatic depictions of violence and death. It is interesting to explore the reason as to why the Boston Massacre had specifically evoked feelings of frustration and discontent among the British public. Prior to the

Boston Massacre, many Britons found colonial grievances, mainly taxation without representation, to be selfish and entitled. On the other hand, concerns about military occupation during peacetime seemed to have struck a chord within the British public. A new perspective had

154 Baldwin, “Debates of a Political Club,” 440. 155 Ibid., 439. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 50 emerged, in which Britons, similar to those present in the “Debates of a Political Club,” sought to re-evaluate the previous colonial grievances with a sense of compassion and acknowledgement. These sentiments were absent within the prejudiced views that prevailed before the Boston Massacre.

Prior to the Boston Massacre, the British public maintained a prejudice against the

American colonists that viewed those outside of Britain as inferior and lowly. London alone contained 700,000 individuals. Boston appeared “insignificant” to “any member of the English ruling group.” As a result, “this placed [Boston’s] inhabitants… in a status different from and lower than the English of England.” In addition, the expectations of mercantilism played a role in the development of this prejudice. This economic system demanded that the colony’s only purpose was to benefit the mother country, which made those in Britain maintain a sense of power over the colonies. Combined with the rebellious protests against the Stamp Act which would provide Boston with the label “troublemakers,” those in London continued to harbor resentment against Boston.156

The extent of this prejudice can be seen in Matthew Wheelock’s Reflections moral and political on Great Britain and her colonies, printed in early 1770. Wheelock resided in London after he lived in the colonies for a period of time, which to him meant that he was acquainted with the “manners prevalent in most of our colonies.”157 In this pamphlet, Wheelock shared his perspective on the relationship between Great Britain and the American colonies. Wheelock argued that the American colonists were unreasonable and entitled, as he insisted that their complaints about taxation were unfounded. Throughout Wheelock’s pamphlet, it becomes clear

156 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 5. 157 Matthew Wheelock, Reflections moral and political on Great Britain and her colonies, (1770), 3. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 51 that a distrust and disrespect for the American colonists had emerged throughout Britain during these preliminary stages of discontent before the American Revolution.

Wheelock attempted to assess the implications of the recent political unrest in the colonies through his evaluation of the legitimacy of their arguments. He argued that the

American colonists believed that they received inferior treatment from Parliament when compared to British locals. In regard to their notion of inferiority in citizenship, he raised the question “would the colonists have crossed the sea to form a settlement in America, if their quality of [sic] British citizens had not been their protection?”158 This question implied that the

American colonists had been granted equal status as British citizens while in the colonies, as otherwise they would not have left Britain in the first place. In his address of colonial grievances against taxation, Wheelock conceded that it would have been unjust to tax the colonists before the Seven Years’ War. Britain’s debt was not alarming at that time; however, it made perfect sense to tax the colonists after the war. He noted that the Britons were taxed as well; therefore, it was not honorable for the colonists to claim that Britain would tax only part of its subjects and not the whole.159 Overall, Wheelock insisted that “reason and morality” evaded the colonists as a result of their “ambitious designs.” He believed that they manipulated the British constitution by using the spirit of its language in order to act “against the general established law.”160 With these notions in mind, it becomes understandable how Wheelock, as well as many other British locals, came to harbor contempt for the colonists.

Although Wheelock shared this perspective with many of his fellow Britons, the

American colonists were not as supportive of his analysis. Benjamin Franklin annotated this

158Wheelock, Reflections moral and political, 49. 159 Ibid., 50-51. 160 Ibid., 47-48. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 52 pamphlet and provided his own counterargument to the claims made by Wheelock. For the most part, Franklin critiqued the manner in which Wheelock presented his case. When Wheelock stated that the colonists hold “extravagant and unjust demands” for exemption from taxation,

Franklin noted that Wheelock “decides before he examines” based on the biased language he used.161 Furthermore, in his attack on the character of the colonists, Wheelock commented that

“the character of a gentleman is rare to be met with in [sic] these provinces.” Franklin countered when he stated that “no gentleman that knew the Country would say this.”162 It is important to note that there is bias in both of these accounts because the two men clearly presented their own localities in a favorable manner. On the other hand, Franklin’s intelligence and respectability was well-known; thus, Wheelock’s information must be interpreted cautiously. In addition, Wheelock admitted that he had not been well-read on current affairs due to his distance from the main hubs of communication in London. Furthermore, he stated that he wrote the pamphlet with the purpose to preserve the goodness of the British Empire through a presentation of his case prior to

Parliament’s convening. As he claimed this purpose, he also admitted that he wrote the document in haste.163

Considering that most of the British public and the government were woefully ignorant to the affairs of the American colonies, it is no surprise that colonial agents were frustrated with the inaccurate descriptions provided by Englanders such as Wheelock. Franklin’s response emphasized the points made by Zobel, one being that “thoughtful Americans” were consciously aware of this British-held prejudice. Those who were as well-versed as Franklin sought to

161 Benjamin Franklin, Marginalia in [Matthew Wheelock], Reflections Moral and Political, (1770), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-17-02-0190. 162 Ibid. 163 Wheelock, Reflections moral and political, 3. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 53 disprove the notions that Americans were entitled, selfish, and unruly.164 On the other hand, certain colonists believed that this prejudice had been too ingrained into Britons, past the point of any attempt from the colonists for redemption. John Adams viewed the placement of troops in

Boston as an extension of that prejudice which places mistrust and unruliness upon the colonists.

He was not alone in his belief, as many Bostonians saw the placement of British troops in Boston as a police force rather than a protective army. This led to the suspicion that Boston had been viewed as “an enemy people.”165 In his autobiography, Adams, reflected upon the following:

‘their very Appearance in Boston was a strong proof to me, that the determination in Great Britain to subjugate Us, was too deep and inveterate ever to be altered by Us: For every thing [sic] We could do, was misrepresent [ed], and Nothing We could say was credited.’166

In providing this realization, Adams suggested that it would be nearly impossible to change Britain’s views of the American colonists. Adams believed that the longstanding prejudice had not been successfully challenged, even as colonial agents such as Franklin attempted valiantly to dismiss such prejudiced notions. Nevertheless, this pessimistic stance held by Adams would prove to be too skeptical of the potential for change. The Boston Massacre represented a pivotal turning point in altering the outlook that the British held towards the

American colonies, as the Bostonians would finally be ‘credited’ amongst the British public. In a reflection of the comments made in the “Debates of a Political Club,” the language used to speak about the colonies after the Boston Massacre is vastly different from the language used by

Wheelock in his pamphlet. Horatio Cibus, one of the debaters, spoke on the validity of the

164 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 5. 165 Richard Archer, As If an Enemy’s Country, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 545. E-Book. 166 Jesse Lemisch, “Radical Plot in Boston (1770): A Study in the Use of Evidence,” (Harvard Law Review, December 1970), 493.

