Party System Change in Québec: Evidence from Recent

James P. Allan Wittenberg University

Richard Vengroff University of Connecticut

Dr. James P. Allan, Department of Political Science, Wittenberg University, 200 W Ward St, Springfield, Ohio, United States, 45501 [email protected]

Dr. Richard Vengroff, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut Storrs, Connecticut, United States 06269 [email protected]

Abstract Since the 1990s, provincial elections in Québec have signaled an incremental change in Québec’s party system. These changes are manifested in increasing voter dealignment and volatility in party support. In this article we find that these trends largely continued in both the of 2012, which produced a minority government and in the 2014 election that resulted in a majority government. Taking a longer-term perspective, we examine changes in public opinion, party identification, electoral volatility, and behavior in Québec Provincial elections since 1998. The implications for future government formation and the potential impact on policy are examined.

produced minority and majority Prior to 2012, the past five governments respectively. National Assembly elections in Québec had Belanger and Stephenson (2007, 8- signaled a progressive incremental change in 9) argue that partisanship in Canadian Québec’s party system (Vengroff and Fisher federal parties is associated with three key 1995; Allan, O’Reilly and Vengroff 2001; variables: “stability, intensity and loyalty.” Allan and Vengroff 2004, 2008, 2009). We believe these factors are at play in the These changes, manifested in increasing provincial parties in Québec as well. We voter dealignment and volatility in party argue that recent elections provide evidence support (Belanger and Nadeau 2009), that voter attachments to two of the three appeared to reach a pinnacle in the major parties—the Parti Liberal du Québec provincial elections of 2008 which resulted (PLQ) and the Parti Québécois (PQ)— in a return to majority government in significantly weakened over this period Québec after the first minority government (Allan and Vengroff 2009). Furthermore, in a century. This article expands the although voter support for the Action analysis of the dealignment processes to the Démocratique du Québec (ADQ) increased 2012 and 2014 provincial elections, which dramatically over this period, voters’ sense

Southern Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 6, 1 (April 2015) 2 of attachment to the party remained percentage terms. We would also expect that relatively weak. As we saw, this weak a recently formed party like the CAQ (like attachment contributed to a major loss of its predecessor the ADQ) and even the tiny votes and seats in 2008, which propelled the Green and QS parties would be beneficiaries ADQ from the “Loyal Opposition” to the of voter dealignment. status of an unofficial parliamentary party that would be absorbed by François The rest of this article proceeds as Legault’s Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) follows. We begin with a brief discussion of in the months leading up to the 2012 the 2012 and 2014 elections, focusing on election. While the CAQ enjoyed notable major developments in the party system success in its first , it failed since the previous elections, key aspects of to maintain its momentum with voters in the campaigns, and the election results 2014.1 themselves using both global and riding- level analyses. Then, to place these recent In American parlance, over the elections in a broader context and to test our years we expect a growing number of hypotheses about voter dealignment in individual voters to have moved from strong Québec, the paper then turns to a longer- to weak party identifiers, to third parties and term perspective, examining aggregate even to truly dealigned independents. This trends in electoral participation, support for condition of declining partisanship has, and major (and minor) parties, and electoral we expect will continue to contribute to volatility since the 1990s.2 We conclude by change in the party system in Québec. discussing the implications of these trends Reflecting the major cleavages and for the future of the party system in Québec. combination of cleavages in Québec society, the linguistic divide, the modest ideological The Québec Party System since divide (social democratic vs. “liberal”) and 2008 the sovereignist-federalist division, the traditional main parties face a growing Following the indecisive election of challenge to their hegemony. As the two 2007, which produced the first minority major parties lose voter loyalty and electoral government in Québec in living memory, support, we expect to see parties like the the 2008 election saw, in some respects at ADQ and subsequently the CAQ filling the least, a return to “normalcy” in Québec void, tentatively capturing the more fiscally politics. Using the onset of the global conservative part of the Francophone vote. financial crisis as a justification for the need We also expect an increase in the for a majority government, Jean Charest willingness of voters to support or at least sought, and received, a majority mandate vote strategically for new but less during the December election. The PQ also competitive parties such as the Greens and recovered from its disastrous 2007 Québec Solidaire (QS). This may also result performance: while unable to secure a in a decline in turnout. victory, the new PQ leader, Pauline Marois, led her party back to the status of the If we are indeed looking at a Official Opposition in the National situation of weakening partisanship and Assembly. For the ADQ, meanwhile, the transitions in that partisanship, what should election provided a blow from which the we expect to see in the aggregate data from party was never to recover. Having been 2012 and 2014? We hypothesize that thrust into Official Opposition status support for the two major parties would following the election of 41 MNAs in continue to decline in both real and 2007—many of whom were considered ill-

