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Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 4

1-23-2012 “Missed Opportunity”: Operation Broadsword, 4 Brigade and the , 1990–1991 Sean M. Maloney Royal Military College of

Recommended Citation Maloney, Sean M. (1995) "“Missed Opportunity”: Operation Broadsword, 4 Brigade and the Gulf War, 1990–1991," Canadian Military History: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 4. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol4/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Maloney: “Missed Opportunity”: Operation Broadsword, 4 Brigade and the Gul

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1995 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 4 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Sean M. Maloney

he decision not to deploy 4 Canadian deploy and sustain a brigade-sized force in a TMechanized Brigade (CMB) to participate in regional conflict. Much of this criticism resulted the Gulf War may eventually be of interest to from inter-service disputes and defence budgetary students of Canadian defence policy. The current matters. This could be ignored except that the lack of available material on this subject will no alleged inability of the Army to conduct such a doubt attenuate such efforts. The purpose of this deployment was used by some to call into article is to provide a brief, and very tentative, question the viability of Canada's land force discussion of relevant factors contributing to the commitment to NATO's Central Region since decision not to go. In essence, the following should 1951. It thus deserves examination. be considered a "toe in the water" rather than a "headlong dive." Responding to the U.N.'s request for forces to enforce the economic sanctions, Prime Minister On 2 August 1990, overran and occupied Mulroney announced the deployment of a Canadian its smaller neighbour . This act not only naval task group to the on 10 August. threatened the delicate balance of power in the Middle Operation FRICTION had started. Other commands East but posed a direct threat to the economic well- within the Canadian Forces were anticipating further being of the Western world. If Saudi Arabia and action on the part of the Canadian Government and other Gulf states were invaded in turn by Iraq, used their initiative to prepare a number of the flow of Persian Gulf oil would be shut off, contingency plans in case the senior military adversely affecting other parts of the world. leadership had to provide options to the political Additionally, the morally repugnant and brutal leadership. By 13 August, seven contingency plans occupation of Kuwait, coupled with the seizure of were proposed even though no detailed staff work Western embassies and citizens (including on them had been done. In order of priority these Canadians) were indications that plans included: could not be negotiated with. The , with unprecedented haste, passed Resolutions 660 1. Evacuation of Canadian nationals from the and 661, demanding that Iraq vacate Kuwait Gulf Region immediately or face imposition of economic 2. The deployment ofCF-18s to Turkey sanctions. 3. Resupply and sustain the Operation FRICTION task group In the wake of the conflict, a great deal of criticism 4. Replace vessels involved in Operation was levelled at the apparent inability of the Army to FRICTION 5. In-theatre airlift support to Pan-Arab forces Opposite: Private Mike Robitaille stands sentry at 6. Logistical support to multi-national forces the entrance to Canada Dry 2 in . in Gulf region (CFPU IWC 90-333) 7. The Deployment of Ground Combat Forces.

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Two soldiers from 3rd Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment on patrol at Canada Dry 2 in Qatar. (CFPU ISC 90-5050) As the Canadian naval task group departed on 24 August for its "Persian Excursion," the first The Americans had already committed a U.S. pre-positioning ships from Diego Garcia Marine division, an airborne division, an disgorged enough equipment for two U.S. Marine airmobile division and a mechanized division to Corps divisions. By 25 August, the U.N. passed Saudi Arabia for Operation DESERT SHIELD. Resolution 665, which permitted the use of In addition to this, the United Kingdom military force to back up the economic sanctions announced Operation GRANBY on 14 September. against Iraq. Operation GRANBY deployed the 7th Armoured Brigade from British Army of the Rhine (BAOR); Around this time, Canadian Forces at the same time, implemented Operation had prepared a contingency plan to deploy a CF- DAGUET which deposited the 6th Light 18 squadron and an Army protection unit to an Armoured Division into the desert sands of Saudi undesignated location in the Persian Gulf. This Arabia. The British wanted to bring in an entire was a logical contingency to the planners who felt three-brigade division to Saudi Arabia but could that the ships would require air cover and the only provide 7th Armoured Brigade initially, aircraft would require protection from hostile followed by 4th Armoured Brigade on 22 ground forces. This contingency was quickly November. Sometime around 14 September, adopted by the Government and Operation Canadian officers at higher-level NATO SCIMITAR was announced on 14 September. The headquarters were informally contacted by first CF-18s from CFB Baden left on 6 October British officers from BAOR. Could Canada for their base in Qatar, which had been secured provide a brigade under British control to form a by "M" Company 3 Royal Canandian Regiment Commonwealth Division along the same lines as (RCR), from Baden-Soellingen. the Korea conflict in 1951?

