Zheng Wang. Never forget national humiliation: historical memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, April 22, 2014. pp. cm. $32.50, cloth, ISBN 978-0-231-14891-7.

Reviewed by Zachary Fredman

Published on H-Diplo (December, 2012)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

As the title for his new book on historical Ph in confict analysis and resolution from George memory and Chinese nationalism, Zheng Wang Mason University and now teaches at Seton Hall’s has chosen a phrase that frst became popularized Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International in China around 1915: “never forget national hu‐ Relations. Before taking up his professorship, he miliation” (Wuwang guochi). This phrase aptly spent nearly a decade as a researcher at the Chi‐ captures Wang’s thesis: the Chinese Communist nese People’s Association for Peace and Disarma‐ Party (CCP) has bolstered its legitimacy in the ment in Beijing. post-Tiananmen era by using historical memory A timely and well-researched book, Never to cultivate a nationalistic and anti-Western vic‐ Forget National Humiliation qualifes as a land‐ tim mentality that provides young Chinese with mark in the study of Chinese nationalism. Despite an understanding of who they are and how to the minor reservations detailed below, it ofers a comprehend the rest of the world. Historical comprehensive exploration of Chinese identity memory, Wang argues “is the prime raw material and the politics of history education in the Peo‐ for constructing China’s national identity” and it ple’s Republic of China. Anyone interested in mod‐ constitutes a powerful force in the way the Chi‐ ern China or U.S.-China relations should read this nese understand and carry out foreign relations book. (p. 223). “To understand a country,” Wang writes, “one Wang brings impressive credentials and an should visit the country’s primary and high insider’s perspective in his attempt to understand schools and read their history textbooks” (p. 7). how historical memory informs Chinese foreign Through his study of Chinese textbooks and edu‐ policy and why Chinese youth are so patriotic and cation policy, Wang reveals how the CCP has used nationalistic. A native of Kunming, capital of Chi‐ history education to glorify the party, consolidate na’s southwestern Yunnan province, he holds a H-Net Reviews national identity, and justify one-party rule in the books engage in selective remembering and for‐ post-Tiananmen era. After the 1989 Tiananmen getting. For example, China’s standard history protests and the Soviet bloc collapse, China’s lead‐ textbooks praise Ming Dynasty admiral Zheng ers concluded that the CCP’s greatest failure in the He’s naval expeditions as “voyages of peace and 1980s was not focusing enough attention on ideo‐ friendship,” yet recent scholarship has shown that logical education. Shortly afterward, the party Zheng’s voyages were often accompanied by vio‐ launched its patriotic education campaign. By se‐ lence against local populations (p. 46). These text‐ lecting which parts of Chinese history to remem‐ books emphasize that China has always been a ber and which parts to forget, the CCP has used “peace-loving country” while overlooking military historical memory to cultivate a national con‐ campaigns various dynasties have undertaken sciousness and what Wang calls a “Chosenness- against China’s neighbors. History education in Myth-Trauma (CMT) complex.” Wang argues that China also glorifes the CCP’s achievements while this CMT complex and historical consciousness downplaying or ignoring the sufering that many “are the dominant ideas in China’s public rhetoric ordinary Chinese have experienced at the party’s and bureaucratic procedures” (p. 240). hands. In China’s textbooks, most sufering comes Inspired by a letter CCP leader Jiang Zemin at the hands of foreigners and brings national hu‐ wrote to the Education Ministry, the party ofcial‐ miliation. ly launched the patriotic education campaign in Under Mao, history education emphasized na‐ August 1991 with two documents: “Notice about tional glory. The government suppressed writing Conducting Education of Patriotism and Revolu‐ about the Nanjing Massacre and used class strug‐ tionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively Cul‐ gle theory to explain the Chinese Revolution and tural Relics,” and “General Outline on Strengthen‐ foreign imperialism. Above all, history education ing Education on Chinese Modern and Contempo‐ during the Mao years emphasized that the CCP rary History and National Conditions.” The patri‐ and Mao’s brilliant leadership deserved all credit otic education campaign jettisoned the Mao-era for victory over the Japanese and the Guomin‐ class struggle narrative in favor of a framework dang (GMD). Under Mao the party had redeemed for teaching history that focused on China’s strug‐ the country after a century of national humilia‐ gle with outside forces. A 1994 CCP directive stat‐ tion stretching from the First Opium War to the ed that the party initiated the campaign in order Communists’ victory in the . to “boost the nation’s spirit, enhance cohesion, China’s patriotic education campaign revised foster national self-esteem and pride, consolidate these Mao-era narratives. The new narrative and develop a patriotic united front to the broad‐ blamed the West rather than class enemies for est extent possible, and direct and rally the mass‐ China’s sufering. In teaching students about the es’ patriotic passions to the great cause of building War of Resistance against Japan, for example, the socialism with Chinese characteristics” (p. 99). revised curriculum focused on ethnic confict be‐ The patriotic education campaign--the driving tween Japan and China rather than class confict force behind contemporary Chinese nationalism-- between the CCP and the GMD. More than any‐ is thus “an elite-led, top-down political move‐ thing else it emphasized the foreign powers’ bru‐ ment” (p. 140). tality against the Chinese, forcing the younger Central to the patriotic education campaign generation to confront the atrocities of the centu‐ are the CCP’s chosen glories and traumas--Wang’s ry of humiliation. According to Wang, “this transi‐ CMT complex. Wang shows that when looking to tion from China as victor to China as victim re‐ the glories of China’s past, party-approved text‐

