USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 901, 26 April 2011

Articles & Other Documents:

Iran to Hold Int'l Disarmament Conference mid June Analysis-North Korea Diplomacy at a Crossroads: Talk or Troubles? New Cyber Attack Targets Iran NASR Opens New Chapter in India-Pakistan Arms Race Kim Jong-il's Recent Activities Hint at Trouble Ahead Making Sense of ‗Nasr‘ Carter Begins N. Korean Trip over Denuclearization Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine Countdown Starts for China's Space Station in 2020 Mideast Unnerving North Korea India Exacerbates Nuclear Woes The Terrorism Monster Antony, Forces Stress on Unconventional Threats Rather than China, Pakistan Is ISI the Problem?

Air Force Officials Announce Helicopter Acquisition Stupidity Goes Nuclear — I Strategy Viewpoint - Dancing a Delusional Tango

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

Iranian Students‘ News Agency (ISNA) – Iran Iran to Hold Int'l Disarmament Conference mid June April 24, 2011 TEHRAN (ISNA)-Iran plans to hold the second international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation conference mid June. The gathering mainly seeks examination of current challenges on nuclear disarmament and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The conference scheduled for June 12-13 intends to present approaches for creation of a world without nuclear arms. A Probe into nuclear doctrines and lack of their conformity with current international circumstances, international commitment of countries on disarmament due to destructive aftermaths of existing nuclear arms and taking concrete steps and specified offers to materialize goals of nuclear disarmament and annihilation of the weapons are other issues to be discussed in the international gathering in Tehran. The conference also involves three specialized sessions with the mentioned matters are on the spotlight and experts would put forward their offers. Tehran hosted the first international disarmament conference on April 18-19, 2010 with officials from different countries took part. During the two-day conference, world officials, politicians, envoys and nuclear experts from 60 world countries discussed ways to end concerns with regard to challenges on nuclear disarmament, countries' commitment to nuclear dismantlement and disarmament and aftermaths of inaction in the destruction of the Weapons of Mass Destruction. http://isna.ir/Isna/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1753621&Lang=E (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Tehran Times – Iran Tuesday, April 26, 2011 New Cyber Attack Targets Iran Tehran Times Political Desk TEHRAN - Iran has been targeted by a new computer worm named Stars, the director of Iran‘s Passive Defense Organization announced on Monday. Fortunately, Iranian experts detected the computer worm and are investigating the malware, Gholam-Reza Jalali told the Mehr News Agency on Monday. But no final result has been achieved yet, he added. ―(However), certain characteristics about the Stars worm have been identified, including that it is compatible with the (targeted) system and that the damage is very slight in the initial stage, and it is likely to be mistaken for executable files of the government,‖ Jalali stated. Therefore, Iranian experts should study various aspects of this worm so that the necessary actions can be taken to deal with it, he said. Jalali did not give any details about what facilities the worm targeted or when experts first detected it. Stars is the second computer worm to target Iran in the past eight months. In September 2010, international news agencies reported that the Stuxnet worm, which is capable of taking over power plants, had infected many industrial sites in Iran. Later, Western officials and media outlets claimed that the cyber attack had hindered Iran‘s nuclear program. Iranian officials confirmed that some Iranian industrial systems had been targeted by a cyber attack, but insisted that no crashes or serious damage to the country‘s industrial computer systems had been reported and said Iranian engineers had rooted out the problem. Iran also dismissed the claim that the cyber attack had seriously affected its nuclear program. Jalali added, ―It must be taken into consideration that (the fact that we dealt with) Stuxnet does not mean that the threat has been completely eliminated since worms have specific life cycles and can continue their activities in other forms.‖ ―Therefore the country should prepare itself to tackle future worms since future worms, which may infect our systems, could be more dangerous than the first ones,‖ he noted. Elsewhere in his remarks, Jalali said that although the United States and Israel have flouted international law in their cyber attacks against Iran, this matter can still be pursued through legal channels. He added, ―The Foreign Ministry might not have paid due attention to pursuing this issue legally. But it seems that our diplomatic apparatus should pay attention to legally pursuing cyber attacks against the Islamic Republic of Iran more than before, since many countries, such as Russia, regard any cyber attack as an official (act of) war.‖ On April 16, Jalali stated that the German engineering conglomerate Siemens should be held responsible for the infection of Iranian industrial sites by the Stuxnet computer worm. At the time, Jalali also said that the U.S. and the Zionist regime were involved in the cyber attack against Iran. http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=239425 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Chosun Ilbo – South Korea April 25, 2011 Kim Jong-il's Recent Activities Hint at Trouble Ahead North Korean leader Kim Jong-il secretly visited a building where agencies engaged in military operations against South Korea are clustered and the General Reconnaissance Bureau last month, a source said Sunday. The so-called Building No. 3 houses the United Front Department and the Workers Party's international affairs department. The General Reconnaissance Bureau, an agency in charge of armed provocations against the South, is believed to have supervised the sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan last year. "Kim Jong-il inspected the areas and encouraged agents" on his visits, a North Korean source said. "It seems highly likely that the regime will provoke again in case its charm offensive falls on deaf ears." At a meeting in Pyongyang Sunday, a day before the North Korean Army's 79th anniversary, Minister of the People's Armed Forces Kim Yong-chun said, "A tense situation is being created on the Korean Peninsula, where nobody knows when a war could break out." And the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland on Saturday warned that the North will "no longer insist on dialogue," if the South continues to ignore its overtures. The regime has apparently stepped up sea infiltration drills and artillery training in recent days even as it has been pushing for inter-Korean talks on various issues. According to the KCNA news agency on Saturday, Kim went on one of his "on-the-spot guidance" tours to the Rajin Shipyard in North Hamgyong Province, which is known to be making chiefly warships and submarines. This was the first time since Kim took power 1998 that the North Korean media has mentioned the shipyard. Meanwhile, Kim sang the praises of the "military-first‖ doctrine when he visited the Army Unit 264 in North Hamgyong Province, which supervises the regime's nuclear test site in Punggye-ri and its long-range missile launch pad in Musudan-ri. South Korean security officials note that Kim had frequently visited military units or certain areas immediately before the regime launched provocations of various kinds. Kim visited North Hwanghae Province about two weeks before the North sank the Cheonan in March last year, and South Hwanghae Province right before it shelled Yeonpyeong Island last November. He visited various locations in the Hamgyong provinces before the regime conducted its nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 and test-launched long-range rockets. All this could mean that his latest visits are a prelude to another provocation. Kim Jong-il has recently been stressing self-reliance. The KCNA said he spoke about the topic Saturday during a visit to an iron and steel complex in North Hamgyong Province. Traditionally, the regime has emphasized self- reliance and tightened controls whenever it has had difficulty getting overseas aid. A South Korean security official said the flurry of activity could just be an attempt to pressure the South into resuming dialogue. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/04/25/2011042501050.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Yonhap News – South Korea April 26, 2011 Carter Begins N. Korean Trip over Denuclearization SEOUL, April 26 (Yonhap) -- Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and three elder statesmen on Tuesday began their three-day visit to North Korea on Tuesday amid a flurry of diplomatic efforts to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and revive stalled international talks on the North's nuclear weapons programs. Carter arrived in Pyongyang via a chartered plane in the morning along with three former European heads of state -- former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, former Norwegian Prime Minister Dr. Gro Brundtland and former Irish President Mary Robinson. The North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Carter's arrival in a brief dispatch, but did not elaborate on his schedule in Pyongyang. The former leaders said in a statement in Beijing on Monday that they "aim to see how we may be of assistance in reducing tensions and help the parties address key issues including denuclearization." Carter also expressed hope for a meeting with Kim and his heir-apparent son, Kim Jong-un, though he said he has yet to hear from North Korea whether such a meeting has been arranged. The KCNA reported early Tuesday that the senior Kim attended an art performance in Pyongyang along with his son and other top officials, without elaborating on when the performance was held. Still, the Pyongyang-datelined report indicates that the two Kims could be staying in the North Korean capital, a development that may lead to Carter's meeting with the reclusive North Korean leader. Carter has often acted as a diplomatic troubleshooter. In 1994, he met with then-North Korean leader Kim Il-sung, the late father of the current leader, and brokered a U.S.