The air force planners had to be convinced to This was a tempting request. It was, however, take a security company with them. Later on, "C" fraught with problems. The political dimensions went Company 1 Royal 22e Régiment (R22eR) took over well beyond command and control on the battlefield. as Security Company for the Operation SCIMITAR Some Canadian officers believed that the British bases CANADA DRY 1 and CANADA DRY 2. The wanted "more flags" on the battlefield to balance out security threat was rated as "high" in theatre; American influence; in the British mind a Saddam Hussein publicly announced that Commonwealth partner might be easier to terrorist groups sympathetic to Iraq would wreak influence than say, the French. This would be havoc within those nations arrayed against him. important in the post-war resolution of the

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conflict. In Canada, however, there were the issues formation best suited for operations in the Middle of national pride and the old colonial relationship. East was 4 CMB. It was at 75% of war For this and other reasons, the British proposal establishment strength, while the other brigades was put on hold. in Canada ranged from 70% to 45% of their establishment. Only 4 CMB had main battle Canadian military staff planners at all levels tanks. Notably, the planners did not think that knew that force would ultimately be needed to enough lift could be acquired to move a brigade evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. They also knew group to Saudi Arabia immediately; they from the list of planning priorities generated in estimated that it would take 8 to 10 weeks to August that the last Canadian option was to fully deploy the formation. deploy ground troops to Saudi Arabia. Canadian initiative operated at new heights. Mobile These assumptions were critical in the Command HQ (FMC HQ), with input from 1st creation of the more detailed contingency plan Canadian Division, conducted a quick staff check Operation BROADSWORD. The Chief of the on 26 October on the feasibility of providing a Defence Staff (CDS), General de Chastelain, brigade-sized formation to Saudi Arabia. The ordered a staff check with the aim of analyzing assumptions in this staff check formed the basis the factors influencing the deployment and for what would eventually be called Operation employment of a viable brigade group to support BROADSWORD. U.N. coalition action against Iraq. This staff check was prepared by 13 November, and added more FMC HQ determined that any Canadian detail to the FMC HQ staff check. The CDS check formation sent to Saudi Arabia would have to fight in assumed that a Middle East deployment would a high-intensity battlefield environment, a battlefield receive first priority over existing Army that probably would include the use of chemical and operations, and that resources could be drawn biological weapons. The headquarters also assumed from anywhere. Again, it was assumed that the that Canadian units in Europe could be released by force would be integrated into a higher formation SACEUR for operations. Furthermore, the (division or corps). Most importantly, this check planners knew that such a formation would have assumed that the force would be based on 4 to work within the framework of a higher Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG) formation like an Allied division or corps. More after augmentation with Operation PENDANT (the importantly, any Canadian contribution less than unit was re-titled for this operation) adding a third a brigade group was unacceptable for "visibility infantry battalion with Armoured Personnel reasons." Carriers and a fourth tank squadron. Four CMBG also had to have enough supplies for 30 days of After surveying the existing formations in the operations, and it had to have time to acclimatize. , FMC HQ determined that the It was further assumed that 2 Princess Patricia's