1 Even though the CAQ vote total declined, it still 2 Data limitations mean that individual–level analysis managed to win a few more seats. of voting behavior is beyond the scope of this article.

Southern Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 6, 1 (April 2015) 3 equipped to deal with the new demands 2009 to early 2010 according to Leger placed on the legislative caucus—the ADQ Marketing opinion polls, reached a low suffered as its more neoliberal message was point in late 2011, and was never to return to treated with greater skepticism as the those earlier highs for the 2012 and 2014 financial crisis took hold. The election elections. would leave it with only seven representatives. The main beneficiaries of the declines were some smaller parties—Québec In other ways, however, the election Solidaire on the sovereignist left in was notable. Turnout fell to just over 57%, a particular, and, in what was ultimately its low in the post-Quiet Revolution era. And, final flourish, the ADQ on the right. While as we noted previously (Allan and Vengroff the ADQ support climbed to over 15% once 2009), the collapse in the ADQ vote, more in the middle of 2011, by the end of according to Bélanger and Nadeau (2009, the year the party had all but ceased to exist. 104-106) translated into minor vote gains for In its place, Coalition Avenir Québec made the two larger parties. It also appeared that an immediate impact, initially eclipsing the many former Adequistes simply stayed at two major parties in Leger’s polls just as the home. The dealigning trends from previous ADQ had done previously. While its support elections appeared to be ongoing. fell somewhat during the latter part of 2012, it maintained a solid level of support that set The decline of the ADQ left some it apart from the other less-established vacant space on the ideological spectrum for parties. Interestingly, as the QS established a a new , Coalition Avenir foothold in the polls, another small left-of- Québec, led by former PQ cabinet minister center party, the Greens (PVQ, a party François Legault. Similar to its immediate which profited from strategic voting in some predecessor in its broad ideological solidly Liberal Anglophone ridings) faded as outlook—though less socially conservative the election approached. than the ADQ—the party also favored a moratorium on any sovereignty In the years between the 2008 and for a decade. The CAQ formally merged 2012 elections, then, while the Québec with (some would say absorbed) the rump electorate behaved in a manner that ADQ at the beginning of 2012, with the suggested a possible return to dominance by remaining Adequiste MNAs becoming CAQ the two largest parties, it should not be members instead. interpreted as the Québec party system returning to a period of equilibrium. In the spring of 2012, further signs of discontent Opinion Poll Trends, 2008-2014 were apparent as thousands of university students took to the streets to protest the Public opinion polling during this Liberal government’s plans to sharply period appeared to continue to confirm the increase tuition rates in the province. It was general trend of declining support for the against this backdrop that Charest requested major parties that had been apparent in dissolution of the National Assembly in previous elections. As Figure One shows, early August and called for an election to be support for the PQ and PLQ peaked in late held on September 4.

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Figure One: Opinion Polls Between 2008 and 2012 Elections (Leger Marketing)

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Feb-09 Jun-09 Oct-09 Feb-10 Jun-10 Oct-10 Feb-11 Jun-11 Oct-11 Feb-12 Jun-12