2 H-Net Reviews veals a great deal about changes to Chinese na‐ the Olympics, 2001-2010.” The document urged tional identity” (p. 103). government ministries and provinces to win hon‐ In order to cultivate the new China-as-victim or at the 2004 and 2008 Olympic Games by win‐ identity, the patriotic education campaign ning as many gold medals as possible--silver and reached beyond the classroom. Wang fnds no bronze would not sufce. They targeted medal- parallel anywhere in the world for “the special ef‐ rich disciplines that rely on athletes’ long-term fort made by the Chinese government since 1991 training and individual skillfulness--diving, to construct memory sites and use them for ideo‐ weightlifting, shooting--rather than more popular logical reeducation” (p. 104). In 1995 the party se‐ sports emphasizing teamwork and contact, such lected one hundred national-level demonstration as soccer or basketball. The strategy paid of sites for patriotic education. Nearly two-thirds handsomely in 2008 when Chinese athletes took were devoted to past wars and conficts. The re‐ home ffty-one gold medals. mainder featured ancient Chinese civilization and But Wang argues that China’s emphasis on national heroes like Mao and Zhou Enlai. Taking gold medals “masks a lingering inferiority com‐ their cues from the center, provincial and county plex” (p. 153). In 2004 Chinese hurdler Xiang authorities created patriotic education bases of won China’s frst track and feld gold and became their own. Wang counts more than 2,300 provin‐ the country’s most popular athlete. By winning cial- and county-level sites in Beijing, Hebei, Jiang‐ gold in a sport traditionally dominated by West‐ su, Jiangxi, and Anhui alone (p. 109). Visiting erners, Liu, according to Wang, “became an in‐ these sites, he notes, has become a regular part of stant symbol for China’s ability to conquer the the school curriculum. world in any new feld that China wants to take Entertainment, too, has become a patriotic ed‐ on” (p. 153). Because of the lingering memory of ucation tool. To encourage visits to patriotic edu‐ national humiliation, the Chinese government can cation bases, the CCP launched a “Red Tourism” legitimize its rule through sports. To win more program in the early 2000s. Red tourism skillfully gold medals than the United States symbolized exploits China’s domestic tourism boom by replac‐ China’s passage into the top tier of world powers. ing the term “education” with “tourism.” The re‐ Yet Wang remains wary about such logic and sults, as Wang shows, have been impressive: be‐ urges Chinese elites to heed the words of historian tween 2004 and 2007 more than 400 million Chi‐ Xu Guoqi: “A nation that obsesses over gold nese traveled to red tourism sites (p. 109). While medals to bolster nationalist sentiment and its do‐ at home, Chinese can watch movies and TV series mestic legitimacy is not a confdent government” about the War of Resistance and humiliation at (p. 162). the hands of foreigners. Nothing, of course, illus‐ Wang’s next chapter shows how this “culture trated Chinese national greatness and rejuvena‐ of insecurity” infuenced China’s response to tion like the opening ceremony at the 2008 Beijing three crises in U.S.-China relations. The majority Olympics. of China’s top leaders interpreted the 1999 NATO Wang’s excellent chapter on the Beijing bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade as Olympics reveals that the anxieties underpinning an open provocation and insult to the Chinese China’s patriotic education campaign also inform people. The government organized anti-American its attitudes toward international athletic compe‐ demonstrations outside U.S. diplomatic missions tition. In preparation for the games, the CCP’s and demanded an ofcial apology. Beijing had General Sports Administration drew up a strategy also demanded an apology after the 1996 called “The General Outline for Winning Honor at Strait Crisis. In 2001, Beijing blamed the United