Iraqi prisoners of war in Saudi Arabia being watched by Canadian and British soldiers. (CFPU VSC 91-6224-2)

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Leopard Is of 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade on exercise in Germany. (CFPU LRC86 057-4) Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) would be the assumptions as the CDS staff check. It should be third infantry battalion. noted here that no decision was made by the Canadian Government in November 1990 to The timings for the deployment of 4 CMBG deploy ground forces to Saudi Arabia; this was a to Saudi Arabia in the CDS staff check assumed military contingency plan in case the Canadian that it would take 7 days to produce the plan, 45 Government was asked to do so and committed days to assemble the force, 55 days to move the itself to such a course of action. force and 35 days of training and acclimatization in-theatre. Some general shortfalls needed to be Over the next 15 days, the Division and FMC made up, however. The long standing problems HQ planning staffs in Lahr, Kingston and St. in Canada's logistics and medical structures, Hubert laboured to produce a concrete concept problems which had been identified in the 1970s, that would keep the Canadian Government's had not been corrected even though major options open. As a result, the BROADSWORD attempts at overhaul had taken place in the mid- plan was an amalgamation of several elements 1980s. The other critical area was combat that included a concept of operation; a risk sustainment. The problems inherent in assessment, a movement estimate, and a casualty reinforcing 4 CMBG in Germany had never been estimate. solved either, though attempts had been made to improve the state of Canada's reserve forces. If The concept of operations for Canada wanted to sustain a brigade group in- BROADSWORD, as in the earlier estimates, theatre for a period longer than six months, postulated that 4 CMBG would operate as part reserve forces would have to be employed, and of an allied division within the framework of an there was no job protection legislation to allied corps. The threat environment in which 4 guarantee Militia soldiers their livelihood once CMBG would be operating was a heavily they returned from the Gulf. armoured one, with the enemy in prepared defensive positions in the desert. Iraqi chemical While the CDS staff check was undergoing capability was as diverse as it is was prolific; review, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark met known enemy chemical weapons included with his American counterpart, James Baker, in mustard blistering agents, phosgene choking Bermuda on 13 November. The effect of this agents as well as Sarin and Tabun nerve agents. meeting on the CDS tasking instruction for 14 The Iraqis were also credited with producing BZ, November is unclear, but the media speculated a psychochemical similar to LSD. Finally, the that the Americans sounded out Clark on sending enemy had combat experience from the long Iran- land forces to Saudi Arabia. Whatever the impact, Iraq war; Canadian troops had not been in HQ was tasked to prepare combat since Korea. a plan to deploy a mechanized brigade group to Saudi Arabia, and this plan was to be called As to tactical employment, 4 CMBG was Operation BROADSWORD. For all intents and incapable of participating in an advance to purposes, this tasking instruction used the same contact, based on the equipment that it possessed

