SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Monthly APRIL 2007 28 March 2007 This report is available online and can beFORECAST viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at www.securitycouncilreport.org
OVERVIEW FOR APRIL CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE The United Kingdom will preside over the A private briefing by the Secretary-General Status Update since our March Council in April. It is unclear whether any the- on his trip to the Middle East is expected. It Forecast...... 3 matic debates will take place. Press reports will provide an important focus for discus- Kosovo...... 2 have indicated a possibility of the Council’s sions on Lebanon and Darfur in particular. Darfur/Sudan...... 4 holding a thematic debate on the impact of Similarly, the new Under Secretary-General Chad/Central African Republic...... 7 climate change on security issues, but no for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, is Lebanon...... 8 decision had been taken at press time. Cli- expected to brief the Council on his trip to Democratic Republic of the mate change has been one of the issues the conflict-torn Darfur region. Congo...... 10 Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has singled Consultations are expected on: Western Sahara...... 12 out as his priority early on in this tenure. n Kosovo Georgia...... 14 Open meetings of the Council in April will n Burundi Somalia...... 15 include the monthly briefing on the Middle n Chad and the Central African Republic Liberia...... 16 East. There will also be several meetings n Darfur North Korea...... 17 adopting resolutions renewing mandates: n Somalia Burundi...... 18 n on Georgia, renewing the mandate of n Lebanon (reports on resolutions 1559 Upcoming Issues in Sanctions UNOMIG; and 1701, respectively) Committees...... 19 n on the DRC renewing the mandate of n Liberia (with a possibility of a resolution MONUC; should the Council decide to end dia- Notable Dates for April...... 20 n on Western Sahara renewing MIN- mond sanctions); and Important Dates over the Horizon....20 URSO’s mandate; and n The North Korea sanctions. n on Sudan, renewing the UNMIS mandate. >>page 2
Aide-Memoire
Important matters pending before the n Action on the Secretary-General’s recommen- General’s recommendations on the status Council include: dations for a peacekeeping force in Chad and of the Sheb’a Farms. In his last report on n Implementation of the phased approach for the Central African Republic is still awaited, implementation of resolution 1701 (issued Darfur as agreed in Abuja in November because of Chad’s concerns with the pro- on 14 March), the Secretary-General men- 2006 is lagging. In early March, Sudan posed robust military component. tioned good progress on the cartographic responded to the heavy support package n On Somalia, the Council is still to act on its analysis of the status of the farms, and said with a large number of objections. A more threat “to consider taking measures against that the technical work would be completed detailed AU-UN agreement on the hybrid those who seek to prevent or block a by the next reporting period in mid-June. operation as endorsed by the Council on 19 peaceful dialogue process, overthrow the n The December 2004 report by the Secretary- December is still pending. Transitional Federal Institutions by force, or General on human rights violations in Côte n No action, as envisaged in resolution 1706 take action that further threatens regional d’Ivoire, requested by a presidential state- on Darfur, has been taken to impose ”strong stability” made in resolution 1744. ment, has still not been made public. Also effective measures, such as asset freeze or n On the DRC, the Council is still to consider on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report travel ban, against any individual or group imposing individual sanctions under resolu- by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser that violates or attempts to block the imple- tions 1596, 1649 and 1698 against armed on the Prevention of Genocide has not been mentation of the [Darfur Peace] Agreement groups’ commanders that recruit children published. or commits human rights violations.” A num- and/or refuse to disarm. There seems to be n The 2005 World Summit requested reforms ber of proposals are being considered but strong momentum for that in April. relating to the Military Staff Committee. divisions remain. n The Council is still waiting for the Secretary- This has yet to be addressed.
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org OVERVIEW FOR APRIL (continued) Kosovo Kosovo sanctions to target peace spoilers, which Expected Council Action The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy has been on a back-burner for months, may Martti Ahtisaari, the Secretary-General’s Martti Ahtisaari is expected to brief the also receive renewed attention. Special Envoy for the Future Status Process Council early in the month. The United King- for Kosovo, completed his final recommen- Lebanon dom, having played a key role in the dations in late March. On 26 March, the The Council postponed its consideration of formulation of resolution 1244 in 1999, Secretary-General transmitted Ahtisaari’s the 1701 report, originally planned for March, would probably like to see significant prog- final proposal to the Council along with until April, in order to hear the Secretary-Gen- ress on Kosovo during its presidency. Ahtisaari’s conclusions and recommenda- eral’s observations on his Middle East trip Russia would prefer to delay Council action tions and his own letter supportive of both prior to that discussion. Much will depend on and give time for further negotiation. At this documents. In early April Ahtisaari is expected the outcome of the Arab League Summit and stage it is impossible to predict whether the to present both documents in closed consul- on whether any of the current diplomatic ini- Council will do anything in April beyond tiatives will be successful in brokering a tations of the Council. Discussions on how receiving the report and the briefing and political agreement between the government to proceed commenced in late March in the consulting on timing and process. However, and the opposition. If that fails and the crisis context of finalising the monthly programme it is likely that a draft resolution will begin to worsens, the Council may decide to look for of work and will probably continue into April. circulate at least amongst small groups. ways to pressure the factions, keeping within On substance, it seems likely that some Western Sahara the spirit and language of resolution 1701 Council members will begin drafting a new The renewal of the MINURSO mandate in which gives it a role in seeking long term resolution in April, but it is uncertain when it Western Sahara has been routine, with six- solutions. The Council will also need to will be considered in detail. month extensions being expected and the decide what to do about various instances of Key Recent Developments stalemate on the ground continuing. This violations of resolution 1701 described in the Ahtisaari held his final meeting on the future April, however, Council members may most recent Secretary-General’s report. status process for Kosovo with representa- receive a Moroccan plan for extended tives from Belgrade and Pristina on 10 March. autonomy for Western Sahara. This docu- Iran In mid-March the P5 plus Germany agreed This was the culmination of two intense ment has been expected since Morocco on a draft resolution tightening sanctions on weeks of consultations on Ahtisaari’s initial announced the possibility more than a year Iran by imposing a ban on arms sales and proposal. Ahtisaari and his team held 17 ago. The document has been informally expanding the list of individuals and entities rounds of direct talks and made 26 missions presented in a number of capitals. But it subject to asset freeze. The P5 strategy of to Belgrade and Pristina in 13 months while remains unclear whether it will be formally working sequentially, first between them- trying to come to a negotiated agreement. transmitted to the Council and if it is, whether selves and only subsequently with the E10, Council members will have sufficient time to received a setback when South Africa, Indo- Following the 10 March meeting, Ahtisaari study it before MINURSO’s mandate expires nesia and Qatar asserted the right for incorporated 11 pages of amendments into at the end of the month. Another issue out- negotiating space and incorporation of their his final package, which he presented to the side the recent routine is growing concern own ideas in the resolution, delaying adop- Secretary-General on 15 March. In his report, about the human rights situation. A recent tion by several days. On Saturday, 24 March, Ahtisaari recommended independence, report by the Office of the High Commis- the resolution was unanimously adopted supervised by the international community, sioner for Human Rights revealed severe with minor changes to the original draft, and asked the Council to endorse the cases of violations by Morocco in Western such as reference to a Middle East free of Kosovo Status Settlement proposal upon Sahara as well as breaches by Polisario in weapons of mass destruction and additional which independence will be based. the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria. Paral- language on resuming negotiations in good lels with the Kosovo dossier may also play a The Contact Group on Kosovo (the US, the faith and coming to a long-term agreement role in how the parties and some Council UK, France, Italy, Russia and Germany) was on Iran’s nuclear programme. This seems to members view any Moroccan proposal. briefed by Ahtisaari on 9 March. At the time signal that incremental pressure will con- of writing, the Group was expected to meet Democratic Republic of the Congo tinue until Iran is ready to make a significant on 28 March in London to discuss both After a two-month technical rollover of the compromise to open the way for negotia- issues of procedure and substance con- mandate of MONUC, the Council will again tions. However, Iran declared the resolution cerning the final status package. face the question of how to preserve the illegal and said it would reduce cooperation very fragile peace in the DRC. There have with the IAEA in response to it. In the latest UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) been several troubling developments, Darfur report published on 9 March, the Secre- including clashes between supporters of tary-General said that Kosovo needed President Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre The Council seems to be very close to the end of the road in trying to deal with Sudan clarity on its future and called on the inter- Bemba in the capital late in March and the national community to move towards a displacement of thousands of people in the over the implementation of the AU agreed package of support for AMIS and deploy- timely conclusion of Kosovo’s future status country. The Council will need to face the political process. question of whether any reduction in the ment of a robust hybrid operation. Work is size of MONUC would be prudent at this actually underway by a number of members On 9 March the Serbian foreign minister stage. Examples of other missions prema- on a sanctions package and this seems warned that Kosovo’s independence could turely downsized, notably that in Timor-Leste, increasingly likely to dominate discussions lead to nationalists loyal to the late Slobo- will be on members’ minds. The issue of on Sudan and Darfur during April. n dan Milosevic rising up again.