PLQ PQ ADQ Others PQS PVQ CAQ PON

The 2012 Campaign “reasonable accommodation” had become more vocal in recent years, under Marois the The decision to seek an early PQ sought to make national identity a core election was viewed as a risky move on element of its campaign. Thus, the PQ Charest’s part, especially since the PLQ proposed a charter that would restrict the rarely led in the polls during 2012. The public display of religious symbols, give student protests, and the government’s rather greater prominence to the French language heavy-handed response to them, further when it came to admitting new immigrants, eroded support for the government. During and extend Bill 101 to cover CEGEPs and the courses of the five-week campaign, the small-businesses. The party also proposed “usual suspects” were prominent issues: creating a category of Québec citizenship taxes, economic development, and social that would be available to residents, and services were brought to the fore, and the prospective residents who could speak PQ promised to reverse the PLQ’s tuition French (Montreal Gazette, 9/3/12). increases if elected. As in every Québec election, sovereignty was the 800-pound As Figure Two shows, during the gorilla in the room. However, the campaign election campaign itself, the Pequistes led in was notable, perhaps, in that Legault tried to the polls for most of the time. More notably, take the issue off the table by calling for a Legault’s CAQ regularly received the decade-long moratorium on a sovereignty support of more than one in four of the . Naturally, the PQ demurred, electorate during the campaign, and in and promised a referendum once it believed several polls ran second only to the PQ.3 a victory was possible. The Liberals tried, While most observers expected a PQ victory unsuccessfully, to draw the PQ out on the then, the only question was whether the issue. party could secure a majority government. Another major concern that came to the fore during the campaign related to 3 To emphasize the extent to which CAQ was identity politics. While debates over dominated by its leader, during the campaign the official party name registered with the DGEQ included the phrase “L’équipe François Legault.”

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Figure Two: 2012 Campaign Polling (Leger, CROP, Forum Research)

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

PLQ PQ CAQ QS ON GPQ Other

2012 and 2014 Election Results For the Coalition Avenir Québec, on the other hand, the results were far more In the end, the Parti Québécois encouraging. The new party won over 27% of achieved its victory, but Marois’ party failed the vote, placing them only about four to win enough seats to secure an overall percentage points behind the two major majority in the National Assembly. The parties in terms of overall vote share. election results are shown in Table One. Moreover, this represented a gain of almost Although the PQ was able to secure an eleven percentage points when compared to additional three seats compared to its 2008 the performance of the ADQ in 2008, total, its share of the vote actually declined resulting in an extra 12 seats within the by over three percentage points, and its total legislature. Finally, the election also of 54 seats left it well short of a majority. produced gains for Québec Solidaire, which While these results may have been saw it double its representation (albeit from disappointing to Pequistes, Liberals had even one to two seats) with over six percent of the more reason to be dissatisfied with the vote in the province. results. The PLQ saw its share of the vote decline by over ten percentage points, Once again, therefore, the election resulting in the loss of sixteen seats, produced a result that was far from decisive, including the Sherbrooke riding of Premier where it was not entirely clear which party Jean Charest. Despite this decline, however, could claim the most satisfaction from its it is worth noting from Table One that the performance: the PQ won without securing a electoral difference between the two parties majority, the PLQ perhaps did better than in the entire province remained quite small— expected despite its losses, and Legault’s only around 33,000 votes separated them, and CAQ performed credibly while falling short the difference in vote share was less than one of the levels of support that greeted its arrival percent. on the political scene in Québec. Within two years, however the province went to the polls again. This time around, the campaign came to be dominated by two issues: the Charte de

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Table One: 2012 Québec General Election Result Party Votes Votes (%) Change since Seats Seat change 2008 Parti 1,393,703 31.95 -3.22 54 3 Québécois Parti liberal 1,360,968 31.20 -10.88 50 -16 du Québec Coalition 1,180,235 27.05 10.68 19 12 Avenir Québec* Québec 263,111 6.03 2.25 2 1 solidaire Option 82,539 1.89 na 0 0 nationale Parti vert du 43,394 0.99 -1.18 0 0 Québec Others 0.89 0 0 Total 100.00 125 * CAQ performance compared to ADQ in 2008 la laïcité, and Québec’s sovereignty. Furthermore, the Liberal Party had, while in power, developed and required the “Cultural affinity” arguments, often dissemination of a statement of “Québec labeled “reasonable accommodation,” in values,” which all actual and potential Québec, Canada, and in many Western immigrants were required to sign. European countries, pushed governments to take action to address growing citizen The PQ leadership did not think the malaise. It rose to immediate salience among Liberals went far enough. In the 2012 the Canadian public in 2007 when the campaign, party leader Pauline Marois somewhat isolated and un-diverse Québec proposed a Charter of Secularism. The municipality of Hérouxville targeted what its Charter, among other things would have leaders erroneously believed to be Muslim made it illegal for government officials to practices. The public outcry, both positive wear religious symbols while on the job. The and negative, resulted in the setting up of a debate got even more heated when the Québec provincial commission (the Taylor- discussion turned to making sure that new Bouchard Commission) to study the issues immigrants were prepared to adopt and/or and make recommendations regarding adapt to Francophone Québec language and multiculturalism. culture. Marois further proposed creating a distinct Québec citizenship that would apply The Liberal Government in Québec to all current residents but limit access to City responded by promulgating Bill 94 in future immigrants to those who speak French 2010. The bill required women to show their and know about the history, culture and faces in order to receive government services. values of Québec. As a minority government Although the issue was quite controversial, the PQ, elected in 2012 was unable to and regarded by many as anti-Muslim, it hit a subsequently gain enough support to pass the responsive chord and received broad support charter in the National Assembly. across both Québec and Canada.