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in Germany. Leopard Is and M-113s advancing Canadian Support Group and a Canadian Medical in the open desert were vulnerable to direct fire Group. This would have increased the number from long range. The planners reasoned that 4 of troops in theatre from the 7,000 to 9,000 CMBG could, however, participate as the reserve originally envisioned to 12,000. formation within an armoured division. Once the other armoured brigades bypassed strongpoints Once the planning process was underway, and took on the enemy's armoured reserve, 4 units were solicited to provide material and CMBG could be used to assault bypassed Iraqi organizational improvements that they deemed units. If the situation worsened, and allied forces necessary for a Middle East deployment. Planners were forced onto the defensive, the brigade was at the several headquarters involved in already attuned and equipped for defensive BROADSWORD also added changes and operations in an armoured heavy environment. suggestions. An attitude developed in many places Other missions could include flank or screen simultaneously; this attitude can best be operations on a flank, or corps rear area security. described as the "We can't go without " syndrome. This was an understandable With regards to assigning 4 CMBG to a phenomenon since some equipment programmes division or corps, there were a number of which had been put off in 1989 could now be possibilities. The choice came down to placing 4 implemented. Some (but not all) of these CMBG under the British division or under a U.S. organizational "grafts" included the deployment division operating within a U.S. Corps. As noted of the new ADATS anti-aircraft system, an artillery earlier, a bias had developed against placing 4 target acquisition battery, an entire intelligence CMBG under British command. This emotional company, a forward replacement holding unit, all bias was, however, backed up with undeniable of 2 (Electronic Warfare) Squadron, a facts. 4 CMBG had not operated with the British decontamination unit, an evacuation company since 1970 but had operated with the Americans and a 400-bed field hospital. Personal equipment since 1971. When the list of advantages and necessary for fighting in desert environment was disadvantages was compiled, the situation needed, as well as improved Nuclear, Biological favoured placing 4 CMBG with VII (US) Corps, Chemical Defence (NBCD) detection and preferably with 1st (US) Armored Division. protective gear. This was not a problem, since Interoperability issues, including liaison officers, Canada led NATO in the development of NBCD training and equipment compatibility no longer protective equipment. Other larger pieces of existed between the British and the Canadians. equipment would, however, delay the deployment Standardization did exist in the form of the usual and would increase cost if the decision was made NATO agreements, but Britain no longer had to obtain them. anything comparable with the Canada-U.S. integrated logistics system. As a result, placing 4 It would be easy to call this situation "gold CMBG with the British armoured division was plating" and to blame inter-arm rivalry. The real no longer a reasonable option. problem was that the Canadian Army was still playing "catch up" from the 1970s deficiencies The organization of 4 CMBG for a Middle East and the heightened expectations of the 1980s. deployment was not radically different from having 4 Many of these material improvements had been CMBG augmented in Europe by Operation identified by 4 CMBG back in 1985, but had not PENDANT (a reinforcement plan). 4 CMBG would been solved by 1990. have a four-squadron tank regiment (8th Canadian Hussars) plus a recce squadron, while The movement estimate for BROADSWORD the infantry battalions (3 RCR, 2 PPCLI, 1 R22eR) was not encouraging. There was no sealift capability would be augmented to include three four- organic to the Canadian Forces and this forced company battalion structures. 444 Tactical the logistics planners to look to commercial Helicopter Squadron was having problems with shipping. Unfortunately, the Americans had the aging Kiowas and wanted to create a already hired much of Canada's commercial sea composite squadron with Kiowas and Twin Huey and air lift to support their own deployment light transports. The other arms and services operations. Even the United Kingdom was required litde modification, at least initially. Some chartering Eastern Bloc shipping to move the planners called for the deployment of a complete balance of their division to Saudi Arabia! The use

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Above left: Canadian medical personnel arrive in Saudi Arabia; Above right: Canadian doctors perform surgery on an Iraqi prisoner of war. (CFPU ISC 91 -6210-1 & ISC 91 -4435) of the large RO/RO (Roll on/Roll off) could muster in terms of overwhelming air Newfoundland ferries was contemplated, but this was support, initiative and manoeuverability. not feasible for political reasons. Moving manpower was less of a problem; agreements By 20 November the window on deployment between the Canadian Government and was closing fast. On 29 November, the U.N. commercial air carriers in Canada ensured Security Council passed Resolution 678, which Canada's ability to move troops and some light set a 15 January 1991 deadline for Saddam equipment. The apparent lack of heavy lift would Hussein to move his forces out of Kuwait. When probably have imposed a significant time delay asked on 7 December 1990 as to the feasibility on the deployment of 4 CMBG if BROADSWORD of BROADSWORD in light of this development, were authorized and implemented. 1st Canadian Division planners replied: "There are no show stoppers per se but one issue, the Another problem that the planners had to deal composition and availability of battle casualty with was conflicting casualty estimates which were replacement could impose limitations on the driven by extremely pessimistic threat assessments employment of 4 CMB(G) plus." emanating from American sources. Medical specialists calculated that, given 30 days of combat, BROADSWORD hung on the wall for the next the entire brigade group would need replacement. month. On 12 January 1991, an anonymous military They estimated that, out of a 9,000 man force, source recently returned from Germany leaked there would be 1,971 killed and 7,434 wounded. significant aspects of BROADSWORD to the Other BROADSWORD planners developed a media, including the size, composition and the smaller estimate in which 3,000 killed and possibility that the brigade might come under wounded would need replacement after thirty British command. The source was motivated by days. Another DND agency put the rates at 1,000 a belief that BROADSWORD planning was being killed and 3,472 wounded- It appears as if these done behind the backs of the Canadian people estimates were based on the Iran-Iraq War, which under instructions of the Mulroney Government, was a First World War attrition-type of conflict. and that the Canadian people were not being given They also failed to take into account the fact that a say in the deployment of troops overseas. He the allied coalition being formed was in every way was mistaken in his assertions. BROADSWORD a far superior military machine than what Iraq planning was anticipatory on the part of the