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org NATO has said it is ready to continue pro- Options n deciding after initial general reactions in viding security in Kosovo under the Ahtisaari Once it receives Ahtisaari’s report the Coun- informal consultations to establish a high- plan to protect both Serbs and ethnic- cil has several options: level Council working group, with a Albanians. The EU has given support to the n moving toward discussion of a draft reso- mandate for a fixed period, to meet with proposal. However, two EU members, lution that would impose the Ahtisaari the parties in a sustained and intensive Greece and Slovakia, seem to support fur- recommendations; process to discuss elements that might be ther negotiations before the Council comes n holding an initial round of general dis- generally agreeable for a draft resolution; to a decision. EU preparation to replace cussions in informal consultations on n deferring action on the Ahtisaari recom- UNMIK seems to be well advanced. reactions to the Ahtisaari recommenda- mendations for a longer period (e.g. tions, but deferring consideration of ninety days) to allow for bilateral and Russia is concerned that the Council should specific proposals for Council action for regional discussions and to give the Con- not rush into a decision on the Ahtisaari a short period (e.g. 21 days) pending fur- tact Group additional space to explore a proposals. It considers that there is still ther consultations in the Contact Group negotiated outcome; and room for a negotiated solution. and with the parties; >>page 4
Status Update since our March Forecast Recent developments on the situations the establishment of a regional secretariat Strategy and the Secretary-General’s rec- covered in our March Forecast are covered were vital goals and the Council should sup- ommendations to address corruption in in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, port efforts toward ratifying the Pact government institutions, border control other interesting Council developments in (SC/8968). and the drug trade. March included: n Côte d’Ivoire: The Council issued a press n Iran: On 24 March the Council unani- n Small Arms: The lapsed draft resolution on statement (SC/8970) on 14 March in sup- mously adopted resolution 1747 tightening small arms circulated in March 2006, com- port of the 4 March agreement (S/2007/144) sanctions on Iran and requesting a report pounded by the lack of Council action on signed by Côte d’Ivoire’s president and from the IAEA within sixty days. this issue, has left the Secretariat for some opposition leader in Ouagadougou. The n Regional Organisations, Chapter VIII: On time without a mandate to produce periodic Secretary-General’s latest report recom- 28 March the Council will hold an open reports. However, a draft presidential state- mended engaging with the parties on the debate, initiated by the March presidency of ment is currently in circulation and will UN’s role in helping implement the Ouaga- South Africa and chaired by the South Afri- possibly be adopted by month’s end. The dougou agreement (S/2007/133). can foreign minister, on the relationship draft statement calls for a report from the n West Africa: The Council held consulta- between the UN and regional organisations Secretary-General on small arms within the tions on 16 March to discuss the 13 March (S/2007/148). A presidential statement is next six months. report from the Secretary-General on cross- expected to place particular emphasis on n Women, Peace and Security: On 7 March, border issues in West Africa, originally the relationship between the UN Security the eve of International Women’s Day, the expected at the end of 2006 (S/2007/143). Council and the AU Peace and Security Council adopted a presidential statement With little time for Council members to anal- Council in light of current peace and secu- condemning violence against women and yse the report and form positions, the rity challenges in Africa. (Please see our 23 girls in conflict. In addition, the statement consultations yielded no outcome. It is March Update.) reaffirmed women’s role in peacebuilding unclear when and in what context the Coun- n Guinea-Bissau: On 29 March the Council and stressed the importance of increasing cil will consider the issue again. (Please see will hold consultations on the latest women’s participation in decision-making in our 15 March Update.) UNOGBIS report from the Secretary-General peacekeeping operations as well as at the n Uganda: On 22 March the Secretary-General’s (S/2007/158). The potential instability stem- national and local levels. (S/PRST/2007/5) Special Envoy, Joaquim Chissano, briefed ming from a recent no-confidence motion by n Iraq: On 7 March the Council held con- the Council under the agenda item “Great Guinea-Bissau’s parliament against the sultations on the latest UNMOVIC report Lakes Region (LRA)” on the latest develop- prime minister will be on Council members’ (S/2007/106). South Africa, Council presi- ments in the peace talks between the minds as they consider the report. dent in March, announced to the media that Ugandan government and the LRA. The n Liberia: On 30 March the Council is the US and UK are drafting a resolution to Council adopted a presidential state- expected to renew UNMIL’s mandate. The terminate the mandate which may be circu- ment expressing support for the Special Secretary-General’s latest report recom- lated in the coming weeks. On 15 March Envoy and the resumed peace talks mended a one-year extension and continued the Council was briefed on UNAMI and the (S/PRST/2007/6). (Please see our 20 cooperation between UNMIL and UNOCI MNF (SC/8971). The Secretary-General’s March Update.) (S/2007/151). latest report was also under consideration n Afghanistan: On 23 March the Council n Zimbabwe: At press time OCHA was (S/2007/126). extended UNAMA’s mandate for 12 months expected to brief the Council on the human- n Great Lakes Region: Ibrahima Fall, the in resolution 1746 as recommended in the itarian situation in Zimbabwe. South Africa, Secretary-General’s Special Representative Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2007/ as president of the Council for March, for the Great Lakes Region, briefed the 152). A briefing by the Secretary-General’s seemed less convinced that there were Council on 9 March prior to the expiration of Special Representative Tom Koenigs and international peace and security implica- his office’s final mandate on 31 March. Fall Antonio Maria Costa of UNODC on 20 tions but did not oppose the Council stressed that quick implementation of the March urged the Council to support being briefed. December 2006 Nairobi Security Pact and the Afghanistan National Development
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org n applying some of the Ahtisaari recom- consider equipping UNMIK for a more Selected Secretary-General’s Reports/ mendations immediately and deferring unstable security situation. Letters other elements for consideration after a Council and Wider Dynamics • S/2007/168 and add. 1 (26 March defined period (e.g. six months) and In the last month there have been a number 2007) was the letter transmitting Ahti- establishing a negotiating process for the of closed-door informal meetings on Kosovo saari’s report on Kosovo’s future status interim period. led by the P3 (the US, the UK and France), and the Comprehensive Proposal for Key Issues which advocate for moving forward quickly the Kosovo Status Settlement. The key issue which is emerging for April is towards the status decision. The UK will be • S/2007/134 (9 March 2007) was the timing. It seems likely that this will be played both president of the Council and of the latest report of the Secretary-General out initially in the discussions in late March Contact Drafting Group in April, and it on UNMIK. and first days of April on the Programme of seems likely that they will take the lead in • S/2007/130 (6 March 2007) was the Work for the month of April. drafting a resolution. letter reporting on the operations of the Kosovo Force from 1 to 31 On the one hand, there is a risk of violence On the other hand, Russia would like to see December 2006. if the Council takes too long to make a deci- the Council viewing Ahtisaari’s package as sion. As the Secretary-General has pointed one further step in a process that should Other Relevant Facts out, radical groups could exploit public dis- continue until both sides can agree on a satisfaction with delays in the process. This solution. Their position was asserted very Special Representative of the Secretary- General could lead not only to inter-ethnic violence strongly during and after the discussion of but also to violence directed against the the UNMIK report in March with the Secretary- Joachim Rücker (Germany) international presence in Kosovo. General’s Special Representative, Joachim UNMIK Rücker, on the receiving end of very blunt On the other hand, a peremptory Council • Size of UNMIK mission: 37 military comments. Russia seems to prefer to con- decision to impose an outcome without observers, 2,028 police, 506 interna- tinue discussions elsewhere rather than even tacit Serbian support could be equally tional staff, 2,040 local staff; 146 UN moving to the Council in April. China is also destabilising and could lack the legitimacy volunteers partial to a longer timeline for the Council’s and effectiveness necessary for a long- • Size of OSCE mission: 252 interna- final decision to give the parties more time term solution. tional staff, 768 local staff to come to a negotiated solution. • Size of EU mission: 125 international The second key issue is the substantive Some of the elected members, including staff, 336 local staff question of principle that continues to con- Indonesia and some African members are Cost cern many Council members. Can the concerned about what they perceive as US$2.218 billion for fiscal year 2006/ Council impose a decision effectively unnecessary haste to make a decision on 2007 (not including OSCE, EU and shrinking the territorial boundaries of a Kosovo. The implications for territorial NATO expenditures) member state either directly, or by affecting integrity are clearly a worry for them. the constitutional order within a state, so KFOR (NATO FORCE) that a geographical unit of the state could Underlying Problems General Roland Kather (Germany) unilaterally determine an independent sta- The final status recommendation could Size and Composition of Mission tus for itself? A related question is whether have human rights implications. Forced dis- the Council should do so given the potential placement is possible if the situation turns • Size: 16,300 troops precedent for other regions where break- violent. Some human rights groups are also • NATO Countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, away groups are demanding independence. concerned that while Ahtisaari’s package Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, (In April there are two other situations on the deals comprehensively with the rights of France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Council’s agenda, Western Sahara and the Serbian minorities, there are other Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Georgia, where similar issues are in play minorities like the Roma, Bosnians and Turks Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portu- and where the repercussions of the Kosovo whose concerns have been neglected. gal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, decision could have some impact.) Spain, Turkey, UK, US UN Documents • Non-NATO Countries: Argentina, The third issue is whether there is any real- Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Security Council Resolution istic prospect that some delay for further Georgia, Ireland, Mongolia, Morocco, discussion and negotiations might produce • S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) autho- Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine consent or at least tacit acquiescence. If so, rised NATO to secure and enforce the what face-saving changes or substantive withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces alterations might need to be incorporated in from Kosovo and established UNMIK. any Security Council resolutions? Selected Presidential Statements Darfur/Sudan Finally, in the background, there is the issue • S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) Expected Council Action of how UNMIK would cope if the security declared it was time to begin the The Council is expected to take up in April situation deteriorates. UNMIK has down- political process to determine the a response to Sudan’s negative stance on sized significantly pending the status future status of Kosovo. peacekeeping in Darfur. A briefing by Under decision. If a decision on Kosovo is likely to • S/PRST/2004/13 (30 April 2004) reaf- Secretary-General John Holmes on his visit be delayed then the Council may have to firmed strong support for the policy of to the region on 21-22 March may also “standards before status.”
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org stress the rapidly deteriorating humanitar- In particular, the government objected to: ian situation. At press time, members were n the three engineering companies; awaiting results of a number of diplomatic n the light aviation unit and helicopters for SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT initiatives. These include the visits of UN protection of civilians; Monthly envoy Jan Eliasson to the region and by n an air reconnaissance unit; the presidents of Nigeria and South Africa n moving AMIS into three sectors (involv- APR 2007FORECAST to Sudan, and the Secretary-General’s ing deployment of two additional AMIS attendance at the Arab League Summit on battalions as authorised by the AU PSC); n setting up key commissions and related 28-29 March. and legislation; n deploying police in areas controlled by n increasing the pace of southern Discussions on sanctions are likely. The the government. development; upcoming briefing of the Sanctions Com- n progress with victims’ compensation, new mittee’s Panel of Experts will provide a The letter seems to ignore the November oil contracts and transfer of oil revenues; focus. It is unclear whether and when Coun- AU agreement on the phased approach. n disarmament, demobilisation and reinte- cil action on sanctions will be considered. Nor does it refer to the fact that AMIS already gration; and At press time, the UK seemed ready to pres- has a protection of civilians mandate as n following up on the Abyei boundary issue. ent a draft resolution. established by the AU PSC in June 2006 following the signing of the DPA. Related Developments in the The Council is expected to renew the man- Human Rights Council date of the UN Mission in the Sudan Sudan stressed that the UN should provide (UNMIS), which expires on 30 April. The only “technical, logistical and financial The report of the high-level mission on regular Secretary-General’s report is due. expertise and civil and military consultants” Darfur was released on 7 March. Indone- and that AU forces must remain under AU sian Ambassador Marakim Wibisono Key Recent Developments command and control. It suggested that the withdrew from the mission once it Open conflict between rebels and the gov- AU-UN-Sudan tripartite mechanism be became clear that Khartoum would not ernment (including the Janjaweed) and used to harmonise positions. This mecha- issue visas. targeting of civilians continue. Reports sug- nism operates by consensus. gest a further upsurge in intercommunal The report notes gross and systematic violence. Camps for the internally displaced At a Sanctions Committee meeting in early human rights violations from all sides are reaching full capacity. Two AU Mission March, there was a preliminary exchange of and that Khartoum “has manifestly failed in the Sudan (AMIS) soldiers were killed. ideas on the possibility of sanctions. The EU to protect the population of Darfur from called for new Council measures and the US large-scale international crimes, and has On 6 March, the Secretary-General sent continued to signal unilateral sanctions. itself orchestrated and participated in a letter to Khartoum with the terms of these crimes. As such, the solemn obli- reference of an AU-UN joint special repre- The Secretary-General considered Khar- gation of the international community to sentative. It also contained the operation’s toum’s response “not satisfactory” and exercise its responsibility to protect has initial framework, including: underlined that the proposal was done in become evident and urgent.” It recom- n mandate: protection of civilians and tasks accordance with the [November 2006] mends, inter alia, the establishment of a assigned by the Darfur Peace Agreement Addis Ababa and Abuja Agreements, and strong human rights monitoring mecha- (DPA) and existing AU Peace and Secu- was not a matter to “revisit or reinterpret”. nism, the full implementation of the rity Council (PSC) decisions; phased approach and of the Security Council consultations were held on 19 n size: 19,000-20,000 troops, 3,772 police Council sanctions regime. March with a briefing by Under Secretary- officers and 19 formed police units, pref- General Jean-Marie Guéhenno. He stressed erably African; and The Human Rights Council opened its that there is still a “long way to go” and that n UN funding, with the understanding that fourth session on 12 March. The Secre- the Council must play a role in overcoming financial management and oversight tary-General underscored existing Sudan’s misgivings. mechanisms will be put in place and the pressure on the Council saying that the “world is watching to see whether this AU will be responsible for prior liabilities. UN envoy Jan Eliasson briefed the Council young Council will live up to its promise”. on 6 March on his efforts alongside AU envoy An AU-UN draft agreement on a joint con- Salim A. Salim to re-energise the political cept of operations and mission plan is well Sudan, Russia, China as well as the Arab process. Eliasson reportedly stressed the developed. Group, the Asian Group and the Organi- need for an immediate ceasefire and guar- sation of the Islamic Conference Khartoum replied to the 24 January heavy- antees of humanitarian access. opposed consideration of the report. support proposal with complaints that it The situation in south Sudan remains Western and several African states, nota- “reveals the existence of essential differ- fragile. The implementation of the Compre- bly Zambia, Nigeria and various others ences in the understanding of the nature hensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was supported it. At press time, two draft and objectives” of UN support. The reviewed at a donors’ conference on 19-21 resolutions have been circulated: one response contained many objections based March, with special attention on spill-over critical of Sudan presented by Germany on the position that “the [DPA] is the frame- effects from Darfur. CPA implementation is and a much milder one by Algeria. The work and reference” for support packages. moving slowly and faces considerable diffi- Council was expected to take action by culties with: 30 March.