“A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 54 colonies’ concerns. He revealed that the British views towards the American colonies may have become more sympathetic:

“I am not surprised that the Americans should think themselves oppressively treated, when members on this side of the Atlantic are heartily of the same opinion; nor am I surprised as the excesses they run to in defence [sic] of privileges, which so many, even of their British fellow subjects, pronounce to be their birth-right and exhort them to assert with their blood.”167

In his sentiments, Cibus presented an entirely different perspective than Wheelock. Cibus argued that the majority of British opinion was in favor of the Bostonians. Varro had referenced the same popularity that the Bostonians had in Britain when he provided his counterargument.

This popular sentiment is completely antithetical to Wheelock’s harsh condemnation of the colonies. Both Wheelock’s pamphlet and the debate in The London Magazine appeared the same year, yet they express two contrasting views of public opinion. The difference between the two printings had been the occurrence of the Boston Massacre, which Cibus noted was a payment that Bostonians made “with their blood.”168 It is important to note, however, that these changes in public opinion were not so incredibly strong as to render their opinion of Americans as complete equals. This can be evidenced by the differences in language used to describe the two tragedies that have been discussed, the Massacre of St. George’s Fields and the Boston

Massacre.

In its discussion of the Boston Massacre, The London Magazine labelled the event as an

“unhappy disturbance” or a “melancholy disturbance.” While the adjectives carry connotations that do paint the event as being a tragedy, the word “disturbance” does not carry as much weight as “massacre.” Furthermore, the newspaper published an account from the town of Boston that

167 Baldwin, “Debates of a Political Club,” 441. 168 Ibid., 441. “A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 55 discussed the grievances which prompted the aggravation seen amongst the colonists. Although this colonial account does use the word “massacre,” those writing for The London Magazine still chose to use the phrase “unhappy disturbance” for their section on the Boston Massacre. This diction choice minimized the impact that the colonists wished to leave upon the British public.169

Even The Annual Register, which had been open in its condemnation of Parliament’s mismanagement of colonial affairs, chose to use the phrase “unhappy riot” to describe the

Boston Massacre. Similar to the London Magazine, the register included an excerpt from Boston that directly referred to the event as a “massacre,” yet their own writers did not use that diction choice.170 The most common manner in which the newspapers and magazines referenced the

Boston Massacre with the term “massacre” had been when they reprinted articles from the

Boston Gazette or letters from the town of Boston. On the other hand, The Annual Register refers to the Massacre of St. George’s Fields as the “late massacre” and not some type of “unhappy disturbance.”171 This careful choice in language reveals that the British felt secure when they used diction that portrayed their own massacre as being more severe than the massacre that had occurred in the colonies.

As argued earlier, the Boston Massacre and the various other military skirmishes that occurred beforehand, particularly the incident with young Seider, resonated with Britons. In turn, this resonance likely evoked a stronger sense of sympathy when compared to other colonial grievances. The British public began to hold views that were much more supportive of the

American colonies. This support evoked a change in language throughout the public attempts to address the state of affairs on the other side of the Atlantic. How is it that this change in

169 Richard Baldwin, The London Magazine, vol. 39, (London, 1770), 249-251. 170 Burke and Dodsley, The Annual Register, 211-215. 171 Ibid., 138.

“A Storm that will Sweep them to Destruction” 56 language, and consequentially the growth of liberal political views, came about after the Boston

Massacre? Perhaps, with memories of the recent tragedy at the Massacre of St. George’s Fields, the British public realized that the Boston Massacre had hit a bit too close to home. After all, the political consequence of this shared experience between Boston and England would become significantly visible. Following the propogandist funerals of young Allen and Seider, Harris and

Maier reveal the “boosted popular support for John Wilkes” that transpired on both sides of the

Atlantic. The increased support for liberal politician Wilkes served as a microcosm for the emergence of liberal views among the British public that followed the two cataclysmic tragedies.

In the realization that “the ‘Massacre of St. George’s Fields’ aroused Englishmen,” it is no wonder that Wilkites and Rockingham Whigs were prompted to attack “the government for its tendency to use military force as a substitute for political action.”172 This argument had become a prevalent talking point in the Boston Massacre debates as well. Pownall and Burke both suggested that the mishandling of colonial affairs allowed for an imbalance between military and civil affairs, as political ineptitude had been a causation in the tensions that led to the Boston

Massacre. Parliament neglected to address the concerns of liberal protestors and refused to recognize its own accountability in aggravating hostilities between the colonies and the mother country. The British public responded with a heightened expression of liberalized stances to

Parliament’s policies, especially those in relation to the American colonies.

172 Shy, Toward Lexington, 396. “A Growing Historical Wind”

After five years of colonial unrest over a multitude of issues, such as the various acts of taxation passed by Parliament and the culmination of hostilities between the British military and the colonists, political leanings in Britain began to reflect a growing sympathy for the American colonies. From 1763 to 1771, there grew a “change in emphasis from Tory and Country Party panaceas to the ideas associated with Wilkite radicalism.”173 After the Massacre of St. George’s

Fields and the Boston Massacre, support for John Wilkes and his liberal position increased amongst the British public. Throughout the rise of Wilkite radicalism, “a most intimate intertwining of colonial and radical agitation occurred in London.”174 British scholar Ian R.

Christie argues that radicalism emerged amongst the British public due to the “continued identification of colonial and popular London grievances.” The British public believed that if the colonial grievances were resolved, so would the grievances of the London public as well. For example, in 1771, a series of resolutions from the Wilkite Society of Supporters of the Bill of

Rights were published in the Public Advertiser. These resolutions called for the repeal of acts issued against the colonies, especially taxation acts, that had been “incompatible with every principle of British liberty.” Wilkes’ circle had come to the belief that executive authority over the colonies had become oppressive. A fear emerged that “a sinister plot against British liberties and the whole framework of the constitution was brewing” under British and Scottish political figures, such as the Earl of Bute.175 As a result, they believed infractions against colonial civil liberties could easily lead to the violation of civil liberties in London itself. John Adams, elected to the Society of Supporters of the Bill of Rights, manipulated this fear after the Boston

Massacre. He appealed to the ‘the friends of Liberty in England for our mutual safety and

173 Ian R. Christie, “British Politics and the American Revolution,” (Albion: A Quarterly Journal, 1977), 223-224. 174 Ibid., 223-224. 175 Ibid., 223. “A Growing Historical Wind” 58 defence [sic].’176 In his use of the word “mutual,” Adams implied that a risk to civil liberties had emerged in both Boston and London. On a separate note, it is intriguing that the Wilkites included suspicions of the Scottish in their accusations of despotism. It is important to remember that it had been Scottish soldiers who fired upon the British mob of Wilkite supporters during the

Massacre of St. George’s Fields. The relationship between the Massacre of St. George’s Fields and the Boston Massacre likely spurred the connections that were made by Wilkites when they identified colonial grievances as similar to their own. The timeframe of increased support from

1770 to 1771 only reinforces that likelihood.

At the same time that Wilkite radicalism began to gain traction, colonial agents in

London felt the effects of their unfortunate failure to persuade MP’s to address and remedy colonial grievances. Michael Kammen’s A Rope of Sand pinpoints the year 1770 as a turning point for the declining influence of colonial agents. Kammen notes that “the discontent” began to spread after 1770 as a response to the inability of the colonial agents to successfully defend the interests of the colonies.177 As a result, “a number of agencies…were abandoned after 1770.”