-North Korea nuclear deal that eventually unraveled. Last August, Carter secured the freedom of a detained American during his trip to Pyongyang, though he could not meet with Kim Jong-il as the North Korean leader had traveled to China for a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao. It's not clear whether Carter can bring home another detained American during this week's trip. Carter has said his group does not have immediate plans for a meeting with North Korean authorities on the possible release of Jun Young-su, a detained American. Jun is the fifth American detained by North Korea in recent years. The North has released four Americans. The trip comes amid a flurry of diplomatic moves by regional powers to revive the six-party talks on the North's nuclear programs. Top Chinese nuclear envoy Wu Dawei arrived in Seoul on Tuesday for talks with his South Korean counterpart on ways to resume the six-party nuclear talks involving the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia. "I came to coordinate the positions of China and South Korea on the situation of the Korean Peninsula and the six- way talks," Wu said after arriving in South Korea. The Chinese envoy also said he met with Carter and his delegation on Monday night in Beijing, though he did not give any further details. In a related move, a South Korean delegation is visiting Washington Tuesday to meet with Kurt Campbell, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, and other U.S. officials to discuss the nuclear talks and other bilateral and regional issues. The flurry of meetings comes as the North has not shown any indication that it will take any steps over its two deadly attacks on South Korea last year that killed 50 South Koreans. The North's refusal to take responsible actions over its provocations has been a major stumbling block to improving inter-Korean relations and resuming the six-nation talks on the North's nuclear programs. Carter is expected to meet with South Korean officials in Seoul Thursday after his trip to Pyongyang, though it remains unclear whether President Lee Myung-bak will meet the former U.S. president amid conflicting views on the nature of his trip to the North. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/04/26/54/0401000000AEN20110426005800315F.HTML (Return to Articles and Documents List)

People‘s Daily Online – China April 26, 2011 Countdown Starts for China's Space Station in 2020 Authorities in charge of the manned space program unveiled plans on Monday to build a 60-ton space station, made up of three capsules, and develop a cargo spaceship to transport supplies. The China Manned Space Engineering Office said at a news conference that it also wants the public to get involved by suggesting names for the space station, due to completed around 2020. According to documents provided by the office, the space station, weighing about 60 tons, is composed of a core module and two others where experiments will be conducted. A cargo spaceship to transport supplies will also be developed. The 18.1-meter-long core module, with a maximum diameter of 4.2 meters and a launch weight of 20 to 22 tons, will be launched first. The two experiment modules will then blast off to dock with the core module. Each laboratory module is 14.4 meters long, with the same maximum diameter and launch weight of the core module. "The 60-ton space station is rather small compared to the International Space Station (419 tons), and Russia's Mir Space Station (137 tons) which served between 1996 and 2001," said Pang Zhihao, a researcher and deputy editor- in-chief of the monthly magazine, Space International. "But it is the world's third multi-module space station, which usually demands much more complicated technology than a single-module space lab," he said. The office also said that China will develop a cargo spaceship, with a maximum diameter of 3.35 meters and a launch weight less than 13 tons, to transport supplies and lab facilities to the space station. Pang said it is the first time that the office confirmed plans to build a cargo spaceship, which is vital for long-term space missions. The public is being asked to submit suggestions for names and symbols to adorn the space station. "Considering past achievements and the bright future, we feel that the manned space program should have a more vivid symbol and that the future space station should carry a resounding and encouraging name," Wang Wenbao, director of the office, said at the news conference. China previously named the space lab "Tiangong" meaning heavenly palace, and the spacecraft to transport astronauts was named "Shenzhou", divine vessel. Its moon probes were named after the country's mythical Moon Goddess "Chang'e". But the names were selected without public input. "We now feel that the public should be involved in the names and symbols as this major project will enhance national prestige, and strengthen the national sense of cohesion and pride," Wang said. The public is welcomed to submit suggestions for the space station and its three modules, as well as symbols for the China Manned Space Engineering Program and the space station. Suggestions should be submitted between Monday and July 25 via websites including www.cmse.gov.cn or e- mailed to [email protected]. The result will be decided before the end of September. Suggested names for the cargo spaceship, however, should be submitted far earlier - between Monday and May 20. The result will be announced before the end of June, Wang said. According to Zhou Jianping, chief designer of the manned space program, the different deadlines are "due to time schedules for various projects", which indicated that the cargo spaceship project could soon begin development. China is now in the second phase of its manned space program. According to the schedule, a space module Tiangong-1 and the Shenzhou VIII spacecraft will be launched in the latter half of this year in the first unmanned rendezvous and docking mission. Shenzhou IX and Shenzhou X will be launched next year to dock with Tiangong-1. But problems in ensuring long-term missions for astronauts need to be overcome. Wang Zhaoyao, spokesman for the program, said that developing technology needed to guarantee mid-term missions in space (a stay of at least 20 days), and developing cargo supply technology will be among the tasks to be met during the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) period. The manned space program will lay the foundation for possible missions in future, such as sending men to the moon, according to the office's documents. Source: China Daily http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90881/7361197.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Nation – Pakistan India Exacerbates Nuclear Woes By Khan A Sufyan April 25, 2011 On May 18, 1974 India conducted its first ‗peaceful‘ nuclear test explosion, dubbing the operation ‗Smiling Buddha.‘ But Buddha himself would at best have smiled sardonically at seeing his name tied to such an experiment. After the test, India vowed never to weaponise its nuclear assets, a pledge that seems to have gone unheeded. A decade later, the country again set out to test its nuclear capabilities in the Operation Shakti tests - five nuclear tests conducted over three days. Pakistan soon followed suit. It has long been clear that India intended to go back on its non-nuclear weapon pledge. Indeed, an early indication was the commencement of the construction of a nuclear submarine after the 1974 nuclear test. Nuclear drills, meanwhile, were reportedly being taught to every Indian naval officer as early as the 1950s by officials from the Bharat Atomic Energy Centre (BARC) in Mumbai, where India converts fissile material into nuclear weapon cores. In 1976, Dr Homi Nusserwanji Sethna, the chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission at the time, created the Diesel Propulsion Research Team (DPRT), an apparent subterfuge for designing a nuclear propulsion plant for India‘s first nuclear submarine. A team of four naval officers led by Indian Navy Capt. PN Agarwala and Capt. Bharat Bhusan were inducted into the DPRT. Many Indian Naval officers at the time were also trained in nuclear engineering at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and subsequently transferred to the Defence Research and Development Organisation‘s classified nuclear submarine project, which was called the Advance Technology Vehicle (ATV). More recently, during a nuclear discussion session at the India International Centre New Delhi, former Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral shared an anecdote with the audience highlighting the Indian Navy‘s desire to induct nuclear submarines with a long-range nuclear missile launch capability. This was the same Gujral who, while ambassador in Moscow in 1979 – and on the instructions of Indian Defence Minister C Subramaniam, Indian Defence Secretary K Subrahmanyam and BARC Director Raja Ramanna – reportedly met Adm Sergei Gorshkov and sought assistance with India‘s quest for nuclear submarines and long-range, submarine-launched nuclear missiles. Gujral‘s efforts at the time led to the birth of the ATV and later the lease of Russian nuclear submarine INS Chakra to India. The nuclear reactor in INS Chakra was operated and maintained by Russians. All activities, including the top-secret ATV project, were said to have been kept from other Indian service chiefs and senior officers of the Indian Navy, a fact revealed years later by the then Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov in Moscow. In a similar instance of cooperation between India and Russia, the latter has also agreed to lease India Akula nuclear submarines, but with the catch that they do so while maintaining ‗full control‘ over them. With Akula, India will be in a position to launch submarine-borne long-range nuclear tipped ballistic missiles, which are also being developed with Russian assistance. How does all this fit into India‘s broader military strategy? Recently, in a seminar titled ‗Terrorism is a Derivative of Nuclear Deterrence‘ held at India‘s National Defence College, Indian National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon justified India‘s use of force in statecraft, citing recent changes in global strategic affairs. Such discussions are being conducted at various forums across the country in what seems like an attempt to prepare the Indian public (and send a veiled warning to friends and foes alike) for the idea that India could use force—including its