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Options A parallel issue is how to re-establish a revisiting the already agreed approach. The Security Council could: peace process in Darfur, and whether to China has expended political capital in this n continue with diplomatic pressure on focus on this as a means to make progress regard. Interestingly, it removed Sudan from Sudan to realise its November 2006 com- with the phased approach. (However in a list of countries for financial incentives for mitments; 2005, the same was being said about the Chinese companies to invest in early n add a sanctions dimension, perhaps with Abuja peace negotiations.) March. the extension of the arms embargo to the A third issue is the future of UNMIS. It It remains to be seen whether these mem- entire Sudan and strengthening of the involves reconciling support for the CPA bers will agree that quiet diplomacy may no-fly zone; and with the possibility that this has provided still yield results in terms of a clear agree- n reopen the agreement on a phased Khartoum with additional leverage to under- ment from Khartoum that is consistent with approach to a hybrid operation (this mine Council pressure on Darfur and to its existing commitments. option is highly unlikely). pursue a military policy. Adopting a wider sanctions package may in UN Documents There are also a number of open issues on the short-term stiffen Sudan’s resolve. It the phased approach, in particular: Selected Security Council Resolutions may also suggest that the viability of a nego- n finalising the hybrid operation proposal, • S/RES/1714 (6 October 2006) tiated approach has been exhausted for the including AU-UN agreement on mandate, extended UNMIS until 30 April 2007. time being. Strengthening and enforcing a size, cost, command and control, and • S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) set a no-fly zone presents huge challenges, par- ensuring that UN accountability, procure- mandate for UNMIS in Darfur. ticularly with obtaining assets from willing ment and managerial standards are in • S/RES/1591 (29 March 2005) and member states and cooperation from neigh- place, particularly in view of the need to 1556 (30 July 2004) imposed bouring countries especially Libya, Chad secure funding commitment from the sanctions in Darfur. and the Central African Republic. General Assembly’s Fifth Committee; and • S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) Another option is to tailor a milder sanctions n encouraging UN troop generation for the established UNMIS. package limited to additions to the targeted heavy support (2,250 troops and 675 Selected Presidential Statement police) and the hybrid operation (17,300 sanctions list. In practice, unilateral sanc- • S/PRST/2006/55 (19 December 2006) military and 5,000 police). tions now seem increasingly likely. endorsed the phased approach. Other options are: Council Dynamics Selected Secretary-General’s Reports n finalising and formally endorsing the Members appear divided on how best to • S/2007/104 (23 February 2007) was hybrid operation proposal; react to Khartoum’s misgivings about the the latest monthly report on Darfur at n endorsing reactivation of the Darfur phased approach. The US and the UK in press time. peace process, perhaps with a deadline particular, alongside France, Ghana, Italy • S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) and Add. for an immediate ceasefire and increases and Panama seem to support sanctions. 1 (28 August 2006) and S/2006/645 in humanitarian access to be verified by These members do not appear to have (10 August 2006) made recommenda- the sanctions Panel of Experts; and given up the phased approach. But there is tions for UNMIS’ mandate in Darfur n threatening meaningful sanctions in case a perception that Sudan’s response made it and for UN assistance to AMIS. the deadline is not observed. clear that stronger pressure—including Other Key Issues sanctions—is needed since Khartoum • A/HRC/4/80 (7 March 2007) was the Khartoum’s response to the heavy support appears to be ready to indefinitely stall ful- report of the Human Rights Council’s package seems to signal that Sudan has no filling its commitments. high-level mission to Darfur. intention of honouring the earlier agreement Most members have indicated that reopen- • S-4/101 (13 December 2006) was on the deployment of a robust hybrid oper- ing the phased approach is unacceptable. the Human Rights Council Darfur ation with protection of civilians at its core. decision. It also suggests that Khartoum intends to China, Russia, South Africa, Qatar and • S/2006/961 (6 December 2006) prevaricate by indefinitely blocking imple- Indonesia continue to be reluctant about contained the 30 November AU PSC mentation of the phased approach. sanctions. These members seem to prefer communiqué endorsing the phased allowing more time for Khartoum to clarify approach. The issue for the Council is therefore the substance of its concerns and continue • S/2006/795 (2 October 2006) was the whether and when alternative avenues of with dialogue. There may also be pressure latest Panel of Experts’ report. Council action should be explored; bearing to delay action until (if and when) there is in mind that punitive measures could ren- consensus that the Panel has been able to For full historical background, please see der the phased approach impossible and demonstrate violations of resolution 1591. our February, July and January 2006 and undermine UN peacemaking efforts in the March 2007 Forecasts. short-term. On the other hand, Khartoum’s most recent response may have proven to be too much for even some of these members, especially
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Other Relevant Facts countries continues to present grave threats to civilians. UNMIS: Special Representative of the SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Secretary-General In Chad, there are now 120,000 internally Monthly Vacant displaced persons (IDPs), plus 200,000 Darfurian and 46,000 CAR refugees. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General APR 2007 Humanitarian access is constrained and FORECAST Jan Eliasson (Sweden) diminishing. The implementation of a peace operation and inviting consent (along the UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost accord signed in late December under Lib- lines of resolution 1706); and yan auspices between the government and • Maximum authorised strength: up to n authorising an essentially civilian 27,300 military and 6,015 police one of the rebel groups, the United Front for operation. • Strength as of 28 February 2007: 9,336 Change (FUC), seems to have made prog- The first option could be undertaken by the military and 642 police ress with the appointment of FUC leader Council Working Group on Peacekeeping. • Key troop contributors: India, Pakistan, Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim as defence min- The second option runs the risk of initiating a Bangladesh, Kenya, Egypt and China ister, but violence continues. deadlock similar to the one regarding Darfur. • Cost: 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 In the CAR, hit-and-run rebel attacks The third option runs the risk of not only cre- $1,126.30 million (excludes Darfur) continued. The situation in the northwest ating an ineffective and dangerous operation, UNMIS: Duration seems to be worsening. CAR forces with but also encouraging behaviour similar to 24 March 2005 to present; mandate French support managed to regain control that of Chad and Sudan in the future. expires 30 April 2007 over the northeastern town of Birao from the rebel group Union des forces démocra- Other options include: AU Special Envoy tiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR). It is n adopting a wait-and-see approach while Salim A. Salim unclear whether UFDR leaders, currently in supporting a firm engagement of Chad by AMIS: Size and Composition prison in Benin, will sign on to a peace key players, especially some of the P5 and the Secretariat; • Total authorised strength: about agreement concluded in early February n adopting a resolution simply affirming the 10,000 military and 1,500 police between the government and other rebel Council’s willingness to authorise a • Strength as of 1 September 2006: leaders in Libya. robust operation; and 5,703 military and 1,425 police Chad has blocked the deployment of the n reinforcing the view that the establish- • Key troop contributors: Nigeria, UN advance mission approved by the ment of a political process is an important Rwanda and Senegal Council on 16 January and so far opposes step towards regional and domestic sta- AMIS: Duration a UN operation with a robust military com- bility and for the mission’s exit strategy. 25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires ponent. N’Djamena prefers instead a civilian Key Issues 1 July 2007 presence consisting of police and gen- darmes in refugee and IDP camps. The key issue is how best to address Chad’s concerns about a UN operation. At Council consultations on 23 March, Chad reiterated that position but indicated willing- It in turn raises a number of related issues, Chad/Central African including: Republic ness to reach a negotiated agreement on the proposed operation’s size and structure. n whether key Council members—France Expected Council Action in particular—will be willing to push Chadian and Sudanese representatives The Council is expected to continue discus- N’Djamena to accept the force with the reportedly met on 10 March in Tehran to sions of the proposed UN operation in Chad kind of robustness recommended by the continue talks to normalise bilateral rela- and the Central African Republic (CAR). Secretary-General; tions. It was reportedly agreed that an Members seem to have adopted a wait- n how best to address the opposition of Iranian technical assistance team on and-see approach for the time being, as regional players to robust peacekeeping regional issues would go to Chad and Chad and the Secretariat are expected to in Chad and Darfur, particularly from Sudan. The meeting came as the latest in a consult with a view to agreement on the Libya, Sudan and Eritrea; series of efforts, particularly from Libya, to proposed operation’s size and structure. n whether to make concessions on the improve Chadian-Sudanese relations. How- military component’s size; and A briefing by Under Secretary-General ever, in the absence of improvements in the n the wider questions that the precedents John Holmes on the humanitarian situation situation on the ground, deep scepticism in Darfur and Chad may create for future in the region in April may be a basis for remains. UN peacekeeping. Council members to review the protection Options needs of civilians and assess the respec- Another key issue is how to maintain In the absence of Chad’s consent to the tive responsibilities. momentum for firmly encouraging a domes- operation, available options for the Council tic political process in Chad. This seems to Key Recent Developments include: have become sidelined as a result of Chad’s Despite some progress with peace talks n actively engaging with Chad to reach a opposition to the operation. This in turn involving some of the rebel groups in Chad negotiated outcome; raises questions related to any future mis- and the CAR, the security situation in both n upping the ante by authorising a robust sion’s viability and exit strategy.