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military in the event the Government wished to capable of matching Iraqi equipment on the select a ground force option. It was not designed battlefield; there was not enough equipment. to circumvent the democratic process. Naturally, 3. BROADSWORD was not sustainable from parliamentary critics of the Government's a personnel and equipment battle casualty handling of the Gulf situation pounced on the replacement point of view. issue without having the facts and roundly criticized the government. By 14 January, 4. There was not enough time to get to the Minister of National Defence Bill McKnight told theatre, train and acclimatize before the the media that the Government had no intention ground war started. of sending a brigade to the Gulf. Two days later the air assault started, and by 28 February the 5. The Canadian people would not have supported the ground war or we didn't need land portion of the campaign was complete. to deploy ground forces.

It is easy to say that 4 CMBG was not needed 6. BROADSWORD was a fundamentally flawed in Saudi Arabia, that it could not have arrived in concept because it was based on a time to do anything, and that it was not mechanized brigade group. sustainable. Comments such as this can only be 7. BROADSWORD would have cost too much. made in retrospect, however, since we know now how short the war actually was. At the time many 8. BROADSWORD demonstrates that the planners believed that the ground war would last NATO Central Region commitment was not several weeks to many months. There was no workable either. indication that it would last only 100 hours. If it had been a longer war, Canadian land forces The lift, deployment time and equipment would have been a valuable contribution. questions can be discussed together. The assumption that 4 CMBG would be operating with Why was Operation BROADSWORD not VII (US) Corps (and probably with 1st (US) implemented? The answer to this question is multi- Armored Division) was based on the close faceted and the reasons are found at many levels. It relationship 4 CMBG had developed with the is unclear at this point which level of command made Americans since 1971. Four CMBG already had the decision not to go. There are four possibilities liaison officers with VII (US) Corps and 1st (US) here. The first is that the politicians wanted to go Armored Division (two of them, Major K.D. Mohr with ground troops but were convinced by the highest and Lieutenant-Colonel N.H. Connally were military level that BROADSWORD was not a feasible invited to go and were given permission to do so, undertaking. The second option is that the politicians Major Mohr seeing action with 1st (US) Armored did not want to go and told the military no. There Division) and the Americans respected Canadian could have been a combination of these reasons, capabilities on the battlefield. The U.S. did sound whereby the political level did not want to go and the out Canada on the ground forces issue while they highest military level did not encourage them to were deciding if and when to send VII (US) Corps. implement BROADSWORD. Fourthly, the highest If Canada had decided to go at that time or even military level might not have passed on or late in November, arrangements would have been recommended to the political level the existence and made to deploy 4 CMBG to Saudi Arabia using advanced nature of BROADSWORD beyond the the ILOC agreement; the Americans constantly list of options created in August. pushed for "more flags" and if Canada seriously demonstrated it was interested, American support would have been there. In terms of time, Some were not convinced of BROADSWORD'S the British were able to deploy their 4th Armoured feasibility. Let us briefly explore some reasons why Brigade (similar in composition to 4 CMBG) from BROADSWORD was not considered to be a viable BAOR making the decision on 22 November with operation: the first units arriving on 10 December. The 1. BROADSWORD was not logistlcally feasible; Americans had a constant flow of forces we could not get enough lift In time, existing throughout the period. lift was dominated by the Americans. There is no doubt that some of Canada's 2. If we had gotten to Saudi Arabia, our equipment (particularly tanks) was not equipment was in poor shape, not only for the