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In 2013 with the buildup to the independence and the prospects for a third release by the PQ of the details of the referendum in the event of a PQ victory. proposed charter in the National Assembly, Normally, the PQ tries to soft-pedal public support for it rose to 66% (CBC News, sovereignty during election campaigns in 9/10/13). The Charter seemed like a sure order not to scare away uncommitted voters winning issue for them as they prepared for and the so-called soft sovereigntists. Instead the next election campaign. Marois and the they found themselves painted by the PQ were convinced that they could use the opposition with a broad sovereignist brush. Charter to make a strong case for a majority government. However, as the details were The Liberals seized on the Péladeau released and reports of negative incidents position and rapidly transformed the mounted and were widely reported, debate on campaign into one that put the PQ on the the Charter heated up. By January of 2014, defensive. Support for sovereignty remained public support for the Charter had dropped to flat at about 40%, with only one in five 48% (Kelly 2014). Regardless, the PQ Québécois wanting it to be an important issue seemed poised to win a majority of seats in in the campaign. Even among Francophones, the April election. less than a third (31%) felt that a PQ victory would or should be a mandate to hold another The Party leadership hoped to contest referendum on sovereignty. Yet this more the election based on the Charter, the than anything else dominated the campaign. economy and past and pending corruption The PLQ called into question not only the charges against the Liberals. An important issue but also the honesty and integrity of the point that Marois failed to see was that the PQ. Tactically Marois found herself trapped salience of the Charter as an election issue into promoting both a low-salience policy, was relatively low. Polls during the election the Charter, and defending the relatively campaign showed that nearly two thirds of unpopular issue of sovereignty. Their efforts voters (63%) wanted to hear less about the to address the economy, the top issue for Charter while huge majorities expressed most Québécois, took backstage causing the interest in hearing more about policies Party to lose its edge. affecting the economy and job creation (85%), health (84%), public finance (77%) This is where electoral volatility and and education (73%) (Leger Research voter identity come into play. “Soft Intelligence Group 2014). Contrary to high sovereigntists” and francophone federalists PQ expectations, the best that could be said found a welcoming home in the CAQ. about the proposed Charter’s influence on the Historically, supporters of third parties like election was that it did not seem to the CAQ are more likely to vote strategically significantly hurt the PQ among francophone when under the pressure of a close election. voters. This was especially the case as the Québec election seemed to be a dead heat in the polls The PQ hoped to respond to the as election day approached. Empirically, this economic concerns by bringing in a big gun, is what seemed to happen in March and early billionaire Québecor CEO, Pierre Karl April of 2014. Second preferences of third Péladau. During a major press conference party voters and their willingness to migrate Marois hoped to use this star candidate to between parties became quite significant. underline the Party’s commitment to business Among CAQ voters 43% listed the Liberals and economic growth. However, instead of as their second choice and only 17% selected emphasizing his perceived strength on the the PQ in that role. As can be seen in Figure economy, Péladau touted his strong support Three there is a direct and strong negative for sovereignty for Québec. His public correlation between the decline of support for appearances derailed Marois’ efforts. Instead, the CAQ and increased support for the the topic on everyone’s mind became Liberals until the last days of the campaign

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Figure Three: Polls During 2014 Campaign (Leger)