nuclear capability—in pursuit of its geo-political objectives. Meanwhile, India is spending billions of dollars on other modern defence acquisitions, and will eventually be in a position to acquire an anti-ballistic missile capability with foreign support. This is without doubt a significant threat to Pakistan and the region as a whole. Still, India‘s build-up has been overshadowed in the Western media by stories of how Pakistan has doubled its nuclear arsenal over the last few years. But are there any real surprises in the news? In October 2001, the US Defence Threat Reduction Agency published a report titled Minimum Nuclear deterrent postures in South Asia: An Overview, which highlighted Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons capacity from dedicated facilities. A key conclusion of the study indicated that if fissile material production rates remained constant, by 2010 Pakistan‘s nuclear weapon equivalent quotient could grow to about 110, a number that seems to have been confirmed by the recent reports. India‘s stockpile (from dedicated facilities only) was estimated likely to number about 200. This would make sense as the Indian nuclear programme was initiated far earlier than Pakistan‘s, so it would have accumulated much more fissile material. With this in mind, why has all the focus been on Pakistan‘s nuclear capabilities? The sense among some Pakistanis is that external entities are attempting to break-up Pakistan. And, considering the level of unrest and political conflict here, it‘s easy to understand why they might think that. Either way, Pakistan will have to grapple with an increasingly nuclear future. –Diplomat http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/25-Apr-2011/India-exacerbates- nuclear-woes (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Times of India – India Antony, Forces Stress on Unconventional Threats Rather than China, Pakistan By Rajat Pandit, Tamil News Network (TNN) April 26, 2011 NEW DELHI: Rather than full-blown conventional wars with Pakistan or China, India at this point in time is faced more with unconventional threats like jihadi outfits getting hold of "dirty" nuclear bombs, crippling cyber-attacks and "hybrid forms of warfare". This was the hard-nosed assessment of the Indian defence establishment after defence minister A K Antony inaugurated the Army and IAF commanders' conferences here on Monday. Army chief General V K Singh, in fact, was quite categorical that "the major concern" at the moment was the ongoing "attempts" by "non-state actors" to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This comes in the backdrop of continuing fears that the threat of jihadi outfits gaining access to enriched uranium, nuclear components or technical know-how to make "dirty" bombs -- radiological dispersal devices combining radioactive material with suitable explosives – remains a clear and present danger in Pakistan, with or without official help. There have been instances to underline this fear in the past. In August 2001, for instance, two senior scientists of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme were spotted hobnobbing with Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al- Zawahiri in Afghanistan. Gen Singh, on his part, said though conventional conflicts were not on the horizon, the armed forces had to be ready to tackle "hybrids forms of warfare", which basically entails state and non-state actors joining hands to fight a common foe. This, of course, is also nothing new for India, targeted as it has been for long by the ISI-Lashkar-e- Taiba combine. Echoing similar views, Antony said terrorism emanating from across the border remained India's primary concern. "We are taking adequate steps to ensure any spill-over effect from any adverse development in Pakistan is successfully countered by our armed forces," he said. "Besides conventional threats, our armed forces have to reckon with non-conventional threats, cyber and information warfare. Though a conventional war is unlikely, there is need to maintain maximum level of operational preparedness to deal with such challenges," he added. The Navy, for instance, has in the past warned that terrorist outfits can exploit lax container security at Indian ports to smuggle in 'dirty' nuclear bombs or other WMDs. "Security concerns of the future will increasingly be dictated by economic, geopolitical, environmental, social and demographic considerations. Terrorism, cyber-attacks and sea piracy are some of the major challenges facing the nation," said Antony. Even as the Af-Pak region remains enmeshed in turmoil, political disturbances in West Asia and North Africa have forced fresh challenges for global security. "We have to be ready with a set of appropriate responses to counterbalance our interests," he said. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Antony-forces-stress-on-unconventional-threats-rather-than-China- Pakistan/articleshow/8085849.cms (Return to Articles and Documents List)

U.S. Air Force Air Force Officials Announce Helicopter Acquisition Strategy Air Force News Service (AFNS) April 25, 2011 By Master Sgt. Amaani Lyle, Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs WASHINGTON (AFNS) -- Air Force officials announced their strategy here April 25 to recapitalize the Air Force's helicopter fleet, which is critical to nuclear weapon security response, continuity of government, and combat search and rescue. The Air Force secretary and chief of staff have directed that the service proceed with full and open competition for both the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform program and the HH-60 recapitalization program. These two programs will hold separate competitions using their respective capability development documents approved by the joint requirements oversight council to meet the warfighter requirements. "The Air Force ultimately benefits from competition and allows industry to fully play in these acquisition programs," said Maj. Gen. Randal D. Fullhart, the global reach programs capability director. "We anticipate, based on market research and industry response to requests for information, that a derivative of helicopters already in production will be able to meet warfighter requirements." The CVLSP program fills identified capability gaps while replacing the current Air Force UH-1N Huey fleet, in which service officials noted deficiencies in carrying capacity, speed, range, endurance and survivability, General Fullhart said. The fleet will consist of 93 aircraft spread among Air Force Global Strike Command, the Air Force District of Washington and other major commands, he added. "For CVLSP we're anticipating a summer 2011 draft request for proposal release and the final RFP early fall," General Fullhart said. "We're proceeding toward an initial operating capability for common vertical lift support platform program in 2015." HH-60 recapitalization, officials said, is the Air Force's program to replace the 112 aging HH-60G Pave Hawks. The HH-60G is used primarily to conduct combat search and rescue, but is also used for emergency aero-medical evacuation, homeland security, humanitarian relief, international aid, non-combatant evacuation operations and special operations forces support. Air Force leaders noted that the current fleet is heavily tasked, with the Operation Enduring Freedom flying tempo being twice the standard utilization rate, and aircraft availability projected to be less than 50 percent by 2015. The anticipated request for proposal release for this program will be in 2012, General Fullhart said. While a long-term replacement remains critical, General Fullhart points out that 13 Pave Hawks have been lost to combat, training and civil rescue missions, and 54 of the remaining 99 HH-60G aircraft are currently undergoing repairs to correct major structural cracks. In response, service officials have implemented a short-term solution, the operational loss replacement program, to maintain current CSAR capability. Operational loss replacement, General Fullhart said, replaces lost aircraft and addresses the immediate need to maintain the operational availability of legacy HH-60Gs. Originally, losses were not replaced due to the anticipation of CSAR-X, a program that was since canceled, he said. This long- and short-term approach is the best way to deliver the required capabilities to the warfighter, General Fullhart explained. The CVLSP and HH-60 recapitalization will help ensure that the service sustains the warfighter's capabilities across the full spectrum of military operations, according to senior leaders. "As in the KC-X competition, the ability of offerors to meet requirements at best value to the taxpayer will be invaluable," General Fullhart said. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123253121 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Reuters U.K. OPINION/Analysis Analysis-North Korea Diplomacy at a Crossroads: Talk or Troubles? By Jeremy Laurence Seoul, Sunday, April 23, 2011 (Reuters) - Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter goes to North Korea this week to press it to show it is sincere about returning to aid-for-disarmament talks, but the chances of Pyongyang's giving up its nuclear program appear more remote than ever. The Nobel Peace prize winner will lead a delegation of former state leaders on a three-day visit to the secretive state, where they will also discuss U.N. agencies' appeals to provide food aid to the impoverished North. Analysts say the visit will probably yield more promises from North Korea, but unless it shows sincerity by matching words with actions -- such as allowing international nuclear inspectors back into the country -- the impasse over restarting nuclear talks will remain. North Korea quit six-party talks involving it, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, in 2009 after the United Nations imposed a new round of sanctions after the North conducted a second nuclear test and a long- range missile test. "I'd expect a few new North Korea overtures, in particular in connection with the Carter visit in late April, and the rest depends on the West's reaction," said Ruediger Frank, a North Korea expert at the University of Vienna. Carter achieved diplomatic success on the peninsula in 1994 when he brokered a deal which pulled Washington and Pyongyang back from the brink of war over the North's nuclear program. "At a time when official dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea appears to be at a standstill, we aim to see how we may be of assistance in reducing tensions and help the parties address key issues including denuclearisation," Carter, who was in Beijing Sunday, said in a statement. DPRK is the formal name of North Korea. John Delury, of Seoul's Yonsei University, said Pyongyang, Washington and Seoul like to "show themselves to be open to dialogue, so there's a lot of dancing around," but there is little genuine desire to make the six-party talks work. "Seoul and DC (Washington) strike me as ambivalent at best about returning to talks ... (the) only motivation is the negative one -- that sanctions don't seem to be working," he said. While Washington has said it "won't talk for talks' sake," experts say that while the two sides engage in dialogue the likelihood of the North staging a military attack like last year's deadly assault on a South Korean island diminishes. The South's spy chief, Won Sei-hoon, told lawmakers last week that North Korea could stage a missile or nuclear test if its appeals for talks failed, South Korean media reported. DIPLOMACY PICKS UP Over the past month, North Korea has embarked on a charm offensive sending officials to Berlin and London, where they also met former U.S. government officials to discuss their nuclear program and ways to end their political standoff. Nuclear envoys from the regional powers have also been shuttling back and forth in a bid to find a way to restart the talks. The main power brokers in the region, China and the United States, say the two Koreas must first hold bilateral nuclear talks as a prelude to ground-breaking U.S.