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Gulf but for Germany as well. The Leopards were group army concept such as it existed in 1953 showing their age, particularly when one was designed to fight two wars; one in Germany compares their protection and firepower to the and one in Korea, with sustainability coming from T-72. In terms of interoperability, some equipment the two Militia division equivalents. The draw could receive spare parts through the U.S. system down in Army strength in 1970 ensured that there since a M-113 is a M-113, an M-109 is an M-109 were four partially manned brigade groups. The and a C-7 is similar to an M-16A2. Other non­ events in 1990 show that the wisdom in this draw standard equipment like the Leopard, the litis down was more than flawed. The Oka Crisis in and the MLVW would have posed logistical 1990 occupied an entire brigade group (Canada problems. The solution here was to acquire even had to approach SACEUR to explain why equipment from the Americans. In fact, the half of 1st Canadian Division was tied up in an Americans unofficially offered enough M-60A3s, internal security situation) and this stretched M-2s and M-109A2s to equip and sustain a Army resources thin. Since the Militia was Canadian brigade group in the same way the untrained and unequipped for the internal Americans helped some of the gulf Cooperation security missions, regular forces had to be used Council countries (the M-60A3 offer was and flexibility was lost. apparently changed to M-l Abrams tanks later). These vehicles were already in-theatre and it The political problems with calling out the would have been relatively easy to deploy Militia to sustain BROADSWORD were Canadian troops and small equipment by air. It insurmountable. No job protection legislation takes less than two weeks to retrain on a new existed. Problems with neglected training and a tank and this retraining would have been done lack of equipment meant that Militia personnel concurrently in the operational desert would have to undergo a significant period of environment. training before they were ready to fight in a Middle East environment. Despite the limited steps taken There have been arguments made that too in the late 1980s (the Total Force Concept) to many "bells and whistles" were added to the correct this, the Militia's ability to provide battle existing brigade structure, that this drove up the casualty replacements was an unknown factor in cost of deployment and that the refitting increased BROADSWORD planning. The politicians feared the deployment time. This argument does have an opposition backlash and thus would probably some merit, but there were numerous cases where not have supported such measures early on in BROADSWORD planners "just said no." On the the deployment. other hand, if 4 CMBG were operating as part of VII (US) Corps, why did it need its own The most open-ended argument made against decontamination capability, target acquisition BROADSWORD was the belief by some that the battery, an EW squadron, its own field hospital Canadian people would not have supported such a and the brand new AD ATS system? Could these deployment and would have become disillusioned resources have been provided by division or when it started to take casualties. The Canadian corps? Exercises in Germany demonstrated time public was overwhelmingly in favour of military and again that 4 CMBG was capable of operations within the context of the U.N. assimilating non-Canadian units into its resolutions. There was only a minuscule "peace organization and planning structure or utilizing movement" consisting of a few students. Naturally, support provided by a higher headquarters. the media made this movement out to be more Canada had a "free ride" with these resources in than it was and the Opposition parties played this Germany since the 1970s; why change now? for all it was worth to embarrass the Mulroney Government as much as possible. If the Prime The sustainability question is important for Minister chose to deploy ground forces to Saudi it shows a weakness that has existed in the Arabia, he would have done so after explaining Canadian Army since the Diefenbaker the reasons for his decision. These reasons would Government decided that sustainability forces probably have focused on the need to limit existing were no longer required. The destruction of the aggression and deter future aggression and the Militia in the early 1960s was so profound that need to provide economic stability in the West. attempts to remedy the problem still baffle The spectre of Saddam Hussein developing defence planners today in 1994. The four-brigade nuclear weapons only increased the reasons for