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Council and Wider Dynamics Selected Secretary-General’s Reports Other Relevant Facts The Council now seems focused on how to • S/2007/97 (23 February 2007) was the encourage Chad to consent to the UN oper- CAR: Special Representative of the new report on UN peacekeeping in Secretary-General ation. At press time, members seemed Chad and the CAR. convinced that no operation can be Lamine Cissé (Senegal) • S/2006/1034 (28 December 2006) was deployed without a military component to BONUCA: Size and Composition the latest BONUCA report. back up the civilian presence. • S/2006/1019 (22 December 2006) was Strength as of 30 September 2006: France and some African members seem to the first report on UN peacekeeping in 19 internationals, five military, six police be advancing the idea of adopting a resolu- Chad and the CAR. BONUCA: Duration tion indicating the Council’s support for a Other 15 February 2000 to present; mandate future operation. There also seems to be • S/2007/135 (12 March 2007) was a expires 31 December 2007 preliminary interest within the Council in letter from Libya forwarding the Chad- Force multinationale en Centrafrique sending another technical assessment mis- Sudan statement on re-energising the (FOMUC): Size and Composition sion in light of the 23 March consultations. Tripoli Agreement. • Current strength: 380 troops Positions are yet to be tested should • S/2006/934 (30 November 2006) • Contributors: Gabon, Republic of N’Djamena’s opposition to the military com- contained the new modalities for Congo and Chad BONUCA. ponent continue. It is possible that the same FOMUC: Duration divisions in the Council on Darfur could be • S/2006/103 (14 February 2006) was October 2002 to present; mandate mirrored in Council dynamics on Chad. In the Chad-Sudan Tripoli Agreement. expires 30 June 2007 particular, some, such as China, Russia, Qatar, Indonesia, Congo and South Africa, Historical Background February 2007 The Secretary-General pre- may be uncomfortable with going so far as sented finalised options on a UN operation to repeat the 1706 model. France has pub- in Chad and the CAR. In Libya, Chad and Lebanon licly supported a united international Sudan agreed to re-energise the Tripoli diplomatic effort to bring about consent. Expected Council Action Agreement and the CAR government and The Council is expected to take up Leba- Members are aware of the influence of the UFDR signed a peace deal. Chad non twice during April. Consultations on regional players on Chad’s position. Libya, opposed the deployment of the UN advance the Secretary-General’s report on the Sudan and Eritrea appear to have a wider mission and of an operation with a robust implementation of resolution 1701 were agenda against UN deployments in the military contingent. postponed from March to early April, so as region and are highlighting various meet- January 2007 The Council requested to hear the Secretary-General’s account of ings and manoeuvres to suggest that the finalised options on a UN operation in Chad his visit to the region. For further details security situation is improving in the region. and the CAR. visit our March Forecast. The Chadian government, observers note, December 2006 Cautioning against deploy- In the second half of April, the Council is has little incentive to consent to a robust ment without a political process, the expecting the Secretary-General’s report operation. The deployment of a UN mis- Secretary-General unveiled preliminary on implementation of resolution 1559. sion could expose or constrain Chadian options on a UN operation in Chad and support for Darfurian rebels and lead to Both reports are expected to be discussed CAR. Chad signed a peace deal with the pressure for reforms in the country’s in informal consultations and presidential FUC under Libyan auspices. domestic political situation, including on statements are likely in both cases. human rights violations. August 2006 The Council adopted resolu- Key Recent Developments tion 1706. UN Documents The report on implementation of resolution June 2006 A Council mission visited Chad 1701 was released on 14 March. It noted Selected Security Council Resolution and Sudan. Chad requested to brief the the following. • S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) Council on Sudan’s support for Chadian n The near full deployment of the UN mandated a multidimensional UN rebels. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and presence in Chad and the CAR and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). requested recommendations. April 2006 Chadian rebels attacked n Violations of the Blue Line by both sides Selected Presidential Statements N’Djamena. during the 7 February incident. n An increase of Israeli over-flights of Leba- • S/PRST/2007/2 (16 January 2007) 8 February 2006 Chad and Sudan signed nese airspace. (Israel claims these flights requested further recommendations the Tripoli Agreement. are justified because the captured Israeli on peacekeeping in Chad and the Late 2005 Spill-over from the conflict in Dar- soldiers have not been released and the CAR by mid-February and the immedi- fur into Chad increased significantly. arms embargo is not fully implemented.) ate establishment of an advance Chadian rebels began an offensive against n UNIFIL and the LAF had not detected ille- mission. the government in the east. Chad and gal transfers of arms south of the • S/PRST/2006/47 (22 November 2006) Sudan openly traded accusations of rebel Litani River. renewed BONUCA. support.
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org n Hezbollah openly acknowledges con- On 21 March, Serge Brammertz, the head ducting armed activities. of the UN International Independent Investi- n Israel has briefed UNIFIL several times on gation Commission (UNIIIC) on the Hariri SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT alleged serious breaches of the arms assassination, presented his report to the Monthly embargo on the Syrian-Lebanese border. Council. He was optimistic that the Com- (This is denied by Lebanese officials and mission would have a “unifying theory” APR 2007FORECAST remains to be verified.) soon for all bombings in Lebanon, but that n Israel’s failure to provide detailed data it was unlikely that the work would be com- taking stock of progress toward the imple- about the location of cluster munitions pleted by the next reporting period in June. mentation of resolutions 1559 and 1701 used during last summer’s conflict. He also noted progress on the motives until later in April. n A lack of progress on the release of Israeli behind the Hariri assassination, and on the The second issue is what to do if there is no soldiers captured by Hezbollah. identity of the suicide bomber. progress—or if the domestic crisis worsens. n Analysis of cartographic material on the Brammertz also cleared away a negative It remains to be seen whether the Council status of the Sheb’a Farms is currently element which has been in the air since would be ready to pressure Lebanese fac- underway. The technical work is expected January. He noted that the ten previously tions to find an agreement. In the past, both to be completed by mid-June. uncooperative states had responded posi- the Council and the Secretary-General The Secretary-General suggested that the tively to his requests for cooperation and all seemed to believe that progress could only Council consider an independent assess- outstanding matters were resolved. At press take place through a political process. But ment mission to assess options for time Council consideration of a resolution resolution 1701 put the Council and the monitoring the Syrian-Lebanese border. He to extend the UNIIIC mandate by twelve Secretary-General more squarely in the also urged neighbours, Syria in particular, months seems to be proceeding smoothly— spotlight, giving them both an important to do everything they can to help implement another positive sign. role in finding a “long-term solution”. resolution 1701. Finally, Syrian members of the Islamic mili- As a longer-term goal, the Council will also The current political crisis in Lebanon tant group Fatah al-Islam, based in the Nahr be looking at the issue of progress on dis- entered its fourth month in March. Two core al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in north- arming militias. issues continue to divide the majority and ern Lebanon have confessed to the The fourth issue, and perhaps also one for the opposition: establishment of an interna- bombing of two buses in February. There later in April, is what to do about the inci- tional tribunal to try those responsible for have been tensions between this group and dents described in the report on resolution the assassination of former Lebanese Prime refugees in the camp. 1701, including the Israeli over-flights, the Minister Rafik Hariri and power sharing Options delay in delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese within the government. (The opposition is The Council has the following options: border, the reports of arms moving across demanding a veto power in the cabinet.) n use the early April session to approve a the border and Blue Line violations. It The president of parliament Nabih Berri, presidential statement designed to posi- remains to be seen whether the 1559 report representing the opposition, and the major- tively reinforce the current momentum; will provide more evidence. A related issue ity leader Saad Hariri opened a political n defer until later in the month how to take is how to secure the Syrian-Lebanese bor- dialogue on 8 March. There seems to be up the more difficult aspects of resolu- der. The possibility of deploying UN some optimism that a solution to the politi- tions 1559 and 1701 (when it might be peacekeepers along the border was raised cal crisis could be found before or at the much clearer whether current efforts are in the press recently, but the Lebanese gov- Arab League Summit on 28-29 March in bearing fruit); ernment has not made that request yet and Riyadh. n apply a strict approach (especially if Syria had already indicated in the past that progress is minimal) to compliance by all it would object. There has been supportive diplomatic activ- parties—in a balanced way—with resolu- ity in the region reinforcing efforts to find a Finally, there is the impact of the sanctions tions 1559 and 1701; solution to the Lebanese domestic crisis. resolution on Iran. The resolution prohibits n take up the Secretary-General’s proposal n On 3 March, Iranian president Mahmoud Iran selling or exporting any substantial for an independent assessment mission Ahmadinejad met with Saudi King Abdul- arms. This will restrict the flow of arms to to analyse how better to prevent breaches lah in Riyadh. The meeting did not Hezbollah and place additional pressure on of the arms embargo; produce a specific outcome but it seems Syria to not only stop any smuggling across n urge Israel to phase out its over-flights to have been a helpful development. its borders but prevent entry of Iranian arms and perhaps set a series of benchmarks n On 12 March, the EU foreign policy chief cargos to its territory. for this. Javier Solana went to Lebanon, then to Council Dynamics Saudi Arabia and Syria. He stressed that Key Issues Council members are hopeful that a Leba- the solution to the current political stale- The main issue at press time is whether the nese political agreement can be found. mate had to be a Lebanese one. Arab League Summit and other current dip- Many expressed such expectation during n Finally, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon lomatic initiatives will help broker a political the 14 March briefing on the Middle East. visited Iraq, Egypt, Israel/Palestine, agreement between the opposition and the Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon (but Lebanese government. The related issue Most members still prefer that the issues of not Syria). for the Council is whether to delay disarmament and presidential elections be
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org addressed in the framework of a Lebanese Selected UN Documents on Imple- Belgium, China, Cyprus, Denmark, political dialogue. As long as there are signs mentation of Resolution 1701 Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, of progress there is some reluctance to put Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Security Council Resolution pressure on the parties at this stage. Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Republic of • S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called However, the arms embargo breaches are Korea, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, for a cessation of hostilities between progressively becoming a bone of conten- Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portu- Israel and Hezbollah, authorised a tion. The US tends to share Israel’s concerns gal, Qatar, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, reinforcement of UNIFIL and extended and Russia tends to support Syria. If the Tanzania and Turkey the mandate until 31 August 2007. Secretary-General’s report again contains Cost (approved budget) Latest Presidential Statement unverified information about arms smug- Commitment authority: 1 July 2006 – gling into Lebanon, as in the last 1559 • S/PRST/2006/52 (12 December 2006) 31 March 2007: $350.87 million report, Russia and possibly others may pro- welcomed the Secretary-General’s test that in the absence of evidence, it report on resolution 1701 and reiter- Useful Additional Sources should not be mentioned in the report. ated its support for the current n “Lebanon as a Battlefield? State-Building Lebanese government. and Reconstruction” in The Middle East: UN Documents on Implementation Latest Report of the Secretary-General Fragility and Crisis by Markus E. Bouillon, of Resolution 1559 on Resolution 1701 International Peace Academy, February Resolutions • S/2007/147 (14 March 2007) 2007 n Hizbollah and Its Changing Identities • S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) encour- by Amal Saad-Ghorayeb and Marina S. aged Syria to respond positively to the Selected UN Documents on UNIIIC Ottaway, Carnegie Endowment, Policy Lebanese request to delineate their Security Council Resolutions Outlook No. 34, January 2007 common border and called for further • S/RES/1686 (15 June 2006) extended efforts to disband and disarm Hezbol- UNIIIC’s mandate by one year. lah and to restore fully Lebanon’s • S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) control over all Lebanese territory. requested negotiation with Lebanon Democratic Republic • S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) on a tribunal of international character. of the Congo urged all remaining foreign forces to • S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005) withdraw from Lebanon and all Leba- Expected Council Action authorised expanded technical assis- nese and non-Lebanese militias to The Council is expected to renew the man- tance to Lebanon and extended be disbanded and disarmed. It also date of the UN Mission in the Democratic UNIIIC’s mandate until 15 June 2006. supported the extension of the Gov- Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by 15 • S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged ernment of Lebanon’s control over all April. It is unclear whether downsizing will Syria to cooperate with the investiga- Lebanese territory and a free and fair be mandated. A further technical rollover is tion and established sanctions against electoral process. an option. suspects in the Hariri assassination. Secretary-General’s Reports on Imple- • S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established Progress is possible with targeted sanc- mentation of Resolution 1559 UNIIIC. tions under resolutions 1596 and 1649. Members expect the second Group of • S/2006/832 (19 October 2006) Latest UNIIIC Report • S/2006/248 (19 April 2006) Experts’ mid-term report by 20 April. The • S/2007/150 (15 March 2007) • S/2005/673 (26 October 2005) Sanctions Committee may also meet with • S/2005/272 (29 April 2005) the Group and the Secretariat to discuss Other Relevant Facts • S/2004/777 (1 October 2004) conclusions of their reports on economic Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for sanctions. Presidential Statements on Implementa- Implementation of Resolution 1559 tion of Resolution 1559 Key Recent Developments Terje Røed-Larsen (Norway) • S/PRST/2006/43 (30 October 2006) The situation in the DRC remains fragile. • S/PRST/2006/3 (23 January 2006) Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator Violent incidents were reported in Febru- • S/PRST/2005/26 (22 June 2005) for Lebanon ary and March. Recruitment of child • S/PRST/2005/17 (4 May 2005) Geir O. Pedersen (Norway) soldiers and widespread human rights vio- • S/PRST/2004/36 (19 October 2004) UNIFIL Force Commander lations by militia and Congolese security forces continue. Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy) Size and Composition of UNIFIL Supporters of President Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba clashed in western DRC • Authorised: 15,000 troops in early February, leaving 77 dead, and • Current (as of 15 March 2007): 12,764 again in late March in Kinshasa. In eastern military personnel, including 176 staff DRC, fighting between Congolese armed officers, 10,828 troops and 1,474 forces and the Forces démocratiques pour maritime task force • Troop-contributing countries:
10 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) flared, lead- n spearhead the formation of a cross- ing to the displacement of 10,000 persons. border commission; and n protect local miners. The March report of the Secretary-General SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT on MONUC contained recommendations Options Monthly on MONUC’s post-transition mandate: Options include: APR 2007 n contributing to security sector reform n approving the Secretary-General’s rec- FORECAST (SSR); ommendations on force strength; local elections later in the year, but mem- n building a stable environment and pro- n authorising more substantial downsizing bers will be mindful of current global tecting civilians; to commence immediately; demands on peacekeeping resources. n consolidating democracy; n endorsing a consolidation period of two n safeguarding human rights; and to three years—on the model of the UN Another concern is foreign combatants, n providing support for the upcoming local Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)—then phas- especially whether to impose targeted elections. ing down according to progress with sanctions under resolution 1649 and how future benchmarks on security, gover- best to continue to encourage countries in Cautioning against immediate drawdown in nance and the consolidation of state the region to cooperate. view of the fragile security situation and authority; upcoming elections, the report recom- A final issue is how best to proceed in light n revising MONUC’s mandate along the mended a strength of 17,030 troops, 760 of the recommendations of the Group of lines proposed by the Secretary-General observers, 391 police advisers and 750 Experts and the Secretary-General’s report in his MONUC report; formed police until 31 December 2007. on sanctions. n including assistance with natural resources Drawdown benchmarks would be recom- management and good governance in the Council Dynamics mended in November 2007. new MONUC mandate (commodity sanc- There is unity among Council members to The latest report of the Group of Experts to tions are unlikely, and there is some continue MONUC as a robust operation. the Sanctions Committee in late November scepticism on the feasibility of the recom- Most, especially African members, seem 2006 indicates that there is a “clear geo- mendations from the Group of Experts); wary of cutbacks and would support main- graphical correlation” between militia n expressing support for regional cross- taining MONUC’s size. activity and the exploitation of natural border cooperation on the illicit move- Other members, while sympathetic to the resources in eastern DRC. The report also ment of combatants and resources as challenges confronting the DRC, would be underlined challenges from the lack of well as the return of foreign militia within mindful of the need to contain costs. It is security and transparency, and widespread the framework of the Great Lakes unclear whether the US will push for imme- extortion from government officials. Conference; and diate downsizing (particularly regarding the n including additional names in the tar- The Group recommended: geted sanctions lists. At press time, it additional contingents) or accept current n imposing reporting obligations on Kin- seems that France, the UK and the US levels in the short run. shasa regarding natural resources; may propose a new list under resolutions Most will want to be clear about the exit n appointing a steering committee to over- 1596 and 1649. strategy before renewing MONUC and will see the formation of a control system, look for a framework in that regard. including a certification scheme; and Key Issues n establishing a new targeted sanctions The key issue for the Council is how best to Discussions on the sanctions reports indi- regime on the basis of violations of rele- assist the Congolese government consoli- cate that most Council members appear vant Congolese law. date state authority, reform the security sympathetic to the view that there is a pow- sector and improve governance. erful link between natural resources and The Secretariat’s 9 February report on the militia activity. However, there seems to be effects of economic sanctions, however, A related issue therefore is the size and general scepticism about the appropriate- concluded that targeted measures specifi- future mandate of MONUC. This will likely ness of commodity sanctions and the cally for the DRC would have only marginal involve agreeing on a framework for feasibility of the Group of Experts’ recom- effect given the weak regulatory environ- MONUC’s future exit strategy while avoid- mendations. ment, the possible lack of enforcement and ing hasty cutbacks that could undermine the availability of other agents to fill the vac- the mission’s success. Most members seem more sympathetic to uum. It cautioned against sanctions given A related key issue is whether and when to the Secretary-General’s observations and that the government has only recently been start downsizing MONUC, especially the that the solution lies with the Congolese elected and that there could be negative supplemental contingents authorised in government and with international assis- effects for local miners. resolutions 1621, 1635 and 1736. Much will tance. But there is also underlying concern with the possibility that the Secretary-Gener- Instead, the report recommended public depend on assessments of the security sit- al’s report may be used to discredit sanctions and private efforts to: uation in the DRC, bearing in mind that the in general as a policy instrument. n promote SSR and good governance; electoral process will not be finalised until n ensure transparent and law-abiding busi- ness practices;
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 11 UN Documents Useful Additional Sources According to Moroccan official statements, n Eastern Congo Monthly Update, Enough the proposal, which would reflect the expec- Selected Security Council Resolutions Project, March/April 2007, www.enough tations of all CORCAS members, would • S/RES/1742 (15 February 2007) project.org respect Moroccan sovereignty and national renewed MONUC until 15 April. n MONUC human rights report, www. unity and take into account social and cul- • S/RES/1736 (22 December 2006) monuc.org/downloads/HRR_6Month_ tural specificities of Western Sahara. It is temporarily re-hatted UN Operation in Eng.pdf also claimed that it would comply with Burundi (ONUB) troops to MONUC. “international standards for autonomy”, • S/RES/1711 (29 September 2006) providing the Sahrawis with real authority in extended MONUC until 15 February. Western Sahara the legislative, executive and judicial fields. • S/RES/1698 (31 July 2006), 1596 However, the plan has not been finalised (3 May 2005) and 1649 (21 December Expected Council Action yet. In part this may be because the 2005) strengthened sanctions. The mandate of the UN Mission for the Ref- CORCAS process has encountered tre- • S/RES/1635 (28 October 2005) and erendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) mendous difficulties. It may also be that 1621 (6 September 2006) authorised expires on 31 April. The Council is expected Morocco is reluctant to finalise the proposal temporary increases in MONUC. to renew it for six months and to discuss in the absence of clear signals that it would • S/RES/1565 (1 October 2004) revised the report of the Secretary-General on succeed. MONUC’s mandate set forth in resolu- MINURSO, which is due mid-April. The In a memorandum to the Council on 13 tions 1493 and 1291. Council might also discuss a Moroccan plan for extended autonomy to Western Sahara. February, Polisario said that the Moroccan Selected Secretary-General’s Reports autonomy plan would violate the principle • S/2007/156 (22 March 2007) was the Key Recent Developments of self-determination, and it would therefore latest MONUC report. In his October report, the Secretary-General not be acceptable. Algeria issued a declara- • S/2007/68 (8 February 2007) was the clarified that his Personal Envoy for Western tion on 28 February along similar lines. report on economic sanctions. Sahara, Peter van Walsum, was advocating The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy • S/2006/310 (22 May 2006) was a direct negotiations between the parties has been unable to travel to the region but report on foreign armed groups. because the Council had made clear in resolutions 1495 and 1541 that any solution had some contacts with the Group of Other Relevant Documents had to be “on the basis of agreement Friends and Morocco in New York. It is • SC/8949 (7 February 2007) was the between the two parties.” However, this did unlikely that he will make new recommen- press statement expressing concern not mean that Van Walsum supported dations on the political process. with the violence in western DRC. Morocco’s arguments. He explained that Options • S/2007/40 (25 January 2007) was the the UN could not support a plan that The Council has the following options: latest Group of Experts report. excluded a referendum with independence n a simple six-month renewal of the MIN- as a possible option. For full historical background, please refer URSO mandate; to our April and September 2006 and Feb- The Secretary-General called on the two n renewing the mandate for a shorter ruary 2007 Forecasts. parties, Morocco and the Polisario Front, to period (perhaps two or three months) to enter into negotiations without precondi- bring pressure on the parties to make Other Relevant Facts tions and avoid extending the stalemate. progress; Special Representative of the Secretary- n endorsing the Secretary-General’s rec- Morocco has continued to develop its plan General and Head of Mission ommendations and urging the parties to for a solution based on autonomy. In Feb- resume direct negotiations without pre- William Lacy Swing (US) ruary, it sent a ministerial delegation to all conditions; and MONUC: Size, Composition and Cost of members of the Group of Friends of West- n including language on the need to Mission ern Sahara (France, Russia, Spain, the UK respect human rights in Western Sahara. • Authorised strength: about 18,000 and the US) as well as Germany (which military and 1,316 police currently holds the EU presidency) and Given that the Moroccan plan is not officially • Strength as of 28 February 2007: the UN Secretary-General to present “ele- before the Council, reference to it in the 17,342 military and 1,048 police ments” of a possible autonomy plan for resolution does not seem a likely option. • Main troop contributors: India, Western Sahara. The most likely option seems an extension Pakistan, Bangladesh and Uruguay In early 2006 Morocco established a Royal without change for six months. • Cost: 1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007 Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs US$ 1.138 billion Key Issues (CORCAS, Conseil royal consultatif pour les Morocco’s autonomy plan has been in MONUC: Duration affaires sahariennes), comprising all Moroc- the works for more than a year. For the • 30 November 1999 to present, can political parties as well as Sahrawi Group of Friends, the issue has been how mandate expires on 15 April 2007 leaders, but not the Polisario. Elected repre- much caution to maintain while the plan sentatives for women, youth groups and remains vague. civil society were also involved.