-North Korea talks followed by six-party talks. But analysts say the six-party talks are doomed because the sides have very different agendas. The North sees the talks as a means of brokering denuclearisation of the entire peninsula, while Washington, Seoul and Tokyo say the agenda is focussed solely on the North. Moreover, few really believe the North will ever give up its program to make a nuclear bomb for it is the ultimate bargaining chip as well as a deterrent. Even the U.S. Commander in South Korea, Walter Sharp, this month said that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il believed he had to have "the bomb" to ensure regime survival. Uprisings in the Middle East and north Africa, in particular the events in one-time nuclear weapons aspirant Libya, have only served to strengthen the North's belief in a nuclear capability. North Korea said last month Western air strikes against Libya showed how it had become more vulnerable after scrapping its nuclear weapons program in 2003. But at the same time, the North's leadership will also be acutely aware of the West's resolve to pursue regime change in authoritarian states such as Libya, and it will be anxious not to invoke an Asian repeat. Before the "Jasmine" uprisings, experts predicted the North would likely make another aggressive move on the Korean peninsula, either in the form of a military attack or by conducting a nuclear or missile test, as early as this spring. "Due to the Libyan events, the probability of a new attack against the South diminished greatly, while a new missile and/or nuclear test is more likely than we could think a couple of months ago," said Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul. Editing by David Chance and Robert Birsel http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/04/24/uk-korea-north-idUKTRE73N06X20110424 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

IDN InDepthNews - Analysis That Matters - Germany OPINION/Analysis NASR Opens New Chapter in India-Pakistan Arms Race April 24, 2011 By Devinder Kumar IDN-InDepth NewsReport NEW DELHI (IDN) - A new chapter in arms race on the Indian subcontinent has been opened with Pakistan successfully conducting the first flight test of a newly developed short-range surface-to-surface missile capable of carrying both tactical nuclear and high-explosive conventional warheads. Named 'Hatf IX' or NASR, it is referred to by Pakistan's Inter Services Public Relations organisation as a 'Multi Tube Ballistic Missile' because the launch vehicle carries multiple missiles. NASR has a range of 60 km. It is powered by a high-thrust single-stage solid-propellant rocket motor. NASR's launch platform is a double-tube transporter erector launcher (TEL) capable of carrying two missiles. Media reports on April 19 described NASR as a quick response system which has "shoot-and-scoot‘" nuclear delivery capability. Control surfaces behind the nose and tail of the missile help in improving the missile's aerodynamic lift, stability and maneuverability during flight. According to military strategists, NASR test fire demonstrates that Pakistan has achieved the capability to deploy sub-kiloton, low yield tactical nuclear warheads. They view the Multi Tube Ballistic Missile as "Pakistan's answer to India's Cold Start Doctrine". The Chinese 'People's Daily Online' said quoting 'Islamabad Globe': "Much of this so called 'Cold Start Strategy' is based on the Israeli strategy which it tried to implement in Lebanon. Israel was unable to implement its objectives in Lebanon and had to withdraw even from the Litani River." It added: "The essence of the Cold Start doctrine is reorganising the army's offensive power that resides in the three strike corps into eight smaller division-sized integrated battle groups (IBGs) consisting of armour and mechanised infantry and artillery, closely supported by helicopter gunships, air force and airborne troops (parachute and heliborne). "The IBGs are to be positioned close to the border so that three to five are launched into Pakistan along different axes within 72 to 96 hours from the time mobilisation is ordered. "The probable objective areas for Cold Start could be (1) Ravi-Chenab corridor from two directions, an IBG along Jammu-Sialkot-Daska axis and another across the Ravi to link up with the first IBG, and (2) in the south against Reti-Rahim Yar Khan-Kashmore complex." The online Chinese daily went on to say: "The U.S. had taken up concerns by Pakistan on the perceived Cold Start strategy of the Indian Army that envisages rapid deployment of troops on the western border to escalate to a full blown war within days but has been told that such a doctrine does not exist but is a term that has been fabricated by think tanks. "The matter was repeatedly taken up by senior U.S. Defence delegations after Pakistan voiced concerns that diverting more troops to the Afghan border would not be feasible given the Indian Cold Start strategy that could bring offensive elements of the Indian Army to its eastern border within four days." Referring to India's Cold Start Doctrine, Pakistani defence analyst, Shireen Mazari said: "India has always felt that Pakistan had a loophole in terms of lacking short range battlefield nuclear weapons, which it could exploit on the assumption that it made little sense for Pakistan to respond to such conventional attacks with strategic nuclear weapons." Mazari added: "With NASR, Pakistan has plugged that loophole. Indian dreams of a limited war against Pakistan through its 'cold start' strategy have been put into permanent 'cold storage.' This will allow for a reassertion of a stable nuclear deterrence in the region." Strategic Plans Division Khalid Ahmed Kidwai said the successful NASR testing marked a milestone in consolidating Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum. Kidwai pointed out that in the hierarchy of military operations, NASR provided "Pakistan with short range missile capability in addition to the already available medium and long range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in its inventory". Analysing the NASR testing, Ali Ahmed, an analyst at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) said: "Pakistan is the weaker side in the India-Pakistan dyad. Recognising this structural factor, its military, which also runs the state, has been constantly innovative in addressing what it perceives as an asymmetry. It has resorted to external balancing in renting out its strategic location for geopolitical use by external powers. It has forged a close relationship with China to balance India and help China in its strategic purposes in relation to India." The Nasr test, said Ahmed, coincided with the launch of corps level Indian military manoeuvres, Exercise 'Vijayi Bha', in the Rajasthan deserts. Pakistan's nuclear related rhetoric is also designed to increase the salience of the nuclear overhang and addresses multiple audiences, in particular the U.S., he added. Ahmed said the intention was to "get the U.S. focus back on the eastern front in terms of making the admittedly delicate balance seem untenably unstable, in light of U.S. keenness to get the Pakistani Army take on the Taliban in North Waziristan." The prestigious IDSA analyst said the NASR was meant to deter India's launch of Cold Start. Since NASR is reportedly nuclear capable, short range and light weight, it could imply the use of tactical nuclear weapons were such a conflict to occur. "Fearing a lower nuclear threshold, implied by availability of tactical nuclear weapons, India may be deterred from embarking on Cold Start. This would enable Pakistan to recreate the space it once had for continuing its prosecution of proxy war -- a space that has been constricted by India's formulation of a Cold Start doctrine, even though all the components of the doctrine such as weapons acquisitions, relocation of formations and change to a manoeuvre war culture are not yet entirely in place," Ahmed explained. http://www.indepthnews.net/news/news.php?key1=2011-04-24%2023:05:33&key2=1 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis (IDSA) - India OPINION/Analysis Making Sense of ‘Nasr’ Ali Ahmed April 24, 2011 News reports have it that Pakistan has successfully conducted a test of a surface-to-surface short range Hatf IX (Nasr), described as a multi-tube ballistic missile with a ‗shoot and scoot‘ capability. The statement of the Director- General of the Strategic Plans Division, Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, that the flight consolidated Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum indicates that Nasr is nuclear capable. To Pakistani analyst, Dr. Shireen Mazari, ‗It (Nasr) will act as a deterrent against use of mechanised conventional land forces. This was essential in the wake of India's adventurist war-fighting doctrine formulations, which envisaged the use of rapid deployment of armed brigades and divisions in surprise and rapid attacks.