The deterioration of the agency system that promoted traditional London lobbying led to the development of “new kinds of activist groups” that relied “less on Anglo-American links and more in terms of forging American unity.”178 This transition to intercolonial correspondence represents an early symbolic separation from London. The hope placed in colonial agents left the colonists disillusioned and frustrated, which in turn revealed to the colonists that it would be more beneficial to work with one another rather than through appointed agents in London. The severance of ties with some of these agents exhibit that the American colonies began to gravitate

176 Jerome Reich, British Friends of the American Revolution, (New York: M.E. Sharp Inc, 1998), 38. 177 Michael Kammen, A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974), 191-192. 178 Ibid., 192. “A Growing Historical Wind” 59 towards the advocation of their interests through their own means.179 As Neil Longley York notes, “what frustrated colonists learned over these years is that any sort of less formal representations-through lobbyists or sympathetic members of Parliament…proved inadequate to their political needs.”180

This disunion in part had been a result of the colonists’ epiphany that the time for reconciliation had officially passed. Parliament once again refused to acknowledge and remedy what the colonists had considered an abuse of imperial power. Kammen notes that “the only basis for reconciliation had been clearly realized” with the course of events throughout 1770, and to “restore old harmony,” Parliament would have to “repeal all legislation passed since 1763 affecting America unfavorably.”181 Unfortunately, by 1770, Parliament had clearly expressed that it was ‘composed of men who are out of the way of being affected by the Distresses of

America.’182

With both the excitement of the Boston Massacre and the repeal of the Townsend duties, the year 1770 had led to consistent news coverage of the American colonies. On the other hand,

“the years between repeal of those duties and the furor created by the Boston Tea Party were relatively calm,” with the creation of a “superficial repose.”183 This period “marked by neither notable cooperation nor conflict,” in part was the result of the quietness of the British press.

Overall, there had been less pieces published on the events within colonial affairs. The years following the Boston Massacre and the repeal of the Townsend duties were not nearly as exciting

179 Kammen, A Rope of Sand, 157. 180 Neil Longley York, The Boston Massacre: A History with Documents, (New York: Routledge, 2010), 428. E- Book 181 Kammen, A Rope of Sand, 298. 182 Ibid., 244. 183 Ibid., 200. “A Growing Historical Wind” 60 as 1770. Furthermore, the British public already had expressed strong sympathies towards the

American colonies after the Boston Massacre. There was not much the British press had done to thoroughly upset the American colonies during these relatively placated years. In addition, in the few years following 1770, “new dangers- Irish disorder, the threat of war with Spain and France,

…and Caribbean insurrection- drew attention and resources from the task of policing the mainland colonies.”184 With other emerging issues in the British Empire, the American colonists were not at the center of the attention in the London press or Parliament.

By the time 1773 arrived, attention would be redirected to the American colonies following the infamous Boston Tea Party. Although the Boston Massacre had left behind a note of sympathy and understanding when speaking about the American colonies in the British press, the Boston Tea Party would arouse previously-held prejudices against the colonists. News of the

Boston Tea Party “struck London like an incendiary bomb,” as unfavorable press coverage of the

American colonists had been provoked. “The newspapers roundly abused America daily,” following the incident.185 This led to an emergence of “the biggest frenzy and strongest anticolonial feeling in England” that one London observer named William Samuel Johnson “had ever seen.”186 Eventually, pro-American sentiments would rebuild after the issuance of the

Intolerable Acts and the Quebec Act. Public opinion would turn against Parliament once again, as ‘the late unpopular American acts [had] totally sunk the ministry in the esteem of all ranks.’187

For example, the London Chronicle had labeled the Quebec Act as ‘infamous and despotic,’ and that it had been the ‘boldest stride to despotism.’188 Furthermore, The London Packet noted that

184 Shy, Toward Lexington, 327. 185 Kammen, A Rope of Sand, 289. 186 Ibid., 289. 187 F.J. Hinkhouse, The Preliminaries of the American Revolution as seen in the English Press 1763-1775, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926), 171-172. 188 Ibid., 170. “A Growing Historical Wind” 61 the Quebec Act was ‘universally objected to’ as a bill.189 Bets had been put in place that the

Bostonian [Port] and Quebec Bills would ‘turn out the ministry’ and organizations such as the

Society of Supporters of the Bill of Rights sought to reveal the names of those who voted in favor of the bills.190 Overall, the sympathy towards the American colonists following the oppressive measures that Parliament issued throughout 1774 outweighed the criticisms that immediately followed the Boston Tea Party.

The time period from 1771 to1773 had witnessed relative mollification as the American colonies waited for reconciliatory policies to be issued by Parliament. It becomes evident that at the moment in which the Boston Massacre had occurred, most Bostonians were not seeking independence nor a war. As York notes, “what seems a logical procession now- from resistance to revolt to revolution- struck many Bostonians…as abhorrent then.” The propagandistic value of the event drove the push for “imperial reform” in the American colonies, not outright independence.191 York further argues that after the Boston Massacre trials, both sides were left placated, even if unsatisfied. The results “sparked no riots in Boston or retaliatory policies in

London.” On the other hand, this lack of retaliation from London did not equivalate to the reform and reconciliation that the colonists had sought to their many grievances before the tragedy.192

Boston personally had felt signaled out by Parliament from 1769 to 1770, as colonial policies were not as strictly enforced among the other American colonies throughout these two years. Despite Boston’s concerns, the appeasement of the other colonies led to the hope that ‘the contention between the two countries was finally closed.” Massachusetts continuously served as

189 Hinkhouse, The Preliminaries of the American Revolution, 171. 190 Ibid., 171. 191 Neil Longley York, “Rival Truths, Political Accommodation, and the Boston ‘Massacre,’” (Massachusetts Historical Review, 2009), 31. 192 Ibid., 2. “A Growing Historical Wind” 62 an exception, as it had been “the one colony that remained unreconciled to the new direction in colonial policy.” The placement of military troops in Boston during peacetime reinforced these ideas of unfair treatment.193 Once the troops departed after the Boston Massacre, Boston felt

“autonomous of British authority.” The colonists put “thoughts of separation” on hold throughout this placated period from 1771 to 1773. Britain resumed more aggressive policies after the Boston Tea Party, especially with the Intolerable Acts of 1774. From the time in which troops were stationed in Boston to the issuance of the Intolerable Acts, “the British government had done all it could to sharpen the difference between Boston and the rest of the colonies.”194

As a result, “the latent revolutionary fervor of Bostonians returned [after the Boston Tea Party], not to be dampened until independence was achieved.”195

It is important to elaborate Parliament’s particularity in its harsh response to events in

Boston when compared to other colonies, especially after the Boston Massacre. In 1772, Rhode

Islanders “had attacked and burned” a customs schooner. In doing so, the colonists had caused injury to its commander, an event that became known as the Gaspee incident. The act had been considered “outrageous” according to historian John Shy. The situation had come as close to