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

PLQ PQ CAQ Greens QS ON Other

when it seemed to recover somewhat. Explaining Party System Fluidity

Hence, the combination of a volatile One factor potentially influencing electorate, the commitment of the PQ to a the party system in Québec is the low salience issue (the Secularism Charter), institutional structure, the . the distractions of having to address the Over the years scholars and pundits alike sovereignty issue, the poor economic record have noted the distortions in the election and inability to manage public finances and results in Québec produced by the single- the resulting inability of Marois to maintain member, simple plurality electoral system. a focus on the economy, led the PQ from an Although like many other provinces Québec apparent victory in January to, as Table Two has been engaged in a serious analysis and shows, a crushing defeat in April. The potential reformulation of its electoral Liberals, on the other hand, were able to put system any such change remains highly the PQ on the defensive while emphasizing unlikely given the interests of the major their own commitment to the economy. If parties in maintaining the status quo. The party ID among Québec voters was more Least Squares Index of Disproportionality stable, especially among third party, index gives us a good indicator of the especially CAQ voters, an ongoing series of relative distortion (vote – seat disparity) in minority governments alternatively led by an election. These data are shown in Figure the PQ and the PLQ would be the likely Four for recent elections in Québec. The outcome. Instead, existing voter higher the figure the greater the dealignment, volatility and strategic voting disproportionality and the more favourable helped produce a largely unanticipated the system to the larger, more established majority Liberal government. parties. The high levels of disproportionality in elections prior to 2007 were consistent with the level of disproportionality generally found in single member district (SMD)

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Table Two: 2014 Québec General Election Result

Party Votes Votes (%) Change Seats Seat change since 2008 Parti liberal 1,757,071 41.52 10.32 70 21 du Québec Parti 1,074,120 25.38 -6.57 30 -24 Québécois Coalition 975,607 23.05 -4.00 22 +4 Avenir Québec* Québec 323,124 7.63 1.60 3 1 solidaire Option 30,697 0.73 -1.16 0 0 nationale Parti vert du 23,163 0.55 -0.44 0 0 Québec Others 1.14 0 0 Total 100.00 125

systems. However, the comparable figure The vote/seat distortions returned to for 2007 was only 5.5, a figure more higher levels in the 2008 election, rising to consistent with the results in proportional 11.9, much to the benefit of the two representation (PR) systems, systems less traditionally largest parties, the PLQ and the favourable to the largest parties. PQ. In the 2012 election, levels of In fact, the 2007 election produced disproportionality conformed to the earlier the most proportional results in many years. levels, again to the benefit of the two larger The Liberals won 33% of the vote and 38% parties. The impact of the electoral system of the seats. For the ADQ, which until then was most keenly felt by the CAQ, which greatly suffered the distortions of the SMD won less than two-fifths of the seats won by system, the results were for the first time the second-placed PLQ, despite having a relatively equitable as they received 30.8% vote share difference province wide of only of the vote and 32.8% of the seats. For the about four percentage points. If anything, PQ, which finished third and is usually the therefore, the disproportionality inherent in beneficiary of vote seat distortions, the the electoral system acted as a brake on the results were likewise very equitable with the impact of the influences of dealignment party receiving 28.3% of the vote and 28.8% among the electorate. Nevertheless, the of the seats. Québec Solidaire and the Green electoral system’s distorting effects was not party with 3.65% and 3.89% of the vote enough to prevent another minority respectively were shut out. The greater government. The 2014 election produced a competitiveness and vote/seat equity in the disproportionality score of 11.6, with the system clearly contributed to the problem of difference between the Liberals’ vote share producing a majority government. and seat share amounting to over fourteen percentage points. This time around,

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Figure Four: Disproportionality (Gallagher’s Least Squares Index)

20

16

12

8

4

0 1998 2003 2007 2008 2012 2014

however, the PQ’s discrepancy was smaller, the PLQ’s dominance was such that it won but once again it was the smaller parties— 70 seats and finished second in a further 30 primarily CAQ and QS—that were hurt by constituencies, while the PQ was its primary the SMSP electoral system. CAQ, despite challenger in the majority of cases. While it winning more than nine votes for every ten was unable to match its 2012 vote share, the PQ won, ended up with less than 75% of CAQ still managed to break the PLQ/PQ the PQ’s seat share. duopoly in 54 seats.