3 H-Net Reviews

States for the collision between a Chinese F-8 Joseph Stilwell, commander of U.S. forces in Chi‐ fghter jet and a U.S. EP-3 spy plane and expected na, needlessly angered the Chinese by treating Washington to apologize and take full responsibil‐ them with disrespect and contempt. Stilwell as‐ ity. According to Wang, each incident touched on sumed this was the best way to accomplish his the feelings of national humiliation cultivated by goals, but Chinese president Chiang Kai-shek in‐ the patriotic education program. As a result, the terpreted Stilwell’s manner as evidence of the Chinese government escalated each crisis through general’s ignorance and racism. Ch’i concludes military maneuvers, rejecting American apolo‐ that Stilwell treated Chiang harshly and demand‐ gies, or sending students to pelt U.S. diplomatic fa‐ ed control over Chinese military forces because cilities with rocks and debris. Because the CCP has he failed to understand the depth of Chinese na‐ built its legitimacy on righting the humiliations of tionalism.[1] Books like Never Forget National Hu‐ the past, it cannot allow the country to be humili‐ miliation go a long way toward giving non-Chi‐ ated again. Each crisis thus becomes a test of the nese a clearer understanding of how many Chi‐ CCP’s political credibility, and presses the govern‐ nese see the world. ment toward a more uncompromising stance. Although a frst-rate study, Never Forget Na‐ Wang concludes that Beijing must move be‐ tional Humiliation is not without its faws. Wang’s yond its victim mentality and allow discussion of frst chapter contains a literature review and the‐ the failures and catastrophes caused by the party. oretical framework that may put some readers He sees the 2005 publication of the frst joint his‐ of. That would be a mistake--the book is well tory textbook in East Asia--written by Chinese, Ja‐ worth reading. And though Wang argues that Chi‐ panese, and South Korean scholars--as a step in na’s CMT complex and historical memory are the the right direction. But he also concedes that Chi‐ dominant ideas in the PRC’s bureaucratic proce‐ na has a long way to go: in 2006 the CCP shut dures, he proves his case only when discussing down Bingdian (Freezing point), the weekly sup‐ the Belgrade embassy bombing and EP-3 spy plement to the national China Youth Daily news‐ plane incident. But these minor shortcomings do paper, after Bingdian published an article criticiz‐ not detract from this masterful book. One hopes it ing a Chinese history textbook for fostering blind not only leaves non-Chinese with a clearer under‐ nationalism and providing one-sided historical ac‐ standing of the PRC and its people but also en‐ counts. Party ofcials also sacked the China Youth courages the Chinese to look more honestly at Daily’s editors and barred all Chinese media from their country’s recent past and see China as it tru‐ reporting on the suspension. Though China today ly is. is far more open than it was during the Mao Note years, the party retains its monopoly on interpret‐ [1]. Ch’i Hsi-sheng, Jianbanuzhang de mengy‐ ing controversial history. ou: Taiping yang zhanzheng qijian de ZhongMei Wang wrote Never Forget National Humilia‐ junshi hezuo guanxi, 1941-1945 [Allies at daggers tion because he wanted to help Westerners better drawn: China-U.S. military afairs cooperation understand the Chinese people, their motivations, during the Pacifc War, 1941-1945] (Taibei: and their intentions. Here he succeeds admirably, Zhongyang yanjiu yuan lianjing chuban gongsi, and his task is no doubt an important one. Failing 2011), esp. 503-555, 634-643. to understand Chinese nationalism in the past has caused and exacerbated problems in U.S-.China relations. Taiwanese scholar Ch’i Hsi-sheng, for example, shows that during World War II General

4 H-Net Reviews

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-diplo

Citation: Zachary Fredman. Review of Wang, Zheng. Never forget national humiliation: historical memory in Chinese politics and foreign relations. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. December, 2012.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=36967

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

5