“open rebellion” as had other noteworthy events, mainly the Boston Tea Party the following year.196 Nevertheless, “the British response to the destruction of the Gaspee was curiously weak,” considering “no effective measures were taken” afterwards to restrain the Rhode

Islanders in any fashion comparable to the Intolerable Acts. British military officers who responded to the incident even had admitted that they believed no consequences would ensue, as

193 Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, 388-389. E-Book. 194 Shy, Toward Lexington, 399. 195 Richard Archer, As If an Enemy’s Country, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 546. E-Book. 196 Shy, Toward Lexington, 401. “A Growing Historical Wind” 63

“Boston was the heart of the problem,” not Rhode Island.197 The attention had been taken away from the other colonies, as Boston had become the focus of Parliament’s attentions on the opposite side of the Atlantic. The years between 1771 to 1773 may not have been entirely quiet for the rest of the colonies, as evidenced by the occurrence in Rhode Island. Since no miraculous outbreak of violence occurred in Boston particularly, however, Britain had not felt obligated to respond in a deliberate and conspicuous manner to the occurrences in other colonies.

On a further note, it is interesting that the Boston Massacre itself had been an exception to this pattern of severe retribution from Britain. The Stamp Act and Townsend Act riots had led to the placement of troops in Boston during the Fall of 1768. Furthermore, The Boston Tea Party in 1773 would be followed by the Intolerable Acts in 1774. The Boston Massacre, in which

British soldiers were antagonized and assaulted by the Bostonian mob, received no remarkable notice of retaliation. Perhaps the fear of another ornate debate from colonial agents such as

Pownall and Burke prevented the issuance of retaliatory policies. Justice for the soldiers in the legal trials that followed may have been enough to possibly subdue any thoughts for retaliation that Parliament held. Whatever the case may be, the Boston Massacre had received a different, more forgiving response from Britain’s government unlike any other violent occurrence in

Boston before or following the tragedy. Unfortunately for Parliament, the absence of retaliation did not equivalate to a satisfactory response in the minds of both the American colonists and the

British public.

British military officials believed that only Boston would present a true threat in the case of rebellion. It had become an understanding that ‘the real inability of the Americans to make

197 Shy, Toward Lexington, 402. “A Growing Historical Wind” 64 any effectual resistance,’ would prevent success from open rebellion among the entirety of the

American colonies. Boston could not fight a war on its own. This observation had been based on

“the assumption that Boston would remain isolated.” Once again, Boston stood at the center of

Parliament and the British Army’s attention, as “little else could be done until the rest of

America brought Boston to its senses.”198

Boston officially had earned a reputation as the “troublemakers” in the American colonies, which drove Bostonians to maintain a power struggle with London in the years before the American Revolution. Zobel noted the inevitability of surmounting tensions between the two regions. He argues that “the men in Boston, and London…had struggled blindly to control, for whatever purpose, a growing historical wind whose power and direction they could only feel.”199

York complements Zobel, as he similarly notes that this “odd mix of confrontation and avoidance” between the American colonists and Parliament only “exacerbated disputes” as “no true reconciliation had been achieved” following the Boston Massacre. The Annual Register offered its criticisms on this lack of reconciliation. The register commented that Parliament had held the “hope of profiting by [the colonies’] disunion” and thus would remain reliant on “the principle upon which American affairs were suffered hitherto to lie dormant.”200 It would only be a matter of time until violence broke out once more. By that point in time, reconciliation would no longer be as considerable an option as it had been throughout the aftermath of the Boston

Massacre.201

198 Shy, Toward Lexington, 410. 199 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 302-303. 200 Burke and Dodsley, The Annual Register, 91. 201 York, “Rival Truths,” 31. “A Growing Historical Wind” 65

On the other hand, one particular British official offered his own form of reconciliation to the American colonies prior to the outbreak of war. In his remembrance of the Boston Massacre during the early stages of the American Revolution, British General Thomas Gage used a definitive hesitancy when he had been placed at Boston in the Fall of 1774. He had been the same man who ordered military depositions to be taken after the Boston Massacre, although the process had already been underway. Gage is a unique figure to examine the effects of the Boston

Massacre in its influence throughout the months prior to Lexington and Concord. He had seen the Boston spirit following the Boston Massacre and the Boston Tea Party, which led Gage to decide “that Bostonians would fight rather than back down.”202 During the Fall of 1774, when

Gage worked in Boston to attempt an enforcement of the Intolerable Acts, he suggested privately that Hutchinson needed to “suspend the Acts” for the time being. Gage’s “sole aim seem[ed] to have become that of postponing conflict as long as possible.” Unfortunately, this private postscript from a personal letter would be revealed to William Knox, the undersecretary of state in the American Department of the British government. Knox would spill the contents of the letter, which tarnished Gage’s reputation among the King’s ministers. Gage’s suggestion both undermined the authority of Parliament and presented the Bostonians as worthy adversaries against the mighty British army.

In prior months, Gage had been confident that if Boston were to rebel, the British Army would be able to defeat the rebels easily. His opinion would soon change. After the last three of the Intolerable Acts were to be implemented in August of 1774, Gage experienced an intense resistance from the town of Boston in which his own person had been threatened by the end of the month. During this time, Gage wanted to avoid enforcement of the Intolerable Acts as well as

202 Shy, Toward Lexington, 411. “A Growing Historical Wind” 66 any sort of violent confrontation. Instead, Gage chose to quietly prepare himself and his army through fortification of the town. In his remembrance of the Boston Massacre, Gage took the necessary measures to prevent any sort of unfortunate incident between British soldiers and

Bostonians. He immediately adopted a “policy towards the townspeople of conciliation,” as “no repetition of the Massacre of 1770 would occur if he could help it.” This policy of conciliation, for example, included Gage’s order that soldiers must “apologize or make amends for misdemeanors” between themselves and the Bostonians. If the fault for any sort of accident had been equally shared between the soldier and the townsperson, Gage still “was reluctant to let [his soldiers] prosecute civilians.”203

With his use of a “conciliatory attitude,” Gage had lost respect among his army who had grown to disdain his hesitancy and carefulness. Similarly, after he sent the dispatches that advocated for suspension of the Intolerable Acts, Gage had discredited himself in the eyes of the

King’s ministers. In the end, the Boston Massacre had influenced General Thomas Gage’s policy of appeasement towards the Bostonians throughout the Fall and Winter of 1774, months before

Lexington and Concord. His hesitancy demonstrates the powerful effect of the Boston

Massacre’s legacy, as it altered British military presence prior to the war. General Gage lost respect among his superiors and his own army, but he did so due to his fear of reproducing what he had considered a devastating altercation. General Gage refused to feel the repercussions of his army’s behavior once again, and “by preventing any accidental outbreak of violence, [Gage] ensured that King George would make the decision” to declare war.204

203 Shy, Toward Lexington, 410-416. 204 Ibid., 410-416. “A Growing Historical Wind” 67

As the beginning of the American Revolution began to unfold, the Boston Massacre shaped the manner in which the colonists and royal officials responded to early acts of war. At first, the Boston Massacre blurred the timeline as to when war decidedly began. Historian

Brooke Barbier claims that “Neither side would have anticipated” that the standoff at Lexington and Concord “would lead to a war or even anyone being killed, as redcoats hadn’t shot any colonists dead since the Boston Massacre.”205 In the days that followed Lexington and Concord,

Joseph Warren and other rebels collected statements from those who witnessed the fighting.