12 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org The second issue is whether Morocco will In its previous resolution on Western present a plan in sufficient time for the Sahara, the Council was unable to tackle Group of Friends and others to assess it, the substantive issues due to divisions SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT and also give Polisario reasonable time to among its members. Monthly review it and respond before the expiry of New Council members like Indonesia and the mandate. APR 2007 South Africa seem to be influenced by estab- FORECAST A further important issue will be whether lished UN principles of self-determination n any solution should include provisions Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will sup- in the context of the decolonisation pro- for self-determination of the people of port any plan in his report on current cess and are therefore likely to be reluctant Western Sahara; information. This seems unlikely unless the to impose any outcome on Polisario. n any solution should be mutually accept- parties agree to it as Ban’s predecessor, Members of the Group of Friends on the able; and Kofi Annan, had already stated that the UN Council seem to agree on the need to have n the Council would not impose any solu- could not welcome a solution that did not sufficient time to evaluate the content of any tion on the parties. include self-determination with indepen- plan. All seem to agree the plan has to be dence as an option. A related issue is In the absence of negotiations between the realistic, but they seem to have different whether Ban will even mention the exis- parties, it seems that the process is con- expectations about what is realistic depend- tence of this plan. To do so might serve as a demned to stall further. Most Council ing on their different interpretations of basis for pressing the parties to reengage. members hope that the position of the par- the concept of self-determination. France But given the Polisario and Algerian state- ties will change and provide a window of supports Morocco and considers that self- ments in February, this seems unlikely. opportunity. determination can occur within the framework An issue that may come up in April or per- of Moroccan sovereignty. The US tends not Underlying Problems haps at a later stage is the possibility to to specify whether self-determination should Morocco is claiming that until the problem expand the MINURSO mandate to include necessarily include independence as an of Western Sahara is resolved, there is a risk responsibilities to contribute to the promo- option. Russia seems to believe that since of terrorist spill-over activities from Algeria tion and protection of human rights. Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara and Mauritania. has not been recognised by the International A final issue which is likely to be unspoken but Court of Justice in its 1975 advisory opinion, UN Documents in the back of many Council members’ minds self-determination must include all options Latest Security Council Resolution is the fact that similar issues arise in both for the people of Western Sahara including the Kosovo and Western Sahara dossiers. • S/RES/1720 (31 October 2006) rolled independence. South Africa seems to share over the MINURSO mandate for an Council and Wider Dynamics a similar position. additional six months. During consultations before the last exten- France and the US seem to believe that it Latest Secretary-General’s Report sion of MINURSO’s mandate in October, would be helpful for Morocco to present its Denmark and Argentina reportedly wanted • S/2006/817 (16 October 2006) plan. This plan, or some variant of it, might to include a provision on the situation of Selected Letters to the President of the then become a basis for renewed negotia- human rights in Western Sahara. These Council tions between the parties, if Polisario can were described in a confidential report by be persuaded to reconsider its position. • S/2007/55 (31 January 2007) and the UN High Commissioner for Human However, the US is unlikely to support the S/2007/56 (5 February 2007) was an Rights referred to in the last MINURSO plan to the point of imposing it on Polisario exchange of letters between the presi- report. This report, which was leaked and is as it believes that it has to be acceptable to dent of the Council and the available on the internet, revealed severe both parties. Secretary-General on the appointment cases of violations by Morocco in Western of Julian Harston as the new Special Sahara and breaches of freedom of asso- In the light of all the above it is not surpris- Representative for Western Sahara ciation, movement, expression and ing that there are differences on how to and Head of MINURSO. assembly by Polisario in the Tindouf refu- deal with the MINURSO mandate. The US Other Related Documents gee camps in Algeria. may continue to toy with the idea of with- • A/1514(XV) (14 December 1960) Dec- drawing support for a renewal of MINUSRO Morocco, Polisario and others such as laration on the Granting of as a lever to compel the parties to negoti- France were unwilling to go beyond a sim- ate. Other members are hesitant about this Independence to Colonial Countries ple rollover of MINURSO, so this provision and may be opposed to a total withdrawal and Peoples was not included. Another proposal that the of the force. • Advisory Opinion of the International Council should urge the parties to launch Court of Justice (16 October 1975) negotiations without preconditions was Despite differing positions, there is a con- also resisted by both parties and Algeria. sensus that previous Council principles For historical background and a fuller list of should not change: documents, please refer to our January 2006 Forecast.
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 13 Other Relevant Facts Russia denied this. A fact-finding team com- A major concern will be achieving a prising representatives of UNOMIG, Georgia smooth mandate renewal. In January Special Representative of the Secretary- and Abkhazia and the Commonwealth of 2006, Russia’s objections to traditional General Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping language reaffirming Georgian sover- Julian Harston (UK) force was sent to the Upper Kodori Valley on eignty and territorial integrity led to a Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy 13 March. Initial evidence suggests that two-month technical roll-over. In October Russian gunships may have been involved. the renewal resolution required complex Peter van Walsum (Netherlands) negotiations, and the Group of Friends Abkhazia held a parliamentary election on 4 MINURSO Force Commander was clearly divided for some time. This March but failed to form a government when Major General Kurt Mosgaard (Denmark) month, there will be little time between the only 18 members were elected in the 35- release of the Secretary-General’s report Size and Composition of Mission seat parliament. Runoff elections were held (31 July 2006) and Council discussions, which could fur- on 18 March. Although recognised by Russia ther complicate negotiations. • Authorised strength: 231 military some, including the US, Georgia and the personnel and six police officers EU, regard the elections as illegitimate. A more substantive issue is Georgia’s • Strength as of 31 January 2007: 215 continued request for international Sporadic violence continues. On 5 January, total uniformed personnel, including peacekeepers to replace CIS forces. But one policeman was killed and another 28 troops, four police officers, 183 there is little appetite in the Council to take wounded in an attack on the Georgian vil- military observers up this issue. lage of Ganmukhur. UNOMIG condemned Key Troop Contributing Countries the attack, stressed the need for both sides An issue in the back of many minds will be Malaysia, Egypt, Russia, France, Ghana, to cooperate to prevent further violence and comparisons between Abkhazia and the China, Honduras increased the number and frequency of Council’s upcoming decisions on Kosovo. Cost patrols. However, at press time, UNOMIG Russia maintains that if Kosovo is given 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $44.94 had participated in only two joint patrols independence then others seeking self rule million with CIS forces in the Kodori Valley since should be able to follow. Georgia says the October. Joint patrolling is an important ele- Kosovo comparison is invalid. But clearly Useful Additional Sources ment in determining what is happening in some in Abkhazia might see Council- n The United Nations and Western Sahara: the Kodori Valley and requires cooperation approved independence in Kosovo as a A Never-Ending Affair by Anna Theofilo- with the Georgian authorities. green light to take that route. poulou, United States Institute of Peace, On 12-13 January in Geneva, the Group Special Report 166, July 2006 Council and Wider Dynamics of Friends (France, Germany, Russia, the Most members prefer to focus on maintain- UK, the US and, in New York, Slovakia) met ing the status quo and ensuring the security Georgia with representatives from Georgia and situation does not deteriorate. When the Abkhazia. The two parties were urged to mandate was last renewed, some members Expected Council Action engage on security issues in the northwest questioned Georgia’s intentions after it The Council is expected to renew the man- and cooperate to reduce tensions. Both sides launched a special operation in the Kodori date of the United Nations Observer indicated willingness to move forward. Valley. However, now most members have Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) which a more positive assessment of the Georgian Options expires on 15 April. position. Some new members like South The most likely option is a mandate renewal Africa and Indonesia are paying special By 3 April, the Council should receive the for six months. Possible, though less likely, attention to the issue of territorial integrity. Secretary-General’s report on the situation is a shorter period to put pressure on the in Abkhazia. It expects to be briefed by the parties to make greater progress. Another Underlying Problems Secretary-General’s Special Representa- option is for the Council to request the Sec- Tens of thousands of people were displaced tive on Georgia, Jean Arnault, on 10 April. retary-General to propose ways of bringing from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the The report is expected to cover steps taken about a comprehensive political solution. early 1990s. While the Georgian govern- to meet the provisions of resolution 1716, ment has been developing an internally Key Issues which expressed concern about Georgian displaced persons (IDPs) strategy, there The short-term main issue is the lack of con- actions in the Kodori Valley. was no significant repatriation to Abkhazia fidence between the two sides which means in 2005-2006. Poor living conditions among that the conditions are not there for a credi- Key Recent Developments IDPs may create unrest in the future. Tense relations between Georgia and ble political process. Sustained dialogue is Russia were further strained when, accord- essential for progress. ing to Georgian officials, three Russian A related issue of concern is continuing vio- helicopters had fired into the Kodori Gorge. lence, which raises the question whether a stronger stand might be necessary.