‘ She believes, ‗Indian dreams of a limited war against Pakistan through its Cold Start strategy have been laid to rest. This will allow for a reassertion of a stable nuclear deterrence in the region.‘ This article analyses if Dr. Mazari is right. Pakistan is the weaker side in the India-Pakistan dyad. Recognising this structural factor, its military, which also runs the state, has been constantly innovative in addressing what it perceives as an asymmetry. It has resorted to external balancing in renting out its strategic location for geopolitical use by external powers. It has forged a close relationship with China to balance India and help China in its strategic purposes in relation to India. For over quarter of a century, it has tried to gain ‗depth‘, forward of its defences, by rendering rear area security problematic for Indian forces through its proxy war. It has attempted internal balancing by reportedly training five lakh irregulars for making India‘s stabilisation operations untenable, even at the risk and cost of the backlash it is currently enduring. This explains the utilisation of the development of Nasr for purposes beyond merely doctrinal. Further, Pakistan employs information operations interestingly and to some effect. For instance, it claims to have equalised India‘s number of nuclear tests at Chagai and insists that these give a variegated capability. It periodically claims success of missile tests from the point of view of deterrence signalling. The Nasr test, for instance, coincided with the launch of corps level Indian military manoeuvres, Exercise Vijayi Bhav, in the Rajasthan deserts. Pakistan‘s nuclear related rhetoric is also designed to increase the salience of the nuclear overhang and addresses multiple audiences, in particular the US. Its prosecution of operations against the Taliban in FATA and Khyber Pakhtoonwa province has been marked by much sound and fury, particularly with respect to the displacement of people. Its deployment of nationalist strategic analysts to inform, rationalise, legitimise and influence has been proactive. All these resulted in a former US president once famously mistaking South Asia to be the most ‗dangerous‘ place in the world! This creditable record of information warfare requires to appropriately condition analyses of developments like that of the Nasr. Nasr‘s flight test had both Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai and Dr. Shireen Mazari giving their opinions. This clearly indicates that even if Nasr is a forbidding reality by itself, the same needs underlining and highlighting for effect. Multiple aims are thus achieved. The purported aim is deterrence, which explains the timing to coincide with the Indian exercise. It could also be to get the US focus back on the eastern front in terms of making the admittedly delicate balance seem untenably unstable, in light of US keenness to get the Pakistani Army take on the Taliban in North Waziristan. That said, taking Nasr seriously at face-value helps arrive at its actual significance. The development of Nasr indicates that Pakistan views India‘s Cold Start doctrine with concern. The Nasr is meant to deter India‘s launch of Cold Start. Since Nasr is reportedly nuclear capable, short range and light weight, it could imply the use of tactical nuclear weapons were such a conflict to occur. Fearing a lower nuclear threshold, implied by availability of tactical nuclear weapons, India may be deterred from embarking on Cold Start. This would enable Pakistan to recreate the space it once had for continuing its prosecution of proxy war - a space that has been constricted by India‘s formulation of a Cold Start doctrine, even though all the components of the doctrine such as weapons acquisitions, relocation of formations and change to a manoeuvre war culture are not yet entirely in place. It has been assessed that Pakistani reliance on its nuclear cover would increase with India‘s increasing felicity with Limited War doctrine. Pakistan is reportedly ahead of India in numbers of nuclear warheads and in a more variegated missile delivery capability. This, to one analyst, spells a strategy of ‗asymmetric escalation‘. In the Pakistani logic, nuclear deterrence is also to operate at the conventional level. Nasr, to Dr. Mazari, makes for deterrence stability since it helps strengthen this dimension of nuclear stability. Dr. Mazari is right on deterrence stability, but gets her reason wrong - the reference to Cold Start being anachronistic. India‘s Army Chief has indicated that no such doctrine exists. It appears that the Indian military is looking to respond to subconventional provocations at the same level. This may be in the form of surgical strikes, Special Forces operations, border skirmishes, activation of the Line of Control, select punitive operations, etc. The Indian intent will be to convey a message of resolve as well as to punish and cause selective attrition. And the aim would be to address Pakistani cost-benefit calculations in such a manner as to coerce Pakistan into limiting its provocation below India‘s ‗level of tolerance‘. Such a course of action by India has internal political utility in letting off steam in terms of ‗something‘ being done. It is also decidedly less expensive, preserving India‘s grand strategy of economic rise from being unnecessarily buffeted. The Indian move away from a default resort to Limited War places the onus of escalation on Pakistan. India‘s conventional capability is to ensure that Pakistani reaction to such subconventional retribution is non-escalatory. Should Pakistan try to respond with conventional action, that would provoke a ‗Cold Start‘ by India. Pakistan would thus be placed a second time round in a position of decision to escalate, this time by using Nasr. The prospects of Pakistan‘s self-deterrence under such circumstances are higher. In the event, Pakistan will be forced to react defensively to India‘s ‗contingency‘ operations. In case push comes to shove and Pakistan does resort to the use of Nasr, then this would more likely be on its own territory, rather than provocatively on Indian launch pads close to the border. India‘s promised retaliation may not then necessarily be along the lines of its nuclear doctrine of ‗massive‘ punitive retaliation (strategy having the privilege of departing from doctrine). The net result would be further nuclear impact(s) on Pakistani territory. In other words, stability reigns not due to India being deterred, but Pakistan being self-deterred. Accountability for initiating both the conflict and a possible nuclear conflict would rest with the Pakistani military. The aftermath would surely find it decisively pushed off its commanding perch in Pakistan by an angered people. In rethinking Cold Start as a default option and working towards proactive ‗contingency‘ options, India is a step ahead in doctrinal shadow boxing. It appears to be playing by Schelling‘s concept of Limited War as a ‗bargaining‘ process: ‗It is in wars that we have come to call ‗limited wars‘ that the bargaining appears most vividly and is conducted most consciously. The critical targets in such a war are the mind of the enemy…the threat of violence in reserve is more important than the commitment of force in the field… And, like any bargaining situation, a restrained war involves some degree of collaboration between adversaries.‘ (Schelling, Arms and Influence (1966). The challenge in South Asia is to ensure that the contest remains at the doctrinal level. Keeping it so entails getting into a doctrinal dialogue with Pakistan so that the ‗collaboration‘, mentioned by Schelling, can be from a mutually intelligible script. Ali Ahmed is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. A former infantry colonel, he has written for professional journals while in service. In 1999-2000, he was a Fellow at the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi. He is a PhD candidate in international politics at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His articles have appeared in idsa.in, claws.in, ipcs.org and elsewhere in print. He has a MPhil in International Relations (Cantab), MA in War Studies (London), MSc in Defence and Strategic Studies (Madras). http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/MakingSenseofNasr_aahmed_240411 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Hudson New York OPINION Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine By Taylor Dinerman April 25, 2011 Although US policymakers have long been concerned about the possibility that Pakistan's nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists such as the Taliban or Al Qa'eda, a related question has not gotten quite as much attention: What is Pakistan's doctrine for using these weapons in any possible future war with India? An article by Commander Muhammad Azam Khan (ret.) of the Pakistani Navy, in the March issue of the US Naval Institute's magazine,Proceeding, gives us a small, but frightening, look at the way Pakistan's military thinks about using its nuclear force. Entitled "India's Cold Start is Too Hot," the piece is ostensibly a critique of the Indian "Cold Start" strategic concept, which would allow India's armored units to launch a limited offensive into Pakistan with little or no preparation. Commander Khan's article includes a glimpse of when and why the Pakistani military could initiate a nuclear war, as in his comment: "The country's (Pakistan's) military planners must think beyond using tactical nuclear weapons," -- indicating that he is uncomfortable with Pakistan's plans to use nuclear weapons in the early stage of any future conflict with India. At first glance, the logic behind Pakistan's nuclear policy is not too far removed from NATO's so-called "tactical" nuclear doctrine, which, beginning in the early 1950s, was designed to compensate for the West's lack of conventional military "mass" by using Pakistan's nuclear firepower. Traditionally, tactical nuclear weapons are those designed to attack military targets on the battlefield and strategic ones are designed to hit cities, industrial targets and military bases deep inside the enemies homeland. When discussing the battlefield or tactical use of nuclear weapons, however, it is worth keeping in mind that from the point of view of people close to the action, any use of nuclear weapons in their vicinity is strategic. To put it bluntly, for Americans, during the Cold War, nuclear weapons going off in Europe might be "tactical," but nuclear weapons going off on US soil would have been "strategic." The concept was revised several times, but