Almost all of the witnesses had claimed that the British soldiers fired first upon the colonists.

One of the colonial military leaders, Captain John Parker of Lexington, stated that the British redcoats fired upon his men without any provocation. In the same sense of urgency that characterized the days following the Boston Massacre, the colonists wished to record and send statements to London before General Gage did the same for his soldiers. In her description of the reports, Brooke Barbier notes that “the rebels had known how it important it was to shape people’s interpretations of an event- recall Revere’s depiction of the Boston Massacre- and they wanted their message heard first.”206

The Boston Massacre had taught the American colonists an important lesson: respond promptly and persuasively to events that involved colonists and royal officials, especially when that news had a counterpart that was sent to London as well. Their efforts had been successful, as the British public reacted swiftly to express more than just sympathy for the American colonies after Lexington and Concord. The Middlesex Journal reported that ‘very large subscriptions are now commenced in the city for the use of Bostonians. Two patriotic Aldermen subscribed

205 Brooke Barbier, Boston in the American Revolution: A Town Versus an Empire, (Charleston: The History Press, 2017), 169. E-Book. 206 Ibid., 184. E-Book. “A Growing Historical Wind” 68 yesterday £50 each.’207 The Constitutional Society, an offshoot of the Society of Supporters of the Bill of Rights, voted to institute a subscription service to provide relief to the “widows, orphans, and parents” of those who were ‘inhumanely murdered by the King’s troops at or near

Lexington and Concord.’208 After Lexington and Concord, many supporters of Wilkes had argued that “if the colonists stood firm all would be well, but if they yielded, the liberties of both countries would be destroyed.”209 Once again, the influence of the press and the pressure of increasing liberal views swayed opinion to positively favor the colonial efforts. This public sympathy, combined with the verbal attacks against Parliament after the Intolerable Acts and

Quebec Act, had established a pattern of favorable public opinion to the American colonies.

Arguably, this favorable opinion originated as a result of the Boston Massacre. Prior to the

Boston Massacre, public opinion had seen the colonists as inferior to British citizens and wrongful in their rejections of the Stamp Act. As seen with the pronounced sentiments of support after the Boston Massacre, as well as after Lexington and Concord, it is clear that the Boston

Massacre had established a turning point in British public opinion. A system of support and empathy had emerged that would last well into the early stages of the Revolution.

This favorability for the American colonists among the British public following

Lexington and Concord is interesting to examine in conjunction with the Boston Massacre. The portrayal of the two events within the British media facilitates an understanding of these connections. When presented in the press, the description of Lexington and Concord bore close similarities to the manner in which the Boston Massacre had been discussed. The language usage and details were strongly familiar, as the similarities drove Neil Longley York to comment that

207 Hinkhouse, The Preliminaries of the American Revolution, 193. 208 Ibid., 193. 209 Ibid., 194. “A Growing Historical Wind” 69

“one could be forgiven for having a sense of déjà vu, both with the issues involved and press tactics used to try to win over public opinion.”210 An article from the Essex Gazette had been reprinted in London newspapers and magazines. This story claimed that British troops were responsible for ‘commencing hostilities,’ as it had been the British troops who were ‘shooting down the unarmed, the aged, and infirm,’ while ‘killing the wounded.’211 The piece was quite dramatic, which led to the realization that “the whole presentation bore the expert stamp of

Samuel Adams.” Adams pushed forward similar descriptions of the Boston Massacre five years ago.212

Samuel Adams had been the man to dub the Boston Massacre as the “Horrid Massacre,” and had served on the committee that drafted the letter to Thomas Pownall. This letter stated that the soldiers were ‘instruments in executing a settled plot to massacre the inhabitants.’213

Furthermore, following the trials of the soldiers, Samuel Adams took to the press under the pseudonym “Vindex” to express his displeasure at the verdict. Adams published in the Boston

Gazette, as he sought to display “his burning passion to convince the world that the soldiers had indeed attacked the mob.”214 Samuel Adams’ pattern for the manipulation of skirmishes had been well known, as he turned tragedies into intense, patriotic tales. In his vision to present the British soldiers as barbaric murderers, the British minsters held the belief that Lexington and Concord was simply another scheme in a “a series of Adams-organized riots.”215 Through an examination in regard to the influence of Samuel Adams’ manipulation of the Boston Massacre, it becomes clear that the propagandistic extortion of the tragedy that occurred in Boston distorted London

210 York, The Boston Massacre: A History with Documents, 332. E-Book. 211 Michael Pearson, Those Damned Rebels, (Da Capo Press, 1972), 157. E-Book. 212 Ibid., 157. 213 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 211. 214 Ibid., 299. 215 Pearson, Those Damned Rebels, 162. E-Book. “A Growing Historical Wind” 70 ministerial opinion of the early battles of the American Revolution. London ministers believed that the events occurring during the Summer of 1775 were simply continuations of Adams’ mischief to promote his rebellious agenda.

To exemplify Adams’ efforts, following the Boston Massacre, Samuel Adams had organized March 5 as an annual holiday to remember the Boston Massacre. July 4 would soon take the place of March 5 in the “holiday hierarchy.”216 On March 5, 1776, as the American

Revolution progressed, Peter Thatcher spoke of the Boston Massacre on its anniversary. In his commemoration, Thatcher remembered the night in which “the streets of Boston [had been] strewed with the corpses of five of its inhabitants, murdered in cool blood, by the British mercenaries.” He argued that it had become time to recognize a “Tragedy more striking” that has fallen upon the American people in the past year: the early battles of the American Revolution.

In his connections between the Boston Massacre and the early years of the Revolution, Thatcher sought to evoke feelings of “vengeance” and “indignant rage” for the loss of Bostonian

“ancestors.” In a final note, Thatcher suggested that Boston’s strength in the past few years, particularly during the Boston Massacre, has shown that “like the sturdy oak, you have stood unmoved, and to you, under God, will be owing the salvation of this extensive continent.” It is clear from Thatcher’s speech that in the arrival of the American Revolution, Bostonians held the losses from the Boston Massacre freshly in their consciousness.217 Thatcher’s speech was one of many, as orators spoke each year to celebrate the holiday. Within these speeches, “hackneyed arguments of English political folklore” were used consistently. Any version of the idea that “a standing army is a cancer in the body politic” had been reinforced annually to the American

216 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 301. 217 Peter Thatcher, “AN ORATION DELIVERED AT WATERTOWN, MARCH 5, 1776. TO COMMEMORATE THE BLOODY MASSACRE AT BOSTON: PERPETRATED MARCH 5, 1770,” 1776. “A Growing Historical Wind” 71 public. These arguments reveal a “new and sterner American attitude toward the British army.”