More evidence of how the SMSP The 2012 and 2014 elections, then, electoral system distorted the electorate’s produced results that suggested voter preferences can be seen by looking at the loyalties are not as strong as they once were. relative placing of each party—especially In the first election no party was able to the CAQ—in each constituency. Table secure a legislative majority, one party Three shows the winning and runner-up secured over a quarter of the vote in its first parties in each of the 125 election contests in electoral outing, and the former incumbent 2012. In addition to its nineteen victories, party saw a sharp decline in its support. Yet CAQ finished second in a record 53 the second election saw a return to majority contests, more than either of the two larger government, with the PLQ recovering its parties. In many districts, therefore, CAQ lost ground at the expense of the PQ and was either the winner or the main opposition CAQ. It would appear that voters are party, but of course in a first-past-the-post behaving in a manner that we have seen in electoral system, the second place finishes previous elections, demonstrating weaker count for nothing. In 2014, the distortions— attachments to political parties. But in order shown in Table Four—were not as severe: to test our hypotheses about longer-term voter dealignment in Québec, it is necessary

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Table Three: 2012 Québec Election, Second-placed Parties by Constituency

Second Placed Party: PQ PLQ CAQ QS PVQ ON Total Winners Winning PQ X 20 32 2 0 0 54 Party: PLQ 29 X 21 0 0 0 50 CAQ 8 10 X 0 0 1 19 QS 2 0 0 X 0 0 2 Total Second 39 30 53 2 0 1 125 Places

Table Four: 2014 Québec Election, Second-placed Parties by Constituency

Second Placed Party: PLQ PQ CAQ QS Others Total Winners Winning PLQ X 45 21 3 1 70 Party: PQ 18 X 11 1 0 30 CAQ 10 12 X 0 0 22 QS 2 1 0 X 0 3 Total Second 30 58 32 4 1 125 Places

to place the last two elections in a broader broaden our analysis to include elections historical context. dating back to the 1990s.

Longer-Term Party System Change in Québec Changes in Party Support As we have noted previously (Allan The analysis of the aggregate data and Vengroff 2009) the 2007 election was from 2012 and 2014 provides support for the notable in that both the PQ and the PLQ lost hypothesis that the party system is in a state support. The 2012 election, though, repeated of flux. The spectacular rise, then fall, of the this outcome. More generally, though ADQ, and its replacement by the CAQ weakening loyalties to the two major parties provides further evidence of an electorate in Québec is part of a longer trend. Figure with increasingly weak ties to the major Five shows the total vote share obtained by parties in Québec. In order to examine these two parties in elections since 1989. In claims of voter de-alignment and party every election between 1989 and 2007, the system change in more detail, however, it is combined vote share of the two parties worth examining change over a long period declined. In 1989, the two parties accounted of time. In this section of the paper we for more than nine out of every ten votes; by 2007, only slightly more than 61% of voters gave their vote to either the PQ or the PLQ.

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Figure Five: Support for PQ+PLQ

100 90.11 89.15 86.42

79.23 77.25 75 66.9 61.43 63.15

50 % Vote Share

25

0 1989 1994 1998 2003 2007 2008 2012 2014

In less than a decade, then, the two coupled with the decline in turnout. heretofore-dominant parties in Québec lost nearly 32% of their support. Taking the 2012 and 2014 elections Of course, it goes without saying into consideration, however, it is the 2008 that the 2007 election was exceptional, with election that increasingly looks like the the ADQ making a major breakthrough into outlier case. Support for the two major the position of being the Official Opposition parties fell precipitously in 2012, by over within the National Assembly. In the 2008 fourteen percentage points, to approach the election the ADQ vote collapsed, and the 2007 levels once more. While there was a Liberals and Pequistes returned to their slight recovery for the “Big Two” in 2014, previous positions as the top two parties in their support remains well below historical the province. But this result was achieved, levels. The overall trend line, therefore, on average, with the two parties only suggest that significant numbers of voters in gaining a few hundred extra votes in each Québec continued to move away from the constituency. As Figure Five shows, while parties that have dominated (and, it must be their combined vote share recovered said, continue to dominate) Québec politics between 2007 and 2008, the 2008 total of since the 1970s. 77.25% remained below 2004 levels, and represented a decline of more than 14% In the period between the 1990s and compared to 1989 levels. Thus, prior to 2008, of course, a key beneficiary of 2012, even if we were to treat the 2007 weakening ties to the major parties was election as an outlier, the longer-term trend Mario Dumont’s ADQ. From 1998 onward, pointed to a weakening of loyalty to the the vote share of the ADQ rose above Liberals and the PQ, especially when double digits, with the party reaching its