14 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org UN Documents n Press Statement of the Meeting of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General Latest Security Council Resolution in Geneva on 12-13 February 2007 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT • S/RES/1716 (13 October 2006) Monthly extended UNOMIG’s mandate until 15 April 2007 and expressed concern Somalia APR 2007FORECAST about Georgian action in the Kodori Expected Council Action Valley in July 2006. involving about 3,000 delegates on 16 April. The Council expects the report of the Apparently the agenda will not include Selected Letters Secretary-General on Somalia, due by 20 power-sharing, and it is unclear whether • S/2007/74 (9 February 2007) was April. It is likely to include: UIC members will attend. The Special Rep- the letter from Georgia regarding n developments on an all-inclusive political resentative of the Secretary-General, Georgia’s adherence to the require- process and reconciliation; and François Lonseny Fall, recently called on ments of resolution 1716. n recommendations on the UN’s further members of the Organisation of the Islamic • S/2007/9 (8 January 2007) was the engagement in Somalia, stabilisation and Conference, in particular Yemen, to contrib- letter from Georgia on the attack on reconstruction and possibly the feasibil- ute to efforts to encourage moderate UIC the Georgian Interior Ministry’s check- ity of transition from the AU Mission in members to attend. point near Ganmukhuri. Somalia (AMISOM) to a UN operation. The first contingent of 1,700 Ugandan troops Selected Secretary-General’s Report A Council statement expressing support for operating under AMISOM was deployed on • S/2007/15 (11 January 2007) was the AMISOM and noting the eventual start of 6 March as Ethiopian troops continued to latest Secretary-General’s report. the national reconciliation conference, withdraw. Burundi has pledged about 1,600 scheduled for 16 April, is possible. It seems troops, Nigeria and Ghana 850 each, and For historical background and a more com- unlikely in April, however, that members will Malawi an unknown number. AU Peace and plete list of documents please see our want to take up the issue of authorising Security Commissioner Said Djinnit report- January, March, July and October 2006 AMISOM’s transition to a UN force. edly stated in early March that AMISOM Forecasts and the 12 October 2006 would remain in Somalia for “five, six or Update. The sanctions committee awaits the mid- term briefing by the Monitoring Group in seven months, and it would be followed by a Other Relevant Facts late April. After some delay, it is possible larger United Nations operation.” Special Representative of the Secretary- that the committee will also hold an Concern remains about AMISOM’s future General and Head of Mission exchange of views between the Monitoring and, in particular, its exit strategy. Volatile Group and states identified in the Group’s Jean Arnault (France) operating conditions, the lack of positive reports as having violated the arms prospects for national reconciliation in the UNOMIG: Size and Composition embargo. short run and regional divisions on • Authorised strength as of 31 January AMISOM’s deployment (in particular 2007: 139 total uniformed personnel, Key Recent Developments Insurgent attacks continued in March, lead- Eritrea’s misgivings about the operation) including 127 military observers and seem to have increased perceptions that 12 police ing some 40,000 residents of Mogadishu to flee violence in the capital and prompting AU forces are a partial, pro-TFG presence. • Key troop contributors: Germany, The powerful Hawiye clan, one of the lead- Pakistan and Bangladesh widespread criticism of human rights viola- tions committed by all sides. In early March, ing groups in the Mogadishu area, has Duration the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) announced its opposition to the TFG and August 1993 to present announced a plan to stabilise Mogadishu in the AMISOM presence. Cost thirty days, but scepticism remains. Observers have noted with concern 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $33.38 Ethiopian, TFG forces and, more recently, AMISOM’s loose command-and-control million (gross) AMISOM contingents have been targeted in structures and its lack of unified command. The AU issues only guidelines to national Other Facts attacks. Media reports have suggested that contingents serving in AMISOM. Size of CIS troops: about 1,800 Russian these attacks were perpetrated by remnants troops of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and Against the backdrop of the recent attacks, warlords seeking to regain territorial control some AU members have apparently been Useful Additional sources and discredit the TFG. consulting on the possibility of a change in n Georgia: IDPs’ Living Conditions Remain In consultations on 13 March, the Council strategy. Ugandan President Yoweri Musev- Miserable as National Strategy Is Being expressed concern with the attacks and eni recently said that Ugandan troops Developed Internal Displacement Moni- underlined the need for the Somali political serving under AMISOM will engage in train- toring Centre, Norwegian Refugee process to be as representative and inclu- ing Somali forces, but that they will not Council, September 2006 (http://www. sive as possible. forcibly disarm militias. internal-displacement.org) The TFG unveiled plans to hold a national reconciliation conference with AU support
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 15 Options future and establishing a credible political November 1994 The Council decided to ter- Options include: process. Council discussions in March minate UNOSOM II by March 1995. n authorising AMISOM’s transition to a UN focused more on the establishment of a October 1993 18 US Rangers were killed force. This option seems unlikely at this credible political process as a key condition and mutilated, 75 were wounded. The US point in light of recent security develop- for security. They seem to have crystallised announced withdrawal from Somalia by ments and the prospects for national around the need for broad-based national March 1994. reconciliation; reconciliation, particularly including moder- n signalling that the authorisation of a UN ate UIC members. June 1993 Pakistani troops were attacked, force is likely to be affected by the results 24 were killed. Positions on the transfer from AMISOM to a of a credible, all-inclusive national confer- UN operation are unclear. African members, ence, including power-sharing and March 1993 UNOSOM II was established. the US and others such as Indonesia seem security arrangements; likely to continue to push for transition. December 1992 The Council authorised n delaying a decision on transition and UNITAF. focusing on strengthening UN peace Other members may continue to be reluc- support activities short of a peacekeep- tant to authorise the transfer. They are likely April 1992 UNOSOM I and a sanctions com- ing operation and closely monitoring to be concerned with the lack of security mittee were established. developments on the political process and absence of a political environment January 1992 The Council imposed an arms and AMISOM; and conducive to UN peacekeeping, in particu- embargo. n imposing targeted sanctions against lar a political process with a good prospect peace-spoilers (if any are identified). of success. 1991 Civil war broke out; Somaliland declared independence. Key Issues There seems to be no momentum for The key issue for Council members is how creating a targeted sanctions list. Some Other Relevant Facts best to encourage an all-inclusive political members, in particular the US and UK, Special Representative of the Secretary- process including power-sharing. A related appear to be uncomfortable with putting General concern is the lack of clarity on the upcom- emphasis on violations of the embargo, ing national conference’s agenda, especially and prefer a broader focus on reconcilia- François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) the possibility that power-sharing may not be tion and security. Chairman of the Sanctions Committee discussed. Another is the TFG’s apparent Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa) reluctance to include UIC elements in the UN Documents reconciliation process and to make positions Selected Security Council Resolutions Useful Additional Sources in the government and parliament available n Africa: Confronting Complex Threats by • S/RES/1744 (20 February 2007) for an eventual power-sharing deal. Kwesi Aning, International Peace Acad- authorised AMISOM. emy, March 2007 The second issue is AMISOM’s lack of suf- • S/RES/733 (23 January 1992) ficient troops and funding and its loose imposed the arms embargo. command-and-control structures, which Latest Secretary-General’s Report raises questions about AMISOM’s long- • S/2007/115 (28 February 2007) Liberia term viability. Latest Monitoring Group’s Report Expected Council Action The third issue is whether—and when— • S/2006/913 (21 November 2006) The Council is expected to review Liberia AMISOM should become a UN operation. diamond sanctions by 20 April. A briefing There are related concerns that the transi- Historical Background by the chair of the Liberia Sanctions Com- tion, without a political process in place, February 2007 The Council authorised mittee (1521 Committee) is likely. Preceding may reduce pressure on the TFG to move AMISOM. the review, the Committee expects a brief- towards broadly-based reconciliation. ing by the Panel of Experts. The Kimberly December 2006-January 2007 Ethiopian Process is also expected to inform the Other issues are: and TFG forces overran the UIC. Committee of its assessment of Liberia’s n guaranteeing the delivery of humanitar- progress towards joining the Kimberly Pro- ian assistance; and October-November 2006 The UIC encircled cess Certification Scheme. Depending on n addressing the regional dimension of the the TFG at its sole outpost, Baidoa. Ethio- these reports, the Council may choose to situation in Somalia, especially the move- pian troops began amassing along the take action ranging from a press statement ment of refugees, arms and combatants, border. encouraging Liberia’s further progress to a and related violations of the arms 25 September 2006 The UIC took control of resolution lifting the sanctions prior to their embargo. Kismayo. current expiration in June. Council Dynamics Early June 2006 The UIC seized control of Key Recent Developments Until recently, Council members have Mogadishu and Jowhar. In its December 2006 report, the Panel of focused primarily on balancing the impera- Experts said that while progress continued tives of improving security in the immediate 10 October 2004 The TFG was estab- in Liberia, the country was “not yet in a lished.
16 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org position to demonstrate the internal controls Key Issues necessary for the Kimberly Process Certifi- Considering the role that diamonds have cation Scheme” and that lifting diamond played in fuelling conflict in the region, the SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT sanctions, as imposed by resolution 1521, key issue for the Council will be to ensure Monthly was not warranted. The Panel pointed out that Liberia establishes a transparent and that certain components, such as a diamond verifiable certificate of origin regime to APR 2007FORECAST valuation scheme, were still missing and enable it to join the Kimberly Process Certi- that other components required stronger fication Scheme. and set up the Sanctions Committee, leadership from the government—particu- requires a report every ninety days. larly the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Council Dynamics No Council action is expected unless there Energy—to function coherently in a durable Members generally agree that compliance is a major setback in the six-party talks such and credible fashion. with resolution 1521 is necessary before sanctions are lifted. The findings of the as failure by North Korea to meet the mid- Having considered the Panel’s findings, the Panel of Experts as well as the Kimberley April deadline for shutting down its Council on 20 December 2006 adopted Process appear to carry much weight. Yongbyon reactor. resolution 1731, renewing diamond sanc- Key Recent Developments tions for six months with a review after four Underlying Problems In February the six-party talks among the months. This was intended to allow the Liberia’s fragile stability continues to be US, Russia, South Korea and North Korea Liberian government sufficient time to meet threatened by disenchanted ex-combatants, produced a breakthrough. On 13 February the benchmark set in resolution 1521 for youth unemployment and problems with Pyongyang agreed to close its Yongbyon lifting of sanctions by establishing a the rule of law. reactor within sixty days, in return for 50,000 transparent and internationally verifiable UN Documents tons of fuel aid or equivalent economic aid. certificate of origin regime for trade in Libe- It also agreed to discuss with the other par- rian rough diamonds with a view toward Selected Security Council Resolutions ties a list of its nuclear programmes. joining the Kimberly Process. • S/RES/1731 (20 December 2006) renewed diamond sanctions for six Working groups were set up under the Resolution 1731 requested the Panel of months. February agreement to consider denucle- Experts to report to the Council through the • S/RES/1689 (20 June 2006) renewed arisation of the Korean Peninsula, Sanctions Committee by 6 June and pro- sanctions. normalisation of DPRK-US relations, nor- vide it with informal updates in the meantime. • S/RES/1647 (20 December 2005) malisation of DPRK-Japan relations, The resolution also requested that the Panel renewed sanctions. economic and energy cooperation and a undertake a follow-up assessment mission • S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) Northeast Asia peace and security mecha- to Liberia and neighbouring countries to established the 1521 Committee, nism. The US and Japan working groups investigate implementation of resolution requested the appointment of a Panel began bilateral discussions. In March the 1521, but at this time no travel appears to of Experts and established the sanc- US/North Korean talks resolved outstand- be planned. tions regime. ing issues relating to DPRK funds frozen in At press time, the Panel’s evaluation Latest Secretary-General’s Report a Macau bank. The Japan-DPRK discus- remains unclear. Considering the remain- sions on the question of abducted Japanese • S/2007/151 (15 March 2007) was the ing challenges that the report of the Panel of nationals made no progress. latest report on the UN mission in Experts described in December, it is possi- Liberia. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei ble that Liberia does not yet meet the criteria visited North Korea on 13 March to discuss set in resolution 1521 and that lifting of the Latest Report of the Panel of Experts the return of inspectors (expelled by North sanctions is not yet warranted. But this • S/2006/976 (13 December 2006) Korea in 2002) and monitoring of the shut- remains to be seen. For background and a more complete list of down of the Yongbyon reactor. Options documents, please consult our October and The sixth round of six-party talks on 19 Depending on the findings of the Panel of December 2006 and March 2007 Forecasts. March in Beijing reviewed progress made in Experts and the information received from the working groups and next steps. the Kimberley Process, the Council may choose one of the following options. All UN member states were required by n If the benchmarks set in resolution 1521 North Korea resolution 1718 to report to the Council by have been achieved, the Council may Expected Council Action 14 November on implementation of the adopt a resolution lifting Liberia’s dia- The Sanctions Committee on the Demo- resolution. By mid-March only about sev- mond sanctions. cratic People’s Republic of Korea (the enty countries and the EU had reported. n If progress is substantial, but still lacking DPRK, or North Korea) will give its second While the Sanctions Committee was able to some essential elements, the Council briefing to the Council in April. Resolution speedily adopt lists of prohibited trade may opt for a supportive message to the 1718, which in October expressed grave items in nuclear, chemical and biological Liberian government in the form of a concern over North Korea’s nuclear test press statement.