On that note, while the Boston Massacre had shaped British attitudes towards the American colonies, the converse is true as well.218

A further investigation can be made into the remembrance of the Boston Massacre throughout the American Revolution and its manipulation for political propaganda. In Scars of

Independence, Holger Hook discusses the violence that characterized the interactions between

British soldiers and American colonists throughout the Revolution. In doing so, Hook reveals reoccurring characteristics in the language used to describe these skirmishes. He does so to establish that the Boston Massacre had represented a forewarning of violence to come. Hook discusses the use of the word “massacre” to describe different moments of bloodshed throughout the American Revolution. For example, Hook references the title given to Baylor’s Massacre in

1778, in which a British regiment had pursued a surprise attack against American troops. There had been heavy losses among the Americans. Interestingly, Hook shares that Baylor’s Massacre also had been referred to as the “horrid Massacree [sic],” which is the exact phrasing used in A

Short Narrative to describe the Boston Massacre.219 Another surprise attack earned itself the title

“The Paoli Massacre,” which took place in 1777, while “The Cherry Valley Massacre” in New

York would occur the following year. Overall, after the Boston Massacre, Americans became privy to using the term “massacre” when experiencing unforeseen levels of severe violence from the British. At the same time, one must consider that these events took place during an active war and thus severe violence should have been expected. While these particular cases may have been noticeably gruesome when compared to other battles in the American Revolution, the term

218 Shy, Toward Lexington, 376. 219 Holger Hook, Scars of Independence, (New York: Crown Publishing, 2017), 536, E-Book. “A Growing Historical Wind” 72

“massacre” is used sparingly in other large-scale events during the Colonial Era. For example, there is limited used of the word “massacre” in the French and Indian War. The Massacre of Fort

William Henry is the most prevalent case of such an event in the French and Indian War; however, the incident is typically referred to as a “surrender” more commonly than a “massacre.”

Hook concludes that “the Boston Massacre shows us that violence cannot be separated from stories about violence.”220 The Boston Massacre had a lasting impact on the ways in which

Americans interpreted events of the Revolution, as they occasionally labelled violent acts of war using the same terminology found in the pamphlets and reports on the Boston Massacre. Their efforts produced the desired effect of rousing shock among both the Americans and the Britons.

There had been multiple attempts to raise patriotic notions that denounced the British

Army and Parliament for mistreating the American colonists on both sides of the Atlantic.

Overall, the colonists were deeply wounded in their relationship with Britain. After certain violent skirmishes were labelled as “massacres,” and Boston’s suffering had been defended, the thought of reconciliation had become more distant than the idea of independence. Furthermore, even if the colonists were approachable to the idea of swift reconciliation, it would not have mattered. Parliament would continuously express the inability to offer reconciliation to the

American colonies throughout the early years of the American Revolution. It is important to recognize, however, that there had been a few voices in Parliament that sought to make a change to the handling of colonial affairs. In the House of Lords, during a debate on Lord Chatham’s motion in early Summer of 1777, a group of Lords expressed that Parliament indeed had served

“as the aggressors” in this “unnatural war against the British colonies in America.”221 As Lord

220 Hook, Scars of Independence, 57. E-Book. 221 "News," from Morning Post, (2 June 1777), Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Burney Newspapers Collection, link. gale.com/apps/doc/Z2000933207/BBCN?u=loc_main&sid=BBCN&xid=dae6703b. Accessed 23 Feb. 2021. “A Growing Historical Wind” 73

Chatham had suggested, Parliament spent their time “cutting [their] own throats” in America. It was necessary to pursue a “speedy determination for peace at all events.” Lord Camden expressed similar sentiments to Lord Chatham, as he argued that the main object of the debate had been not to decide “who has been wrong, or who right, but to the means of getting in the most speedy manner out of this most unhappy quarrel.” At the same time, however, he also reminded the House of Lords that to say, “we have not been the aggressors, is a most erroneous account.”222 Of course, these Lords faced tremendous opposition. Lord Gower maintained that the Americans had been the aggressors this entire time, as “from the beginning [the colonists] had rejected the legislative authority in England.” Lord Lyttleton supported Lord Gower’s viewpoint, in which he believed that the “Government had acted with the utmost wisdom” and that the colonists “were determined long ago upon independency.”223 Seeing that the Declaration of Independence had been written the previous year, Lord Lyttleton held suspicions of the colonists’ loyalty prior to the Revolution. On the other hand, his perspective undermines the attempts for peace, such as the Olive Branch Petition, that preceded such drastic measures for separation.

Unfortunately, Lord Chatham’s attempts to withdraw troops from the colonies and offer reconciliation for colonial grievances throughout 1777 were unsuccessful. His motions would continuously fail in the House of Lords, as per usual of such motions.224 Once again, although

Lord Chatham and his supporters advocated for the urgency to address colonial affairs and bring an end to the violence, Parliament would persist in its judgement that the American colonies had been entitled troublemakers. Many of the Lords stood their ground in their belief that Parliament

222 “News” from Morning Post. 223 Ibid. 224 Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Walpole, National Archives, 11 December 1777. “A Growing Historical Wind” 74 had acted rightfully and intelligently in its management of colonial affairs. This naïve mindset guided Parliament in its successful ability to shut down any attempts from pro-American leaning politicians to challenge the accountability and authority of Parliament. During the Winter of

1777, Benjamin Franklin expressed his disappointment at the failure of Lord Chatham’s motion to withdraw troops from the American colonies. Franklin sorrowfully noted that “Every thing seems to be rejected by your mad Politicians that would lead to Healing the Breach; and every thing done that can tend to make it everlasting.”225

In his reflection on the Boston Massacre’s role during the road to revolution, John Adams famously claimed that on the night of March 5, 1770, ‘the foundation of American independence was laid.’226 With hindsight, it must have been easier for Adams to see the natural progression from this tragedy to the eventual outbreak of war. At the time the Boston Massacre had taken place, however, independence was not an objective nor vision for most American colonists.

Glimpses of symbolic separation emerged as the reliance on colonial agents decreased, but early skepticism did not amount to definitive separation. The period of placation that followed from

1771 to 1773 reinforces the argument that both the American colonists and the British did not see the Boston Massacre alone as a decisive climax in the instigation of the American Revolution.

Rather than a patriotic climax, the Boston Massacre served as a constant reminder as the steps towards revolution were interpreted, or perhaps misinterpreted. In remembrance of the Boston

Massacre, General Gage approached fortification in Boston with a policy of appeasement in order to avoid another Massacre of 1770. In remembrance of the Boston Massacre and Samuel

Adams’ tactics for propagandistic manipulation, British ministers downplayed the severity of

225 Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Walpole, National Archives, 11 December 1777. 226 Zobel, The Boston Massacre, 302. “A Growing Historical Wind” 75

Lexington and Concord. In remembrance of the Boston Massacre, American colonists labelled various battles throughout the American Revolution with the term “massacre.” The colonists knew the associations and impact that such loaded language would have on public opinion. In remembrance of the Boston Massacre and the Massacre of St. George’s Fields, Wilkite radicals continuously identified colonial grievances with their own. Consequentially, Wilkites encouraged public support for colonial efforts in the early stages of the American Revolution. In remembrance of the Boston Massacre, Thatcher claims that Boston was due for “vengeance” and that the town had earned a noteworthy reputation as being resilient. The Boston Massacre, on a literal level of military violence and colonial riot, may not have instigated the emergence of the

American Revolution on its own; however, when it served as a living memory, that is where the

Boston Massacre gained its true influence and power.