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Figure Six: Support for PQ, PLQ and ADQ/CAQ

100 98.23 97.41 97

93.62 94 92.27

% Vote Share 91 90.2 89.95

88

85 1998 2003 2007 2008 2012 2014

electoral zenith in 2007. While the ADQ almost 5 percentage points lower than in then imploded in spectacular fashion at the 1998. In 2012 and 2014, the longer term subsequent election, its political space trend of declining support for the three within the party system was replaced by the largest parties in Québec resumed, and even CAQ. If we consider the ADQ or the CAQ accelerated, as support fell to its lowest to have achieved “major party” status during points since the ADQ first emerged in 1998. this time, does this suggest a “realignment” among the Québec electorate, with voters A corollary of the decline in support accommodating a new addition to the party for Québec’s major parties is growing system? In other words, rather than voters support—albeit still small—for smaller becoming disenchanted with major parties in parties in the province. Figure Seven Québec, they simply transferred support to a examines the changing levels of support for new challenger. smaller parties in Québec. While the total vote share of smaller parties remains low, it Figure Six does not provide much has risen steadily in the last decade or so, support for this “realigning” hypothesis. peaking at double-digit levels in 2014. What While the overwhelming number of votes is more evident, however, is that there has was shared among the three parties in every been some consolidation among the minor election since 1998, the combined share of parties—particularly on the left—with the the three parties’ vote declined over time. In Greens being recently replaced by Québec 2007, when the ADQ had its best result, it is Solidaire as credible challengers in some notable that the three-party share of the vote districts. Indeed, the latter party gained a actually declined overall. And while the seat in the 2008 election and added an total for 2008 increased—as the ADQ additional seat in both the 2012 and 2014 support fell precipitously—it was still elections. If it is able to maintain its foothold

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Figure Seven: Support for Parties other than PQ, PLQ and ADQ

13.75

11 9.8 10.05

7.97 8.25 6.81

% Vote Share 5.5 4.72

3.52

2.75

0 1998 2003 2007 2008 2012 2014

in the National Assembly in the years to According to Pedersen, come it is most likely to draw disaffected Volatility “tells us to what extent former Pequistes to its ranks. party strength is being reallocated from one election to the next between Whether one defines the CAQ as losing and winning parties. An being one of the major parties in Québec or examination of national patterns will not, therefore, the long term trend in Québec thus indicate, if the relative positions points not to realignment in the party of parties are fairly constant, or if they system, but to increasing dealignment. fluctuate in ways which may eventually reflect basic electoral alignments. (1990, 199.) Electoral Volatility Further evidence of dealigning trends in Québec’s party systems can be seen by examining electoral volatility.

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Figure Eight: Electoral Volatility in Québec (Pedersen Index)

18

13.5

9 Volality Index

4.5

0 1994 1998 2003 2007 2008 2012 2014 Levels of volatility between recent effective number of parties was less than Québec elections are shown in Figure Eight, two, consistent with a traditional two-party using Pedersen’s method.4 The measure system. Since then however, the value has shows a clear upward trend over time, even increased, reaching almost three in 2007 allowing for the decrease in volatility in before averaging around a “two-and-a-half” 2007.5 Voter volatility dipped slightly in party system in subsequent elections.7 2012 compared to the previous election, and again in 2014, but remained well above historical levels prior to 2008. Such levels of Voter Turnout electoral volatility do not suggest a party system in a steady state where voter The final, and perhaps most telling loyalties to a single party remain stable over evidence of partisan dealignment in many time. The upward trend in volatility has also party systems is declining levels of voter produced an increase in the “effective turnout. As voter loyalties to political parties number of parties” (Laakso and Taagepera become weaker, the opportunity costs of 1979) represented in the National voting become greater and the challenges to Assembly.6 Between 1989 and 2003, the party organizations to get out the vote increase. Declining turnout has been widespread in advanced democracies over 4 Pedersen’s index is calculated by summing the absolute values of all percentage vote gains and losses for each party in an election, and dividing the result by two. The higher the score, the greater the degree of volatility between elections. 7 For a discussion of the growth of Québec’s party 5 To give these values some context, in Pedersen’s system from a comparative perspective (through the examination of volatility in the postwar period in 2012 election), see Perella and Tanguay (2013). Our Western Europe between 1948-1977, the average level analysis also is consistent with that of Jean-François of electoral volatility was 8.1%. Godbout (2013: 30-3), who employs Laakso and 6 Rather than simply denoting the actual number of Taagepera’s measure to show that the effective parties represented in the legislature, the “effective number of candidates within individual Québec number of parties” measure takes into account the constituencies also trended upward over the same relative strength of each party based on its seat share. period.