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the DESERT STORM. Canadians are a practical in question, one should examine the forces people who have fought wars for lesser reasons deployed by the British and the French. The in the past. British 4th Armoured Brigade was deployed in less than a month from its bases in Northern Suggesting that a Canadian brigade group was Germany. It consisted of an armoured regiment, not needed in such a conflict is an extension of the two battalions and an argument against having a Canadian brigade group artillery regiment; almost identical to 4 CMB in in Europe. Canada cannot afford to be isolationist in Germany but with better equipment. Its the world community and must act in difficult performance in the Gulf War, though situations. The loss of prestige is not an easy thing overshadowed by 7th Brigade, was particularly to measure but the deployment of low risk forces effective in reducing bypassed Iraqi strong points. like two combat ships and a squadron of fighters to protect them certainly made Canada look cautious The French 6e DLB (6th Light Armoured and minimalist. The ridiculous political debate over Division) had three mechanized infantry how "defensive" the FRICTION and SCIMITAR forces battalions mounted in VAB wheeled APCs, three were supposed to be was laughable. The deployment armoured regiments (one tank and two heavy of a Canadian field hospital to Saudi Arabia and armoured car), an artillery regiment and two medical personnel to U.S. ships was less laughable, attack helicopter regiments with 60 anti-tank particularly to the casualties that they treated, but helicopters. This formation was unsuited to a Canada perhaps could have done more in other frontal assault role against the enemy's main areas. defensive positions; as a result it was relegated to the very important role of flank guard on the As to the financing of a Saudi Arabia deployment, left flank of the main effort. 6e DLB did not sit it is conceivable that many of Canada's out of pocket out the war; it operated in an aggressive fashion costs would have eventually been funded by Saudi within the limits of its capabilities. Arabia and the Japanese. Participating in a war of liberation not only carries with it a sense of Unlike the British and French forces, a moral satisfaction but also provides business Canadian mechanized brigade deploying to the opportunities for the inevitable reconstruction Gulf would not have been sustainable over a long effort, as discussed by the British commander, period without a radical change in Canadian General Sir Peter De La Billiere in his book Storm mobilization policy. This dictated that the Command. operational employment of the Brigade in the Gulf would have to be considered carefully. These Was a mechanized brigade group the only employment options were considered by a option for a Canadian Army deployment to the planning cell in Ottawa and this cell concluded Gulf? A number of officers have questioned this that a brigade based on the existing European basic assumption in the BROADSWORD planning commitment could have fulfilled a number of process and they have a valid point. There were roles in the Coalition plan, that is, flank guard/ other options; how many of them saw light of day screening, counter-penetration and blocking. in high level planning discussions is unknown. These employment options were based on the The CDS believed that only an independent assumption that the Brigade would not be brigade group-sized commitment would be a sustainable for a long period, the same viable one for political purposes within a coalition. assumptions which had been used in Central One possible option was a light infantry brigade Region planning for twenty years. However, these group of three infantry battalions operating with, employment options as developed by this say, the 101st (US) Airborne Division (Airmobile) planning cell do not appear to have been or the 82nd (US)Airborne Division. Units from disseminated widely and there is little discussion the Special Service Force based in Canada had of them in the BROADSWORD plan. good working relationships with these formations. Such a brigade group could have been delivered Though many shortcomings (specifically by air in a timely manner. equipment and lift) were "overcomable" if the effort and initiative had been made in November, the If the viability of a Canadian mechanized casualty estimates and the sustainability problem brigade group operating in the Middle East was gave the higher level military and political

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leadership cold feet. One BROADSWORD planner deployment, and the entire national effort would thought that this was the primary reason for not have been directed to supporting the Central deploying to the Gulf: Region.