Conclusion

The Boston Massacre continues to be presented in public memory through museum exhibitions, library collections, and artwork. Interestingly, the National Library of Scotland hosted an exhibition on American Independence, in which one of the engravings found in A

Short Narrative was included. An article that discusses this exhibition is currently online. The description that follows the artwork is a compelling interpretation of how Scotland perceived the tragedy:

“Boston was a centre for protest against British rule and taxation. British troops were sent to maintain order but this caused greater resentment. During a protest on 5 March 1770, outnumbered British soldiers panicked and opened fire, killing five Americans in what became known as ‘the Boston Massacre.’”227

The diction choices of “outnumbered” and “panicked” imply a sense of confusion and evoke sympathy for the British soldiers. There are no descriptions or adjectives present to justify the feelings of the colonists that night, aside from the expression of colonial “resentment.” It is interesting that Scotland presents the Boston Massacre in such a light, especially when considering that the soldiers who fired upon the crowd at the Massacre of St. George’s Fields were Scottish soldiers. Perhaps, sympathies for military authorities remain in their own public memory. It is reasonable to expect current public memory to reflect such ties, as connections to the Massacre of St. George’s Fields continue to be seen within current remembrances of the

Boston Massacre. For example, at The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, there is a collection of artwork and pamphlets, which is titled “Massacre in St. George's Fields and Boston etc. [eleven political pamphlets].” This collection includes historical pieces from both events in a singular group, such as “England's Warning Piece;… A Sermon Occasioned by the Untimely

Death of Mr. William Allen…,” as well as A Short Narrative. This curatorial choice exemplifies

227 “The Boston Massacre,” National Library of Scotland, (2012). Conclusion 77 that the Britons and the American colonists had recognized the close proximity of the two events and cross-referenced one another throughout the production of political pamphlets and artwork.228

The British Library published an article that includes a group of collection items titled

“The Pamphlet War and the Boston Massacre.” The article evaluates the intent behind the production of pamphlets and almanacs following the Stamp Act Crisis, including those that discuss the Boston Massacre. The library article notes that the “harassed British troops guarding the Boston Custom House fired a volley into crowd that had gathered. Five men died.”229 It is interesting that in a similar manner as the National Library of Scotland, the British Library provides an adjective to immediately evoke sympathy for the soldiers. In this case, the word was

“harassed.” On a separate note, the article attributes purpose for the soldiers, as they were

“guarding the Boston Custom House.” Conversely, the colonists were just a “crowd that had gathered.” This description implies that the British soldiers had carried out a rightful task in their defense of the Custom House and the colonists were just there to “harass” them. This perspective limits the potential for a fuller understanding of the colonists’ grievances and concerns.

While it is true that the soldiers were aggravated by the Bostonian mob, American museums typically attribute a higher level of importance to the consequences of the soldiers’ firing. Last Fall, the Smithsonian Associates Streaming hosted an online Zoom programing event on the Boston Massacre. In the announcement for this presentation, the following description is provided on their website:

228 “Massacre in St. George's Fields and Boston etc. [eleven political pamphlets]1768–70,” The Metropolitan Museum of Art of New York City. 229 “The Pamphlet War and the Boston Massacre,” The British Library. Conclusion 78

“The humiliated apprentice called in reinforcements and soon the sentry was being pelted by stones and snowballs thrown by the 100 townspeople now surrounding him. Then a squad of burly Redcoat guardsmen arrived, and in the chaos someone yelled “Fire!”. Shots rang out. When the smoke from the soldiers’ muskets cleared, five local men lay dead and dying on the snowbound street.”230

While this description includes that the sentry had been threatened by the Bostonian crowd, the following sentence immediately describes the rest of the British soldiers as “burly,” contrasting the previous descriptions of “outnumbered” and “panicked.” Furthermore, the other descriptions from the United Kingdom simply mention that people had died. The Smithsonian description recognizes that they “lay dead and dying on the snowbound street,” which produces romantic imagery of coldness and loss. In addition, the description from the United States is both lengthier and more detailed, which reveals a higher level of commitment to provide a thorough understanding of the event. Overall, the differences between the two regions’ descriptions highlight that those in the United Kingdom hold a different memory of the Boston Massacre than their American counterparts. The United Kingdom has been more likely to use adjectives that express empathy for British soldiers and to include less sorrowful remembrances of the

Bostonian civilians who were killed that fateful evening.

The Boston Massacre continues to serve as a topic of interest on both sides of the

Atlantic, as evidenced by these recent collections and programs. In just the past year, two books that cover the events of the Boston Massacre have been released: Serena Zabin’s The Boston

Massacre: A Family History as well as Dan Abrams and David Fisher’s John Adams Under Fire.

Most literature on the Boston Massacre has sought both to establish the true rendition of events from March 5, 1770 and to provide an evaluation of the grievances that led to the famous

230 “"Fire!": The Real History of the Boston Massacre,” The Smithsonian Associates Streaming, (2020).

Conclusion 79 outburst of violence on that evening. For the most part, this literature has interpreted the Boston

Massacre from a predominantly colonial outlook.

Occasionally, the historiography does include reference to the British outlook of the

American colonies. Usually, these sources reference the “Friends of America,” many of which were colonial agents such as Pownall and Burke. Even so, the literature from this British perspective fails to thoroughly evaluate reactions and responses to the Boston Massacre explicitly. For example, H.T. Dickinson’s The Failure of Conciliation: Britain and the American

Colonies 1763-1783 discusses the efforts made by Burke and Pownall to support the American colonies in Parliament. In his scholarly article, there is no mention of the motions put forward for debate on Parliament’s role in increasing tensions prior to the Boston Massacre. The current literature that references these pro-American leaning politicians tends to focus on the various taxation acts, such as the Stamp Act, as well as the Coercive Acts that followed the Boston Tea

Party.231 My thesis has sought to expand this literature to include the role of the Boston Massacre in the discussion of Parliament’s mismanagement of colonial affairs during the years prior to the

American Revolution.

There has been a limited focus on the Boston Massacre from the British perspective, which I have aimed to expand and evaluate. The objective of this thesis has been to prove that

Parliament purposefully silenced liberal, pro-American leaning politicians who sought to hold

Parliament accountable for its mismanagement of colonial affairs. The Boston Massacre served as a microcosm to examine this pattern of both intentional neglect and general ignorance regarding colonial affairs. The colonists held London’s public opinion as a vital component in

231 H.T. Dickinson, “The Failure of Conciliation: Britain and the American Colonies 1763-1783,” (The Kyoto Economic Review, 2010).