Southern Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 6, 1 (April 2015) 16

Figure Nine: Voter Turnout in Recent Québec Provincial Elections

100

78.32 80 74.6 70.42 71.23 71.44

57.43 60

Turnout (%) 40

20

0 1998 2003 2007 2008 2012 2014

recent decades so is there any reason to they have not yet become entirely expect that the party system in Québec disengaged. Similarly, in 2014, turnout, should be an exception to this broader trend? while below 2012 levels, remained above As Figure Nine clearly shows, the the 70% mark. This may be attributed to the answer is somewhat mixed. In 1994, voter prominence of the sovereignty issue in the turnout in the province exceeded 80%, a campaign rather than party loyalty. comparatively impressive level of turnout for a plurality-based electoral system. But in Conclusions the years since, turnout had been in a steady decline, with turnout in 2008, perhaps an The last six provincial elections in outlier (Blais, Galais and Gélineau 2013), Québec signaled an incremental change in falling to an historic low in modern times. Québec’s party system. These changes are Weakening voter attachments to political manifested in increasing voter dealignment parties in Québec were not just increasing and volatility in party support. Our findings the possibility that voters would switch their converge with those of Belanger and Nadeau support between elections; recent electoral (2009). They saw the two major parties, the evidence showed that increasingly large PQ and the PLQ moving toward the center numbers of Québécois and Québécoise were ideologically with relatively little to simply deciding to stay at home on election distinguish them in many policy areas. With day. This particular indicator of dealignment sovereignty/independence becoming less was less evident in 2012, however. The prominent as an issue until 2014 this opened turnout of 74.6% was the highest turnout for up some space for third parties that are more a provincial election in Québec since 1998, ideological in orientation. suggesting that although voters have steadily been becoming less loyal to political parties Belanger and Nadeau (2009)

Southern Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 6, 1 (April 2015) 17 suggested that the 2007 election was not a the case in 2014, this might reinvigorate and realigning election, but a deviating one, and differentiate the two leading parties and their we then saw a return to normalcy in 2008. federalist and sovereignist bases. Opinion Given the continuing regional polls since the 2012 election, and to some concentrations of strength of the PLQ and extent during the 2014 election also suggest PQ it will be hard to unseat them without another return toward normalcy, as the CAQ serious electoral system reform, an unlikely appears to fade for the time being, but it occurrence. The distortions in the electoral would be premature to suggest that we are outcomes produced by the FPTP system seeing a resurgence of bipartism. After all, may reinforce the return to bipartism, even if the earlier demise of the ADQ clearly did a third party challenger is able to hold its not produce this outcome. Dealigning position in the electorate. Given the growing trends, with third parties emerging (and volatility of the electorate, however, we feel being replaced), turnout generally falling, that dealigning, rather than merely and the PQ and PLQ no longer able to deviating, elections will become more command greater than 75% of the common in the future and may serve to electorate's support will make the system disrupt further the existing party system and less stable. If the trends of the last several government stability. elections in Québec continue, for the immediate future we can expect ongoing but Decreasing party loyalty and weaker bipartism in elections to come. As elevated levels of volatility may thus be the noted, without the issue of independence, we hallmarks of the party system in the future. might expect a series of minority However, should there be a serious governments and/or new governing reopening of the sovereignty debate, as was coalitions, formal or informal.

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