I honestly believe the reason that it got In sum, Operation BROADSWORD represents handicapped or turned off was that people possibly one of the biggest "what if s" in Canadian realized there would be casualties. There was military history. It was not only a missed DEATH involved! It was pretty easy to continue to sit offshore, embargo shipping, fly some opportunity. BROADSWORD also highlighted airplanes, come back to a relatively secure some of the structural weaknesses that have environment....The government could see that existed in the Canadian Army since 1970 and we were talking 30 casualties a day, half of them should provide guidance for future defence policy being deaths. That was startling to the makers and military planners. politicians...

Another planner had a similar point of view:

We may have been too pessimistic. The casualty A Note on Sources estimates were up there and the shopping lists too big. That was the straw that broke the camel's The public version of War Without Battles: Canada's NATO back. When all was accumulated, with the high Brigade in Germany, 1951-1993, from which this article is risk assessment and a long shopping list, the derived, contains no footnotes. The book is based on the full thing became intolerable and it was cancelled. I range of primary and secondary sources, including a large wonder what would have happened if we had number of interviews. The primary sources are not, as yet, gone with a less grandiose shopping list....The in the public domain. A public official history of Canada's Chief [ultimately] did not recommend it to the participation in the Gulf War produced by the Director political level. Genera] History will be released in 1995; its interpretation differs from the one presented here. The authors of that study have produced a fine work which is much more detailed with The operational commanders for BROADSWORD regards to the decision-making process. Some of the certainly believed that the plan was a good one and secondary source literature I used for this presentation that it was capable of being executed. Many includes: logisticians also believed that the movement problem could have been overcome, and that the Bergot, Erwan et Alain G.andy. Operation DAGUET: Les Français Dans La Guerre Du Golfe (Paris: Presses de equipment could have been acquired quickly. la Cite, 1992) What was lacking was the will to do it. De La Billiere, Sir Peter. Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War (London: Harper Collins, 1992.) The most important question here is, does Deere, David N. (ed) Desert Cats: The Canadian Fighter Squadron in the Gulf War (Stoney Creek: Fortress the failure to execute BROADSWORD "prove" that Publications, 1991) the NATO brigade commitment was not a viable Department of National Defence. "Canadian Forces in the one? (At least one Canadian Admiral has made Persian Gulf (2nd ed)" (Ottawa: DND Media Liaison this assertion). Many well informed people think Office, 23 Jan 91). that the answer is no. To redeploy a brigade group Kindsvatter, Peter S. "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Deployment and Preparation for Desert Storm", Military Review to an entirely new and unfamiliar theatre of January 1992 pp. 2-16. operations against a new enemy cannot be Kindsvatter, Peter S. "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Ground compared to having a brigade in-theatre with Offensive", Military Review February 1992 pp. 16-37. intimate knowledge of the ground, its allies and Kindsvatter, Peter S. "VII Corps in the Gulf War: Post-Cease- Fire Operations", Military Review June 1992 pp. 2-19. its enemy. There is no doubt that the sustainment Morison, Bob. Operation Desert Sabre: The Desert Rat's and logistical problems were significant, and Liberation of Kuwait (Hong Kong: Concord Publications, would have posed problems in NATO's Central 1991). Region. This ignores that fact that Canadian planners knew what the problems were and were Sean M. Maloney is currently working not given the guidance and political support towards his Ph.D. at Temple University in necessary to fix them prior to 1985. The Canadian Philadelphia, PA. He is the author of War soldier's ability to improvise and make things Without Battles: Canada's NATO Brigade happen should never be underestimated. A NATO in Germany, 1951-1993, soon to be war would have been more important than a Gulf published.

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Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1995 11