Conclusion 80 forging the Parliamentary response to the tragedy. Unfortunately, the colonists were disillusioned when they held such optimism, as they would be left disappointed in the rejection of the motions issued by Pownall and Burke.

Furthermore, this thesis has sought to examine the effectiveness of the communication networks between the colonies and England. The role of colonial agents had been to facilitate these communication networks, which served as a crucial component in the transfer of news to both the British public and Parliament. I have focused on these agents to prove that the American colonists relied heavily on colonial agents to represent their interests on the other side of the

Atlantic until 1770. The colonies’ reliance on these agents began to deteriorate as they formed their own intercolonial correspondence networks. The colonists had spent years frustrated and disappointed with the lack of an adequate response from Parliament to the growing number of colonial grievances.

Moreover, an examination into the language usage in media descriptions after the Boston

Massacre shows that this specific tragedy served as a turning point in British views of the

American colonies. The connections between the Boston Massacre and the Massacre of St.

George’s Fields emphasize the relatability and empathy that emerged as a result of the similarities seen between the two events. In addition, the British public’s frustration with its own

Parliament lessened the expression of previously held prejudices that viewed the American colonists as selfish and entitled. Magazines and newspapers reported that the majority of the

British public favored the side of the American colonists after the Boston Massacre. This popularity translated into increased political advocacy for the American colonies, as Wilkite radicalism spread across London. Considering the timeline of this advocacy and the similarities between the two tragedies, the connections between the Massacre of St. George’s Fields and the Conclusion 81

Boston Massacre likely served as an underlying factor to encourage the spread of Wilkite radicalism.

At the same time, an exploration of the word “massacre” has revealed that although the

British public began to express a newfound sympathy towards the American colonies, the Boston

Massacre did not stand as equal in severity when compared to the Massacre of St. George’s

Fields. The variability in the description of the two events reveal this disparity in the British public media. Furthermore, I argue that although the Boston Tea Party led to a temporary reinstatement of prejudice and anti-colonial sentiment in British news coverage, the contempt for the Intolerable Acts and Quebec Acts outweighed initial public concerns. As the progression towards American Independence continued, news coverage of the bloodshed at Lexington and

Concord was oftentimes favorable to the American colonists. Media sources and political societies issued notices of subscriptions that aimed to provide aid to those who lost loved ones at

Lexington and Concord. Overall, this change in public opinion can be traced back to the Boston

Massacre specifically, as prior to the Boston Massacre, many Londoners held the American colonists in low esteem. As a result, the Boston Massacre’s legacy had created sympathy for the

American colonies, which established a lasting impact on public opinion. This favorable public opinion increased outward expression of support for the colonies during the early stages of the

American Revolution.

Finally, to address the political climate that ensued after the Boston Massacre, it is vital to emphasize that there had been a period of relative uneventfulness until the Boston Tea Party.

This period ensued from Parliament’s lack of reconciliation or, conversely, retaliation to the

Boston Massacre. The timeline to the American Revolution remained in a temporary limbo. This period allowed for tensions to deescalate, even if the causes of such tensions remained Conclusion 82 unresolved. When Parliament pursued a path that focused on the “politics of avoidance,” they entered an irresponsive state that failed to offer any sort of reconciliation to the American colonies. As a result, Parliament’s strategy of evasion would only have short-term success in the appeasement of the American colonies. If reconciliation had been achieved during this period of limbo, perhaps later colonial grievances would not have culminated into riots and protests such as the Boston Tea Party. The specificity of British retaliation to the Boston Tea Party, when compared to reactions towards incidents in other colonies, signifies a pattern in which Boston had been signaled out as the “troublemakers.” While other events consumed the focus of

Parliament, such as the conflicts between Spain and France, the British government and consequentially the British press had paid less attention to the American colonies. This had been true despite the occurrence of violent events in other colonies, as seen with Rhode Island. In comparison, Boston had experienced relatively uneventful years. Since this specific colony had become the main attention of Parliament in the observance of colonial affairs, the colonies as a whole received less attention during this time. Essentially, many historians have viewed this time period between 1771 to 1773 as a missed opportunity for Britain to reconcile colonial grievances before the outbreak of violence in 1775.

The Boston Massacre has proven to be an exciting and intriguing moment in American

History, as books and exhibitions continue to recreate and analyze the narrative that guided the events of March 5, 1770. On the other hand, this thesis has sought to demonstrate that this tragedy was not solely a decisive moment in American History. The Boston Massacre was also an important moment in British History and Atlantic History. There is more to the Boston

Massacre than the dominant narrative which focuses on the colonial outlook. The emergence of overlooked perspectives, approaches, and political standpoints help us to continuously “define, Conclusion 83 over and over again,” the meaning of this famous event.232 While the patriotic standpoint has earned extensive representation in the literature on the Boston Massacre, my thesis has sought to reinvent the story of the Boston Massacre from a perspective that has gone undervalued for quite some time. There has always been the “potential to see something else entirely in the Boston

Massacre” that has not been seen before. Something that goes beyond the attempts to make sense of the inconsistent colonial testimonies of the British soldiers’ firing. Something that goes beyond examinations of the accuracy in Paul Revere’s engraving and its role in political propaganda. Something that “lay just beneath the surface.”233 While some scholars may maintain that the Boston Massacre had been only a “minor topic of the day” in Britain, this thesis has sought to invalidate such a notion, as the Boston Massacre was something more than a fleeting infatuation.234 The Boston Massacre would decisively alter the triangular relationships between the colonists and Parliament, the British public and Parliament, as well as the British public and the colonists. An eye-opening perspective from a lens of British political and public opinion has been provided in order to balance the narrative of the Boston Massacre. This narrative continues to be re-invented and continuously explored through new viewpoints, so I will not be the last to attempt such a feat. After all, “as a symbol, the Boston Massacre refuses to resolve itself,” and we can continue to hope that it never will.235

232 Eric Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2017), 428. E- Book. 233 Ibid., 427-428. 234 F.J. Hinkhouse, The Preliminaries of the American Revolution as seen in the English Press 1763-1775, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926), 150-151. 235 Hinderaker, Boston’s Massacre, 428. E-Book. Bibliography

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Exhibits and Collections

“"Fire!": The Real History of the Boston Massacre.” The Smithsonian Associates Streaming. 2020. https://smithsonianassociates.org/ticketing/tickets/fire-real-history-of-boston- massacre

“Massacre in St. George's Fields and Boston etc. [eleven political pamphlets]1768–70.” The Metropolitan Museum of Art of New York City. https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/346486?searchFields=All&sortB y=Relevance&ft=William+Bingley&offset=0&rpp=20&pos=5

“The Boston Massacre.” National Library of Scotland. 2012. https://www.nls.uk/exhibitions/treasures/american-independence/boston-massacre

“The Pamphlet War and the Boston Massacre,” The British Library. https://www.bl.uk/the- american-revolution/articles/the-pamphlet-war-and-the-boston-massacre