when the Soviets achieved nuclear equality -- and later nuclear superiority in all classes of nuclear weapons -- the NATO "tactical" nuclear doctrine became essentially irrelevant. By the late 1970s, the USSR had both nuclear and conventional superiority over the Western allies. As a result, NATO not only spent hundreds of billions of dollars building up its conventional force, but also made a modest effort to modernize its nuclear force, so that by the late 1980s, NATO's military power was roughly a match for that of the Soviet armed forces and their allies. Pakistan's strategy is motivated by forces other than simple self defense. Its defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, which the Bangladeshis refer to as their War of Independence, is fiercely resented by Islamabad's elite. This resentment, when combined with persistent politically and religiously motivated terrorism as well as nuclear capability, has created what is possibly the single most unstable state on Earth. This instability may very well mean that the usual fears and restraints that leaders have when considering actually using nuclear weapons are not as present as they might be elsewhere. For India, this has meant that Pakistan has been the base for launching three major assaults: the first in 1999, when the Pakistani Army launched a covert offensive in the Kargil region of the disputed Kashmir province; the second in 2001, when terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi; and the third in 2008, when there was a major terrorist strike on Bombay (Mumbai). Commander Azam Khan claims, with some satisfaction, that, in 2001, when India deployed forces near it's Northwest border, "India lost face because of its failure to elicit any strategic gains from Pakistan." Azam Khan further explains that he believes India has revised its plans and now has embraced a "Cold Start" operational concept that would allow India to launch an offensive with virtually no notice -- an apprehension not entirely credible, as not even the best trained and best prepared military is able effectively to mount an attack without at least a few days' preparation. Pakistan's perception of the "Cold Start" concept enunciated by Commander Khan is "that Indian offensive operations would not give Pakistan time to bring diplomacy into play and that such offensive operations would not cross the nuclear threshold nor prompt Pakistan into crossing it." This means he perceives that India believes that the Indian Army assumes it could launch a limited a ttack on Pakistani territory without fear of a Pakistani nuclear strike. The commander claims that this is a dangerous assumption. the fact that Pakistan would threaten to use nuclear weapons against Indian conventional forces on its own territory may seem normal, or at least as normal as anything to do with the use of nuclear weapons is "normal," but in the context of Pakistan's internal politics and its belief that India is obsessively out to attack it, this idea could lead to what Commander Khan calls "Armageddon." Other sources indicate that "Cold Start" is an Indian Army concept that has not been accepted as official doctrine by either the Indian high command or by India's political leadership. This difference is significant as, unlike Pakistan, the Indian Armed Forces have always respected ultimate civil authority. As Pakistan can never hope to match Indian conventional or nuclear strength, it might therefore attempt to make up for this weakness by appearing to be "a little crazy." That method of masking weakness with bluster has been seen before, most notably by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's Iraq after its defeat by the US-led coalition in 1991. For Saddam, the results were unhappy; for Pakistan, a strategy based on looking ferocious while actually being weak could lead to results that are even more unhappy. As a naval officer, Commander Khan makes a good case that both his nation and India depend for their economic survival on access to the world's oceans. He claims that a naval offensive aimed at India's Western Coast could do enough damage to its economy that this might substitute for the tactical use of nuclear weapons. However this strategy would take months to be effective, and in any future Indo-Pakistani war both sides would seek to end it on their own terms, as soon as possible. India's ability to blockade Pakistan's ports and Pakistan's ability to harass, but not to destroy, India's shipping, adds to the strategic imbalance on the subcontinent. It would take a huge increase in the size and effectiveness of Pakistan's Navy to change this imbalance; such an increase is well beyond the ability of Pakistan's economy to sustain. The Indian Navy's increasing cooperation with the US disturbs Commander Khan; he claims that Pakistan has the option of offering China's Navy bases and support to counter Indian-US seapower. Just how attractive this option is to China may be questionable. If Pakistan were to turn its back on the United States, China might hesitate to entangle itself with a second unstable, impoverished, nuclear-armed state. One North Korea might be all China prefers to tolerate. http://www.hudson-ny.org/2040/pakistan-nuclear-doctrine (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Japan Times – Japan OPINION Monday, April 25, 2011 SENTAKU MAGAZINE Mideast Unnerving North Korea Sentaku North Korea's ruler and his heir apparent are scared stiff at the prospect of prodemocracy movements spreading from the Middle East and northern Africa to their home turf. Even though the North Korean populace are said not to have access to Twitter and other modern means of communications — unlike their counterparts in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen — they appear able to obtain more information on the outside world through cell phones and other methods than is generally thought. It is this advance in information technology within the world's most isolated state that has caused much uneasiness for Pyongyang's supreme leader Kim Jong Il and his son Kim Jong Un, who is certain to succeed the father. Radio Free Asia (RFA), broadcast from the United States, has reported that high-ranking officials of the Korean Workers' Party were informed in February of the situation in Egypt through an intraparty publication circulated exclusively to the top echelon. The paper attributed antigovernment demonstrations to economic mismanagement, but made no mention of Egypt's protracted autocratic rule. This indicates all the more clearly, the RFA says, that Pyongyang is becoming increasingly nervous about the situation in the Middle East. Even though it is extremely difficult to know what is happening with the North Korean government and leadership, other information on North Korea gets out of the country quickly. South Korea can obtain news on most major events that have happened in the north with practically no time lag. If such information can flow out of the country in real time, there should be no doubt that outside information is flowing in just as fast. The main instrument for transmitting outside information into North Korea is cell phones in China. China has built up a broad network of cell-phone transmission stations along its border with North Korea, making phone communications with Seoul or Tokyo easy. Those traveling back and forth between China and North Korea are bringing cell phones into North Korea. According to a survey financed by subsidies from the U.S. State Department of 250 North Korean defectors to China, 7 percent of them were using cell phones inside North Korea. Cell-phone service, which started in the North in 2002, is available only to a limited group of people. Yet, the number of users has now jumped to more than 300,000 now — more than 1 percent of the population — compared with a mere 69,000 in September 2009. Orascom Telecom is the cell-phone service provider in North Korea. Ironically it is headquartered in Egypt, a foutainhead of the prodemocracy movements so dreaded by Kim and son. Orascom CEO Khaled Bichara has predicted that within four to five years more than 1 million North Koreans will be using cell phones. It has become fairly easy for North Korean defectors residing in South Korea or Japan to communicate with friends and families back home by telephone if they pay off brokers and wait three to seven days. These brokers also serve as "underground banks." When money is sent to banks inside China, it reaches designated North Koreans with the help of "collaborators" inside North Korea. This would suggest that, contrary to the general assumption, North Koreans are not "innocent people" who know nothing of what goes on outside their own country. A Japanese journalist who has made a number of secret trips to the North says that, although Pyongyang is desperately trying to shut out incoming information, the attempt is almost meaningless. According to this journalist, when an officer of a foreign nongovernmental organization visiting the North asked a resident there in February if the latter knew of what was happening in North Africa, he replied that he did in a matter-of-course manner. North Korean leaders, meanwhile, are trying to strengthen ideological control over the people. The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported recently that restrictions that China had imposed on the Internet "have dealt a blow to actions that mislead people's minds and create social instability." A Japanese scholar who recently visited China says he was puzzled to hear a Chinese official say publicly that under no circumstances would Beijing allow the North Korean regime to collapse and that China would come to the regime's aid if needed. This surprised the scholar because, even though the North has long been known as a Chinese "vassal state," Beijing in the past had never admitted to this sentiment. The same Chinese official was also quoted as saying that son Kim Jong Un would receive the same warm welcome on his visit to China in the near future as his father Kim Jong Il received on his tour of Beijing shortly after he was nominated to succeed his father Kim Il Sung, the founder of the communist state. This indicates China feels the same sense of crisis as North Korea about the prospect of prodemocracy movements in Middle East and North Africa influencing its people. North Koreans do not appear able to rise up against their leaders in a unified manner as people in North Africa and the Middle East have done. That's because their thoughts and actions are watched vigilantly by five layers of organizations, including the Korean Workers Party, the national security division and monitors at the workplace. Nevertheless, the father-son team seems scared. This is reminiscent of Pyongyang in 1989, when then father and son Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il had a helicopter made ready for their possible escape to another country after hearing the news that Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu had been executed in the revolution against his dictatorship. Is the same sense of dread felt by today's father and son? More intriguing is the view from the ground up: Has an insurgent mood reached the point in North Korea as to make the hereditary leaders nervous? Some believe that a small incident could very well ignite a major explosion. This is an abridged translation of an article from the April issue of Sentaku, a monthly magazine covering Japanese political, social and economic issues. http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20110425a2.