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 17 weapons, work on negotiating standard UN Documents Key Recent Developments guidelines for the conduct of its work has BINUB commenced work on 1 January. In been delayed. At this point, no Council Selected Security Council Resolutions a press statement on 21 December 2006, member state has proposed that any enti- • S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) the Council stressed the office’s critical ties or individuals be designated for targeted expressed grave concern over North role during the peace consolidation phase. sanctions. Korea’s nuclear test, imposed sanc- The Council noted that despite progress, tions and set up a Sanctions many challenges remain, especially with Options Committee. regard to: The most likely option is that the Council will • S/RES/1695 (15 July 2006) con- n the rule of law; be briefed by the Sanctions Committee demned North Korea’s launch of n human rights; and chairman, Ambassador Marcello Spatafora ballistic missiles. n the implementation of the Comprehen- of Italy, and take no further action. Presidential Statement sive Ceasefire Agreement. Key Issues • S/PRST/2006/41 (6 October 2006) BINUB replaced the UN Operation in The only practical issue for the Council at was the statement expressing concern Burundi (ONUB), the peacekeeping mis- this stage is how the Sanctions Committee over North Korea’s declaration that it sion whose mandate expired on 31 should carry forward its mandate without would conduct a nuclear test. December 2006. Outstanding peace and jeopardising progress of the six-party talks. Selected Letter security issues at that time involved delays with the implementation of the Ceasefire But a key issue on the minds of members • S/2006/481 (4 July 2006) was the Agreement and the refusal of the Forces will be whether North Korea will fulfil its com- letter from Japan requesting a meet- Nationales de Libération (FNL) to join the mitments to shutdown the reactor. ing of the Council after North Korea ceasefire monitoring team. The AU Special launched ballistic missiles. Council and Wider Dynamics Task Force, set up under the Ceasefire China and the US are working together on Other Agreement, will now provide security for this issue in the Council and appear to have • S/AC49/2006/48 through returning FNL commanders and combat- similar goals for the six-party talks. S/AC49/2007/20 were letters submit- ants. A South African battalion, previously The Sanctions Committee has met regularly ting reports from UN member states deployed with ONUB, has remained under since October. While members agree on on implementing resolution 1718. the AU force. Recently, South Africa the need to carry out its mandate, some • Briefing to the UN Security Council by approved an AU request to deploy an addi- have felt a special need for caution over the Ambassador Peter Burian of Slovakia tional 1,100 troops. last few months to avoid any risk of jeopard- and 2006 Chair of the Sanctions Committee, 11 January 2007 (http:// Five of seven suspects (including former ising the six-party talks which were at a very President Domitien Ndayizeye) arrested in delicate stage. This led to unusually pro- www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/ selc_docs.shtml) August for allegedly planning to kill Presi- tracted discussions on the Committee’s dent Pierre Nkurunziza and overthrow the guidelines and other matters. It is likely this Useful Additional Source government, were acquitted in January. dynamic will influence Committee delibera- n Press Statement on the Fifth Round of the (There had been widespread international tions through April. Six-Party Talks, 13 February 2007 concern about the government’s handling Underlying Problems of the alleged coup, in particular allegations For historical background please refer to our The World Food Programme said that 37 of torture used to obtain confessions.) November 2006 and January Forecasts. percent of children under age six and one- PBC Developments third of women are malnourished. South Korea is resuming fertiliser shipments that The Peacebuilding Commission has may help curb food shortages in 2008, but Burundi started a series of informal thematic dis- the drop in foreign aid last year makes cussions to develop an integrated starvation in the north a concern. The Expected Council Action peacebuilding strategy for Burundi by suspension of UNDP projects, after criti- The Council is expected to consider the mid-2007. The peacebuilding strategy cism of the organisation for making Secretary-General’s first report on the UN would become the principal framework payments to DPRK in hard currency and hir- Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). The for Burundi’s relationship with the PBC, ing government officials, may have an Secretary-General’s Executive Representa- recording the commitments made by the impact on various projects covering eco- tive for Burundi, Youssef Mahmoud, may parties and serving as a type of compact. nomic and social development, environment also brief the Council. No formal action is It will provide benchmarks by which the and food management. expected, but a press statement is a possi- PBC can monitor progress and identify ble outcome. BINUB’s mandate expires on peacebuilding gaps at the country level. 31 December.
18 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org The discussions are open to relevant UN Documents stakeholders (civil society, the private Selected Resolutions sector and international actors) and will SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT focus on issues in the priority areas iden- • S/RES/1719 (25 October 2006) Monthly tified in the December country-specific established BINUB. • S/RES/1606 (20 June 2005) requested APR 2007 meetings. The first thematic discussion FORECAST for Burundi on 27 February focused on the Secretary-General to start negotia- good governance. tions on transitional justice Upcoming Issues in mechanisms in Burundi. Sanctions Committees A Burundi donors’ roundtable was held Selected Secretary-General’s Report on 14-15 March in Bujumbura. The PBC’s Somalia Sanctions (751 Committee) • S/2006/994 (18 December 2006) was next formal country-specific meeting on See Somalia brief in this issue, page 15. the last report on ONUB. Burundi and its next visit to the country are expected to take place in April. Selected Letters Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions (1267 Committee) • S/2006/1020 (18 December 2006) was The Committee is expected to take up the Key Issues the letter from the Secretary-General review, required under its recently revised The main issue for the Council is that peace appointing Youssef Mahmoud as his guidelines, of names on the Consolidated consolidation in Burundi continues to move Executive Representative for Burundi List that have not been updated in four or forward. With the recent political changes and head of BINUB. more years. The Secretary-General will pro- and developments on the Ceasefire Agree- • S/RES/1606 (20 June 2005) requested vide the Committee with the names. Also, ment, it appears that progress is being the Secretary-General to start negotia- the Committee may conduct discussions of made. Challenges remain, particularly in tions on transitional justice the report to the Council regarding its human rights, good governance, and the mechanisms in Burundi. rule of law. The Council will watch develop- responses to recommendations contained ments closely, but in first instance will rely Other Selected Document in the Monitoring Team’s report. • SC/8921 (21 December 2006) was on the Peacebuilding Commission to Liberia Sanctions (1521 Committee) address these issues. the press statement commending See Liberia brief in this issue, page 16. ONUB for its work and stressing the Members will be looking to see whether challenges remaining for Burundi. DRC Sanctions (1533 Committee) BINUB is meeting benchmarks set out in The Committee will review the Secretary- the 14 August addendum to the Secretary- Other Relevant Facts General’s report (S/2007/68) of the potential General’s June report. These include the economic, humanitarian and social impact implementation of the political and military Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BINUB on the population of the Democratic Repub- aspects of the Ceasefire Agreement, the lic of the Congo of measures recommended establishment of a human rights commis- Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia) in the Group of Experts report dated 18 July sion, and the creation of a comprehensive Size and Composition of Mission 2006 (S/2006/525). In a separate meeting in civilian disarmament program. (1 January 2007) April the chair and possibly another mem- • Total authorised strength: 448 Council Dynamics ber of the Group is likely to brief the personnel (141 international civilian Council members agreed on BINUB’s man- Committee. personnel, 235 local civilian date without much difficulty. Unless the personnel, seven military observers, Democratic People’s Republic of situation deteriorates, Council members 14 police and 51 UN volunteers) Korea Sanctions (1718 Committee) are likely to adopt a “hands-off” approach, • Strength as of 1 January 2007: 641 See the North Korea brief in this issue, page particularly given the Council’s heavy personnel (242 international civilian 17. agenda in April. personnel, 308 local civilian person- Underlying Problems nel, no military observers, 11 police Heavy rains last December severely affected and eighty UN volunteers) agricultural production, leaving Burundi on Duration the verge of a food crisis, which could January 2007 to present threaten stability. Recommended Budget UN-Burundi negotiations to establish a 33.1 million Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Special Court Chamber have not moved For background and a more complete list of beyond a preliminary stage since the Coun- documents, please consult our March, cil made its request in resolution 1606 of June, September and December 2006 June 2005, while challenges in the area of Monthly Forecasts and our 23 October 2006 transitional justice and human rights viola- Update. tions appear to have increased.
Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 19 Notable Dates for April Important Dates over the Reports Due in April Relevant Document Horizon 3 April SG quarterly report on UNOMIG (UN Observer n The Council is tentatively planning visit- Mission in Georgia) S/RES/1716 ing missions for 2007. West Africa mid April SG quarterly report on UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) S/RES/1714 (including Côte d’Ivoire), Timor-Leste, mid April SG semi-annual report on MINURSO (UN Mission Central Africa and the Middle East have for the Referendum in Western Sahara) S/RES/1720 all been discussed as possibilities. 19 April SG semi-annual report on resolution 1559 n Human Rights Council elections are (Lebanon/Syria) S/PRST/2004/36 scheduled for May and its fifth session is 20 April SG report on progress by Somalia’s Transitional scheduled for 5-11 June. Federal Institutions toward an all-inclusive political n A Council open debate on Protection of process and on the recent Technical Assessment Mission S/RES/1744 Civilians is expected in June. 23 April SG quarterly report on UNMIN is likely to be discussed n The Special Court for Sierra Leone has in May (UN Mission in Nepal) S/RES/1740 reported that Charles Taylor’s trial at The 30 April SG regular report on UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia Hague will begin in June. and Eritrea) S/RES/1741 n Election of Nepal’s constituent assembly 30 April SG regular report on BINUB (UN Integrated Office in is expected in June. Burundi) S/RES/1719 n Parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste 30 April SG monthly report on Darfur S/RES/1590 are expected in June. April 2007 Mandates Expire Relevant Document n Elections in Sierra Leone are expected 15 April UNOMIG S/RES/1716 in July. 15 April MONUC (UN Mission in the DRC) S/RES/1742 n The Secretary-General’s next reports on 30 April UNMIS S/RES/1714 the thematic issues of Protection of Civil- 30 April MINURSO S/RES/1720 ians in Armed Conflict and Women, Peace April 2007 Other Important Dates & Security are expected by October. n Resolution 1721 called for presidential 20 March-3 April Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, will visit elections in Côte d’Ivoire by 31 October. Sudan, Chad and the CAR. He is likely to brief the Council when he returns. But the 4 March Ouagadougou agree- 23 March-2 April The Secretary-General will visit the Middle East (Egypt, Israel/Palestine, ment between the parties calls for Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) and participate in the Arab League Summit in elections to be held within ten months. Riyadh on 28-29 March. He will brief the Council upon his return. Included n Local elections in the DRC are expected in these early April discussions with the Council will be the Secretary-Gen- in the second half of 2007. eral’s report on resolution 1701 (Lebanon) which was postponed from 27 n Parliamentary elections in Kosovo are March to early April (S/2007/147). expected in late 2007. 9 April Presidential elections in Timor-Leste 13 April Resumption of peace talks between the Ugandan government and the n A workshop on security sector reform, a LRA have tentatively been scheduled to take place in Juba. joint initiative of Slovakia and South Africa, 16 April A Somali national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu is being planned. is being planned for later in 2007 in Africa. 17-18 April A UNHCR-sponsored international conference at the ministerial-level on the situation of Iraqi displacement will be held in Geneva. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT STAFF 20 April The Security Council will review the Liberian diamond sanctions Colin Keating, Executive Director Joanna Weschler, Director of Research (S/RES/1731). Curtis A. Ward, Senior Research Consultant 30 April A donor conference for the Iraq Compact is being planned. Anne-Gaëlle Claude, Research Analyst Also expected in April: Fernanda Rafaela Fernandes, Research Analyst • The North Korea Sanctions Committee will report to the Council in early April (S/RES/1718). Amanda Roberts, Programme Coordinator • The Panel of Experts mid-term briefing to the Sudan Sanctions Committee originally expected in Shamala Kandiah, Research Consultant late March may be pushed to mid-April. Brian Lockstone, Communications Consultant • The Somalia Sanctions Committee is expected to receive the Monitoring Group’s mid-term briefing Nicole Richards, Administrative Assistant in late April (S/RES/1724). • The preliminary proposal from the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process Security Council Report is published with for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, was submitted to the Security Council in March. It is expected to be the support of the Government of Canada, introduced by Ahtisaari in early April. the Government of Norway, The Rocke- • The Peacebuilding Commission’s next round of country-specific meetings are expected in April for feller Foundation, the John D. and Catherine Burundi and in April or May for Sierra Leone. T. MacArthur Foundation and the William • Parliamentary elections in Chad are scheduled for April. and Flora Hewlett Foundation. 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