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Nation – Pakistan OPINION/Editorial The Terrorism Monster April 25, 2011 It is an undeniable reality that before the Americans‘ vengefulness drove them to a disastrous misadventure in Afghanistan no one had heard of the terrorism monster in the tribal areas or, for that matter, elsewhere in Pakistan. It is the wholehearted help and cooperation our government extended to the US to facilitate its prosecution of the so- called war on terror that brought that curse upon this land, and it will not go away till the US and NATO troops had packed up from Afghanistan and went back home. Thus, the assertion of COAS General Kayani that Pakistan security forces have broken the back of terrorists and the nation would soon prevail upon them is a plain fallacy. For one thing, the military‘s own spokesman is reported to have maintained only recently after the Kayani- Mullen meeting that the drone attacks ―undermine our national effort (to fight terrorism)‖; it raises the question, how would Pakistan succeed in prevailing upon the militants, if the US shows no intention of stopping these attacks, as bluntly reaffirmed by Admiral Mullen in an interview with a private TV channel of Pakistan? For another, there comes to mind a basic and most pertinent question, why on earth has Pakistan taken up the cudgels on behalf of the US, especially when it stipulates killing our own people? Both the indiscriminate use of drones and our own policy of fighting the tribesmen have created a strong sense of resentment not only among the targeted people, but also other citizens in the country. Their perception that Pakistan‘s involvement in the war is ground enough to treat the government that helps promote the US anti-terrorist cause as an enemy on the basis of the principle, ‗the friend of an enemy is an enemy‘ is hard to question. The Washington Post, quoting a Pakistani security analyst, says that General Kayani‘s remarks are in response to Admiral Mullen‘s accusations of foot-dragging in launching a military campaign in North Waziristan and the ISI‘s links with the Haqqani network, and reflects a stalemate in the Pak-US ties. There is no doubt that Pakistan‘s alliance with the US in this war has cost it dearly. The terrorists‘ revenge has caused us the loss of thousands precious lives, created a climate of pervasive insecurity in the country and ruined our economy, to boot. At this moment when this association with the US is not just harming our interests but also does not promise to yield any good results in the future, we have to take a decisive step. If General Kayani says, no sacrifice is too great for sovereignty, there should be no hesitation in breaking off the alliance. All cooperation with the US must stop and as it is not likely to hold back drones from violating our sovereignty, shoot them down. Only then the Army would be living up to the expectations of the nation; otherwise General Kayani‘s words would turn out to be no more than hot air. http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Opinions/Editorials/25-Apr-2011/The- terrorism-monster (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The News International – Pakistan OPINION Is ISI the Problem? By Ahmed Quraishi Monday, April 25, 2011 It is if you believe the reasoning that Admiral Mike Mullen offered as he barged into Pakistan with a daring move, attacking our premier spy service on our home turf. This signifies two problems. One is that our high tolerance level emboldens our antagonists. Adm Mullen feels he can raise the stakes and do something he never did before because he knows there won‘t be any public consequence strong enough to deter him. Someone in Islamabad or Rawalpindi should have told him, ‗If you feel this is the way to negotiate differences, by embarrassing us in front of our own people, then that‘s the wrong way of doing it‘, followed by a cancellation of his official engagements here until he retracts. The second problem with his statement – that the ISI maintains links to Afghan Taliban factions – is that he is putting the ISI at the centre of the Pakistan-US dispute. That‘s factually incorrect. But instead of correcting Mr Mullen, the responses from the Pakistani side are defensive in nature – ‗the Haqqani network are our adversaries too‘ or ‗we‘re too busy right now to take action against them‘ or ‗it‘s just a matter of time before we take action‘. The fact is: It is not the ISI but the deliberate American damage to vital Pakistani interests over a decade that is at the core of the current Pak-US dispute. The drone issue or the Raymond Davis affair is just an offshoot. Mr Mullen‘s diagnosis is self-serving. The question is: why is he getting away with it without being challenged? To be fair, the Pakistani Army chief did decry the ‗negative propaganda‘ that the United States is waging against Pakistan. It‘s the first time any Pakistani official used these two words together to describe the behaviour of our friends in Washington. But it‘s not enough because our duplicitous ally is still scoring points in the battle for perceptions. It is time we wiggled out of the commitments made by two presidents, Mr Musharraf and Mr Zardari, to America‘s Afghan war. President Zardari is likely to support this policy change. The United States failed to live up to the post- 2002 commitments to its Pakistani ally. The Americans almost turned Afghanistan into an Indian outpost, created conditions for insurgencies in Balochistan and FATA, and caused us up to $80 billion in direct and indirect losses and millions of displaced, killed and injured Pakistanis. The Pakistani military should commission a policy review that concludes with a recommendation to the government to formally exit America‘s war. The notion that the United States would retaliate militarily to a sovereign Pakistani policy decision is exaggerated. Washington is in no position to do that. Pakistan‘s issues with domestic religious extremism can and will be resolved domestically. Any future Pakistani assistance to the US war effort in Afghanistan can be negotiated under new terms. The Americans are trying to create an impression that their interference in Pakistan is important to help Pakistan defeat extremism. For example, Adm Mullen came here last week emphasising, ‗the long-term US commitment to supporting Pakistan in its fight against violent extremists‘. It is amazing how Washington has been redefining the mission and moving the goal posts over the past decade with no questions asked from our side of course. The strength and ability of terror groups such as TTP and BLA to resupply will end when CIA ends its grand strategic project in Afghanistan. We should tell Washington that we will maintain ties to legitimate Afghan parties, including the Afghan government and Afghan Taliban. American demands to cut off ties to any one of them are misplaced. If an Afghan group that Pakistan maintains links with is killing US soldiers in Afghanistan, this is not necessarily Pakistan‘s design or responsibility. It is the result of flawed US policies in Afghanistan over the last decade, and a result of ignoring Pakistani advice. It is also time to loudly question CIA ‗assessments‘ about the number of al-Qaeda remnants in the Afghanistan- Pakistan region. We know the figure is insignificant to pose any threat to anyone. The US military and CIA inflate these assessments to justify prolonging the Afghan war and, more importantly, to justify meddling in Pakistan. The US is also pandering to its Indian ally by telling another lie, that the pro-Kashmir Lashkar-e-Taiba group, which is opposed to Indian military presence in Kashmir, has somehow metamorphosed into a ‗global threat.‘ This is political propaganda. The writer works for Geo television. http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=43521&Cat=9&dt=4/25/2011 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

The Express Tribune – Pakistan OPINION Stupidity Goes Nuclear — I By Ejaz Haider April 26, 2011 An April 19 press release from the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) tells us that Pakistan has ―successfully conducted the 1st flight test of the newly developed Short Range Surface to Surface Multi Tube Ballistic Missile Hatf IX (NASR)‖ which is supposed ―to add deterrence value to Pakistan‘s Strategic Weapons Development programme at shorter ranges‖. For good measure, we are also informed that ―NASR, with a range of 60 km, carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes [sic]. This quick response system addresses the need to deter evolving threats.‖ I wish I could rejoice in this ―achievement‖. Let‘s consider some aspects of nuclear strategy, avoiding, as far as possible, technicalities to analyse this system‘s test. Deterrence works best through denial. Its stability springs from a combination of the catastrophic deadliness of nuclear weapons and the mutual vulnerability of the adversaries — each is deterred by the certainty of the other‘s response and the inevitable destruction it would cause. If either of these two conditions changes, deterrence runs the risk of dilution. This is why, all else being equal, a counter-value strategy, targeting cities, offers the best deterrence, because it threatens maximum collateral damage in terms of enormous destruction of infrastructure and the deaths of millions of people. The logic of this is that greater sophistication of nuclear devices and delivery systems, while allowing for precision targeting, risks diluting deterrence by decreasing collateral damage. In a counter-force strike, which aims at taking out the adversary‘s military assets, the damage will definitely not be as extensive as a counter-value strike against a hugely populated city. This is as far as the strategic, long-range nuclear arsenal goes. The problem increases in the case of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), which are generally low-yield, area weapons meant for battlefield use (I eschew the issue of employment which can even render a higher yield weapon tactical). This is where our latest ―success‖ comes in. The NASR test is a signal that we have TNW capability, that this capability is plutonium-based, and that, marvel of marvels, we can miniaturise at this level and, because the ISPR press release refers to NASR as a ballistic missile, that we can achieve sub-orbital flight of a 60 km rocket (this last one has me totally stumped, by the way). But let‘s leave NASR here for a while and go back in time to see what the United States achieved with TNWs. Remember that the learning curve in the case of the US and the USSR constituted one flawed question: How to fight a nuclear war and win? The various strategies to this end, all of which are luckily RIP, brought the calculus of conventional war to bear on a weapon whose destructive potential was simply intolerable. This is why the debate on the development, deployment and possible uses of TNWs by the 1960s had run out of life. This is how it went and here I quote from an article I wrote for The Friday Times as far back as January 21-25, 2005. ―The concept of TNWs was based on a policy that sought to reduce the conventional imbalance between Nato and Warsaw Pact forces. Proponents suggested that small-yield short-range battlefield weapons would increase the strategic nuclear threshold by lessening the salience of strategic nuclear weapons, although TNWs were not strictly perceived as an alternative to strategic bombing but as a supplement to it. ―The logic to develop and deploy TNWs was pegged on three main propositions: it would be difficult for the other side (Warsaw Pact) to develop them any time soon and therefore the option would afford Nato an advantage for some time; they could be used without too much collateral damage; finally, their use would favour defence (note that for a long time the tendency was to look at nuclear weapons in the classic defence-offence equation). ―The first of these propositions became invalid in short order because the USSR developed TNWs by the mid-fifties, blunting any advantage Nato might have enjoyed. Also, it became clear that TNWs could not only be used by the defending forces against invading columns but equally effectively employed by an attacking force – just like it would conventional artillery to soften up the defences. And once the USSR deployed these weapons it became certain that there was no inherent advantage to be had by the defenders of possessing TNWs. Finally, since the most likely battleground for a direct hot conflict between Nato and Warsaw Pact forces would have been central Europe, the proposition that low-yield weapons would have less collateral damage was proved erroneous by military exercises.‖ In our case, will we be using this weapon system for war fighting against an attacking Indian force on our soil? There can be no other use for such a weapon. If it does come to that, our deterrence would already have failed and I cannot see how use of TNWs will constitute a climb on the escalatory ladder to resurrect it. We are, of course, not even considering how our own troops and population would be exposed to the fallout from a TNW. Neither am I even touching upon the hair-raising issue of command and control of this system dispersed right down to the units and sub-units by the very logic of its deployment and employment. Meanwhile, why would an adversary not raise the bar after its force is struck with a TNW? This was precisely the folly of strategies that led to the development of sophisticated and more accurate missiles. It was thought that striking and degrading only the enemy‘s hard targets would prevent him from an all-out nuclear strike. Someone realised that it was stupid to determine the enemy‘s response for him! Moreover, our deterrence is pegged on NOT fighting a war, i.e., ensuring prevention of war by denying India its conventional advantage. This weapon system is about fighting a war, or supposed employment in case hostilities break out. That makes a mockery of our basic strategic requirement. Are we now going to frame and put the old deterrence on a wall in a drawing room? At the minimum, going for this kind of system reflects a mindset, one of paranoia, which ends up signalling to the adversary the exact opposite of what needs to be signalled — ie we are confident of our deterrent. Instead, we are happily embarked on diluting our deterrent and consider it an outstanding achievement. But this is not all. There are other troubling questions related to the civil-military imbalance and flawed decision- making to which I shall return in the follow-up. The writer was a Ford Scholar at the Programme in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at UIUC (1997) and a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy Studies Programme. http://tribune.com.pk/story/156311/stupidity-goes-nuclear--i/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)

JoongAng Ilbo – South Korea OPINION Viewpoint - Dancing a Delusional Tango Just like the old days, Carter still appears to be on Pyongyang’s side. Kim Jong-il will try to use Carter just like his father had done. By Kim Jin April 26, 2011 Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter is on a visit to Pyongyang. When it comes to Korean Peninsula affairs, Carter appears to look at a half side of the world. He denounced the development- and patriotism-driven dictatorship but spared criticism on the corruption and hereditary power succession of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-il. Once again, he won‘t look through the cruel truth of the three-generation power succession. Moreover, he is infatuated with the fantasy of serving as a peacemaker and is likely to dance to Kim Jong-il‘s whistle of a disguised gesture of peace. In the 1970s, President Park Chung Hee was fighting against two enemies, North Korea and poverty. He protected Korea against the North Korean threat with the Korea-U.S. alliance and established a solid economy with dictatorship focused on development. Yet, Carter, the leader of the ally, put two daggers - withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea and the human rights concerns - against Park. Pulling out the U.S. forces from Korea was a dangerous game that threatened the existence of the allied nation. But right after he came into power, Carter aggressively pursued withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea. In addition, he demanded Park release anti-government figures. Until then, Washington‘s overseas human rights policy was quite realistic. The United States criticized human rights oppression in the communist bloc while reserving criticism against inevitable dictatorships in developing allies. Carter pursued just the opposite. His human rights foreign policy was a chaotic dance. He publicly denounced human rights violations in allies, including South Korea. Yet, he never openly pressed on human rights conditions in communist countries such as the Soviet Union and China. Carter‘s unrealistic human rights foreign policy led to unfavorable consequences for the United States. Iran had been a strong anti-communist ally but the Islamic Revolution of 1979 overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty and installed an extremist anti-American rule under Ayatollah Khomeini. In the late 1970s, North Korea‘s threat to the South was direct and real. In April 1975, South Vietnam fell. Kim Il Sung augmented armaments and tested the Korea-U.S. alliance with a shocking provocation. In 1976, North Korean soldiers murdered U.S. Army officers with axes at Panmunjom. Nevertheless, Carter pressured Park Chung Hee, rather than Kim Il Sung. Withdrawal of the U.S. forces did not actually happen - due to strong domestic and overseas opposition - but four years of the Carter administration was a painful time for Park Chung Hee and Koreans. In 1994, Pyongyang declared its intention to pursue nuclear development and the Korean Peninsula was faced with a serious crisis. Carter visited Pyongyang at the invitation of Kim Il Sung. The meeting opened a door for negotiation between Pyongyang and Washington as well as the inter-Korean summit meeting. Carter still boasts that his visit to Pyongyang became a breakthrough of the crisis. However, in the end, it was not a breakthrough. North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program but it has been revealed that it stealthily continued nuclear development using uranium enrichment. Kim Il Sung used Carter to escape the U.N. sanction and earned valuable time and money for nuclear development. Of course, not just Carter, but the entire world was deceived. However, Carter was actively caught in a trap. If he hadn‘t traveled to Pyongyang - and if the United Nations had effectively exercised sanctions - the situation would have been very different. Just like the old days, Carter still appears to be on Pyongyang‘s side. In his memoir, he claimed that in 1994, the U.S. was trying to take serious political and economic sanctions through the U.N. on a small, isolated, poor and mysterious communist country. The prime objective of the Carter Center is human rights but you can hardly find information about human rights infringement in North Korea at its Web site. Since the sinking of the Cheonan, the Western community, the United States and South Korea are pressuring North Korea together. Standing on the edge, Kim Jong-il will try to use Carter just like his father had done. The Kim family and Carter have been dancing a delusional tango for generations. Jimmy Carter had been a naval officer. When he arrives in the South after the Pyongyang visit, he may want to visit the National Cemetery, where the sailors of the Cheonan are buried. Carter must realize that the truth of the Korean Peninsula can be found from the graves of the 46 victims, not the smile on Kim Jong-il‘s face. The realization would be an awakening for 87-year-old former president. The writer is an editorial writer of the JoongAng Ilbo. http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2935316 (Return to Articles and Documents List)